ML20091G805
| ML20091G805 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1984 |
| From: | Irwin D HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8406040365 | |
| Download: ML20091G805 (20) | |
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LILCO, 0{y'{ sell, 1984 "0A AN ~4 f]O ,d9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FEMA'S APPEAL FROM LICENSING BOARD DISCOVERY ORDER OF MAY 18, 1984 HUNTON & WILLIAMS P.O. Box 1535 707 East Main Street Richmond, Virr/ inia 23212 June 1, 1984 8406040365 840601
- PDR ADOCK 05000322 _
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
'I. Background................................................. 1 II. Discussion................................................. 4
- 1. Other Sources of Information on the Results and Basis of the RAC Report Exist...................... 5
- 2. The Documents Are Not Necessary to Understanding the RAC Review........................... 7
- 3. The Harm From Compelled Disclosure is Real and Substantial................................... 9
- 4. The Licensing Board Misapplied the Tests for Determining Whether to overcome Executive Privilege................................... 10 III. Conclusion............................................... 13 l
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TABLE OF CITATIONS 1
FEDERAL CASES Black-v. Sheraton Corporation of America, 50 F.R.D. 130 (D.D.C. 1970)........ .......................... 6 City of Burlington, Vt. v. Westinghouse Elactric Corp.,
246 F.Supp. 839 on remand (D.D.C. 1965)....................... 9 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., v. Coleman, 432 F.Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ohio 1976)................... ........ 10 Crumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973)................................. 7 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. U.S.,
157 F.Supp. 939 (U.S.C.C1. 1958).............................. 5 Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).................. 6
, Machin v. Zucker, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963)................ 10 Mitchell v. Bogg, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1958).................. 6 4
Niemeier v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1977).................................. 7 Unicn of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, No. 82-2053, F.2d (May 25, 1984)..................... 4 U.S. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
86 F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C. 1975)................................... 4 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena.,
40 F.R.D. 318-(1966) (D.D.C. 1966) aff'd mem. sub nom.
Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967) cert. denied 389.U.S. 952, 885 S.Ct. 334, 19 L.Ed 2d~361 (1967)..........................................S
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NRC CASES Long' Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-83-72, 18 NRC.1221 (1983)....................... 4 Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144 (1962).................... 5,12 REGULATIONS lo CFR 5 50.47(a)(1) and -(2)................................. 2,9 4.
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LILCO, June 1, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
LILCO'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FEMA'S APPEAL FROM LICENSING BOARD DISCOVERY ORDER OF MAY 18, 1984 I. BACKGROUND 4
The principal question presented by this appeal is whether the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board properly formulated and ap-
- plied the test for determining whether Suffolk County had demon-strated a need sufficiently compelling to. overcome an assertion by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of executive privi-lege with respect to 37 documents relating to the deliberations of its Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) in its review of the emer-gency plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.1/ The Licens-ing Board, after in camera review of these documents and over Suffolk County's opposition in its papers, had held each of the 37 documents to be subject to a valid claim of executive privilege.
Licensing Board, Memorandum and Order Ruling on Suffolk County Mo-tion to Compel Production of Documents by FEMA, May 18, 1984 1/ As permitted by the Appeal Board's Order of May 30, LILCO will address issues relating to one agency's directing another to disclose documents in a separate paper to be filed next Tuesday, June 5'.
(hereinafter " Licensing Board Order"), at 6.2/
The Licensing Board went on to hold, however, that as to 30 of the documents, Suffolk County's asserted need for them out-weighed FEMA's asserted need to preserve their confidentiality.
Licensing Board Order at 7-8. The Licensing Board's rationale for its finding of need, Licensing Board Order at 6-8, devolves from the facts that its emergency planning findings for Shoreham under 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1) and -(2) of the Commission's regulations 4
depend in part on FEMA's review; that that review, relative to the 2/ Suffolk County had contended, without examining the docu-ments, that they contained purely factual information and were not subject to executive privilege. The Licensing Board re-jected this argument, stating:
Suffolk County next asserts that these documents are not privileged because they all relate to the RAC Review or the RAC Report which is attached to the FEMA testimony.
Suffolk County asserts that this material con-sists.of purely factual material. We dis-agree. While there are obviously facts contained in the documents, the thrust of these documents is that they contain evalua-tions,-advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations which fall within " executive
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privilege." We also find that the FEMA find-ings herein, as adopted from the RAC Report, involve the decision making process of govern-ment which is protected by executive privi-lege. Thereforc, we find that FEMA has made a prima facie showing of executive privilege.
