Text

Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting Requirements for Safety Features Actuation Sys Containment High Radiation Monitors
	ML20141F110
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	06/24/1997
From:	; CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20141F102	List: ML20141F095; ML20141F105; ML20141F110;
References
	NUDOCS 9707020040
	Download: ML20141F110 (25)
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LAR 95-0026 Page 19 f9 , F ,

h. *.

INSTRUMENTATION

uw a a?

3/a.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEM INST 2UMENTATI SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRLHENTATION t.!MITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION

! 3.3.2.1 The Safety Features Actuation System (STAS) functional units l snown in T:ble 3.3-3 snall be CPERA8LE with their trip setpoints set j consistent with the values snown in the Trio Setpoint column of Table 1 3.3 4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as snown in Table 3.3-5.

j j APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACT!CN:

i j a. With a SFAS functional unit trip setpoint less conservative

! than the value snown in the Allowab'e Yalues column of Table 3.3-4, declare. the functional unit inoperable and apply the soplicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3. until the func.

O tional unit is restored to OPERA 81.E status with the trip gt ;I setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trio Setpoint value.

o <

$ = <9 r '

b. With a $FAS functional unit inoperable, take the action snown g5m in Table 3.3-3.

g2 E3 >

SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS E "'c v1 ..

5WO y ARM y E e '"J 4.3.2.1.1 Each $FAS functional unit shall be demonstrated OPEUBLE by E"d the performance of the CFANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CAL 18 RATION and CHANNEL

@ Q FUtiCT10NAL TEST during the MODES and at the frequencies shewn in Table g 4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated CPERA8tE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of functional units affected by bypass operation. The total bypass fum: tion shall be demonstrated CPERA8LE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each functional unit affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The SAFETY FEATURES RESP 0M5E TIME of each 5FA5 function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit-at least once per 18 months.

Each test shall include at least one functional unit per function such that all functional units are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant functional units in a specific SFA5 function as shown in the " Total No. of Units' Column of Table 3.3 3.

DAY 15-BE53E. UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 9707020040 970624 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P PDR

TABLE 3.3-3 SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION jh-S w 5 MINIMUM gT T TOTAL NO. UNITS UNITS APPLICABLE 8 FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF UNITS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION M h

1. INSTRUMENT STRINGS E

Z a. DELETEDCentainmcat Radiaticn - DELETED DELETED DELETED DELETED DELETEp

- High 4 3 3 1,2,3,4,6 * * * * +0a

b. Containment Pressure -

High - 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 10#

c. Containment Pressure -

High-High 4 2 3 1,2,3 10#

d. RCS Pressure - Low 4 2 3 1,2,3* 10#

RCS Pressure - Low-Low 4 2 3 1,2,3** 10#

$ e.

f. BWST Level - Low-Low 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 10#

g L

2. OUTPUT LOGIC

a. Incident Level #1:

Containment Isolation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4,6 * * *

11

b. Incident Level #2:

High Pressure Injection and Starting Diesel Generators 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 11

c. Incident Level #3:

Low Pressure Injection 2 2 1, 2, 3, 4 k 1 11 g d. Incident Level #4:

g Containment Spray 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 11 a e. Incident Level #5:

z Containment Sump Recirculation Permissive 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 11 S

h m

to g TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) g

< "a Di SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 3 i dc

@ MINIMUM

$ TOTAL NO. UNITS UNITS APPLICABLE OF UNITS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION b

2 FUNCTIONAL UNIT

~

j 3. MANUAL ACTUATION r

a. SFAS (except Containment Spray and Emergency Sump Recirculation) 2 2 2 1,2,3,4 F 12

b. Containment Spray 2 2 2 1,2,3,4 12 1

4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS E

y a. Sequencer 4 2/ BUS 2/ BUS 1,2,3,4 15#

C

b. Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (90%) 4***** 2/ BUS 2/ BUS 1,2,3,4 15#

c. Diesel Generator Stan, Load shed on Essential

> Bus (59%) 4 2/ BUS 2/ BUS I,2,3,4 15#

5 o

E. 5. INTERLOCK CHANNELS 5

!_"E A a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve i I 1 1,2,3 13#

l dE 2 3****** I4 g[ b. Pressurizer Heaters 2 2 o

em

-a t

- . - - - _ ~ . - - . . . ~ . ~ . - - . . .

l l

!AR 95-0026 Page 22 ADDil!0NAl. CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LETTER TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) Senai No. 14 4 i Date 4 h2/97 TABLE NOTATION

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 1800 psig.

Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 1800 psig.

- Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 600 psig. Bypass l shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 600 psig. i l

l !

- - DELETED l I

- - - DELETED This u shuii.cnistion, of tiie cuniaiiiniciii pui v 3end exheust ayateni nobiu sua nionitor (with the containnivni puigc end cxhau3i sy3tciii in opvianon), inust be OPERADLE Juinig CORE ALTERATIONS ei iiiovcnicnt of Liadisted fuc' within l

- conteninieiit to nicci the ivquhcnients vf Tvchnicel Specificenen 3.9.4. Whvn usin3 ihe containnivni puis and c cxheusi sy,steni nobis gaa iiionitor, SFAS is not icquiccd tu bu OPERADLE in MODE G.

- - - - All functional units may be bypassed for up to one minute when starting each Reactor Coolant Pump or Circulating Water Pump.

- - - - When either Decay Heat Isolation Valve is open.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

l ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE functional units one less than the Total Number of Units, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable functional unit is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

b. The Minimum Units OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional functional unit may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 11 - With any component in the Output Logic inoperable, trip the associated l components within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 3-12 Amendment No.28,37,52, i 102,135,159,I86,211 l

l l

F.

LAR 95-o026

~ "

i TlilS PAGE PROVIDED TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued l ACTION STATEMENTS l

ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE Units one.less than the Total Number of Units, restore the inoperable functional unit to OPERABLE :

status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the ,

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

ACTION 13 - a. With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure 2 438 psig, both Decay Heat Isolation Valves (DHil and DH12) shall be verified closed.

b. With Less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure < 438 psig operation may continue; however, the functional unit shall be OPERABLE prior to increasing reactor coolant pressure above 438 psig.

ACTION 14 - With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure < 438 psig, operation may continue; however, the functional unit shall be OPERABLE prior to increasing reactor coolant-pressure above 438 psig, or the inoperable functional unit shall be placed in the tripped state.

ACTION 15 - a. With the number of OPERABLE units one less than the Minimum Units Operable per Bus, place the inoperable unit in the ,

j tripped condition within one hour. Fe functional unit 4.a ;

the sequencer shall be placed in the triped condition by i physical removal of the sequencer module. The inoperable functional unit may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

b. With the number of OPERABLE units two less than the Minimum Units Operable per Bus, declare inoperable the Emergency Diesel Generator associated with the functional units not i i

meeting the i equired minimum units OPERABLE and take the l ACTION required of Specification 3.8.1.1. !

i MDdiOML CHANGts PRE'n00 SLY PROPOSED By LEHER l

Svial No._ Z 44 I Date 4 bih !

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-12a Amendment No. -28,- 52, 102r

-+39, 211

. t yc .

eS o

O- w

> TABLE 3.3-4 o vi -

< o i E . .

8 .

de SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMEN13 TION TRIP SETPOINTS a m !

m ALLOWABLE VALUES - ,

m FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT

.m C INSTRUMENT STRINGS -

Z DELETED Cunianuu .d Rud uimo DELETED DELETED j q a..

<44Oud 3uuudaiRATED. < 4 . Cua3.eund at i

TIIERMAL I'OWER RATCO TI!ERMAL I'OWER#

b. Containment Pressure - High s 18.4 psia s 18.52 psia # !

t

c. Containment Pressure - High-High s 38 ' ;.sia s 38.52 psia #

l i

d. RCS Pressure - Low a 1620.75 psig a 1615.75 psig#

W n

c. RCS Pressure - Low-Low a 420.75 psig a 415.75 psig#

v l .L w

" f. BWST Level 2 89.5 and s 100.5 in. H2O 2 88.3 and $. g s 101.7 in. H:0 # E o

52 4

I

- .s o SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS y o" -v a-g i

a. Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (90%) a 3744 volts for a 3558 volts A loA47 s 7.8 see s 7.8 see CE

- 5R o

e ;,[

b. Diesci Generator Start, Load Shed on a 2071 ar.d s 2450 volts 2 2071 and s 2450 l E *

[ Essential Bus (59%) for 0.5 0.1 see volts for gyy g - 0.3 0.1 sec# :o g c !

