ML20087P088
| ML20087P088 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1984 |
| From: | Baxter T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| ALAB-729, ALAB-744, NUDOCS 8404060031 | |
| Download: ML20087P088 (45) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '84 /PR -5 A10:33 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OC'!fTf U$$h r cRANCH BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of )
)
METROFOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289
) (Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
LICENSEE'S REPLY BRIEF ON REVIEW OF ALAB-729 AND ALAB-744 SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE George F. Trowbridge, P.C.
Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
David R. Lewis Counsel for Licensee April 3, 1984 4
8404060031 840403 PDR ADOCK 05000289 Q PDR 3 So}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of )
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289
) (Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
LICENSEE'S REPLY BRIEF ON REVIEW OF ALAB-729 AND ALAB-744 SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE George F. Trowbridge, P.C.
Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
David R. Lewis Counsel for Licensee April 3, 1984 h--- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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, TABLE OF 60NTENTS
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................i11 c
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I. .-INTRODUCTION............................................ 1 ~4 r r II. ISSUE NO. 1: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION S OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT................................. 2 (T W
A. The UCS Brief...................................... 2 g G:
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- 1. UCS Misstates' the Environmental ;
Qualification Issue........................... 2 {
- 2. UCS Erroneously , Asserts 'that b Compliance with' Environmental @
Qualification Standards and Interim Operation ar'e Matters Which Cannot b- =
be Delegated to the Staff.....................lO _.
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- 3. The Boards and.the Commission Have Not Abdicated Responsibility.................. 13 h.-
~ .. n B. The Staff's Brief........'......................... 15 C -;
C. Conclusion..............y......................... 17 w g--
III. ISSUE NO. 2: EMERGENCY FEEDWATER $
SYSTEM RELIABILITY..................................... 17 {
e A. UCS Has Not Shown that the Appeal Board K Erred in its Treatment of~the Licensing ?-
Board's Quantitative _ Analysis of EFW F System Reliability................................ 18 y
,g B. '
UCS Does Not Challenge the Findings that the EFW System Meets Safety-Grade $
. Design Criteria................................... 23 Z C. Other-Issues on Decay Heat, Removal -3 Cap' ability are outside the Matters L_
Specified for Review.............................. 24 ;
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w Page IV. ISSUE NO. 3: PORV USAGE DURING LOW TEMPERATURE OPERATION AND INADEQUATE CORE COOLING CONDITIONS................................ 26 A. Application of the Nexus Standard................. 26 B. Criteria to be Applied in Determining Whether the PORV Should be Safety Grade........... 27 C. Low Temperature Operations........................ 28 D. Inadequate Core Cooling Conditions................ 30 E. Conclusion........................................ 32 V. ISSUE NO. 4: SYSTEMS INTERACTION...................... 32
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VI. ISSUE NO. 5: MAIN STEAM LINE RUPTURE DETECT I ON SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 VII. CONCLUSION..................*........................... 38
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page I. Cases:
Bellotti v. NRC, No. 82-1932, slip op. (D.C.
Cir. September 23, 1983)............................... 12 Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-73-38, 6 A.E.C. 1082'(1973)................ 14 Metropolitan Edison Company, et al. (Three Mile; Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1)
Comdission Order and Notice of Hearing, CLI-79-8, 10 N.R.C. 141 (1979)................. 3,11,37,38 Licensing Board First Special Prehearing Conference Order, LBP-79-34, 10 N.R.C.
828 (1979)............................................ 3,4 Commission Order, CLI-81-3, 13 N.R.C. 291 (1981)........ ......................................... 33 Licensing Boarc Partial Initial Decision (Procedural Background and Management Issues), LBP-81-32, 14'N.R.C. 381 (1981)................ 3 Licensing Board Partial Initial Decision (Plant Design and Procedures, Unit Separation, and Emergency Planning Issues), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211 (1981)............................... passim Commission Order, CLI-82-32, 16 N.R.C.
.1243-(1982)............................................ 11 Appeal Board Decision (Environmental Issues), ALAB-705, 16 N.R.C. 1733 (1982)................ 3 Commission order, CLI-83-5, 17 N.R.C. 331 (1983)................................................. 24
~ Appeal Board Decision-(Design Issues),
ALAB-729, 17 N.R.C. 814 (1983), request for reconsideration denied, ALAB-744, 18 N.R.C.
743_(1983).......................................... passim
-iii-
Page Commission Order, CLI-84-3, 19 N.R.C.
(March 28, 1984)............................... 3,4,11,16, 24,26,35,39 Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-80-21, 11 N.R.C. 707 (1980)........... 5,6,7,8,9,14,16 Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-746, 18 N.R.C. 749 (1983)...................................... 22 Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978)........................... 12 II. Statutes:
Administrative Procedure Acts 5 U.S.C. $ 554(d)...................................... 12
- l. 5 U.S.C. s 558(c)...................................... 14 i .
III. Regulations:
10 C.F.R. 5 2.202(f)........................................ 14 10 C.F.R. $ 2.206........................................... 24 10 C.F.R. $ 2 . 714 ( b ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 , 10 10 C.F.R. 6 50.2(u)......................................... 31 i
110 C.F.R. 5 50.49............................................ 9 IV. Miscellaneous:
49' Fed.' Reg. 8422 (March 7, 1984) Policy Statement on Environmental Qualification............ 10,13
- _iv.
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April 3, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of )
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289
) (Restart)
(Three_ Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
LICENSEE'S REPLY BRIEF ON REVIEW OF ALAB-729 and ALAB-744 I. INTRODUCTION By Order dated January 27, 1984, the Commission identified for review five issues relating to Metropolitan Edison Company, at al. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1),
ALAB-729, 17 N.R.C. 814 (1983), request for reconsideration o
denied, ALAB-744, 18 N.R.C. 743 (1983). The Commission's Order f provided for the simultaneous filing-of initial and reply briefs on these issues. Initial briefs were subsequently filed by Licensee, the NRC Staff,-and intervenor Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).1/
f 1/ Licensee's'Brief on Review of ALAB-729 and ALAB-744 (March 19, 1984) (hereinafter Licensee's Brief); NRC Stsff's BriefE
.Concerning the Commission's Review of Specific Danign Issues in L
~ALAB-729 (March 19, 1984) (hereinafter Staff's Brief); and Union of Concerned Scientists' Brief on the Commission's Review of ALAB-729 (March 19, 1984) (hereinafter UCS Brief).
s_.
II . . ISSUE NO. 1: ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT A. The UCS Brief 3
In its brief, UCS does not address the environmental qual-ification issue that was litigated in the restart proceeding;
-instead, UCS defines an issue -- Licensee's compliance with GDC 4 -- that not only was not raised in the proceeding, but clso is beyond the scope of the proceeding. Having defined an issue not raised in the restart proceeding, UCS declares itself the winner by default. UCS then attacks the Licensing and Ap-peal Boards' decisions by applying them out of context, and it occuses the Licensing Board, Appeal Board, and (prospectively) the Commission of being unfair. Finai.y, UCS attacks as a vio-lation of due process the certification procedure established by the Commission.
- 1. UCS Misstates the~ Environmental Qualification Issue.
UCS' arguments on brief of this issue. rely on a misper-ception of the matter that was litigated in the restart pro-ceeding. The gravamen of.UCS' complaint is that "[njo party cven attempted to show that TMI-l meets GDC 4 or that all safe- ,
ty equipmentLis environmentally qualified."
UCS Brief at 2.
See id. at 6-7. UCS posits that in order to avoid this demon-stration, "both the Licensing and Appeal Boards have sought refuge in the Commission's generic pronouncements on environ-mental qualification." Id. at 3. However, it is manifest that no such demonstration was called for in this proceeding.
I .
