ML20077J072
| ML20077J072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1983 |
| From: | Dignan T, Gad R PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, REID & PRIEST |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8308120225 | |
| Download: ML20077J072 (48) | |
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00LWtJ;u UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
gg j j gj .10 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFN rr M vdt~iA before the 00C55TIb 5 St'UEf EiRANCH ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD
)
In the Matter of )
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444 OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) ) *
)
APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO PETITIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION FOR DIRECTED CERTIFICATION (Evacuation Time Estimates)
Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
R. K. Gad III i
Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Telephone: 423-6100 l
l Dated: August 8, 1983.
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8308120225 830003 PDR ADOCK 05000443 '
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Procedural History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The MassAG Petition Should Be
. Dismissed for Lack of Standing . . . . . . . . . . 9 The Petitions.Should be Dismissed for Failure to Meet the Marble Hill Standards for Directed Certification . . . . . . . 10 On the Merits, the Ruling Below Was Correct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 B. The NECNP Challenge on Appeal . . . . 25 C. The MassAG Challenge . . . . . . . . 29 (a) Notification /
Preparation / Mobilization Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 (b) Simultaneous Evacuation of beach Areas . . . . . . . . . 32 (c) Other than Home-Based Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 (d) Subsequent Population Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 (e) " Evacuation Shadow" . . . . . . 35 l (f) Summer Population / Adverse i
t Weather Scenario . . . . . . . . 38 i
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(g) Actually Implemented Evacuation Routes . . . . . . . 38 (h) Special Institutions or Transportation Dependent . . . . 38 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 l
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o s
l TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s)
Court Cases Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975) . . . . . . . 3 n.2 NRC Cases Cincinnt.ti Gas & Electric Company (Wm. H.
Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Units No. 1), ALAB-727, NRC (May 2, 1983) . . . . . . . . 20, 28 C:leveland Electric Illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear Power Palnt, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . 35 Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-379 5 NRC 565 (1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 13 Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730 NRC (June 2, 1983) . . . . . . . . 20, 27 Houston Lighting 6 Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-635, 13 NRC 309 (1981) . . . 12, 13 & n. 10 Louisiana Power s Light Company (Waterford Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, NRC (June 29, 1983) 20, 21 Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857 (1974) . . . . . . . . 9, 10 Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB 583, 11 NRC 447 (1980) 3 n.2, 10 Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-405, 5 NRC 1190 (1977) . . . 4 n.3, 6 n.7, 10
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, 6 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-271 1 NRC 478 (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-734 NRC (1983) . . . . . . . . . 12, 18 n.14 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-731 NRC (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029 (1982) . . . . . . . . 5 & nn.4 & 5, 6 n.7 Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Stion, Units 2 and 3),
ALAB-717, NRC (March 4, 1983) . . . . 28 Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units IA, 2A, 1B and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, rehearing denied, ALAB-467, 7 NRC 459 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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t Filed: August 8, 1983 i
l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD i
)
In the Matter of )
)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) 50-444 OL
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) )
)
APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO PETITIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION FOR DIRECTED CERTIFICATION (Evacuation Time Estimates)
Introduction Before the Appeal Board are two petitions for directed certification. One is filed by the Massachusetts Attorney General ("MassAG") (filed July 15, 1983) (hereinafter "MassAG Petition") and the other is filed by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, Inc. ("NECNP") (filed July 22, 1983)
(hereinafter "NECNP Petition"). Both petitions seek I
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l immediate interlocutory review of the same order below, which granted partial summary disposition of two NECNP contentions.2 The ruling allowed a motion that was 1Actually, the NECNP petition addresses only the allowance of the motion as to Contention NECNP III.12, and it asserts only three issues:
"The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) petitions the Appeal Board to take directed certification of the Licensing Board's summary disposition of certain issues raised by NECNP's Contention III.12 in the Seabrook operating license proceeding. . . . In doing so, the Board committed three errors which shifted the burden of proof onto NECNP: it ruled against NECNP on issues that were not placed into controversy by Applicants; it ignored a number of factual issues raised by NECNP in opposition to summary disposition motions; and it accepted a commitment to complete the
[ evacuation time estimates] as grounds for dismissing NECNP's charge that they were not accurate because they did not reflect true evacuation routes."
NECNP Petition at 1-2. NECNP then declares its willingness to leave litigation of the first two asserted errors to MassAG, while it argues only the third asserted error.
The MassAG document sweeps with such a broad brush that it is difficult to figure out with precision what it complains of. Given that it is NECNP's contention that is in issue, and given that NECNP filed its petition after MassAG and, presumably, the two parties worked together on the matter, we are content to accept NECNP's description of the scope of the MassAG pleading. This leaves, as we comprehend matters, the ruling below as to Contention NECNP III.13 unchallenged.
i
4 I submitted by the Applicants, supported by the Staff, and opposed by NECNP but not by MassAG.2 By its order of June 20, 1983, this Board directed j that a single response to both petitions be submitted.
2 It is not clear whether MassAG has been suddenly moved by a previously dormant desire to litigate the
- question of evacuation time estimates, or whether MassAG has in fact been lying in wait on this issue for some time. Its recent adoption of NECNP's proposed witness on evacuation times (Mr. Herr) suggests the former; other information available to the Applicants '
suggests the latter. Either way, however, MassAG cannot succeed: Regardless of whether it was a previous lack of interest or a long-standing excess of cleverness that motivated MassAG to leave the litigation of NECNP's contention to NECNP, MassAG must now take the status of that contention as NECNP has left it. "An administrative hearing would be a
, meaningless charade if those with amply opportunity to participate were allowed to stand idly by and then, nevertheless, demand a replay when they do not like the result." Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo .
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-583, 11 NRC 447, 448 (1980), citing, inter alia, Nader v.
