ML20101A986
| ML20101A986 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1984 |
| From: | Bradford L THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20101A988 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#484-695 OLA, NUDOCS 8412200005 | |
| Download: ML20101A986 (16) | |
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DOCHETED USNRC 154 EC 13 NO:17
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l j'FFICE OF SECREW UNITED STATES'OF AMERINbhSfIC If-ll NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
Before the Atomic-Safety and Licensidg Alipeal Board In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-289 OI.A.
)
(Three Mile oland Nuclear-
) (Steam Generator Repair)
-)
Station, Unit No.1)
BRIEF ON APPEAL FROM INITIAL DECISION IN TMl-1 STEAM GENERATOR REPAIR OI.A AND IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD ON THE BASIS OF NEW INFORMATION 8412200005 841210
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DR ADOCK 05000 r,
LOUISE BRADFORD For Three Mile Island Alert Dated:
December 10, 1984 h
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TABLE OF CONTENTS I.-
INTRODUCTION
'1
'A. - - Background 1
- 1. +
Description of the Steam Generators 1
2.
Description of'the' Repair Process 2
3.
Procedural History 2
.11.
IMPROPER. BOARD RULINGS DURING DISCOVERY 7
1.
The Protective Order 7
2.
Request for an Expert Panel 7
i' lit.
SUMMARY
' DISPOSITION 8
' 1 '.
Contention 1.c 8
2.
Contentions 2.a, 2.b.1 and 2.b 2
-9 IV. - IMPROPER RULINGS DURING THE HEARAING 11 V.
THE BOARD'S INITIAL DECISION 13 Summary Conclusion 14 f
a k.-_
'l.
INTRODUCTION On 15 ' July 1983; an Atomic ^ Safety and Licensing Board was established to, among 'other things,- rule on contentions to be admitted and to L
preside.over a hearing to consider the safety of:the TMI-1 steam' generators as repaired using the ' kinetic expansion' process.-
During the proceeding the-Board denied TMI A an effective -
opportunity. to prepare and present its' case.
The ' Board artificially and -
improperly narrowed the scope of the hearing, thereby denying a full hearing on important. safety - issues.
The new information which has come to light since the close of the hearing demonstrates the importance of the issues and the necessity for a full hearing.
A.
BACKGROUND ~
1.
Description of the Steam Generators.
.in. November 1981,- primary to secondary leaks ' were discovered in both TMI-a once' through steam generators -(OTSG).
Upon investigation it was discovered that a majority of the tubes in both ' steam generators had suffered circumfrential cract:ing.
TMI-1 has two vertical straight tube and shell once through steam-generators.
Each OTSG contains 15,531 inconel-600 tubes, 56 feet 2-3/8 inches in length, rolled and seal-welded into 24 inch thick carbon steel tube sheets at the top and bottom of OTSGs.
The plant was shut down in February 1979, for refueling and has remained in a cold shut 'down condition since the TMI-2 accident at the direction of the NRC, -pending. the outcome.of restart hearings.
During.
August and ' September -1981, hotJ functional - tests were performed at TMI-1.
There was no indication of leakage from the. OTSGs at that time and it was not until November 1981 during pressurization for additional tests that the m
.x primary _to secondary leaks were detected in the steam generators.- This leakage was caused by intergranular stress assisted cracking of the steam J
generator tubes. Eddy current testing (ECT) revealed that 95% of the damage occurred within.the top seven inches of the upper tub sheet (UTS).
2..
Description of the Repair Process.
The existing technical specifications for _TMI-1 allowed only for plugging as a method of steam generator tube repair, but because of the extent of the damages plugging was not a viable method of repair.
The Licensee did not consider replacing the damaged steam generators but, instead, _ attempted to repair them by kinetically expanding the tubes within the tube sheet to provide a new seal below where the defects' were detected.
This was done by detonating an explosive cord encased in a polyethetene insert which had been placed in the tube.
The -resulting explosive energy was transmitted to.the tube wall by the polyeth'elene insert, pressing the tube against the tube sheet.
The tubes were expanded from the top of the UTS down either 17 or 22 inches depending on the elevation of the lowest ECT indication within the UTS.
This was to provide a 6 inch or greater ECT indication-free expanded length between the lowest elevation ECT indication
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and the bottom of the expansion to serve as the new pressure boundary.
About 5% of the damag.e to the steam generator tubes occurred in the lower elevation of the UTS or in the free span of the tubes. These tubes were ~not amenable to the kinetic expansion repair method and were subsequently plugged.
