IR 05000498/1996023

Insp Repts 50-498/96-23 & 50-499/96-23 on 961029-1101.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Cr Simulator,Tsc,Osc, & EOF

ML20134K899
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	11/15/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134K883	List: IR 05000498/1996023 ML20134K880
References
50-498-96-23, 50-499-96-23, NUDOCS 9611200084
Download: ML20134K899 (17)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket Nos.: 50-498 50-499

- License Nos.: NPF-76 NPF-80

- Report No.: 50-498/96-23 50-499/96-23 Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company Facility: South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 I ocation: FM 521 - 8 miles west of Wadsworth Wadsworth, Texas Dates: October 29 through November 1,1996 Team Leader: Gail M. Good, Senior Emergency Preparedness Analyst inspectors: Howard F. Bundy, Reactor Engineer Edwin F. Fox, Jr., Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist Wayne C. Sifre, Resident inspector Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Attachment: Supplemental information

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9611200084 961115 PDR G ADOCK 05000498 PDR

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1-2- l EXECUTIVE SUMMARY South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 ;

NRC Inspection Report 50-498/96-23,50-499/96-23

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Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance and capabilities during the full-scale, biennial exercise of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspection team observed activities in the control room simulator, technical support center, operations support center, and emergency operations facilit Plant Support

• Overall, control room staff performance was very good. Communications were effective and the quality of periodic status briefings was excellent. The control room communicated effectively with the technical support center and used its !

expertise advantageously in resolving technicalissues. The control room staff was l particularly effective in tracking plant parameters which could satisfy emergency action levels. Emergency classifications and offsite agency notifications were I timely and correct. The control room staff encountered difficulty in implementing I two emergency operating procedures (Section P4.2).

• Overall, the technical support center staff's performance was very good. The technical support center manager exercised excellent command and control and maintained facility team focus on safety and providing support to other facilities (Section P4.3).

• The overall performance of the operations support center was very good. The operations support center coordinator exercised strong command and control of center activities, inplant repair teams, and information flow. Team priorities were closely coordinated and verified with the technical support center. Methods used to brief and prepare teams expedited team dispatch and repair activities. Health physics briefings and coverage for inplant teams was strong (Section P4.4).

• Overall, the emergency operations f acility staff's performance was very goo Facility personnel worked well as a team to promptly classify emergency events, make timely offsite agency notifications, and develop appropriate public protective action recommendations. Facility command, control, and management were identified as a strength. An exercise weakness was identified for failure to communicate protective measures to offsite utility field team members in a timely manner. The licensee questioned the characterization of the exercise weakness during a followup discussion on November 12,1996 (Section P4.5).

• The inspectors determined that the scenario was sufficiently challenging to test emergency response capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. Use of a mock NRC team and control of the fire brigade response were identified as strengths (Section P4.6).

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• The licensee's self-critique process effectively identified areas for corrective actio The management critique was thorough and professionally conducted. Offsite response agency participation in the management critique was identified as a program strength (Section P4.7).

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i IV. Plant Support l f

P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness i

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P4.1 Proaram Areas inspected (82301) j The licensee conducted a full-scale, biennial exercise on October 30,1996. The exercise was conducted to test major portions of the onsite (licensee) and offsite emergency response capabilities. The licensee activated its emergency response  :

organization and all emergency response facilities. The Federal Emergency l Management Agency evaluated the offsite response capabilities of the State of Texas and Matagorda county. The Federal Emergency Management Agency will issue a separate repor i The exercise scenario was run using the Unit 1 control room simulator in a dynamic ;

mode. The exercise began at 6:45 a.m. with the plant operating at 100 percent  !

