ML20133B508

Dcrdr Summary Rept for Yankee Nuclear Power Station

ML20133B508
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	08/01/1985
From:	YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20133B505	List: ML20133B502 ML20133B508
References
NUDOCS 8508060195
Download: ML20133B508 (130)

Text

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l-DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SUIStARY REPORT FOR THE YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION LICENSE NO. DPR 3 50-29 Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701 l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Roon Declan Review TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................... 11

1. INTRODUCTION.................................................... 1 II. ORGANIZATION.................................................... 2 III. LERIVATION OF INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL NEEDS................. 4 IV. COMPARISON OF NEEDS WITH INVENT 0RY.............................. 5 V. CONTROL ROOM SURVEY............................................. 8 A. Operating Experience Review................................. 8 )

B. S t a t i c Su rv e y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 VI. ASSESSMENT OF DEFICIENCIES...................................... 11 A. Data Management System...................................... 14 VII. PROPOSE MODIFICATION............................................ 18 VIII. RESOLUTION OF HEDs.............................................. 19 A. Implementation Schedule..................................... 112 IX. ATTACHMENTS..................................................... 115 l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review I. INTRODUCTION The Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was completed in accordance with the requirements specified in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. The i use of the guidance provided by NUREG-0700, -0801, 0835 and others, has assisted in the performance of the review. A Program Plan, submitted in March of 1984, described proposed methods of performing the review. An in-progress audit by an NRC team in October of 1984 resulted in some changes to the Program. Additional changes in the procedures and techniques described in the Program Plan, were made as better methods were evolved during the review process.

L This Summary Report presents the results of the DCRDR, a brief

' discussion of the methodology and is structured in direct relation to the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. Sections II through IV of the report have abbreviated titles representing the six requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Sections 5.1.b(ii) through (iv), 5.1.c and 5.1.d.

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I Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review f II. ORGANIZATION The DCRDR crganization is composed of two levels, a Managem,ent Team and /

a Review Team. The Management Team has overall responsibility for the program, its implementation, the resolution of its findings and the authorization of its proposed modifications. It directs the efforts of a Review Team, which has conducted the plant operating experience reviews, interviewed the operators, reviewed the control board and Control Room, conducted the comparison of I&C needs, evaluated the findings, proposed f suitable modifications and prepared the Summary Report. The Review Team was supplemented by additional personnel as needed. Figure I identifies the members of the two groups and shows the groups' relationship.

Resumes for D. B. Hallonquist, who assisted the Review Team, and J. D. Candon, the nuclear system engineer added to the Review Team after the Program Plan was submitted, are included in Attachment A.

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YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION -

DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW Management Team L.H. Heider, V.P. Operations N.N. St.Laurent, Plant Manager E.A. Sawyer, Engineering Services Group Manager 1

L.D. Marsolais, Program Manager, Engineering Services Group J.M. O'Connor, ISC Engineer, Engineering Services Group J.D. Candon, Nuclear Systems Engineer, Engineering Services Group R. Aron, Plant Operations Staff Dr. T. Sheridan, Human Engineering Specialist FIGURE I Administrative Structure l

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review III. DERIVATION OF INFORMATION AND CONTROL NEEDS Section 5.1.b (ii) of NUREG-0737 requires deriving the information and

~ control (I&C) needs for emergency operation by the use of a task analysis.

The tasks stated by the procedure steps of the symptom-oriented Emergency

. Operating Procedures (EOPs) were reviewed in detail to extract the information and control needs of the operator and define the requirements of these needs.

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The EOPs used at the Yankee plant address certain aspects of the reactor plant, e.g., fuel integrity, heat removal and radioactivity

containment. As a result, these ten procedures address a considerable number of events. A detailed description of the scope and basis for the EOPs is provided in the Procedure Generation Package, which was separately submitted.

To maintain the independence of the derivation of the I&C needs from the existing Control Room inventory, the task was assigned to the human

factors consultant, T. Sheridan Associates. Dr. D. Lanning of T. Sheridan Associates derived the I&C needs and requirements to implement those EOPs.

The result of this effort was a computerized work sheet. Each item is

- cross referenced with the EOP step number, task, the I&C needs to implement the step and the requirements of those needs. This data base formed an important link in the DCRDR process.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review T

IV. COMPARISON OF NEEDS WITH INVENTORY Item 5.1.b(iii) of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, requires that the DCRDR shall include "A comparison of the display and control requirements with a

Control Room inventory to identify missing displays and controls." In

~ Section III of the Summary Report, a method of deriving information and control needs for emergency operation was described. A worksheet was used for the comparison.

A team comprised of a senior licensed operator, two human-factors consultants, one of whom derived the list of needs, and the Review Team Manager performed the comparison. The comparison consisted of:

1. The operator would describe how he would perform the step.

identifying the instruments and controls he would use.

2. The human factors engineers would compare this to the list of needs on the worksheet and discuss them with the operator.

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3. Once the component the operator used was identified, the i characteristics of the component were compared to the requirements of the worksheet, a 1

4. If the component on the needs list existed, its number and location were entered into the "Needs Met" column and a "Yes" entered in the. l

" Requirements Met" column. I l

-5. If a component identified in the needs column did not exist, a "No"

. . was entered into the "Needs Met" column and a comment in the "Conment" column.

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6. If the component existed but did not exactly meet the requirements, a "No" was entered under " Requirements Met" and a comment ,

describing the differences entered in the " Comment" column. ,

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

7. If the component was located a distance from the operator normal control station, or any unusual actions were required to perform the step, a comment was entered.

8. All entries in the " Comment" column were entered as findings in the Data Management System and the finding number placed beside the comment to aid in subsequent auditing.

A list of the EOPs used is provided in Attachment C.

EOP Procedure Nos. 1, 4, 7 and 10 were found to exercise all areas of the Control Room and were compared by the team above. The remainder were compared by a smaller team comprised of the operator and the Review Team Manager.

In all comparisons, if any action stated in the procedure was performed outside the Control Room by others, a comment was entered. In the instances when the operator was required to leave the control Room, e.g., the Switchgear Room, the comparison Team went to the location and evaluated the operator's actions, component needs and requirements. In one instance, the procedural step required starting the steam-driven emergency feed pump, a function performed by the auxiliary operator. The comparison Team evaluated the required components against the operator action and made comments even though the area may have been outside the scope of a DCRDR.

Seventy-five findings resulted from the information and control comparison. The number suggests that both the derivation of information and control needs, and the comparison with the Control Room inventory was detailed I

! and intensive enough to reveal all legitimate human factors problems. Among l

l the types of HEDs discovered were:

l-L 1. Pump and valve control switches identified by number instead of function.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed control Room Design Review

2. Normal or abnormal ranges not indicated.

3. Engineering units of indicators not provided.

4. E0P numerical values not provided on indicators.

5. Action points not identified on indicators.

6. Procedure steps require leaving the Control Room.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review i

V. CONTROL ROOM SURVEY A. Operatinz Experience Review While no review of operating experience is required by NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. Yankee chose to augment the actual requirements with a review of historical events and by interviewing operators both for their knowledge of historical events, and to gain their valuable insight on methods to improve Control Room operation.

The plant scram log for the entire plant lifetime and the Licensee Event Reports submitted to date were reviewed to find those events that could have been the result of poor human engineering. The Review Team, as a committee, evaluated these items and entered those it deemed worthy into the Data Management System as findings. The Data Management System is described in Section VI.A.

Operator questionnaires were issued to all operators on a voluntary and anonymous basis. Thirteen operators chose to return their questionnaires.

Eleven operators agreed to be interviewed. The interviews were conducted by the' Review Team Manager and the human factors consultant to minimize any reticence on the part of the operator. Those operators who agreed to be interviewed were forthright with their comments. The auditors' comments on the interview were entered either on the interview sheet or on the actual questionnaire itself. Responses which were considered personal idiosyncrasies, or which were mentioned by only one operator, were generally deleted by the Review Team. On the other hand, comments which appeared in the

' operator interviews and the static survey were given more attention even if mentioned by only one operator. All comments are retained in the DCRDR document file, however, and were reviewed by the NRC in-progress Audit Team.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review B. Static Survey Section 5.1.b(iv) requires "a Control Room survey to identify deviation from accepted human factors principles. This survey will include, among other things, an assessment of the Control Room layout, the usefulness of audible and visual alarm systems, the information recording and recall capability, and the Control Room environment."

A static survey of the control board was conducted by the Review Team using a checklist of standards derived from the BWR Owners Group checklist and from NUREG-0700. The survey was conducted in accordance with a procedure involving the use of the checklist on a panel-by-panel basis. The Survey Team (s) included an operator and an engineer, at least one of whom has had human factors training. This procedure had been used in a number of nuclear plants previously and reflected improvements which have resulted from its evolution and review by the NRC staff. Generally, the procedure was structured to investigate items on the board relative to their ability to provide clear and unambiguous information to the operator. Switches and controls were evaluated for convenience of operation, possibility of error and ease of understanding the function performed, e.g., isolation vs. throttling valves.

The anthropometric measurements of the control board and any panel-mounted devices were checked and recorded, and compared to the standard expressed in NUREG-0700. The Safety Parameter Display System terminals were evaluated against similar standards.

By means of a special part of the checklist, the Control Room environment was evaluated for comfort, noise level, lighting, location, traffic patterns, work load and other issues, and compared to the standard requirements.

Each panel was evaluated against each item on the checklist, and a four-level scale of compliance plus a "not applicable" category used for E

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review rating each. Notes were made in conjunction with these checklists about the HEDs of particular displays and controls.

The checksheets used for the survey were duplicates of the BWR Owners Group checksheets, which were reviewed by the NRC staff and deemed acceptable with minor.cdditions in Generic Letter 83-18. Each deviation was numerically

. graded 0 through 4 and those with a value of 2 or greater were identified as potential HEDs.

While deficiencies were found on every panel, many were duplicates.

