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Supplemental Testimony of Mc Cordaro,Ja Weismantle & Eb Lieberman on Phase II Emergency Planning Contentions 23.D & 65.Certificate of Svc Encl
	ML20079F691
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Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	01/16/1984
From:	Cordaro M, Lieberman E, Weismantle J; LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
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f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i

In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

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! a SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, JOHN A. WEISMANTLE AND EDWARD B. LIEBERMAN ON BEHALF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 23.D. AND 65 l

-l Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street j P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 (804) 788-8200 i

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8401190170 840116 PDR ADOCK 05000322 C PDR

LILCO, denuary16, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)

(Shoreham Nuclear-Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, JOHN A. WEISMANTLE AND EDWARD B. LIEBERMAN ON BEHALF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 23.D. AND 65 PURPOSE AND

SUMMARY

OF TESTIMONY The purpose of this testimony is to analyze the estimates of (1) evacuation times, (2) frequency of automobile accidents, and (3) frequency of automobiles running out of gasoline presented in the direct testimony of Peter A. Polk filed on November 18, 1983.

It demonstrates that the evacuation time estimates of up to 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months for evacuation of the full 10-mile EPZ developed by Mr. Polk are derived from a relatively simplistic model and data base.

l l Further, it demonstrates that, to the extent that the evacuation i time estimates exceed about 7 1/2 hours, the modeled traffic con- ,

l sists entirely of persons who leave voluntarily from the East End of Long Island, beyond the EPZ, never enter the EPZ, and do.not i

materially impede the exit of the population leaving the EPZ. The l

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population leaving the EPZ exits the boundary in 7 1/2 hours or less. Secondly, the testimony demonstrates that Mr. Polk's

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estimate of the frequency of accidents is overstated by a factor of 40 because of an error in the interpretation of the data relied on by him. Third, it shows that Mr. Polk has overstated the likelihood that evacuating automobiles vill run out of gasoline by about a factor of three, and that his testimony fails to account for the presence of multiple refueling tank trucks, each one of which will be able to assist more cars than Mr. Polk's testimony hypothesizes will need refueling.

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LILCO, January 16, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, JOHN A. WEISMANTLE AND EDWARD B. LIEBERMAN ON BEHALF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 23.D. AND 65 TESTIMONY

1. Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. [Cordaro) ,My name is Matthew C. Cordaro. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company, 175 Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801.

[Weismantle] My name is John A. Weismantle. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company, 100 Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801.

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[Lieberman] .My name is Edward B. Lieberman. My business i

i address is KLD Associates, Incorporated, 300 Broadway, Huntington Station, New York, 11746.

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2. Q. Please summarize your professional qualifications and your role in emergency planning for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

A. (Cordaro, Weismantle, Lieberman] Our professional quali-fications and our roles in emergency planning for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station are detailed on pages 2 and 3 of our earlier testimony on Contention 65. Those quali-fications and roles have not changed since the preparation of that testimony.

3. Q. Could you briefly summarize the purpose of this supplemen-tal testimony?

A. [Cordaro, Weismantle, Lieberman] This testimony has two basic purposes. First, it will review the inputs, model-ing methodology and results of the traffic evacuation time estimates presented in the direct testimony of Peter A.

Polk on behalf of Suffolk County, dated November 18, 1983 (hereinafter " Polk Testimony"). Second, it will review the estimates presented in the Polk Testimony of the fre-

,quency of occurrence of automobile accidents and of auto-mobiles running out of gasoline during an assumed evacua-tion of the entire Shoreham EPZ. The bases for this testimony include, primarily, review of detailed computer printouts, maps and other documents provided by Suffolk County at LILCO's request pursuant to this Board's Orders of December 12 (Tr. 1289-90) and December 23, 1983, the

deposition of Mr. Polk on January 6, 1984, and documents received earlier in discovery and the general literature.

4. Q. What conclusions have you reached regarding those aspects of Mr. Polk's testimony reviewed by you?

A. [Cordaro, Weismantle, Lieberman) With respect to the evacuation time estimates, we concluded generally as fol-lows: First, the input data to the PRC model used by Mr.

Polk are roughly comparable to those used in the KLD model analyses performed by Edward Lieberman for LILCO, with one exception. Unlike Mr. Lieberman's analyses for LILCO, which utilize evacuation of an approximately 10-mile EPZ as a base case but also evaluate varying degrees of volun-4 tary evacuation from beyond the EPZ boundary as alternate cases, Mr. Polk's analyses always presume evacuation from of the entire East End of Long Island, and of population

elsewhere out to a range of 20 miles. However, by 4

j detailed analysis of computer printouts and materials obtained on discovery it is possible to distinguish Mr.

Polk's treatment of the evacuation process for persons leaving the EPZ from that of voluntary evacuees from beyond it.

Second, as to models, the PRC model used in Mr. Polk's analysis is in many respects, particularly in its treat-

[ ment of evacuation routes as separate and unconnected

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roads rather than a part of a highway network and its failure to account for.many physical realities along evac-untion roadways, a simpler and less flexible model than the KLD model used by Mr. Lieberman. As a result, while it does not necessarily yield " incorrect" results for any given case, one cannot place the same degree of confidence in the accuracy of those results as one can in results obtained from the KLD model.

Third, despite the differences in models, the results

' yielded by them are remarkably similar when one evaluates the time it takes persons originating from within the EPZ to reach its boundary. As is explained more fully below, detailed analysis of the computer printouts and other doc-uments provided by the County reveals that the last vehi-cle leaving from within the EPZ reaches its boundary, using Mr. Polk's model and data, at about 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 30 minutes after the start of a full lO-mile EPZ evacuation, assuming summer population, normal weather, no special traffic controls, and voluntary evacuation by persons ori-ginating outside the EPZ. This is virtually identical to i

l the time calculated by Mr. Lieberman using the KLD model

-- 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 35 minutes -- for the last car to reach the.EPZ boundary from within under virtually the same conditions (summer population, normal weather, normal traffic

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controls (an " uncontrolled" case), 50% shadow outside the EPZ). The much longer times reported by Mr. Polk on the Sunrise Highway and the Long Island Expressway along or near the EPZ boundary -- 17 and 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months respectively --

are entirely attributable to, and entirely composed of, voluntary evacuees coming from the East End and the south shore, from outside the EPZ, never entering the EPZ, and never coming closer to Shoreham than the EPZ boundary. To put it another way, no person modeled by Mr. Polk as evac-

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uating from within.the EPZ reaches its boundary more than 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 30 minutes after the start of the evacuation.

Thus, properly analyzed, the PRC modeling results done by Mr. Polk corroborate, rather than dispute, the more de- -

tailed analyses done by Mr. Lieberman using the KLD model.

With respect to the frequency of occurrence of acci-dents during an evacuation, Mr. Polk's estimate stems from a serious misreading of the traffic engineering handbook i on which he relies. Accident frequency is not simply a 1

l function of automobile speed, as is asserted by Mr. Polk, but.of automobile speed relative to that of the prevailing traffic. Failure to account for this fact has produced an estimate which is excessive by a factor of approximate.ly 40.

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l out of gasoline, Mr. Polk's estimate of 277 is overstated I for two principal reasons: first, Mr. Polk's_ estimate

, does not account for the improved mileage efficiency of a

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'1985 fleet of automobiles, and second, Mr. Polk's estimate rests on a data manipulation error. The result is about a threefold overestimate of cars running out of gas: the proper number, using Mr. Polk's methodology, is approxi-

-mately 96 cars. Even those present no difficulty, since 1

LILCO will have fuel trucks dispersed at 7 locations, each of which can provide 3 gallons of. gasoline to more than-400 cars,.i.e., to more cars than Mr. Polk's uncorrected estimate assumes will nus out of gasoline in the entire EPZ.

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Those are the summary results of the reviews performed l

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5. : .Q. Could you briefly describe and compare the input data used in LILCO's and Suffolk County's evacuation time estime.tes?

A. [ Lieberr.an) The DYNEV model used in LILCO's analyees and [

the EVACPLAN model used in Suffolk County's analyses

. require very different types of input data. As discussed l- on pages.25 and 26 of the November 18, 1903 testimony of this panel on Contention 65, the DYNEV system utilizes a i

large body of input information designed-to reflect as l

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I accurately'as possible the entire evacuation network, including specific. roadway attributes like roadway lengths, the p'resence of turn bays and a description of control devices at intersections; mean discharge headways; mean~ free flow speeds; and a trip table that specifies the number of vehicles leaving each origin node and their associated destination. -By contrast, the EVACPLAN model used in Mr. Polk's analysis utilizes a far more limited body o'f information. The entire evacuation network is partitioned into a collection of unconnected, linear road-ways, each of which is analyzed separately. For each intersection chosen as an evaluation point on an evacua- -

tion route, the' number of lanes on each of up to three legs entering,'and one. leg exiting, the intersection must be specified; the, highway type'on-a scale of one to four (each value is assigned a given capacity) described; and the population that enters the intersection from the cross-street legs specified. The input data do not

- include any information about physical distances between intersections or the actual traffic control devices pres-ent at each intersection.

'.A~ comparison of the input data used in LILCO's and Suffolk County's analyses for the area within the EPZ boundaries reveals:

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1. The capacities used in LILCO's analyses for roadways common to both analyses are similar to, or lower than, those assumed in'Suffolk County's analyses. (A detailed comparison of these capacities is attached to this testimony as Attach-

-ment'1). In most cases, the lower capacities used in LILCO's analyses re-sult1from the consideration of traffic control devices that limit the otherwise free flow of traffic ~.

2. LILCO's-analyses are premised on a summertime population of 160,000 in 1985; Mr. Polk's analyses assume a population of 169,000.1/ LILCO's analyses assume 100% of this EPZ population will evacuate if ordered to do so; Mr. Polk's analyses assume 80% will evacuate.

3. LILCO's analyses assume a vehicle occu-pancy rate .of approximately 3.0 persons /

car during an evacuation; Mr. Polk's analyses-assume a vehicle occupancy rate of 2.8 in summer and 2.7 in winter.

4. Given the input data described in items 2 and 3,-LILCO's analyses assume approxi-mately 53,000 vehicles would seek to

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evacuate the EPZ; Mr. Polk's analyses assume approximately 48,000 vehicles.

5. LILCO's analyses assume evacuation traf-fic from within the EPZ will access the roadway network at 64 roadway links; Mr.

