ML20065H593

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Brief on Exceptions to ASLB 810827 & 820727 Partial Initial Decisions on Mgt Issues,Training & Integrity.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20065H593
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/30/1982
From: Aamodt M
AAMODTS
To:
NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8210050192
Download: ML20065H593 (36)
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00CNETED USNRC

'82 OCT -4 AiO:i2 4 UNITED STA'IES OF ATRICA 0FFICE OF SECi%T? ~,

NUCLEAR REULATORY CQHISSION C:.CMU{fgEhn. '.

BEFCRE THE ATOMIC SAFEIY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of ) i t )  :

MEIROPOLITAN EDISON CCMPANY ) Docket 50-289 SP

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Generating Station, Unit 1)

)

i AA>ODT BRIEF OF EXCEPTIONS TAKEN TO AUGUST 27,1%1, JULY 27,1982 PARTIAL' INITIAL DECISIONS (MANAGDENT ISSUES /IRAINING/IhTERITY)

. September 30, 1982 ,

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TABLE OF N T Paragraph (s) 1 Introduction ........................................

Requirements to be met by Licensee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9 Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12

'IRAIN ING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-46 OPERATIONS STAFF..................................... 47-69 MANAGEMENT COMPETENCY /INTEGRIW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70- 84 CONDUCT OF HEARING................................... 85-90 THE !RC INVESTIGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91-93 THE NRC EXAMINATIONS................................. 94-%

PRFJUD I CE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 AUTHORITIES Cocmission's Order and Notice of Hearing, CLI-79-8. . 2, 9, 17,22, 39, 43 Conmission's Order, CLI-80-3,.Mareb.6,.1980............. 7, 70 Cocmission 's Order , CLI-80-3, mrch 14, 1980. . . . . . . . . . . . 42  %

Conmission's' Order , CLI-81-3, March 23, 1981. . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 52 Nuclear Regulatory Proceedings ,

Partial Initial Decision, August 27, 1981. . . . . . . . . . . ' 8, 14-19. 26, 27, 34, 52, 54, 64, 71, 82 -85 Partial Initial Decision, July 27, 1982............. 8, 14, 21, 23, 26,-28-30, 51, 57, 64, 71, 74, 76, 82, 84, 94 Report of the Special & ster, April 28, 1981........ 24, 28, 37, 46, 64 l

NRC Staff l

Inspection Report 50/289/80-21...................... 4, 34, 37, 38, 74 ~

NURED - 066 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 43 l NUREG-0694.......................................... 86  !

36, 52, 53 l

( NUREU - 07 31. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NUREG-0737 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42, 52, 53, 8 5, 86 Regulations 46 Federal Register 26491, 26494, May 13, 1981...... 41, 42 35 .

ANSI /ANS 3 .1 (197 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35,36 Draft ANS 3 . 2 (197 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

+ UNITED STATES OF #fERICA 00ghD l NUCLEAR RELULATORY CONISSION .

BERRE THE ATOMIC SAFE 1Y AND LICENSING APPEAL BOejQ @ M In the Matter of )

MEIROPOLITAN EDISDN C&FANY ) Docket 50-289 SP (Three Mile Island Nuclear

~ Generating Station, Unit 1) )

i AROUT BRIEF OF EXCEPTIONS TAKEN TO AUGUST 27, 1981, JULY 27,1982 PARTIAL INITIAL DECISIONS (MANAGEMDIT ISSUES / TRAINING /INTEURITY) ,

1. The studies following the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (M-2) identified the training of the operators as causal to the escalation of what could have been a relatively insignificant incident on March 28, 1979. A ntrber of management deficiencies were identified. Related requitanents, rsIndies and assurances were ,then considered essentihl before the same management was allowed to restart Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI-1), idle for refueling at the time of the TMI-2 accident.
2. On Atgust 9,1979 the Camission ordered that M-1 be kept idle until eight "short term" items were resolved to the satisfaction of the Atomic Safety ,

t and Licensing Board through the conduct of a hearing. One of these requirements related to the training program for licensed operators: ,

Augument the retraining of all Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators assigned to the control room including training in the area of natural circulation and small break loss of coolant accidents including revised procedures and the M -2 accident. All operators will also receive training at the BW sinulator on the M-2 accident and the ,

licensee will conduct a 100 percent reexamination of all operators in ,

these areas. NRC will administer emplete examinations to all licensed personnel in accordance with 10 CFR 55.20-23. CLI-79-8, Item 1(e).

3'.' The level of "aygmentation" was defined by a report referenced on page 18 .

of the Cm mission Order. This report was a stnnary of a meeting between the NRC Staff and the Licensee on June 28,1979 (Attachment 1). Thid report stated ,

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the level of trainirg and the ntaber of operators to be trained to'that level:

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Retraining Progran '

The licensee comnitted. to retraining approximately 40 reactor operators needed to cover the operatirg shifts. Furthermore, the licensee' committed [

to have a degreed engineer present during plant operatico to assist the j shift supervisor. As part of the retraining programs, the operators will  ;

be taking college level technical courses in fluid flow, heat transfer i and hwudynanics. % e staff indicated the qualification of the  ;

instructors for these courses chould be addressed. We licensee was also advised to contact the NRC Operating Licensing Branch regarding the i content of the technical courses for the operators. A criterion for i retrainirs operators should be developed and be made part of the restart report... l t

4. We NRC Staff throtgh their inspections identified considerable weakness in the TMI training programs for unlicensed personnel. IR 50/289/80-21, Noverber f

1980; Staff Exhibit 4, Appendix B, page 9. %e Staff stated that the- f

r'esolution of these weaknesses in training should be judged in the restart hearing. Id. (
5. %e NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued a. letter of March 28, f i

1980 setting out new requirements for reactor operator training and licensing for i all licensees. His letter also set out the specific training areas that nust be f covered including 28 control manipulations that the ope'rators were to practice. f hse requirements are known as the March 28 Denton letter.

6. h restart hearing was held in the vicinity of %ree Mile Island 7 (Harrisburg, twelve miles north), and menbers of the public were invited to f l bring matters, pertinent to the restart of IMI-1, to the attention of the Board.

h Aamodts submitted a contention concerning the trainirg of all TMI-1 personnel. l i

Wis contention was accepted by the Board without the objection of any party. l

h Aamodts asked that an independent engineering firm verify the adequacy of  !
  • i l Licensee's training: j It is contended that TMI-1 should not open until the performance of j licensee technicians and management can be denonstrated to be upgraded  ;

as certified by an independent engineering ' firm. %is upgrading should j include 1007. test and retest, or discharge of those who cannot consistently  !

and confidently master all necessary information for safe conduct of their.

j job. descriptions under all anticipated critical situations as well as . <

routine situations.. I I

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7. Although the Comicsion did not addrcss the question of management competency in terms of adequacy of training, the Comnission ordered on March 6, 1980 that management conpetency -- the end result of adequate training, experience and personal capabilities -- be addressed in the hearing. We scope of the order was the entire conmand structure from corporate to plant level in regard to organization, cocpetence and technical capabilities. CLI-80-3, Items 1-12.
8. In July 1981, after the hearing had adjourned and before the Board issued ,

their first decision, a cheating incident involving two senior reactor operators was reported. August 27 PID #43. The Board subsequently reopened the record of the hearing to determine whether cheating was extensive and whether management was i nvolved. July 27 PID #2032. Although the Board issued their decision on managenent issues before evidence on the cheating incident was taken, the Beard's decision of August 27,1981,was pendant on the outcome of the investigations of cheating.' August 27 PID #45. We Board issued their final decision on management issues on July 27, 1982.

9. The Board's decisions were to advise the Comnission whether the Cccmission's Orders had been met by Licensee. A part of the August 9 Order h

was that the Board decide whether the Conmission's Orders were sufficient to resolve all safety issues. CLI-79-8, page 12. We Aaaodt Contention, the NRR regulations and the issues raised by the cheating incident went beyond the i specific items of the Comnission's Orders. ne Board had the responsibility to l resolve these matters.

