ML20008F483

Technical Evaluation of Electrical,Instrumentation & Control Design Aspects of Override of Containment Purge Valve Isolation & Other Engineered Safety Feature Signals for Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3

ML20008F483
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/31/1981
From:	Broderick N, Cooper J, Radosevic J EG&G, INC.
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20008F479	List: ML20008F478 ML20008F481 ML20008F483
References
CON-FIN-A-0231, CON-FIN-A-231 EGG-1183-4180, NUDOCS 8104210066
Download: ML20008F483 (11)

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Energy Weasurements Group yg San Ramon Op.orgtlons I

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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE ELECTRICAL, x

INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL DESIGN ASPECTS gro:

OF THE

'-M OVERRIDE OF CONTAINMENT PURGE YALVE ISOLATION AND OTHER 5NGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FOR THE l

CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT 3

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sy (CCCKET No. 50 302)

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by J. H. Cooper jq

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J. R. Racosev1c Depar men. Manager

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irq hicnolas i/irocer cK EM De:artment Manager 1

Werw Pe formed for t.awrence t.ivermore National Latscratory under U.S.G eoartment of Energy 8104 210 0Llo

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.~9t ABSTRACT

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This report documents the technical evaluation af the electrical, instrumentation, and control design aspects of containment purge valve isolation and other engineered safety feature signals for the Crystal River T

nuclear power plant, Unit 3.

The review criteria are based on IEEE M

Std-279-1971 requirements for the safety signals to all purge and ventila-tien isolation valve:.

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FCRENCRD This re;ce is supplied as part of the Selected Electrical

,e str= e nt ati en, and Control Systems Issues (SEICSI) Program being con-h ::ed for the U.

S., Nuclear Regulatory Carmis sion, Office of Nuclear 9,g' Rea::ce Regulation, Division of Operating Reac:ces, by Lawrence Livemnre

,a ora:ory, Field Test Systems Division of the E;ectronics Engineerin9

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IIf The U. S. Nuclear Regula cry Cecnission funded the work under an ju horizaticn entitled "El ect rical, Instr =entaticn and Con:r:1 System

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The work was performed by EG&G, Inc., Energy Nasurements Group

ar namen Operations, for Lawrence Livemcre Labora: cry under U. S. Depar -

ren: 0* :nergy centract number CE-ACCE-76NV01183.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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. 4 Page 1.

INTRODUCTIOt 1

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EVALUATION OF CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PCWER PLANT, UNIT 3 3

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2.1 Review Criteria.

3 2.2 Containment Ventilation Isolation Circuits

,y Design Cescripticn.

4 2.3 Containment Ventilation Isolation System Design Evaluaticn.

5 2.4 Other Engineered Safety Feature System Circuits.

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REFERENCES 9

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U TECHNG L EVALUATICN CF THE ELECTRICAL,

.9 INSTRUMENTATION, AND CONTROL CES*GN OVERRIDE ASPECTS CF CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATICN AND

]W OTHER ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE SIGNALS FCR THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PCWER PLANT, UNIT 3 da -

(Docket No. 50-302)

J. H. C00per ip E3&G, Inc., Energy Measurements Group, San Ramen Operations W

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INTRCCUCTION 1

W h4 Several instances have been reported where automatic closure of

.e contai=en ventilation / purge valves wculd not have occurred because ne safety actuation signals were eitner manually overridden or blocked pw3 a y1 c.ri ng ne m al plant opera:1 ns.

These events resulted fr:xa procedural n

. ace;uacies, design deficiencies, and lack of prc;;er management c:ntrols.

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~,ese events al so brought into questien the mecnanical operatility of the I

c:nt ainment isolation valves themselves.

These events were determined by ne U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccenission (NRC) to be an Abncmal Occurrence l!

(p72-5) and were, accordingly, reported to the U. S. Congress.

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LQ As a follow-up on this abncmal occurrence, the NRC staff is reviewing ne electrical override aspects and the mechanical operability aspects of contaiment ourging for all operating power reactors.