power. When the operating crew assumed the watch at 6:57 a.m., a containment high pressure alarm existed. Operators immediately began a purge to reduce pressure. The operators noted that the inboard supplemental purge isolation valve failed to close when they secured the purge at 7:13 a.m. At 7.:14 a.m., the plant operators determined that a reactor coolant system leak of 11 gallons per minute existed which resulted in the shift supervisor declaring a notification of unusual event at 7:19 a.m. At 7:30 a.m., the Number 11 steam generator feed pump turbine tripped and underwent a mechanical failure resulting in flying parts. The flying parts damaged the Number 12 steam generator feed pump turbine and caused it to trip. The operators manually tripped the reactor _at 7:31 a.m. when a low steam generator level trip appeared imminent. Operators noted that one control rod f ailed to inser At 7:50 a.m., lightening struck the "B" essential safety feature transformer, thereby, damaging the bus and causing a ground condition. The standby diesel generator started but failed to load on the deenergized bus. The operators secured the diesel generator at 7:51 a.m. At 7:55 a.m., a fire was reported in the E1B switchgear room. The shift supervisor dispatched the fire brigade to the room and declared an alert at 8:06 a.m. The fire was reported out shortly thereafter. The shift supervisor remained in the alert condition because of increasing radiation levels in containment. Emergency director responsibilities and authorities were transferred to the technical support center at 8:45 a.m. and then to the emergency operations facility at 9:10 The emergency operations facility director declared a site area emergency at 9:12 a.m. due to high radiation levels in containment (loss of two fission product barriers). The control rod drive housing on the control rod that failed to insert ruptured at 11 a.m. resulting in a rod ejection and a large unisolable lea Containment pressure increased and the outboard supplementary purge valve failed open, which initiated an offsite radiological release. The emergency operations

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facility director declared a general emergency at 11:08 a.m. due to loss of all three !

l fission product barriers. The release was terminated at 1:30 p.m. after the outboard supplementary purge valve was repaired, Controllers terminated the e exercise at 2:15 I P4.2 Control Room Insoection Scoce (82301-03.02)

The inspectors observed and evaluated the control room simulator staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise scenario conditions. These tasks  !

included detection and classification of events, analysis of plant conditions, i notification of offsite authorities, and adherence to the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan implementing procedures, logs, checklists, and notification forms generated during i the exercis j Observations and Findinos j The control room staff performed very wellin mitigating the effects of the simulated >

plant and equipment f ailures. The control room staff was particularly effective in )

l tracking plant parameters which could satisfy emergency action levels. The control l room staff was also proactive in attempting to control these parameters to avoid i emergency action levels. The control room staff appropriately classified the unusual l event due to reactor coolant system leak rate in excess of 10 gallons per minute I and the alert based on fire in a vital area affecting safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The control room staff also appropriately continued the alert due to increasing radiation levels in containment. The inspectors concluded that the crew was both cautious and expeditious in classifying the events. The shift supervisor, unit supervisor, and shift technical advisor all had appropriate input in arriving at the l correct classifications. Corresponding offsite agency notifications were timely and

! correc Internal and external control room communications were effective. The periodic status briefings conducted by the shift supervisor were very strong. Whila brief and concise, appropriate input was solicited from all crew members. Any l inattentiveness to the briefing was promptly corrected by the shift supervisor. The control room communicated effectively with the technical support center and used

its expertise advantageously in resolving technical issues, such as the reactivity

! status of the reactor and problems in implementing emergency operating l l procedure l I

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-6-The control room staff experienced the following problems using two emergency operating procedures:

• Step 18 of Procedure OPOP05-EO-E010," Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," Revision 5, required a return to Step 1 if the reactor coolant system pressure was not controlled or decreasing, which was the situation. After failing to satisfy this step twice, the management staff determined that they needed to exit this loop to proceed with reactor coolant system cooldown and depressurization in accordance with Procedure OPOP05-EO-ES12," Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization,"

Revision 4, as directed by Step 21 of Procedure OPOP05-EO-E010. After consultation with the technical support center, the decision was made to deviate from the requirements of Step 1 * Step 27 of Procedure OPOP05-EO-ES12 was deficient in requiring the reactor coolant pump to be stopped if the Number 1 seat leakoff flow was less than 0.9 gallons per minute. Procedure OPOPO4-RC-0002," Reactor Coolant Pump Off Normal," Revision 7, Addendum 2, indicated a Number 1 seat leakoff flow range of 0.2 to 1 gallons per minute was acceptable. After consultation with the technical support center, the decision was made to deviate from the requirements of Step 2 The inspectors observed that the shift supervisor properly approved and logged the above procedure deviations in accordance with Procedure OPOP01-ZA-0018,