This type included:

1. Lack of color code.

2. No standard abbreviations.

3. Switches identified by number instead of function.

4. Components outside anthropometric limits.

In addition, a number were isolated examples. Those included:

1. Indicators not in recommended arrangement.

2. Demarcation and hierarchical labeling lacking.

3. Similar lights which indicated opposite action.

The environment was found to have too high a lighting level normally with emergency lighting below the recommended standard. Temperature control was good but drafts occasionally were felt. The noise level was below the acceptable maximum. The Control Room was found to be frequently crowded.

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review VI. ASSESSMENT OF DEFICIENCIES Section 5.1.c of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, states: " Assess which human engineering deficiencies are significant and should be corrected. Select design improvements that will correct these deficiencies. Improvements that can be accomplished with an enhancement program (paint-tape-label) should be done promptly."

The Review Team addressed this requirement in the following manner.

The human engineering observations obtained during the Operator Interview / Questionnaire section were evaluated by the Review Group and those comments deemed worthy of further consideration entered into the Data Management System as findings.

The review of historical operating events was handled in a similar manner. The review of the events resulted in certain findings entered into the Data Management System.

The static survey of the Control Room resulted in a numerical response

<- and comment. All comments were entered into the Data Management System as

, findings. The comparison of information and control needs resulted in a series of comments which were entered as findings in the Data Management System. The information and control needs analysis did not result in any human engineering comments. Its only product was a list of needs and requirements to implement emergency operation. l l

l All findings in the Data Management System were evaluated by the entire '

l Review Team. The degree of relevance, importance and probability of causing l error were discussed for each individual finding resulting in either the finding being transformed into a HED or being assigned to Discard. Frequently it was found that similar observations were made in several areas. For example, the lack of a plant color code was noted on each panel worksheet.

Similarly, the lack of an approved abbreviation and acronym list i

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review was observed on each panel checksheet. In these cases, many findings were combined into a single HED. In many cases; however, a single finding was classified as an HED. Those findings which were assigned to discard were retained in the Data Management System for posterity and future review if found.necessary. Each finding assigned to discard was accompanied by a comment justifying its assignment.

Those findings determined to be HEDs were then entered into the HED file of the computerized Data Management System. Each HED was evaluated by the multidisciplined Review Teen to:

1. Determine that the description of the HED adequately represented the findings of which it was comprised.

2. Assign a proper classification relative to its probability of causing error.

3. Provide a recommendation to the Management Team which would address the deficiency and not create another deficiency.

The method of classification in accordance with the potential for causing operator error, and the effect or importance of that error, was implemented in the following manner. A classification index was established.

CLASSIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT Class A - An HED that could potentially have a significant impact on safety or cause a deviation from Technical Specifications.

Class B - An HED that has the potential to cause human error that could be harmful to plant personnel or equipment.

Class C - An HED that could inconvenience the operator, such as a control and feedback arrangement which is inconvenient or clumsy to work with.

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review The Review Team decided that this simple, straightforward classification would be most useful.

The process by which HEDs were classified entailed meetings and lengthy discussions of every HED by the entire Review Team. The diversity of backgrounds and varied experience of the Review Team members contributed greatly to the assignment and classification of the entire list of HEDs.

Based on the results of the review, it was not found necessary to prioritize HEDs on the basis of specific concern or relative importance to each other. None of the deficiencies were found to require immediate correction. This was not surprising since in a Control Room with a long operating history, it would be expected that any such deficiency would have been corrected as quickly as it was discovered. The deficiencies found by the Review Team were, for the most part, deficiencies which, if corrected, would improve the Control Room man-machine interface.

The Management Team decided it would accept HEDs submitted by the Review Team as written. Thp, Management Team evaluated each HED, including the recommendations and decided upon.an ultimate disposition based on its safety significance, its cost / benefit ratio, and its relationship with other activity affecting the Control Room. All of the above activities are entered in the Data Management System.

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A. Data Manatoment System l The Data Management Systom derived for use by Yankee has considerable capability.. It consists of tato computer files which can be manipulated to obtain the maximum correlation and tracking. Information from the four sections of the DCRDR was entered into the Data Management System as follows:

1. All questions in the static survey answered with a numerical value of 2 or greater required a comment which was entered as a finding.

2. All comments from the-I&C comparison were entered into the findings file.

3. Comments from the operator interview and questionnaire deemed significant by the Review Team were entered as findings.

4. Certain historical events resulted in comments by the Review Team which were entered as findings.

Findinas File Each entry from the four activities described above entered into the findings file were given a unique descriptive number composed of four separate units as follows:

1. A sequential entry number identified as record key defines the order in which the finding was entered and also keeps a total.

2. A letter describing the section of the DCRDR from which the finding was derived. S represents static survey; 0, operator interview; H, review of historical events; and T, task analysis, or, more .

I properly, I&C comparison since no findings are derived directly from the task analysis.

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

3. A two-digit number representing the panel on which the findings were discovered.

4. A four-digit alphanumeric definition of the checksheet question which generated the finding.

A brief description of the human factors problem follows under the

. heading " Description". A resolution column describes the assignment of_the finding, either to an'HED by a four-digit number or to discard. A space for

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comments follows. If a finding is assigned to discard, a comment is entered justifying the assignment. All findings remain listed in the file for documentation and tracking.  !

The file can be sorted to print out the findings listed by section, l panel, question number, and HED number. The last is the most useful; but ,

sorting by panel enables a review of the various findings affecting a single i panel, t

Similar findings reported for different panels and similar kinds of problems were found. As a result, in many cases, several findings were combined into a single HED. In other instances, a single finding constituted an HED. An HED file was created and is defined in the next section.

4 HED File i

A listing of HEDs entered into the computer was identified in the following manner:

1. A sequential number labeled RCD identified the sequence of entry i and, therefore, a cumulative total.

2. An HED number of four digits which identifies the general component or functional area of the deficiency, e.g., recorders, environment, etc.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

3. A brief description of the deficiency. When the HED is comprised of several deficiencies, the description is broader and less specific than a description in the findings file. An HED comprised of a-single finding may simply repeat the description of the finding. However, evaluation of the original finding by the Review Team may being out additional concerns, in which case, the HED could be more detailed than, or address additional aspects of, the finding.

4. Status of the HED is entered as resolved or unresolved. A raiolved entry indicates that the concern has been addressed and a decision has been reached concerning the recommendation.- In the event that no change will be made, justification is entered in the last column.

Recomunendation/ Resolution This column contains a classification, in accordance with the classification document, and either a recommendation or resolution depending on the time the document is used. When it was prepared by the Review Team to submit to the Management Team, it contained a recommendation. Once the Management Team had addressed and resolved the HED, the entry in this column became a resolution and included an implementation date. The version containing the recommendations was reviewed by the NRC audit team, and a copy will be retained in the doatstnt file. The final version containing the resolution is submitted with this Summary Report and will be maintained in the Yankee files. l I

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Use of the Data-Management System The Data Management System is used as follows:

1. The information in the HED and in the findings which comprises that HED are provided to the Management Team in the form of an HED list and a findings list sorted by HED. In this form the information is available in a general form and a detailed form as well.

2. Assignment of the implementation of a given HED to the design engineers, in the form described above, provides sufficient detail to implement the design.

3. Evaluation of all the deficiencies found on a single panel for possible interaction can be aided by printing out all the findings for a given panel.

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review VII. PROPOSE MODIFICATION Findings assigned to, or collected in, HEDs were again evaluated by the entire Review Team. Lengthy discussions were held to determine a logical modification to address the deficiency. In this discussion, the determination that the modification would indeed correct the problem without introducing another problem was made. In some instances, e.g., the collection of )

annunciator deficiencies resulted in a recommendation that a study be made to resolve the best way to correct the deficiencies and then be implemented, the verification and validation were done only in the conceptual sense.

Verification and validation of the actual design and installation would have i

to await those events. In those cases where the recommended modification was  !

more specific, e.g., provide the missing engineering units on an indicator, the Review Team was able to make the determination that this simple change ,

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The HEDs, including the recommendations, were forwarded to the Management Team which made final decisions. The results of the Management Team decisions were assigned to the various engineering support groups for implementation. Those ultimate resolutions and schedules are described in Section VIII.

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i' Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review l-l - VIII. ~ RESOLUTION OF HEDs The DCRDR at the Rowe plant resulted in more than 500 individual findings which were combined into 91 human engineering deviations (NEDs).

Fifty-four.HEDs were judged by the Review Team to be in a category that could potentially inconvenience an operator, but would have no safety significance.

The remaining thirty-seven HEDs were evaluated to have some influence on safety.

The Management Review Team reviewed the HEDs and the Review Team's recommendations for correction of the HEDs. After considerable study, it was

- agreed that 54 HEDs should be corrected. Of the remaining 37 HEDs, 18 have an indi*tidual explanation for not correcting. The remaining 19 HEDs include a notation " benefit cannot be supported by cost."

- For the latter group of HEDs, the Management Team believes that even though a design feature might deviate from accepted human factors ideals, it does not necessarily require correction. Our review process included a careful evaluation of what potential reduction in operator error rate and commensurate increase in plant safety could be achieved by correcting this group of HEDs.

The results of a recent NRC SALP audit place Rowe as having the lowest operator error rate among the nation's nuclear utilities. Since 1979, there have-been six operational errors, an average of one per year. Our review indicates that we have reached a point of little or no return in reduced -

i operator error rate for further investment of our resources; and that those resources could be better applied elsewhere.

Yankee Nuclear Power Station takes pride in their extremely low operator error rate. It is our intention to maintain this error rate at one i of the lowest levels in the nation. We will do this by careful evaluation of l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review potential problem areas and by implementation of modifications to correct actual problems. This intent is supported by our commitment to correct 54 HEDs consisting of several hundred individual findings. We believe, however, that the benefit to be gained by correction of the remaining HEDs cannot justify the investment in resources necessary to make these corrections.

The schedule for correction of the HEDs will be based on their integration into other work for the next refueling cycle, the amount of effort for engineering and operations for the designed installation of individual HEDs, the classification of HEDs, the manpower available and finally the location of the HEDs. We expect to finalize a specific list of HEDs to be performed in the next refueling cycle and subsequent cycle by February 1, 1986. Because of the volume of HEDs and other work for engineering and operations, it is not expected that we could complate all HEDs in one cycle.