All of the tubes in both steam generators which had
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not been previously plugged, were kinetically expanded regardless of.whether,
or not they'were later to be plugged.
3.
Procedural History.
On 9 May 1983, Licensee submitted to the NRC an application for an amendment to its operating license, requesting that it be allowed to revise the
)
..[
technicslispecifications to recognize steam generator repair techniques other
- than 7 plugging / and : that the-Commission : approve the proposed kinetic
/ expansion repair: method used at the' facility ~.
-On '31 May 1.983, the NRC published a' notice in the ~ Federal. Register -
captioned:" Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed-No Significant : Hazards-Consideration Determination and OpportunityH for -
' Hearing."
On 21 September 1983,.TMIA filed " Supplement To Petition For
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' Leave - To 4 Intervene."
During a special prehearing conference held on 17 October -1983, the Board. heard oral argument on. the admissibility of the
- proposed contentions and by its Order of 29 November 1983, admitted:
1.
Neither. Licensee nor the NRC Staff have demonstrated that the -
kinetic expansion steam generator tube repair technique, combined' with selective tube plugging, provides reasonable assurance that the operation of TMI-1 with the~ as-repaired steam generator 'can be~
conducted without endangering the health and safety of the. public for the 'following reasons:
1.a. - Post repair. and plant performance testing and analysis including the techniques used, -empi_rical information collected, and data evaluation, and ' proposed license conditions are Inadequate 'to -
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provide sufficient assurance that tube ruptures, including but not limited 'to those which'-could result upon restart, a turbine trip at maximum-power, termal shock.from inadvertent actuation of emergency.:feedwater at high power ~ or following rapid cooldown after a LOCA, will be detected.in time and prevented' to avoid endangering the health and safety of the public through release of radiation into the environment beyond permissible limits..
1.b.
.Because of the enormous number of tubes in both' steam
. generators which have undergone this. repair process, ~(1) the possibility of a simultaneous rupture in'each steam generator, which would : force the-operator - to accomplish cooldown and depressurization' using.at least one faulted steam generator, resulting in ~ release of radiation into ; the ~ environment beyond permissible' levels, "isn't an incredible. event," (see, September,19,--
1982 memorandum from' Paul Shewmon,'then Chairman of the ACRS),
(2)'.and could-lead to a ~ sequence of events not encompassed by emergency procedures,.(3) and in the course of a LOCA, such ~a scenario could create essentially uncoolable conditions.
1.c.
.The type of plug used, the number of tubes -requiring
' plugging, and choice of tubes to be plugged, including failure by i
M Licen'see. to plug 66 degraded tubes, supported. a conclusion that
. plan operation -with ' the as-repaired steam generator can _ not be
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conductad without, endangering ' the health and. safety.of-the public, considering _among _other things interference which: plugged tubes -
will"have 1nithe. plant's ability: to responda to transients and 3
accidentse 1.d.n Neither 'the :" Report of Third Party Review of. Three Mile :
L
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island,' Unit 1, Steam Generator Repair"- nor-the Staff's 1 Safety
+
Evaluation 1 Report- (i;UREG-1019)J 'are credible documents in theiri evaluation of the kinetic expansion. repair technique; including leak 1 tightness and load carrying capabilities, and thus can not be used -
as a-basis for concludion that the -repairs insure safe plant
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operation, because of the reports' inherent -Inconsistencies,. their failure to provide data or calculations to support their evaluations, assumptions, and conclusions, and. theifact that, those individuals
' participating.in the Licensee and NRC reviews lack proper.
qualification to render an expert opinion on this issue., as evidenced for: example by. the fact that their. basis assumptions and conclusions -
rest improperly on linear fracture mechanics theory as opposed to non-linear theory,: axial symetric-stress analysis which would-not be f,
applicable to all cracks,' failure to analyze. crack _ resistance on the -
basis of toughness' as opposed to hardness which has no relation to, 1
crack. resistance, and failure to differentiate-in their analysis:
between the effects of thermal stress on small versus large cracks.'
2.
'Neither Licensee nor the ' NRC. staff has demonstrated' that the corrosion which damaged the steam generator and other RCS components and systems, will not reinitiate during plant operation" and rapidly progress, attacking either the steam generator or elsewhere in the primary pressure boundary,' thus providing.no reasonable assurance. that the operation - of TMl-1 with.' the;.
as-repaired steam generator can be conducted without ' endangering the health and safety of the public, for the following reasons:=
b 2.a.