" Emergency Operating Procedure User's Guide," Revision 8. Although these '

procedural problems did not result in exacerbating plant safety, they delayed placing the plant in a depressurized conditio Although the overall adverse effect on performance was minimal, fatigue appeared to contribute to a decrease in attentiveness and intensity of the control room staff i during the last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of the exercise. The inspectors observed the following I minor performance lapses during this period: '

• One of the board operators stated that he wanted to start a safety injection pump and then was distracted by an annunciator on another panel. The unit supervisor directed the operator to start the pump twice before he responde * Another board operator inadvertently stated that he had started an auxiliary feedwater pump which was powered by a deenergized bu * The frequency of the otherwise excellent briefings decreased. It was not apparent that all crew members were as aware of plant status as they had been earlie I i

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, Conclusions Overall, control room staff performance was very good. Communications were effective and the quality of periodic status briefings was excellent. The control l room communicated effectively with the technical support center and used its :

expertise advantageously in resolving technical issues. The control room staff was ;

particularly effective in tracking plant parameters which could satisfy emergency +

action levels. Emergency classifications and offsite agency notifications were timely and correct. The control room staff encountered difficulty in implementing two emergency operating procedure P4.3 Technical Suncort Center Inspection Scone (82301-03.03)  ;

i 1 The inspectors observed and evaluated the technical support center staff as they t

performed tasks necessary to respond to the exercise scenario conditions. These

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tasks included staffing and activation, f acility management and control, accident l assessment, onsite protective action decisionmaking and implementation,

! communications, assistance and support to the control room, and prioritization of mitigating actions. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan implementing procedures and log Observations and Findinas The technical support center had the minimum required staf f within 15 minutes l after the 8:09 a.m. alert public address announcement. At 8:32 a.m., the facility I manager announced that the technical support center was activated for plant l assessment and mitigation functions. The technical support center was activated in a coordinated and efficient manner and was staffed with a sufficient number of individuals who demonstrated the appropriate expertise for their various position Communications were promptly established with the control room simulator, operations support center, and emergency operations facility. There were an adequate number of communicators available in the technical support center, and ;

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status boards were maintained current. The inspectors identified an area for l

improvement in that three-point communications were seldom observed within the technical support center. The facility manager stated that this did not meet l

management's expectations. Three-point communications involve: (1) information i communication by provider, (2) information restatement by receiver, and (3) information confirmation by provider.

The technical support center manager exercised excellent con. mand and contro l 4 Distractions were kept to a minimum, and the team maintained their focus on safety j and support for the control room and other organizations. Tscility management

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team meetings were initially conducted about every 30 minutes to update plant j

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l status and technical support center priorities. As the exercise progressed, the l facility manager determined that the meetings were too frequent and becoming a ;

distraction. The meetings were changed to every 45 minutes. The technical .

support center manager conducted a short facility update briefing after each l meeting. Appropriate log-keeping was observed, and the technical support center !

staff exhibited good team work and coordinatio I

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Plant conditions were appropriately analyzed and evaluated in a timely manner. The l technical team was persistent in their efforts to stop the supplemental containment !

purge system flow. Severalinnovative options were considered, including use of a !

blind flange, crushing the piping, and connecting alternative power sources to the stuck open valv I i

Technical support center habitability was properly monitored throughout the !

exercise. However, changes in facility habitability were not always communicated j to the staff in a timely manner. This resulted in some confusion about when the ;

consumption of food or drinks was permitted. The inspectors identified this as an j area for improvemen l Conclusions  ;

I Overall, the techn; cal support center staff's performance was very good. The l technical support center manager exercised excellent command and control and ;

maintained facility team focus on safety and providing support to other f acilitie j i

P4.4 Ooerations Sucoort Center I Insoection Scone (82301-03.05)