Those HEDs which require only simple paint, label and tape correction will be made by the end of 1935.

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0100 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The findings that comprise this HED describe isetruments and controls which exceed the anthropometric limits recommended by NUREG-0700. Of these findir.gs, none of the indicators or controls which are out of the limits requires precise readings or frerrent/ rapid manipulation.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Controls and di s',6ys that comprise this HED are not required to be operated or read precisely during emergency operations. No change will be made, t

STATUS: Resolved l

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' Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0101 l

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The fire panel has controls that are 14-inches above the standard. In addition, the panel is located behind the guards station. Thus, the operator does not have easy access to this panel. The operator uses this panel to determine the location of a fire.

l RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Demonstration shows access is easy enough for all operators. Small table with phones will be relocated to allow better access.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desisin Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0102 DESCU PTION OF DE.FACIENCY: Switches for CC-MOV-631, SW-MOV-404 and FW-FCI-4000 EBFP switches located too close to the edS e of the MCB which could cause inadvertent operation.

RECOMMENDATION: Class B - A guard will be provided.

4 STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0103 4

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The surge tank hydrogen valve and LPST control valves are

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outside the anthropometric limits established in 0700 and are hard to reach.

RECOMMENDATION: Included in HED1405.

STATUS: Resolved i

I Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0104 i

DESCRIPTION OF

, DEFICIENCY: The NRV cabinet cannot be seen from the MCB area.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - There are no displays or controls that require this cabinet be viewed from the MCB area. No chanEe will be made.

STATUS: Resolved S

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0105 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: VC temp is required by E0Ps as a precursor of off-normal conditions. It is located on the back panel and is too low.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED01A1 DESCRIPTION OF I DEFICIENCY: During the static Control Room survey, it was determined that level indicator SI-LI-1 and the switch for MOV 518 are located too low on the SI Panel.

RECOMMENDATION: Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear Tower Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED01B0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The atmospheric dump valve switches on the vertical panel of the MCB are located at a longer reach than recommended by human factors guidelines.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - This is only a minor inconvenience to the operator. No change will be made.

l STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0200 l

3 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: On the SI and DG Panels it was determined: a) the sequence of operation for the controls is not evident, b) feedback information and controls are located separately from each l' other, c) the flow paths for test and operation are not l easily followed, and d) white lights on the SI Panel are confusing.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

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STATUS: Resolved I i l l

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l Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE l HED0201 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: On the MCB nuclear panel the following deficiencies were found: a) the digital rod position indicators have incorrect metal labels, b) where the original counter was removed the hole is not filled, and c) there is an unused counter mounted on the board.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - A) The metal labels will be removed. B) The hole will be filled. c) The unused counter will be removed.

STATUS: Resolved I

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0202 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The CCW and SW controls and displays on MCB Panel No. 8 are not grouped by system or laid out in a logical manner RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Demarcation and hierarchical labeling will be employed to improve understanding.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0202 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The feedback for atmospheric steam dump valve controller TV-411 and the diesel generator are on the MCB, distant from and not visible from the controls.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The feedback on the MCB is not required during emergency operations. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved

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• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0204 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The controls for the air particulate monitor are not grouped in a logical manner (left display goes with right control).

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved t

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed control Room Design Review 1

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• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD * .

NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE RCWE HED0205 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Battery 3 ground detector voltmeters are separated by other instruments, unlike 1 and 2.

REC 0tetENDATION: Class C - Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Wuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0206 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: HP drain header can overpressure LPST if valve opened during operation.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - A warning label will be placed near MOV-510.

STATUS: Resolved e

4 Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0207 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The numbering of the 2400 and 480 volt bus mimics are not laid out in the preferred order (top to bottom).

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The order is acceptable and familiar to the operators. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved l

F-Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desitn Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED02A1 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: On the Main Control Board, it was determined that the mimics: a) have flow arrows which are too dim, b) are missing a jumper to the lef t of feed and bleed Mx, c) and points are not identified, and d) valve nameplates not provided (example, charging and bleed).

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Flow arrows will be improved, end points identified and missing jumpers replaced. Valves will be identified by function.

STATUS: Resolved I

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED02B0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The findings that comprise this HED describe areas on the control panels where demarcation of controls and displays is needed (or would be helpful) for grouping similar control functions.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The groupings of the controls will be reviewed.

Demarcation and hierarchical labeling will be applied.

STATUS: Resolved 4

T Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0300 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The items that comprise this HED describe how color is used inconsistently on the control Room panels. Some examples are: a) H2 Panel green open, red closed is not consistent with rest of Control Room, b) amber is used for both trip and permissive.

RECOMMENDATION: Class B - A color standard will be developed and the control panels changed to conform to the standard.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0400 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The items that comprise this HED describe how labels are used inconsistently. Some examples are: a) panels are not labeled by number or function, b) label nomenclature, acronyms and abbreviations are inconsistent, c) labels are not provided for all controls and displays.

RECOMMENDATION: Class B - A standard for labels will be developed. All labels will conform and all control and displays will be labeled. Future label changes will be controlled.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0401 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: On the containment isolation panel, the labels: a) provide switch number not the number of the valve being controlled, b) switches are marked test / normal. When switch is in test the valve closes, when switch is in normal, it closes automatically on a CI signal.

REcoletENDATION: Class C - This panel will have a generic label. The switch labels will identify the valve being controlled and the '

switch will state close/ auto instead of test / normal.

STATUS: Resolved 1

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detal. led Control Room Desinn Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0402 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Operational limits or warnings are not provided on labels.

REcoletRNDATION: Class A - After mimics are improved, demarcation and hierarchical labels applied and alarm points marked on indicators. The board will be evaluated for use of warning labels and labels will be applied.

STATUS: Resolved l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWK HED0403 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Numerous switch labels different from ROPS.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - After approved label standard is implemented, procedures and training will be made consistent with labels.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• MUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED04A0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: This HED describes the areas of the Control Room where temporary labels (either paper or dymo tape) are used.

There are no procedures or controls on the use of temporary labels.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Temporary labels will be reviewed, then made permanent or removed. A procedure will be established to control application or temporary labels.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED04B0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Multi-point recorders have labels that are either black letters on a white backEround or white letters on a black background, while the pens aro red, blue and green.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The labels for the pens will be lettered in the same color as the pen it represents.

STATUS: Resolved o .

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUHAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE R0WE HED0500 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The findings that comprise this HED describe display instrumentation which presents incorrect or confusing information to the operator. Some examples are: a) scale on the paper is not the same as on the recorder, b) engineering units not provided, c) pen colors are not consistent, and d) values are hard to read.

REC 000tENDATION: Class B - The findings that comprise this HED will be corrected.

STATUS: Resolved

c. _ . . - _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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l-Yankee Nuclear Ptwer Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• I NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0501 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The fire panel switch layout is poor, disorderly and confusing. No operational procedures exist.

REcoletENDATION: Class B - Procedures exist for the detection of a plant fire. Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear Fower Station Detailed Control Room Dosistn Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05A0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFIC 12NCY The met recorder EM-II on the drain panel is located above the recomended standard and the clarity of the printed number is poor. Due to its location it has parallax and Elare. This recorder is used to calculate release information after an accident.

RECOMMEWDATION: Class A - A permanently attached step stool will be provided. The numbers will be reviewed to ensure the operator can read to the required accuracy.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION - YANKEE ROWE HED05B0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: In many instances the only status indication is a light.

None of these have a lamp test feature so that an operator cannot easily check his indicator.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved

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l Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECOED

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05C0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: This HED is comprised of switch escutcheon plates that are a) worn so they cannot be read, b) positions marked 1 and 2 instead of start /stop (SI pumps), c) marked breakers instead of synchroscope, and d) handles obscure pointers.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - The worn escutcheon plates will be replaced. All escutcheons will have correct operating nomenclature.

STATUS: Resolved 4

I Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE ,

HED05C1 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY The same type switch handles are frequently used for pumps, valves and fans. Different pushbuttons used for NOV-603 and 609. On NRV panel, test switches larger than operating switches. Some handles modified with slash marks.

RECONNENDATION: Class C - Benefit cannot he supported by cost.

STATUS Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05C2 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The individual rod disconnect switches on the back of the MCB have worn stops. Thus, the operator is not sure if the switch changed state after operation. Incorrect switch position during testing could result in rods out of stop.

RECOINGENDATION: Class C - These switches will be rebuilt or replaced.

STATUS: Resolved i

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Yankee Nuclear Power station Detailed control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05C3 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The synchroscope switch is worn, thus, it does not always make contact. Failure of this switch could prevent the picking up of emergency load.

REC 00stENDATION: Class A - This switch will be rebuilt or replaced.

STATUS: Resolved

', l Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed control Room Desian Review

• HUM AN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05DO DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The display instrumentation is not marked to show normal or abnormal range of operation, nor are alarm setpoints shown.

RECONNENDATION: Class A - A review of the display instrumentation will be conducted and where applicable, expected operating range and alarm setpoints will be shown.

STATUS: Resolved l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• f NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE RCWE i HED05D1

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DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Alarm and action points not shown on SI tank level indicator.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - These levels will be clearly marked on the level indicator.

STATUS: Resolved l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HEDOSEO DESCRIPTION OF DEPICIENCY: On the Safety Injection Panel, the white pointer on the sigma meters tends to blend into the background. This makes it hard to read the meter from a distance.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The color of the pointer will be changed to q provide contrast.

STATUS: Resolved l

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l N-i I' Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review l

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE l

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, HED05El ,

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. DESCRIPTION OF l DEFICIENCY: The shutdown cooling flow meter has a range from 0 to 1000 l spm in 20 spm graduations. Technical Specifications l

l require a flow of 850 spm, thus operator must interpolate  ;

between 840 and 860. l RECOMMENDATION: Class A - 850 wil'1 be clearly and permanently marked. l l

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STATUS: Resolved

t Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian R'. view

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05E2 DESCRIPTION OF

• DEFICIENCY: Several examples exist where meter lights are used in exact opposite modes, e.g., light out/on when setpoint is reached or signal present on similar meters. This is confusing to operator.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Loss-of-signal lights on the charging / bleed indication will be corrected. The others will not, as the benefit is not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HEDOSE3 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Redundant, side-by-side SI accumulator level indicators have different labels.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - These labels will be made the same.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05E4 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: SI accumulator level indicator lacks units called out by EOP.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Units will be identified.

