ML20080C597

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Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys,Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML20080C597
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/22/1983
From:
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20080C592 List:
References
NUDOCS 8308260409
Download: ML20080C597 (7)


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July 22; 1982 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPCRT CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 SEISMIC CUALIFICATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

1. INTRODUCTION

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Since the accident at Three Mile Islano, considerable attention has been focused en the capacility of nuclear power plants to reliaoly removg decay heat. The NRC has recently undertaken Multiplant Action Plan C-14 " Seismic Qualification of AFW Systems" [Ref.1), which is the subject of this evalua-tion.

To implement the first phase of Action Plan C-14, the NRC issued Generic Letter No. 81-14 " Seismic Qualificatan of AFW Systems" [Ref. 2], dated February 10, 1981, to all cperating PhR licensees. This letter requesteo each licensee (1) to conduct a walk-down of non-seismically qualified portions of

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the AFW system and identify deficiencies amenable to simple actions to improve seismic resistance, and (2) to provide design information regaroing the seis-a.ic capability of tne AFW system to facilitate NRC backfit decisions.

The licensee of Crystal River Unit 3 responded with a letter dated July 14, 1981 [Ref. 3]. The licensee's response was founo not to ce complete ano a Request for Acditional Information was issued by the NRC, oated January 7,1982 [Ref. 4]. The licensee provided supplemental. responses in letters dated February 26,1982 [Ref. 5] and April 20,1982 [Ref. 6] .

This report provides a technical evaluation of the information provided in the licensee's responses to the Generic Letter, and includes a recommencation regarding the need for additional analysis and/or upgracing modification of l this plant's AFW system. l 8308260409 830809 PDR ADOCK 05000302-P pm

2. EVALUATION Information provided in licensee's responses included: .

o Specification of the overall seismic capability of the AFW system.

o Identification of AFW system components that are currently non-seismically qualified for SSE.

o Discussion of levels of seismic capability of non-seismically quali-fled components of the AFW system. ,

c Description of the AFW system boundary.

o Status of compliance with seismic related NRC Bulletins and Informa-tion Notices.

o Results of walk-down of non-seismically qualified areas.

o Additionally, a schematic sketch of the AFW system.

o Additionally, description of methocologies ano acceptance criteria for seismically qualified AFW system ccmp,onents, o Adcitionally, results of walk-cown of the seismically qualifiec AFW system areas.

We have reviewed the licensee's responses, and a point-by-point evaluation of licensee's responses against Generic Letter's requirements is providec below.

(1) Seismic Cacability of AFW System Except for those items identified in the following, the AFW system has been cesigned, constructed and maintained to withstand an SSE utilizing methocs and acceptance criteria consistent with that applicable to other safety-related systems in the plant. Presently, those items icentified by the licensee as not being fully seismically qualified are evaluated below:

o Pumos/ Motors - None o Pipina - None o Valves / Actuators - Nona o Power Supplies - In Ref. 5, the licensee provided a partial list which identifies the turbine building motor control center that supplies power to the individual pump discharge valve, concensate s

storage tank suction and main condenser suction valve. However, these valves are prepositioned te be not required for actuation for AFW system operation and are only required for maintenance or trans-fer of suction supply from the condensate storage tank to the non-qualified backup condenser hotwell. We therefore concluce that the turbine building motor control center is not essential to providing the safety function of the AFW system.

Later in Raf. 6, the licensee icentified the remaining non-seismically qualified power supply items but old not evaluate their seismic capability. However, the licensee also stated that such power supplies will be upgraced uncer their overall AFW system up-grace project.

o water Scurce(s) - None o

Initiation / Control Systems - In Ref. 5. the licensee provicea a par-tial list which identifies (a) the automatic actuation and centrol system, and (b) several manual control stations located on a section of the main control board which was not seismically qualified. How-ever, seismically qualified manual flow controls and circuits inde-pendent of the non-nuclear instrumentation (NNI) and integrated con-trol . system (ICS) are provided on a qualified section of the main control board, and hence there is no' seismic related concern.

Later in Ref. 6, the licensee icentified the remaining non-seismically qualified initiation / control system components, but did not evaluate their seismic capability. However, the licensee also stated that initiation / control systems will ce upgraced under their general AFW upgrace project.

o Structures - None Based on our evaluation, those areas of the AFW system jucgeo not to possess an SSE capability are icentified below:

o Pumas / Motors None o Pipino None o Valves / Actuators None o Power Sucolies None*

t o Water Source (s) None o Initiation / Control Systems None

  • a Structures None
  • Note: Current seismic capability unkncwn, but will be upgraded.

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Based on the above evaluation, we conclude that the AFW system will pos-

$ sess an SSE level of seismic capability upon completion of the general upgrace j.

project.

Because the primary water source and supply path is seismically qualified, switchover to a secondary water source is not involved. Additionally, infor-mation regarding the seismic capability of any alternate decay heat removal system is not requireo because the AFW system will have an SSE level of seis-mic capability. .