On Q

5:vem:er 23,1978, the NRC issued a letter entitled " Containment Purging

~.-ing N0 mal Plant Operation" (Ref.1] :o all boiling water reactor (SWR) a-d pressurized water reactor (PWR) licensees.

In a le::er dated January D, 1379 [Ref. 2], Florida Power Ccrporaticn (FPC), the licensee for the W

Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, Uni 3,

replied to the NRC generic j

It ter.

A meeting was held in Washington en September 11,1979 [Ref. 33

~

e:. :ne NRC staff and EG&G, Inc. (San Ramen 0;erations) personnel.

In a p,

.y Te: er dated January 10,1979 [Ref. 23, the licensee described ne system l'

ss'gn enanges made to Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3.

'N This dccument addresses only the electrical, instrunentation, and

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n:r:1 (EI&0) design aspects of :ne c:ntainment ventilation isolation l

V:) ar.d c:ner engineered safety features (ESFs'..

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EVALUATION CF CRYSTAL RIVER N'JCLEAR POWid PLANT, JNIT 3 i,

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2.1 REVIEJ CRITERIA ps.

Tne primary intent of tnis evaluation is to deter. sine if :ne m

following NRC staff criteria are me for tne safe:y signals to al! purga (Q

and ventilation isolatica valves:

1 (1) Criterion nc.1--In tieping wi:n :ne requirements i O of CC 55 and 56, :ne overr:ctng of cne type of

,M safety actuation signal (e.g., ractation) snould not cause :ne Olocking of any c:ner ty;e of satety c

actua: ion signal (e.g.,

ressure) far : nose valves

na: nave no functi:n

esices containmen:

I isola:icn.

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(2) Criteri:n no. 2--Suf ficien: pnysical features (e.g.,

keyloct swi cnes) are to :e provicec :o J':

f acill: ate acequa:e acministra:1 <e c:ntrols.

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(3) Criterion no. 3-Ine syste:n-level annunciation of l

ne overriccen s a us sn:alc ce r:vice: for every a:wm safety sys;em imcacted wnen any overrice is ac:ive QlW (see d.G. 1.c7).

Incidental to :nis review, :ne folle.ing accitional NdC s;3ff casign :riteria ere usec in ne evalua: ton:

1 (1) Criterion no.

--Diverse signals snculd be pro-F, gy viced to initiate isolation of :ne c:ntainmen:

A ven:11 ati:n system.

5:ecifically, c:ntainment nign radiation, safety injection actuation, anc c:ntainmen; nign pressure (anere ::ntainmen; nign r.ty pressure is not a porticn of sa'ety injec 1cn P

actua:icn) sneuld automatically int: tate CVI.

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' M (2) Cetterien no. 5--Ine instrumenta:ica and c:n rol l W systems or:vided to ini-iate i3F snoulc ce ce.

signec anc :;ualifiec as safety-grace euui?cen:.

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Overr;:e:

ine signal is s-til present, anc 1: is stocue: :n M

cc:er to perfom a func; ion con:rary.o :ne signal.

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Criterien no. 6--ine overriding or reset:ing of 4

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ne isolatica actuation signal snould not causa any valve or dam:er to :nange position.

Critericn 6 in :nis review applies primarily to relatec iSF s/s e s Oe:ause implementation of :nis criterien for ::ntain=en: isola-ton Ijs e:s has :een reviewed oy tne i.esscas Learned Task Force, cased on :ne

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Pt:Or. endations in NUREG C573, Section 2.1.4 [Ref. c].

Aut :a-i valve et;;sitioning u cn reset may :e acceptaste anen contain=en isola:icn is involved; considera ica. vill :e given on a case-by-case easis. A :e::-

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a:i'.i y would se de::encen: upon syste: func:1cn, design intent, and sui:-

1 a:le 0; era:1ng ::rocacures.

2.2 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISULATION CIRCUITS CESIGN UESCR!/i!ON Crystal River Nuclear Power plant, Uni:

3, nas :-c EiF rains N

.1:n can cause isolation of :ne ::ntainment ventila:icn system.