STATUS: Resolved j

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Yankca Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• A NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05ES

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Power range meters have odd minor division of 2.5.

Operators are required to set these meters after calculating Rx power. Setting affects trip point and is difficult to do accurately.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Calibration procedure will be reviewed and scale accuracy required will be provided.

STATUS: Resolved L

e Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05E6 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Pressurizer NR level hard to read and to trend. This parameter is used for both normal and emergency operation.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - A clear unambiguous indication will be provided with trending capability..

n STATUS: Resolved 9

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i Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• R NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED05F0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The failure mode of the display instrumentation, especially standby instruments, it not clearly evident on most displays.

RECOMMENDATION: Class B - Training program will address failure mode of instruments, e.g., live zeros, fail as is, etc.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0600 1 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Numerous annunciator findings comprise this HED, examples are: The annunciator system is a) not consistent in the use of acronyms and abbreviations, b) not prioritized, c) there are no first out alarms, d) not consistent in type of alarm system used, e) has a high use of common windows which block second alans and f) windows inconsistent in type and size.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - A study will be conducted to address all findings. The study results will be reviewed and appropriate changes made. An annunciator standard will be developed and implemented.

STATUS: Resolved l.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED06AO DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The annunciator response controls: a) vary widely in size, shape and relative location to each other, b) in many instances they blend in with the controls on the panel and c) it is possible to inadvertently acknowledge / cancel an alarm.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - These findings will be addressed in the study of HED0600 and changes made as deemed appropriate.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detaileil Control Room Design Revi.ew

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0701

-DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: ~ There are no provisions to prevent interchanging indicator light lenses.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The position of indicating light colors will be standardized. Training will address lens and bulb replacement.

STATUS: Resolved f

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKER ROWE HED0800 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The findings that comprise this HED describe meters or recorders that have a glare or parallax problem. Thus, reading of these instruments is difficult.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - These instruments do not require precise readings during emergency operations. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved p--

t Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0801 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The feedwater controller has glare bands on the glass.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Benefit not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved 4

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0900 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Noise level is marEinally below the maximum reconmended in NUREG-0700.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Benefit not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0901 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The normal lighting for the main control board exceeds NUREG-0700 levels 8 to 30 footcandles.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - There have been no operator complaints. No medical problems have been noted. The benefit is not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0902

. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Near the shutdown cooling panel the lighting is 3 footcandles below the NUREG-0700 minimum.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - This is a Class C deficiency. The panel is used infrequently. Plant operators have independently assessed the lighting in the area and find it to be sufficient. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0903 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Only one area od the Control Room meets the recomo.ided 10 foot candles for lighting. ENG-SRV 282/84 provides details.-

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Benefit is not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED0904 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: There is a draft from the ac unit at the NRV control panel and the guard's station.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Air flow will be redirected to maintain the comfort level at frequently used stations.

STATUS: Resolved 1

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1000 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The findings that comprise this HED are a result of comparing the SPDS to NUREG-0835. Some of the findings are: a) displays not specialized to operating mode, b) no indication of failure, c) no automatic display and d) some variables sampled every 4 seconds instead of the recommended 2.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - All information displayed on the SPDS is duplicated elsewhere. No immediate action is recommended.

Future changes should consider addressing the above. No changes will be made.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1001 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: When reviewed to NUREG-0835, it was determined the SPDS has the following deficiencies: a) no audible alarm, b) alarm clears by itself and c) no indication of an approach to an unsafe condition.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Benefit is not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved 4

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r Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YAEKEE ROWE HED1002 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: During the interviews the operator stated that adequate training on the SPDS was not provided which limits its usefulness as an operator tool.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The intended use of the SPDS will be reviewed.

Training will be improved so that the operators can use it to its fullest.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1100 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: There is too much furniture in this small Control Room. At the SAS there are frequently extra guards and chairs.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Furniture needs will be carefully reviewed and unneeded items removed.

STATUS: Resolved l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1101 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The door for the NRV panel cannot be fully opened because of the bookcase at the end of the row.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The bookcase will be moved.

STATUS: Resolved A

i Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1200 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Frequently it has been difficult to find a free Gaitronics channel for operations use. Assignment of specific channels for operations use has been successful in resolving the problem.

RECOMMENDATION: The problem has been resolved. To maintain this status, permanent labels will be applied to all Gaitronics stations.

STATUS: Resolved 1

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1201 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: After 4 pm on weekends and holidays, the Control Room operator is required to answer all incoming telephone calls. This distracts the operator from his duties. Note findings.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The listed telephone will be switched to the security office after 4 pm. An unlisted line to the '

Control Room will be available for the duty officer.

STATUS: Resolved F

n Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1202 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: All operations department information (Technical Specifications, procedure, E-Plan, etc.) are maintained in identical marked binders.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Binders for Technical Specifications, E0Ps, normal operating procedures and E-Plan will be color coded.

STATUS: Resolved i

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review i

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1203 i.

DESCRIPTION OF s DEFICIENCY: In-plant communication systems are not redundant or diverse. There are two way radios in the Control Room but the receivers have not been issued.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - In the event of a Gaitronics failure, a security officer will be sent to notify the auxiliary operators that the system has failed. At this time the auxiliary operators will be. issued radios.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE

, HED1204 t

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: CC flow can be changed at the SDC panel but no flow meter is available there. No connunication station provided near this panel, l

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - A CC flow meter and Gaitronics station will be provided at this panel.

STATUS: Resolved I

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1 Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Reviev

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• f NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE l l HED1300 )

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DESCRIPTION OF l

DEFICIENCY: Reactor operators do not receive regular training on fire fishting and emergency breathing equipment. l l

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - All personnel including R0s will be trained periodically in the use of emergency equipment that they are expected to use. i l

STATUS: Resolved I

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• l NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1301 l

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DESCRIPTION OF l DEFICIENCY: Access to the Control Room is not procedurally controlled.

l During transients the Control Room tends to become a l gathering place with increased noise level and congestion.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Access to the Control Room during transients will be procedurally limited and by invitation only. Access is controlled at present by 2001. Shift supervisors will be re-instructed on their responsibilities on this aspect of the procedure.

STATUS: Resolved 1

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION - YANKEE ROWE HED1301 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Access to the Control Room is not procedurally controlled.

During transients the Control Room tends to become a gathering place with increased noise level and congestion.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Access to the Control Room during transients will be procedurally limited and by invitation only. Access is controlled at present by 2001. Shift supervisors will be re-instructed on their responsibilities on this aspect of the procedure.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review l 1

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• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE ,

i HED1302

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l DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The findings that comprise this HED describe how the Control Room congestion impedes operator action during normal periods.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - A) Access to the Control Room will be limited.

B) The guards will no longer pass through the operator area. c) The SS has been provided with a desk and communications.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1400 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Some contiguous indicating lights for control rod position are often out of service. These lights are used to determine if the rods in a bank are in step. The operator should be able to determine if the rods are in step or, if out of step, by how much.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The rod position system is regularly maintained.

The system has Technical Specification limits and the limits are being met. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved l

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1401 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The blue safety injection lights on the MCB are not required and needlessly clutter the panel.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - These lights will be removed.

STATUS: Resolved I

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1402 DESCRIPTION'0F DEFICIENCY: The power range indicators have gain and setpoint adjustment knobs which are too close together and can be operated inadvertently.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A 'The gain is periodically adjusted by the operator. If the setpoint is inadvertently changed during the gain adjustment, it causes no problem other than ,

changing the alarm point.

The setpoint adjustment is not a normal operator action.

If the gain was to be inadvertently changed during the setpoint adjustment, it would not be a problem. The gain is part of a two out of six logic and this would only be one out of six. Benefit is not supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved i

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detbiled Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING OEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATI01 -- YANKEE ROWE HED1403 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: In order to do emergency boration, it is necessary to remove the f tses inside the MCB to bypass the charging pump cut out on high pressurizer level.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - A switch with status indication will be provided on the MCB to bypass the high pressurizer level trip of the charging pump.

STATUS: Resolved Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1405 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: On the MCB LCV-220 and 221 are located higher than recommended, and open-close is different on each controller. EOPs require H2 valve operation and position indication.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Benefit not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved i

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1406 DESCRIPTION OF

. DEFICIENCY: On the MCB, there is no indication of purification cooling flow, LP surge tank makeup and shutdown cooling flow.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - All except shutdown cooling are controlled elsewhere by an AO. SDC flow is available in the Control Room area. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved 1

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1407 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The load limit and governor controls require a control movement that is opposite to the feedback indication.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - These controllers are required during emergency operation. A warning label will be provided.

STATUS: Resolved 9

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION - YANKEE ROWE HED1408 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: There is no protection for the trip or scram pushbuttons.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - Protection for these switches will be provided.

STATUS: Resolved I

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1409 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The operator is unable to determine the SI loop valve position during normal operation.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The operation of these valves is procedurally controlled. Prior to plant startup, the valves are opened and power is removed. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved i

-Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1410 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: A digital meter is used to display LPST level. This indicator is not marked to show the units or the range of indicator.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - A label will be provided that indicates the function, range and units.

STATUS: Resolved

i Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1411 i

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The EOP instructs the operator to maintain steam generator temperature less than loop temperature during natural circulation. There is no direct indication of steam generator temperature.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - During natural circulation, conditions are not changing rapidly. Steam tables are provided and the saturation curve is above the panel. This is sufficient.

No change will be made.

1 STATUS: Resolved i

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1413 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The EOPs require venting the VC. The controls are located in the Switchgear Room, and the procedure is complex.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - The valves will be identified and the procedure revised.

