ML021550484

Issuance of Amendments 156 & 148, Deleting TS Section 5.5.3, Eliminating the Requirements to Have & Maintain the Post-Accident Sampling System

ML021550484
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	05/22/2002
From:	Rinaldi F NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
To:	Dennis Morey Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Rinaldi F, NRR/LPD2-1, 415-1447
References
TAC MB4089, TAC MB4090
Download: ML021550484 (14)

Text

May 22, 2002 Mr. D. N. Morey Vice President - Farley Project Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MB4089 AND MB4090)

Dear Mr. Morey:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 156 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 148 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated January 24, 2002.

The amendments delete TS Section 5.5.3, Post Accident Sampling, for Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain the post-accident sampling systems.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Frank Rinaldi, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 156 to NPF-2

2. Amendment No. 148 to NPF-8

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: See next page

Mr. D. N. Morey May 22, 2002 Vice President - Farley Project Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 RE: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS (TAC NOS. MB4089 AND MB4090)

Dear Mr. Morey:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 156 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 and Amendment No. 148 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated January 24, 2002.

The amendments delete TS Section 5.5.3, Post Accident Sampling, for Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain the post-accident sampling systems.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Frank Rinaldi, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 156 to NPF-2

2. Amendment No. 148 to NPF-8

3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC PDII-1 R/F G.Hill (4) WBeckner SCahill,RII ACRS OGC DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML021550484.wpd Accession Number: ML021550484

• See previous concurrence.

OFFICE CLIIP LPM* PDII-1/PM PDII-1/LA PDII-1/SC NAME WReckley FRinaldi CHawes JNakoski DATE 3/27/02 05/17/02 05/17/02 05/17/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 156 License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

(Southern Nuclear), dated January 24, 2002, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-2 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 156, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by December 31, 2002.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 22, 2002

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 156 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 DOCKET NO. 50-348 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 148 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications and associated Bases with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Insert 5.5-2 5.5-2 B 3.3.3-13 B 3.3.3-13

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-364 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 148 License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

(Southern Nuclear), dated January 24, 2002, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 148, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by December 31, 2002.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

John A. Nakoski, Chief, Section 1 Project Directorate II Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 22, 2002

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 156 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 148 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 24, 2002, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) et al.,

submitted a request for changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would delete TS Section 5.5.3, Post Accident Sampling, for Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain the post-accident sampling systems (PASS).

In the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 2, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) imposed requirements on licensees for commercial nuclear power plants to install and maintain the capability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. The desired capabilities of the PASS were described in NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements. The NRC issued orders to licensees with plants operating at the time of the TMI accident to confirm the installation of PASS capabilities (generally as they had been described in NUREG-0737). A requirement for PASS and related administrative controls was added to the TS of the operating plants and was included in the initial TS for plants licensed during the 1980s and 1990s. Additional expectations regarding PASS capabilities were included in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident.

Significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI accident in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant operations and developing better strategies for managing the response to potentially severe accidents at nuclear plants. Recent insights about plant risks and alternate severe accident assessment tools have led the NRC staff to conclude that some TMI Action Plan items can be revised without reducing the ability of licensees to respond to severe accidents. The NRCs efforts to oversee the risks associated with nuclear technology more effectively and to eliminate undue regulatory costs to licensees have prompted the NRC to consider eliminating the requirements for PASS in TS and other parts of the licensing bases of operating reactors.

The staff has completed its review of the topical reports submitted by the Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) and the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) that proposed the elimination of PASS. The justifications for the proposed elimination of PASS requirements center on evaluations of the various radiological and chemical sampling and their potential usefulness in responding to a severe reactor accident or making decisions regarding actions to protect the public from possible releases of radioactive materials. As explained in more detail in the staffs safety evaluations for the two topical reports, the staff has reviewed the available sources of information for use by decision-makers in developing protective action recommendations and assessing core damage. Based on this review, the staff found that the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. The staff agrees, therefore, with the owners groups that licensees can remove the TS requirements for PASS, revise (as necessary) other elements of the licensing bases, and pursue possible design changes to alter or remove existing PASS equipment.