Suffolk County may choose to contest that determination before this Appeal Board. However, without access to these documents neither LILCO nor any other party has substantive basis to do any-thing other than accept the validity of the Licensing Board's de-termination that the documents are subject to a valid claim of
- privilege, and this memorandum proceeds on that premise.
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consistency of LILCO's Shoreham Transition Plan with the provi-sions of NUREG-0654, is embodied in the RAC Report, which FEMA in-tends to place in evidence alcng with its prefiled direct testimo-ny; that thh materials being sought provide " access to the underlying documents and processes by which the RAC Report achieved its final form"; that Suffolk County's contentions prin-cipally claim that the LILCO Transition Plan does not comply with NUREG-0654; and that " cross-examination alone" at hearing of the four FEMA witnesses, three of whom worked on the RAC Report, will not be " equivalent" to the material set forth in these documents.
The Licensing Board therefore ordered their production.
Following issuance of a stay by the Licensing Board and its continuation by this Board, the matter is ripe for briefing on the merits. LILCO participates in this appeal not because it has knowledge of any of the documents currentl'y in dispute -- it has neither -- but because FEMA's efficient and effective review of the Shoreham Transition Emergency Plan is highly important, if not indispensable, to the successful resolution of emergency planning issues at Shoreham. The Director of FEMA, Louis O. Giuffrida, supported in detail before this Board by high-ranking FEMA region-al officials, Philip H. McIntire and Roger B. Kowieski (the latter of whom is Chairman of the RAC), have all strenuously asserted that disclosure of the documents in question would severely dis-rupt the. collegial evaluation process of the RAC, impairing if not
- destroying its further functioning.
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The RAC has not finished its work at Shoreham: LILCO must amend its Transition Plan to address, to the satisfaction of the RAC, the deficiencies noted in the RAC Report; thereafter, an emergency planning exercise will be planned, held and graded under the auspices of FEMA and the RAC; and under the recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in ,
l Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, No. 82-2053, F.2d '
(May 25, 1984), it appears that an opportunity must be provided for litigation of the results of that exercise before a full power operating license can be granted. Thus LILCO, while having nei-ther custody nor knowledge of the contents of the documents imme-diately at issue, is seriously concerned about the harm which their compelled release could have on the licensing of Shoreham.
II. DISCUSSION Assuming v.ecessarily that a proper claim of privilege has been asserted with respect to the documents at issue, the only relevant questions are (1) whether a compelling need has been es-tablished to. warrant production, and (2) whether that need is great enough to overcome the agency's asserted need to preserve confidentiality. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-83-72, 18 NRC 1221, 1227-28 (1983). The bur-den is on the party seeking discovery to overcome the privilege.
U.S. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 86 F.R.D. 603 (D.D.C.
1975)'. Moreover, the showing of necessity must be a definite one, t
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not merely relying on asserted deficiencies in the government's need for secrecy; and the government is not obligated to refute all possible need for the documents before the opposing party is required to object. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (1966) (D.D.C. 1966) aff'd mem. sub nom. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967) cert. denied 389 U.S. 952, 885 S.Ct. 334, 19 L.Ed.2d 361 (1967). Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. U.S., 157 F.Supp. 939 (U.S.C.C1.
1958).
In assessing assertions of need, both the availability of other sources of information and the importance of the information are recognized as relevant by both the Commission's licensing boards and federal courts. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1164-65 (1982).
- 1. Other Sources of Information on the Results and Basis of the RAC Report Exist In this case, the 37 documents being sought by Suffolk County do not exist in a vacuum. FEMA has already produced over 1100 pages of documents relative to its review of Shoreham in response to an FOIA request by Suffolk County; forty of these documents have been identified by FEMA as bearing.on the RAC Review. FEMA's Response to Suffolk County Request for Production of Documents, May 14, 1984, at 1-4. In addition, FEMA has agreed to make its
'four witnesses, three of whom participated in the RAC pro. cess, available for two days of-depositions (Suffolk County was offered
its choice of deposing these witnesses together or separately; it has chosen to do so separately). Suffolk County's papers to date do not assert that these additional avenues of discovery are in-sufficient for probing the basis of the RAC's findings; they ig-nore them. The Licensing Board's opinion similarly views the 37 contested documents in isolation.3/
The results of federal court cases dealing with assertions of executive privilege show a sensitivity to the results available from other means of discovery. In Black v. Sheraton Corporation of America, 50 F.R.D. 130 (D.D.C. 1970), an FBI agent was not re-quired to answer questions on deposition concerning the extent of a wire tapping investigation or leads developed as a result, since plaintiff had access to documents in FBI files and the ability to depose agents involved which provided adequate information. In Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), however, plaintiff obtained access to wire tap records because no other less sensi-tive source was available. Similarly, the need for access to agency reports is greater when witnesses who gave those reports refuse to testify. Mitchell v. Bogg, 252 F.2d 513 (8th Cir.