STATUS: Resolved

4 Yanken Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1414 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: When testing the NRVs there is no direct feedback. The operator is provided with a dedicated line to communicate with I&C personnel at the valves.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The indirect feedback that is provided is adequate. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1415 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The lockout relays on the SI Panel require greater than normal hand pressure to reset.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The operator only uses these switches to reset safety injection. The force required is within the operators capability. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved L

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1417 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: WL switches must be operated to reset SI but are not mentioned in EOPs.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - This information will be added to the EOP.

STATUS: Resolved s

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• 1 NUCLEAR STATION - YANKEE ROWE HED1418 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: E0P requires action on low S.C. pressure. No direct alarm exists.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - An alarm will be provided.

1 STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1419 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: There is no single listing of equipment out-of-service which is continuously maintained.

RECONNENDATION: Class A - Two lists presently exist and are continuously maintained. One is the tagging book, one is the bypass and safety function status book. Between these two, all necessary information has been provided. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved l'

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t Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1421 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Numerous scrams had occurred from spurious SUR when source range channels became energized during power reduction, with scram bypass switch left in wrong position. This scram function has since been removed.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - The unused source range SUR bypass switch will be removed from the control board.

STATUS: Resolved

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v Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENCINEERINC DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1422 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: E0Ps require MC pressure indicator showing 820 psi, a pressurizer level indicator with good trending capability and mid position indication on the atmospheric steam dumps. None of these exist.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - The pressurizer level indication will be provided in HED05E6. For the remainder, the benefit is not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1425 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The ATWS in EOP No. 1 procedure requires the cperator to open Breakers 1 and 2 and Circuit 12 in the Switchgear Room.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Benefit cannot be supported by cost.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review A HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1426 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The EOPs require determination of adequate shutdown margin. The procedure is cumbersome and time censuming.

RECOMMENDATION: Class C - This action is not time related. The time exists to perform the calculation. No change will be made.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Deslan Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1427 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: The EOPs require plant cooldown using the atmospheric dump valves. Continuous valve position is not indicated at the control Room switch. Human factor engineering consultant suggested SG heat removal should be balanced.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - See HEM 422.

STATUS: Pesolved

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• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1428 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: Hot well level, cooldown rate instrument, steam pump controls, bus room fan status, and SJAE pressure are not available in the Control Room but required in EOPs.

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Benefit is not supported by the cost.

1 STATUS: Resolved I

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review y 1

• HUNAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1429 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENC2: The procedure instructs the operator to trip the purification pumps. The pump switches are marked start and stop.

RECOtStRNDATION: Class C - The procedure will be revised to state start /stop.

STATUS: Resolved

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review

• HUMAN ENGINEERING DEFICIENCY RECORD

• NUCLEAR STATION -- YANKEE ROWE HED1500 L

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY: EOP requires pressure control of steam-driven feed pump but gauge cannot be seen from manual control station. "

RECOMMENDATION: Class A - Benefit is not supported by the cost.

STATUS: Resolved l

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Yankee Wuclear Power Station Detailed Control Rcom Design Review e

IX. ATTACHMENTS Attachment A Resumes Attachment B Audit Concerns l

Attachment C List of Emergency Procedures Used l

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' Y=ab e Euclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Desian Review k

l I ATTACHMENT &

i RESUMES N '

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review RESUME JOHN DYNAN CANDON EDUCATION:

Independent Studies in Organizational Behavior (no degree) 1973-present, University of Vermont Burlington, Vermont B.S. (Electrical Engineering) 1964-1966, University of Vermont Burlington, Vermont Cadet engineer (no degree) 1959-1963, USMA West Point, New York College preparatory (H.S. Diploma) 1955-1959, Proctor High School Proctor, Vermont YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY (September 1973-Present)

Present Position: Principal Engineer Engineering Services Group March 1981-June 1985 Position: Principal Engineer - Emergency Procedures Nuclear Engineering Department Responsibilities: Work on special projects as directed by NED Director and Project Managers of the YNSD operating plants-Major Accomplishments:

o Participated in generation of the Boiling Water Reactor Emergency Procedure Guidelines as Chairman of the Sub-Group. (Current Member) o Participated in generation of the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency

!, Procedure Guidelines. (current Member) l l 0 Participated in the Regulatory Response Group of the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group. (Current Member)

, o Participated in the task analysis of several reactor Control Rooms, notably the Vermont Yankee Station and the Rowe Station.

l 0- Participant in the modifications to emergency operating procedures at the I 1Rowe Station and at the Vermont Yankee Station.

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o Participant in the design, the verification and the validation of the Rowe Station Safety Parameter Display System.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review o Participation in the Ad-Hoc Utility Group Qualifications for Reactor Operators r;eview of Florida Power & Light's task analysis for shif t supervisor.

o Participation with other Control Room experts for EG&G Idaho in a modified Delphic Technique Conference for future Control Room enhancements.

o Participation of several INPO nuclear utility task forces, o Participation in the AIF subcommittee on Control Rooms.

1977-March 1981 Position: Principal Engineer Nuclear Engineering Department Responsibilities: To assist Department Manager as necessary in the nuclear engineering, development and licensing arena.

Organize projects and task forces at inception; review and follow during execution; assure day-to-day continuity of department efforts; follow-up of implementation; and formulate future plans.

Major Accomplishments:

o Member of Yankee Senior Task Force for TMI Post-Accident Evaluations and In-House Recommendations.

o Instrumental in the formation of the BWR Owners Group in June 1979.

o . Participated in the analysis of the TMI-2 accident from the operators perspective and presented the results to the Control Room operating crews at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station and the Maine Yankee Power Station.

o Participant on the Pilgrim Station Nuclear Audit and Safety Review Committee.

o Participant in the development of REACC, a management computer graphic Program for project cost estimating and accounting at YAEC.

o Supervised the Stability Testing Program at the Vermont Yankee Station.

1975-1977 Position: Manager of Core Components Group Yankee Atomic Electric Company A-2

-- - . . _ - . ~

. Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Responsibilities: To assure continuous supply of core components (fuel, control rods, instrumentation, channels analytical services, licensing services) for the Yankee Station, the Maine Yankee Station and the Vermont Yankee Station.

Major Accomplishments:

4 o Negotiated several contracts for core components with vendors, presented results to sponsor companies, administered contracts.

o Managed the Maine Yankee Power Station uprate from 2440 MWt to 2630 MWt

! licensed power level.

September 1973-1975 Position: Engineer - Reactor Physics Group Yankee Atomic Electric Company l

Responsibilities

To assist in developing the SIMULATE model; to assist in evaluating fuel j failures at operating reactors; to assist in evaluating reactor transients.

l Major Accomplishments:

i o Participated in creation of several algorithms for use in SIMULATE.

o Accomplished operator of the SIMULATE code.

o Evaluation of Vermont Yankee Accidental Criticality Transient.

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION (April 1964-September 1973) 1970-1973 i

l Position: Reactor and Computer Supervisor Vermont Yankee Station f

Responsibilities: To coordinate the Startup and Test Program for reactor operational l' testing; to supervise the reactor and computer personnel; to evaluate the results of reactor operational tests.

Major Accomplishments:

i. o. Trained, directed and supervised the reactor and computer engineers assigned to the group.

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i o- With others, designed the Special Nuclear Material Accountability L

procedure for the Vermont Yankee Station.

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i Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review o- Designed a core loading of fuel elements based upon linear reactivity evaluations of re-constituted fuel assemblies, o- Participated in initial on-site licensing school as student and

. instructor. Prepared operating procedures and FSAR revisions.

o Prepared, conducted and analyzed the results of numerous startup tests including fuel loading procedures. Performed tests and surveillances for normal operations. Performed analysis of post-trip computer outputs and-instrument readings.

April 1964-1970 Position: Engineer-in-Training Responsibilities: To become a nuclear power generation specialist.

Major Accomplishments:

o Participated in startup testing at Millstone Point Unit 1. Participated in installation, test and operation of travelling incore probe system.

Performed engineering calculations to compare operating limits to design and Technical Specification limits. Participated in writing operating procedures. Participated in test and operation of the station process

-computer. Participated in analyses of post-trip computer outputs and instrument readings. (1969-1970) o' Participated in startup testing at Connecticut Yankee. Participated in installation, test and operation of prototype incore flux monitoring devices including calculation of reactor operating values for comparison to design and Technical Specification limits. Participated in installation, test and operation of station process computer.

• Participated in analysis of post-trip computer outputs and instrument

-readings. (1967-1968)

-o -Certificate of Completion of short course on Nuclear Power Reactor Safety l

st MIT. (1967) o Participated in refueling at Rowe Station. Participant in vapor container leak rate test. (1966) o Certificate of Completion of short course on Reactor Safety at University

of Michigan. (1966)

AFFILIATIONS ,

i o' Member - IEEE-o Member - AIF Subcommittee on Control Rooms

. AWARDS

.o- 1970 Reactor Operators License - Millstone Unit 1 o 1972 Senior Reactor Operator License - Vermont Yankee A-4

Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Rcom Design Review RESUME OF:

DAVID B. HALLON0UIST PERSONAL DATA Address: 340 Sunderland Road #13, Worcester, MA 01604 Telephone: (617) 791-2179 (Home)

Telephone: (617) 872-8100 X-2347 (Office)

Family: Wife (Nora) and Two Children (Bert and Neil)

Date of Birth: December 9, 1953 BACKGROUND 1981 - Present Yankee Atomic Electric Company Mr. Hallonquist has completed an extensive 3-year Engineering Training Program with Yankee Atomic Electric company. This program was divided into three 1-year segments with assignments at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, the Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, and Yankee Nuclear Services Division (YNSD) in Framingham, Massachusetts. The following is a composite of Mr. Hallonquist's training schedule:

Date Location Time in Department Department 1981-82 VY 7 Months Maintenance (Electrical) 2 Months Reactor Engineering 2 Months Operations 1982-83 YP 6 Months Maintenance (Mechanical) 6 Months Instrument and Control 1983-84 YNSD 6 Months Maine Yankee Project (Systems Engineer) 6 Months Plant Engineering (Engineering Services Group)

On-the-job training at these sites included Engineering (writing pas, PDCRs, and EDCRs), Procurement, and Expediting of materials, supervision of installation, and final closeout.