[ INTERLOCK CHANNELS e

w 4

a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve < 438 psig < 443 psig#*

ij 2 y and Pressurizer Heater

$ # Allowable Value for CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

g

Referenced to the centerline of DHII and DHl2 O

4 i

l 1

! LAR 95-0026 TABLE 3.3-5

'Page 25 l.

i S AFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RE5PONSE TIMES l l

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

1. Manual l

l a. Fans !

i l l.

Emergency Vent Fan NA

2. Containment Cooler Fan NA

b. HV & AC Isolation Valves l 1. ECCS Room NA

2. Emergency Ventilation NA

3. Containment Air Sample NA

4. MlCouauuned I'mp NA

5. Pentration Room Purge NA l

c. Control Room HV & AC Units NA 1

d. High Pressure Injection i

1. High Pressure Injection Pumps NA

2. High Pressure Injection Valves NA

e. Component Cooling Water l 1. Component Cooling Water Pumps NA

2. Component Cooling Aux. Equip. Inlet Valves NA

3. Component Cooling to Air Compressor Valves NA

f. Service Water System j

1. Service Water Pumps NA

2. Service Water From Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves NA

, g. Containment Spray Isolation Valves NA l-l h. Emergency Diesel Generator NA

i. Containment Isolation Valves

1. Vacuum Relief NA

2. Normal Sump NA i 3. RCS Letdown Delay Coil Outlet NA I 4. RCS Letdown High Temperature NA i

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-14 Amendment No.

LAR 95-0026 "H38 PA8E Pi!0VIDED TABLE 3.3-5 (

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION l RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS i.

Containment Isolation Valves (cont'd)

5. Pressurizer Sample

6. NA Service Water to Cooling Water NA

7. Vent Header

8. NA Drain Tank

9. NA Core Flood Tank Vent NA

10. Core Flood Tank Fill

11. NA Steam Generator Sample NA

12. Quench Tank

13. NA Emergency Sump 14 NA RCP Seal Return NA

15. Air Systems

16. N2 System NA

17. NA Quench Tank Sample

18. NA RCP Seal Inlet NA

19. Core Flood Tank Sample

20. NA RCP Standpipe Demin Water Supply NA

21. Containment H Dilution Inlet

22. NA Containment Dilution Outlet NA

j. BVST Outlet Valves NA

k. Low Pressure Injection

1. Decay Heat Pumps

2. NA Low P essure Injection Valves NA

3. Decay Heat Pump Suction Valves 4 NA Decay Heat Cooler Outlet Valves NA

5. Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves- NA

1. Containeest Spray Pump l NA

m. Component Cooling Isolation Valves

1. Inlet to Containment

2. NA Outlet from Containment MA

3. Inlet to CRDM's

4. NA CRDM Booster Pump Suction NA

5. Component Cooling from Decay Heat Coolers NA DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-15 Amendment No. III. MA 135

l l

LAR 95-0026 Page 27 TAllLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES l

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS l

2. Containment Pressure - High

a. Fans

1. Emergency Vent Fans s25*

2. Containment Cooler Fans s 45*

b. HV & AC Isolation Valves

1. ECCS Room s 75*

2. Emergency Ventilation s 75*

3. Containment Air Sample s 30*

4. DELETED Coiitaiiiiiieiit I'nigu s-f5*

5. Penetration Room Purge s 75* l

c. Control Room HV & AC Units s 10*

1

d. Higi Pressure Injection

1. High Pressure Injection Pumps s 30*

2. High Pressure Injection Valves s 30*

e. Component Cooling Water

1. Component Cooling Water Pumps s 180*

2. Component Cooling Aux. Equip. Inlet Valves s 180*

3. Component Cooling to Air Compressor Valves s 180*

f. Service Water System

1. Service Water Pumps s 45*

2. Service Water From Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves s NA*

g. Containment Spray Isolation Valves s 80*

l h. Emergency Diesel Generator s 15*

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT l 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. I14

LAR 95-0026 Page 28 TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

2. Containment Pressure - High (Continued)

i. Containment Isolation Valves

1. Vacuum Relief < 30*

2. Nomal Sump {25*

3. RCS Letdown Delay Coil Outlet < 30*

4. RCS Letdown High Temperature j30* g

5. Pressurizer Sample < 48*

i 6. Service Water to Cooling Water {45* y2

7. Vent Header 5 15* gO

8. Drain Tank 5 15* >

9. Core Flood Tank Vent i15* @O l

< 15*

l 10. Core Flood Tank Fill g i 11. Steam Generator Sample 5 15* g j

12. Quench Tank < 15*

13. Emergency Sump NA* g

14. RCP Seal Return 5 45* gg

15. Air System 5 15* g i

16. N2 System < 15* g i

17. Quench Tank Sample 5 35* g

18. RCP Seal Inlet < 17* -

19.