10. ne Board received evidence on all issues between October 15, 1980 and December 10, 1981. W e Main Hearing was conducted by the Board from October 15, 1980 until July 9, 1981. The Reopened Proceeding to hear evidence related to the l cheating incident was conducted by a Special Master, Judge Gary L. Milho11in, from Novenber 10 until Decenber 10, 1981.

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II. n e Aamodts participated in both the Main Hearing and the Reopened Proceeding as a full party, cross-examining witnesses, presenting two witnesse ,

Proceeding as a full party, cross-exanining witnesses, presenting five witnesses and filing findings, listed as References, page 11. After the Board'.s August 27 PID issued, the Amodts filed exception with the Appeal Board on October 24, 1981.

The Amodts strongly disagreed with the Board's findings and conclusions.

Aa:rodts urged the Cocmissie to not make the Board's Atgust 27 PID effective until before the Reopened Proceeding had been concluded. Aacodt Conments, Following the Special Master's Report (April 2.; 1982) of the Reopened Proceeding, the Board issued their second managecent decision, July 27 (1982) PID. The Azodts disagreed with the Board's decision that all issues were resolved based on the imposition of a nwber of conditions to favor restart of IMI-1. The Aacodts filed excepti6ns to the Board's July 27 PID on September 1,1982.

12. The brief of,the Aaaodt exceptions to the Board's management decisions considers the evidence developed in the two hearings in relationship to the orders, contentions, regulations and issues described in paragraphs 2-8 above.

under the general topics of Training, the Operations Staff, Management Integrity.

and Cocpetency, and the Role of the NRC Staff.

TRAINING

13. We took exception (84) to the Board's conclusion at 584(c), August 27 l

PID, which is based in general on the Board's findings in paragraphs 163-276.

These findings are su marized in paragraph 276:

(1) that the Licensee's training program is comprehensive and acceptable;

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(2) that the Licensee's audits and the NRC licensing process (including .

I the Category T testing) can be depended upon to measure adequacy of training; i (3) that Licensee has generally couplied with the Ccanission's Orders of  !

t March 6 and August 9; f (4) that operators' training in the new procedures would be the subject of a later decision, issued Decenber 14, 1981; i i

(5) that Licensee has substantially atgnented its training department, [

7 heading it with professional educators; }

(6) that the consultants who reviewed Licensee's training progran were highly qualified and independent; .

(7) that the' operators h' ave'been exposed to training,  ;

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(8) that the training was in areas which the operators should master; ,

(9) that the record on training is extensive. t

14. The Board's conclusion #584(c) was considered to have resolved the  ;

Cocmission Order Item 1(e) stated in paragraph 2 above. To come to this conclusion, f

the Board depended heavily on the testinony of Licensee's consultants. August 27 PID #225-241. At the time of the first decision, the Board considered these t

~ consultants to be " independent", presumably of Licensee's interests.  !

In their second managment decision, the Board called than " Licensee's consultants". l, July 27 PID #2321. We take exception to the Board's first characterization.

Aanodt Exceptions August 27 PID #39. Licensee presented these consultants as their i witnesses and prepared their pre-filed testinony. Gardner, Christensen, Kelly, ,

all ff. Tr.12,409. It was generally on this testimony that the Board depended rather than the testinony elicited through cross-examination of these witnesses. l This was despite the fact that the pre-filed testinony had been destroyed or weakened through cross-exanination. For instance, the Board cited Dr. Gristensen's prefiled testinony at #235, that Licensee's siculator program made a substantial j contribution to the DiI training program, and ignored Dr. Gristensen's response i i

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on the stand, that he was unable to say whether the sinulator training adequately j prepared the operators for energencies. ( Tr.12,471 (Christmsen). 'Ihe Board i depended on Dr. Gardner's prefiled testinony to provide an inpression that the OARP prepared the operators to safely operate the plant (#241), while Dr. Gardner testified that he was not capable of deciding whether the' content of 'the program

was appropriate. Tr.12,628 (Gardner). Dr. Gardner looked at limited aspect .

of the progran -- the technical adequacy of the training and testing methods;

, Dr. Cardner had no expertise in nuclear engineering. Tr. 12,503; Gardner '  !

ff. Tr.12,409. We took exception to the Board's interpretation of tl consultants  !

l at #30-34, 40-41, 45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, Aamodt Exceptions to Atgust 27 PID. i

15. 'Ihe Board also placed the review of the OARP in a different context l

than intended by its authors. Licensee's witnesses and three other consultants  !

participated in a review of the OARP, which was presented and accepted as evidence in the hearing (Licensee Exhibit 27). August 27 PID #201. 'Ihe Board's inplication of the depth of these experts' participation is grossly exaggerated. Each expert spent a very limited time observing a single aspect of the OARP. Licensee Exhibit' !

4 27, pages 8, 9. Dr. Christensen spent a single day at the BW simulator. Tr.  !

12,472 (Christensen). Dr. Gardner spent about two days observing instructors -

and films of instructors. Licensee Exhibit 27, page 54.

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16. Each of the experts approached their authorship of a chapter or two I in the Review as an opportunity to apply the principles of their expertise to- l nuclear power plant training. Drs. Gardner and 01ristensen were sinply trying to apply the principles of effective teaching and effective human engineering,  ;

respectively, to the nuclear training situation. Licensee Exhibit 27, Chapters  !

8, 9, 10. However, the Board overlooked the content of the report which was critical of the OARP, despite our attempt to bringthese matters to the Board's I f

attention. Aacodt Findings, May 15, 1981, # 104-105, 101, 81, 75, 61-72. [

For instance, the Board overlooked the inappropriate training schedule of a 40 hour4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> week of classes, the inadequate audio-visual' aids and the severely )

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critized sinulator program. ' Licensee Exhibit 27, pages 60,26, 107. Where the Board did notice, for instance the criticisms of the quality of instruction.

the Board did not appear to appreciate the seriousness of the reviewers. See

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Atgust 27 PID #262. Be Board relied on the Swmary placed at tiie beginning of the Review Report. August 27 PID #203. We took exception the Board's Atgust 27 findings at #30-34, Aamodt Exceptions.

-17: A particular significant oversite of the Board was there failure to seriously examine the evidence concerning the qualifications of the DiI instructors.

Be Ocmnission intended that the Board do so:

...Be staff indicated the qualification of the instructors for these courses (fluid flow, heat transfer and % ermodynamics) should be addressed. . . CLI-79-8, page 18 (Report of June 28 Meeting, page 1) .

18.. % e Board makes two findings concerning instructors. August 27 PID #262.

One is incorrect: he ntnber of instructors of licensed operators das nine, not

45. These instructors do not have baccalaureate degrees
45. Tr. 12,176 (Long). Be other finding is presunptive: The Board inplied that a newly-instituted annual week-long course in training techniques could or had addressed the identified deficiencies in instruction.

19 We Board failed to address the qualifications of the instructors.

The Board failed to address the Comnission's specific concern aboutthe qualifications of the instructors who tatght fluid flow, heat transfer and %ermodynamics. All The evidence was that the regular DiI instructors who taught those subjects did not have baccalaureate degrees. Tr.12,176 (Iong). Since the Cocmission referred to " college level" as the standard for augnentation of those courses, it would appear that instructors without baccalaureate educations would be unable to tasch at that level. We, therefore, take exception to the appropriateness of the Board's finding that the RII training of operators is not a " college curriculum",

while we do not dispute the Board's description. (August 27 PID #262).

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20. We nust note that the Board's position appeared to be an accomodation

. i to Licensee. Be Board nust have'been aware of the Conmission's standards as <

setout in the Report of the June 28 meeting. We Board expressed surprise when Licensee's Dr. Knief explained the absence of appropriate mathematics from the

% ermodynamics training. Tr. 12,1%-7.