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Sample's of some notable projects that Mr. Hallonquist was directly responsible for during the program are as follows:

- In-core instrument repair at Yankee plant.

- Design of level control systems for #1 feedwater heater and drain receiver at Yankee plant.

- Design, procurement and installation of Appendix "R"

fire barriers at Maine Yankee.

- Insulation studies of various tanks at Maine Yankee.

- Evaluation and purchase of an infrared video system for YNSD.

- Organizing an infrared inspection program for performing

i. preventative maintenance surveys at Yankee plant, Vermont Yankee, and Maine Yankee.

1979 - 1980 Central Intelligence Agency During the summer of 1980, Mr. Hallonquist worked as a test engineer for the office of Technical' Services / Equipment  !

Suitability Division in Washington, DC. His i responsibilities during this period were testing a Doppler-Shift Radar, a Forward-Looking Infrared System, various Photo-Optic Systems, and concealment devices.

4' In the summer of 1979, Mr. Hallonquist worked as an Analyst for the Office of Scientific Intelligence /Buclear Energy Division in Washington, DC. The nature of this work is classified.

1971 - 1977 U.S; Navy Mr. Hallonquist served on the U.S.S. George Bancroft,

. SSBN 643uns a Nuclear ~ Reactor Operator / Reactor

!? ~ - Technician / Electronics Technician. His duties and L' responsibilities included the safe operation of the ship's

( nuclear reactor, maintenance, and repair of nuclear-related instruments, and the training of new operators.

!~ EDUCATION B.S. in Physics - Rensselear Polytechnic Institute - 1981

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Completed Training Program's in:

l Electronics Technician (Class A) School j- Naval Nuclear Power School l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review SSG Nuclear Power Operational Training Unit (PWR)

VY Systems Training for R0s and SR0s Course in Applied Thermography (Certified Thermographer

1. 1102) i l

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review ATTACHMENT B AUDIT CONCERNS An in-progress audit was conducted by the Human Factors Branch staff members and contractor during October 15 through 19. Following the audit,.a written Audit Report was issued to Yankee Atomic Electric Company. Several of the questions have been addressed in the summary report dealing with various aspects of the DCRDR. Attachment B provides a complete response to the issues raised in the Audit Report.

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COMMENTS ON THE SAI AUDIT REPORT OF THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW AT THE YANKEE PLANT

INTRODUCTION The audit took place at the plant on October 15 through 19. Yankee was represented by members of the YR Project, and both the Management Team and Review Team of the DCRDR. The report which follows will consist of an item-by-item clarification, or explanation, of the issues stated in the Audit Report.

To aid in understanding the entire DCRDR, one should be aware of the following information since a number of the concerns expressed in the Audit Report center around these matters.

1. The only requirements applied to the DCRDR are those of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. All other documents referenced (NUREG-0700, 0801, especially) are guidance to the NRC reviewer and not binding on the licensee. There is no requirement for operator interviews or review of historical operating events. These are voluntary and can be done as the licensee chooses, or not at all.

2. Requirement 2 of the Audit Report, which briefly summarizes Item 5.B.ii of NUREG-0737, is here called " Task Analysis Requirement". 5.B.ii actually states, "The use of function and task analysis (that had been used as the bases for developing emergency operating procedures) to identify Control Room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations. This analysis has multiple purposes and should also serve as the basis for developing training and staffing needs and verifying SPDS parameters." Note the parenthetical requirement for the Task Analysis. No formal Task Analysis to develop E0Ps was available at the time and/or.an acceptance substitute. The Review Team performed the necessary analysis to derive the required information from the emergency operating procedures.

3. The BWR Owners Group methodology and check sheets were accepted by the NRC and so stated in Generic Letter 83-18, dated March 19, 1983. They can apply to any kind of control panel, PWRs, distillery, or a cement factory as well. No unusual knowledge is required to do the survey and fill in the check sheets. Some human factors knowledge might be valuable in assessing the results or proposing a solution.

4. The NRC Audit Team reviewed the work of the Review Team before it was submitted to the Nhnagement Team. The ultimate decision as to which reconunendations of the DCRDR team will be actually implemented, when, and in what fashion is not the responsibility of the Review Team.

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AUDIT COMMENTS AND RESPONSES Audit comments are identified by page and paragraph and occasionally by

-paragraph heading.

The report which follows is provided in a Statement / Response format. While no response to the audit report has actually been required, it is thought that a reply to the audit report could assit.in the review of our DCRDR. Verbal discussions with the NRC representative indicated that issues of concern could be addressed in the Summary Report.

Audit comment Page 6, Last paragraph and top of Page 7 operations and Nuclear Systems personnel were assisted in walkthroughs of EOPs numbered 1, 4, 7, and 10 by the human factors consultants.

The role of the human factors consultants in the walkthroughs of the four procedures listed above was apparently to ask questions and to observe. A review of the task analysis worksheets indicates that there was minimal commentary by the human factors consultants (one finding recorded - on EOP #1).

Response

EOPs 1, 4, 7, and 10 were performed by the human factors consultants and an operator. These four procedures were chosen because they essentially used all the Control Room instruments and controls. The remaining six procedures were done by another member of the DCRDR team and the same operator.

Detailed instructions and original data for both the identification of I&C needs and the comparison with the Control Room inventory were provided to the audit team on the first day.

The role of the two human factors consultants was to perform the comparison by completing the check sheets, as the operator discussed the procedural step.

Instead of one finding there were seventy-five clearly identified findings.

Audit Conument Page 7, Third Paragraph Presently YAEC states that the only EOP not covered in the task analysis is the " Loss of All AC Power". However, documentation is nseded to demonstrate the completeness of the task analysis in covering: the E0Ps, the tasks performed in emergency operations, and the interfaces involved in emergency operations. YAEC should provide a description of a ecmparison of the EOPs covered in the task analysis with the function restoration guidelines and EOPs described in the WOG ERGS in order to assure a more representative review of their work.

Response

The NRC auditor wished to be reassured that the EOPs used to derive the I&C needs included all emergencies, e.g., loss of AC power. No one from the procedure writing group was available at the time. He suggested we provide a comparison with the Westinghouse ERGS in the Summary Report and it was so agreed. -Subsequently, it has been determined that the critical Safety Function EOPs do, in fact, address loss of all AC power. That event title B-2 1

naturally does not occur in a symptom-based procedure. The symptom-based procedures were developed to assure fuel cladding integrity by providing

. guidance to maintain five " critical safety functions" without regard to which I event was being experienced. Thus, the critical safety function E0Ps address all events, including loss of all AC power.

Audit Comment Page 7, Last paragraph and Page 8 first three paragraphs Our assessment of the task analysis worksheets revealed many instances in which the level of detail of the listed information and control requirements is too vague to allow an adequate comparison of the requirements with the existing instruments and controls in the Control Room. An example of such an instance is the following:

Step One of the Reactivity Anomaly Procedure states that th' task is to " Initiate Manual Reactor Scram by l

De-Energizing Control Rod Drives". The I&C need is

" Switch" and the I&C requirement is " Easily Accessible, Reliable, Quick-Acting, Easily Operated Switch". The I&C requirement should list more specific requirements such as: switch positions, type of contrel/ switch capability needed (discrete versus continuous), the control

, operation if the control capability needed is discrete (detented versus spring-loaded, momentary contact position), etc.

Except for these instances, YARC usually provides appropriate detail on the required design characteristics or refers to a standard. The problem with comparing general requirements to Control Room instruments and controls is that the comparison ~could be subjective and the detection of unsuitably designed instruments and controls could be faulty.

Another example of an inexact I&C requirement is:

Symptom 6 reads " Failure to Scram When Main Coolant Pump Current is out

, of range". One of the I&C needs (No. 4) is a " Low Flow Alarm". The l

corresponding I&C requirement states, " Audible and Visual Alarm". In l

other cases, YAEC has identified the setpoint, when exceeded, that the audible and visual alarm would actuate on.

When questioned on the lack of precision of some of the I&C requirements, YAEC stated that this was due to the fact that the Review Team members were not fully capable of performing the entire analysis (in detail) and did not seek help in those areas (tasks and requirements) in which their knowledge was l not sufficient. This response shows neither commitment to nor understanding i of the serious nature of this issue.

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Response

i The concern expressed about the lack of detail in the requirements was again a l

comperison with the " guidelines" mentioned in the introduction. The method chosen by YR to derive the I&C needs from the procedures, did not lend itself

to the level of detail in the guidance. All the available information in the procedure was evaluated to determine the minimum I&C needs and requirements.

t The details used in the auditor's example are not needed for the equipment to perform the procedure step.

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The comparison is indeed subjective, and deliberately so. In the case of the low flow setpoint, this is determined, and may be changed, for each core.

Thus, no specific value was provided. This should not be interpreted to mean that the Review Team was not serious or capable.

Audit Comment Page 8 Last Paragraph The analysis of traffic flow was performed only in the static context of the control Room survey and the evaluation of operator workload (mentioned in the program plan) was not performed at all. When questioned on the methodology of the analysis of traffic flow, the human factors consultant stated that this was performed in both static checklisting and walkthroughs of the procedures.

However, further inquiry found that if the analysis was performed during the walkthroughs, it was not systematic nor rigorous, and was based on subjective observation by the human factors consultants. A static context, such as that offered by checklisting, for evaluating traffic flow is not adequate as the sole means of systematic evaluation since operator activities must be considered. Overall, the analysis of traffic flow was not adequate due to a lack of systematic and rigorous application of criteria in an operational / dynamic context. In addition, contrary to the program plan, YAEC stated that operator workload was not evaluated.

