IR 05000346/1992017

Insp Rept 50-346/92-17 on 921027-1215.Violations Noted,But Not Cited.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety, Surveillance & Maint

ML20127A602
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	12/31/1992
From:	Lanksbury R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127A601	List: IR 05000346/1992017 ML20127A597
References
50-346-92-17, NUDOCS 9301120017
Download: ML20127A602 (11)

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V. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMMISSION REGION 111 Report No. 50-346/92017(DRP)

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Oocket No. 50-346 Operating License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza, 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Oak Harbor, Ohio Inspection Conducted: October 27, 1992, through December 15, 1992

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Inspectors: S. Stasek R. K. Walton Approved By: , d[ _ (1l M I .G1 R.~D. L'anksblTFy,'IhTeT Date Reactor Proje' cts-Section 3B Inspection Summary Jnspection on October 27. 1992. throuah Decen,her 15. 1992 B enort No. 50-346/92017(D_RP))

Areas-Inspected: A routine safety inspection by resident inspectors of action on previous inspection findings, licensee event report followup, operational safety, followup of events, surveillance, and maintenanc Results: An executive summary follows:

Plant Operations: Overall, performance of tne operating crews was good this '

inspection period. Operators responded in a conservative and timely manner _-

during an event in which control _ rod group 6 left its _ fully withdrawn position. However, two valves were found out of position in the control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) and appeared to be a result of operator -

inattention to' detai Radioloaical Controls: Adherence to radiation. protection program requirements was good with no examples of ~ problems noted during the inspection perio Maintenance / Surveillance: Maintenance and surveillance-activities observed I during the . inspection _ period appeared to be conducted in accordance with all applicable requirements. The _ licensee's troubleshooting; of control rod group

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6 normal power supply problems was orderly and well planned. The insp.#. tors-found bolts in the Containment Purge system ductwork that were loose. uo 9301120017 921231 PDR ADOCK_05000346-G -PDR

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licensee event reports (LERs) reviewed this inspection period that related to inadequacies in the surveillance program were categorized as non-cited violation Security: A weakness was found in the licensee's handling of security material as well as access control to the auxiliary feedwater pump room This matter was referred to Region III Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards for any necessary followup action ._

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Toledo Edison Comoany

1. D. Shelton, Vice President, Nuclear G. Gibbs, Director, Quality Assurance

1. • L. Storz, Plant Manager

1. • J. W. Rogers, Manager,-Maintenance

1. • S. Jain, Director, Engineering

• E. Salowitz, Director, Planning J. K. Wood, Operations Manager

• J. Polyak, Manager, Radiological Protection-S. A. Byrne,_ Superintendent, Instrument and Control (I&C)

Maintenance G. R. McIntyre, Supervisor, Electrical / Control Systems

• E. C. Caba, Manager, Performance Engineering

• V. Sodd, Manager, Independent Safety Engineering

1. • N. Bonner, Manager, Design Engineering

• D. Haiman, Manager,. Engineering Assurance / Services

1. • R. Schrauder, Manager, Nuclear Licensing J. Wissner, General Supervisor, I&C Maintenance

• C. Hawley, Superi.ntendent, Shift Operations

• R. Seyferth, Supervisor,- Quality Verification

• D. Andrews, Systems Engineering

• G. Honma,: Supervisor, Licensing

• N. Peterson, Licensing

1. T. Chambers, Shift Supervisor

1. M. Leisure, Licensing USNRC

1. J. Roe, Director, Reactor Projects - III, IV, V, NRR

1. T. King, Assistant Director for Region III Reactors, NRR-

1. J. Hopkins, Licensing Project Manager, NRR

1. R. Lanksbury, Chief, DRP Section 3B, RIII

1. J. Hannon, Director, Project Directorate III-3

1. • S. Stasek,-Senior Resident Inspector

• R. K. Walton, Resident ~ Inspector The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course of the inspectio * Denotes those personnel attending the Dec> mr 15, 1992, exit meetin # Denotes those personnel attending the Decu,oer 2, 1992 management meetin "

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2. Followup of Previous Inspection Findinas (92701)

(00en) Unresolved Item (346/92014-01(DRP)): Improper Independent Verification (IV) performed. Discussion with the individuals involved with the inadequate return-to-service of the steam generator differential pressure switch revealed that once the first technician had performed the required lineup, the second technician did not, in fact, perform an adequate IV. The second individual indicated that he fully understood what constituted an adequate IV, had received training in_the past as to how to perform IVs, and had performed IVs prior to_ this incident in an apparently acceptable manner. In addition, he indicated that since that time, he had conducted IVs per station requirement Discussion with the General Supervisor, I&C, revealed that although prior training had been provided to I&C maintenance-personnel'at some point (as verified by the level of familiarity by the technicians

interviewed), this training had been provided via_a " shop meeting"