Polk's analyses assume access on 25 en-tering legs.

1/ The input data to Mr. Polk's analyses and the deposition testimony of Mr. Polk differ on this value. Mr. Polk's deposi,-

tion testimony suggests a population of 151,800. Since the purpose of this testimony is to compare the evacuation time estimates produced by LILCO's and Suffolk County's analyses, the population value used in Mr. Polk's analyses was chosen for comparative purposes.

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6. .Q. Could you briefly compare the models used in LILCO's and Suffolk County's analyses?

A. [Lieberman] The DYNEV system used in LILCO's evacuation time studies is described in detail on pages 18-23 of this panel's previous testimony on Contention 65 and in Appen-dices B and C of Appendix A to the LILCO Transition Plan.

The EVACPLAN model was used to produce the results presented in Mr. Polk's testimony. This model is summa-rized in Appendis B to a report entitled " Preliminary Evacuation Time Estimates for the Shoreham EPZ" that was prepared by PRC Voorhees for Suffolk County in November 1982. Briefly, the EVACPLAN model is made up of two modules: an EVACURVE module and a QUEUE module. The EVACURVE module computes a departure time curve for each preparatory step to evacuation. The module then computes 3:

a joint probability distribution of all component steps, which describes the rate at which vehicles will enter the designated intersections. For the analyses presented in Mr. Polk's testimony this joint probability distribution is the same as that presented on pages B-4 to B-6 of the November 1982 PRC Voorhees report. The joint probability distribution and the individual distributions for time to travel home and to prepare to evacuate home presented there are shorter than comparable distributions that are discussed at pages 27 to 31 of that same report. These

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latter distributions were shown to be virtually identical to'those_used in KLD's modeling analyses (see Figures 1 .

and 3 of Attachment 10 to this panel's earlier testimony on Contention 65). Thus, the trip generation distribution used in Mr. Polk's analyses is shorter than that used in i-LILCO's.'

The QUEUE module is designed to simulate traffic flow on an evacuation roadway network. The primary inputs to this model are the major evacuation routes, their sub-routes, and key intersections on those routes and sub-routes; the population entering at each intersection on these routes and subroutes; the joint probability distri-bution.from the EVACURVE module; and roadway capacities.

The QUE E module simulates traffic flow by first. assigning four-legs of traffic to each intersection (leg 1 repre-I sents traffic entering the intersection along the evacua-tion route being modeled, legs 2 and 4 represent traffic entering the system from side streets, and leg 3 repre-sents traffic leaving the intersection along the evacua-tion route). The model then movee the traffic at discrete time intervals (in this case 15 minutes) according to available roadway capacities and to the existence of queues. Traffic queues are d$scharged at rates propor-tional to their magnitude and roadway capacity.

From this rather abbreviated description of each model,

'it can be seen that.a major difference between the two models involves; network. continuity. The DYNEV system per-mits the modeling of an entire evacuation network includ- 3 ing roads linking major evacuation routes. This permits cars to be routed, either by design or by individual choice, on an extremely large and diverse number of possi-ble paths. By comparison, the EVACPLAN model~does not provide this flexibility. Since only one departure path is permitted from each intersection, and that path is along the route being modeled, there is no linking of major evacuation routes. As applied in Mr. Polk's analy-sis, the EVACPLAN model's continuity was restricted even further since the designated subroutes were not linked to the major evacuation routes for modeling purposes. In

-other words,.while the subroutes were modeled indepen-dently, the flow of traffic from the last intersection of the subroute was not fed into the appropriate intersection on the main evacuation route. Instead, when the main evacuation route was modeled, loading was performed as though the subroutes did not exist. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the analyses presented in Mr. Polk's testi-mony evacuate traffic on four unconnected routes.

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One other difference in the way each model was applied is worthy of note. The DYNEV system was run over a series of iterations. These iterations were designed to be responsive to the guidance of NUREG/CR-1745, which recom-mends such-a technique to identify potential bottlenecks and to provide alternative routings, (see Cordaro, et al.

Testimony on Contention 65 at 35-39). By comparison, the EVACPLAN model appears to have been run only once follow-ing an assignment of traffic by a planner at PRC Voorhees.

The result, as will be explored in more detail below, is that roadway capacities are unrealistically underutilized, ar.bitrary routing is postulated and unnecessarily extreme bottlenecks are formed.

7. Q. Could you explain the derivation of the evacuation time estimates contained in Mr. Polk's testimony?

A. [Lieberman) The evacuation time estimates contained in

' Mr. Polk's testimony, which include maximum values of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months in summer and 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months in winter, were derived as follows in Mr. Polk's analysis:

1. The area on Long Island within 50 miles of the Shoreham plant was divided into 9 subregions. Subregion 1, which was defined as an area within 10 miles of the Shoreham plant, is roughly equivalent to the Shoreham EPZ.

2. For modeling purposes, 8 of the 9 subregions were assumed to evacuate.

Subregion 8, which is located 20 to 50 miles west of the Shoreham site, was not .

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-13a evacuated, presumably because the evacua-tion of these people would have no effect cn1 the evacuation times for people within a 10-mile EPZ.

3. In each subregion, varying percentages of residents were assumed to evacuate.

Within 10 miles of Shoreham (Subregion 1), 80% of the people were assumed to evacuate; 54-63% of the people from 10 to 20 miles from the plant (Subregions 2 to

7) were assumed to evacuate; and 48% of those more than 20 miles to the east of the plant (Subregion 9) were assumed to evacuate.2/

4. All. evacuees were assigned to one of four major evacuation routes: the Jericho Turnpike, Route 347, the Long Island Expressway (LIE)oor the Sunrise Highway.

In addition, major evacuation routes were

-further detailed through the use of subroutes: one subroute was specified

.for-Route 347; two for the LIE; and three for the Sunrise Highway. The major evac-uation. routes and subroutes, and each of the intersections at which traffic flow

-(i.e., the existence of queues) is mod-eled are shown in Attachment 2 hereto.

The assignment of evacuees to major evac-uation routes or subroutes was made by a 2/- The computer results-presented in Mr. Polk's testimony as-sume that 63% of the population to the east of the EPZ,'and 54%

of the population to the west of the'EPZ voluntarily evacuate.

When questioned about the consistency of these values with opposite values presented on page 33 of the November 1982 PRC

-Voorhees report at his deposition, Mr. Polk could not explain the difference. Polk Deposition Tr. :28. Subsequently, on January 12,-1984,- LILCO was provided with copies of revised evacuation time estimates based'on 54% voluntary evacuation from the east and-63% from the west. These new evacuation tim.e estimates are roughly equivalent to those presented in Mr.

Polk's testimony, with variations in the time to clear roadways of less than one hour. Given the abbreviated form of the re-sults that were provided to LILCO, this testimony will be based on the computer analyses that underlie Mr. Polk's testimony.

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planner at PRC Voorhees, without the assistance of a traffic assignment model.

A primary criterion in this assignment was that voluntary evacuees from outside the EPZ would not be assigned to evacua-tion routes that entered the EPZ. People were restricted to following, and not to deviating from, the major evacuation path chosen for them.

5. The 18-hour summer evacuation time esti-mate was the result of lengthy delays at the intersection of the LIE and Horse Block Road, which lies just beyond the southwest corner of the EPZ (Intersection 6 on the LIE on Attachment 2), and along the Sunrise Highway (Intersections 7 through 12 on the Sunrise Highway on Attachment 2). The intersection of the LIE and Horse Block Road also constrained the evacuation time estimate for winter.

In order to analyze the evacuation time estimates pres-ented in Mr. Polk's testimony, it is necessary to under-stand where traffic entering any given intersection is coming from. This could not be discerned from the attach-

! ments to the Polk Testimony, but can be from the detailed l'

computer listings provided on discovery pursuant t'o this l Board's discovery order of December 12, 1983. Those i

listings, which show the extent of traffic entering and exiting each mode, led intersection on each leg to it, have been summarized and reformatted for convenience on Attach-

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ment 3 to this Supplemental Testimony. Using these refor-matted listings, it can be readily seen that the long queues and lengthy clearing times both at the intersection

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of the LIE and Horse Block Road and on the Sunrise Highway

are caused entirely by and consist entirely of voluntary evacuees from outside the EPZ who never enter the EPZ.

The delay at the intersection of the LIE and Horse Block Road is caused by traffic that originates near the south-ern shore of Long Island (see southern subroute of LIE evacuation route on Attachment 2), beyond the 10-mile EPZ.

This traffic proceeds westbound on the Montauk Highway until it reaches Horse Block Road (Intersection 6 on Montauk Highway), where it arbitrarily and inexplicably turns northwest onto Horse Block Road and intersects with the LIE (Intersection 7 on Horse Block Road, Intersection 1

6 on the LIE) just outside the EPZ boundary. The model runs that show the LIE-Horse Block Road Intersection clearing at 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months also show that'all traffic heading westward on the LIE to that intersection from within che EPZ cleared the EPZ at 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 30 minutes (see Attachment 3, LIE, Intersections 4, 5 (leg 1) and 6 (leg 1)); all remaining traffic flow is the East End traffic that never even touches the EPZ boundary until Horse Block Road, and never enters the EPZ. Thus all traffic delays at this intersection after 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 30 minutes result from queu.ing on Horse Block Road, not on the LIE itself, in a queue which did not originate in the EPZ, never enters the EPZ, e

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and.does.not affect traffic exiting the EPZ (see Attach-ment'3, LIE, Intersection 6 (leg 2)).

- The delays on .tdie Sunrise Highway are likewise caused by the assumed voluntary evacuation of persons from the two forks of eastern Long Island, particularly the South-ern Fork, beginning entirely beyond the.10-mile EPZ (see Sunrise Highway evacuation route on Attachment 2). In Suffolk County's analyses it is assumed that people.from as far east as Montauk Point will seek to evacuate. Given the relatively large populations in these areas in the

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summer and the;1imited roadway capacities of the Sunrise Highway.in the East Hampton and Southhampton areas, sub-stantial delays, result beginning at locations 20 to 30 miles-east of the Shoreham plant (see Attachment 3, Sun-I l rise-Highway, Intersections 1, 2 and 3): These delays cause some voluntary evacuees to arrive at the southern boundary of the EPZ (Intersection 7 on the Sunrise Highway route) as late as 15 hours1.736111e-4 days 0.00417 hours 2.480159e-5 weeks 5.7075e-6 months after the order to evacuate.