NRC, 513 F.2d 1045, 1054-55 (D.C. Cir. 1975):
"[Ilt is incumbent 'upon an interested person to
- act affirmatively to protect himself' in l administrative proceedings, and . . . 'is]uch a person should not be entitled to sit back and wait
, until all interested persons who do so act have been heard, and then complain that he has not been properly treated.' As we have admonished, '[tlo permit such a person to stand aside and speculate j on the outcome; if adversely affected, come into i
this court for relief; and then permit the whole matter to be reopened in his behalf, would create
- an impossible. situation."
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- . . . _ l ThepetitionJofMas'sAGshouldbeju.barily~ denied ,.
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because MassAG hau,no standing to appeal the fate that i
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has' befallen-NECNP's Contention. - Should the Board -
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reach the issue of the appropriateness of directed A . <
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certification, both petitions should be den {ed because e
neither MasshG"nor NECNP has satisfied the Mdtt.'ld Hill -
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standard.3 Should the Board reach the merits of the
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~Public Se_rvice Cc=nany_of-Indiana (Marble Hill.
Nuclear Generating Station,.,. Units-1 and 2), ALAB-405, 5 NRC.1190 (1977). Marble Hill, creates a two-pronged standard; the first focu nes~0n the effect of the .
challenged ruling on the^ parties below, and the second' focusses on the Affect of the challenged ruling on the proceedings beloi. MassAG purports't,o. rely on both ,
prongs. On the firsc'it offers onlylthat,-1,f - ',
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erroneous, additional litigation will,be required later and the costs thereof will have'to b~e borne by the ;' _
parties. Petition at 19. MassAG rests its case on the J.
second on the same proposition, namely that,' if .
erroneous, the ruling will require that additonal litigation be engaged in at a later tine. Proscinding .
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from the fact that this potential does not distinguish .-
th present ruling.but rather characterizes All %
as..rted errors,(MassAG forgets that...thssruling below . sy has the concomm: tant effect to eliminating ' litigation -
' C now. There is,,therefore,. no assertion (that the net effect of the ' ruling below -- even if. ermneous -- is ^
to increase the amount of litigation that would ,
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NECNP, on the_other hand, abjureiany Teliance'on ~
the first prong,of' Marble Hill and claims ~ reliance'onl'y on the second prong. s \,
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,- ruling below, the ruling should be affirmed because it was correct.
Procedural History Contentions NECNP III.12 and .13 were admitted by the Licensing Board on November 17, 1982. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82 __, 16 NRC , Slip Opinion at 19 (November 17, 1982). The Board had previously admitted NECNP as a party, on the strength of other admitted contentions;* it had previously denied admission as an intervenor to MassAG, having ruled that none of its contentions applied to "on site" emergency planning issues.5 The Board, however, granted MassAG
, _ . " interested state" status sua sponte.s The Board
- See Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, finits 1 and 2 ) , LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1047-77 (September 13, 1982). Contentions NECNP III.12 and .13 were admitted by the Licensing Board on
, u. reconsideration, which NECNP sought following the i September 13th Order. MassAG did not seek reconsideration of that Order.
5 LBP-82-76, 16 NRC at 1077-79.
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directed those persons admitted as " interested states" to specify those subjects which the interested states intended to litigate.7 7MassAG originally filed four contentions (which are quoted in full at LBP-82-76, 16 NRC at 1077-78),
one of which was later withdrawn. Id. As the Licensing Board interpreted the MassAG contentions, they referred only to off-site planning issues, id. at 1078-79, an interpretation in which MassAG apparently acquiesced (since, unlike other parties, it did not seek reconsideration on the ground that the Board had misapprehended the nature of the contentions proffered). Compare Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 159, 189 (1978). As the Board made clear in its November 17, 1982 Order (where it admitted NECNP Contentions III.12 and .13), it did not regard contentions relating to the FSAR-contained evacuation times as relating co off-site issues.
In its original order the Board iterated the obligation of persons admitted as interested states to
" indicate with reasonable specificity, in advance of he-ring, the subject matters on which it desires to participate." LBP-82-76, 16 NRC at 1079. The Board deemed MassAG to have so specified as to off-site emergency planning matters. Id. At no time, including after the admission of contentions NECNP III.12 and
.13, and including at the time that the summary disposition motion on those contentions was filed, did MassAG specify that it wished to participate with respect to those contentions. Neither did it oppose the motions.
Massachusetts' decision to " sit out" the battle over the FSAR-contained evacuation time estimates is perhaps accounted for by the fact that the official Massachusetts state agency charged with reviewing such estimates (The Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and Office of Emergency Preparedness) reviewed those l
MassAG did not thereafter specify the FSAR-contained evacuation times as an issue it wished to litigate, and it took no part in the activities regarding Contentions NECNP III.12 and .13 that followed.
Discovery was exchanged between the Applicants' and i NECNP on Contentions III.12 and .13, which estimates three years ago and gave them a glowing endorsement:
"The calculated evacuation times estimates are consistent with MCDA's estimates, which were based upon experience, and upon some basic load-loading analyses using techniques developed in the context of the FEMA Crisis Relocation Planning Program. More importantly, MCDA is familiar with the methodology used in generating the estimates, and with the EVAC model, from experience with work done in the Pilgrim [ Nuclear Power Station] area. The Pilgrim area results have generated a high degree of confidence in both the EVAC model and in HMM's [ the authors of the Applicants' evacuation time estimates) personnel.
"Because planning for the Seabrook NPS is in a prototypical stage, the estimates will be very useful in the route design and traffic management components of the actual evacuation plans, which will be developed over the coming months."
l Letter of Paul J. Cahill Director, to Mr. James A.
l MacDonald, dated August 4, 1980. This letter is rnproduced in the FSAR SS-REP at Appendix C, and was, therefore, before the Licensing Board.
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substantially narrowed their scope.' Following the close of discovery, the Applicants moved for summary disposition of the two contentions. The Staff supported the motion for summary disposition; NECNP opposed; MassAG remained mute. NECNP's opposition was supported by the Affidavit of one Philip B. Herr.