UCS fails to perceive -- or perhaps refuses to acknowledge
-- the limits that the Commission placed on the scope of the restart proceeding and hence on the Licensing Board's jurisdic-
. tion. In its Order establishing the restart proceeding, J Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 4
Unit No.l1), CLI-79-8, 10'N.R.C. 141, 148 (1979), the Commis-sion defined as the subjects of the proceeding the necessity Land su'fficiency of short and long term actions; and the Licens- -
t ing-Board ruledLthat the scope of the restart proceeding is
. governed by the' Commission's Order'and Notice of. Hearing and contentions having a reasonable nexus to the TMI-2 accident.
i " Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Stationi
. Unit No. 1), LBP-79-34, 10 N.R.C. 828, 830-32 (1979);
l~ Metropolitan Edison Company.(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,
- Unit No. 1),'LBP-81-32, 14-N.R.C. 381, 394 (1981). See also
- Metropolitan Edison Company-(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, 2
. Unit.No. 1),-CLI-84-3, 19 N.R.C. , ' slip op. at 3-5 (March 28,'1984); Metropolitan Edison Company, et al. (Three Mile 1Is-l ' land' Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-705, 16 N.R.C. 1733, 1743l(1982). 'The scope of the environmental qualification l' .issuezthatLwas_ considered by the Licensing Board must be' deter-
.. mined.in~this context.
The environmental qualification contention that.wasforigi-i, nally proposed-in this proceeding-(UCS Contention 12); raised-three particular issues relating:to-the adequacy of-
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l then-existing criteria for and methods of qualifying equipment (implicitly in light of the TMI-2 accident). That contention also contained a generalized assertion that TMI-1 should not be permitted to resume operation until "all safety-related equip-ment has been demonstrated to be qualified to operate as re-quired by GDC 4."2/ By making this assertion, UCS was quite clearly advancing programmatic environmental qualification as an additional short-term action whose completion was necessary for restart.3/ Given the scope of the proceeding, however, the Licensing Board's role was to determine, based on the TMI-2 accident, 1) whether stricter environmental qualification stan-dards were necessary, and if so, 2) what those standards should be and 3) whether compliance with stricter standards should be required as a long-term action or as a short-term action.
2/ The Licensing Board ruled that the contention was "too broad in that its reference to GDC-4 would extend to struc-tures, systems, and components without further limitation."
The Board therefore limited the contention to " equipment impor-tant to safety in the containment and auxiliary building."
LBP-79-34, supra, 10 N.R.C. at 837 (1979).
3/ The contention attacked the sufficiency of the environ-mental qualification program as a whole, and not the sufficien-cy of the qualification of particular pieces of equipment.
(Pressurizer level instrumentation is the only equipment cited.) If the UCS contention had not been programmatic in scope, it equally clearly would have been rejected for failing l the specificity requirement of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(b). Moreover,
- a. contention that sought to-litigate the environmental qualifi-cation of each and every piece of equipment important to safety in the containment and auxiliary-buildings would clearly have failed the nexus requirement. See CLI-84-3, supra, 19 N.R.C.
at , slip op.,at 7 n.5, 10 n.9 (March 28, 1984).
4 I
This approach was exactly that taken by the Licensing Board. When UCS abandoned its contention, the Licensing Board adopted part of the contention and inquired 1) whether the TMI-2 accident demonstrated that some equipment may have been exposed to environmental stresses beyond that for which they were qualified, 2) whether qualification of items grandfathered by Regulatory Guide 1.89 was necessary for restart, and 3) what were appropriate environmental qualification standards. See Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1396 (1981). See also Tr. 2289, 2381-84.
It was this programmatic inquiry that was litigated in the restart proceeding, and it was this inquiry that was, to a con-siderable extent, overtaken by the Commission's " generic pro-nouncements."' In light of the nexus requirement, Licensee presented considerable evidence concerning the equipment quali-fication implications of the TMI-2 accident, the corrective ac-tion taken as a result (to protect equipment against submer-gence), and the IE Bulletin 79-OlB program and Licensee's progress under it.4/. See Licensee's Brief at 6-9. The l
4/ . Licensee's witness'Braulke testified that Licensee had cubmitted the master list of equipment called for by IE Bulle-
. tin 79-OlB, that he-estimated that 95 percent of the items were documented, and that Licensee was making good progress in com-plying with CLI-80-21. In its brief, UCS asserts that this testimony was false, and points to the Franklin Research Center TER on TMI-1, dated November 5, 1982. UCS Brief at 3 n.1.
However, as UCS is aware, the deficiencies identified in the (Continued Next Page)
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Licensing Board's decision relied on this testimony.
LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1402 (1981). With respect to submergence, the Licensing Board determined two short-term ac-tions to be completed and certified prior to restart. Id. at 1407. In addition, the Licensing Board imposed six restart conditions based on the Staff's review of equipment qualifica-tion for-main feedwater transients and small-break loss-of-coolant accidents. Id. at 1404.
With respect to radiation intensity, the Licensing Board found that its concerns had been resolved by the Commission de-cision .cn1 Petition-for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-80-21, 11 N.R.C. 707 (1980). In particular, the Commis-sion's guidance in CLI-80-21 and the DOR guidelines subsumed a' TMI-2 type accident. Accordingly, the Licensing Board was presented with appropriate qualification standards and found "no basis to treat TMI-1 differentl'y." LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1403 (1981). The Licensing Board also recognized that some items would not be qualified (i.e., demonstrated to be qualified) in accordance with CLI-80-21 prior to restart; (Continued) l .
. .TER were.predominantly based on uncertainty by Franklin Re-i search Center as to whether Licensee had adequate documentation to demonstrate the. qualification of the identified equipment (although Franklin had not requested documentation). Meetings were subsequently held to addrera these concerns. No equipment at TMI-1 was (or is) classified ' , the NRC in category II.b,
" Equipment Not Qualifie3,"
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however, in the absence of reason to treat TMI-1 differently from other operating reactors, the Licensing Board rejected, as a necessary short-term action, demonstrated compliance with the
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substantive criteria of CLI-80-21 in advance of the Commission deadline. The Licensing Board found that the June 30, 1982 deadline in CLI-80-21 was a " reasonable time for compliance" and made a finding of reasonable progress. Id.
The Appeal Board's affirmation was equally consistent with the scope of the proceeding. The Appeal Board held that "[a]ll issues of environmental qualification as litigated in this case are fully embraced within the determinations announced by the Commission in CLI-80-21 and the ensuing rulemaking." ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 893 (1983) (emphasis added). Later the Ap-peal Board elaborated on its deci'si'on and stated:
[W]e rejected UCS' earlier claim that the Licensing Board was obligated to decide in-dependently of Commission determinations whether TMI-1 can be operated safely while environmental qualification is undertaken.
(We nonetheless approved a Licensing Board conclusion that there is.no basis for-treating TMI differently than other op-erating. reactors. . .).
ALAB-744,. supra, 18 N.R.C. at 744 (1983).
In summary, the Licensing and Appeal Boards considered ev-idence on the TMI-2 accident and found that the substantive criteria for environmental qualification of safety-related
. electrical equipment had been established generically by the Commission and were appropriate for TMI-1. In addition, the t
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Boards found that demonstrated compliance with these substan-tive criteria in advance of the Commission's generic schedule was not a necessary short-term action (i.e. need not be accom-plished prior to restart). In making this last finding, the Boards properly relied on evidence demonstrating that the TMI-2 accident implications did not necessitate treating TMI-1 dif-ferently from other operating reactors in this respect. Actu-al,. demonstrated, and completed compliance with the-substantive environmental qualification criteria was simply never a matter i
to be. proven in the restart proceeding.
UCS argues that the Licensing and Appeal Boards misapplied l
the Commission's generic pronouncements. UCS Brief at 3. Ac-cording to UCS,.the Boards improperly substituted a generic, industry-wide safety finding to resolve a plant specific
' issue 5/ and ignored the Commission's charge that the June 30, 1982 deadline "do[es) not excuse a licensee from the obligation to modify or replace inadequate equipment promptly." Id. at 3-6. In fact, no one has excused Licensee from this obliga-
. tion, and Licensee has replaced unqualified equipment at TMI-1.