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annei centac s are comoined in a :nc-cut-of-:nree logic for :ne engine-era: safeguares signal, anc are again comoinec :o f:r: an

• UK" closare f meti:n f:r eacn set of valves:

two ector-opera:e: valves ( w/.18 anc 3r L-!- 1C ) ace :=o air-opera:ec valves ( A.ti-1A and Any-10).

ine closure

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Aut::atic Closure (a) dign radiation in :ne rea::ce :uilding (con-er i

tain=ent) 31.

(3)

Hign react:r :uilcing pressere (engineered safe-guares signal)

(2)

Manual Closure (a)

System-level isolati:n s.vit:n P

(D)

Individual valve closure pusneu:::n.

LJ-Eacn valve c:ntrol incluces :ne signal

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r:1 contac:Or.vi:n auxiliary contacts or an air-control valve at:n

';_i, auxiliary seal-in contacts.

Neitner set of valves can be rese: or over-

-i::ar. in :ne c:n:rol logic circuit.

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In :ne case of co;0r-operated valves,.nen a cni:: rec plant n

r :i -i:n cr manual-close pusnout: n or swi :n calls for isolation, :ne

:a::s close.

Closure provides power to :ne m::e c:ntac:or, put ling 1:

ar: :1: sing :ne seal-in : ntacts :na: crive :ne ::c::e until :ne tosec LL..

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soi en is reacned. The limi: sni :n s:::s :ne :::or.

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i;; ing cefinition is given for !ari y f use in :nis evaluan:n:

Rese:: Ine signal nas c: e anc gene, and :ce circui; is :eing Oleare: in cr:er Oc return i: :s :ne ner:21 ::ndi:icn.

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.M If a motor-opera:ed valve is in :ne process of opening anc on d

isolation (close) signal occurs, tne talve will ie.edia:ely s:cp opening i

and reverse to closed.

If :ne ini;.iating signal re: urns to :ne un: ripped concition, tne valve will remain closed.

Status lign s on motor-operated valves indica:e :na :ne valve is eitner open or closed.

An operator can l

reopen tne valve wnen all trips are cleared by pressing :na "3 pen" pusn-p outton.

--a In tne case of air-operated valves, wnen a monitored plant cun.

p-g dition or manual-close pusnoutton or switen calls for isolattun, it inter-y ruots ne power to tne air con

rol valve.

Wnen :ne power to tne air con-trol valve is interrupted, tne control valve closes, tne air supply 15 g

interrupted, and tne purge isolation valve closes of spring action.

If an g

air-operated <alve is in :ne process of opening enc a close signal occurs, it will stop opening and close i:medi a te ly.

If :ne initiating s t e,na l returns to tne untripped candition, the valve will remain closed.

Air-

,E, l coersted valves also nave status lignts to indicate tnat tne volve is 1

-i ei:ner open or closed.

An operator can recoen :ne valve by pressing ne "open* pusnou; ton, wnicn is sealed-in oy an auxiliary contact on tne air w

control valve.

Air pressure opens ne valve agains: :ne valve spring

'g force.

2.3 CUNTAIN

dint Vd.iIILATION ISOLAT!ON 5YS rdA DisIGN iVALUAT!ON Crystal diver Nuc ear Power Plant. Uni:

3, is now purging and m

venting continuously.

ine licensee states tna: :ney nave no overrides anc Q

nat, in :neir coinion, continuous purging is in :ne ces interes: of :ne g

outlic anc of tne employees of /PC.

d Tne con:sincen-ventilarion isolation nas no overrides. and k'*

nerefore, NdC staf f criteria Nos.1, 2, and 3 are no* applicaole.

tq Ine containmen: ventila: ion isolation signal is generated oy nign 4

radiation in :ne reactor building and oy nign reac:ce cuilding pressure.

l Inis design does no: meet tne NdC staff criteria for diverse actuating

,,,,e signals.

Tne licensee sta:ed at :ne meeting in uetneses [xef. JJ anc in a 4-3 le:ter cated Acril 12, iW9 [def. 5], tna a nt;n pressure core cooling inje: ion (HPI) actuation signal will se accad to ventilation isola: ton l

sig als.