2.0 BACKGROUND

In a letter dated May 5, 1999 (as supplemented by letter dated April 14, 2000), the CEOG submitted the topical report CE NPSD-1157, Revision 1, Technical Justification for the Elimination of the Post-Accident Sampling System From the Plant Design and Licensing Bases for CEOG Utilities. A similar proposal was submitted on October 26, 1998 (as supplemented by letters dated April 28, 1999, April 10 and May 22, 2000), by the WOG in its topical report WCAP-14986, Post Accident Sampling System Requirements: A Technical Basis. The reports provided evaluations of the information obtained from PASS samples to determine the contribution of the information to plant safety and accident recovery. The reports considered the progression and consequences of core damage accidents and assessed the accident progression with respect to plant abnormal and emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidance, and emergency plans. The reports provided the owners groups technical justifications for the elimination for the various PASS sampling requirements.

The specific samples and the staffs findings are described in the following evaluation.

The NRC staff prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) relating to the elimination of requirements on post-accident sampling and solicited public comment (65 FR 49271) in accordance with the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). The use of the CLIIP in this matter is intended to help the NRC to efficiently process amendments that propose to remove the PASS requirements from TS. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which this model apply were informed (65 FR 65018) that they could request amendments confirming the applicability of the SE to their reactors and providing the requested plant-specific verifications and commitments.

3.0 EVALUATION The technical evaluations for the elimination of PASS sampling requirements are provided in the safety evaluations dated May 16, 2000, for the CEOG topical report CE NPSD-1157 and June 14, 2000, for the WOG topical report WCAP-14986. The NRC staffs safety evaluations approving the topical reports are located in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) (Accession Numbers ML003715250 for CE NPSD-1157 and ML003723268 for WCAP-14986).

The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for PASS were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that were operating at the time of the TMI accident are likely to have been the subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the PASS functions described in NUREG-0737 as obligations. The issuance of plant specific amendments to adopt this change, which would remove PASS and related administrative controls from TS, supersede the PASS specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.

As described in its safety evaluations for the topical reports, the staff finds that the following PASS sampling requirements may be eliminated for plants of Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse designs:

1. reactor coolant dissolved gases

2. reactor coolant hydrogen

3. reactor coolant oxygen

4. reactor coolant pH

5. reactor coolant chlorides

6. reactor coolant boron

7. reactor coolant conductivity

8. reactor coolant radionuclides

9. containment atmosphere hydrogen concentration

10. containment oxygen

11. containment atmosphere radionuclides

12. containment sump pH

13. containment sump chlorides

14. containment sump boron

15. containment sump radionuclides The staff agrees that sampling of radionuclides is not required to support emergency response decision making during the initial phases of an accident because the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters or measurement of radiation levels. Therefore, it is not necessary to have dedicated equipment to obtain this sample in a prompt manner.

The staff does, however, believe that there could be significant benefits to having information about the radionuclides existing post-accident in order to address public concerns and plan for long-term recovery operations. As stated in the safety evaluations for the topical reports, the staff has found that licensees could satisfy this function by developing contingency plans to describe existing sampling capabilities and what actions (e.g., assembling temporary shielding) may be necessary to obtain and analyze highly radioactive samples from the reactor coolant system (RCS), containment sump, and containment atmosphere. (See item 4.1 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments.) These contingency plans must be available to be used by a licensee during an accident; however, these contingency plans do not have to be carried out in emergency plan drills or exercises. The contingency plans for obtaining samples from the RCS, containment sump, and containment atmosphere may also enable a licensee to derive information on parameters such as hydrogen concentrations in containment and boron concentration and pH of water in the containment sump. The staff considers the sampling of the containment sump to be potentially useful in confirming calculations of pH and boron concentrations and confirming that potentially unaccounted for acid sources have been

sufficiently neutralized. The use of the contingency plans for obtaining samples would depend on the plant conditions and the need for information by the decision-makers responsible for responding to the accident.

In addition, the staff considers radionuclide sampling information to be useful in classifying certain types of events (such as a reactivity excursion or mechanical damage) that could cause fuel damage without having an indication of overheating on core exit thermocouples. However, the staff agrees with the topical reports contentions that other indicators of failed fuel, such as letdown radiation monitors (or normal sampling system), can be correlated to the degree of failed fuel. (See item 4.2 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments.)