Response

Numerous adverse comments relative to the YR analysis of traffic flow and operator workload were included in the subject paragraph by implying a standard and then criticizing our method. The Program Plan states "By means I of a special part of the checklist the control room environment will be evaluated for comfort, noise level, lighting, location, traffic patterns, workloads, and other issues...", and this was indeed done. We found that the guards walk through the Control Room on their way to and from the SAS, the L Operation Department personnel walk through on their way to the toilet, the Control Room operators answer a lot of outside telephone calls between 5:00 and 7:00 FM, and that certain instruments are located on the back of the board, to name just a few findings. We did not do, or ever expected to do, what the NRC consultant assumed the brief statement in the Program Plan meant. And, as stated, when the I&C comparison walkthrough found the l procedure required leaving the Control Room, or doing several widely separated

. tasks at the same time, these facts were addressed in the resulting findings.

l Audit Comment Page 9 First Paragraph In rummary, the task analysis and instrument and control comparison was fairly

well performed. YAEC did take the initiative to develop symptom-oriented EOPs and use these rather than the event-oriented EOPs as the basis for the task analysis. However, the following concerns should be resolved

1. The effect that the results of the NRC's review of YAEC's PGP will have upon the task analysis.

2. The comprehensiveness of the coverage of emergency operations in the task '

analysis.

3. Instances exist in the task analysis where "I&C requirements" were not defined in sufficient detail.

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4. The analysis of traffic flow was not adequately performed.

5. No analysis of operator workload was performed.

Response

1. We cannot anticipate the NRC's review of the YAEC Procedure Generation Package _(PGP). The EOPs used were the latest issue available. However,

'any substantive changes in the procedures are required to be " verified" that they can be accomplished. Presumably, the revised procedure generation package (PGP) will describe this function.

2. Comprehensive coverage of emergency operation has already been addressed

in the response to Page 7.

3. I&C requirements not in sufficient detail. See response to Page 7.

t 4. Analysis of traffic flow. See response to Page 8.

5. Operator workload. See response to Page 8.

Audit Comment Page 9 Last Paragraph The process and actual results of the verification of available and suitable inetruments and controls raises some concerns since some of the requirements on the computer printout which listed "I&C requirements" correlate with instruments and controls in the Control Room. For example, the main coolant flow instrument was initially determined to require a linear display meter

-with specific range and scale requirements. These initial requirements, as defined by the task analysis, were apparently modified to match the flow meter existing within the Control Room. No documentation was available to justify

, the requirement modifications.

j Response i

The original list of I&C requirements were generated by the human factors consultants without ever seeing the control Room. They inserted the l l requirement for the main coolant pump ammeter to have a linear scale. During the walkthrough by the same consultant team, they found the actual scale was linear, except between zero and the first division the scale was compressed.

He changed the requirement to " readable". In the second instance, the range for each of the four-loop flow indicators was incorrectly defined as the range

'for total core flow. The human factors consultant team corrected these numbers when they were discovered during the walkthrough.

These two instances were the only changes made during the walkthrough. The auditors comment is incorrect in that it mixes two changes together, but it also implies that there were numerous such instances. These examples were explained to the audit team and they found no other such examples.

)udit Comment Page 10 Control Room Survey The Yankee Rowe CRDR survey, as derived from the BWROG checklist and NUREG-0700, does not appear to be adequately comprehensive and lacks

objectivity. In comparing the YAEC CRDR survey checklists with the criteria B-5

expressed in NUREG-0700, the YAEC CRDR survey checklists were found to contain both generalities.and partial coverage of review areas in NUREG-0700, thus

limiting;the reviewer's ability to identify items which have potential for

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human error. .In making's quick survey of - these areas within the Control Room.

-the NRC audit team identified discrepancies with NUREG-0700 criteria that may not have been identified using the present YAEC CRDR survey checklists. The YAEC Control Room survey addresses non-computer Alarm / Status Lights (annunciators) by asking fourteen questions to cover the two defined areas of Alarm / Status Lights grouping and Alarm Status windows. In contrast, the more detailed quantitative approach of NUREG-0700, Section 6.3, addresses the same subject of Annunciator Warning Systems using four topic areas which describe fifteen guidelines (listed in Appendix 3). The YAEC CRDR checklist fails to address nine of these guidelines and the remaining six are only partially addressed.

Additional surveying by the NRC audit team revealed that the YAEC CRDR survey checklist covering Control Room Environment lacked thorough and detailed criteria in the. areas addressing Communication Systems, Audible Signals, and Lighting, as described in Appendix 4.

Response

t. As noted in the introduction, the BWR Owners Group survey form, which we used, was accepted by the NRC. Despite his concern, he does not list any

substantive omissions from using the YR survey sheets. Note the examples

listed in the next comment.

l Audit comment Page 11 Second Paragraph During a walkthrough inspection of the Yankee Rowe Control Room, two items i were discovered that were neither addressed by YAEC's subjective checklist, nor appeared in the list of findings compiled by YAEC. First, on the main control panel, the two circulating water pumps and their two associated motor operative valves were neither physically aligned nor demarcated to indicate which valve was associated with which pump. Secondly, the Main Coolant heat Balance Panel, which includes instrumentation for all four loops, has several scales which need to be addressed. The Change Temperature display (MC-T1-76/or Loop 1) does not use normal scale increments, i.e., 0-40-80-120 up to 200 0F. Furthermore, the Temperature Hot Narrow Range (THNR No. 1) and l

i the Temperature Cold Narrow Range (TCNR No. 1) scales are not comparable at 4600 F-5600F for THNR No. I and 4350F -5350F for TCNR No. 1. The TCNR and the THNR are next to the Temperature Hot Wide Range (THWR) and the Temperature Cold Wide Range (TCWR) instruments, both of which have scales of 0-700 0F. The close proximity of four instruments of the same type labeled

. TMNR, THWR, TCNR, and TCWR, using three different scales multiplied by a

! factor of four loops, should have been a prime target for YAEC examination.

I

Response

c These examples were noticed by the DCRDR review team during the static survey and judged inconsequential.

i

The circulating water pump switches and corresponding indicating lights are located one above the other on Panel 10. The position indicating lights for

-the pump discharge valves are located between the pump switches, one beside a

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the other. While not adhering to the strictest human factors standard, which

prefers everything consistently top to bottom, or right to left, no operator has ever been confused by this layout and the reviewers thought it unworthy of comment.

l The second example is not exactly clear. Since the narrow range hot les

, temperature and the narrow range cold les temperature indicators normally span *

'different ranges, one would logically expect different scales and ranges. The

, . comparison of I&C needs with the Control Room inventory had no problem with  !

I these divisions. All four loop TCNRs use the same range and divisions, j Similarly, all THERs and the wide range instruments.

' Audit Comment Pages 11 and 12 Operator Interview The Yankee Rowe Program Plan stated the " interview with a majority of the operators will be conducted. The interview sample population will include supervisory and non-supervisory operators and both licensed operators and

< senior licensed operators".

The licensee stated that 31 questionnaires were sent out to licensed i i operators. The compilation of comments from operator questionnaires and interviews indicated 13 questionnaires were returned and that 11 operators f were interviewed. A review of the questionnaires and interview sheets

indicated that only 5 interview sheets were appended to the operator

! questionnaires.

l The sunnary report compiled from operator interviews and questionnaires was

vague and non-specific in that it contained comments like:

( "SPDS, not well suited, fails, inaccurate."

l "New stuff on H2 panel is strange."

l "DG panel has too many colored lights."

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"Every procedure has quirks."

l_

Operator interviews should be used to define in detail those specific operator concerns resulting from the Detail Review Team's analysis of all operator questionnaires. This information combined with the results of the historical i

review should provide a specific, detailed listing of problems to be investigated.

In general, the operator questionnaires / interview sheets reflected significant operator concerns, Which appeared to be given candidly and seriously, resulting in the identification of HEDs. For additional detailed operator concerns, refer to Appendix 5 of this report.

Response

), First, it should be noted that the operator interview is not a requirement.

! .Second, during the survey.it was discovered that all operators did not prefer to be interviewed or to complete questionnaires. Third, the interviewers, the Review Team manager, and the human factors consultant, discovered in reviewing the questionnaires, that the operator-frequently did not understand the I

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4 l- question and answered something else; had numerous idiosyncrasies, and frequently stated "They wouldn't change anything anyway". As a result, the survey team found it useful to filter the operator comments to extract a logical finding. In addition, the operator comment occasionally directed the reviewer to an area of concern where no question had been asked. Since there was no stated requirement for operator interviews and it was a voluntary =

action, the Review Group considered it allowable to modify the Program Plan statements and to report the changes in the Summary Report.

Regarding the 5 interview sheets for 13 questionnaires, the interviewer stmply wrote the responses on the operator questionnaire sheet.

Audit Comment Page 12 Last Paragraph' and Page 13 A historical survey was conducted which generally followed the guidance of the Yankee Rowe Program Plan. The Program Plan provided for a review of the Licensee Event Reports (LER), Plant Information Report (PIR), and the Plant

Scram Log for the years 1982 and 1983. It provided that the review would be done in accordance with an explicit procedure developed and provided by the Review Team. It further provided that the operator questionnaires and interviews would probe the operators' knowledge of events prior to the document review.

The operator questionnaires and interview results did not indicate that any questions were asked, or responses given, concerning events prior to the document review, as specified by the plan. This would seem to ignore several years of plant operating experience which might have provided valuable input to the DCRDR process.

Response

The plant scram log covers the plant's complete lifetime. The reference to

! " prior to the document review" was to LERs, which have only been required in i recent years. The interview " probing for prior events" was indeed done as at least one of the operators was an original startup operator and several were operators of long standing. In addition, one of the interviewers was an original operator with 10 years of early experience.

Audit Comment Page 13 Control Room Surveys 7

The Control Room surveys conducted by the licensee were not performed entirely in accordance with the Yankee Rowe Program Plan and survey checklists. Some

[

discrepancies between the intended survey methodology and that actually performed are listed in Appendix 6 of this report. The surveys were accompanied by written instructions, included as Appendix 7, yet a review of the documentation showed omissions of data and varying levels of compliance to the instructions. It is possible that further instruction on the use and

[

- value of these surveys would have aided in meeting this requirement of

[ NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. In addition, a lack of accurate documentation establishing an audit trail for reviewing the changes in the survey

methodology makes it difficult to determine if decisions were made to omit

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certain sections of the survey (e.g., color coding, labels), or whether l-certain sections of the survey escaped the examination of the Review Team in l

an incomplete state.