21. After the Reopened Proceeding, the Board could not walk away frcxn the evidence of weakness 6f instruction. July PID #23334. H6 wever, the Board still 1' did not icpose the Ccmnission's standards. %e Board would require that criteria ,

for instructors be established by Licensee, but the Board did not establish a ,

standard for those criteria. Id. #2421(2).

22. W e Board has altered the Cocmission's schedule concerning augpentation

) of training. Whereas the Cocmission Order (CLI-79-8) Item 1(e) was to be met i before the Board's decision to restart, the Board would allow resolution of the i standards of instruction for some indefinite period after restart.

23. Although the Board found significant weakness in instruction, the' Board did not find a " failure of instruction". July 27PID$2341. At the same tim:, ,

the Board would impose conditions on restart that the Board believed would provide

, assurance of quality of training. Id. #2344. Be Board sinply failed to address )

any standard for training, or to apply the Conmission's standards. i

, 24. Judge Milho11in did find a failure of instruction in the TMI training [

program:  !

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In sum, the Licensee's training program was poorly administered and,

-judging from the evidence presented before me, it was weak in content  :

and ineffective in its method instruction. I do not believe that the l Licensee's training program responded adequately to the Coomission's .  ;

l Order of August 9,1979. Special Master's Report #251. ,. ,

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. Training was not an issue in the Reopened Proceeding, however the f

, operators were examined for the first time in the restart hearing. %e evidence on training was produced coincidently. Id. 242-251. [

. Be Board did not accept the Special Master's findings for two reasons.

L July 27 PID #2335. %e NRC Staff was satisfied with the performance level of the ,

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'IMI operctors on the licensing examinations, and the Board believed the evidence they presented in the August 27 PID. We Board described this evidence as the

" professed" knowledge of expert witnesses, Staff testimony and course outlines.

We Board's weighting of this ' evidence ~over the first-hand evidence deduced by Judge Milhollin is hardly credible. In addition, the Board is capricious in their own argunents. ' Bey found within the same decision that the NRC exams can not assure that Licensee's training and examination program "have met their obligation".

Id. $2346. Rey found, as was the case, that the Staff did not audit Licensee's training program. Id. Wey signaled their own doubts concerning the esperts' testinony: " professed knowledge". Id. 2335. %e Board's only " solid" evidence was the " course outlines", presented in Dr. Iong's testinony. August 27 PID #198.

Not only are these " outlines" not note than course titles, the witness was not involved in the related trcining program (OARP). 'Dr. -long and the other training management witnesses (Knief and Newton) joined the training department at the end or after the OARP was administered. Iong, et al. ff. Tr.12,140, pages 8,9,13,14, 17,18.

27. %e kS Corp. had audited the operators knowledge following the OARP,

'however the Board did not place any weight en this information. August 27 PID #231-2.

We operators were again audited following the 1981 requalification training (Asso (Associated Technical Training Service audit). %e results of both audits were dismal. Licensee Exhibit 27, page 67; Aarodt Exhibit 10 (Reopened Proceeding);

' Tr. 20,606 (Newton). %e Board noted that audits were made (August 27 PID #276),

however the Board gave no weight to the outcome of the audits.

28. B e audits mocked the NRC examinations. Tr.12,703; 12,733; 12,738 '

(Kelly); Tr. 12,748-9 (Boger) . Be ATTS audit was given two weeks prior to the NRC licensing exam and was used specifically to prepare the operators to take the licensing exam. Tr. 20,585-6; 20,605 (Newton). An intensive two week review of the training naterial was provided between the ArrS audit and the NRC exam.

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. iv-Despita the coaching to pass the licensirg cxas, Senior Reactor W did not feel that he could pass the NRC ex a and copied from Senior Operator 0. Staff Exhibit 26, Enclosure 5 (Reopened Hearing). As deduced by Judge Milhollin, O and W were involved in a pattern of cheating that extended to the audits and the TMI training department weekly tests. Special Master's Report #21. The grades of the operators on the April NRC licensing ex as, the audits and the .

tests given in the TMI Training Department are all clearly tainted by the administration of these tests without proctors, with books open and with coanunication between the examinees. Af ter the cheating incident was revealed, Licensee provided tutoring for the operators to prepare them to take the reexamination in October. It was clear that the operators were well-coached to take the October licensing exams, and that the NRC exas are susceptible to coaching. See Aaaodt Findings, filed March 4, 1982 #311-2. Despite the extensive coaching, one-half of the senior reactor candidates failed the licensing exam. Tr. 25,326-7 (Goldberg). The Board appeared unaware of this record evidence. July 27 PID #2341 Although subsequent filings of the Staff have stated that these and other operators have passed subsequent reexaminations, the following questions remain: What effect did coaching have on the final passing grades? Unddr what conditions were the reexaminations codducted? Unless these are resolved, and others concerning the validity of the exminations, the Board had no basis for depending on the performance level on NRC exams as evidence of the adequacy of Licensee's training.

29. Concerning the validity of the licensing exams: The Board finally came July PID f2362,2346.

to our position af ter the Reopened Proceeding./ The evidence was quite clear in

.the main hearing that the licensing exams were audit-type, but not constructed through use of standard techniques to assure validity, reliablilty or appropriate choice of a critical score. See Aaaodt Findings, May 15, 1981 #26-36; Aamcdt Findings, March 4, 1982 #306-318.

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30. The Board asserted that they relied on the evidence of the Reopened Proceeding rather than the Special Master's Report in reaching their conclusion that training had been resolved to meet the Cocmission's August 9 Order. July 27 PID # 2342. The Board claimed that they relied on the testinony of the instructors and exa:ninees and the examination papers. Id. However, the Board provided no findings which set aside Judge Milho111n's argtments nor any conclusions based reasoned analysis which would refute Judge Milho11in's arguments. Were is little evidence of the Board's reliance on first-hand evidence. The Board, instead, returned over and over again to the licensing exams (and the evidence of the main hearing) that the TMI training program was adequate.
31. The Board would impose conditions to monitor Licensee's training program af ter restart. Id. #2421. While these conditions would appear to be assurances l that Licensee's training would be nonitored, the realities of NRC's regulation, even within the conduct of this hearing, destroys any assurance. There were audits of Licensee's training by PQS Corp. and ATTS. Neither the Board nor the Staff i t

paid any attention to these audits. The Staff had intended to use the PSQ audit i in April 1980 following the OARP as an assessment of Licensee's training program. .

SER, at C6-6 (Staff Exhibit 1). This audit contained a test (Category T) on the I special training required by the Conmission. However, the Staff later testified that they were not interested in the results of the audits. Tr. 20,688-9; 20,706 r

(Crocker); Tr. 20,697 (Swanson). The Staff testified in February 1981 that the results of the audits would be used to decide which operators could sit for the licensing examination. Tr.12,824 (Boger); Staff Exhibit 1, page Cl-16. In fact, the Staff witness assured the Board that the requirements for eligibility to pass sit for the licensing exams would be strictly enforced. Tr. 23,833-4; 12,805 (Boger). However, just over two conths later, the Staff denied that there were any eligibility requirements or that there ever had been' Tr. 20,596-8 (Swanson);

Tr. 20695 (Crocker); See Aanodt Findings, May 15, 1981 #1-15. The Board expressed .

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surprise in the hearing (Tr. 20,598 (9nith), however found (August 27 #274) that neither the Staff nor the Cocmission had set any elegibility requirements.

In fact the Board rejected in their first decision (#264) our contention that an independent engineering firm should verify the trainirg of TMI personnel.

32, ne matter of the adequacy of training cannot be assured by audits in the future. We Staff did not pay any attention to those made during the hearing where the issue of adequate training was a focus.

33. Safe operation of the plant by conpetent personnel was a standard that the Board was to assure the Conmission was et prior to their decision to restart. We Board has not done that. Such an assurance cannot be postponed until sometime after restart. We urge the Appeal Board to find that the Board failed to provide assurance in this critical area, and that Licensee failed to provide the burden of proof, so that in view of the overriding issue of public health and safety, the TAI-1 plant may not be restarted.