The inspectors observed and evaluated the operations support center staff as they performed tasks in response to the scenario conditions. These tasks included the fire brigade response, functional staffing, and inplant emergency response team dispatch and coordination in support of control room and technical support center requests. The inspectors reviewed applicable emergency plan implementing procedures, logs, checklists, and forms generated during the exercis Observations and Findinas L The fire brigade's response was efficient and effective. Personnel arriving at the l fire brigade staging area rapidly donned fire fighting clothing, assembled equipment, j and assumed prescribed duties. The fire brigade leader provided good command l

! and control of the response activities. The most rapid ingress route to the affected

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i area was determined. The route required coordination with security to ensure rapid  !

entry to the fire (located in a vital area). The fire brigade applied appropriate fire l fighting strategies (e.g., using carbon dioxide then waiting until the bus was  !

deenergized before applying water). The fire brigade leader properly kept the {

control room informed of the status of the fire and its effects on the bu !

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, The operations support center was promptly activated after the alert declaratio !

l Teams dispatched from the simulator control room and teams designated by the {

operations support center were properly logged on the team tracking boar ;

However, some inplant teams were dispatched without the necessary equipment to ,

effect repairs. For example, two teams were not provided keys to allow them to l either enter an area to do work or to obtain necessary tool !

The operations support center coordinator exerted effective command, control, and I leadership by using three-point communications, conducting comprehensive ,

briefings, and focusing on priority tasks. Status briefings were informative, timely, !

and presented clearly and loudly to facility staff. Briefings were provided by the i

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operations support center coordinator and functional area supervisors. Internal and l l external information flow effectively supported timely inplant team formation and l dispatc l

The operations support center was efficiently arranged with key facility personnel in l a horseshoe configuration facing status and team dispatching boards. Team l briefings were conducted in a separate room to eliminate distractions. Personnel  !

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l available for team assignments were organized on a team resources status board ( and grouped by disciplin j I i i

A pool of craft personnel was initially assembled in the machine shop. When l radiological conditions changed, the operations support center coordinator and radiological coordinator properly decided to relocate the craft personnel to the welding shop (north of the release pathway). Radio communications were maintained by a radio communicato ;

Sufficient supplies were available to support center activities. Radiation protection i equipment, including alarming dosimeters and survey equipment were available and j properly issued to team members prior to leaving the health physics are l l

Teams were formed, briefed, and dispatched in a timely manner with minimal delays f observed. Over 30 teams were dispatched during the exercise. The operations j l support center used a special team to obtain parts for inplant teams. The - l

} inspectors concluded that this practice was a unique and effective method to j i expedite team dispatch. The teams maintained continuous contact with the i- operations support center through the radio communicator. Teams were given i periodic plant condition updates and informed of emergency classification change :

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i The habitability of the operations support center was properly monitored during the

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exercise. Facility habitability was initially determined and continuously monitored thereafter. Following routine surveys and air sampling, habitability status was posted on status boards. When the status of habitability was uncertain, eating, ;

smoking, and drinking were not permitte '

Inplant radiation levels reported by the teams were appropriately posted on building layout maps in the operations support center. Team priorities were based on the critical nature of the assignment. The operations support center coordinator and support staff continually reassessed team priority assignments and adjusted the ranking when conditions change Health physics coverage and team briefings were very thorough and conscientiously i l accomplished, inplant teams received necessary health physics information and equipment prior to entering the radiological controlled area. Health physics personnel also ensured that team members were aware of methods to keep doses i as low as reasonably achievable, given the simulated plant conditions. Moreover,

health physics personnel who accompanied inplant teams were knowledgeable and ,

i took personal responsibility for the team's safety, i i l Conclusions t

l The overall performance of the operations support center was very good. The j operations support center coordinator exercised strong command and control of center activities, inplant repair teams, and information flow. Team priorities were

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closely coordinated and verified with the technical support center. Methods used to brief and prepare teams expedited team dispatch and repair activities. Health physics briefings and coverage for inplant teams was stron P4.5 Emernency Operations Facility i Inspection Scone (82301-03.04)

The inspectors observed the emergency operations facility's staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise. These tasks included facility activation, event classification, notification of state and local response agencies, development and j issuance of protective action recommendations, dose assessment and coordination