1958). .
3/ The Licensing Board's Opinion does not specifically treat the other documents released pursuant to the FOIA or the depositions; indeed, its reference to " cross-examination alone," as at a hear-ing, id. at 9, suggests further that it was considering the 37 l-documents in isolation.
All of the analyses in the cases above militate against com-
.pelled production of the privileged RAC documents. Other, less sensitive documentary discovery is available; deposition discovery is available. No showing has been made or even asserted to date that such discovery is inadequate to permit a probing of the bases for the RAC's collegial conclusions and whether they are tenable.
At least until these other bases have been explored, Suffolk Coun-ty's motion is, at best, premature.
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- 2. The Documents Are Not Necessary to Understanding the RAC Review Similarly, the necessity of the documents sought is a rele-vant consideration. Since the rationale of the privilege is to prevent interference with the operation of the deliberative pro-cess, the need for secrecy is diminished when the material is in-corporated by. reference into the final decision. Niemeier v.
Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1977)
(memos within 5 5 of FOIA subject to disclosure when within final opinion). Similarly, if documents serve as justification for a decision of the agency affecting regulated parties, they should be revealed even if it was originally prepared for pre-decisional consultation. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (reports that explain Board's decision as to whether companies accrued excess profits subject to discovery).
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l In this case, however, the documents sought are not incorpo-rated into or used as an explicit justification for the RAC's views. Of the documents being sought, the majority (nos. 1-21) contain the individual preliminary observations of individual mem-bers of the RAC. It is clear beyond argument that the RAC Report is not simply a collation or compilation of individual views.
Rather, it is the result of an extended collegial process in which the individual comments of RAC participants on matters within their specific areas of expertise, as well as their more general views, are submitted for review by other participants; and that these comments and views both shape, and are shaped by, those of the other members is a process of comment and discussi 7.
McIntire Affidavit; Kowieski Affidavit. The documents sought are but individual threads in a complex collegial fabric. Their rela-tionship to the findings of the final product, the RAC Report, and to its bases, is not linear. They are only tangentially relevant to the actual matter at issue, namely, the assertions a'nd conclu-sions of the RAC Report and their bases. The alternative method of discovery offered by FEMA -- two days of depositions of the agency's proposed witnesses, including the RAC Chairman and the two RAC consultants who actually drafted most of the RAC Report --
affords a more direct and more efficient means of probing those bases than the documents being withhcid.
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- 3. The Harm From Compelled Disclosure is Real and Substantial The degree of harm expected to be suffered as a result of re-lease of the privileged information is to be weighed against the asserted need for compelled production. If incentives exist so that the information will still be obtainable, the adverse impact from disclosure is diminished, and with it the strength of any a
claim for protection. City of Burlington, Vt. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 246 F.Supp. 839 (D.D.C. 1965) (anonymity for in-formers in antitrust cases not as important if it is in informer's self-interest to reveal the information). Thus, the mere asser-tion of a chilling effect cannot rebut all claims of necessity of disclosure. By contrast, in the present case FEMA's assertions of harm are not " mere claims", nor do other incentives exist to in-duce RAC memP sarticipate. Specific, emphatic assertions under oat' Chairman of the RAC, Mr. Kowieski, and by a rank. Regional officer., Mr. McIntire, indicate that disclo-sure (., will affect the integrity and candor of the collective RAC deliberative process, (2) will make RAC members, particularly non-FEMA personnel, reluctant and perhaps unwilling to serve on
-the RAC, and (3) will in all probability lead to more informal means of doing business under which the quality of the work prod-uct may suffer and significant delays will in any event be experi-enced. McIntire Affidavit; Kowieski Affidavit. Unless these as-sertions are rejected, the resulting harm is real; it' jeopardizes 2
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the-RAC process, and to that extent, the Commission's ability to
-make necessary licensing filings under S 50.47(a)(1) and -(2).4/
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- 4. 'The Licensing Board Misapplied the Tests for i Determining Whether the Overcome Executive Privilege There is little if any disagreement abcut the Licensing Board's statements of the tests either for determining the eligi-bility of material for protection under the executive privilege, cn: for determining whether it has been overcome. The difficulty in this case arises in the application of the tests. As the dis-cussion above illustrates, the following factors are de-terminative:
)g 1. The availability of other means of obtaining the same or equivalent information. The relevant information here is not the melange of individual RAC members' preliminary views, but the sub-
, stance and basis for the collegial RAC conclusions expressed in the RAC Report. That substance and basis exists, or does not, apart-from the individual members' preliminary views; and it can be sought both through the other documents already produced and, 4/ Two additional factors, though not themselves dispositive, also weigh against compelled disclosure. The first is the fact that FEMA is not a party to this litigation but rather NRC's con-sultant, see Machin v. Zucker, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Secondly, the fact that the RAC's work is still ongoing intensifies the harm to be suffered from disclosure: the chilling effect of disclosure would not only impair its future functioning in other cases, but also its ability to complete its evaluation of
. Shoreham, cf..Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., v. Coleman, 432 F Supp. 1359 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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at least equally importantly, by deposition. Both Suffolk Coun-ty's papers to date and the Licensing Board's Opinion fail to view the 37 disputed documents in this context, which cannot be ne-glected and which diminishes any assertion of need.