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34. Re Board also failed to resolve the weaknes'ses in training of unlicensed personnel. These weaknesses were identified in the NRC inspections, Report 50/289/80-21 of November 1980:

The general employee indoctrination and non-licensed auxiliary operator training programs were established and implenented. Technicia6 training was minimal other than equipment training offered by vendors or other outside sources. There was no written training progra:n for the remaining non-licensed personnel. On-th-job training lacked management overvise and appeared to be disorganized. Supervisory training in administrative and technical areas had not been developed. Staff Exhibit 4, Appendix B, page 9.

Other than their findings in Health Physics training (August 27 PID #360 forward),

the Board failed to develop any significant record. T'he Board was satisfied with lists of courses and training organization in the matters of the training for Shift Technical Advisors, auxiliary' operators, techinicihns, security personnel and unnagenent.

Id. #208-223. he Board's other evidence was the Staff's I

Safety Evaluation Report (Id. #224), however, the report noted that at the time of t

its writing the training of non-licensed personnel had not been completed. The l Staff presumed that Licensee's training .

i * ...

1 organization would adequately inplement training of auxiliary operators, for instance,

- when acceptable procedures had been fully developed.

35. % e Board also asserted that the standards of ANSI /ANS 3.1 (1978) were' appropriate. Id. #164. We discussed the inappropriateness of these standards in our reply to the Staff's findings. Aantxit Reply Findings, June 30, 1%1, #7-11. 'As set out there, ANS 3.1-1978 was sinply an attenpt to standardize personnel training and qualifications prior to the 7MI-2 accident. The appropriate standards for IMI-1 personnel would be those that evolved from the accident, or 1

, Draft ANS 3.2-1979. De Cacmission had asked for atgnentation of training.

t The' new standard, where applied, would result in significant upgrading of personnel capabilities. Crocker and A11enspach ff. Tr. 12,653, pages 7, 8. '

36. The Board incorrectly asserted that the training of the plant staff (in general) met the guidelines of NUREG-0731, the Staff's guidelines for managrent structure and technical resources. NUREG-0731 is based on the  :

i standards of ANS 3.1-1979. Even the Board's cited reference does not support the Board's assertion The Staff witnesses testified that the guidelines had not been met by Licensee. Crocker and A11enspach ff. Tr.12,653, pages 7, 8.  !

Even in the area of training of licensed operators, the course content did '

not meet the standards of the guidelines. Tr.12,587 (Long); Tr. 12,193-6 (Kneif).

i. 37. Concerning the Board's assertion relative to Health Physics training,  !

we call attention to the evidence of continued " looseness" in Licensee's  !

i administration of the Radiation Worker Permit test. NRC Inspection Report 50-289/82-07, July 1, 1982, We believe that Judge Milhollin erred in n'ot '

hearing our witness Harry Willians, a former IMI guard. . Aamodt Findings, March 4,  !

1 % 2 #265-272; Special Master's Report #179-180. Dr. Iong's description of the " loose" testing practices at the time of Mr. Williams' ecployment was *

! corroborative evidence. More important is the fact that just six months late  !

i after Dr. Iong offered assurances that the tests would be. secured, tests and i E

f

, . ~ ,a , ~ - - , ,_--,n ~,-,., .,,...,-n, , . , . . , , - . , - . . . . ,---r,,,,-a, .N

answer keys were lying on open shelves in the training area. A TMI sployee, a radiological assessor made three reports of violations before the situation was corrected. This apparently d411 berate exposure of the answer keys coincides with Mr. Williams' testinony that answer keys were made available to contractor personnel who would have difficulty understanding the training materials. Other aspects of these violaticus are discussed below.

38. We urge the Appeal Board to find that the Board failed N provide assurance that the training of non-licensed personnel. According to Inspection Report 50/289/80-21, the Board was to verify satisfactory coupletion of corrective actions. In view of critical role of non-licensed personnel in the safe operation of the plant, the plant should not be restarted until this matter is resolved.
39. The Comission was particularly concerned with the capabilities of the operators to respond to transients such as the TMI-2 accident. CLI-79-8

~

Order I' tem 1(e). He Carlssion ordered sinulator training for the operators.

and a 100 percent ree:: amination of all operators in these areas.

40. ne Board has misinterpreted the Conmission's Order, and Licensee has not fulfilled the Comnission's requirements. The Comnission intended that all operators be tested at the simulator to ascertain that'the operators have understood the training and knw how to respond appropriately to a number of

~ " '"

transients. That is clearly stated in the Cocmission's order.

41. The Board did not enforce sinulator testing of the TMI-l operators because the Co: mission only made simulator testing mandatory for licensing candidates of new licensee. 46 Federal Register 26491, 264%, May 13,1981.

Atgust 27 PID #545. Although the Comission decided that Licensee should be considered an operating licensee, despite its license suspension, the Comnission gave the Board the authority to decide where TMI-1 should be treated as an applicant. Comission Order, March 23, 1981, page 7. Even if the Comrission had not ordered sinulator testing of the operators in their August 9 order, the

Board should h:ve. Bis was clearly a requirement which originated fro:n identified deficiencies in the training at IMI following the nfI-2 accident.

NUREG-0660.

42. He Cbanission by order of March 14, 1980 specifically provided that any party to the proceeding might raise an issue not specifically listed as a "short term" safety concern in the Conmission's August 9 Order as long as that issue had reasonable nexus to the TMI-2 accident. On August 4,1981, we '

L made a cotion that all TMI-1 RDs and SR0s be examined by the NRC on a sinulator.

The Board ruled against this notion on the grounds that it was too late. The '

Board believed that we understood on April 30, 1981 that the NRC did not intend r

to perform sinulator testing of previously licensed operators. August 27 PID #543.

We, however, believed at that time that the Conmission planned to enforce siaulator examination of all operators after October 1981. It was actually not until May 13, 1981 that the Conmission excluded operating licensees from the F

NUREG-0737 requirements. 46 Federal Register 26491, 264%, May 13,1981.

The NUREG-0737 Cocr.ission-approved requirements revised the scope of the licensing i examinations to include sirulator exaninations for all applicants for licenses I at power plants. %e Board also considered it too late for the other parties to address our motion. Such was not the case. At the time of the August 27 decision, '

the Board was aware of the delay caused by the cheating incident. As it turned out, there has been nearly a year and a Reopened Proceeding in which the matter could have

~

been addressed.

43. The Board also failed to provide evidence that th, Licensee's  !

siculator training program met the requirerents of the cocmission's Order Item II 1 (e). Licensee's program fell far short of the NURE-0660 recocrendation

[

of 160-200 1.aurs per operator annually. The Board found Licensee's program of -

one week annually to be adequate. The actual hands-on time for each operator l i is 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. Tr. 12,156-7;12,263 (long). We effective training time was

- t i

.. w-9 further reduced by the time (as nuch as a day and one/ half) needed to adjust to the design differences between the BW sinulator and the TMI-1 control room.

Licensee Ex. 27, page 109.

44. ne March 28 Denton letter outlines 27 control room manipulations which are to be performed on an annual or two-year cycle. Control manipulations that cannot be performed at the plant are to be accouplished at the sinulator.

The capability of the 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> BW progran to adequately perform the Denton manipulations was not explored in the hearing. %e TNI operators are only able to perform ten scenarios in a week at the sinulator. Licensee Exhibit 27, page 105. Licensee admitted that this a very small sanple of the possible scenarios that can happen. Tr.12,274 (Ross).

45.' The Review Cocmittee strongly advised that Licensee obtain an exact replica simulator. Id., page 144. %e Board adopted the Gonmittee's attitude that the restart of the plant should not be delayed uqtil such a sinulator was in place. %e Board failed to allow that the Cacmittee was hired by Licensee, and the Licensee's interests were the Cormittee's interests.