In lieu of the information that would have been obtained from PASS, the staff believes that licensees should maintain or develop the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. Although this capability may not be needed to support the immediate protective action recommendations during an accident, the information would be useful for decision makers trying to limit the publics ingestion of radioactive materials. (See item 4.3 under Licensee Verifications and Commitments.)

The staff believes that the changes related to the elimination of PASS that are described in the topical reports, related safety evaluations and this proposed change to TS are unlikely to result in a decrease in the effectiveness of a licensees emergency plan. Each licensee, however, must evaluate possible changes to its emergency plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the changes decrease the effectiveness of its site-specific plan. Evaluations and reporting of changes to emergency plans should be performed in accordance with applicable regulations and procedures.

The staff notes that redundant, safety-grade, containment hydrogen concentration monitors are required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(1), are addressed in NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.97, and are relied upon to meet the data reporting requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section VI.2.a.(i)(4). The staff concludes that during the early phases of an accident, the safety-grade hydrogen monitors provide an adequate capability for monitoring containment hydrogen concentration. The staff sees value in maintaining the capability to obtain grab samples for complementing the information from the hydrogen monitors in the long term (i.e., by confirming the indications from the monitors and providing hydrogen measurements for concentrations outside the range of the monitors). As previously mentioned, the licensees contingency plan (see item 4.1) for obtaining highly radioactive samples will include sampling of the containment atmosphere and may, if deemed necessary and practical by the appropriate decision-makers, be used to supplement the safety-related hydrogen monitors.

The elimination of PASS affects the discussion in the Bases section for TS 3.3.3, PAM

[Post-Accident Monitoring] Instrumentation. The Bases change replaces reference to PASS with "other core damage assessment capabilities" in the justification for allowing two containment hydrogen monitors to be inoperable for for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The Bases change is consistent with the staff's findings relative to PASS elimination. The replacement of the affected page is included with this amendment.

4.0 VERIFICATIONS AND COMMITMENTS As requested by the staff in the notice of availability for this TS improvement, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific verifications and commitments.

4.1 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere.

The licensee has made a regulatory commitment to develop contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, containment sump, and containment atmosphere. A description of the contingency plans will be contained in plant procedures and will be implemented with the implementation of this license amendment.

4.2 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold (typically this is 300 FCi/ml dose equivalent iodine). This capability may utilize the normal sampling system and/or correlations of sampling or letdown line dose rates to coolant concentrations.

The licensee has established the capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert level threshold. This capability will be described in plant procedures and will be implemented with the implementation of this license amendment. The licensee has made a regulatory commitment to maintain the capability for classifying fuel damage events.

4.3 Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and maintain), the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs.

The licensee has established the capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to offsite environs. This capability is described in the licensees emergency plan implementing procedures. The licensee has made a regulatory commitment to maintain the capability to monitor radioactive iodines.

The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the above regulatory commitments are provided by the licensees administrative processes, including its commitment management program.

Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would define the appropriate change-control and reporting requirements.

The staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation of regulatory requirements which would require prior NRC approval of subsequent changes. The NRC staff has agreed that NEI 99-04, Revision 0, Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes, provides reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to the NRC staff.

(See Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, Managing Regulatory Commitments Made by Power Reactor Licensees to the NRC Staff, dated September 21, 2000.) The commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry guidance or comparable criteria employed

by a specific licensee. The staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these commitments in a future inspection or audit.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (67 FR 21293). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: W. Reckley Date: May 22, 2002

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant cc:

Mr. Don E. Grissette William D. Oldfield General Manager - SAER Supervisor Southern Nuclear Operating Company Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 470 P. O. Box 470 Ashford, Alabama 36312 Ashford, Alabama 36312 Mr. Mark Ajluni, Licensing Manager Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295 Mr. M. Stanford Blanton Balch and Bingham Law Firm Post Office Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35201 Mr. J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health 434 Monroe Street Montgomery, Alabama 36130-1701 Chairman Houston County Commission Post Office Box 6406 Dothan, Alabama 36302 Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, Alabama 36319