- 2. The importance of the information sought. The relevant information to be obtained covers the collective RAC findings and their basis, not the dynamics of the RAC process or the prelimi-
. nary individual views of individual members.5/ Thus the only unique content of the RAC documents is, in essence, irrelevant to inquiry into the bases for the RAC's conclusions, at least in the absence of substantial allegations of irregularities in the RAC process. Neither Suffolk County's papers to date nor the Licens-ing Board's Opinion distinguish between these two types of infor-mation and, to that extent, are incorrect.
- 3. The Licensing Board's Opinion recites a series of factors weighing in favor of, and against, disclosure, id. at 4-5. Of the five factors considered to favor disclosure, id. at 4, the first two -- the importance of the information being sought and its availability.elsewhere -- are consistent with other authority. Of the other three, one is not relevant and two are misapplied by the ,
Licensing Board.
5/- This might change if a substantial and substantiated allega-tion were made of irregularities in the RAC process; however, no such allegation has been made here.
- a. The third factor mentioned by the Licensing Board --
a philosophy of b. road discovery prevailing under NRC rules --
applies to discovery generally, but not to a specific-case deter-mination whether to overcome a privilege. Broad discovery is part of the general federal discovery philosophy, but no authority was cited by the Licensing Board, nor has any been separately found, to suggest that this general philosophy should undermine or affect specific determinations on privilege, which are definitionally ex-ceptions to he general discovery rules.
- b. The fourth factor referred to by the Licensing Board is its March 6, 1984 Memorandum and Order in this case, providing LILCO with certain New York State documents over claims of execu-tive privilege by the State. Though the Board's passing reference to this earlier, detailed ruling does not reveal it, that decision upheld numerous of New York State's claims of executive privilege, as well as overruling several of them. Similarly, an earlier Li-censing Board in this case upheld numerous claims of executive privilege asserted by Suffolk County in this case. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-82-82, supra. Thus, governmental claims of executive privilege have been both upheld and overcome on specific facts already in this case, and citation to these earlier opinions generally does not argue per se in favor of disclosure of documents on the facts here.
- c. The Licensing Board's fifth enumerated factor is that the RAC members are not FEMA employees and therefore
= e 1 presumably not subject to discipline or retribution by FEMA.
While the Board's observation may be accurate, it is not disposi-tive. If these employees' views expressed in the RAC process do not mirror those of their "home" agency, they may be subject to discipline by that agency. Further, personnel who are not FEMA employees may simply be unwilling to participate in RAC work under conditi~ons of contentiousness if their preliminary individual views are going to be subject to fishbowl scrutiny. Unless FEMA possesses the power to coerce these independent personnel, the RAC process may be aborted at the front end, as the McIntire and Kowieski affidavits show. Thus this factor also does not weigh in favor of disclosure.
CONCLUSION The Licensing Board sustained FEMA's assertion that all of the 37 documents in contention are protected by executive privi-
-lege. No other party is in a position to challenge this determi-nation on the merits.
To overcome the privilege as to these documents, compelling need for the.information contained in them must be shown, and must outweigh the government's interest in preserving confidentiality.
Other means besides these documents are available for probing the basis for the RAC's conclusions; the only unique information in the disputed documents apparently relates exclusively or predomi-nantly to essentially irrelevant unspecified issues ~concerning'the dynamics of the RAC' process and individual members' preliminary
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l 14-individual views. Against this weak assertion of need is a vigor-
~ous. demonstration by FEMA of harm from release (unfortunately, not fully developed before the Licensing Board), intensified by the ongoing nature of the RAC's work at Shoreham.