46. The Board has erred' in not finding that Licensee cust provide a I full replica simulator in order to assure adequate operator response to all

' anticipated emergencies.

OPERATIONS STAFF

47. %e issue of the ntrber of operators available to run the plant is clouded by a lack of information'and the number of 6perators involved in cheating.
48. %e attrition rate at IMI-1 has been high. In 1981, ten out of 36 operators and Shif t Technical Advisors left 'bfI. ' wo~ overriding factors were the discovery of cheating and the weekly shitt rotation. Aamodt Findings, March 4, 1981 #329, 339.
49. Licensee has recruited RO trainees and prouoted fra the ranks of the auxiliary operators. Both nodes of replacing operators has inherent problems.

The Cocnittee preferred the hiring of degreed engineers directly in to the licensed operator progr e. Licensee Exhibit 27, page 340. However, the Supervisor of Operations, Michael Ross, preferred operators with on-hands experience as auxiliary operators. If the operators had progressed through the auxiliary operator progra:n, Ross would want RO trainees to have 9 nonths experience before asstming a position in the control room, and SRO trainees, an additional year. If the trainees entered the licensed operator program with-out the auxiliary training, Ross would require an additional three years experience at the controls. Tr.12,231 (Ross).

50. Ross would have note and higher-quality operators on each shift during the restart phase that would be required. Tr. 24,254 (Ross). He would like 3 senior operators and frm 4-5 operators per shift. Tr. 24,250 (Ross). The Vice-President of IMI-1, Henry Hukill, considered five shif ts to be a mininum.

He would oppose starting the plant with fewer than five shifts. Tr. 24,075-6 (Hukill). The Ross and Hukill requirements would be met by a complement of 40 licensed operators. This ntrber agrees with the requirements established by the NRC and the Licensee after the IMI-2 accident and referenced by the Cocmission August 9 Order. Report June 28 Meeting, CLI-79-8, page 18.

51. The Board avoided the issue of ntmbers of operators available to staff the plant. In addressing the issue of operator integrity, the Board refers to "ecme thirty to forty licensed cenbers of the TMI-1 operating staff".

July 27 PID # 2043. The Board did not provide any data to support these numbers.

The uncertainty of the numbers would appear to indicate that the Board did not have any firm data.

-52. The Board remained satisfied with the staffing conditions presented in the August 27 PID. Id. #2410. Condition 9 (Id. #253) listed the mininun

_,, , . . - _ - - + -

staffing the Board would impose. The Board's requirements fall below those of MIREG-0737 and 0731. The former, the Lessons Learned adopted by the Cocmission,

~ ' - -

are only applicable to new licensees as the Cocmission removed operating" plants from the effect of their proposed rule. 46 Federal Register 26491, 26494, May 13, 1981. The reasoning was that the experience of operators of licensees would compensate for fewer numbers of operators. The Cocmission ruled that 1MI-1 should be classed with operatic plants. Cocmission Order, March 23, 1981.

Ibwever the Cocmission provided for the Board to evaluate irr31vidual issues to and take exception to the 'farch 23 Order where deemed appropriate. Id. page 7.

Clearly, the turnover of operators at 1EI-1 in the past year should have caused the Board to impose the staffing requirements of NUREG-0737. The requirements included shift staffing of two senior operators as a mininum, experience require-ments, and limits on overtime. NUREE-0737, page 3-9, 3-10,11, 3-16,17.

5'3. NUREE-0737 considered these shift staffing requirements minimal safeguards. I.A.1.3-7. NUREG-0731, the guidelines for management, require two licensed senior operators as a mininun on each shift. These guidelines consider two SROs a minimum staff to manage emergencies. NUREG-0731, page 1, 6, 7. The guidelines describe the specific duties of the SROs. Id. page 7, 9,

19. The guidelines also advocate overtime restrictions to enhance fitness of personnel. Id. page 9.
54. The Board's Condition 9 does not specify any experience requirements, I a particularly appropriate consideration for 1MI-1. Only one senior operator is required per shift. An operator who'has failed the senior licensing exam j would be allowed to function as the Shift Foreman, in command of the control room.
  • Individuals with licenses who have other jobs in the plant would be allowed to mann the control room, the plant could be operated for ten consequtive days with fewer operators than required by this condition, Licensee would only have to try to maintain a combination of 30 operators and trainees, and l Licensee would only have to try to restrict overtime.

1

55.

We would urge the Appeal Board to consider the Board's staffing conditions too minimal for safe operation of the plant, particularly ir view of the turnover in operators, the time the plant has been down, and the inade-quacies identified in the training program. We urge the Appeal Board to recoamend optimal staffing requirements that are responsive to the judgments of the Supervisor of Operations, the Vice-President of DiI-1 and the joint decisiot of NRC and the Licensee after the DfI-2 accident. We would also urge the Appeal Board to consider the staffing issue pendant on the resolution F of the adequacy of the training program and the issue of operators integrity.

56.

Ju%e Milhollin did not address the issue of staffing the plant  :

other than that He found that the number, and the responsibility, of the persons on the Licensee's operations staff who were compromised by the evidence in this case was such that the overall integrity of the operations staff was shown to be inadequate.

Special Master's Report #338.

57. '

Be Board agreed that five individuals, in addition to 0 and W (no longer operators at 'IMI), either cheater or probably cheated. We Board agreed that in two other instances, the cheaters had not been identified. July 27 PID #2039, 2040, 2047, 2090-1, 2096-7, 2131-4, 2137.

'Ihe Board overlooked or t excused the evidence that was considered by Judge Milhollin concerning the following individuals:

00 (Special Master's Report #69), P. (Id.), Q (Id.),

FF (Id.94-100), and DD (Id. 101-111). 2e Board could not conclude that all 1

cheating had been found. July PID 27 #2041-2, 2087.

58. The Board's assertion that "some thirty to forty licensed reabers of the D11-1 operating staff did not cheat, even though they easily could have.."

~

(Id. #2043) is obviously not supported by the record or the Board's own findings. I t

'Ihe Board did not examine all of the evidence available, and the Board did not '

see any of the witnesses testify.  % e Board admitted that the conditions at ntI were conducive to cheating, but the Board presented no evidence why the l

1

, individuals examined in the hearing would have cheated and the reaining would not have. [

60. Judge Milhollin's decision on the extent of cheating was rooted in  ;

the evidence including his observations of each witness as they testified.

We observed that Judge Milhollin continually recorded his observations of the witnesses. '

61. ne Board concluded that all suspicious "parallelisms" on examinations were identified. Id. #2042. We Board failed to acknowledge the limitations of the Reopened Proceeding and the scope of the ,

the extent of the limitations of the Reopened Proceeding and the NRC investiga- f tions. We discussed these limitations in Aamodt Findings, Filed January 18,

1982 #12-34; March 4,1982 #100-168.
62. We disagreed with the Board's and Judge Milhollin's uncertainty concerning Operator U. . We believe that the evidence inculpates U as being e I stationed in the training area to provide answers to'exsinees during the NRC examination. Aamodt': Cocments, Filed May 18, 1982, pages 18-20. Judge Milho11in's uncertainty concerning U's behavior rested or his certainty of the content of the question U asked the Shif t Technical Advisor KK. Judge Milho11in's certainty was not founded. Id. -

t 4

l 63. Be Board's conclusions did not take into account the reluctance of the operators to testify about their co-workers. Witnesses had withheld inform-ation from the NRC investigators. Aanodt Findings, January 18, 1982 #37-74.

Althotgh the Board noted that it was appropriate in i hearing, particularly l '

the Reopened Hearing, to consider the witness' demeanor, the Board indicated l-

' that their. standard for acceptable evidence was, the actual words or doctments on the record. July 27 PID #2036. We Board characterized the latter evidence -

  • l 'as " objective". % e Board would appear to impugn Judge Milhollin's objectivity, l *

. _ , - - - , f ,- -. . , - ,- ,- , - , ,,

. 1-We found that Judga Milho111n cxanined all the evidence, including the witnesses' demeanor, in a fair and objective manner. We found that he accorded the witness the benefit of any doubt. Aamodt Cocments, May 18,1%2 page 20 (last para.) - 21.