By its Order of June 30, 1983, the Board granted the Applicants' motion in all respects save two; in two respects, the Board found that the Applicants' time studies omitted to estimate times for certain required scenarios.'
'In response to the Applicants' interrogatories relating to Contentions NECNP III.12 and .13, NECNP stated that "The deficiencies in Applicants' evacuation time estimates are listed in Contention III.12 . . . ."
and "NECNP has not yet had any experts evaluate Contention III.12 (or Contention III.13]. We will supplement our answers to these interrogatories when the expertise becomes available to us." ("NECNP Response to Applicants' Interrogatories and Request for the Production of Documents" (filed January 21, 1983) at 20-21.) NECNP never supplemented its answers to interrogatories.
'The first of the two areas was a simulataneous evacuation of certain sectors. The Board perceived from other documents that these estimates had in fact been performed and the only omission was in their publication in the FSAR; such is exactly what happened
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The MassAG Petition Should be Dismissed for Lack of Standing The Appeal Board generally declines to entertain exceptions by parties where the ruling below did not relate to the party's contentions, where the party previously took no part in the litigation of the points at issue, and where the ruling below does not manifest a plain error having serious safety implications. See Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 864 (1974). The obligation to have participated before one will be heard to complain at the appellate level since NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. O, in effect at the time the FSAR was published (and even today the version cited at 10 CFR $ 50.47 n.1), did not require the particular scenarios, though a later revision did. The second respect concerned evacuation under peak summer population / adverse weather conditions; the Board ruled adversely to the Applicants' assertion that the two phenomena were inconsistent (i.e., that people don't go to or remain on the beach in stormy weather), on the basis of what the Board considered to be a regulatory requirement that the hypothetical situation be considered in any event. This scenario did require another run of the same coaputer program, using the same baseline assumptions, as grounded the other estimates; such was promptly done and submitted in the form of direct testimony.
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applies equally to " interested states." Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-583, 11 NRC 447, 448-49 (1980). Here MassAG did not file any opposition to the '
summary disposition motion in question -- and did not in any other respect participate in the litigation of contentions NECNP III.12 and .13. In this situation, MassAG "is scarcely in a position, legally or equitably, to protest the determinations made by the Board in connection with" Contentions NECNP III.12 and
.13. Prairie Island, 8 AEC at 864. What would apply in the case of an obligatory appeal ought, we submit, to apply a fortiori to discretionary, extraordinary interlocutory appeal.
i The Petitions Should be Dismissed for i
' Failure to Meet the Marble Hill Standards for Directed Certification Directed certification is an extraordinary remedy.
It is, therefore, to be considered only in a narrow class of cases and only upon particular showings; the burden of demonstrating that the standards are met is on he who seeks the remedy. See Public Service Company l
of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-405, 5 NRC 1190 (1977); Consumers l
o Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-379, 5 NRC 565 (1977); Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-271, 1 NRC 478 (1975).
Under Marble Hill, there are two bases on which one may attempt to justify directed certification. These are that the ruling below has a pervasive and unusual effect on the remaining proceeding or that it has an
) immediate and irreparable effect on the petitioning party; the order that qualifies for interlocutory appeal must:
"either (1) threaten the party adversely affected by it with immediate and serious irreparable impact which, as a practical matter, could not be alleviated by a alter appeal or (2) affect the basic structure of 3^ the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner." '
5 NRC at 1152. An order appropriate for directed certification must have a practical effect that is somehow qualitatively different from the ordinary legal consequences of an order of that type. See Id. at 1192 n.7. Here the order on challenge is one allowing a motion for summary disposition. Such an order typically disposes of a contention prior to hearing.
Such an order typically remits the disappointed l
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litigant to his post-decision appellate remedy, and, if he is successful, to the remedy of a remand and re-opening to litigate at an evidentiary hearing the prevously disposed of contention, which is precisely the effect of the order below in this case. It has no effect on the balance of the proceeding, i.e., on the litigation of other contentions, either by its terms or as a practical matter. These typical characteristics, 4
because they are typical, do not satisfy the Marble Hill test and do not warrant interlocutory appeal.
Neither is it sufficient that the order may have been incorrect; the effect of an order is the same, and an allegation of error is short of the Marble Hill mark.
Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-731, NRC , CCH Nuc. Reg. Rptr. 1 30,'iS3, at p. 30,867 (June 20, 1983);
Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook
! Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-734, NRC , Slip Opinion at 6-7 (July 19, 1983); Houston Lighting &
Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-635, 13 NRC 309, 310-11 (1981).
Neither of the two petitions satisfies the Marble Hill test. For its part, all that MassAG offers in i
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support of its burden on this score -- in addition to the inevitable argument that the order below was error
-- is the financial impact of having first to appeal and then to litigate later what was (apparently) hoped to be litigated earlier. Thus, after stating (but making no attempt to apply) the relevant standards, all that MassAG says on the point is:
"No later appeal can remedy the harm, both to
- intervenors' finances and to the important matters of public health and safety which they are seeking to address, of being forced to participate in a proceeding where their most fundamental rights will be consistently violated."