As discussed above, UCS' argument is inapposite, because no plant specific demonstration of compliance with the 5/ UCS is wrong when it asserts that at the time of issuance of CLI-80-21, "[t]he Commission had not a shred of evidence be-fore it on~the status of safety equipment in TMI-1." See UCS Brief at 4. .In fact, substantial information on TMI-1 had been
. filed by Licensee with the NRC under IE Bulletin 79-01B.
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substantive provisions of CLI-80-21 was required in this pro-I ceeding. In view of the issues actually litigated and decided, the~ Boards' decisions are not inconsistent with a licensee's
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obligation to modify or replace equipment promptly. In fact, the very existence of this obligation, coupleu with the Staff's interim revicw and responsibility to make a technical judgment f regarding continued opera. tion, supports the decision that dem-
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onstrated compliance with~CLI-80-21 (or 10 C.F.R. 5 50.49) is l not,a necessary short-term, action, since it belies the necessi-r
( ty for immediate action. Similarly, the Commission's generic I
faafety; finding and interim procedures are inconsistent with UCS' unqualified legal assertion that all equipment must be !
L : demonstrated to be qualified prior to restart. Furthermore, the Commission's generic safety finding was not used by the
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Boards to authorize and justify operation of-TMI-l prior to demonstrated environmental qualification. Operation prior to demonstrated environnental qualification continues to depend on the Staff's-review'and technical judgment, which is to be (and has been).made outside of the restart proceeding.
r Licensee also submits that-even if UCS' contention had not
[been; programmatic.in scope, UCS would'still have-no grounds to object to the Boards'Lrulings.. The Commission's recent policy 1 statement. suggests that to dispute the Staff's technical judg . ;
ment, a petitioner.in a 2.206 proceeding must present.informa-l tion-revealing specific qualification deficiencies.which would i
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.preventLa plant 'from going to and maintaining a safe shutdown condition in the event of a design basis accident. Statement of Policy on Environmental Qualification, 49 Fed. Reg. 8422,
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18426 (1984). To the extent such judgment may be litigated in, proceedings other than a 2.206 proceeding, the same threshold I chowing should be required. Moreover, 10 C.F.R. $ 2.714(b) re-quires-specificity'in contentions. If.UCS had wished to liti-gate th'e qualification of individual pieces of equipment, it should not have abandoned its contention and should instead
- have alleged. specific deficiencies.6/
- 2. UCS Erroneously Asserts that. Compliance j with Environmental Qualification Standards j- and Interim Operation are Matters ~which Cannot be-Delegated'to the-Staff.
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.In itslbrief, UCSl argues:
Both the questions of 1)~whether. specific equipment is' qualified and 2) if not, whether-operation can nonetheless safely be
- permitted are fundamental matters in dis-
,- , pute raised by_the_ contention. ,Their reso-
~1ution perforceJcannot:be delegated'to the l,'
Staff-and the mechanism for their.resolu-
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-tion,1 assuming it is other than a finding
- that.the record ~does not support restart, must provide UCS a. fair. opportunity to g . present' evidence and question witnesses l presented by.the other side. -
.6/ The only alleged environmental' qualification deficiency to l which UCS = refers ir) fits brief' related (presumably) to the abil-
!' -ity :of the emergency feedwater system to withstand a high ener-
! .g y line. break or, main steam line break'in the auxiliary build-L Jing. -This matter is; clearly beyond the scopetof the restart l
l proceeding because it lacks any nexus to the TMI-2 accident, j~ .cnd;it has now.been. raised by:UCS.in a 2.206 petition.
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-i UCS'Brief at 8. )
'Again,-whether all safety-related equipment is qualified
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and1whether. operation can nonetheless safely be permitted were Edefinitely not issues in this proceeding. The Boards consid-
~ored only whether the implications of the TM1-2 accident neces-sitated imposing some environmental qualification requirement
- beyond those requirements already established by the Commis-i cion. While the. Licensing Board imposed some restart condi- l tions, the Boards found that no further short-term action was necessary. However, even if the Boards had determined that
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some additional environmental qualification requirement was
.necessary as'a short-term action, compliance with that require-ment would still not have been a matter to be litigated.
The Licensing Board was not authorized to determine com-pletion of required actions. This function was delegated-to the Director of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to be determined outside of-the-litigation. .CLI-79-8, supra, 10 N.R.C. at 148; Metropolitan Edison Company.(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.il),.CLI-82-32,[16 N.R.C. 1243 (1982).
. -UCS' persistent: refusal to acknowledge the scope of-this
- j. proceeding /and the matters to be decided.by the Staff outside ,
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oof the^ proceeding suggests thattit believes it has a right to
. litigate.-every issue conceivably 1 relevant to the operation of L
'TMI-1.7/..In' direct.. contradiction to the.UCS viewpoint is the f
e p 7/. Compare CLI-84-3,' supra, 19 N.R.C.
, slip op. at 9
.(March 28,.1984).
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D.C. Circuit's Eecent opinion, Bellotti v. NRC, No. 82-1932, slip op. (D.C. Cir. September 23, 1983). In that opinion, the D.C. Circuit held that the Commission has the authority to de-fine the scope of an enforcement proceeding. The Commission may reserve issues for decision by the Staff outside of the ad-judication. In Bellotti, the court found that the Commission's
' decision limiting the scope of an enforcement proceeding was made pursuant to a rational policy " directing agency. resources -
toward the inspection rather than the adjudication." Id. at S.
For the same reason, UCS' attack on the certification pro-cedures misses the mark. UCS cites Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), for the propo-sition that "a decision must be made on the ' basis of the record after fair opportunity for exploration of the facts by the parties.'" UCS Brief at 7. That case does not foreclose an agency from considering facts not in the record to decide a collateral matter that was reserved for decision by its staff.
n UCS also cites several inapplicable cases on separation of
" functions'. UCS Brief at 8. Again, this doctrine does not pre-vent a staff member who participated in a proceeding from ad-visinganagency_onmattersreservedforthestaff'sdecIsion
.outside of the proceeding.g/
g/- UCS'also cites 5 U.S.C. 5 554(d). Section 5(c) of the Ad-ministrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. S 554(d) (1982), entitled
- Separation of Functions, only prohibits consultation on a " fact in issue" unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to (Continued Next Page)
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- 3. The Boards and the Commission Have Not Abdicated Responsibility. i A persistent theme throughout the UCS brief on the envi-ronmental qualification issue is that the Boards and the Com-mission are shirking their duty. UCS describes the procedural posture.of this issue as "the muddle of buck-passing that has characterized the NRC's tortuous evasion of the question posed by UCS" and as a "shell game," and implies that "the Commission may avoid grappling with.the substance of the serious safety
.and policy questions presented by manipulating the scope of the hearing to exclude them." UCS Brief at 1, 6. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Far from. abdicating. responsibility, the Commission has
' adopted new and more. stringent environmental qualification standards and has set about implementing those standards. See Statement of Policy on Environmental Qualification, 49 Fed.
-Reg. 8422, 8425 (1984). The Commission established precise procedures.for evaluating interim operation. In CLI-80-21, the Commission directed the' Staff to make a technical judgment regarding continued operation in cases where existing
.(Continued) participate; it specifically. exempts the members comprising the agency from its proscriptions; .and it applies only to adjudica-
.tions required by statute to be on the record. .
documentation raised questions about the ability of equipment to perform its intended function. This judgment was to be made publicly available, and the Commission provided that:
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. . . If any interested person reviews the staff's written judgment on qualification and desires a hearing, that person may pe-tition the Commission pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.202 and 10 C.F.R. 2.206.
CLI-80-21, supra, 11 N.R.C. at 715 (1980).