As with the LIE evacuation route, detailed analysis of Mr.

Polk's modeling shows that all EPZ residents who travel-south and exit the EPZ at the Sunrise Highway (i.e., at Intersections 8 and 9) reach the Sunrise Highway no later than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 30 minutes. Though their progress is slow thereafter,~given the assumption that over half of the

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people from the East End are evacuating, it may be readily inferred from a review of the. queue length and discharge rates used in Mr. Polk's analysis of the Sunrise Highway that each one of those EPZ evacuees would have cleared Intarsection 10 on the Sunrise Highway, beyond the end of.

.~its run as an EPZ boundary, by 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Even this esti-mate ignores'the fact that once persons are on the Sunrise Highway they are beyond the EPZ.

8. Q. What is the. proper framework for consideration of persons who are.not within the EPZ at the time of an evacuation recommendation, but nevertheless evacuate voluntarily without ever entering the EPZ?

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A. [Cordaro, Weismantle, Lieberman] NUREG-0654, incorporated into the. Commission's regulations at 10 CFR 5 50.47,-pro-vides for the use of an emergency planning zone approxi-mately 10 miles in radius. Two of the reasons underlying this provision are pertinent here. First, a 10-mile EPZ covers an area large enough to encompass the effects of the vast majority of realistically anticipatable accidents at a commercial reactor. Second, the logistic and support base adequate to provide emergency services within a 10-mile zone are generally considered to be substantial enough to be expandable, ad hoc, ia) address limited'em.er-gency needs beyond that zone. Thus under NUREG-0654 as incorporated into 10 CFR $ 50.47, an EPZ is so defined

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that plans which provide for protection of the population within it are an acceptable basis for emergency prepared-ness. It follows that the primary reason for considering populations outside the EPZ in the development of emergen-cy plans pursuant to the Commission's regulations is to determine whether they affect the feasibility of imple-menting planning measures for persons within the EPZ.

The analyses presented in this testimony confirm what has been shown-in our earlier testimony on evacuation time estimates: the voluntary evacuation of populations frpm beyond the EPZ does not materially affect the evacuation estimates for residents, and the extent of that effect,

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such as it'is, is determinable.

Suffolk County's evacuation time estimate argument is pivoted not on the movement of the persons living within the EPZ -- those sought to be protected by the Commis-sion's regulations -- but on the movement of persons liv-ing beyond the EPZ and not entering it. This is inconsis-tent with the Commission's regulations, as outlined above.

It is also bad planning: if one were to accept the Coun-ty's estimate of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months to evacuate the lO-mile EPZ as the basis for protective actions rather than the appropri-ate range of about 5 to 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months , it would not conduce to the most accurate and therefore most effective development

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1 l-of protective actions in the event of an accident.3/

Thus, both from a regulatory standpoint and from a planning standpoint, the County's proposal that evacuation time estimates for the 10-mile EPZ turn on the travel times of voluntary traffic which (1) originates outside the EPZ, (2) never enters it, and (3) does not materially impede the exodus of population from,within the EPZ, is not useful.

9. Q. What would be the evacuation time estimates produced by Mr. Polk's analyses if the evacuation of the EPZ is used as the criterion for determining evacuation time?

A. [Lieberman] From the detailed computer printouts provided in response to LILCO's discovery request, it is possible to produce an evacuation time estimate for the people evacuating from Subregion 1, which is roughly analogous to

. the'Shoreham EPZ. A review of Attachment 2 indicates that each of the four major evacuation routes carries people from within the EPZ to beyond its boundaries. In addi-tion, the Route 25 subroute of Route 347 also carries t

3f It should be noted that the County has not reported any evacuation time estimates for the far more likely scenarios of evacuation of radii less than 10 miles or of a less-than mile radius plus a " keyhole" out to 5 or 10 miles. Thus its analysis simply does not apply to those circumstances.

f people-from within the-EPZ. This subroute does not merge with-Route 347 until roughly 8_ miles west of the EPZ;

.therefore it should be considered as a separate evacuation

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route in determining.the time needed to evacuate the EPZ.

The method used to determine the evacuation time for tdie EPZ,- using each of the five routes just listed was as follows:

1. Identify from the input data provided by Suffolk County all intersections at which traffic from Subregion 1 enters an evacu-ation route. These are: (1) Intersec-tion 1 for the-Jericho Turnpike; (2)~ Intersections 1, 2 and 3 (only leg 2) for Route 25; (3) Intersections 1 and 2 for Route.347; (4) Intersections 1 through 5 on the LIE, as well as all three intersections on the North William Floyd Parkway subroute and Intersection 7 on the unnamed subroute that uses the Montauk Highway and Horse Block Road; and (5) Legs 2 and 4 of Intersections 8 and 9 on the Sunrise Highway and leg 4 of

- Intersection'2 of_the subroute entitled

" North Fork via E-61."

2. Produce time histories of traffic on all

. legs of these interse'etions as well as time histories for several intersections west of the EPZ on each route to ensure that queue formation at these intersec-tions from outside the EPZ will not affect traffic evacuating the EPZ. The time histories for a summer evacuation are attached as Attachment 3 to this tes-timony.-

3. Discern from each intersection-specific .

time history the time at which the inter-section, or leg of interest, clears.4/

. 4/-; The time histories presented in Attachment 3 indicate that

.an: intersection has been cleared of queues at the time associ-footnote continued

F The evacuation time needed to clear the subregion of interest, in this case Subregion 1, is defined as the longest time for any intersection or leg.

An examination of the time histories shows that the entire evacuation of Subregion 1 can be accomplished in approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 30 minutes in~ summer and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 45 minutes in the winter, notwithstanding the assumed exis-tence-of evacuation beyond it. In both cases, the lim-iting point is the intersection of the LIE and the William Floyd Parkway. This intersection takes approximately an hour' longer to clear than any other area in the EPZ. The delay at this intersection results from a queue that forms along the William Floyd Parkway north of the LIE. This queue can be discharged onto the LIE at only one third the roadway capacity of the LIE because of the constraining capacity of the existing entrance ramp.

Closer examination of the time histories in Attachment 3 and of a map showing traffic assignments that were supplied in response to discovery indicates that even this footnote continued ated with the final entry. In cases when the last entry is after 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , it may be necessary to interpolate between hour-ly entries to determine the exact time at which the last queued car exits the intersection. The time needed to cletr the queue on a specific leg of an intersection is when the value under the column headed "Q" for an individual leg is zero.

/

f

delay on the William Floyd Parkway could' easily and real-istically have been eliminated. First, traffic ori-ginating within five miles to the east and southeast of the Shoreham plant could be assigned to any of the three intersections of the LIE (1, 2, 3) east of the William Floyd Parkway intersection, rather tJuul going entirely to the William Floyd Parkway. This reassignment would dis-tribute demand more efficiently over existing roadway capacities, and would more realistically reflect the routes people living in this area would be likely to take.

Second, the modeling results show that the intersection of the William Floyd Parkway southbound onto the Sunrise Highway was clear of traffic on the William Floyd Parkway after approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 30 minutes, or five hours be-fore the William Floyd-LIE intersection (LIE Intersection 4), approximately two miles to the north, clears. Thus, it seems.likely that some traffic sitting in a queue on the William Floyd Parkway waiting to enter the LIE would choose in any event to proceed south on the William Floyd Parkway and to evacuate on the Sunrise Highway. The re-sult would be a further reduction in the time needed to clear the William Floyd-LIE intersection, and thus to

-evacuate the EPZ.

/

10. Q. How does this-evacuation time estimate compare with evacu-ation time estimates produced by LILCO?

A. [Weismantle, Lieberman) The assumptions underlying the Polk Testimony's evacuation time estimates for Subregion 1,.not including any. reorienting of traffic.on the William Floyd Parkway, most closely resemble those made in the summer, uncontrolled, 50% shadow run made by LILCO. The

~

results of this run appear as Case 27 on Attachment 6 to this panel's earlier-testimony on Contentions 23 and 65 and are further detailed in Attachment 11 to that testi-

mony. The Case 27 results indicate an evacuation time estimate of,7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 35 minutes -- an evacuation time esti-mate virtu' ally-identical to the 7 hour8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months 30 minute estimate produced by Mr. Polk.

l l The close agreement between these two analyses may l

reflect a trade-off between two opposing factors. On one hand PRC's arbitrary and relatively inefficient assignment of traffic to routes within the EPZ tends to concentrate traffic on only a portion of the available roadways. This approach'will produce higher estimates of evacuation travel time than will actually be realized. On the other hand, the PRC estimates of capacity on some arterials appear to be somewhat generous (see Attachment.1). These higher capacities. counteract the limited roadway system used by PRC.

By comparison, KLD's analysis produced r.uting patterns which utilized more roadways -- i.e., more of the avail-able roadways network capacity -- than did those of PRC.

Also, the KLD capacity estimates attempted to reflect the effects of congested conditions.

Thus, the results of the KLD analysis are more repre-sentative of-the roadway network and actual motorist behavior, and are more likely to yield accurate evacuation time estimates over a spectrum of input assumptions.

11. Q. What conclusions have you reached regarding the estimates of the number of accidents contained in Mr. Polk's testi-mony?

A. [ Lieberm.1n)_ In his direct testimony, Mr. Polk predicted that 141 accidents would occur during an evacuation of the Shoreham EPZ (Polk Testimony at 10-11). This estimate contrasts sharply with this panel's estimate of approxi-mately 4 accidents in its November 18, 1983 testimony on Contention 65.D. This difference becomes startling when one recognizes that both accident predictions are premised on the same background document -- the Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook.

The difference of interpretation of the Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook, and hence the difference in predicted accidents, centers on whether accident fre-quency increases at very low speeds. Mr. Polk's estimates

/

-m -

assume that it does. As support, Mr. Polk cites pages 816 and 818 of the Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook. These two pagas, which are attached along with other pertinent pages from the handbook as Attachment 4 to this testimony, contain two curves, Figures 26.1 and 26.2, which present accident frequencies in terms of travel speed and variation from mean speed respectively. The frequency rate of 40,000 accidents per 100 million vehicle miles used as the basis for Mr. Polk's accident calcula-tions is taken from Figure 26.1 alone assuming a travel speed of 15 miles per hour.