20.

Core Flood Tank Sample RCP Standpipe Demin Water Supply 515* Ng 5 15* gg

21. Containment H2 Dilution Inlet 5 75* pw

22. Containment Hz Dilution Outlet 5 75*

j. BWST Outlet Valves NA*

k. Low Pressure Injection

1. Decay Heat Pumps < 30*

2. Low Pressure Injection Valves 5 NA*

3. Decay Heat Pump Suction Valves 5 NA

4. Decay Heat Cooler Outlet Valves 5 NA*

5. Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves 5 NA*

3. Containment Pressure--High-High

a. Containment Spray Pump 5,80*

b. Component Cooling Isolation Valves

1. Inlet to Cont.ainment 5 25*

! 2. Outlet from Containment < 25*

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-17 Amendment No. YTJ.114.

l LMt 95-0026 Page 29 TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

b. Component Cooling Isolation Valves (Continued)

3. Inlet to CRDM's s 35*

4. CRDM Booster Pump Suction s 35*

5. Component Cooling from Decay Heat Cooler s NA*

4. RCS Pressure-Low i

a. Fans

1. Emergency Vent Fans s 25*

2. Containment Cooler Fans s 45*

b. HV & AC Isolation valves

1. ECCS Room s 75*

2. Emergency Ventilation s 75*

3. Containment Air Sample s 30* 1

4. DELETED Cor.tainiaent Purge s 15'

5. Penetration Room Purge s 75*

c. Control Room HV & AC Units s 10*

d. High Pressure Injection

l. High Pressure Injection Pumps s 30*

2. High Pressure Injection Valves s 30*

e. Component Cooling Water

1. Component Cooling Water Pumps s 180*

2. Component Cooling Aux. Equipment Inlet Valves s 180*

3. Component Cooling to Air Compressor Valves s 180* J l

f. Service Water System l l l l 1. Service Water Pumps s 45* j j 2. Service Water from Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves s NA*

g. Containment Spray Isolation Valves s 80*

h. Emergency Diesel Generator s 15*

?

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-18 Amendment No. 114

i e

l LAR 95-0026 Page 30 TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES l

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

4. RCS Pressure-Low (continued)

i. Containment Isolation Valves l

l 1. Vacumn Relief < 30*

l 2. Normal Sump 7 25*

3. RCS Letdown Delay Cof1 Outlet 2 30* !

4. RCS Letdown High Temperature l

5. Pressurizer Sample 530* l 6.

5 45* l Service Water to Cooling Water < 45*

7. Vent Header

8. Drain Tank 7 15* O h,r".J

9. Core Flood Tank Vent 7 15* W )

10. Core Flood Tank Fill i515*

15* O Z l l 11.

12.

Steam Generator Sample <15* p_ g

=

13.

Quench Tank <15* g E ,

14.

Emergency Sump Air Systems <15* g%

NA*

Q i

15. N2 System < 15*

16. Quench Tank Sample < 35* 1

17. Core Flood Tank Sample I 15* 1

18. RCP Standpipe Demin Water Supply 2 15*

19. Containment H 2 Dilution Inlet i 75* 4

20. Containment H 2 Dilution Outlet 5 75* b _

j. bWST Outlet Valves NA*- M l M !

5. RCS Pressure--Low-Low

a. Low Pressure Injection

1. Decay Heat Pumps 5 30*

2. Low Pressure Injection Valves < NA*

3. Decay Heat Pump Suction Valves ._< NA*

4. Decay Heat Cooler Outlet Valves < NA*

5. Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves 5NA*

b. Component Cooling isolation Valves l 1. Auxiliary Equipment Inlet < 90*

2. Inlet to Air Compressor < 90*

3. Component Cooling from Decay Heat Cooler 5 NA*

l c. Containment Isolation Valves i 1. RCP Seal Return < 45*

2. RCP Seal Inlet 517*

(

l l LAR 95-0026 ;

l

, Page 31 1 TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) !