. The Commission also established the restart proceeding to address specific issues arising from the TMI-2 accident. But the scope of the restart proceeding was limited, and certain i
j matters were reserved for decision by the Staff. The Commis-l 1
- sion surely did not intend the restart proceeding, which was initiated in'1979 with an expected duration of one year, to be
- a. forum for assessing TMI-1 compliance with the overall equip-ment qualification program which arose prior to the TMI-2 acci-dent. Clearly, the Commission never intended the Licensing Board'to replicate the Staff's review program or to usurp its 7
delegated' responsibility. The restart proceeding followed the
- summary suspension of the TMI-1 license,9/ and a limited i
l 9/- The. Administrative Procedure Act provides a licensee a
, - right.of notice and opportunity to achieve compliance prior to
- license suspension, but a temporary immediately-effective sus-
_ pension may-be ordered if the public health, safety, or inter-est so. dictates. .5 U.S.C. 5 558(c); 10 C.F.R. 2.202(f). The
. Commission has stressed that. summary administrative action is a "drasticLprocedure." Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, l- Units?1 and 2), CLI-73-38, _ 6 A.E.C. 1082, 1083 (1973).
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proceeding with a well-defined, focused scope was essential.
Nevertheless, UCS has ignored both the scope of the restart proceeding and the appropriate 2.206 forum for challenging spe- }77, ,
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cific environmental qualification deficiencies, and now accuses ..l.. %:
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the Commission of being unfair. 'YSAC -
Rg:R .~ ;*s.4: '
. ' qs .a B. The Staff's Brief K%
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Licensee agrees with the Staff's conclusion as to the cor- I ' _J*$. .
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rectness of the Licensing and Appeal Boards' decisions. See M.. .C - 4 '
W --n Staff's Brief at 3-9. Licensee disagrees, however, with the jM; C -
Staff's statement of what the proper scope of the contention is D yd 4p.~f p .ry q if the issue of environmental qualification has not been re- ?).
- f .
- Q moved from the proceeding. 9. v. _ -
. .n The Staff states that the issue is: 4z;3 ' ..m.<
. :4 4 Whether the safety-related electrical 9 ?r-equipment at TMI-1 must bs environmentally %
qualified in accordance with the require- k.s.tl p.cyk. .-
ments of 10 C.F.R. S 50.49 prior to restart, and if so, whether such equipment >N is qualified or, if qualification in accor-dance with those requirements is.not com- ,f(['N,d r, ,.,; ; r plete for certain equipment prior to p :..c;.'
restart, whether Licensee has provided an b' Sc.?
adequate justification to permit operation '
of TMI-1 until the qualification of such %;.3 .R ;
certain equipment is complete. The equip- WWa ment covered by this issue is the equipment - :w.q
. defined by 10 C.F.R. S 50.49 to be within jwPi4; the scope of that rule. The standards d's (qualification criteria) which the equip-ment must meet in order to be found envi-TC[
ronmentally qualified are, as allowed by 10 % g, fpbe;"
C.F.R. S 50.49, either the DOR Guidelines lk;f;;
or NUREG-0588. 1, .','
$y '
., , *'v. ,'qA
,. n A>. .
n.r .
_ _ E
Staff Brief at 9. In support of this formulation, the Staff adds, "there appears to be no valid reason why the proper scope of the contention should be any broader than the scope of the
~
generic rule resulting from CLI-80-21." Id. at 10.
While Licensee agrees that the scope could be no broader, we submit that it cannot be so broad. In its struggle with the Commission's hypothetical question, the Staff appears to disre-gard the scope of the restart proceeding. The contention was properly limited to the containment and auxiliary buildings,10/
and any contention must be specific and have a reasonable nexus to the TMI-2 accident. As discussed above, the restart pro-ceeding was a proceeding of limited scope to address expedi-tiously the necessity and sufficiency of certain actions relating to the TMI-2 accident. The proceeding was not de-signed to be a forum to relitigate the TMI-1 operating license, or the overall safety of TMI-1. CLI-84-3, supra, 19 N.R.C. at
, slip op. at 9 (March 28, 1984).
10/ The Licensing Board also indicated, when it raised its Board questions, that it was not particularly interested in the auxiliary building. Tr. 2382.
16-
C. Conclusion In essence, a fairly specific issue was raised and liti-gated -- whether the implications of the TMI-2 accident neces-sitated some environmental qualification measures in excess of those normally required by the Commission. The Commission's requirements, however, were modified and improved during the proceeding, and, as augmented by the restart conditions im-posed, the changes eliminated the Licensing Board's concerns. gj;wem Accordingly, based on the new environmental qualification stan- gf.: -i .:1
.. :t.
dards and the evidence regarding the implications of the TMI-2 4 -).~ t
. .; ? . ;
accident, the Licensing Board found no basis to impose addi- /Tfd E l yk tional measures. The Appeal Board correctly affirmed this de- ? "' 'g ;
.re K: .....i termination. 1. ,- ?t ?.f
.Y III. ISSUE NO. 2: EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ~ WQh\
SYSTEM RELIABILITY %s N.(
th ~p:
5 94 Licensee will not repeat here the thorough recitation of 4 f$;.v? 1'4-the evidentiary record provided in its initial brief. J..d[$.
n, .-
ws. ..
The UCS brief on Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System +3 f p ..-T -
reliability mischaracterizes that evidentiary 9):
M**. .,
R i record,11/ fails to rehabilitate the Licensing Board's 3 ,7 ;. g.
C,%ll.
8aA.'ig .c. e ,
11/ For example, in its opening argument on the importance of ib28i the EFW system, UCS quotes extensively from a memorandum writ- J.h.$ $E. '
ten by AEOD staff. UCS states that it offered this document g N.'. ?'
into evidence in the Appeal Board's reopened hearings on decay 4 . i*: . .: -
heat removal, but that the objections of Licensee and the Staff IQTO were sustained. UCS Brief at 10 n.7. First, UCS did not offer $e...s f.04.
(Continued Next Page) t$ .<
- ,.e, .s.-
iy . ..
E '
f 4
~
quantitative reliability analysis, does not challenge the ;
finding of the Licensing and Appeal Boa _Js 4: ,
that the EFW system is safety grade for events within
~~
i
~
the scope of this proceeding, and ventures outside of the matters specified by the Commission for review. !
3 A. UCS Has Not Shown That the Appeal Board YY i'OU -
Erred in its Treatment of the Licensing Board's E APf3 P Quantitative Analysis of EFW System Reliability. $?I [ .* .'~
..,..p..
~ j IM."71 The Commission set for review the question of whether the ; ,'f.;.: q r.. ..
Appeal Board erred in its treatment of the Licensing Board's q(-. :.g_ , - _p quantitative analysis of the reliability of the EFW system at ^e QC
.V[h}.,-t }e TMI-1. Commission Order at 2 (Jan. 27, 1984). The Appeal :. c-4 6 Ni-ty Board rejected that analysis, a conclusion UCS characterizes as 1,5;[, g4,y' n,. .; c ::-
unjustified. See UCS Brief at 18. Nevertheless, UCS also at- 4 *~'
tacks the Licensing Board's analysis: .V
'Y N.#1 . -y[.;c As the Appeal Board observed, the Licensing Board hiQ.
. 4 g7-4%g
_61%
multiplied the following two values to obtain its estimate of M?{;je a m__._ -
the failure probability per demand of the EFW system: (1) the Staff's estimate of failure probability of the system (as (Continued) the document into evidence. Second, the Appeal Board sustained objections to UCS use of the document in cross-examination of Staff witness Ornstein because the witness was there to testify on feed and bleed cooling and the memorandum, on its face, was an AEOD analysis of EFW pump arrangement at the Ft. Calhoun facility. See R. Tr. 766-770.
$ Q 'i...
. -:. ,_ 3 .; ; .y.. y y ,3
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. ; , _;.f. k (.l_
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1METEC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ^ -
BEFORE THE COMMISS0bN FR -5 NO 33
, g ;;.. cF __ s t +
In the Matter of ) i)CCs.LllMG i SEP'!E BRANCH
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289
) (Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Reply Brief on Review of ALAB-729 and ALAB-744" and " Notice of Appearance" of David R. Lewis were served this 3rd day of April, 1984, by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, upon the parties on the attached Service List.
Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
.r
E __
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY CDMISSION -
BENRE THE CDNISSICN L
In the Matter of ) ~
)
ht;ndGJTAN EDISCN CCHPANY )
Docket No. 50-289 -
) (Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit No. 1) )
^
h SERVICE LIST Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Washington, D.C.
20555 Board q U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccanission * '
Comnissioner Victor Gilinsky Washington, D.C. 20555 Z
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission .
Washington, D.C. 20555 Ivan W. Smith, Esquire _
Chainnan, Atcznic Safety and Licensing -
Ocmnissioner Thcznas M. Ibberts Board -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 .I Catunissioner James K. Asselstine Sheldon J. Wolfe, Alternate Chairman -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission ; -
Washington, D.C. 20555 Atcznic Safety and Licensing Board '-
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Ocnnissioner Frederick M. Bernthal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Catmission Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. -
Washington, D.C. 20555 _--
Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board .- '
Docketing and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D.C. 20555 office of the Secretary -
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccunission Washington, D.C. Richard J. Rawson, Esquire --
20555 Office of Executive Iegal Director _a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission I Gary J. Edles, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 Chairman, Atonic Safety and Licensing 7 Appeal Board John A. Ievin, Esquire 4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Assistant Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Pennsylvania Public Utility Ccmnission ~ -
P. O. Box 3265 Dr. John H. Buck Harrisburg, PA 17120 ?' :
Atcznic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Marjorie M. Aamodt
< i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission _2 Washington, D.C. 20555 R. D. 5 Coatesville, PA 19320 -_ .
Reik n;
~
Maxine Woelfling, Esquire Steven C. Sholly Assistant Counsel Union of Concerned Scientists Department of Environmental Resources 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., #1101 514 Executive House, P. O. Box 2357 Washington, D.C. 20036 Harrisburg, PA 17120 ANGRY /'IMI PIBC Ms. Iouise Bradford 1037 Maclay Street
'IMI ALERE Harrisburg, PA 17103 1011 Green Street Harrisburg, PA 17102 Chauncey Kepford Judith H. Johnsrud Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Harmon, Neiss & Jordan 433 Orlando Avenue 2001 S Street, N.W., Suite 430 State College, PA 16801 Washington, D.C. 20009 l
- - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - -- d
ultimately modified) in preventing steam generator dryout; and (2) a failure rate for the main feedwater system based upon ex-perience at fiv' B&W plants. ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 831
~
(1983). UCS now attacks the Staff estimate, on which the Li-censing Board relied, as generous to TMI-1, and argues that the failure rate is in fact higher than indicated by the Staff.M/
The Licensing Board, on the other hand, found the Staff's esti-mate to be conservative. LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1369 (1981).
The focus of this new attack on the Staff's estimate is the treatment given to diesel generator reliability. First, any error in the Staff's assumption on the availability of die-sel generators would be common to its EFW system reviews for other plants and thus would not alter the comparison of EFW systems among plants. See Tr. 16,971 (Curry). Second, it was not error for the Licensing Board to decline to take official notice of different failure rate data for diesel generators.
The UCS written motion requesting such relief was filed with ($$.h.f n, n the Licensing Board on May 20, 1981 -- after the witnesses on h.g2}D A M [.'
EFW reliability had been excused and the hearing on design %.A ;
bhy&-%
issues was nearly concluded.13/ The unfairness of amending the ; '(
]k:' Q /4 t
..> e, : c M/ UCS did not attack, on appeal, either the Staff's estimate or the Licensing Board's reliance upon it. See Union of Con-cerned Scientists' Brief on Exceptions to the Partial Initial
[M
/.5.-
d[-
- ~
Decision of December 14, 1981, at 103-110 (Exceptions 103-109),
April 14, 1982. Compare UCS Brief at 14 (also raising for the p!, , .f. '
first time purported Licensing Board error in denying an offi- 'q :J C cial notice request by UCS). h ';,af. f) 13/ Proposed findings of fact on EFW system reliability were }4. ' -
filed with the Licensing Board on June 12, 1981. Q.".%,
% .. ~
record by official notice at the last minute -- when over seven evidentiary hearing days, with attendant opportunity for all to _
confront the evidence, had been previously devoted to Board Question 6 -- is patently obvious.14/
UCS also attempts, in vain, to discredit the .
uncontroverted evidence, by witnesses for both Licensee and the Staff, showing that the Staff's estimates should not have been used in the manner in which the Licensing Board ultimately used them. The " failure" rates recited in the UCS Brief, and branded " intolerable," are.in fact no such thing. See UCS Brief at 12-14. The mission success criterion used by the Staff, to make its analysis consistent with those done for --
Westinghouse. plants, was avoidance of steam generator dryout. .
As the Appeal Board properly held, ". . . the failure of the EFW system to prevent steam generator dryout cannot be equated with a total failure of the EFW system to perform its func-ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 833 (1983) (footnote tion."
omitted).
14/ In addition, Licensee's objections were not general. Cf. -
UCS Brief at 15. The subject data do not represent facts or even actual failure rates. They are instead mathematical as-sessments of the future probability of failure made by the ,
authors of WASH-1400, who do not fully explain the source data on which their predictions are based. To the extent that the source data was based on nuclear' power plant experience, how- ggg -p ever, it would appear that the data included only a single year of operating reactor experience. Licensee's Response to UCS' Request to Take Official Notice, May 21, 1981. In any case, these were not the type of indisputable facts for which offi-cial notice may be appropriate.
. =k 3EE _
dE As the Appeal Board found, the five-minute success crite- ;-'
4' rion did not permit consideration of operator actions to 53 a
re-establish feedwater flow. Based upon the uncontroverted ev- l7-t~
~
idence, the Appeal Board found that improved operator proce-dures would result in improved actions and better EFW "E 1
reliability. Id. at 832-833. In addition, the operators have Ak
==
improved control room instrumentation to indicate the status of 5-the system. LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1362-63 (1981). -
Ignoring Licensee's testimony, UCS attacks a Staff witness' 7_
m.
testimony on this score as " sheer speculation" solely because he had not personally reviewed plant procedures and operator jg training. See UCS Brief at 16. It was not necessary for Mr. I-
.=
Wermeil to duplicate the reviews of other Staff members, which -
o-are well documented in the various Safety Evaluation Reports on jp 14 which he was entitled to rely.15/ The record shows that Mr. j$
Wermeil was intimately familiar with the equipment and proce- ][ .
dural improvements for EFW systems instituted by the NRC after hg
, '5 the TMI-2 accident. See Wermeil and Curry, ff. Tr. 16,718, at r
=-
1-30; Tr. 16,719 (Wermeil). While UCS employs specious grounds ;
4 to challenge this one Staff opinion, the record is clear that operational errors that might affect the functioning of the EFW =
system have been evaluated, and procedural changes, coupled t--
E
.5:
15/ See, e.g., Staff Ex. 1 at Cl-1 through Cl-12; C2-6, 7; 4 C8-34 through C8-40.
f d
2 7
7_
e.
. _ _ _ _ _ . O
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s ;;
w.. . . o
(; ? \ ; ~
F,J 'f' 1
with operator training, have been instituted to assure proper ,$,." ' . - fj
.. Q.".;p .
surveillance and operation of the system. Capodanno et al., ;j;..~ C "
.k ~ ,l .' -- .
ff. Tr. 5642, at 4; Wermeil et al., ff. Tr. 6035, at 3. ig ,1*(
UCS cites a 1979 B&W analysis of the TMI-l EFW system as M
evidence indicating that a different mission success criterion ; y: g -f./
q . ,, Q,<
ny ,, I ,, .
would not have resulted in great improvement to calculated EFW ; N ,., d.
'. -e reliability. This is so, according to UCS, because "in no case 4: . .; g P I.
v_v -
were the reliab.ility estimates as high as the best Westinghouse : W/::
%..m .' -
reliabilities."16/ -
UCS Brief at 17. In fact, that analysis, ty k3.e. .f while not intended to establish a numerical reliability for the 4-1).jf' .