A closer examination of Figure 26.1 in context with Figuce 26.2 and the accompanying text reveals that Figure 26.1 cannot be used in this manner. On page 815, Figure 26.1 is described as follows:

l Figure 26.1, taken from a study made by the Federal Highway Administration, reveals some interesting findings regard-ing accident involvement and speed on i main rural highways, not including free-l ways. Accident-involvement rates are the highest at very low speeds, are lowest at about the average speeds, and increase again at very high speeds. A principal l conclusion is that the more a driver l deviates from the average speed of traffic, the greater is his or her chance of being involved in an accident.

An examination of the report cited as the source of Figure 26.1 confirms that Figure 26.1 was premised on an assumed average speed:

- ~. . .

One of the:important-findings of this !

study is that the greater the differen- l tial.in speed of a driver and his vehicle

-from the average speed'of all traffic, the greater the chance of that-driver

.being-involved in an accident. For exam-ple, a driver traveling at 40 or 80 miles per hour in relation to an average speed of 60 miles per hour for all traffic has a substantially greater chance of being involved in an accident-than a driver traveling at-the average speed. But, if the average travel speed were only 40

. miles per hour on a section of highway, the possibility-of a driver being involved in an accident would be least at the average travel speed of 40 miles per hour.

I Solomon, " Accidents on Main Rural Highways Related to n Speed, Driver, and Vehicles,",U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Preface (1964).

Since congested conditions prevail most of the time

, during an evacuation, there will be little deviation from the mean speed of about 6.5 miles per hour; in other words, low speeds will be the norm rather.than an aberra-1.

l tion from normal free-flow highway speeds. Thus, Figure 26.2, which displays accidents rates as a function of variation from.mean speed, is the figure Mr. Polk should L

hava used. Assuming a variation of 0 miles per hour, i.e., a. uniform speed-of 6.5 miles per hour, then the ac-cident frequency is only about 100 accidents per 100 mil-lion. vehicle miles, or 1/40 of Mr. Polk's assumed rates.5/

5/J If some cars travel 10 miles per hour faster than the av-erage speed, i.e., 16.5 miles per hour, there would be little effect on.the expected accident rate.

27-Using this correct accident frequency, Mr. Polk's analysis would predict 3 accidents during an evacuation -- an acci-dont rate vir'tually identical to that predicted in this panel's earlier testimony and consistent with national

accident statistics.

12. Q. Does the testimony of other Suffolk County witnesses lend a credence to Mr. Polk's accident estimate?

A. [Lieberman) No. Testimony filed by Inspector Roberts, et al. and by Philip Earr include accident statistics that are ostensibly designed to support the accident estimate of Mr. Polk. Neither does.

The testimony of Inspector Roberts, et al. states that 977 traffic. accidents were reported at 126 intersections in the Sixth Precinct during the year beginning September l

l 1982 (Roberts, et al. at 66-67). The Sixth Precinct, which served as the basis for this study, covers an area that approximates the Shoreham EPZ. The 126 intersections studied represent intersections along the five major high-ways within the. Sixth Precinct. Thus, the accidents reported in this testimony can be expected to constitute a substantial percentage of the accidents that occur within the EPZ during a given year. If the 977 accidents are divided by the number of hours in a year -- 8,760 -- an accident rate of 1 accident approximately every nine hours

./

- y w - - = g'y---w%-q ------Ty gory- -eq-mpe %.ew--m ,w-w-*wmee

f is produced . Stated in terms of a five-hour evacuation, Inspector Roberts, et al.'s study shows that there is slightly greater thau a 50% chance that one accident will occur at one of the 126 intersections during an evacua-tion. While the rate of occurrence of accidents per unit of; time (the frame of reference used by Inspector Roberts,

. et al.) is not the most precise indicator for predicting accidents during an evacuation, it nevertheless serves to demonstrate that Inspector Roberts, et al.'s accident study lends no credence to.Mr. Polk's accident estimate or-any value higher than the four accidents assumed in KLD's analyses.

Mr. Herr's reliance on accident statistics from the

~

1083 July weekend does nothing to undermine KLD's estimate of four accidents during an evacuation. Mr. Herr argues 9

that.the reported accidents produce an accident rate of four accidents per hour (Herr Testimony at 41). What Mr.

Herr does not acknowledge is that the Fourth of July acci-dent statistics he relies on reflect a population group of 1.16 million (the population of the five western towns in Suffolk County), or a population group more than 7 times larger than that expected to evacuate the EPZ. If Mr.

Herr's accident statistics are normalized to reflect equivalent size population groups, then a population the

4 size of that within the EPZ would have 0.6 accidents per.

hour or approximately 3 accidents during an evacuation.

Thus, the testimony of Inspector Roberts, et al. and Mr. Herr' contradicts the accident estimate of Mr. "olk, and supports KLD's estimates.

13. Q. What conclusions have you reached regarding the estimates of the automobiles running out of gas contained in Mr.

Polk's testimony?

A. [Lieberman] Mr. Polk's estimate of the number of cars likely to run out of gas during an evacuation is over-stated for a number of reasons. First, the estimate is I

premised on a fuel usage rate for idling that comes from a 1976 report (see Polk Testimony at 13 & n.5). This value overstates fuel consumption for cars that would be hypoth-esized to evacuate in'1985, because fuel efficiencies have been improving since 1976. For example, Table 6-4 of the i . Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook indicates

.that U.S. fleet fuel consumption improved 27 percent be-tween 1975 and 1979. It has continued to improve further since then.

Second, Table 3 of.Mr. Polk's testimony (Polk Testimony at 16) contains a numerical error in the values presented-in the' column headed " Proportion of Vehicles Running Out of Fuel." .This error is most easily seen by examining the first entry, which relates to cars queuing from 0 to 30

/

t l' '

i

minutes. For his analysis, Mr. Polk assumes that no car will start the evacuation with less than one gallon of gasoline, that the fuel usage rate for idling is 0.67 gal-lons per hour, that fuel consumption is 20 miles per gal-lon under normal driving conditions, and that the average

' evacuation trip is 10 miles (Polk Testimony at 12, 14).

Using these assumptions, a car that queues for 30 minutes would consume 0.33 gallons of gasoline while idling in a queue and another 0.5 gallons in traveling out of the EPZ

'(10 mile trip at 20 miles per gallon). Thus, the car would use a total of 0.83 gallons. Since all cars are assumed to have at least 1 gallon of gas, then it follows that no cars queuing for 30 minutes or less would run out of gas. Yet Mr. Polk's analyses assumes that 0.21% will (see Polk Testimony at 16). While the exact nature of Mr.

Polk's error has not been determined,.it appears clear that the other values that appear in the third col'umn of Table 3 are similarly overstated. In addition, each value listed in column 3 is based on the maximum queuing time of each time interval presented (i.e., for the time interval 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the value in column 3 of Table 3 rep-resents a car queuing for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). The more appropriate value would be the midpoint of each range.

i Making the correction in the values in column 3 just discussed and using the midpoint of each time interval, Mr. Polk's analysis would predict that 120 cars would run out of gas. If improved fuel efficiency values are used, this value would decrease to 96 vehicles, or about one third of the 277 vehicles reported in the Polk Testimony.

More importantly, Mr. Polk's estimate fails to take account of the fuel allocation plan that LERO will employ

' during an evacuation. That plan calls for fuel trucks to be dispersed at 7 locations within or just outside the EPZ (OPIP 3.6.3, p. 46b). Each fuel truck will have a fuel capacity of at least 1250 gallons and will dispense 3 gal-lons to each vehicle seeking fuel. Thus, 400 cars can be serviced by each fuel truck -- a larger number of cars than Mr. Polk's uncorrected estimate assumes will run out l

of gasoline in the entire EPZ.

l l

[

l l

/

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I

ROADWAY CAPACITIES (Vehicles / hour)

PRC Report KLD PRC (November Roadway Analyses y Analyses 1982) y North County Road 425 1280 1200 Route 25A/347 1275 1280 1500 Route 25 845 1280 1500 (Middle Country Road)

Long Island Expressway 4590 4560 5400 Sunrise Highway 3060 3040 3300 (arterial) 3600 (expressway)

If The reported capacity is the lowest capacity of a link on the indicated roadway that appears in Table IV to Appendix A to the LILCO Transition Plan.

2f " Preliminary Evacuation Time Estimates for the Shoreham EPZ," PRC Voorhees, p. 6 (November 1982).

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INTERSECTION TIME HISTORIES FROM ANALYSIS OF A SUMMER EVACUATION PRESENTED IN THE POLK TESTIMONY t

s LLEGEND:

A - Veh'icles : arriving at the designated intersection on the specified leg (reduced by a factor of 10).

Q - Vehicles queuing on the specified leg (reduced by a factor of 10). ,

D - Vehicles departing the designated intersection (reduced by a factor of 10).

- Designates the intersection of a major evacuation route or subroute that is at, or is the first beyond, the EPZ boundary.