MassAG Petition at 19. Massachusetts does not explain, however, how it is that litigation later will be more expensive than litigation now, assuming that it was prepared from the outset to accept the burden of litigation at all. It is settled, moreover, that litigation expense does not constitute irreparable injury to a party, Consumers Power Cpmpany (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 779 (1979)
(question of stay pending appeal), and that a plea that future litigation may potentially be required does not
1
, satisfy the test for directed certification. Allens t
Creek, supra, 13 NRC at 310-11.18 Nor does MassAG's assertion of " harm . . . to the important matters of public health and safety" that will be thought to flow from the ex hypothesi temporary approval of FSAR-contained evacuation time estimates that may prove to be, at the most, a matter of hours too short is wholly unexplained and unsupported.11 The 18"(I]t has not been satisfactorily explained why appellate scrutiny of the ruling cannot abide the event j
' of the initial decision and (if dissatisfied with the .
result reached in that decision) [Intervenor's} appeal from it. To be sure, if the ruling were found erroneous on such an appeal, the consequence might well be a vacation of the initial decision and a remand to the Board below. But the same possibility exists with
- respect to all interlocutory determinations made by i
licensing boards on matters which have a potential bearing upon the outcome of the proceeding. If, standing alone, that consideration were enough to justify interlocutory review, it would perforce follow that virtually every significant licensing board ruling during the course of a proceeding would be a fit candidate for immediate appellate examination. It is scarcely necessary to expound at any length upon why a drastic alteration of existing practice to accommodate that thesis would be intolerable - as well as in derogation of the Commission's explicit policy disfavoring interlocutory review. 10 CFR 2.730(f)."
l 12The only place in the proffered affidavit of Mr.
Herr where he made any attempt to quantify the supposed I
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assertion that "[the] most fundamental rights [of inter 7enors] will be consistently violated" (id.) is likewise neither explained, amplified, or otherwise supported. We have no idea what it is that MassAG has in mind; we cannot respond to unarticulated thoughts; and we are not aware that intervenors' rights are being
" consistently violated" in this or in any other NRC underestimation the Applicants' evacuation time estimates was his reference to other studies (done by or on behalf of the NRC Staff, which supported the motion for summary disposition). Affidavit of Philip Herr (filed June 1, 1983) at i 14. These studies show that, by varying population / weather scenarios, baseline assumptions, and methodological techniques, one can arrive at times that vary by a few hours. Bearing in mind the inherent non-susceptibility of the subject matter to quantification with abject precision, and bearing in mind that the purpose of the evacuation time estimates is to sit in the FSAR unless and until a beyond-design-basis accident of extremely small probability happens (at which point in time they are taken into account by state anu local public officials in making protective action decisions -- to whatever extent the officials have not prepared their own estimates (formally or otherwise) and wish to rely on those of the Applicants), the assertion of MassAG that the ruling in this case will have profound, irreparable and indelible -- and immediate -- repercussions is quite counter-intuitive. Being not further illuminated, it is also inscrutable. In all events, it fails of the clear and bright showing needed to carry the case for directed certification.
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l proceeding. Finally, MassAG's unmasked threat warrants no response.ta Taken either separately or together, the assertions of MassAG fail to demonstrate any harm to it that is extraordinary, that transcends.the typical impact of rulings on motions for summary disposition, and that contradicts the prevailing principle that errors below can be cured in the regular course of appeal. The MassAG petition, therefore, fails to meet the Marble Hill test for directed certification and should be denied.
22 MassAG closes his petition with this ominous declaration:
"In the event that this Board does not direct certification of this order to it, Attorney General Bellotti will be forced to consider seeking extraordinary relief in federal Court . . . ."
M:ssAG Petition at 19. Life in the real world tends to counsel that threats of this ilk are best ignored.
Attorney General Bellotti is, of course, free to follow any course he pleases regarding this litigation (including seeking relief in the federal courts and, we suppose, including making threats to tribunals to do so if he doesn't get his way on a motion). Nothing changes the obligation of this Board to apply the applicable law the same way in the face of a threat as it would in the absence of a threat.
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The petition of NECNP fares no better. Once again, the NECNP petition is more articulate and far clearer than that of MassAG; NECNP relies only on the second prong of the Marble Hill test (effect on the proceeding). NECNP Petition at 10. Apart from arguing what it perceives to be consistency,18 however, NECNP taReferring to other rulings that, as NECNP perceives them, were based on a commitment-equals-present-compliance theory, NECNP argues that "there will be [in the future course of the litigation of remaining contentions, presumably] a consistent series
- of erroneous rulings accepting compliance with requirements." NECNP Petition at 12. Prescinding from some threshold difficulties with this theory (such as that the order of present concern was not based on a commitment-equals-present-compliance theory, that the prior order to which NECNP refers was not based on a commitment-equals-present-compliance theory, and that in many cases under the regulations governing acceptability of operating license applications commitment does equal present compliance), this argument has a subtle but significant vice when launched in support of directed certification. A tribunal is expected to be consistent in its legal rulings. Should a tribunal err as to a question of law when it is first presented, it should (until it is convinced that its prior ruling was error) make the same ruling when the same question reappears. This being the case, the "it-will-happen-again" argument can be made as to any asserted error of law made by a competent Licensing Board. Were this argument sufficient, the exception of directed certification would quickly consume the rule against interlocutory appeal.
discusses only a perceived effect on it, not the remainder of the proceeding.24
- NECNP makes an argument to the effect that it may not be able to cure what it sees as the defect in the present case by a late-filed contention and that, since (as NECNP sees things) it failed in its last attempt at directed certification only because of the availability to it of Catawba remedies that were unique to that situation, it should win this one because the same remedies may not be available. NECNP Petition at 10-
- 11. We think NECNP is in error. It is true that the Appeal Board saw NECNP's last petition as not worthy of its time because of the virtual impossibility of any harm to NECNP. Public Service Comoany of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-734, NRC
, Slip Opinion at 7-12 (July 19, 1983). However, NECNP did not urge directed certification in that case on the ground of any effect upon it, id. at 4 n.3, nor does it urge directed certification upon the present petition on that ground. NECNP Petition at 10.
Moreover, we think it unsound to assume, as NECNP apparently does, that the Appeal Board agreed with its assessment that the order involved in the prior petition either was based on the commitment-equals-present-compliance theory or that the Board agreed with NECNP that the prior order was erroneous. Thus, we think that NECNP reads a bit too much in, and leaua most precariously upon, ALAB-734 as mandating allowance of the present petition. Rather, we think that the prior ruling was no less grounded in NECNP's failure to convince the Board that any error inherent in the prior ruling could not be cured by appeal in the ordinary course, and in this respect the two cases are identical. Nowhere in the present petition does NECNP even assert -- much less demonstrate -- that (if there t _ _ _
NECNP's Catawba argument, besides being misdirected, is based on an erroneous perception of what it is that Appendix E requires as a condition precedent to licensing. As NECNP sees it, licensing may not occur until there have been evacuation time studies done by an applicant that take into account the final plans of state and local governments. NECNP Petition at 7.15 Of absolute necessity, NECNP thus was error in the Licensing Board's ruling) reversal of the challenged ruling will not fully redress any error.