There is no assurance that the causative agent or. the source -
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of: initiation or the. conditions under which initiation originally occurred, have been properly identified, thus undermining.any conclusion that the causative agent has.been removed from the-l:
system, and undermining the reliability of any proposed. clean-up,
l process, procedures meant to eliminate. the-corrosive environment; L
or. the ' reliability of the Licensee and staff stress analysis as to L
when corrosion could reoccur.
L 2.b.1.-
The Staff's own consultant on this issue, R. L. Dillon, l
believes' that the risk ~ associated with cleaning, i.e.,
that a
_relatively large inventory of sulfur compounds willTe put into solution, are greater than simply "living with a large S inventory'in 2
the system." supporting a conclusion that.the only two possibilities -
being considered by the Licensee and Staff pose substantial risk that corrosion will reinitiate.
l' l
. During the special prehearing conference, TMI A explained that it was concerned that the kinetic expansion process had reduced the tubes capability y
l to retain plugs such that the plugs would give a good seal.
_g.
. _.. _,... _ l a.
...a
y.
L 2. b. 2.-
Even if the proposed cleaning process: presented no risks,
.there is no assurance that the proposed. process can remove more than 50-80% of the; contamination, thus: there can be no assurance -
thats the; contamination; which would be } left after the process 'is complete will not cause reinitiation.,
- 2.c.-
Neither. the :" Report of-Third Party Review-of Three Mllei Lisland, Unit 1, Steam'. Generator Repair" 'nor the Staff's Safety '
- Evaluation c Report (NUREG-1019) are credible documents in their.
evaluation - of. the : causative ~ agent, cican ~up,' or procedures <to prevent contaminant reintroduction,.and thus can not be' used as.a basis for conclusion.t_ hat the. repairs insure safe-plant operation, because of the! reports' inherent inconsistencies, because the basic-
- assumptions and conclusions therein ' rest improperly 'oniaxial-symetric stress analysis which would not be ~ applicable to.all cracks,-
because of the. failure to analyze crack resistance on the basis of toughness as opposed to hardness fwhich has no ' relation to crack -
- resistance, and because the failure -to differentiate in their analysis, -
between the effects of thermal stress on:small versus large crackst Discovery was = initiated immediately and 31 January was set as the date.for -
completion of discovery.
On 30. December 1983,.TMI A served on Licensee. its "First Set of.
Interrnatives and. Request for Production ofi Documents."
In its' response -
-Licensee stated that because TMI A's document request involved the production.
of a-large. number of documents, Licensee would' establish a document: room located in the vicinity of the TMI Visitors Center and would provide copies of-documents at a cost ' of 10 cents a page.. Licensee further Lstaked that'
. documents containing-information which Licensee considered proprietary would
. be:made available pursuant to applicable proprietary agreement and protective
-order.- On 25 ' January 1984; TMI A - filed "TMI A's Request for Production of,
Documents and Order to Compel Discovery."
Licensee opposed TMI A's1 motion and requested the" Board grantia ' Protective Order.
In,its 2 March.1984 Ruling the Board granted Licensee's motion.for Protective Order'.
On 1 'May -
1984~,. the Board denied -TMI A's Request for Reconsideration of Protective Order. !
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- On 25 January.1984, TMI A filed "TMI A. Motion for Appointment of Special' Panel." ' The-Board. denied the motion in its~ 24 February 1984 Order.
- Motions for summary disposition of contentions were filed by
~ Licensee : and.. staff. on ;24 February '1984.5 TMIA: filed its response in
- opposition to those motions on 3 April 1984.
On 1. June.1984 the Board. issued its. Rulings on Motions for Summary-Disposition.which climinated the majority
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of,TMI A's' contentions.- The following are the issues which survived summary
-disposition and which subsequently became issues at the hearing:-
Issue 1~.a..
Reliability of Leak Rate Measurements.
1.b.
Frequency:of Eddy Current Tests.
1.c.
Power Ascension Limitations.
1.d.
Long-Term Corrosion Tests.
Issue 2.
Inadvertent Initiation of Emergency Feed Water.
Issue'3.
Hardness Tests on Repaired Tubes..
Issue 4.
Industry Experience-with Kinetic Expansion.
. Contention 1.b.
The increased Probability of. Simultaneous -Tube.