Tne licensee stated in :ne le::er of Feocuary lo, 1900 [<e r. b ]

na :ne preliminary installation of :ne diverse isolation mocification is A

seneduled for Feoruary 19, 1930. Wnen :nis is accocolisned i: will sa:isry l

celterion No. 4 YQ Froci tne in formation provided by :ne licensee [xef. /] In re-l sconse :o an NrtC le::er ::a:ed August, 1919 [xef. e], it acpears :na: tne raciation isolation signal is not provided oy sa f ety-g rac.e equipment.;

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nerefore, NRC s:sff cetterion No, b is not sattsfied.

w Reset:ing :ne ac: anion signals canno cause :ne containment

~ 3" isolation signal to cnange s:a:e.

In f act, :nere is no overrice; :nere-

_js fore, valves canno reopen Un:i! :nere is a reques; cy a separa e opera:ce 3

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a::ica of pushing the "cpen" ;ushbutten en each valve, or of cperating the

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" /: system open switch. Criterien No. 6 is, therefore, satisfiM.

2.4 OTiiER ENGINEERED SAFETY SYSTEM CIRCUITS As part of this review, the centairment spray actuation system f

i c a ings were audited.

The licensee also stated that the circuit designs e

r a1 :ne same as the CVI system with respect to resets and overrides.

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Tierefore, the criteria are satisfied.

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CCNCLUSIONS

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The electrical, instr =.entatien, and control design aspects of containment purge valve isolation and other ESF signals for Crystal River M

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3, were evaluated using those design criteria 4

stated in Secticn 2.1 of this report.

We conclude that, with one exception, the CVI system design modifications will bring the CVI circuits design to an acceptable condi-tien.

The single exception is that, the radiatien monitoring equipment does not meet the NRC staff requirement for safety-grade equipment.

The r

mcdification ecmmitted to is to add the nigh pressure injection (HPI) signal to the contaiment ventilation isolation actuation system.

We recommend that all of :ne instrumentation and control systems provided to "I

initiate CVI be designed and qualified as safety-grade equipment.

4 We also conclude that the cther ESF circuit designs discussed m

satisfy the NRC staff criteria.

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M' RiFidiNCES e.d

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MC/DJR letter (A. Sen encer) to FPC, "Contain:nent Purging Ouring t,0rnal Plan: Opera: ion," cated Novencer 23, 1978.

A 2.

F?C letter (W. P. Stewar ) to NRC (R. Reid), "Occte t0-Jud, Cantain-4

.m en Purging During riorma l Plant Operations, Cen:61 diver iiuclear Plant, Uni:

3," dated January 10, 19/9.

]

2.

!U.C meeting dasnington, 9. C., " Crys:al diver.1aclear Po er 5:stion, Unt:

2, Centainment Purge Valve Cesign," (ARC and EG4G), da:ed Se;;ec er 11, 1979.

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U.S.

Nuclear Regulat:ry C c.ission, " Snort-:erm Rec:n::ene n t on of e

Lessons Learnec Task Force," NUREG 0573.

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FJC le :er (W. P. Steaart) to NRC !$i, " Crys:sl Rtver Uni: No. J. ;i S.lle: n /9-UdA,* resaanse :: 1: ems 6, 7, d, 9, 10, 11 and it, ca:ed A:rtl 12, 1979.

s.

F:C le::er (Or. P.

f. daynarc) to NdC

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R.

Cent:n), " Crys al R var Unt: 3, Occus: 50-202, Opers 1ng License No. OPR-/4, NUdfG-U:/$,

"E Sace

-term Lessons Learnec Reconnencations", cated Feorvary 15,19c0.

.J 7.

Telt:ncne c:nference call witn NMC, EG3G; and Florida P0ner C:.npany,

..g Le:t.:er 19,1979.

4

.V.C/DCd ( A. Reid) to FPC, " Request for Additional In for na tion, Con-tainmen; Purge System Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Uni:

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(T AC 10211), Augus: 1979.

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