Moreover, NECNP's assertion that it may lack Catawba remedies in this situation as a reason for granting directing certificatin would, if accepted, distend the directed certification procedure far beyond its present bounds. The fact of the matter is that in most cases the challenged ruling has pretermitted the litigant's opportunity to litigate with utter finality (pending appeal). Directed certification on the second prong of Marble Hill turns on some reason for concluding that relief after the appeal will be inadequate, not on whether or not the litigant may get a second shot at the same issue prior to the time for taking appeals. Thus, while the presence of a Catawba remedy may dictate declining directed certification because the issue tends toward practical mootness, the absence of a Catawba remedy neither makes nor contributes to a positive showing under Marble Hill.
15"[T]he assumptions underlying Applicants' evacuation time estimates . . . cannot be assessed until evacuation plans are developed for the EPZ. . . .
In the absence of information on the actual evacuation j l l
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also asserts that licensing may not occur until the i
plans of state and local governments are final. The law, however, is to the contrary. See Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2),
ALAB-730, NRC , CCH Nuc. Reg. Rptr. 1 30,791 at
- p. 30,848 (June 2, 1983); Cincinnati Gas e Electric Company (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.
1), ALAB-727, NRC , CCH Nuc. Reg. Rptr. 1 30,783 at p. 30,787 (May 2, 1983). See also Louisiana Power s Light Company (Waterford Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, NRC , CCH Nuc. Reg. Rptr. 1 , at p.
(June 29, 1983). There is, rather, nothing inconsistence with the licensing precepts of Appendix E in the Applicants updating and revising their evacuation time estimates (or any other portion of its emergency plans), based on additions to, deletions from, or changes to the plans of state and local goverments (or for any other good reason). There is no necessity that routes chosen [by the state and local goverments],
there can be no basis for a finding of reasonable assurance that the Seabrook EPZ can be evacuated within the times predicted by the Applicants."
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all and every such change precede licensing, either at all or by any minimum period of time, nor does Appendix E require (or even endorse) the inflexibility that NECNP would impose upon the emergency planning process.
Waterford, supra. It is, rather, sufficient that the Applicants have prepared evacuation time estimates on the basis of an acceptable methodology using acceptable l baseline assumptions, which, if found, gives reasonable and acceptable assurance that any updating later performed will provide the same degree of confidence in the updated estimates.
NECNP builds its entire case for directed certification upon this precept that litigation of applicant's evacuation time estimates is inevitably premature prior to finalization of state and local emergency response plans containing the " actual" evacuation routes chosen. The precept is erroneous; the case doesn't exist; and the petition should be denied.
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On the Merits, the Ruling Below Was Correct i A. Introduction As noted above,28 NECNP's answers to interrogatories limited its challenges to the Applicants' evacuation time estimates to the items stated in _ts Contention III.12. These were:
(1) Failure to include " bounds of l error";
(2) Failure to indicate basis for codes or assumptions; (3) Failure to indicate whether the model used is static or dynamic; i
(4) Failure to provide a sensitivity analysis; and (5) Failure to reveal the underlying assumptions.
NECNP stated that it had retained no expert witness 27 and it expressly declined to say what the "real" evacuation time estimates for which it was contending 18 Note 8, supra.
17 Id.; the interrogatories were filed January 21, 1983.
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were.2' This was the status of Contention III.12 when the motion for summary disposition was submitted.
NECNPs opposition to the motion was supported by the affidavit of one Philip B. Herr, the expert whom NECNP apparently retained between January 21, 1983 and May 27, 1983 (but regarding whom or whose work it did not see fit to supplement its answers to interrogatories). Mr. Herr, who appears from his curriculum vitae to have had little experience i preparing evacuation time estimates on his own, offered no opinion as to what the "right" evacuation times
] were. Rather, he advanced, in the most general of terms, several unspecific criticisms of the Applicants' studies, as follows:
(1) Failure to account for
" notification / preparation / mobilization" times; -
(2) Failure to provide for simultaneous evacuation of the beach areas from NE to SSE of the site; i
tsOp. cit. note 8, supra, at 22 (answer to Interrogatory Nos. XXXIII-7, -11.
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(3) Failure to provide for evacuation of other than home-based evacuation traffic; l
(4) Failure to provide for population growth over the life of the plant; 1
(5) Failure to account for voluntary or spontaneous evacuation beyond the EPZ; (6) Failure to model the summer
, population / adverse weather scenarios; (7) Failure to use actually implemented evacuation routes; and (8) Failure to account for evacuation of special institutions or transportation-department people.
Affidavit of Philip B. Herr (dated 5/27/83) at 2-3.
None of these were within the scope of the items set forth in the contention. See Licensing Board Order of June 30, 1983, at 8. Apart from item 5 (spontaneous evacuation), Mr. Herr offered no facts (as opposed to legal argument) on any of his points.
The Licensing Board rejected all but items 2 (simultaneous evacuation) and 6 (summer population / adverse weather scenario). Items 1, 4 and 7 were rejected as a matter of law; item 3 was rejected 24_
l on the basis of a manifest factual error; and items 5 and 8 were rejected on the grounds of NECNP's failure to have " set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact." 10 CFR 5 2.749(b) (emphasis added).
The Staff published its SER Supplement relating to the on-site emergency plans, and noted no open item for evacuation time estimates. NUREG-0896, Supp. 1 at 13-11 (April, 1983). On June 6, 1983, the Staff filed an answer supporting the motion for summary disposition.