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS i l

l

6. DELETED Contdinment RedidLien - High ]

1

6. Emergency Vent Fens a 25' l i

'n . HV & AC Isolstivu Velves l

1. CCCS Room 2 75'

2. Cmergency Vuntildtion a 75' O. Conteinment Air 3dsple a 50'

4. Contdinment Furge a 15'

5. Fenetrstion Room Furge 2 75'

c. Control Room HV & AC UniLo s 10 ^-

TABLE NOTATION

Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included when applicable. Response time limit includes movement of valves and attainment of pump or blower discharge pressure.

l l

I l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-20 Amendment No. 40

TABLE 4.3-2 .e .

o S 4

g SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS a.

G OT g, CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH .g ,

g CHANNEL CHANNEL .

FUNCTIONAL. SURVEILLANCE- M i g FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED .

g 1. INSTRUMENT STRINGS 1

" a. DELETED DEEETED DEEETEd ' DELETED DELETED ;

C6Hti!Hment adiation Migb ~~^T~ *~~~ T " ~~~ Y "^T.T.^2' A .Sf - !

b. Containment Pressure - High S R .M(2) 1. 2. 3 !

c. Containment Pressure - High-High S R M(2) 1. 2. 3

d. RCS Pressure - Low S R M 1. 2. 3

e. RCS Pressure - Low-Low S R M 1. 2. 3 !

+

a f. BWST Level - Low-Low S R M 1, 2. 3 -

s r

2. OUTPUT LOGIC i S a. Incident Level #1: Containment Isolation S R M 1.2.3.44# !

b. Incident Level #2: High Pressure Injection and Starting Diesel Generators S R M 1. 2. 3. 4 hi'

c. Incident Level #3: Low Pressure E _il ks Injection S. R M 1. 2. 3. 4 'g E

d. Incident Level #4: Containment :r. -

[ Spray S R M 1. 2. 3. 4 N K ). i 4 a e. Incident Level #5: Containment Mr !

[ Sump Recirculation Permissive S R M 1. 2. 3. 4 $EL o -

3. MANUAL ACTUATION 2? !

S Ra *

'g a. SFAS (Except Containment Spray NA NA M(1) 1.2.3.44# *5y

, and Emergency Sump Recirculation) p

.m b. Containment Spray NA NA M(1) 1. 2. 3 2, i

- t S 4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS S NA M 1, 2. 3.-4. _

t

-___ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _- .-- __ _ - __ _ -__-_ O

?C..

ua Fo 8

O

> TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) w w $.

< o M o-u

$' SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS' m

m

-*' CHANNEL ' MODES IN WHICH E CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE 9 FUNCTIONAL' UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REOUIRED

5. INTERLOCK CHANNELS

's

a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve S R 1, 2, 3 ,=- F,

b. Pressurizer Heater S R **

3 ## C _

2 W

s m9 w

N o.c 2,y O 4 0' "

w **See Specification 4.5.2.d.1 gg9 VCE en a TABLE NOTATION -< G F-mx Ge (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during *g{

> shutdown. All other circuitry associated with manual safeguards actuation $E g

m shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days. 5e [5 Q ~

C;Q (2) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include exercising the transmitter by

$ "- applying either vacuum or pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter.

Z Oo

'o # DELETED Theoc out v ulllanue requ2&cinenLa in vun;unctivn w2LL Lhose of SecLien

( 4.3.4 upply duting CORE ALTERATIONS vi uiO v cinen t Of lit udiuLed f uel willuu the d u vu ta.uuuen t vnly if uomuy the SFAS ared tudluLieu iuviu tut a 11oLud Au Tu'nlu 3.3-d 3, I L cium 16, 2a, and 36, tu 12cu vf the contetiuuent putsc aud cabauo t ay a Lein y noble gao incultoi. .

1. When either Decay Heat Isolation Valve is open.

___..____._.___=_______________________________.__.__m

_

-- - . - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ ________.___.______________a

i LAR 95-0026 Page 34 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

( i i

I I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t

3.6.1.7 The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be closed with contr'ol power re'mbVed.

I 1

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3 and 4.