- - Designates intersections on the Sunrise Highway where traffic from within the EPZ enters that evacuation route. (Intersections ', 8 and 9 lie

. just outside the EPZ boundary. Intersection 7 receives evacuating traffic only from Subregion 6 (i.e., from outside the EPZ)).

s t -

- .. y THROUGHPUT AT IN0lCATED INTERSECTION - SUDOGER - JERICHO TURNPIKE Intersection 1: Too * -Intersection 2: Setauket Intersection 3: Head of Ha rbor Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4. Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 . Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1- Log 2 . Leg 4 Leg 3 Tlee A O A Q A Q D A 0 A Q A O D A Q A Q A Q D

\

1:15 0 0- 30 0 0 0 25 25 0 7 0 10 0 32 32 0 2 0 7 0 32 1:30 0 0 92 5 0 0 25 25 6 20 2 32 2 32 32 7 7 0 ~ 21 2. 32 1:45 0 0 149 72 0 0 25 25 18 33 13 52 24 32 32 22 11 3 35 11 32 2:00 0 0 131 196 0'O 25 25 31 29 36- 46 66 32 32 40 10 8 31 35 32 2:15 0 0 64 302 0 0 25 25 44 14 55 23 102 32 32 58 5 10 15 55 32

.2:30 0 0 18 341 0 0 25 25 57 4 59 6 115 32 32 76 1 8 4 59 32 2:45 0 0 3 334 0 0 25 25 70 1 53 1 111 32 32 92 0 5 1 51 32 3:00 0 0 0 312 O O 25 25 63 0 44 0 102 32 32 107 0 2 0 39 32 3:15 0 0 0 287 0 0 25 25 96 0 34 0 92 32 32 122 0 1 0 25 32 3:30 0 0 0 262 O O 25 25 109 0 24- 0 82 32 32 136 0 0 0 11 32 3:45 0 0 0 237 0 0 25, 25 121 0 15 0 72 32 32 144 0 0 0 3 32 4:00 0 0 0 212 0 0 25 25 132 0 8 0 61 32 32 141 0 0 0 0 32 4:15 0 0- 0 187 0 0 25 25 141 0. 4 0 49 32 32= 147 0 0 0 0 32 4:30 0 0 0 162 0 0 25 25 149 0 2 0 36 32 32 147 0 0 0 0 32 1 4:45 0 0 0 137 0'O 25 25' 157 0 1 0- 22 32 32 147 0 0 0 0 32 l 5:00 0 0 0 112 0 0 25 25 163 0 0 0 9 32 32 147 0 0 0- 0 32 l l

6:00 0 0 0 12 OO 12 12 144 0 0 0 0 32 32 147 0 0 0 0 32 7:00 0 28 0 0- 0 0 28 28 147 0 0 0 0 32 8:00 0 47 0 0 0 0 32 9:00 10:00 11:00 l 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 ,

18:00 M

Page 2 THROUGHPUT AT IN0lCATED INTERSECTION - SupWER - JERICHO TURNPIKE Intersection 4: Villace or Branch Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4- Leg 3 Time A 0 A O A Q D 1:1s s

1:30 32 0 45 0 45 0 64 1:45 32 15 72 21 72 21 64 2:00 32 31 64 69 64 69 64 2:15

32 47 31 109 31 109 64 2:30 32 63 9 116 9 116 64 101 64 1 2:45 32 79 1 101 1 l 3:00 32 95 0 78 0 78 64 64 J 3:15 32 111 0 54 0 54 '

3:30 32 127 0 30 0 30 64 3:45 32 137 0 9 0 9 50 4:00' 32 137 0 0 0 0 32 4:15 32 137 0 0 0 0 32 ,

4:30 32 137 0 0 0 0 32 4:45 32 137 0 0 0 0 32 5:00 32 137 0 0 0 0 37 6:00 32 137 0 0 0 0 32 7:00 32 137 0 0 0 0 32 8:00 32 137 .0 0 0 0 32 9:00 0 56 0 0 0 0 32 10:00 1's:00 12:00 l 13:00 ,

14:00 l

l 15:00 l 16:00 17:00 ,

18:00

THROUGHPUT AT INDICATED INTERSECTION.- SUtetER - ROUTE 25 INTO 347 Intersection 1: Top Intersection 2: Co ram-Yaoha nk* Intersection 3r Route 83 Area Leg I Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4. Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Time A O A Q A Q D A 0 A Q A Q D A C A Q A O O_

1:15 . .

39 0 18 0 19 0 64 ~

1:30 0 0 106 0 0'O 50 50 0 16 0 0 0 64 64 6 55 3 60 3 64 1:45 0 0 170 56 0 0 50 50 2 26 0 0 0 64 64 48 89 38 98 41 64 2:00 0 0 151 176 0 0 50 50 9 23 5 0 0 64 64 91 79 106 86 118 64 2:15 0 0 74 277 0 0 50 50 14 11 9 0 0 64 64 134 38 164 42 183 64 2:30 0 0 21 301 0 0 50 50 15 3 5 0 0 64 64 177 11 181 12 204 64 2:45 0 0 3 272 0 0 50 50 8 1 1 0 0 60 60 220 2 171 2 195 64 3:00 0 0 0 225 0 0 50 50 259 0 152 0 176 64 3:15 0 0 0 175 0 0 50 50 288 0 131 0 155 64 1 3:30 *0 0 0 125 0 0 50 50 317 0 110 0 134 64 !

3:45 0 0 0 75 0 0 50 50 346 0 89 0 113 64 4:00 0 0 0 25 0 0 25 25 375 0 68 0 92 64 4:15 0 379 0 47 0 71 6h 4:30 0 356 0 30 0 48 u 4:45 0 327 0 16 0 26 64 5:00 0 288 0 6 0 10 64 6:00 0 48 0 0 0 0 48 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 .

11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 l 15:00 l

i 16:00 17:00 18:00

/

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. ~ . . .

Page 2 THROUGHPUT AT INDICATED INTERSECTION - SUMMER - ROUTE 25 INTO 347 latersection 4: Route 97 Area

. Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Time A Q A 0 A Q D 1:15 64 0 . 38 .0 32 0 64 .

20 '100

-~

1:30 64 33 -117 17 64 1:45 64 76 188 116 161 96 64 2:00 64 119 166 283 142 236 64 2:15 64 162 81 428 70 357 64 2:30 64 205 23 488 20. 406 64 2:45 64 248 4 490 3 405 64, 3:00 64 291 0 473 0 387 64 3:15 64 334 0 452 0 366 64 3:30 64 377 0 431 0 345 64 3:45 64 420 0 410 0 324 64 4:00 64 463 0 389 0 303 64 4: 15 64 506 0 368 0 282 64 4:30 64 549 0 347 0 .261 64 4:45 64 592 -0 326 0 240 64 5:00 64 635 0 305 0 219 64 6:00 48 807 0 221 0 135 64 7:00 0 771- 0 137 0 51. 64 8:00 0 665 0 32 0 6 64 9:00 0 446 0 0 0 0 64 10:00 0 190 0 0 0 0 64 11:00 12:00.

13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 l 17:00 18:00 t

1 1

.- 1 . . . . .

t-THROUGHPUT AT. INDICATED INTERSECTION - SufGER - ROUTE 347 Intersection 1: Too Jntersection 2: Ca na l a nd R t. 112* Inter. 3: Old Town Road Area Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg -1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Lg 3 Time A 0 A 0 A Q D A Q A 'O A O O A O A O A Q ~ D 1:15 0 0 44 0 0 0- 32 - . 50 0 6 0 14 0 64 1:30 0 0 138 12 O O 32 32 0 25 0 30 0 64 64 4 18 1 '43 1 64 1:45 0 0 223 118 0 0 32 32 8 40 7- 49 8 64 64 36 29- 9 69- 22- 64 2:00 0 0 196 309 0 0 32 32 22 35 26 43 32 64 64 75 25 23 61 66 64 2:15 0 0 96 473 0-0 32 32 33 17 40 21 53 64 64 118 12 27 -29 106 64 2:30 0 0 27 537 'O O 32 32 45 5 37 6 51- 64 64 156 4 27 9 110 64 2:45 0 0 4 532 0 0 32 32 52 1 26 1. 35 64 64 194- 1 19 1 93 64 3:00 0 0 0 504 0 0 32 32 52 0 13 0 18 64 64 230 0 11 0 66 64 3:15 0 0 0 472 0 0 32 32 41 0 4 0 6 64 64 265 0 6 0 37 64 3:30 0 0 0 440 .0 0 32 ~32 18 0 1 0 1 52 52 291 0' 2- 0 15 64 3:45 0 0 0 408 0 0 32 32 292 0 0 0 3 64 4:00 0 0 0 376 0 0 32 32 263 0 0 0 0 64 4:15 0 0 0 .344 0 0 32- 32 231 0 0 0 0 64 4:30 0 0 0 312 0 0 32 32 199 0 0 'O O 64 4:45 0 0 0 286 0 0 32 32 167 0 0 0 0 64 5:00 '-

0 0 0 248 0 0 32 32 135 0 0 0 0 64 6:00 0 0 0 120 0 0 32 32 7 0 0 0 0 39 7:00 I 8:00 l

9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00

! 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 i 18:00 99:00

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THROUGHPUT AT IN01CATED INTERSECTION - SUMMER - NORTH WILLIAM FLOYD PARMWAY-Intersection 2: Route 25 Intersection 3: Lonewood into Floyd Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Time A 0 A Q A 0 D A 0 A O A Q D 1:15 . -

1:30 21 0 74 0 25 0. 64 64 0 14 0 12 0 '64 1:45 34 4 120 48 40 4 64 64 18 23 4 19 8 64 2:00 30 14 106 148 35 24 64 64 46 20 12 17 10 64 2:15 15 18 52 235 17 40 (1 64 77 10 15 8 13 64 2:30 4 11 15 266 5 36 64 64 104 3 10 2 9 64 2:45 1 3 2 255 1 15 52 52 121 0 4 0 3 64 3:00 0 0 0 225 0 0 32 32 115 0 0 0 0 64 3:15 0 0 0 193 0 0 32 32 83 0 0 0 0 64 3:30 0 0 'O 161 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 64 l 3:45 0 0 0 129 0 0 32 32 19 0 0 0 0 51 .l 4:00 0 0 0 97 0 0 32 l 4:15 0 0 0 65 0 0 32 4:30 0 0 0 33 0 0 32 l 4:45 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00

( 11:00 1

l 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 l

16:00 17:00 18:00

THROUGHPUT AT IN0lCATED INTENGECTION - SUMMER - LONG ISLAND EXPRESSWAY intersection 2: Exit 71 intersection 4: Exit 68 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Intersection 5: Exit 66 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 .

Time A Q A 0 A Q D A Q A Q A 0 D A Q A Q A O D 1:15 24 0 47 0 7 0 63 63 0 35 0 0 0 95 1:30 73 0 146 15 9 0 114 114 0 108 3 0 0 114 '~l 1:45 39 0 40 0 8 0 79 109 0 236 129 9 0 114 114 25 174 86 0 0 114 2:00 35 0 35 8 7 0 74 101 26 208 341 9 2 114 114 50 153 235 0 0 114 2:15 17 0 17 11 3 0 48 62 44 102 526 9 3 114 114 75 75 363 0 0 114 2:30 14 25 29 604 9 3 83 83 100 21 413 0 0 114 2:45 1 0 5 601 9 0 42 42 94 3 409 0 0 114 3:00 0 0 0 574 9 0 41 41 47 0 387 0 0 114 3:15 0 0 0 542 9 0 41 41 4 0 357 0 0 77 3:30 0 0 0 510 9 0 41 41 0 0 325 0 0 73 3:45 0 0 0 478 7 0 39 39 0 0 29? OO 71 4:00 0 0 0 446 4 0 36 36 0 0 261 0 0 68 4:15 0 0 0 414 4 0 36 36 0 0 229 0 0 58 4:30 0 0 0 382 4 0 36 36 0 0. 197 0 0 68 4:45 0 0 0 350 0 0 32 32 0 0 165 0 0 64 5:00 0 0 0 318 0 0 32 32 0 0 133' O O 64 6:00 0 0 0 190 0 0 32 32 0 0 5 0 0 37 7:00 0 0 0 62 0 0 32 ,

8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 1

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THROUGHPUT.AT INDICATED INTERSECTION - SUMMER - SUNRISE HIGHWAY Intersection 1: East Hampton Intersection 2: Shelter Island Inter. 3: S.Hamoton into Sunrise Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1- Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Time A O A Q A O D A O A O A Q D A O A Q A Q D 1:15 0'O 72 0 0 0 32 32 0 3 0 0-0 32 32 0 29 0 0 0 32 1:30 0 0 223 40 0 0 32 32 3 10 0 0 0 32 32 14 91 15 0 0 32 .