64. We find that the Board lacked objectivity in their findings concerning the Supervisor of Operations, Michael Ross. July 27 PID #2046. Prior to the issuance of the Special Master's Report, the Board had already made their own findings concerning Ross. Board Memorandun and Order, May 5,1982. The Board invited the parties to consider in their cocments to the Board on the Special Master's Report the draft of the Board's findings on Ross. We were surprised at the Board's position that they had arrived at tentative conclusions on Ross independent of the Special Master's Reporb.- .Id. page 2. We find that Judge Milho11in's careful analysis of the evidence surrounding Ross (Special Master's Report #137-178) was set aside by the Board. The Board did not include any analysis of the Special Master's finding or the parties' cocments. The Board sinply preferred their' views developed in the main hearing. The Board asserted in their draft "we have our own views concerning his (Ross') culpability. ..

(developed) over mny days during the min proceeding." Board's Mecorandum and Order, May 5,1982, Draft, page 10. The Board's loyalty either to Ross or their own prior statements concerning Ross (August 27 PID #155) is disturbing.

65. Michael Ross, Supervisor of Operations, is clearly culpable.  ;

Special Master's Report #137-178. We find ourselves in total agreement with i the Special Master's findings. Aarodt Cocments, May 18, 1982, pages 6-14.

We found additional evidence which supported our belief that Mr. Ross altered his April NRC examination. Aa:nxit Findings, Filed January 20, 1982, pages 39-41.

e e

, -et-

66. Operator 00 testified that cheating was coanonplace and accepted at

'IMI . Tr. 5,968- % 9, 25,671 (00). ne tests were adninistered under conditions that were conducive to cheating. Tr. 25,982 (00); Tr. 26,806-7 (U);Tr.

that were condacive to cheating. Tr. 25,982 (00); Tr. 26,806-807, 26,811-812 (U);

Tr. 26,233-234 (0); Tr. 26,306-307 (V); Tr. 26,607-608 (T); Tr. 26,453 (OG);

Tr. 26,923 (DD). Licensee finally admitted that test administration was " loose".

Licensee Proposed Findings, January 15, 1982, #325, 327. -

67. - An opinion widely-held by the operators was that providing or receiving-an answer to a question or two was not cheating. Tr. 25,714 (GG); Tr. 26,352 (FF);

Tr. 26,837-839 (U); Tr. 26,452, 26,495-90 (W7; 25,6% (GG); Tr. 26,807 (U);

Tr. 25,%8-%9, 25,671 (00); Tr. 26,608 (T). Mr. O did not consider allowing Mr. W to use his papers during the licensing examination constituted an act of cheating. Staff Exhibit 26, page 46, Enclosure 4. Many operators did not believe that O's behavior warranted termination. Tr.s 25,703 (GG); Tr. 26,570 (I),

t Tr. 24,194 (EE). % e operators did not believe that the plant management would j consider the behavior of 0 and W cheating. Tr. 26,608 (T); 26,574 (I).

Aamodt Findings, March 4, 1982, #162-163.

68. The NRC Staff did not consider an unsuccessful solicitation during a test to be cheating. Id. #165 - 166. It appeared that the NRC proctors were aware of the cheating of 0 and W at the time. Id. #159-161, 164.
69. We total picture would strongly indicate wide-spread cheating at TMI. There is no reason for an operator to so testify (00), other than that .;

it was the truth. We urge the Board to find that the Board has seriously . erred ,

in their interpretation ~ of the record.

I

+

. _ 3_

o MANAGDENT COTETENCY/INTEURITY

70. We Coumission's March 6,1980 Order required the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to decide whether the management of IMI-1 had the requisite cocpetency and technical abilities to safely operate the plant.
71. The Board decided that all management issues were resolved in favor of Licensee following the Main Hearing. August 27 PID #584. % e Board did not alter this decision following the Reopened Proceeding. Following the  :

Reopened Proceeding, the Board identified a number of management weaknesses. ,

I  !

l- Bese were " negligent failure to safeguard the integrity of its (Licensee's) '

examination process", " failure to instill an attitude of respect for the coupany j and NRC-adninistered examinations", " failure to assure the quality of training instruction"; and " negligence in the procedures for the certification of candidates for the NRC licensing examinations". July 27 PID #2419' . %e Board, howevei, ,

did not alter their conclusions from the main hearing that all management issues were resolved in favor of Licensee. Id. #2423. The Board would a'ddress the I management weaknesses by imposing a $100,000 fine. Id. #2419.

72. We agree with the Board that Licensee's managenent exhibited the i weaknesses the Board identified. However, we find the weaknesses indicate serious managenent incompetence. As the Board noted, " Based on the post-TMI attention given to training one would anticipate a nodel progran at IMI-1." I Id. #2336. We find that Licensee's failure to do so is strong evidence of I management inecupetence. We find that a nonetary fine cannot correct management incorpetence.

l 73. We do not understard the Board's failure to recocmend the receval of Dr. Long and Sanuel Newton from the management of the training department.

l Not only did the Board find that Dr. Long was responsible for the failure of the training department (Id.#2407), they also found that Dr. Lore failed to l

to see that the proble of hadequate test administration was corrected after it was brought to his attention. Id.#2323. Dr. Long, in fact, misled the Iaard to believe that the problem had been corrected. Tr.12,740 (Iong).

Mr. Newton's testinony concerning the satisfactory completion of Category T tests concealed the " coaching" techniques used to facilitate the operators' passing and the " loose" administration of the tests, Tr. Newton.

Mr. Newton, as Supervisor of Operator Training, should have been aware of the Ccanission's requirement that all tests be given in a " closed book" format.

Collins Letter, Novecher 1980. His failure to enforce " closed book" tests after Dr. Iong indicated that the procedure had been chav,ed indicates willful negligec.ce.

74. We seriously questioned Dr. Iong's role in the training structure.

He appeared unknowledgeable and ineffective. Aa::odt Findings, May 15, 1982, j #78-82. For this reason, we question Dr. Iong's present~ role as Vice-President of Nuclear Assurance. July 27 PID #2406. It was Dr. Iong who assured in the Reopened Proceeding that the RWP tests would be kept under lock and key. Iong ff. 24,925 page 22,23. However, less than six months later, the WP tests and their answer keys were found lying on open shelves in the training area.

NRC Inspection Report 50-289/82-07, July 1, 1982. We found at the time Dr. Iong appeared in the Reopened Proceeding, that he was unacquainted with the facts of his pre-filed testirony concerning the RWP tests. Aamodt Findings, Filed January

20, 1982, #270.
75. We seriously questioned Mr. Newton's role as Supervisor of Licensed Operators' Training. Aarodt Findings, Filed March 4,. 1982, #277-281. He appeared to have deliberately misrepresented the pass / fail data provided in response to our motion to resolve conflicting data on the record. Id.

1 m - - - m---

In addition, wa hava strious doubts that the information supplied by Mr.

Newton, about the number of hours operators were in training during 1980-1981 (Licensea Exhibit 80). Id. #363-365. Mr. Newton was not candid about the " loose" test administration when he testified in the Reopened Proceeding.

'Ihe first break-through into this information came from an operator.Tr25,6% (GG).

76. We do not understand the Board's conclusion that Licensee was We

" candid" about the inappropriate Category T testing. July 27 PID#2341.

disagree with the Licensee's description of their administration of the Category.

T training and testing. 'Ihe operators' testimony, subsequent to the final Category T examination, was that the course material was not taken seriously by either the operators or the instructors. Tr. 26,406 (FF); Tr. 25,695-696 (GG);

Tr. 25,983 (00).

.. .everything that was asked on the test for all practical purposes

. was also gone over the norning before the test...they just took 20 questions, about, of the contents of what they had lectured us on...