Rupture -in LBoth Steam Generators Resulting from-the Kinetic Expansion
. Repair.
The hearing opened on 16 July 1984 and closed 18 July 1984.
On 31 ' October 1984,- the Board issued its initial Decision concluding that an.
. amendment to the' operating 1.icense which revises the technical specifications to recognize the kinetic expansion repair method should be issued.
II.
IMPROPER ~ BOARD RULINGS..DURING DISCOVERY:
The Board improperly imposed a 'Frotective Order which effectively precluded TMIA from-gaining proper discovery: furthermore, the Board failed to grant TMI A-requested relief which would have enabled TMI A to prepare an effective case.
. L._._L
F~
t-A.
The Rulings. of the Board 'during the discovery phase of the proceeding precluded a full and fair con, sideration of safety significant issues.
1.= The Protective Order.
In its 25 January 1984 Motion for Order to Compel Discovery, TMI A predicted-that without full access to relevant documents-it would be unable to litigate the' major issues in the case.'. TMI A pointed out to the Board that Licensee's' proposed " Proprietary - Agreement" would intimidate TMI A members and would hinder TMIA's ability to-do' adequate research.
Furthermore,
' Licensee had provided no justification for limiting discovery by means of a Protective Order.
TMI A's prior experience with a protective order during the
" Reopened Hearing on Cheating" was an additional factor in TMIA's decision not to become ' party to a Proprietary Agreement.
On 2 March 1984 the Board denied TMIA's Motion to Compel and granted a Protective Order. On 3 April 1984, TMI A requested that the Board reconsider its Protective Or_ der, stating that the documents to which TMI A sought -access were relevant ~ to issues in contention, that Licensee had not denied this fact and that Licensee had not shown cause why the documents should be protected.
In addition, TMIA requested the Board to review the documents -for which proprietary privilege was claimed to determine the validity of that claim.
The Board denied TMIA's request for reconsideration and did not review the documents which Licensee claimed were proprietary.
2.
Request for an Expert Panel.
TMIA on 25 January 1984 filed a Motion for Appointment of Special Panel, explaining that because of the expedited pace of the discovery schedule, the location of the documents, TMIA's lack of expertise in the technical issues being considered, the prohibitive cost of document _
- reproduction and because the Protective Order effectively limited. discovery, without'such assistance,: TMI A.would be forced to enter the hearings with a
- fatally; flawed case.
TMIA proposed that cach of the four parties appoint an expert' representative, who.would be.signatoriesl to.the 1 " proprietary agreement."' 'TMI A further proposed that each expert representative. would examine the. documents and submit a report to the Board; The parties would then ~ have an opportunity to comment on the recommendation of. their appointed ~ expert and. based on the reports and comments, the Board -would
- make a decision.
The Board denied TMIA's motion on 24 February 1984.
111.. Summary Disposition:
The~ Board erred in granting Licensee and Staff's motions for_ summary disposition on contentions relative to the safety of the repaired tubes.
-1.
TMI A - Contention 1.c.
Contention 1.c expressed a concernI that the kinetic expansion process had weakened the steam generator tubes and that they would not be Lcapable of retaining plugs..
In support of its contention, TMI A cited the concerns of Licensee's Third Party Review Group, expressed in the Third Party Report (TPR), that ~
the tubes had been weakened.
TMI A further pointed to 23. plugs-which
-leaked after testing, as additional-evidence that tubes which had been kinetically. expanded 'and then plugged, had a higher risk of plug failure.
- The - Board's dismissal of this fact as "a quibbling - make-weight argument presented in an effort to secure a hearing upon an obviously insubstantial
~lssue," was arbitrary and capricious.
In light of new information that 280 plugs out of 1,006 plugged
. tubes in 'the "A" steam generator, which were recently tested, have failed and that many of these plugs have come out of the tubes, clearly E
Ey l demonstrates. that contention.1.c was a substantial safety -issue.
See TMI A -
Motion!to Reopen the Record,on the Basis of New information,. Att.
3'.
TMI A Contentions 2.a, 2.b.1 and 2.b.2.
- a. > The corrosive contaminant and the failure mechanism had. not z
' been adequately identified.
- b.. The cleaning process utilized by Licensee itself posed a risk of initiating additional corrosion..
c.
There existed a potential for the 20-50% sulfur remaining L
trapped in the oxide film after cleaning to reinitiate corrosion.
Licensee stated that sulfur possibly' coupled with chloride.was the -
suspected corrodant.'
See Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition, e
(Giacobbe at 9 and 26). - (Emphasis added.) They. argued that the necessary precautions had been taken to eliminate contaminants from the RCS.
Licensee.
- pointed out.that the sodium thiosulfate tank (thought to be the primary 4
source of the contaminant) had been physically removed and. that stringent administrative controls on chemical additions to the RCS hhd been put in
. place. ~
s Despite these' precautions sulfur and chloride levels unaccountably-began' to increase in both the' primary. and secondary sides of the steam generators in October of 1983.
See Att.
d, Licensee was unable to determine the cause of the increased levels of sulfur and chloride and they continued.at least'until 17 January 19814.
Atts, l.2.,45 In' its Motion for Summary Disposition, Licensee stated that "two
- Independent laboratories,- Battelle Columbus and Babcock & Wilcox" had examined the -evidence" and "provided a description of the failure scenario.
which they believed was responsible for the damage observed, based on the facts uncovered."
See Licensee's Motion for Summary Disposition,' Glacobbe y
L.
_19.
(Emphasis added.)
llowever Staff consultant Digby Mcdonald stated his belief 'that, a volatile ' polysulfur must be present in the. system.. See SEIU
' Mcdonald ?at 20-21.-
The Staff argued that since Mcdonald's comments, were.
raised in' the context of a "cicaning" recommendation; they were irrelevant in the.' context 6f contention,2.a.
Clearly Mcdonald's concern that other sulfur species might-be' responsible = for theicorrosion~ was relevant to contention 2.a, h
and in ; light of.' the'. concerns expressed by ~ the Staff's consultant, the' Board improperly failed to consider these facts in its decision. >
Contention - 2.b.1 Contention 2.b.1 alleged that concerns raised by Staff consultant '
Dillon regarding the risk of further corrosion from the cleaning process had I
not~been resolved.
Dillon was concerned that the cleaning process itself might put a large' inventory of sulfur into solution.
Licensee claimed that the. cleaning process posed no -danger.
In his statement supporting Licensce's -Motion for -
Summary. Disposition,.Giacobbe stated "Amonium hydroxide was selected as the reagent for use in' raising the pH to avoid the possibility of hideout and i
future corrosion that a solid alkali might introduce."
Giacobbe 182.
Apparently,- the amonium hydroxide was intended in part to = dislodge sulfur from the oxide layer, and put that sulfur into solution so it would eventually be removed from the: system.
This was precisely the issue which was the basis for Dillon's concern, and in fact when sulfur-levels in the stream generator were increasing in October 1983,- Licensee thought that the' increase was caused by the amonium hydroxide.' See Att~
1.
Licensee claimed that Dillon's concerns were mooted by successful hot functional testing and-subsequent -low -leakage, proving that the cleaninn process had been I
f successful.
However, the 27 November 1984 -letter from R. F. Wilson to l 1
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e i.
counsel for Licensee indicates that cracking has reinitiated and Dillon's. theory concerning the cleaning process cannot be ruled out as the cause.
. Contention 2.b.2.'
l-l TMI A alleged that a potential existed for reinitiation of corrosion.
i P
from the 20-50% sulfur remaining trapped in the: oxide layer after cleaninga.
l l
_ Licenseerclied on -its assertion-that the corrodant had been
' identified in order to reassure the Board that the sulfur specie ~present in'the
- steam generators was innocuous, and that the control procedures Licensee had, put in place would minimize.the conversion of the ' sulfur to' an aggressive -
l' from.- Licensee further asserted that the "long-term corrosion test" provided additional ~ assurance that reinitiation would not occur.
l Although Licensee did not make the Board aware of the problems with increasing levels of sulfur and chlorides, and of Licensee's concern over.
i those levels,. (see Atts. I 1,1.,6, TMI A raised genuine material facts, and the Board's dismissal of TMIA's contentions was in error.
l During the hearing the IV.
IMPROPER RULINGS DURING THE HEARING:
Board refused TMIA's request that it_ be allowed to question witnesses regarding _ safety significant information which came to the-attention of the
' parties. during the hearing.
In June and July 1984, Licensee submitted 3 PNO's which described problems of loose and missing plugs in the TMI-1 steam generators.
On the first day of the hearing, TMIA requested that.it be allowed to question Licensee witnesses about the loose and missing plugs.
TMIA pointed out to the Board that contention 1.c had in fact addressed the plug retention capability of the kinetically expanded tubes.- Tr. 204-208 (Bradford).
