ML021680421

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Technical Specifications - Farley Amendment Nos. 156 & 146
ML021680421
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 05/22/2002
From:
NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD2
To:
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
TAC M4089, TAC MB4090
Download: ML021680421 (2)


Text

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.2 Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment This program provides controls to minimize leakage from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident to levels as low as practicable. The systems include recirculation portions of the Containment Spray, Safety Injection, and Chemical and Volume Control Systems, the Waste Gas System, the Reactor Coolant Sampling System, the Residual Heat Removal System, and the Containment Atmosphere Sampling System. The program shall include the following:

a. Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements; and
b. Integrated leak test requirements for each system with the exception of the waste gas system and the containment atmosphere sampling system which are "snoop" tested at refueling cycle intervals or less.

5.5.3 Not Used 5.5.4 Radioactive Effluent Controls Program This program conforms to 10 CFR 50.36a for the control of radioactive effluents and for maintaining the doses to members of the public from radioactive effluents as low as reasonably achievable. The program shall be contained in the ODCM, shall be implemented by procedures, and shall include remedial actions to be taken whenever the program limits are exceeded. The program shall include the following elements:

a. Limitations on the functional capability of radioactive liquid and gaseous monitoring instrumentation including surveillance tests and setpoint determination in accordance with the methodology in the ODCM; (continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 5.5-2 Amendment No. 156 (Unit 1)

Amendment No. 148 (Unit 2)

A ---- '.---.='.- ------..-

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) Condition B applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A are not met. This Required Action specifies initiation of actions in Specification 5.6.8, which requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability, if performed, and identifies proposed restorative actions. This action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the likelihood of unit conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation.

C.1 Condition C applies when one or more Functions have two inoperable required channels (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same Function). Required Action C.1 requires restoring one channel in the Function(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation.

Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the PAM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur.

Condition C is modified by a Note that excludes hydrogen monitor channels.

D.1 Condition D applies when two hydrogen monitor channels are inoperable. Required Action D.1 requires restoring one hydrogen monitor channel to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on other core damage assessment capabilities available to provide information for operator decisions. Also, it is unlikely that a LOCA (which would cause core damage) would occur during this time.

(continued)

Farley Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-13 Revision 1 6