Tr. 25,746 (G) .

77. We never found the Licensee forthright. Licensee's investigation attap;ed to cover even the blatant cheating of Operators G and H. Wilson ff. Tr.24,478, pages 6-8. Mr. Arnold, President of GPU, was satisfied with Mr. Wilson's conclusions. Tr.23,685 (Arnold). Mr. Arnold deliberately inter-fered with the NRC investigation of the cheating of Operators O and W and Shif t Technical Advisor KK's suspicions of conspiratorial cheating involving management. Staff Exhibit (Reopened Proceeding) 26, page 7, 37; Staff Exhibit 27, page 6; Tr. 25,378-379 (Rard); Tr. 25,380 (Baci); Staff Exhibit 27, page 29, Enclosure 8, pages 1, 8. See Aa-odt Findings, Filed March 4, 1982 #143.
78. We cannot help but conclude that upper management was aware of the rumors of cheating, if not actual instances of cheating, before the 0 and.W incident was reavealed. Tr. 26,464 (GG). We found that Mr. Arnold did not need to question why 0 and W cheated. Mr. Arnold's explanations for his failure to y - ,,v - - -

. 9-pursue the cause of the cheating > (Tr. 23,784-785 (Arnold) do not hold water. We

-believe he did not need to ask because cheating was conmonplace and accepted at IMI (Tr. 25,671, 25,%8-969 (00)'. . Whereas the Licensee stated that their failure to warn the operators against cheating contributed to O's and W's  ;

downfall, Ft. Frank Kelly, an auditor with many years of experience, felt that no warning should ordinarily be necessary. Tr. 24,897 (Kelly.). The fact that senior operators and others who had been enployed at TMI for many years did cheat, is a strong refleccion on the management of IMI. We have wondered whether management even required employees to canpromise their standards. For instance, Ft. Newton appeared uncomfortable with his testitrony surrounding the inaccurate data, discussed in paragraph 75 above. Mr. Newton even faintly.

disclaimed authorship. Tr. 20,604; 25, 645 (Newton).

80. The Board found that management was responsible for the operators'

" bitter" and disirespectful attitude toward the NRC licensing exaninations and thatrainingdepartr$nttests. July 27 PID #2411. However, the Board was inc0crect in stating that management learned a6ter the cheating incident of these operator attitudes. Id. #2239. Mr. Ross and Mr. O'Toole, Director of Operations and Maintainance, were both aware of these attitudes for sometime prior. Tr. 24,177 (Ross); Staff Exhibit 27 (Reopened Proceeding), page 33.

Mr. 0'Toole felt responsible. Id. The Review Cocmitte had the " bitter" attitude also, thus upper-management should have been aware. (Licensee Exhibit 27.)

i

81. We also found that Licensee broke the Sequestration Order of the hearing and informed two witnesses of testinony which ,directly involved them.

The Sequestration Order was in place on November 12, 1981' and involved discussions on the record at Tr. 23,532-552. The actual implenentation of the order appeared -

to refrain  !

difficult to bound, however Judge Milho11in-instructed attorneys /from engaging l

in any cormunication which would tend to undermine the spirit of sequestration.

L l .

i 1

Tr. 23,552. , Licensee broke the spirit of the sequestration order if not the order itself by informing two affect _ed witnesses of the testinony of an NRC witness.

Our motion to stay the hearing to exanine the integrity of the hearing was  ;

denied (Tr. 26,788-798), as was our notion for reconsideration (January 8,1982).

We would appeal these denials. We found that the motions were denied for spurious reasons, those being that the scheduled day of the hearing and that Judge Milhollin was satisfied that he had deduced enough evidence concerning the individuals involved. ..

82. As the Board noted, we attenpted to bring the importance of the operators' attitudes to the attention of the Board. August 27 PID #267.

The Board found at that time that we were trying to identify a non-problem.

Id. The Board depended on Licensee's witnesses to set aside our concern.

Our concerns were expressed in the testinony of my testinony. Aanodt ff! Tr.

12,931, page 8. We specifically cited the operators' low norale due to changes

.that evolved from the TMI-2 accident. We were pressed by the Board to drop our request that Harold Denton address the issue of oper'ator attitudes. Tr.

(Smith). Ibwever, after the Reopened Proceeding, the Board not only found that the operators' attitudes were improper, but that Licensee had offered no evidence that this problem had been resolved. July 27 PID #2240.

85, The board also acknowledge that improper certification of candidates to sit for the licensing examinations was "another essential link in the chain of events which ultimately resulted in this reopened proceeding". Id. #2351. '

The Board found af ter the Reopened Proceeding that formal certification procedures were needed. Id.#2350. However, the Board dismissed our attenpts to force this  ;

matter after the Main Hearing. August 27 PID #275.

84. In the first decision, the Board qualified their expertise in assessing the conpetence of management. August 27 PID # . We find from our own experiences that a valid test of management conpetence is the results

- g--

management obtains. We found as did both the Board and Judge Milhollin that Licensee's management failed in a number of inportant respects. The Board did

.not find the model training program they would have expected in' view of the attention given training after the accident. The Board did not understand our concerns after the Main Hearing that Licensee's assurances cannot be relied upon.

Aqgust 27 PID #537, 550. Judge Milhollin expressed similar concerns after the Reopened Proceeding. Special Master's Report #537. The Board would inpose a license condition of a quality assurance program for training. July 27 PID #2421, We cannot find that the Board's conditica will resolve the inadequacies in training i We cannot find that the present Licensee management can resolve the training inade-quacies even if the Board's condition should be inposed. See Aamodt Conments, Filed August 20,1982, pages 32-34.

CONDUCT OF THE HEARING 85'. An additional management issued we raised was the " fatigue" of the i

operators in the control room. We approached the issue in two ways: optimizing the design of the control room and reducing the number of hours operators are on shift. Aamodt ff. 12,931, pages 2-4, 7. The Board concluded that the former .

was adequately addressed since Licensee had an on-going program to inprove the

, control room environment. August 27 PID. We believe that the Board should have fully resolved the control room design issues'in terms of the most optinum features.  ;

There,is no record evidence that all fatiguing features were examined and minimized.  ;

Such a redesign (or remodeling) would be clearly called for in view of the NRC's i

new regulations which allow overtime shifts of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. ' Revision to Item 1.A.1.3 [

, . L L of NURm -0737, Generic letter No. 82-12, June 15, 1982. 1 t

86. We believe that the overtime permitted, the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> shift, and the weekly [

t shift rotation all conpromise the alertness and capabilities of the operators.  !

Our concerns about " fatigue" of the operators was stricken from my testimony by a Board ruling that the issue lacked nexus to the TMI-2 accident. (Aa::odt ff. Tr.

~

l f,_ . _ , , . . , _ _ . . _ _ _ - , , , _ . - _ _ _ , . _ . . . , , _ - - _ _ , _,

_23-12,931, pago 7-8), Board Confirmatory Mecorandum and Ord:.r of Oral Ruling, April 6,1981, discussed at Tr. 20,621-20,624. The Board incorrectly focused on a single argument of my supporting brief that " fatigue" had nexus to the accident. Inter-venor Response to Board Request, March 10, 1981. For instance, overtime was an issued raised in the investigations of the accident, and specified in the sub-sequent regulations. NURE-0680, page 20 forward; NURE-06%; NURE-0737, page 3-6 and 7 stated: i The staff recognizes that there are diverse opinions on the mount of overtime that would be considered permissible and that there is a

' lack of hard data on the effects of overtime beyond the generally '

recognized nomal 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> working day, the effects of shift rotation, and other factors. .

87. NURE-0737 concludes that topic by stating that NRC has initiated studies in the area of overtime. We not only find that the recent revision to ,

NURE-0737 is not reassuring. We find that the recent revision.is not ,

reassuring. In fact, it appears to be a total disregard for the health and .

safety of both ' he t worker and_ the public. Connonsense would dictate short hours for control room operators who rust remain alert and "on top of the situation" at all times. >bst experiments on vigilance reveal man as a poor nonitor by deaonstrating decrement in response proficiency as observation time becomes longer. Human Factors, Vol. 3 (1961), pp. 213-221, Adams, Stenson and Humes.