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h.

Response

Our technique for doing the static survey was to use a set of check sheets for each panel, even though several of the questions were general, such as "Is there a plant color standard?". Some of the surveyors, knowing they had already answered these questions on a previous panel and that they had generated findings, stopped circling the answers for these questions and did not document the reason.

j We have subsequently gone over the checksheets again and filled in all the missing'information. While a couple of questions were discovered to have been actually overlooked, no additional findings were found in the process.

4 Audit Comment Page 13 Last Paragraph In the Program Plan, YAEC stated that a four-level scale of compliance, plus a "not applicable" category, will be used for each item on the checklist. This is different from.the dichotomous approach taken by NUREG-0700 that does not require subjective judgment of human factors principles. The staff was i concerned that the survey team members might need a considerable amount of training to qualify them for such a sophisticated rating approach. YAEC has determined that the five-level scale for rating degree of compliance is not appropriate to its needs; however, no audit trail was available to document

- the decision.to exclude its use.

Response

The last comment is the result of a statement to the audit team from the Chairman of the Management Committee to the effect that after having completed the Seabrook survey and the Rowe survey using the five-level scale of compliance, if we had to do it again, we probably would use a simple yes/no response. We did not make any change, hence, no audit trail of that change could be available. The need for training for the BWR Owners Group checksheets is minimal since the degree of compliance refers to the number of times an example appears on the control panel. Little or no additional training is needed.

s Audit Comment Page 14 Assessment of HEDs

. As previously mentioned, the degree of compliance rating scale of 0 through 4 was determined by the Review Team to be of little use and, therefore, resulted in no substantial effect upon the results of the survey and the assessment of HEDs coming from the survey.

Response

I The fact.that we would not use the degree of compliance rating of 0 through 4 the next time, did not mean it was "of little use", but that the results could have been accomplished with less work. In practice, the Review Team wrote a g finding for every checksheet answer of 2 or greater. In practice, therefore, we were using a Yes/No System.

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Audit comment Page 15 Class A - A HED that could potentially have a significant impact on safety or cause a deviation; Class B -- A HED that has the potential to cause human error that could be harmful to plant personnel or equipment; and Class C - A HED that could inconvenience the operator.

This system of classification was not used to prioritize HEDs on a basis of relative importance. The Design Review Team felt that since none of the HEDs found were to be more significant than any of the others, there was no need to prioritize and resolve the HEDs based on YAEC's classification scheme. We believe that the lack of prioritization is inappropriate since HEDs of seemingly great importance, such as worn-out switches that were not making contact, would prevent picking up emergency loads, were given the same priority as HEDs of much lesser importance, such as labels with incorrect lettering size. Instead, YAEC states that the schedule of implementing HED resolutions will be determined by the complexity of the implementation, which is defined by such factors as:

'o Budget, o Manpower, o Calendar Time, and o The Refueling Schedule.

Response

The Review Team method was to separate classification and prioritization, whereas.the auditor seems to expect a direct relationship. Classification, as done at YR, defined the type of difficulty which could be caused by the HED, leaving the Management committee the freedom to, for example, not implement an HED which was classified as an operator inconvenience (Class C). Prioritizing was to be the means of determining which HEDs should be corrected first.

j During the audit we explained that we found no HEDs of such urgency (priority) that they needed to be separated from the other and implemented immediately.

This is not surprising in an operating plant because as problems had been found in the past, they were corrected. Using this method, the priority is established by the four factors listed, as well as the complexity of the fix and the lead time to order equipment.

Audit Conument Page 16 Selection of Design Improvement Furthermore, we believed that the limited role of the Review Team in determining detailed HED solutions, the apparent ability of the Management Team to change HED assessments, along with the introduction of supplementary staff to develop solutions, to be inadequate for resolving HEDs.

Response

The first item " limited role of the Review Team" was described to the audit team and in the Program Plan, as follows. Specific modifications such as changing the scale of an indicator, or moving a switch to a new position, B-10 i

- . . - - - - - - . - . . - . _ .-._ - - -. - .. - . - __ -. ,. -_,. - . - -~

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l would be recommended by the Review Team. The actual detailed design of the )

. change would be done by others. This left the auditors with the concern that i the actual installation might not meet the concerns originally expressed by the Review Team. The second item, the ability of the Management Team to change HED assessment, was described in the Program Plan. Following receipt {

of the pre-audit letter from the NRC, where this concern was expressed, the l L Management Committee gave up the right to change a HED and the audit team was '

notified of this at the entrance interview.

l Audit Comment Page 16 i

-Furthermore, there was concern that the role of the Review Team in the development of solutions was limited to the conceptual level. This presents j the possibility that the detailed resolutions developed by the engineering

! ' staff could be inadequate, or introduce additional HEDs. Additionally, the l use of supplementary staff, whose qualifications have not been presented, to support the Review Team, appeared to be inappropriate.

Response

This concern had been expressed in the pre-audit letter from the NRC. As a

result, a meeting was held before the audit between the YR Project and the Manager of the Review Team. At that meeting, it was decided that all.

engineering designs would be done by the Yankee engineering staff and that human factors review of those designs would be provided by the normal Yankee engineering review process. This description was presented by the Rowe

! Project representative at the audit entrance interview and found completely

[ unacceptable by the NRC. . Then the Management Team Chairman presented a l . possibility that the Review Team may remain in existence until all l modifications are completed. This was acceptable, but since it had not yet

!' been given managemet:t approval, the concern remains. This decision has been I made. The Review Team will remain in existence until all designs have been reviewed.

Audit' Comment Page 17 Presently, the Review Team has no actual, formal criteria for determining the acceptability of a conceptual solution. This may be the reason why adequate conceptual solutions have not been proposed or developed for all HEDs sent to the Management Team for approval, as shown in Appendix 9.

l Response

-The Review Team creates the conceptual solution to a HED in full committee and generally with unanimous agreement. The Program Plan states that if the human factors expert disagrees, his view will be documented. No such disagreements

.have occurred. No formal criteria for creating conceptual solutions exist.

l However, in the minds of the Review Team adequate conceptual solutions have been proposed. One could wish for more specifics or more detail in the i conceptual solution, but & conceptual solution may deliberately be l non-specific to allow flexibility in implementation. The examples quoted in r

Appendix 9 of some " resolution (which) may be inadequate" represent differences between the NRC consultant's opinions of an acceptable modification and that of the Review Team. We think a step stool is a satisfactory solution. Similarly, in HED 800 we feel we can predict the B-11 l

I' l degree of precision needed in reading the level of the Safety Injection tank no matter what the emergency. HED 1420 " Relieving the control room operator of phone answering duties" solves the problem. Even if the unlikely solution were to provide a telephone operator in the Control Room on the back shift, the distraction would be removed.

The NRC audit report summary ends with eight conclusions.

Conclusion No. 1 Number 1 is satisfactory.

Conclusion No. 2 The results of the function and task analysis indicate that although fairly well performed, more effort will be required to satisfy this requirement in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. The NRC audit team concerns are described in the Function and Task Analysis section of this report.

Response

It is not clear if the "more effort" referenced is the rigorous detail to develop the EOP guidelines and the EOPs themselves. The development of I&C needs appears to be adequate, or has already been addressed, in previous responses.

Conclusion No. 3 The review of the existing Control Room instruments and controls with the information and control requirements identified by the task analysis indicated that a more systematic approach, coupled with improved information and documentation of the task analysis data, will permit compliance with this requirement of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.

Response

The concerns about the comparison between needs and inventory were discussed in previous responses. We assume this task is complete and have no plans for a "more systematic approach".

Conclusion No. 4 The Control Room survey was found to be neither as objective, nor as quantitative, as necessary to assure a proper review, as indicated by the results of a review of the survey documentation and the NRC audit team's sample survey. Additional NRC audit team observations are provided in the Control Room Survey section of this report.

Response

The missing entries have been completed. All check sheets are done. The apparent deficiencies discovered by the Audit Team have been explained. YAEC is convinced that a proper review has been performed without the use of NUREG-0700.

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Conclusion No. S' The NRC audit team is concerned that YAEC has elected not to prioritize HEDs for purposes of resolution, indicating that no HED is more important than any other.

Response

See previous response on this issue. The reason and method for not

. prioritizing is described earlier. -

Conclusion No. 6 l

It is a positive action that the Review Team collectively develops the conceptual solutions, yet the lack of criteria for an acceptable solution needs to be addressed. Furthermore, there is the need for a system which will-

~ permit the Review Team to follow the HED from conceptual solution through detailed design to implementation.

Response

Already discussed in a previous response.

i' Conclusion No. 7 A proposal has been introduced for the retention of the Review Team to participate in the design process to ensure the resolutions correct the

- present problems and that these modifications do not introduce new HEDs into the Control Room. The NRC Audit Team strongly encourages this involvement by the Review Team.

1

Response

The YAEC response to this issue has been resolved and is described in the response to page-16.

Conclusion No. 8 No procedure for coordinating the DCRDR with other improvement programs exists, but the licensee plans to develop this integration procedure. The NRC Audit Team believes this coordination function should be in place before the DCRDR is completed.

Response

Integration of the DCRDR with other improvement programs is being maintained.

Procedures will be developed as needed. When a change from one improvement #

i- program affects another, it is recognized and continuity is maintained.

t i

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Yankee Nuclear Power Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Attachment C List of Emergency Procedures Used for Task Analysis EOP No. 1 Reactivity Anomaly EOP No. 2 Secondary Pressure High EOP No. 3 Secondary Level High EOP No. 4 Secondary Level Low EOP No. 5 Secondary Preesure Low EOP No. 6 Secondary Radiation High EOP No. 7 Main Coolant Pressure Low EOP No. 8 Main Coolant Temperature High EOP No. 9 Main Coolant Pressure High EOP No. 10 Vapor Container Pressure High l

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