B. The NECNP Challenge on Appeal According to NECNP, it proposes to raise three issues on appeal:
"[The Licensing Board] ruled against NECNP on issues that were not placed into controversy by Applicants; it ignored a number of factual issues raised by NECNP in opposition to summary disposition motions; and it accepted a commitment to complete the ETEs as grounds for dismissing NECNP's charge that they were not accurate because they did not reflect true evacuation routes."
NECNP Petition at 1-2. As to the first two, NECNP chooses to rely on the MassAG petition. Id.
The third issue involves the fact that, of necessity, the Applicants' evacuation time studies do not model the selection by state and local governments l
of specific evacuation routes or, as NECNP puts it, "true" evacuation routes. NECNP Petition at 2. In point of fact, of course, the state and local 4
governments have not yet made any such selection, nor is there any certainty that specific evacuation routes will ever be mandatorily imposed upon evacuees. More importantly, state and local governments cannot even consider whether there is warrant for imposing specific 1 routes (and, if so, which ones) prior to the rendition
)
! of the Applicants' evacuation studies, for the evacuation studies are the predicate on which such l assessments are made. Affidavit o{ John Sears (dated I
June 3, 1983) at 3-4. There is, therefore, a necessary 4 order in which the functions of evacuation time estimates can be performed, and it follows that, at least in the first instance, the applicants' evacuation time estimates cannot take into account final evacuation route selection by the state and local governments. No less inexorably, it follows that when, as and if specific routes are selected for mandatory imposition, the evacuation time estimates can be 4
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I amended -- if necessary --to recognize any ameliorative effect the route selection may have.2' The Board recognized this essential element in its ruling, together with the fact that nothing in the NRC Regulations requires that emergency plans (either those of the state and local governments or those of the facility operator).be final as a condition precedent to licensing. See Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, NRC , CCH ,
Nuc. Reg. Rptr. 1 30,791, at 30,847-49 (June 2, 1983);
l'One point -- ignored totally by NECNP -- bears observation with emphasis. If the state and local governments are doing their jobs properly, they will not select any routes (or impose any other traffic control measures) that make evacuation more time consuming. The purpose of such measures is to reduce time required. Where, as in the case of Seabrook, the Applicants' time estimates assume no traffic control measures (including route selection) they stand as a
" worst case" and any subsequent measures by the state or municipalities will only lower the estimated evacuation times. See " Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near Seabrook Station" (Updated 1981, Revised July 1983) (filed July 15, 1983 as Exhibit 2 to
" Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 1"), at 1-1: "These estimates assumed no formal traffic control measures would be in effect, existing traffic patterns would prevail, and no specified evacuation routings would be enforced." (See also FSAR, SS-REP, App. C, p. 1, to the same effect.)
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1 Cincinnati G&E Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727, NRC , Slip Opinion l at 26 (May 2, 1983); Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3),
ALAB-717, NRC , Slip Opinion at 66 (March 4, 1983). In essence, the Board ruled -- and correctly i
so -- that refinements in evacuation time estimates for any time savings that may accrue as a result of local traffic control measures are not required prior to approval of the operating license.
NECNP's founds its argument on the merits on a repetition of its "a commitment does not equal a performance" refrain. NECNP Petition at 7,9. Here NECNP has gone astray. The Board did not dismiss the contention as premature, nor did the Board accept a promise to do the refinements in the'tucare as 1
sufficing to meet a supposed regulatory requirement l,
making the refinements an essential element of the operating license showing. The Board ruled, rather, that only the initial time estimates (including the l
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i integrity of the estimation process and methodology)28 are a licensing item and that, when viewed against this regulatory scenario, a contention that something not required is missing presents no litigable issue.
The Board's ruling was correct and should be affirmed.
C. The MassAG Challenge As NECNP describes the task that it has delegated to MassAG, it raises the following grounds of appeal:
"[The Licensing Board) ruled against NECNP on issues that were not placed in controversy by Applicants [and] it ignored a number of factual issues raised by NECNP in opposition to summary disposition motions . . . ."
l NECNP Petition at 1-2. Unfortunately the MassAG petition is not so well organized, and it is difficult to extract from that document specific exceptions that can be addresssed with precision. Therefore, we*will 2'Of course, it is at the stage of the initial estimates that questions going to the applicants' methodology and baseline aesumptions -- if adequately raised -- can be addressed. The refinements to be made at a later date, because they will employ the same methodology and the same baseline assumptions, are a comparatively ministerial undertaking.
employ the 8-point organizational structure set forth supra at 23-24. This is based on the points raised --
or attempted to be raised -- in the Herr Affidavit.
NECNP did not contend below that the motion should be denied on any other ground, and it cannot so contend on appeal.21 (a) Notification / Preparation / Mobilization Times.
The Licensing Board treated this question as one presenting an issue of law. See Licensing Board Order of June 30, 1983 at 10. The Board ruled, on the basis of the regulation (10 CFR Part 50, App. E, 5 IV.D.3) and on the basis of the Staff guidance (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, both Rev. O and Rev. 1), that the evacuation 22 NECNP had the opportunity (which it exercised) --
and MassAG had the opportunity (which it did not) -- to file a lawyer's pleading in opposition to the motion for summary disposition, in addition to affidavits.