- 46. . , ., . a-.-
TMI-1 EFW system, found that it fell in the mid-range of .M
- 5..fM:
>W Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering plants. Tr. 5948, @ f%. , -
4.- 3 i ~ t c; u 4 5984-85 (Capodanno);'Tr. 6157-59 (Wermeil). UCS fails to ob- -;; t rj p~ . .. 9 serve, however, that the B&W study addressed the EFW system as 'ps .g.f.? M_ , ~-
- n. . .-
it existed in mid-1979. Not only have substantial improvements
&g,j. .~ ;.
been made since that time, but subsequent analysis has shown .P 12 1,,Mjf%:
1 that only one electric driven EFW pump, not the two assumed f_,Q? n
.w . x_
then,.is needed for sEccessful heat removal. Wermeil and N -
p,"@.
ng e.;,,
Curry, ff. Tr. 16,719', at 38.
- .%y .r.
- . .;
Finally, UCS challenge's the Appeal Board's rejection of .
the EFW challenge rate assumed by the Licensing Board. UCS !/".
w _M , ;-
34,.ger 1_6/ It is not necessary, however, to have the best EFW system.
See Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear (io?? ;
- i.R Generating Station), ALAB-746, 18 N.R.C. 749, 753-54 (1983) fl 9 (auxiliary feedwater system of low to medium reliability com- '
pared to other plants). Kyt.c;lh
., 9 . -
+
. 6 .' % [-
. -)
as '
/
/
boldly states that "[t]here was no evidence introduced at all to indicate that TMI-1 would be significantly different within the uncertainty inherent in a quantitative analysis." UCS -_d Brief at 17. In fact, the evidence directly applicable to this _ ._ ,_ ,
. .q.: - -
plant shows that there have been no loss of main feedwater r
.i'y.i .?q.
events at TMI-1. ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 832 n.42 ,'I{d(9 e:-
(1983). ~. j.{ [ #
-O: :.,
ap , .'
B. UCS Does Not Challenge the Findings that the EFW System Meets Safety-Grade Design Criteria. [df.F. jfP dr n,. -: ' . ; :i
.(, ' g. .-
Leaving the quantitative analyses, Licensee, UCS and the jy.g]f.5f.
X ..
Staff, in their initial briefs, turn to the Commission's de-terministic design criteria.17/ The Licensing and Appeal Boards found that the TMI-1 EFW system at restart will be safe-ty grade for me.in feedwater transients and small-break loss-of-coolant accidents. LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1372; ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 831 (1983). These are the classes of events considered to have a reasonable nexus to the TMI-2 accident and to be, therefore, within the scope of this 17/ UCS implies that the Staff's quantitative assessment was the sole basis for its conclusion that the EFW system is suffi-ciently reliable for restart of TMI-1. See UCS Brief at 13.
In fact, the Staff performed and presented its analysis only in response to the requests of the Licensing Board. Tr. 16,740 (Curry). The Staff's conclusion is based upon its review and evaluation of the requirements and of Licensee's compliance with the requirements in terms of the resultant hardware, pro-cedural and technical specification changes. Wermeil and Curry, ff. Tr. 16,718, at 12.
-proceeding. See CLI-84-3, supra, 19 N.R.C. __, slip op. at 5 (March 28, 1984).
Licensee and the Staff have argued that these findings provide adequate support and rationale for concluding that'the TMI-1 EFW system is-reliable. Licensee's Brief at 43; Staff's Brief at 20. UCS simply ignores these findings by the Boarde Eend the' defined scope of the proceeding to argue the seismic qualificatio'n of the EFW system 1@/ and its environmental quali-fication for events outside the scope of this proceeding.19/
See;UCS Brief at 18-19. Consequently, UCS has conceded that, for: purposes of this proceeding,Lthe boards below correctly n
conclu'ded dbat the EFW system is safety-grade, which is the
~
standard UCS itself proposes.
~
C.i Other Issues on Decay Heat Removal Capability are Outside the Matters Specified for Review.
The Appeal ~ Board conducted a four-day reopened hearing on decay heat' removal and. devoted a considerable. portion of its decision to that-broad subject. The Appeal' Board's decision
! 1g/f UCS here expresslyLigbores'the Commission's previous hold-ingLthat the seismic qualification of the EFW system is outside the scopezof the restart proceeding. See Metropolitan, Edison
- Company,-~et al. (Three V?la Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-83-5, 17 F d.". 331 (1983).
c19/ UCS apparent?y ~fr' .izes that these issues are not cov-icred by the restart proe:,rding, since it has filed a petition
-geeking a1 separate show cause proceeding under 10 C.F.R. S 2.~206.'on'these very matters.
. t .
r?
A 6
1
,- e '
y
-Eddressed EFW' system' reliability and~ liquid natural circula-Stion,~ including use~of-the high-point vents, use of the pres- ,
.curizerl heaters'to. control reactor coolant system pressure, the
' boiler-condenser process, and feed-and-bleed l cooling.
JALAB-729, suora,'17-N.R.C. at 829-855 (1983). While UCS sought
! Commission review 2of a number of the Appeal Board's findings in
!this area,'the Commission took review only of the " specific
-issues.in ALAB-729" set forth in the: Commission's Order of
~
L -January 27,'1984.
- Consistently unable to address itself to the issues
'apecified.by presiding adjudicatory bodies, UCS leaves the
- ' question ~of EFW system reliability and wanders into a
' ~
[ simplistic-and distorted discussion of other decay heat removal
- issues , such as : feed-and-bleed cooli'ncj and the boiler-condenser
- process', ' UCS . Brief at ' 19- 23. '.These matters are not
- conceivably encompassed by the second issue specified in the
~
Commission's Order initiating and defining review. Consequent-- -
ly,,the Commission'should not= address these UCS arguments.2y l
c i
u F . . .
2O/c-License'e..andressed O these arguments before-the' Appeal" Board
, .'inuits ".'. .'Brief ontthe Reopened Hearing (Design Issues),"
~' '
udated: April 12, 1983.
[
l
- g. - -
,u ......._.,m , . - . - - - . . _ - - - - , , , . . _ . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . , - - , _ . . , -
IV. ISSUE NO. 3: PORV USAGE DURING LOW TEMPERATURE OPERATION AND INADEQUATE CORE COOLING CONDITIONS A. Application of the Nexus Standard UCS argues that the Appeal Board ruling that the subject uses-of the PORV are outside the scope of the proceeding is
" preposterous." UCS incorporates, by way of support, its August 30, 1983 response to the Commission's Order of August 5, 1983 on ALAB-724. UCS Brief at 24.
Licensee and the Staff questioned the Appeal Board's ruling on use of the PORV during inadequate core cooling condi-tions, but endorsed the Appeal Board's view that PORV usage during low temperature operation does not have a reasonable nexus to the TMI-2 accident. Licensee's Brief at 47 n.32; Staff's Brief'at 22-23, 25.
Since the initial briefs were filed, the Commission issued a Memor'andum and Order on-its review of ALAB-724. Addressing.
- UCS Contention 5, which concerned whether the PORV.should be safety-grade, dhe Commission. held _that in determining jurisdic-tion ~here the issue in each instance is whether the postulated
-scenariotinvolving potential PORV usage has a reasonable nexus to1the.TMI-2 accident. CLI-84-3, supra, 19 N.R.C. , slip op. at 11 (March 28,.1984). This holding by the Commission supports the positions taken by Licensee and the Staff on the subject Appeal: Board; rulings in ALAB-729.
i
~
, - . - - . . , . . - , ~ , ,
i .
'The holding.by the Appeal Board on use of the PORV during
. inadequate core cooling conditions represents harmless error,
'however, since the arguments and evidence presented were evalu-
'ated, as they were in the-case of low temperature operations.
-In both instances, the Licensing and Appeal Boards concluded that; potential use of the PORV during low temperature operation
- cnd inadequate core cooling conditions did not warrant upgrading the PORV to safety grade. LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1281-82 (1981); ALAB-729, 17 N.R.C. at 864-65 (1983).