ACTION: l l

i With one eny coiiteniniuni purgc oupy;y eiid/oc exhenst isolation valve open ihra containme5t purge supply and/or exhatistlpeiistrati6ndr with"its control power not rem 6vsdl. verify.tliat'.the 4

remaining containment purge sOpply and exhaust isolation valves are clo' sed with cahtrol poWE removed by perfo'rming Surveillance R6quirement 4:6.1.7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ?

b Close the open containmentjurge supply and/or exhaust ise tion valve and verify' contioQp4Er is remov ed within'24 houis'bf ti(in'atileist HOISTANDBY.kithin the next 6_h'oursliid]h l I

COLD'SHUTDdWN withiditti6'folloWini30)B6rs.

end piv -id;iig eccuss tv inc ediside oininosyhus, oyvietion niej continnu, giovidcd thet inc l uccnnieletcd tinic is s 90 honis for the picccding 305 deya, otherwisc, bv in et icesi IIOT STAND 0Y w;thhi thu iiext G hours end Li COLD SIIUTDOWN withni dic following,30 honis.

l SURVEIILANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.1.7 At least once per 31 days; verify that sach containment purge sup;ily.and exhausEis61atidn valve is closed with control power removed; The eccuniuletmd iniis any centuiiiniunt purgc sepy;j und/oc cxhenst vel,c is oyvn end viovidua occcos to the outside etniospheiv ohel; bc detuniinica nileJ3t once pu 24 houca.

(

i DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 6-10 Amendment No.135 1

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=

LAR 95-0026 Page 3s CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

_3/4. 6. 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES I AGE PR01IIDED s l .

i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l I l 3.6.3.1 All containment isolation valves shall be OPERABLE with isolation times less than or equal to required isolation times.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

' l ACTION: '

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable,'either: l

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ,'or j

- b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

- c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN w 'ithin the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 4.6.3.1.1 The isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work that could i

affect the valve's performance is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

i

Surveillance testing of valves MS100, MS101, ICSilA and ICSilB is not required

! prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be performed prior to entering MODE 3'.

- The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Selected valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under LJministrative controls.

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-14 Amendment No. 147

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'*tla9s-0026 Page 36 1

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l l

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) t 4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once each l REFUELING INTERVAL, by: i l

l l

l a. Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolatien position.

I-1 4

l b. DELETED Verifying that on a Coatainment Purgc and Exhaust isolation icst signal, )

cach Purgc and Exhaust au cmatic valve actuates to its isciation position. l l

l 4.6.3.1.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve shall be determined to be !

l within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

1 l

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l l

3/4 6-15 Amendment No. 147.213 DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 1

+ - , , - ,,

IEEUELING OPER ATIONS

,, LAR 95-0026 l Page 37 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,

! b. A minimum of one door in each airlock closed, but both doors of the containment personnel air lock may be open provided that at least one personnel air lock door is capable of being closed and a designated individual is available immediately outside the personnel air lock to close the door, and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the atmosphere outside containment shall be either:

l 1. Closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or l

2. Be capable of being closed from the control room by an OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust isolation valve upon receipt of a high radiation signal from the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement ofirradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all i operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment.

)

l

b. With the Icquirements of Specification 3.9.4.c not satisfied for the containment purge and exhaust system sentainment purge and-exhaus! i;0!ation system inoperab!0, close at least one of l the isolation valves for each of the purge and exhaust penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within_one hour l i

1

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

l SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its required condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust valve, within 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement ofirradiated fuel in the containment, by:

, a. -Verifying the penetrations are in their required condition, or

b. Verifying that with the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, and the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor capable of providing a high radiation signal to the control room, that after initiation of the high radiation signal, the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves can be closed from the control room,ror If-using-the SFAS crea-radiation 4nenitersrverifying 4 hat 4>n+Gontainment-Pwgeemi l Exhaust-1 solation test :!gnalreachprgeend-exhaustasolation-valve-automatically ac4uates4o4tsasolation-position:

DAVIS-DESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. 186,202

k

, . dm 95-o026 HilS FME PR0HDED l 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that

1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereoi exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) sufficient redundancy is i maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or

^

maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in-the facility desig % (n 4oSi &

for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The ti integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the 8 -

assumptions used in the accident analyses. -Q l

-Q EE; The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the m

- 3 *, i overallstandards.

design system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original dE i

The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum E o00 -- 1 feequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. v 5

a @om -

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS action function associated with each $f" g channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. NoEe - . ,

credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times <

indicated as not applicable. ~5 l

2 Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.

Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The actuation logic for Functional Units 4.a., 4.b., and 4.c. of Table 3.3-3, Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, is designed to provide protection and actuation of a single train of safety features equipment, essential bus or emergency diesel generator. Collectively, Functional Units 4.a., 4.b., and 4.c. function to detect a degraded voltage condition on~either of the two 4160 volt essential buses, shed connected loads, disconnect the affected bus (es) from the offsite power source and start the associated emergency diesel generator. In addition, if an SFAS actuation signal a present under these conditions, the sequencer channels for the two SFAS l channels which actuate the train of safety features equipment powered by the affected bus will automatically sequence these loads onto the bus to prevent overloading of the emergency diesel generator. Functional Unit 4.a. has a 4

. DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 8 3/4 3-1 Amendment No.-73, !?5, (Hext page is B 3/4 3-la) HB, 211

LAR 95-0026

~"

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 18 PAGE PROVDED BASES .

3L4.3.1 and 3 /4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continuedl total of four units, one associated with each SFAS channel (i.e., two for each essential bus). Functional Units 4.b. and 4.c. each have a total of four units, (two associated with each essential bus); each unit consisting of two undervoltage relays and an auxiliary relay.

An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device (s), 2) associated logic and output relays (including Isolation of Hain Feedwater Non Essential Valves and Turbine Trip), and 3) power sources.

The SFRCS response time for the turbine stop valve closure is based on the combined response times of main steam line low pressure sensors, logic cabinet delay for main steam line low pressure signals and closure time of the turbine stop valves. This SFRCS response time ensures that the auxiliary feedwater to the unaffected steam generator will not be isolated due to a SFRCS low ;

pressure trip during a main steam line break accident. 1 Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turbine trip (above 45 percent of RATED THERNAL POWER) or trip of both main feedwater pump j I

turbines. This anticipatory trip will operate' in advance 'of' the reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak reactor coolant i system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the pilot operated relief valve.

This anticipatory reactor trip system was installed to satisfy Item II.K.2.10 !

of NUREG-0737. The justification for the ARTS turbine trip arming level of 45% is given in BAW-1893, October, 1985.

4

! ADDlil0NAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY l PROPOSED BY LETTER Scrial No _Zp i Date4/tM91 l

l l

i DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. [ I g 1/ 8' ps, ati i

- . - . _ _ - ~ . _ _ _ . _ - ~ _ - - - - - - . - . . .- - - . - - -

LAR 95-0026 09ade'40 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES

(

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE l The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that 1) the

! containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the annulus atmosphere of 0.5 psi and 2) the containment peak-pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 40 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure obtained from a LOCA event is 37 psig. The limit of 1 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total l pressure to 38 psig which is less than the design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

l 3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA.

3/4.6.1.6- CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY Deleted 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM Hii~6tsisififthe'666thi6meht JU^F E?sUppif snd'~skh50stTisolsti66 461v~e5 9

@losed c with' c'ontrol, xuer removed at all > times during MODES'1. 2, 3 and 4'"

'provides assurance t1at the~ safety ~' function of/co'ntainmsnt7 isolation >1s""

gafgt ai nsd;f n M3 vent f of' a1LOCA J ~~^'~"~~~^*'^" '~~~'^ ~ ~ ~' "^~~^ ' ~ -' "^^'

"9 P"diskT.iis,?ACT100st.~uf._shis.+n&.,.sssT,plos+e, IEENt list.~?sfW#,istf6 Tie

%o haus p .n nts~ sol =st~iongval,veefcs dsmea,ch ~tdinmentspenetraI iontand k.fbVis,s5Wiss6nMET1sesiahisrfrlifgd6sii~ siW6p=ijMilife!~~^THE~~"

r. .,m.. , _ n. . =.#.m.w.

m_L ,

. ~x-y=, -. r..m. . .=., ~ ,.r. c. . , ,= ., . -n. ._ t. e=m...