None of the legal arguments raised by MassAG were made by NECNP (or anyone else) below. Most of what MassAG now contends on appeal is afterthought. Of course, one may not urge error below on grounds first asserted at the appellate level. E.g., Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units lA, 2A, 1B and 2B),
ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, rehearing denied, ALAB-467, 7 NRC 459 (1978).
times called for by Appendix E did not require the inclusion of a specific time segment for notification.za All that MassAG offers now is that the Board should not, on a question of law, have disagreed with the legal conclusion of NECNP's expert -- who professed and possesses no qualifications to express legal opinions. This does not rise to the level of appellate argument;za in any event, the Board's ruling 22 Mr. Herr did not offer any basis for any conclusion that the Applicants' time studies failed to account for mobilization and preparation times for evacuees. The studies themselves refute the proposition that mobilization and preparation are excluded from the times estimated (FSAR SS-REP, Appendix C, p. 11); Herr was manifestly in error if he was contending that preparation and mobilization were ignored by the study altogether and he offered no factual predicate for any contention that the study's methodology inadequately accounts for these items.
zaMassAG laments that there was presented to the Board no " expert testimony or argument on (a) the importance of these factors, (b) the fact that they have been considered in virtually all other evacuation times studes, and (c) the illogic of any interpretation of the Commission's regulations as not requiring their consideration." MassAG Petition at 18. The time to have offered such material (if any there be), however, was before, not after, the motion was submitted and the Board ruled. See note 20, supra. MassAG can hardly place blame for not introducing material that MassAG thinks would have been helpful in defeating the motion for summary disposition on anyone but NECNP or itself.
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N*N y j of law was correct.24 , _.
(b) Simultaneous Evacuation of Beach 1 Areas. Thp{
Licensing Board denied summary dispositiyn>on this s
2*As the Licensing Board observed, the strtcture of s Appendix E plainly refutes any notion that the' evacuation time estimates called for should include estimates of the additional activities for which MassAG now contends. The ultimate sentence of the introductory paragraph of 5 IV provides that: "The nuclear power reactor operating license' applicant shall ~
- also provide an analysis of the time require,d to -
l evacuate . . . for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations." (Emphasis added.) Later in the same section it dictates the time within which the operator should complete notification of the public officials ($ IV.D.3) and then it provides for fler.ible notification of the public, et the discretion of the public officials: "The design objective of the prompt public notification shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification pubic within the plume exposure pathway EPO within about 15 minutes. The use of this notification capaiblity will range from immediate notification of the public (within 15 minutes of the time that State and local officials
, are notified that a situation exists requiring urgent j action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available for the State and local governmental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activiate the public notification system. Where there is a decision to activiate the notification system, the State and local official will determine whether to activate the entire system simultaneously or in a graduated or staged manner. The responsiblity for activiating such a public notification system shall remain with the appropriate goverment authorities."
id.
We submit that it is plain both that the Appendix contemplates that evacuation and notification are i
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point. We do not comprehend it to be within the scope 1
of that from which NECNP and MassAG purport to appeal.
(c) Other than Home-Based Traffic. In the real world, the people who evacuate consist of those who live within the EPZ, plus (in the daytime) those who are at work within the EPZ but don't live there, plus non-work-related transients who are present in the EPZ but don't live there, minus (in the daytime) those who live in the EPZ but work outside and therefore aren't present when an evacuation is ordered. For purposes of the Applicants' evacuation time studies, the first category was accounted for by population data, and the second and third categories (workers and transients) were accounted for by taking into account the capacity of the various parking lots within the EPZ. The fourth category (those who reside in the EPZ but who aren't present because they work outside and the evacuation is distinct topics of concern, and that it would be impossible for anyone to estimate the time within which notification would be completed without a specification of the manner in which, in some hypothetical situation, the governmental officials had determined to exercise the discretion that the Appendix reposes in them exclusively.
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ordered during the daytime) was not taken into account at all; this tends to overstate the evacuation times.
None of these points are within the scope of this objection.
What Mr. Herr complains about in this point is the statement in FSAR SS-REP, Appendix C, to the effect that "The permanent population sector will evacuate from their place of residence." Arguably, this assumption has a given individual evacuating from his home rather than his workplace.
Obviously, however, the effect of this modeling convention (which, as a practical matter is a necessary one) is also to overstate the evacuation times required by overstating the population to be evacuated. The reason for this is that a resident who also works in the EPZ is counted twice: first, as part of the permanent population (counted by population statistics), and second as part of the transient workforce (counted as part of the workforce-related parking lot capacity). All of this derives from the described methodology of the time study itself; NECNP has no cause for argument on this score.
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It should be observed that the only fact that Mr. !
Herr offered that had any tangential relevance to the assertion was the assumption that the time studies used a number of cars equal to the number of households. As the document makes clear -- and as the Board itself perceived -- Mr. Herr had simply misread the paper.
(d) Subsequent Population Growth. Here, again, the Board treated this issue as a question of law.
Board Order of June 30, 1983 at 13-14. No complaint is made (and no argument is contained addressing the point) in either the NECNP Petition or the MassAG Petition. The point is, therefore, waived. E.g..
Cleveland Electric. Illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 744 (1977).
(e) " Evacuation Shadow". Mr. Herr in his affidavit expressed the opinien that someone doing a i
study of this sort ought to take into account any diminution in that portion of highway capacity available for evacuating traffic that may result from use by portions of the population that is in fact
) evacuating, though not required to evacuate. Mr. Herr annexed to his affidavit a study purporting to show
that, in Long Island, New York, some people would evacuate even though there was no order or recommendation that they do so. Actually, the study showed that while some people evacuate when they are outside of the order to do so, some do not evacuate when they are within that scope. Mr. Herr made no attempt to determine how the " net" effect affects highway capacity available for evacuation. Moreover, it should be observed that: (1) the study referred to was an attitude survey, not a study of how people actually react in a real-life situation; (2) the Long Island, New York situation is obviously different from the Seabrook situation, since all Long Island traffic must use one of three or four means for leaving the Island, whereas traffic routes emanate from the Seabroox site in a roughly radial fashion; and (3) Mr.
Herr neither opined nor claimed the ability to opine that, even taking " evacuation shadow" into account, the highway capacities proximate to Seabrook would be inadequate for all traffic. The last point, however, j is sine gua non for any-impact on avacuation time estimates.