.B. Criteria to be Applied in Determining
-Whether the PORV Should be Safety Grade UCS asserts-that the Appeal Board's resolution of the PORV
. issue. enshrines a. faulty standard for determining if a struc-ture, system or component should be required to meet gafety-grade design criteria.21/ -UCS Brief at 31. UCS calls the Appeal Board's position (which_ upheld the Leiensing Board)
L cn " extremely dangerous-precedent" "at odds with NRC rules."
Id.
In response to UCS' Contention 14, the Appeal Board en-
- dorsed the Licensing Board's-conclusion that "not all equipment
, that may play some safety role at a plant need meet 21/' The UCS -characterization of- the Appeal Board's standard, hawever, bears no' relationship to the standard actually ap-plied. . Compare.UCS Brief at 31 with'ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C.
.at 861-(1983).
t l
safety-grade criteria." ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 875
'(1983). Safety-grade structures, systems and components are those relied upon to meet critical safety functions, such as those identified in 10 C.F.R. Part 100. Id. In short, the PORV need not be safety-grade if it is not relied upon (i.e.,
required) to meet critical safety functions.
The Commission has not undertaken review of the Appeal Board's findings on system classification, which were applied to the PORV and other systems / components raised in more specif-
'ic UCS contentions.
2' C. Low Temperature Operations UCS employs reasoning by inference and incomplete hypo-theticals in an attempt to piece together an argument (the evi-
-dence'does not exist) that the PORV is required to perform a critical 1 safety function in the prevention of overpressurization during low. temperature operation. UCS never n
establishes that ". . .'under.some plant conditions, the only way:to limit overpressure is by use of the PORV."2_2/
UCS Brief
.at 26.
22/- In support of this statement, UCS cites the statement of its witness that;ifgthe1 operator cannot protect against the overpressurization,' then the PORV would be used. Tr. 9033 i(Pollard). . This.only supports Licensee's position, however, that the PORV is'merely a-back-up to' operator action.
UCS hypothesized, during cross-examination of Licensee witness Jones,-that the plant is in a cold shutdown condition without a bubble-in the pressurizer -- i.e., the primary system is solid. UCS never proved, however, that the plant would be operated " solid" while in a cold shutdown condition. In spite of repeated admonitions by Mr. Jones that he was not suffi-ciently-familiar with conditions under which the plant is al-lowed to operate in-a solid condition, Tr. 8977-79, UCS cites his testimony for the proposition that the operator does not have time to act if the primary system is solid. UCS Brief at
-26. What Mr. Jones actually_said is that the operator probably does not have 10 minutes in which to act. Tr. 8976 (Jones).
The matter was.not explored further and UCS failed to establish the validity of its scenario or the inadequacy of operator ac-tion. Certainly, there is no basis here to warrant a major structural modification of the PORV.23/
23/ In its brief, the Staff endorses the Licensing and Appeal Board. conclusions that the PORV serves as a back-up to operator ,
l cction=for mitigation of a low temperature overpressurization cvent. Staff, however,.Brief at 24 n.17. The Staff now pre-fers a different rationale in support of that conclusion.
While Licensee agrees with the merits of the Staff'.s new ratio-nale; based upon PTS analyses performed since the' hearing,_the
. Staff does:not show that the evidentiary record relied upon by the Boards is in error. See id. at 23-24.
l -
D. Inadequate Core Cooling Conditions Based upon its own interpretation of TMI-1 plant emergency 3
procedures, and not that of any witness, UCS argues that de-pressurization using the steam generators during inadequate core cooling conditions is not an independent method of de-pressurization from use of the PORV. UCS Brief at 28, 29.
While the procedures advise the operators to use the PORV to optimize' reactor coolant system pressure control,24/ this use is not required. In short, use of the PORV may be helpful, but
'it is not required and the steam generators can depressurize the system during inadequate core cooling conditions. See LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1282 (1981) (procedures have been. developed for. coping with inadequate core cooling condi-tions without dependence on the PORV); ALAB-729, supra, 17 L N . R . C .- at 865 (1983) (use of the PORV is not the only method cvailable to depressurize the primary system).
However, even if the PORV were assumed to be necessary -,
during some inadequate core cooling conditions, it need not be made safety-grade for this purpose since it is acceptable to use non-safety-grade systems and components to mitigate events beyond the design basis. The fact that the NRC has exercised 24/ .The newly installed high-point vents would also help to relieve steam. .See ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 838 n.74 (1983).
y m , , , . - --.,-# w
i prudence and. addressed events beyond the design basis for some purposes -- e.g., emergency response preparedness, operator training and procedures, post-accident in-plant shielding, in-ctrumentation to detect inadequate core cooling and high-point vents -- does not mean that all plant structures, systems and components must be redesigned and modified to meet an entirely new (and potentially unlimited) spectrum of accident sequences not previously considered credible for the purpose of de-termining the plant's design basis.25/ Cf. UCS Brief at 29-31.
The Licensing Board specifically inquired into the general question of the scope of the plant's design basis and, in a finding which UCS did not appeal, held that the Staff has dem-
'onstrated that its methods for determining which accident se-quences are credible for the purposes of determining the plant's. design basis are reasonable. LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1395 (1981).
! While it is prudent, in training and procedures, to pro-E vide the operator with the option of using any available equip-ment to mitigate inadequate core cooling conditions, including the PORV, this potential use in events beyond the plant design l
25/ See 10 C.F.R. 6 50.2(u) for the definition of " design bases." . According to'the Licensing Board: "The design basis Lis_the set of prescribed anticipated operational occurrences
~
end accidents used-to assess the way specific systems respond
-to upset conditions." LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1382 (1981).
w + r
-basis.does not warrant a requirement that the PORV be safety grade. -Licensee's Brief.at 46.
?
E. Conclusion The evidentiary record demonstrates that the PORV at TMI-1 need not~beisafety grade for-its potential use during low tem-perature operations and inadequate core cooling conditions. In.
addition,. Licensee notes that the pressurizer PORV and its block valve'are not designed to meet safety-grade design criteria at other operating pressurized water reactors. UCS
-acknowledges.that its Contention 5 applies generally to all PWRs, and its witness proposed that they all be shut down to accomplish the requisite design upgrade. Tr. 9050 (Pollard).
While-the generic nature of the-issue does not compel a partic-ular^ resolution,' Licensee merely notes here that there is noth-ing: unique'about the TMI-1 design which would warrant special Gnforcement action with' respect to the PORV.
V. ISSUE NO. 4: SYSTEMS INTERACTION. ,
The.UCSlBrief on the fourth issue on which the Commission i
L _ has<taken' review -- the adequacy of addressing the need for a i
L 1 systems interaction study for.TMI-1 in the long-term in the Staff's generic program -- centers almost exclusively on the' issue of-whether.non-safety systems or components are' required to be. upgraded to safety-grade. This issue was.the subject of'
- .-.:- -. . . . - ~ - - .. .. . - . -
L L
i UCS Contention 14nand, as discussed below, was addressed fully by both the Appeal Board and the Licensing Board.26/ See LBP-81-59, supra, 14 N.R.C. at 134-49 (1981);-ALAB-729, supra,
?
'17 N.R.C. at 877-881 (1983). UCS fails to address the factual
' basis--for:the Appeal Board decision: absent a determination of the need for and an approved Staff methodology for conducting systems' interaction studies, it would be premature, and poten-tially counterproductive, to require the performance of such a
- study at TMI-1. ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at 884 (1983). In denigrating the App 9al Board's finding of reasonable progress by the Staff in moving towards a resolution of the systems.in-e teraction issue (UCS Brief at 33), UCS also ignores the Staff's recent Task Action Plan for resolution of this generic
-unresolved safety' issue. See Licensee's Brief at 49-50. Nor-has'UCS even' intimated that any.special circumstances exist at TMI-1~which would make the Staff's geheric resolution or its justification.for continued operation of.other operating reac-
- torsninapplicable'to TMI-1. Cf. Metropolitan Edison Company, f'
ot al. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-3, 13'N.R.C. 291, 295-96 (1981).