1:45 0 0 359 231 0 0 32 32 11 15 2 0 0 32 32 28 147 92 0 0 32 2:00 0 0 317 558 0 0 32 32 22 14 6 0 0 32 32 42 130 225 0 0 32 2:15 0 0 155 843 0 0 32 32 34 7 8 0 0 32 32 56 64 341 0 0 32 2:30 00 44 966 0 0 32 32 44 '2 5 00 32 32 70 18 391 0 0 32 l 2:45 0 0 7. 978 0 0 32 32 50 0 1 0 0 32 32 84 3 395 0 0 32 3:00 0 0 0 953 0 0 32- 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 98 0 384 0 0 32 3:15 0 0 0 921 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 112 0 370 0 0 32 3:30 0 0 0 890 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 126 0 356 0 0 32 3:45 0 0 0 858 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 140 0 342 0 0 32 4:00 0 0 0 826 0 0 3? 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 154 0 328 0 0 32 4:15 0 0 0 794 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 168 0 314 0 D 32 l

4:30 0 0 0 762 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 182 e 300 0 0 32 4:45 0 0 0 730 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 196 0 286 0 0 32 0 698 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 210 0 272 0 0 32 5:00 0 0 6:00 0 0 0 570 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 266 0 216 0 0 32 7:00 0 0 0 442 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 322 0 160 0 0 32 8:00 0 0 0 314 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 378 0 104 0 0 32 9:00 0 0 0 186 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 434 0 48 0 0 32 10:00 0 0 0 58 0 0 32 32 51 0 0 0 0 32 32 480 0 2 0 0 32 11:00 0 463 0 0 0 0 32 12:00 0 335 0 0 0 0 32 13:00 0 207 0 0 0 0 32 0 79 0 0 0 0 32 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 .

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Page 2 THROUGHPUT AT INDICATED INTERSECTION - SUMMER - SUNRISE HIGHWAY Intersection 4: Exit 65 Intersection 5: Exit 64 Intersection 6: Exit 63 i

Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg i Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 A 0 A Q D 0 Q A Q D A 0 A Q A 0 0 A 0 Time A A 0 17 0 76 76 0 -10 0 0 0 76 76 0 32 0 0 0 76 1:15 32 0 53 0 0 76 2 164 23 54 76 76 9 31- 1 0 0 76 76 23 99 9 ..

1:30 32 1 .

9 0 0 76 76 46 159 85 0 0 76 1:45 32 8 265 162 87- 30 76 76 32 51 234 404 77 94 76 76 55 45 37 0 0 76 76 69 141 221 0 0 76 2:00 32 11 76 76 92 69 339 0 0 76 2:15 32 12 114 615 38 148 76 76 78. 22 59 0 0 33 706 11 163 76 76 101 6 58 0 0 76 76 115 20 385 0 0 76 2:30 32 13 0 0 76 76 138 3 382 0 0 76 2:45 32 14 5 717 2 152 76 76 124 1 41 0 700 0 132 76 76 156 0 9 0 0 76 76 161 3 362 0 0 76 3:00 32 14 0 0 0 0 76 76 184 3 339 0 0 76 3:15 32 14 0 678 0 110 76 76 166 0 656 0 88 76 - 76 166 0 0 0 0 76 76 207 0 316 0 0 76 3:30 32 14 76 76 230 0 293 0 0 76 3:45 32 14 0 634 0 66 76 76 166 0 0 0 0 0 612 44 76 76 166 0 0 0 0 76 76 253 0 270 0 0 76 4:00 32 14 0.

0 0 0 76 76 276 0 247 0 0 76 4:15 32 14 0 590 0 22 76 76 166 0 0 566 0 5 76 76 166 0 0 0 0 76 76 299 0 224 0 0 76 4:30 32 11 76 76 322 0 20s 0 0 76 4:45 32 2 0 536 0 0 66 66 166 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 64 156 0 0 0 0 76 , 76 345 0 178 0 0 76 5:00 32 0 0 504 0 0 376 0 0 64 64 108 0 0 0 0 76 7,6 437 0 86 0 0 76 6:00 32 0 248 0 0 64 64 60 0 0 0 0 76 76 520 0 3 0 0 76 7:00 32 0 0 120 0 0 64 64 12 0 0 0 0 76 76 523 0 0 0 0 76 8:00 32 0 0 0 479 0 0 76 76 713 0 81 0 0 76 32 479 0 0 0 0 76 9:00 32 32 303 0 0 0 0 76 10:00 32 127 0 0 0 0 76 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 l

l t

v Page 3 TH9OUGHPUT AT INDICATED INTERSECTION - SUMMER - SUNRISE HIGHWAY e

Inter. 8:_ Wadine River Road ** Intersection 9: Wm. Floyd Pkv**

Intersection 7: Exit 61 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1-A Q 0 A Q A O A Q 0 A Q A 0 A O D Time A O A Q 0 48 0 0'O 76 76 0 3 0 0 0 76' 76 0 6 0 0 0 76 1:15 76 10 0 0 0 76 76 6 20 0 0 0 76 1:30 76 23 150 25 0 0 76 76 3 46 242 152 0 0 76 76 12 17 1 0 0 76 76 22 32 - 4. 0 0 76 1:45 76 76 27 15 3 0 0 76 76 45 28 .13 - 0 0 76 l 2:00 76 69 214 371 0 0 76 '

76 42 7 3 0 0 76 76 68 14 18 . 0 0 76 2:15 76 92 105 562 0 0 76 1- 0 0 76 76 91 4 9 0'O 76 2:30 76 115 30. 644 0 0 76 76 51 2 76 138 5 651 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 102 1 2 0 0 76 2:45 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 3:00 76 161 5 634 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 54_ 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 3:15 76 184 5 611 0 0 0 0 76 3:30 76 207 0 587 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76' 105 0 564 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 3:45 76 230 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 4:00 76 253 0 541 0 0 76 76 54 76 0 518 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 4:15 76 276 76 54 0, 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 .

4:30 76 200 0 495 0 0 76 0 472 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 4:45 76 322 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 5:0,0 76 345 0 449 0 0 76 0 357 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 00 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76

. 6:00 76 437 0 265 0 0 76 76 54 0' O OO 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 7:00 76 529 0 173 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 8:00 76 621 0 81 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 9:00 76 713 0 2 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 10:00 76 792 0 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 11:00 76 794 0 0 0 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 12:00 32 745 0 0 0 0 76 76 54. 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 13:00 32 569 0 0 0 0 76 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 14:00 32 393 0 0 0 0 16 76 54 0 0 0 0 76 76 105 0 0 0 0 76 15:00 0 168 0 23 0 0 0 0 23 16:00 17:00 18:00 ,

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Page 4 THROUGHPUT AT INDICATED INTERSECTION - SUMMER - SUNRISE HIGHWAY Rt. 101 Area - Intertersection 11: Rt. 97 Ases. Int 3rsection 12; Rt. 93 Area intersection 10: Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg i Leg 2 Leg 4 Leg 3 Leg I Leg 2 O A Q D A Q A O A Q D A Q A Q A Q D Time A 0 A 76 0 6 0 13 0 76 76 0 15 0 0 0 64 64 0 12 0 12 0 64 1:15 64 64 17 36 3 36 3 64 1:30 76 15 .18 1 39 3 76 . 76 24 47 3 0 0 .__.

76 49 29 8 63 19 76 76 64 75 22 0 0 64 64 52 58 21 58 21 64 1:45 66 65 0 0 64 64 95 51 58 51 58 64 2:00 76 92 25 21 56 55 76 76 108 12 27 27 85 76 76 152 32 99 0 0 64 64 138 25 88 25 88 64 2:15 76 137 64 64 181 7 92 7 92 64 2:30 76 181 4 22 8 85 76 76 .196 9 99 0 0 14 1 64 76 76 240 76 0 0 64 64 230 1 75 1 75 64 2:45 76 222 1 1 64 64 270 0 56 0 56 64 3:00 76 258 0 0 0 44 76 76 276 1 52 0 0 0 0 23 76 76 312 0 28 0 0 64 64 308 0 37 0 37 64 3:15 76 279 0 64 64 342 0 20 0 20 64 3:30 76 301 0 0 0 2 76 76 349 0 4 0 0 -

0 0 0 0 76 76 365 0 0 0 0 64 64 367 0 8 0 8 64 3:45 76 303 0 0 64 64 380 0 2 0 2 64 4:00 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 377 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 76 389 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0- 64 4:15 76 303 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 4:30 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 401 0 0 0 76 76 413 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 4:45 76 303 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 5:00 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 425 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 76 473 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 6;00 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 521 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 7:00 76 303 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 569 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 8:00 0 0 0 0 76 76 617 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 9:00 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 665 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 10:00 76 303 0 0 0 76 76 713 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 11:00 76 303 0 0 0 0 0 76 76 761 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 12:00 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 809 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 13:00 76 303 0 0 0 0 76 76 857 0 0 0 0 64 64 384 0 0 0 0 64 14:00 76 303 .

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1 INSTITUTE OF TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERS TRANSPORTATION AND, .