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of field monitoring teams, analysis of plant conditions, and direct interactions with offsite agency response team ' Observations and Findinas i The emergency operations f acility was promptly and systematically activated following the 8:06 a.m. alert declaration. Full f acility staffing was present at about 8:30 a.m., and the emergency operations f acility was activated at 8:43 a.m. Upon arrival, f acility personnel signed-in on the emergency operations f acility staffing

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-11-board and obtained position-specific alert checklists. Prior to facility activation, the emergency operations facility director ensured that f acility clocks were  !

synchronized, contacted the technical support center manager, established initial I'

f acility priorities, and polled f acility directors for activation obstacle t The emergency operations facility director assumed emergency director responsibilities and authorities at 9:10 a.m. The transfer was very systematic and thorough. Prerequisites outlined in *.he emergency director turnover checklist

(Emergency Procedurc OERP01-ZV-EF01," Emergency Operations Facility Director," ,

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Revision 8, Data Sheet 6) were strictly followed. The emergency operations facility j promptly made a public address announcement to inform the other emergency ,

! response f acilities of the authority transfer.

l l At 9:12 a.m.,2 minutes after assuming the responsibility, the emergency f operations facility director correctly classified the site area emergency based on the loss of two fission product barriers. Offsite protective action recommendations l

were deemed appropriate. The corresponding offsite agency notifications were ,

timely and completed in accordance with Emergency Procedure OERP01-ZV-INO2,

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" Notifications to Offsite Agencies," Revision 6. Facility personnel, including the technical and radiological directors and their staffs, and the engineering assistant, displayed exceptional teamwork during this sequence.

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During the next couple of hours, f acility staff closely monitored changing plant conditions, including radiological conditions in containment, and anticipated possible event escalation paths. At 11:08 a.m., the emergency operations f acility director )

correctly declared a general emergency due to rapidly degrading conditions and 1 indications of a radiological release (loss of the third barrier). The offsite agency notification form was completed and transmitted within 12 minutes, with close coordination between the engineering assistant, technical / radiological / emergency j operations f acility directors, and the offsite agency communicato Since a 5-mile radius evacuation was recommended at the site area emergency declaration, additional protective action recommendations were not required at the general emergency declaration; however, due to changing radiological conditions (trending upward), protective action recommendations were expanded at 11:29 a.m. to include evacuation in Zones 7 and 8 (downwind to 10 miles). The i

expanded protective action recommendations were communicated to offsite

! authorities in a timely manne Dose assessment, radiation protection activities, and field monitoring team rontrol were generally performed well during the exercise. Numerous dose projections l 1 were calculated and used to support protective action recommendations.

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Habitability of the emergency operations f acility was appropriately monitored. Prior i to the radiological release, the emergency operations facility emergency ventilation system was switched to the recirculation mode, and thermoluminescent dosimeters j were distributed to facility personne l

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Two issues involving offsite field team control were identified. First, the recommendation for offsite field team members to take potassium iodide was not communicated in a timely manner and could have affected personnel safety and the ability to obtain timely field measurements and samples (used to validate dose projections and protective action recommendations).

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Following the radiological director's recommendation, the emergency operations

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facility director authorized the use of potassium iodide for offsite field team members at 11:50 a.m. The recommendation was not communicated to Team 2 and the " rad van" until 12:45 p.m. and 1:02 p.m., respectively (55 and 72 minutes). When the recommendation was made, the projected offsite iodine i dose was about 28 rem thyroid committed dose equivalent at 2 miles (field teams were located at about 3.5 miles). The inspectors observed that there was a lack of procedural guidance concerning the process for communicating / logging potassium iodide recommendations to offsite field team members and that involved staff I appeared somewhat unfamiliar with the process. The failure to communicate timely

protective measures to offsite field teams was identified as an exercise weakness (498/9623-01

499/9623-01). ,

in response, the licensee stated that potassium iodide was still 90-95 percent effective up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after exposure and that rescuing Team 1 (simulated jeep ;

malfunction) was considered a priority. The inspectors acknowledged the former point but did not consider it to be a valid justification for delaying the recommendation. Regarding the latter point, the inspectors noted that there was sufficient staff to perform the fiet ' team communication / rescue actions simultaneously. The licensee questioned the characterization of the exercise weakness during a followup discussion on November 12,199 Second, although no problems with field team location tracking were observed, discussions concerning team positions could have been mora explicit. Narrative descriptions were used instead of visual methods, such as maps, to show utility and !