'UCS' entire argument-that systems interaction has been in-
- 'cdequately addressed hinges upon.its perception that there
^26/ UCS did not petition:the Commission to review the Appeal Board's decision on this' contention, nor has the Commission
. opted'to review this subject-sua:sponte.
p_ -.-
k i'
-existLunspecified.non-safety-grade systems-which require
- upgrading to safety-grade,27/ and that the Staff has not per-formed-sufficient analysis _to identify these non-safety sys-tems. : UCS Brief at 33-36. This, of course, was the core issue
~ raised byjUCS in its Contention 1<4 which called for upgrading to safety-grade all systems and components which can either icause'or aggravate,'or.be used to mitigate, an accident. See LBP-81-59,. supra, 14 N.R.C. at 1340-41, 1347 (1981). The Li-censing: Board disagreed with this UCS assertion, concluding thati nonsafety(systems.which can directly or Lindirectly affect core _ reactivity and primary coolant. temperature, pressure, and flow need-inot_be upgraded-to meet. safety-grade criteria-
.except-if the' failure:or off-normal operation cof~the nonsafety' system by.itself-without failures of safety-grade systems will cause coreldegradation. .,
-Id.:at 1348: "Ehe Licensing _ Board also found:that a nonsafety
' system or= component which might be used for-accident mitigation
~
-need.not.be upgraded all-the way to_ safety-grade-(if, indeed, upgrading'is:.needediat all), but that incremental improvements
~
~
can.be made depending.on the varying degrees of importance to cafety. / I_d_ ~at-1349. -In reaching these findings', the Licens-ingfBoar'd.statedithat no evidence had-been-presented that there P ,
[ , '27/c In'i_ts discussion.of the-systems interaction' issue, the
[ ,. . Appeal Board rejected UCS'Eargumentithat-no steps had been.
! taken Eto . address ~ this - problem; . noting that. upgrades to the :PORV.
and EFWDsystem had been required byJthe_ Staff.as a direct re-l' cultiofLthe' lessons learned from:the TMI-2 accident. ALAB-729,
.cupra,--17 N.R.C..at 883'(1983).
l
- k. , I hi_ , , , , ..
cre " specific nonsafety systems at TMI-1 lurking and poised to cause, by themselves, core damage" and that it was " improbable" that.there were serious, but unidentified, existing systems in-teractions. . Ijd . at 1347.
UCS raised these same arguments on appeal. The Appeal Board'found no basis upon which.to upset the Licensing Board decision, further noting that "[w] hen directed by UCS to spe-cific nonsafety systems that were potential hazards, the [Li-censing) Board carefully examined the interaction of those sys-tems with the safety systems." ALAB-729, supra, 17 N.R.C. at .
'877 (1983) (footnote omitted).28/ The Appeal Board also re-jected UCS' claim that the Staff had not performed sufficient enalyses to determine the increased rqliability obtained by partial upgrades, stating that "the need for upgrading of par-ticular components . . . is addressed in great detail elsewhere in the rccord. In addition, the sufficiency of the long and short term restart requirements (including upgrading) was the I cubject-of Licensing Board Question 2." Id. at 878 (footnotes omitted). Thus, UCS' arguments on the issue cf upgrading
'non-safety-grade equipment were fully considered on the record.
. -UCS has raised no evidence, not previously considered, which
'28/' See also CLI-84-3, supra, 19 N.R.C. , slip op. at 10
- n. 9 (March 28, 1984), holding that UCS Contention 14 could not be used to litigate whether-each piece of equipment in the
~
plant needed to be safety-grade; i.e., 'only specific equipment having a nexus to the accident could be considered.
would require the performance of a systems interaction study of TMI-1-in order to identify additional non-safety systems that are required to be upgraded to safety-grade.29/
VI. ISSUE NO. 5: MAIN STEAM LINE RUPTURE DETECTION SYSTEM The Commission has taken review of whether the Licensing Board erred in delegating to the Staff the responsibility for approving Licensee's solution to the potential for isolation of all feedwater flow to both steam generators due to actuation of the main steam line rupture detection system (MSLRDS). The Staff's brief on-this issue takes the position that, while ap-proval of Licensee's proposal was properly delegated to the Staff, the Licensing Board may have improperly delegated to the Staff the responsibility for making a reasonable progress de-termination on this issue. See Staff Brief at 32-33. For the reasons set forth below, L'icensee disagrees with the Staff's interpretation.
The Commission's Order setting'out the scope and proce-dures to be followed.in the restart proceeding delineated the
' findings which would be required prior to a lifting of the 1
29/ .In this regard, Licensee would again point out that a PRA of TMI-1 is being undertaken. While we agree that a PRA and a systems interaction study are not synonymous, Licensee would note that'such reliability assessments have been shown to iden-tify the dominant contributors'to risk, which can then be modified as needed. See, e.g.,' Licensee's Brief at 40-42 (as
.to utility of EFW reliability assessment).
j l
immediately effect'ive shutdown order. CLI-79-8, 10 N.R.C. 141 (1979). While Licensee finds ambiguity in that Commission Order on the long-term actions for which the Licensing Board was to make a reasonable progress determination, the Board's
' delegation here should be sustained. There can be no other re-sult where the Licensing Board imposed (or recommended) a new long-term action.
The Board requirement regarding the MSLRDS problem was in-spired by oral testimony on a related issue and was not made known until the Partial Initial Decision was issued, at which time the Licensing-Board relinquished its jurisdiction on this issue. Consequently, Licensee had no opportunity to present evidence to support, and it would have been impossible for the Licensing Board to make, a reasonable progress determination.
The Commission's statements in CLI-79-8 cannot be read to sup-
_ port such a proposition.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should reject u
the Staff's position that the Licensing Board improperly dele-gated to the Staff the responsibility for making a reasonable progress finding on the MSLRDS issue. In any case, this issue is moot since the long-term action has already been implemented and the parties have addressed its merits. See Licensee's Brief at 57-58. ,
1 y- -
VII. CONCLUSION The design of the TMI-1 facility is not among the unique concerns for-TMI-1 identified by the Commission as additional to the concerns identified for other B&W reactors. See CLI-79-8, supra,.10 N.R.C.
. at 143-144 (1979). Nevertheless, in this enforcement proceeding an exhaustive evidentiary inquiry was undertaken into the adequacy of the plant design and proce-dures. The scope of that inquiry was-suggested by UCS and sub-sequently endorsed by.the Licensing Board, the Appeal Board and the Commission. In spite of every opportunity at trial and on appeal to make its case on the technical merits, UCS has not prevailed on the contentions it raised to challenge the suffi-ciency of the numerous short- and long-term actions proposed by.
the Staff.
It is against this background that UCS now complains that
. . . the Commission may-avoid grappling with the substance of the serious safety and policy questions presented by manipulating the scope of the hearing to exclude them." UCS Brief at 1. The attemot at manipulation, however, lies with
~UCS, which belatedly attempts to expand the scope of the pro-
-ceeding after it has lost on the merits of the issues.it pro- ,
. posed for adjudication. .
~
L:
n As the Commission recently stated:
E The' restart proceeding is an enforce-ment proceeding which is being held because of the TMI-2 accident. The purpose of this
=; . proceeding is not to litigate the overall I
safety of TMI-1, but rather to. resolve questions. arising from the accident.
CLI-84-3, supra, 19'N.R.C. , slip op. at 9 (March 28, 1984).
The proceeding has accomplished the purpose established by
'the Commission, and ALAB-729 (as well as ALAB-744).should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
- SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
- M -
- George.F. Trowbridge, P.C.
Thomas A. Baxter, P.C. -
David R. Lewis 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
_ (202) 822-1000 Counsel for Licensee o.
Dated: April 3, 1984~
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