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format and had not been documented. Also, IV equirements were not periodically reinforced as part of continuing training. As of the I

conclusion of the inspection period, a training action request (TAR) had-l been initiated to incorporate IV requirements into both initial indoctrination and continuing training. The inspector also noted that

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administrative procedure DB-MN-00001, " Conduct of Maintenance", provided a somewhat general definition of Independent Verification. This matter l will remain open pending completion of inspector review.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this are .

. 3. Licensee Event Report Followuo (92700)

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Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following licensee event reports (LERs) were reviewed to determine _that reportability requirements were fulfilled,

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immediate corrective actions were accomplished in accordance with i

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Technical Specifications (TS), and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been established, (CLOSED) LER 92-003-00. Missed Surveillance Test for Inservice Test (IST) Valves. In late March, 1992, the licensee discovered that two previously deferred surveillance tests (STs) for valves SW1434 and CC19 were not performed within the required time limits. The Inservice Testing program allowed deferral of STs when plant status made the performance of the ST impractical, however, the licensee's method to ensure that deferred STs were completed was deficient. The licensee attributed the missed STs to procedural deficiencies and revised the operating procedures

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for service water, component cooling water, and auxiliary

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feedwater systems to include verification requirements to ensure l

that all STs for specified system components were completed prior l- to placing the system in operation. The inspectors reviewed the LER, including the licensee's determination of root cause and associated corrective actions, the revised operating procedures, and the licensee's current program for tracking surveillance

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t test This violation will not be-subject to enforcement action l

because the licensee's efforts in identifying nd correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in section VII.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. This item is considered close (CLOSED) LER 92-007-00. Missed Surveillance Channel Check of Control Rod C7 Position Switc The licensee discovered that a surveillance required by Technical Specification 4.3.3.5._was not performed during July and August of 1992 for rod C7 due to the rod being unintentionally deleted from the surveillance test table. A l word processing operator inadvertently deleted rod C7 from the

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test table when processing a temporary approval for a procedure change and the error was not detected-during the_ subsequent review process. The licensee's corrective-actions included. verification of proper rod C7 position, re-inclusion of. rod C7 in the l

surveillance test table and revision of the Word Processing-L Guidelines to allow better identification of. such errors. The L inspectors reviewed the LER, the surveillance-test, and the l licensee's corrective actions. This violation will not be subject to enforcement action because the licensee's efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet the criteria specified in section VII.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. This item is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified;. however, two non-cited violations were identified.

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4. Operational Safety Verification (71707) (40500)

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l The inspectors : observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspectors verified the operability of selected

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emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified _ tracking -of limiting conditions for operation associated with affected components.

l Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests l had been initiated for certain pieces of _ equipment in need of I maintenance. Walkdowns of the accessible portions of the _ following l systems were conducted to verify operability by comparing system lineups L with plant drawings, as-built configuration, or present valve lineup l lists; observing equipment conditions that could degrade performance; L and verifying that instrumentation was properly valved, functioning, and I

calibrated.

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Emergency Diesel Generators

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Emergency Ventilation System L -

Control _ Room Emergency Ventilation System l' The inspectors, by_o'bservation and direct interview,. verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the-

, station security plan including badging of personnel; access control; i

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security walkdowns; security response (compensatory actions); visitor control; security staff attentiveness; and operation of security equipmen Additionally, the inspectors observed plant housekeeping, general plant cleanliness conditions, and verified implementation of radiation protection control Specific observations and reviews included the following: On December 8, 1992, while performing DB-SS-03041, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Train 1 Monthly Test, an operator found valves HAIS and HA17 out of position open in lie of their required. position, shut. .The licensee determined that the valves were last. positioned during an operation of CREVS on -