,,m

u. . .,a. . + ,. m, ~ u. ..~

thi: System may be in Operation with the reactor coolant system temperature above 200 F. This rcotriction minimizes the time that a direct open path would exist frc the containment atmosphere to the outside at:0:^herc and consequently reducc: the probability that an accident do c wouTd exceed 10 CFR 100 guideline values in the event of a LOCA Occurring coincident with purge system Operation. The use of thi System is therefore restricted to non routinc usage not to exceed 90 hours0.00104 days 0.025 hours 1.488095e-4 weeks 3.4245e-5 months in any con ccutive 355 day period which i: equivalent to approximately 1% of the total po;;ible yearly unit Operating time.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment t

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 135. 205

l

' "* LAR 95-0026 1

Page 41 I i

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES !

leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. 3

! 1 L -

l Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and DH-7B are de- .

i energized during MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves l in the event of a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BWST. Re-energization of valves DH-7A and DH-7B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1,2,3 and 4 under administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.

l Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-9B are de-energized during MODES 1,2,3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in draining the Borated Water Storage Tank to the Containment .

l Emergency Sump and the loss of this water source for normal plant shutdown. Re-energization i of valves DH-9A and DH-9B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1,2,3, and 4 )

under administrative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken l when re-energizing these valves under such controls.

l

! 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM L The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air j temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat ;

removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVFS The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from '2 autside environment in the event of a release of radioactive

!- material to the containment atmospnere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the required time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material ,

to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA. !

Containment isolation valves and their required isolation times are addressed in the USAR. The j opening of a closed inoperable containment isolation valve on an intermittent basis during plant ;

operation is permitted under administrative control.' Operating procedures identify those valves which may be opened under administrative control as well as the safety precautions which must

! be taken when opening valves under such controls.

I I

h mi .

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 135,147,182,195 l

l l - -

l

! *= ' un 9s-oo26 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 118 PAGE PROVIDED w

BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitation on reactivity during REFUELING ensures that:

! l

1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a i

uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel. This limitation is consistent incident in thewith the initial accident conditions assumed for the boron dilution analysis.

l The ACTION statement's minimum boration flow rate of 12 gpm is less than the minimum boration flow rate of 25 gpm specified in TS 3/4.1.1.1, l

' Reactivity Control - Shutdown Margin because the lower flow rate is based on only barating the reactor vessel.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient fission time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived products.

the safety analyses.This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in 3 /4. 9. 4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment, release of fission product radioactivity to the environment as a result of a fuel element rupture must be minimized. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY as described in LC0 3.6.1.1. In other situations, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not present, and therefore less stringent requirements are needed to isolate the containment from the atmosphere outside containment.

be open during CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement of irradiated fuel w the containment provided the conditions specified in LCO 3.9.4.b are met. The individual designated to be continuously available to close the air lock door must be stationed at the auxiliary building side of the air lock. A containment personnel air lock door is considered capable of being closed if the lock.

air door is unblocked and there are no cables or hoses being run through the The LC0 3.9.10 requirement to maintain a minimum of 23 feet of water over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the reactor

! pressure vessel during movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure I vessel while in MODE 6 ensures that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. Further, sufficient time is available to close i

personnel air lock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occ.the urs, DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment -186r-202, 207

.- .. . _ - - . - - -~ __ - - . - .

,g ,LAR 95-0026 Page 43 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Continued)

Regarding LCO 3.9.4.c, the phrase " atmosphere outside containment" refers to anywhere outside the containment vessel, including (but not limited to) the containment annulus and the auxiliary building.

For penetrations that are closed by a method equivalent to a manual or automatic isolation valve, or a blind flange, the isolation technique must be approved by an engineering evaluation.

The isolation technique may include the use of a material that can provide a temporary seal capable of maintaining the integrity of the penetration to restrict the release of radioactive material from a fuel handling accident.

With the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, a high radiation signal received from the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor will effectively automatically contain the release by shutting down the containment purge system supply and exhaust fans and closing their inlet and outlet dampers. On a valid signal, the control room operator will then manually close the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves. Therefore, the uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment will be restricted.

W E A f t %M

[sh ~ 73R$1@Ed!?dil5%IM)fth Ri$$iE0iFActibn7sla3Mt3%hS$fi$ijs !$@i@N{atsidsMFiisMih6ff$

d] )

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Wi R E Bid & G .,.

W Tg%.,ese i EbMSkcE E Ikka!ial MKSEN l Likcw se, use of tiie SFAS ares isdistioiliiioiiitors pmvide sii sutoiiiat.c coiitsiiiiiiciit isoleiieii sigiiel eii high isdistioii, icsificiiiig inc niiceiitiolicd scicusc of isdiosctive niiervuel fioui the coiitu>ini eiit to thv vinnoiiiiiciit.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS l

l The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-la Amendment No. 186,202,

ML20141F110

Text

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