state field team positions. There were times when it appeared tnat utility and offsite field team trackers were not fully aware of the others' team location ]

Throughout the exercise, the emergency operations facility director exercised very ;

effective command, control, and management practices. For example, the emergency operations facility director conducted frequent, comprehensive, i structured, and concise briefings, encouraged clear communications through the use !

of three-point communications and understandable terms, developed and ensured that f acility priorities were completed, and inspired a team spirit. This aspect of the 1 response effort was identified as a strengt ,

I Public address announcements were regularly used to communicate changing plant l conditions an response updates. The inspectors determined that the effectiveness l of the facility public address briefings could have been improved; announcements l were barely audible in the dose assessment / technical are l I

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interactions with offsite response teams in the emergency operations facility (state :

and mock NRC) were effective. Both teams received status briefings upon arrival i and then were quickly incorporated into the response effort. Emergency operations facility personnel closely monitored offsite protective action decisionmaking and implementation status. State and mock NRC representatives were included in facility briefings; however, the value and emphasis of the state's input to the facility briefings was lessened because a briefing microphone was not passed to the l representative at the horseshoe table. Only utility personnel used the microphone ! Conclusions )

Overall, the emergency operations facility staff's performance was very goo Facility personnel worked well as a team to promptly classify emergency events, make timely offsite agency notifications, and develop appropriate public protective action recommendations. Facility command, control, and management were identified as a strength. An exercise weakness was identified for failure to communicate protective measures to offsite utility field team members in a timel manner. The licensee questioned the characterization of the exercise weakness during a followup discussion on November 12,199 P4.6 Scenario and Exercise Control

. Inspection Scoce (82301)

The inspectors made observations during the exercise to assess the challenge and realism of the scenario and to evaluate the control of the exercis I Observations and Findinas i The inspectors did not identify any issues concerning the exercise scenario. The j scenario was sufficiently challenging to test emergency response capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. The licensee appropriately prepared l- hardcopy data to use if the control room simulator failed during the exercise. The l inspectors observed that the RM-11 radiation monitor simulator in the technical  ;

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support center was not providing reliable data. This forced the health physics team (

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to rely on data provided by telephone from the emergency operations facility. As a result, some analyses were slightly delaye The inspectors identified two strengths concerning exercise control. First, the use !

of a mock NRC team added realism and stimulated exercise response activities, i Second, the fire brigade response was controllea very well; cloudy face covers were

used to simulate smoke, care was taken to ensure personnel and plant safety, and equipment was not allowed to operate until proper steps were taken.

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. Conclusions The inspectors determined that the scenario was sufficiently challenging to test emergency response capabilities and demonstrate onsite exercise objectives. Use of a mock NRC team and control of the fire brigade response were identified as strength I

P4.7 Licensee Self-Critiaue Insoection Scope (82301-03.13)

The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensce's post-exercise facility critiques and the formal management critique on November 1,1996, to determine whether the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective actio Observations and Findinas The inspectors determined that the post-exercise critiques were generally thorough, open, and self-critical. With the exception of the emergency operations f acility, entiques included input from all controllers, evaluators, and participants. In the emergency operations facility, participant input was limited to facility directors. In other f acilities, the f acility managers / coordinators met with their staffs prior to the critique to obtain their input. The radiological and technical directors in the emergency operations f acility did not meet with their staffs prior to the critiqu In addition to the verbal, post-exercise critiques, participants were encouraged to complete comment sheets. The sheets included specific questions concerning the  !

scenario, training, facility critique, strengths, minor problems, weaknesses, deficiencies, and procedural guidance. The inspectors concluded that the questions on the comment sheet facilitated the critique proces The management critique was conducted in a professional and serious manner. A handout was distributed to enhance the presentation. The management critique included a summary of the exercise scenario timeline and comments from each of the lead controllers and facility . management. Offsite emergency response agency regresentatives also participated in the management critique. The inspectors concluded that this unique element highlighted the integral nature of the response team effor The issues identified by the licensee's team (controllers, evaluators, and participants) were generally consistent with those identified by the NRC inspection team. The licensee's team identified that all facility objectives were met; most objectives were met satisfactorily, some were met with strengths, and some were met with minor problems. No weaknesses or deficiencies were identifie . . . - - , - . . .- _- - . - . - - . . - - - . . . - . . . . . - - . - - . . - .