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MassAG is guilty of some sleight of hand in its argument on this point. According to MassAG, the Board had before it only the Applicants' statement that "'the !
l transportation corridors serving the overall area . . .
are not taxed to capacity in the evacuation estimate analyses performed by the Applicants. '" MassAG Petition at 14-15. What the affidavit actually says is that:
"the transportation corridors serving the overall area would be available for any additional ' evacuation shadow' evacuee use.
Such transportation corridors are not taxed to capacity in the evacuation estimate analyses performed by the Applicants."
(Emphasis supplied). As the study itself makes clear, the program not only calculates the capacity of each portion of the highway network, but also the portion of that capacity that is being used by evacuating traffic as each stage of the evacuation. See Appendix C, S 5,
" Capacity Calculations." As the full text of Mr.
MacDonald's affidavit makes clear, the Applicants (unlike Mr. Herr) had looked at the actual capacities available and in use, and determined that the highways l
l had sufficient capacity to deal with spontaneous evacuating traffic. MassAG's assertion that all that l
. ao the Applicants offered was some amount of excess capacity simpliciter is simply not accurate; Mr. Herr offered nothing but speculation; and the grant of summary disposition was correct.
(f) Summer Population / Adverse Weather Scenario.
The Licensing Board denied summary disposition on this point. We do not comprehend it to be within the scope of that from which NECNP and MassAG purport to appeal.
(g) Actually Implemented Evacuation Routes. This point is discussed above. Supra at 25-29.
(h) Special Institutions or Transportation
- Dependant As is pointed out above, this is not an item that was within the scope of the contention or upon which NECNP stated an intention to rely in support of the contention in its answers to interrogatories. Thus the Board was under no obligation ts consider the issue at all.
Moreover, the question of how persons in this category will be evacuated is, of necessity, an issue ,
for the state and local governments to consider and resolve, at least in the first instance. The only relevance of the issue to the present contentions is
( whether such steps as the state may take will increase l
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the aggregate clear times for the particular sectors, and, if so, by how much. It is not a priori that any additional marginal time will be required, and Mr. Herr neither opined nor offered any specific facts to the
! effect that it would. See Affidavit of Philip B. Herr (dated May 27, 1983) at 3.25 Finally, woven into MassAG's petition are the threads of an argument to the effect that the Board ought to have denied the motion for summary disposition on other issues, in addition to the bases for denial advanced by NECNP. This is, however, simply a variant asAfter observing in one facially complete sentence that the estimates might be low for any numbers of reasons, Mr. Herr states in a different sentence that "And the study fails to provide information needed by emergency planners, including estimates for evacuation of special institutions and the public transportation-dependent population." The regulations require neither that the FSAR-contained evacustion time estimates design the means for such evacuation nor that they assess separately the time required to evacuation a specific type of evacuee within a given sector, which is'apparently what Mr. Herr refers to. It does not appear from his affidavit that it is any more obvious to Mr. Herr than it is to anyone else that this class of the population cannot be evacuated during the same overall time frame reserved for general evacuation.
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, .4 of the " afterthought" approach. See notes 21, 23, supra. The fact of the matter is that the Board is entitled to assume, as tribunals do regularly and necessarily, that a summary disposition motion is unopposed except to the extent set forth in the respondent's answering pleading (including affidavits, if any).
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for directed certification should be denied.
Respectfu submitted, 3 ,-- - -
(( ,
, f; l Thomas G. )Dignan, Jr Q. -
R. K. Gad III Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Telephone: 423-6100 Dated: August 8, 1993 l
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l DOLKETED l,3hc
'83 AII11 A11:11 0FFsi CF shr:r : .
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UO3EIj.[hfdiEVCf I, R. K. Gad III, one of the attorneys for the Applicants herein, hereby certify that on August 8, 1983, I made service of the within " APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO PETITIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION FOR DIRECTED CERTIFICATION (Evacuation Time Estimates)" by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, to:
Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Gary J. Edles, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Howard A. Wilber, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Helen Hoyt, Chairperson Diana P. Randall Atomic Safety and Licensing 70 Collins Street Board Seabrook, NH 03874 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Harmon & Weiss Board 1725 I Street, N.W.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Suite 506 Commission Washington, DC 20006 Washington, DC 20555
,,o Dr. Jerry Harbour G. Dana Bisbee, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 208 State House Annex Commission Concord, NH 03301 Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire Board Panel Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Director Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, DC 20555 Commission Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esquire Appeal Board Panel 116 Lowell Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P.O. Box 516 Commission Manchester, NH 03105 Washington, DC 20555 l l
Philip Ahrens, Esquire Anne Verge, Chairperson Assistant Attorney General Board of Selectmen Department of the Attorney Town Hall General South Hampton, NH Augusta, ME 04333 David R. Lewis, Esquire Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel Environmental Protection Bureau U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Department of the Attorney General Commission One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Rm. E/W-439 Boston, MA 02108 Washington, DC 20555 Mr. John B. Tanzer Ms. Olive L. Tash Designated Representative of Designated Representative of the Town of Hampton the Town of Brentwood 5 Morningside Drive R.F.D. 1, Dalton Road Hampton, NH 03842 Brentwood, NH 03833 Ms. Roberta C. Pevear Mr. Patrick J. McKeon Designated Representative of Selectmen's Office the Town of Hampton Falls 10 Central Road Drinkwater Road Rye, NH 03870 Hampton Falls, NH 03844 c-e e sb Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Mr. Calvin A. Canney Designated Representative of City Manager l the Town of Kensington City Hall RFD 1 126 Daniel Street East Kingston, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Ruthanne G, Miller, Esquire Mr. Angie Machiros Law Clerk to the Board Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of Selectmen Board Town of Newbury U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Newbury, MA 01950 Commission Washington D.C. 20555 Mr. Maynard B. Pearson Mr. Richard E. Sullivan 40 Monroe Street Mayor Amesbury, MA 01913 City Hall Newburyport, MA 01950 Mr. Donald E. Chick Town Manager Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833 N
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, L R. K. Gad II'I f
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