November 24, 1992. The CREVS operating procedure, DB-0P-06505, repositions valves HA15 and HA17 closed. The licensee documented this event on a Patential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR 92-0462). The inspectors will assess the licensee's -

corrective actions to this event in a future inspection repor Pending completion of inspector review, this matter is considered an open item (346/92017-01(DRP)). During a routine walkdown of the purge exhaust equipment room, the inspectors noted seven bolts on a flanged connection in the-exhaust ducting of the containment purge system that were not properly tightened (i.e., either loose or with the nuts backed off several threads). Engineering then conducted a walkdown of the ventilation ducting within the auxiliary building ventilation. room and identified an additional 10 bolts in the ducting not properl tightened. Subsequently all 17 bolts were retightened as required. An evaluation by the licensee failed to identify any maintenance that had been conducted on the subject equipmen The licensee 'could not explain why the bolts were loose on the -

ductwork, but suggested that it could be due to vibration induce by the operating exhaust fa r The inspectors noted that the affected flange appeared to be intact, despite the loose bolts since approximately 36 bolts total make up the flange. The licensee stated that the safety function of the interfacing emergency ventilation system (EVS) was not affected by the loosened bolts, since it did not change the ventilation ' flow path or flow rates. The licensee added that the bolts did not have torquing requirements and that the EVS-system was periodically tested to ensure operability by performing a

" drawdown" test every 18 months-to demonstrate that the EVS has the capability to establish-a negative pressure within 4 seconds in the volume serviced by EVS. Pending completion of inspector review, this matter is considered an open item (346/92017-02(DRP)).

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. On November 10, 1992, the licensee reported to the NRC-that some-security related material may have been mishandled in the early 1980's. This matter was referred to NRC Region III, the Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards for further evaluation and required follow-up action On November 18, 1992, during a routine plant tour, the inspectors accessed the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFP) rooms. At the doorway, the inspectors checked in with a security guard who was controlling access to the rooms. The guard, recognizing that one inspector had authorized access to the room, logged both-inspectors into the room without first checking the authorized access list. When exiting the AFP rooms, the inspectors checked the log 'aintained by the security guard and found that there was one person listed in the log as being in the rooms even though there was nobody there. The inspectors brought these discrepancies to the licensee's attention. The licensee found that the individual not accounted for had exited the rooms about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> earlier, along with several other people,_and was missed being logged out by the security guard. The licensee also noted that the guard did have an' authorization list for personnel access to the AFP rooms, but assumed that one of the NRC inspectors was on the list and that he was escorting the other inspecto Security management spoke to its guard force to reemphasize the need for more positive control at access points manned by security officer No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Followup of Events (93702)

The inspectors performed onsite followup activities for the following

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events which occurred during the inspection period. Followup inspection included as applicable: reviews of operating logs, procedures, and condition reports; direct observation of licensee actions'; and interviews of licensee personnel. For each event, the' inspectors reviewed one or more of the following: the sequence of events; the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions; and licensee adherence to plant procedures and license conditions. Additionally, as applicable,'the inspectors verified that licensee investigation had identified root cause(s) of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel errors -and were taking or had taken appropriate corrective actions, On November 30, 1992, at 12:56 p.m. (EST), control ream operators identified that control rod group (CRG) 6 rods were star _ ting to insert from their normal fully withdrawn position at jog speed (3 inches per minute). The reactor operator then depressed the " Rod Stop" pushbutton on the rod control panel which terminated rod movement at the 92% rod withdrawn position. CRG 6 was then placed on its auxiliary power supply. The licensee entered Technical Specification 3.1.3.6. and commenced decreasing reactor powe The licensee contacted Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) for technical

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assistance and convened a station review board (SRB) meeting to address the situation. Subsequent agreement was reached that CRG 6 control rods could be safely withdrawn to their fully ' withdrawn position if performed within two hours as allowed by Technical Specifications. At 2:40 p.m., the licensee returned CRG 6 rods to their fully withdrawn positio The minimum power level attained was 68% at which time the operators commenced raising powe The licensee returned reactor power to 100% by 7:30 p.m., on-November 30, 199 The inspectors noted that the control room operators reacted appropriately once the problem was identified. The shift supervisor made a conservative decision to reduce reactor power until he was assured that CRG 6 could be returned to .its normal position without adversely affecting plant operations. Licensee management quickly assembled their staff to evaluate a-course of -

action that would allow returning CRG 6 to its fully withdrawn position safely. Technical information from nuclear engineering and B&W was evaluated and procedural enhancements were recommended during the' meeting. Control room operators were briefed by plant management on the SRB's recommendations prior to withdrawing CRG After the affected rods were returned to their-normal positions, reactor power was slowly returned to 100%. The inspectors observed the operators restore CRG 6 to normal from the control room and noted that the evolution was conducted in a controlled manner. The maintenance activity to troubleshoot and repair the faulty circuit was immediately_ commenced (as discussed in paragraph 7 of this report). On December- 14, 1992, during a routine reactor coolant system (RCS) dilution evolution, control room operators noted that-reactor response was not as expecte Specifically, a small amount of insertion of the group 7 control rod bank should-have resulted from the dilution. However, the actual response was_ that Group 7 rods continued to slowly withdraw. Once the group reached full out, operators began-reducing reactor power to maintain.TAVE *