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The licensee's self-critique process effectively identified areas for corrective actio !

The management critique was thorough and professionally conducted. Offsite response agency participation in the management critique was identified as a  ;

program strengt l

V. Manaaement Meetinas l X1 Exit Meeting Summary 4

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I l The inspectors presented -the inspection results to members of licensee management at the ,

conclusion of the inspection on November 1,1996. The licensee acknowledged the l findings presented. No proprietary information was identified. The licensee questioned the l

characterization of the entcise weakness during a followup discussion on November 12, t 199 !

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l ATTACHMENT

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l l PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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l l Licensee l

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H.' Butterworth, Manager, Plant Operations, Unit 2 '

i T. Cloninger, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering l T. Frawley, Shift Supervisor J. Groth, Vice President, Nuclear Generation {-

K. Keyes, Staff Specialist I L _ J. Ledgerwood, Manager, instrument and Control l C. Lunsford, Supervisor, Maintenance Programs  ;

l_ L. Martin, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance & Licensing l

! R. Masse, Plant Manager, Unit 2 l l- M. McBurnett, Manager, Nuclear Licensing l

G. Parkey, Plant Manager, Unit F. Puleo, Supervisor, Onsite Emergency Response l l K. Richards, Manager, Work Control l l C. Sayko, Manager, Plant Projects & Programs j

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P. Serra, Manager, Emergency Response j i

i l LIST OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED  !

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IP 82301 Evaluation of Exercises at Power Reactors l LIST OF ITEMS OPENED i

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Opened l

l 50-498/96023-01 IFl Exercise weakness - Failure to communicate timely protective j 50-499/96023-01 measures to offsite fie'd teams (Section P4.5) -

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED j gmeraency Plan imolementina Procedures OERP01-ZV-EF01 Emergency Operations Facility Director Revision 8 OERP01-ZV-EF02 Deputy Emergency Operations Facility Director Revision 5 OERM1-ZV-EF03 Radiological Director Revision 2 Of.RP01-ZY-EF04 Technical Director Revision 3 O ERP01-ZV-EF10 Offsite Field Team Supervisor Revision 3

OERP01-ZV-EF15 Dose Asses.

ment Specialist Revision 1

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OERP01-ZV-IN07 Offsite Protectin Action Recommendations Revision 4

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OERP01-ZV-INO1 Emergency Clast ification Revision 3

) OERP01-ZV-INO2 Notifications to Ca'fsite Agencies Revision 6

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OERP01-ZV-OSO1 Operations Support Center Coordinator Revision 1 !

OERP01-ZV-OS02 Assistant Operations Support Center Revision 1 l

i Coordinator 1 j OERP01-ZV-OS03 Radiological Coordinator Revision 2 f OERPO1-ZV-OSO4 - Security Coordinator Revision 2 !

4 OERP01 ZV-OS05 Materials Handler Revision 2 l

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OERPO1 ZV-OS06 Emergency Teams Revision 4 -

OERP01-ZV-SH01 Shift Supervisor Revision 10

OERP01-ZV-TP02 Offsite Field Teams Revision 6 :

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OERP01-ZV-TS01 Technical Support Center Manager Revision 7 !

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OERP01-ZV-TS03 Operations Manager Revision 3 }

OERP01-ZV-TSO4 Radiological Manager Revision 2 j OERP01 ZV-TS07 Technical Manager Revision 3 ;

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Emeraency Operatina Procedures i

OPOP01-ZA-0018 Emergency Operating Procedure User's Guide Revision 8 l OPOP05-EO-EO10 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Revision 5 {

OPOP05-EO-ES12 Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization Revision 4 !

Other Documents i

South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Emergency Plan Management Critique Handout ,

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