The Doard stated that the issue had been dealt with on summary disposition - and that during licensing and amendment hearings there was
always information that became availabic which could be construed as relevant to issues being litigated. -Ti3e Board also stated that if they were to allow all of this material in, hearings would last indefinitely, and noted that the Board had a responsibility to guard against broadening the scope of the hearing.
The Board denied TMIA:s request and suggested that TMIA's representative -
could question Licensee and Staff during the recess.- Tr. 208-209 (Wolfe)..
Clearly, the question of whether the plugs will be retained within the tubes is an important one, made more important by the fact that 280 plugs in steam generator "A" have since failed.
See Att. - 3 _.
The Board's' decision not to allow TMI A an opportunity to explore the new information was improper.
Furthermore, having Licensee and Staff respond to questions off the record is not an acceptable substitute for the creation of a-record.
The Board improperly Expunged Material from the Record:
The Board expunged material from the record without determining that such action was justified.
TMI A gathered the information which formed the ba, sis for a line of questioning from documents made available to TM1A by Licensee, designed to demonstrate that tubes underwent multiple detonations and that the hardening effect was cumulative.
These documents were characterized by Licensee as being non-proprietary.
This information was provided to TMIA in December
.1983, 6 months prior to the hearing.
Although Licensee had on two occasions retrieved documents which it had supplied to TM1 A, in order to excise materials it claimed as proprietary, Licensee made no attempt to remove the so-called proprietary-information, nor even to caution TMI A concerning use of that information.
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g l
)
It was not until the second day of hearing, while TMIA was laying the ground: work forla line,of questioning intended to show that multiple
- detonations:In the tubes would' cause an increased amount of-hardness in the' tubes, that Licensee belatedly decided that this information _was proprietaryr Tr~ 447 o (Churchill) in an off-the-record ' bench conference Licensee requested an.
in-camera session in order to receive the information.
TMI A : maintained its position,. stating that it had a right to full public hearings,> that it had-continually objected to Licensee's claim of proprietary privilege and would not agree to an in-camera session.
TMI A further pointed out that given its lack of expertise in the issues being slaa+ed, it was clear that the. information which was the basis for the line v.
questions, was garnered ~ from the documents provided to TMIA by Licensee.
TMIA had established with an earlier witness the fact that each detonation had a hardening effect on-the tubes, and that this effect was cumulative.
The responses which TMI A expected to elicit with the line of questioning, of which the expunged material ~ was - a part, would have demonstrated that the kinetic expansion process cuases greater hardening if the tubes than the mechanical rolling process.
IV. THE BOARD'S INITIAL DECISION: The Board issued-its initial Decision
' on 31 October 1984.
The decision was favorable te, ihr Licensee.
Since the close of the record several items-of new information have come to : light L which have significant safety relevance, and would have resulted in a different outcome.
}
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Summary Conclusion.
The Board's ruling during the discovery. phase of the hearityg and on Summary Disposition Motions effectively climinated all of the contentions
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.which would have examined the actual safety of the repaired tubes.
Those issues which survived and were - litigated, are-for the most. part only' important when the repaired tubes fall. '
For -example,. issues 1.a,.1.b ~and 1.c.are not issues designed to get at' the facts concerning-reliability of the repaired tubes, but instead '
anticipate' failure.
Resolution of these issues could~ not possibly test the adequacy of the kinetic-expansion repal process since all of these issues went-to the adequacy of systems which would signal or monitor ruptured or leaking tubes.
I Issue 1.d is likewise inadequate.
flaving failed to identify-conclusively the corrosive specie which caused the damage and the exact sequence of the contamination, the long-term corrosion test cannot. possibly be an accurate predictor of future corrosion.
On issue 4 we heard evidence from. Licensee's witness, Dr.' Pal, that there had been virtually no industry. experience with the jkinetic expansion process used as a repair. method for steam gen" rators l'n a nuclear e
power plant in the United States.- See Tr. 399-406 (Pal).
In order-to predict the probability of simultaneous tube rupture in.
both TMI-1 steam generators, it is necessary to first determine the reliability of-the repair method itself.
As. stated earlier, TMIA was effectively precluded from making such a determination as a result'of the improper rulings of the Board during discovery and summary disposition.
The Board's initial Decision should be overturned.
Respectfully submitted,
- JLbreahfl ut Louise Bradford Three Mlle Island Alert, Inc.