The documents should not be compelled to be released.
Respectfully submitted, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Donald P. Irwin Lee B. Zeugin HUNTON & WILLIAMS P.O. Box 1535 707 East Main Street Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: June 1, 1984 8
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LILCO, June 1, 1984 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE In the Matter of LONG' ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
(Emergency Planning Proceeding)' Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT s
OF FEMA'S~ APPEAL FROM~ LICENSING BOARD DISCOVERY ORDER OF MAY 18,^1984:were served this date upon the following by first-
- class; mail, postage prepaid, or by hand (one asterisk).
Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.,* Gary J. Edles, Esq.*
JChairman' Atomic Safety and Licensing
, . Atomic Safety'and Licensing _ Appeal Board Appeal Board; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory .
L U.S. Nuclear Regulatory- Commission
- ~ Commission East-West Tower, 3rd Floor East-West Tower, 3rd Floor 4350 East-West Highway 4350. East-West Highway Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington,-D.C. 20555 Secretary of the Commission Howard A. Wilber* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety.and Licensing Commission Appeal Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Aton.ic Safety and Licensing East-West Tower, 3rd Floor Appeal Board Panel
.4350 East-West Highway U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission
, . . Washington, D.C. 20555 James A. Laurenson,*
L Chairman . Atomic Safety and Licensing.
Atomic Safety and: Licensing Board Panel
~ Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commis'sion Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 East-West Tower, Rm. 402A
~4350 East-West Hwy. Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.*
Bethesda, MD 20814 David A. Repka, Esq.
- . Edwin J. Reis, Esq.
Dr.-Jerry R.-Kline* EU.S. Nuclear Regulatory l . Atomic Safety-and Licensing Commission
. -Board' 7735 Old Georgetown Road i
JU.S. Nuclear Regulatory ~(to mailroom)
Commission Bethesday, MD. 20814' East-West Tower,LRm. 427 4350: East-West-Hwy.~ .
' Stewart M.. Glass, Esq.
Bethesda, MD) ~20814' Regional Counsel Federal, Emergency Management E
IMr.: Frederick ~J. Shon* Agency AtomicTSafetyfand Licensing' 26 Federal Plaza,. Room 1349-Board. New Yorki New York. 10278 U.S.iNuclear-Regulatory ^
, Commission'
. .-East-West-Tower, Rm.~430~
'4350 East-West-Hwy.
} Bethesda,: MD -
, ;20814--
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b ' Eleanor L.-Frucci, Esq.* Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Attorney Twomey, Latham & Shea l
-Atomic Safety and Licensing 33 West Second Street Board Panel Post Office Box 398 U..S. Nuclear Regulatory Riverhead, NY 11901 Commission East-West Tower, North Tower Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
4350 East-West Highway Cammer & Shapiro, P.C.
~Bethesda, MD 20814 9 East 40th Street New York, New York 10016
,, Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
Special Counsel to the James B. Dougherty
.3045 Porter Street 3045 Porter Street Governor, Washington, D.C. 20008
. Executive Chamber Room 229 Johnathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
State Capitol New York State Public Service Albany, New York' 12224 Commission, Staff Counsel
! 3 Rockerfeller Plaza Herbert H. Brown, Esq.* Albany, New York 12223
-Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Christopher--M. McMurray, Esq. Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill- Associate General Counsel Christopher & Phillips '
Federal Emergency Management 18th Floor Agency 1900 M Street, N W. 500 C Street, S.W., Rm. 840 Washington,.D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20472 i Mr. Marc W. Goldsmith Ms. Nora Bredes Energy Research Group Executive Coordinator
-4001 Totten: Pond Ro.ad Shoreham opponents' Coalition Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 195 East Main' Street Smithtown, New York' 11787 MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Suite K- Suffolk' County Attorney San' Jose, California 95125 H. Lee Dennison Building
, -Veterans Memorial Highway jMr. Jay Dunkleberger Hauppauge, New York 11788 New York State Energy Office Agency Building 2 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
. Empire : State Plaza _ Counsel to the Governor t : Albany,.New York :12223 Executive Chamber
, State Capitol'
. Albany, New York 12224 Donald-P. Irwin-
- Hunton & Williams
, :707. East Main.-Street:
-Post = Office-Box 1535 Richmond,fVirginia. -
23212:.
[ DATED: ] June 1,f198,4
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