Operators noted about this time.that Boric Acid Addition Tank

.(BAAT) 1-1 level had decreased approximately 1 inch. During the same time that the dilution was underway, BAAT l-1 was bein recirculated as part of a routine weekly operation The operators surmised that an air operated valve _ (MU23) that_ was closed to isolate the BAAT from the' makeup system while the tank was being recirculated was not fully isolated.- This apparently. allowed some leakage past the valve to combine with_the demineralized water

being supplied to the makeup syam for RCS dilution. Inspector review of the event had not been completed at the conclusion of

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the inspection. Therefore, this is-considered-an unresolved item

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pending completion of NRC followup. -- (346/92017-03(DRP)).

No violations or deviations were identified in this are L

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' Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors observed safety-related surveillance testing and verified that the testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that LCOs were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne The following test activities were observed and/or reviewed:

DB-MI-03001 Channel Functional Test Reactor Protective System Channel #1 DB-MI-03002 Channel Functional Test Reactor Protective System Channel #2 DB-SC-03229 Monthly Source Test of Station Ventilation Normal Range Radiation Monitor DB-SC-03255 Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Response-Time Calculation (SP7B - Startup Feedwater Control Valre only)

DB-SP-03160 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #2 Quarterly Test No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Maintenance L62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components were observed and/or reviewed during the inspection period to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and were in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc _- . . . . .

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The following maintenance activities were observed and/or-reviewed:

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Maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator #2

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Removal and Reinsta11ation of DA24 and DA25 check valves

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Troubleshoot YVA Inverter

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Maintenance on Auxiliary Feedwater System Train 1

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Troubleshoot and Repair of SP7B1 solenoid

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Switchyard Maintenance

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Troubleshooting Control Rod Group 6 Normal Power Supply As discussed in inspection report 50-316/92014(DRP), paragraph 5,-

the licensee's predictive maintenance program was entered into competition in the Fall of 1992. The competition was administered in an effort to identify, recognize, and- reward progressive maintenance programs. Recently the licensee was informed that their predictive maintenance program finished second out of fifteen programs in the " established program" category, The licensee commcnced troubleshooting the normal power supply to CRG 6 on November 30, 1992, shortly after'the problem was identified (reference paragraph 5). The licensee attempted to reproduce the condition in which the failure occurred, but was unsuccessful in duplicating the system response. After further _

troubleshooting, the licensee deduced that, by design, when a rod programmer lamp was deenergized and the proper reactor trip breaker opened, the jog speed circuit actuated which drove the rods in at jog s ee r However, the direction error portion of the '

rod circuitry should have detected that rod motion existed when not directed and prevented the inward rod motion. The licensee replaced the faulty direction error circuit card and placed CRG 6 back on its normal power suppl On December 6, 1992, the licensee performed a periodic surveillance which involved moving each CRG, one at a time, to verify that all CRGs not fully inserted were operable. . The licensee experienced problems with-moving CRG 6 on its normal power supply and transferred CRG 6 back to the auxiliary power supply. The licensee plans to continue troubleshooting the normal power supply to CRG The power supply drawers to all the CRGs are scheduled to be replaced during the upcoming outage via Modification-91-001 This modification will replace the current electro-magnetic and-optical drive components with solid state equipmen _ .

No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Manaaement Meetina (30702) I On December 2,1992, the licensee and NRC management met at NRC-HQ for ;

periodic management meeting. The agenda included a discussion on recent

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organizational changes, unit performance during the current- operating

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cycle, as well' as major activities and programs of interest that were

- being implemented onsite. These included the licensee's motor operated valve program, modifications backlog reduction, and containment neutron surveys recently conducted. Additionally, status of planning, and-  !

ongoing activities in preparation for the upcoming refuel outage (currently scheduled to-start in March 1993) were discussed. Also, ,

brief presentation * were made relating to several long term issues including: spent .

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itorage, new standard Technical Specifications, and the status of licensee's individual plant examination (IPE).  ! Unresolved item .

An unresolved item is a matter requiring more information in order to-ascertain whether it was an acceptable item, violation, or deviatio During this inspection, an resolved item was identified (paragraph 5.b).

1 Exit Interview *

The inspectors ~~+ with licensee representatives (denoted in - _,

paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the findings. After discussions with the licensee, the inspectors have determined there is no proprietary data contained in this inspection repor .

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