TRAFFIC ENGINEERING HANDBOOK SECOND EDITION Wolfgang S. Homburger Editor Louis E. Keefer and William R. McGrath Associate Editors s

PRENTICE-HALL, INC., Englewood Clifs, New Jersey 07632

.. 0,t

. , g [ h, lishment of load limits. Consideration must be given to the of street highway or with the operation of traffic thereon. g L availability of alternative routes, the condition of pavements A request for a revised speed limit, usually lower than the j; y and structures on those routes, the economic loss resulting limit posted, is sometimes the only immediate solution that g.

from additional travel distances, and other factors. the public can offer. Such requests often are based on the b, Many jurisdictions prohibit all trucks on streets desig- misconception that almost all motorists will automatically y; nated as " parkways" er " boulevards." Such restrictions are exceed the posted limit by 5 or 10 mph and that the only ?g generally based on the concept that large, heavy vehicles way to reduce speeds is to reduce the speed limit. Citizens, W-create excessive noise and interfere with the pleasure of acting as individuals or in groups, will frequently request .s driving on facilities that have been designed with special cmphasis on visual aspects of the readway and adjacent lower speed limits for their own neighborhood streets than they, as drivers, would consider reasonable in similar neigh-f(

lands. When such restrictions are adopted, provisions must borhoods elsewhere.

be made for parallel arterial street facilities which can be Public reaction to the imposition of speed limits varies.

used by all clrases of vehicles. In 1971, West Germany proposed the imposition of a 100-Restrictions on truck loadir.g and unloading curing peak km/h (62-mph) speed limit on two-lane rural roads where traffic hours are limited in use to a few large cities with previously no speed limit had been posted. 'Ihe purpose was significan1 congestion. When such restrictions are under to reduce West Germar.y's high accident rate. The general consideration, studies should be made to determine: public reaction was one of anger." In other instances, speed limits have been welcomed. In 1973, the United States

1. The number of truck loading and unloading operations adopted a national law requiring that no speed limit could which take place at various hours of the day in the area be in excess of 55 mph. This law has been controversial under study. and a high level of enforcement action has been initiated

2. The effect of such operations on street capacity, conges- in many states to obtain obedience to the limit.

tion, and accidents.

3. The operating hours of business firms and other facilities Accident frequency and severity as related to served by truck loading and unloading operations. speed. Various safety campaigns have attempted to per-

4. The impact of truck loading restrictions on the cost of suade motorists that speed is the cause of many accidents, operations of delivery firms. and that if speed can be controlled, accidents will be pre-vented or reduced. Although excessive speed is often listed Provision of off-street loading spaceror loading and un- in police accident reports as the cause or major contributing loading operations is a more desirable uethod of alleviating factor in accidents, the problem can be better described as street traffic problems related to trucNperations than special driving too fast for prevailing conditions.

traffic regulations. Statistics have generally shown that the imposition of When trucks are prohibited in certain areas, a " truck speed limits will lead to a reduction in the serious injury route" can be designated to guide commercial vehicles to rate in urban areas and in the overall accident rate on a the best route around such restrictions. Although such des- specific highway section.

ignations are not a traffic regulation, the installation of signs Figure 26.1, taken from a study made by the Federal identifying special routes for trucks should be done only Highway Administration, reveals some interesting findings after study to make certain that the routing is suitable for regarding accident involvement and speed on main rural safe usage by large commercial vehicles. highways, not including freeways. Accident-involvement rates are the highest at very low speeds, are lowest at about the average speeds, and increase again at very high speeds.

Speed regulations A principal conclusion is that the more a driver deviates from the average speed of traffic, the greater is his or her Speed regulations and speed limits are intended to sup- chance of being involved in an accident.

plement motorists' judgment in detennining speeds that are reasonable and proper for particular weather and roadway Effect of environment on speeds. Although much in-conditions. Speed limits are imposed in order to promote formation directed at the driver involves use of the term better traffic flow and reduce accidents. However, if drivers " safe speed," the term is relative and depends oi many do not consider speed regulations to be reasonable, the limits conditions and the situation involved. A safe speed in one will be disobeyed and lose much of their value. In recent location may not be safe in another, and a safe speed at a years, much public attention has been given to the use of specific time at one location may not be safe under other lower speed limits on highways designed for high-speed conditions at the same location.

driving as a means of conserving fuel.

Roadway type and condition. Higher speeds are rela-tively safer on roadways with high design standards-wide Factors affecting speed regulations lanes, absence of sharp curves, adequate sight distance, and clear roadsides--conditions such as exist on freeways. Av.

Public attitude. Transponation officials receive many erage speeds for various kinds of vehicles by highway type requests for establishing new speed regulations or for al-tering the value of existing limits. Such requests often reflect ,s sm.t -s em t_mi.i te cow. om, rna . oa si. im.

th: opinion that something is wrong with a particular section sec. l. A. p .1 Traffic Regulations 815

~

5 5** * * '** flow are not large, mean speeds being reduced only 5 to 8 -i

"#0 ' ' ' ' mph.'8 In extremely dense fogs, of course, traffic may be g j slowed to crawl speeds. Even heavy rain does not appear

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- us to have the same influence because sight distance is not greatly reduced.

so, coo -

\ Establishment of speed limits 9 t.5" E -

The Uniform Vehicle Code'* contains the following pro-y k ." * *"'" ' - vision:

5 V'. .. 1

'u ' . Whenever the tState Hightay Commission) shall detennine upon the basic -

gn 1 %: /[ of an engineenng and traffic invesugation that any maximum speed herein

- ca v 7lME

[)3 4g/ before set forth is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any

] "

loo (o j pan of the (State) highway system. said (Commission) may determine and declare a seasonable and safe maximum timit thereat, which shall be ef.

" fective when appropna:e si5ns giving notice thereof are erected.

i i

"to ao so ao so so o so ,

Travel sPEEo-MILES PER Hour Most jurisdictions use similar legislation to permit state or local officials to establish speed regulations at speci$c --

Figure 26.1. Involvement rate by travel speed. day and night, Sounca: D. Solornon. Accidents on Main Rural Highways Related locations. This is usuallY done on the basis of a traffic 3 engineering investigation, and the revision usually takes the ,.

to Speed. Driver. and Vehicle. U.S. Department of Commerce, '

Bweau of Public Roads. Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government fctm of modifying the basic speed limits set by law or Printmg Office.1964. p. f.

ordinance. The establishment of the regulations at specific locations is commonly termed speed zoning. g cre arc two basic types of speed controls: (1) regulatory in the United States are shown in Table 26-5. Roadway han se eUcet of law and am enbceaW, and ts q surface conditions are also a significant factor affecting safe (2) advisory maximum speed indications that are not en- g speed, especially surface characteristics that make one sur-forceable but warn motorists of suggested safe speeds for i gace more slippery than another when wet.

specific conditions at a specific location. _

Adjacent land use and access. Safe driving speeds are Regulatory controls. Speed regulations r.iay be class- g' also affected significantly by intersecting streets and drive- .

afled as (1) regulations estabhmed by legislative adhority ways. Speeds on urban streets tend to be much lower than 3 and gene + ally applicabic throughout the nation, state, or .

on rural highways because of houses, businesses, and other kinds of development and increased traffic friction.

urisdiction; and (2) zoned speed regulations for spe- ;

%, locations estaulished by administrative action ctfic on th m basis of engineering studies. ;

Weather conditions. Weather is also an important fac-There are two basically different types of numerical max. -

tot affecting safe speed. The most significant condition is .

tmum speed limits: (!) an absolute limit, and (2) a prima e the presence of snow and ice on the pavement. Rain and facie limit. An absolute speed limit is a limit above which fog appear to have less influence. Data obtained at selected it is unlawful t drive regardless of roadway conditions, the -

sites on Califomia freeways and expressways in both day ane" t of traffic, or other mfluencing factors. A pr.,,.afacic ,

and night conditions indicate that the effects of fog on traffic speed is a limit above which drivers are presumed to be 3 driving unlawfully but where, if charged with a violation, a Amage speeds d rm- cla and Pome Escuding VM they rriay contend that their speed was safe for conditions [

speed br Try..t mah y existing on the roadway at that time and, therefore, that 2 they are not guilty of a speed violation. Enforcement offi-Percent f vehicles Exceeding m,,,,y ^~Ye*hY An Cials prefer the absolute limit because it is much easier to sm tmphs ss mph 60 mph 63 .,ph prove guilt in a court of law.

19n 19741975 i,7319741975 im 19741975 im 19741975 Advisory controls. Advisory speed signs wam motor-awaiinienimie 65 o 57.6 57.6 39 65 6: 72 29 27 so , y ists of suggested safe speeds for specific conditions on a -

Rural Prtmary 57.I s3.s 54 6 58 do 47 36 14 17 19 4 s highway. Rey may be posted in the form of advisory speed secondary $ $ N$ N N N N N N N j 8 Pl ates generally used as a supplementary panel with a wam-crean imenra= 57.o 53. 34.7 si n . 33 to i3 m 3 ing sign. In some court jurisdictions, driving above the ;

Urbes Pnmary di.8 42.s =t6 13 10 Il s 3 3 2 I I r4=vv N. Nanonal Cooperanve Highway Research Project Report 95.

. Rural laterstate and Rural Pnmary Egh=ay Research Board. Washengton. D C. 1970, p. 3.

sotace: "Ramincations of the ss mph speed 1.imat."Instmne of Transpanauca '*Um/p'm Fr4 ale Code, rev.1968. Nanonal Commmee on tlniform Traf6c t ans

,;mgmoers.1977 and ordinances, p.156.

818 Transportation and Traffic Engineenng Handbook

I '

TAat.E 364 Casah Shams per Speed Eemss' Hish.ey Cemenisms (7tsee er Men a6mm as sessene Piehmicary Assengs Dissenes toeween Mosher of sesdude Esemasse et Musasus Leagik at Msames s Insensceses Egesis er amassess een No Isas Egesis er syned Enesuds Essend Damen Symed Essueds (per m) (spM tapM (as) (M No man. 30 -

0.2 No sun.

30 No ensa. 3e 0.2 No amis.

30 8 de 0.3 125 de 6 30 0.3 230 30 4 40 0.5 Ss0 de 1 10

- 80D0 10 Speed Chaussenumes (Two er Muss Most as sessandl Aumass Test aus Speed Masamme Pseposed Egesis er Enesses sysed IJams 896 pessmedis Speed. tJeuts of 14 mph Pass (mpM (apM tapM (supM

~~

17J N

- Under 223 Under 25 s 25 18-29 22.S 22.5-27.3 27.5 30 27 S 32 3 16-34 35 21-39 32.3 32537.5 37.5 40 37 S 42.5 36 44 45 31-49 42.5 42.5 873- 47.3 30 47S$23 3654 SS 41-59 32.S

$2S$7.5 37.S 40 37.S 42.3 4644 65 St-46 62.5 42.5 47.3 67.3 70 67.5 er euer seer SS

l ad.1.61 km; I R. 0.3*$ ad.