88. We find that the Board was capricious in ruling against the evidence on fatigue.in the Aamodt testirony. See Tr.12,909; 12919; 12418; 12419; 12, 431.

The Board once described the issue as "alrost half of your Contention". The i

even encouraged our litigation of the issue. Board Menorandum and Order, May 8, 1980, page 6. The found that the length of shifts worked by licensed operators bore on the overall subject of the Licensee's competence to safely operate the  ;

facility and that it was an issue in which the Board and the Comission have expressed strong interest. Id. In view of the high rate of attrition and Licensee's

~

uncertain nuaiber of licensed operators, the issue is particularly inportant.

O O

89. n e Board's shift staffing conditions were arrived at through an agreement between the Licensee and the Ccxmonwealth of Pennsylvania. We considered the entire matter a compromise by the Board and the Counnonwealth. his is dis-cussed fully in our filing of July 20, 1981. Intervenor Aanndt Managenent Findings from the Late-Entered Licensee Exhibits 55 and 59 (Courronwealth and Licensee Agreements).
90. %e Board failed to resolve a severe problem with the loud speaker system throughout the hearing. We brought to the Board's attention that the inability to hear was more prejudicial to members of the public, including intervenors, who were not familiar with the language of the hearing. Tr.

(Aanodt).

'IHE NRC INVESTIGATIONS

.91. We take exception with the Board's findings (July 27 PID #2378-2394).

%e Board found that the Staff's investigations were adegfate with few exceptions. One exception that the Board failed to identify was the inadequate investigation of KK's information concerning a possible conspiratorial scherie of cheating. Id. #2382. . The Board, Judge Milho11in and the parties overlooked the presence of Licensee's attorney during the NRC interview of KK. 'Ihey also overlooked the fact that KK discussed the matter with his management, and then Jc. 111 son prior to the NRC interview. Mr. Arnold and Mr. Stello discussed the

, also prior to the interview, We cannot believe that KK provided all the m.ation he had; he was reluctant to. come forward in the first place and nervous he interview with the NRC until he had completed his account. See Aerodt

,s, Filed March 4, 1982, #143-150; Amodt Ccxmients, May 18,1982, pages 18-20.

A significant fact was that the caller was not hesitant to announce over a speaker system that he was calling on behalf of someone who was taking the NRC licensing exam ion. Staff Exhibit 27 (Reopened Proceeding), Enclosure 10, page 3.

l l

93. Several other aspects of the OIE investigation, including withholding of information and Mn.' Stello's allowance of management presence during the Aacodt Findings, investigations, added to the incffectualness of the investigations.

March 4, 1982, #157-166, 124-134. Wese aspects seriously question the integrity of the management of OIE, however such assertions are unavoidable after a study of the evidence.

'IHE NRC EXAMINATIONS

94. We take exception to all Board findings and conclusions which assert that the NRC licensing examinations are adequate measures of the capabilities of an operatcr.to operat of the operators. We August 27 PID depends heavily on the NRC licensing process as evidence of the the adequacy of operators, instructors and management. At the time of the decision, the Board had co:plete faith in the validity and stated reliability of the examination. We Board /its belief at that time in findings  ;

that disputed our concerns about the exam process. August 27 PID, #268-272.

Those findings have teen affected by the Board's evidence from the Reopened Proceeding as the Board admitted. July 27 PID #2362.

95. The Board accepted in the earlier decision that preparation to pass the NRC was a reliable standard and that it was the Review Cocmittee's standard.

Id. #203. The Board accepted the exam results as an adequate audit of Licensee's training program. Id. #204. The Board's dependence on Mr. Kelly's testinony (Id. #226-228) is affected by the NRC exam since Mr. Kelly's assurance was the licensing exam. The Board's resolution of the ability of the operators to function in emergencies depended on the NRC exams. Id. #249. The Board's conclusions that an independent assessment of the operators was not needed (Id. #264), and

! that the Licensee's training program did not need to be reviewed (Id. #204) are both depend on the licensing exam. The Board's entire section on training (It d.

i

  1. 170-276) has been affected by the Board's new position on the licensing exams.

%. Dere was no evidence presented in either hearing that the NRC licensing process is valid. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. Tr.

12,797 (Boger). The examiner who constructs the tests does not use standard test construction techniques, for instance. Id. We operators did not consider the tests valid. Tr. 24,708 (GG); Tr. 26,052 (A); Tr. 23,975 (Hukill); Tr. 26,320-321 (V); Tr. 26,411 (FF); Tr. 25,585 (I). See Aamodt Findings, March 4,1982, Mr. Hukill considered that passing the exams represented a minimum of

  1. 306-324.

requisite knowledge. Tr. 23,977-978.

PREJUDICE

97. We find that Judge Smith erred in ruling orally against our filing of any findings for the Special Master after January 18, 1982. We discussed this in our January 18 findings at 31-34. s Respectfully submitted, Akd ** L 9 .I Marjorie M. Aamodt 9

i e

00Sc{EC g g -4 NO'12 UNITD STATES OF AMRICA ,-; si.t,6gif,"i~

f NUCLEAR RBATIAIORY C0tIISSION I'OC [ghen BEFORE ' DIE tiIOMIC SAFELY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )

)

MEIiROPOLITAN DISON COI?ANY ) Docket 50-289 SP

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear

)

Generating Station, Unit 1)

't

)

'Ihis is to certify that the document AA'ODT BRIEF OF EXLt.r'110NS TAKEN

'IO AUGUSr 27, 1981, JULY 27, 1982 PARTIAL INITIAL DECISIONS (MANAGEMENT /IPJ.INING/

INTEGRITY) vas served by hand this 4th day of .f M fZ. M k :rties marked with

  • on the attached SERVICE LIST; the reminin.a- es w ut served by deposit in first class U. S. Mail. ,.

., /[ /  ?. -

GL L un LL ( 'l$ r fl/ % -s*! $

Marjorie M. Aaandt i s September 2, 1982 I

1 1

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1

UNITED STATES OF AMRICA NUC17AR IEAIIA70RY CMiISSION BEFORE 1HE ATOMIC SAFEIY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD

'In the Matter of

)

)

MEIROPOLITAN EDISON COIP/WY ) Docket 50-289 SP

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1) )

)

N Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles Chairran, Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Joard kR ert Adler Esquire n Karin W. Carter, Esquire f 1NG/

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission

> Ad'ainistrative Judge John H. Buck - P. O. Bax 2357 Atanic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Harrisburg, PA 17120 U.S. Naclear.Begulatory Carissicn _ _ , _

Washington, D.C. 20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esd~m

% A&rinistrative Judge Cu-istine N. Kciril ' Haanon & Weiss Atcrric Safety and Licensing Appeal Ebard ' 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 U.S. Naclear Regulatory Carission , Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20555 Ivan W. Smith, Esquire, Chairran A Adidnistrative Judge Peginald L. GetchY ' Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocrission Atanic Safety and. Licensing Appeal Board '

U.S. Naclear Pegulatory C:zrission Washington, D.C. 20555 '

Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Y James A. Tourtellott" .

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel . .

Office of the Execut- L"ector 881 West Outer Drive ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulat Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Lon l Washington, D.C. 20 I

Dr. Linda W. Little -

.s D:cketing and Service Section (3) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 5000 Hermitage Drive ['

i office of the Secretary Raleigh, Ibrth Carolina 27612 U.S. Nuclear Fegulatory Carission y Washington, D.C. 20555 George F. Trowbridge, Esquire  !'

s Atanic Safety and Licensing Appeal Ecard Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trosridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Panel Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S. Naclear Pegulatory Carissicn Washington, D.C. 20555 l '

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