Regarding the AFW system boundary, with only one exception, all branch lines which are not seismically qualified and are structurally coupled to the AFW system have been analyzec out to a point of three orthogonal restraints such that all transmitted seismic loads have been consicered in the AFW system qualification. The one exception is the AFW steam supply drain tank vent con-nection to the turoine exhaust line. This vent line is currently uncer review by the licensee.

i The licensee stated that tne AFW system was included within the scope of seismic related Bulletins 79-02, 79-04, 79-07, 79-14, 80-11, and IE Informa-tion Notice 80-21.

(2) Walk-Down of Ncn-Seismically Qualified Portions of AFW System A walk-down of the non-seismically qualified areas icentified certain power supply items to be deficient. They include some inadequate cable tray supports at Elevation 95', a clamp missing frcm a cable tray support at Eleva-tion 119', one loose hanger in the cable spreading room, and three loose items in the control complex electrical support room. The licensee will add steel angle braces where necessary, replace the missing clamp, and tighten all loose items. Such corrective actions will be accomplished as part of the overall AFW system upgrade, which is scheduled concurrent with the Crystal River Unit 3 refueling outage in the first half of 1983.

, (3) Additional Information The licensee provided a schematic sketen of the AFW system including the water source, heat sink, suction and discharging lines, major mechanical equipment, connected branch lines, and structures housing and supporting the AFW system.

The licensee also provided information on the methocologies and acceptance criteria that were used in the seismic design of the seismically qualified portions of the AFW system. In aodition, they stated that for floors having

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fundamental frequency less than 25 Hz, the vertical seismic input was taken as two-thircs of the horizontal response specturm for the respective evaluations.

Additionally, the licensee also performeo walk-cown of the seismically qualified areas of the AFW system. Defic'.encies were identified, corrective acticns were pr:pcsec or are to be identified, and the schecule will be c n-sistent with the overall AFW system upgrace as mentioned previously. Results of this walk-down are summarized below:

o Pipina - (a) A 4" stainless steel line tied into with a main steam line at Valve MSV-440 is supported only for ceacweight. Besices, it is not properly attachec to one support and a U-bolt is missing. (b)

A 6 " sump discharge line routed acove AFW system suction line is supported only for deacweight by roc-type hangers. (c) The turoine pump exhaust line acpears to ce supported for ceacweight aniy. (d) A 12" drain line routed to turbine-driven pump is supported for cenc-weight only by rod-type hangers. (e) The suction line from concen-sate hot-well is routed close to the AFW suction line from the con-densate storage tank and there appears to be not enougn clearance between the two lines (f) A portion of the pump recirculation lines may not be acequately cesigned. (g) A line oranching off the turbine pump exhaust line oces not appear on drawings. (h) A lateral re- l straint, designed as removable support to allow future disassemoly, will be added to one of the seal injection lines routed from the top of the turbine-driven pump casing to the Valve EFV-51. (1) One of two silencers hung over the sunction line requires a more adequate

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support. (j) A clamp is missing from the tubing run for pressure instrument EF-2-PI for the pipe rcuting on the motor-driven AFW pump, and it will be replaced.

o Primary Water Source ano Supply Path - (a) Some new lines have been connected to the condensate storage tank which must be reviewed for

. sufficient seismic support. (b) The neutralizing tank appears too close to the condensate storage tank. A review of the neutralizing tank's fcundation will be done and, if necessary, a barrier cetween ,

the two tanks may have to be adced.

3. CCNCLUSIONS l

The information centained in licensee's responses to Generic Letter 81-14 is insufficient for us to cetermine the present level of seismic capability of i I

some areas of the existing AFW system. The licensee has stated that tne AFW system will be upgraded under the general upgrade project. The walk-down con-ducted by the licensee identified some deficiencies and corrective actions were planned with completion cates provided. Based on submitted information, we concluded.that the AFW system will possess an SSE level of seismic capaoil-ity upon completion of the on-going general AFW system upgrace project. In conclusion, we recommend that no further action be initiated regaroing re- '

analysis and/or upgrading of the AFW system of this plant under NRC multiplant Action C-14.

REFERENCES

1. D. G. Eisenhut, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, memorandum to H. R.

Centon, "Multiplant Action Plan C-14: Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems," February 20, 1981.

2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter No. 81-14 to all operating pressurizeo water reactor licensees, " Seismic Qualification of Auxiliary Feedwater Systems," February 10, 1981. .
3. P. Y. Baynard, Florida Power Corp. , letter to D. G. Eisenhut of U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission, July 14, 1981.

4. J. F. Stolz, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to D. G. Marais of Florica Power Corp., " Request for Aoditional Information on Seismic Qualificaticn of the Auxiliary Feec*ater System, Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3, January 7, 1982.
5. D. G. Mardis, Florida Power Corp., letter to J. F. Stolz of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 26, 1982.
6. O. G. Hardis, Florida Pcwer Corp., letter to J. F. Stolz of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmissicn, April 20, 1982.

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