Sousca: ITE. Trupr Enreiserner Needbest. Premese Hell. Engisweed ChNs. NJ.,1965. Fig.14.2.

posted advisory speeds may be admitted as evidence that (4) Presence and conditidn of shoulders the driver was operating in a reckless manner. (5) Presence and width of median

3. Accident experience Speed Ibnit studies. The establishment of speed limits 4. Traffic characteristics and control must be based on proper engineenng and traffic data. Traffic a. Traffic volumes ofRcials are often called upon to testify in court cases re- b. Parking and loading vehicles garding speed limits and they must support their testimonies e. Commercial vehicles with data accumulated prior to the establishment of safe , d. Turn movements and control

e. Traffic signals and other traflic control devices that Speed limits. This information should be of sufficient quan-affect or are affected by vehicle speeds tity and of proper quality to justify the value of the speed

f. Vehicle-pedestrian conflicts limit.

lhe following factors should be considered, and appro-priate data gathered, in establishing speed limitations (see In the study of prevailing speeds, observations should be muh4 to those vehicles having at least from 6- to Table 26-6):

9-s headways from those ahead and m: king no apparent effort to overtake and pass them. The 85th percentile speed

1. Prevailing vehicle speeds

a. 85th percentile speed (the speed below which 85% as determined by speed studies is a principal factor to be used in the determination of proper speed limits. A graphical of motorists travel)

b. Average test run speeds presentation of speed data will usually show that the 85th

c. Speed distribution data percentile speed value is the point at which speed values become dispersed. Although collecting speed data is highly

2. Physical features satisfactory on streets and highways with moderate to heavy

a. Design speed volumes of traffic, it is difficult to do on low volume roads

b. Measurable physical features because of the time consumed in gathering the necessary (1) Maximum comfoitable speed on curves number of observations. In such cases, trial runs can serve (2) Spacing of intersections (3) Number of roadside businesses per mile as a satisfactory substitute.

e. Roadway surface characteristics and conditions (1) Slipperiness of pavement Signing for speed limits. Signing for speed limits should be consistent with the appropriate sections of the (2) Roughness of pavement (3) Presence of transverse dips and bumps latest edition of the Manual on Uniform Trajic Control Traffic Regulations 817

)

Devices (used in the United States) or its equivalent in other The merits of differential speed limits are subject to de- 5

, countries (see Chapter 23). bate. Proponents contend that reduced speed is desirable for Signs for speed limits are erected at varying intervals, larger vehicles because their operating characteristics (e.g., _

depending on highway type and general location. In urban stopping distance) are not as good as for passenger cars. 1 areas, speed limit signs are usually crected at intervals not Opponents, on the other hand, argue that a differential limit 3 creates variances in speeds and a h+zardous condition. Such =

exceeding 0.5 mi (0.8 km) if the speed limit is 40 mph (65 km/h) or less. On freeways and in rural areas, frequency variances in speed are apparently undesirable, as evidenced j of signing varies considerably, with intervals between signs by the results of studies by the Federal Highway Admin-usually ranging from I to 5 mi (1.6 to 8 km). istration (see Figure 26.2). j a

Speed limits for adverse weather conditions. Basic Determination of advisory speed indications traffic laws usually require drivers to adjust speed to existing g' road conditions. The primary responsibility for accommo-2 Two basically different methods are available for deter- dating to adverse weather conditions thus rests with the -

mining advisory speed limits on horizontal curves: (1) by driver. Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have found it de-trial speed runs with an instrument-equipped vehicle, or sirable, primarily for safety reasons, to reduce speed limits ]

(2) by offit'il calculation. Either method is satisfactory, but at specific locations during adverse weather conditions by =

field runs to check the office calculations are desirab!c in means of signs capable of displaying varicus messages. -

any event. Such practice is generally limited to freeways or express.

ways. j

'Ihe trial-speed-runs method involves using a vehicle .

equipped with a ball-bank indicator to show the combined -

effect of the body roll angle, the centrifugal force angle, Variable speed limits by lanes on freeways. In order to improve the quality and safety of traffic flow, the use of i and the superelevation angle. Safe speeds on curves are indicated by ball-bank readings of 14' for speeds below 20 different speed limits for various lanes of a highway has mph (32 km/h), of 12* for speeds between 20 and 35 mph been tried, principally on freeways or expressways. Where 1 (56 km/h), and of 10* for speeds of 35 mph (56 km/h) and used, the practice is to post the higher limits on lanes closer ]

higher. Also,10* is safe for 50 mph (80 km/h) and even to the median during peak traffic periods. One study reports '

60 naph (% km/h), but for higher speeds a smaller reading that using changeable speed limit signs during the off peak should be used.

a In using the office method for the determination of ad- j Ham 26.2. Accident invotnant rate h vanation 'mm man viscry speeds, t!.e appropriate speed to be indicated may speed on study units. Sounct: Romefications of the 55 mph Speed be calculated from formulas (19.5) or (19.6). Transposm.g Limir, committee 4M 2. Institute of Transponation Engmeers. ,

Arlington. Va.. March 1977. 5 to solve for the speed, these becomC V = Vl5 R (c + f) British units .

d 3 1 V = V127 R (c + f) metric units t"

where V = maximum speed in mph or km/h g t

e = superelevation rate in ft/ft or mim g ;

f = side friction factor _

~~

3 _ .

R = curve radius in feet or meters 4t -

i Safe speeds determined.by these methods may need to 1

be modified by other factors. For example, the safe-stopphg ,

sight distance around the curve may require a more restric- p j

tive speed than the curvature itself. In this case, it would i be advisable to post the advisory speed at the lesser speed .,

(see Chapter 19). p W( W-e. c gl2

~

== -s i

Special problems E

\ / " -

% ,1 Differential limits by kind of vehicle. Some jurisdie-tions have laws or follow the practice of posting different

\ "' ,

/ .

speed limits for different kinds of vehicles. Differentiallim-its are most common for (1) passenger cars, (2) trucks, and ,,,n /ss.

2 (3) buses. Some jurisdictions also post a reduced limit for towed vehicles, such as trailers, wrecked vehicles, or race _

.. m .=

cars. Differential limits are more likely to occur on at-grade . ., ,,. .. .

rural highways than on freeways and urban streets. -vamanan mou e snzo. en-818 Transportation and Traffic Engineenng Handbook

s

,.- o LILCO, Jcnuary 16, 1984

- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Ogg{[0 In the Matter of .g4 jag 18 N058 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham. Nuclear Docket Power Station, No. 50-322-OL-3 Unit 1)gsECf,tg.7

(;FFICE f

- gynce I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S MOTION TO ADMIT SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, JOHN A.

WEISMANTLE AND EDWARD B. LIEBERMAN ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLAN-NING CONTENTIONS 23'.D AND 65 FOR GOOD CAUSE and SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW C. CORDARO, JOHN A. WEISMANTLE AND EDWARD B. LIEBERMAN ON BEHALF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON PHASE II EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS 23.D AND 65 have been served this-date upon all of the following by first-class mail, post-age prepaid, or by-hand (as indicated by one asterisk.), or by Faderal-Express (as indicated by two asterisk).

James A. Laurenson,* Secretary of the Commission Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and' Licensing Commission

-Board .

Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

~

Commission Atomic Safety and Licencing East-West Tower, Rm.- 402A Appeal Board Panel 4350; East-West Hwy. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Bethesda, MD 20814 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline*

Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission' Commission East-West Tower, Rm. 427 Washington, D.C. 20555 4350' East-West Hwy.

Bethesda, MD -20814 Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.*

David A. Repka, Esq.

Mr. Frederick-J. Shon*

Edwin J. Reis, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 7735 Old Georgetown Road commission (to mailroom)

East-West Tower, Rm. 430 Bethesda, MD 20814 4350-East-West Hwy.

Bethesda, MD 20814

_ l

Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.* Stewart M. Glass, Esq.** ;

Attorney. Regional Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Federal Emergency Management Board Panel Agency j U. S. Nuclear' Regulatory 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349 l Commission New York, New York 10278 East-West Tower, North Tower 4350 East-West Highway Stephen B. Latham, Esq.**

Bethesda, MD 20814 Twomey, Latham & Shea 33 West Second Street David J. Gilmartin, Esq. P.O. Box 398 Attn: Patricia A. Dempsey, Esq. Riverhead, New York 11901 County Attorney Suffolk County Department Ralph Shapiro, Esq.**

of Law Cammer & Shapiro, P.C.

Veterans Memorial Highway 9 East 40th Street Hauppauge, New York 11787 New York, New York 10016 Herbert H. Brown, Esq.* James Dougherty, Esq.*

Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq. 3045 Porter Street Christopher McMurray, Esq. Washington, D.C. 20008 Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill Christopher & Phillips Howard L. Blau 8th Floor. 217 Newbridge Road 1900 M Street, N.W. Hicksville, New York 11801 Washington, D.C. 20036 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.

Mr. Marc W. Goldsmith New York State -

Energy Research Group Department of Public Service 4001 Totten Pond Road Three Empire State Plaza Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Albany, New York 12223 MHB Technical Associates Spence W. Perry, Esq.**

1723 Hamilton' Avenue Associate General Counsel Suite K Federal Emergency Management San Jose, California 95123 Agency 500 C Street, S.W.

Mr. Jay Dunkleberger . Room 840 New York State Energy Office Washington, D.C. 20472 Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Ms. Nora Bredes

! Albany, New York 12223 Executive Coordinator Shoreham opponents' Coalition 195 East Main Street

~

Smithtown, New York 11787

/

, - - - - _~_ -, , _ , - - _ - -

. S Gerald C. Crotty, Esq. Ben Wiles, Esq.

Counsel to the Governor Assistant Counsel to the '

Executive Chamber Governor State Capitol Executive Chamber Albany, New York 12224 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 e -r Donald P. Irwin Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: January 16, 1984

(

9 4

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ML20079F691

Text

SUMMARY

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