Text

License Amendment Request for Removal of Obsolete Requirements Associated with the Completion of the Afis Modification
	ML032040581
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	07/10/2003
From:	Rosalyn Jones; Duke Power Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML032040581 (68)
	v • d • e

_ Duke R. A. JONES (Powere Vice President A Duke Energy Company Duke Power 29672 / Oconee Nuclear Site 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864 885 3158 864 885 3564 fax July 10, 2003 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject:

Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-269, 270, and 287 License Amendment Request for Removal of Obsolete Requirements Associated With the Completion of the AFIS Modification on Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3.

Technical Specification Change (TSC) Number 2003-08 Pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Section 90 (10 CFR 50.90), Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) proposes to amend Appendix A, Technical Specifications, for Facility Operating Licenses DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Units 1, 2, and 3. The proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) removes Technical Specification requirements that are no longer applicable to Oconee Nuclear Station due to the completion of Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) modifications on Units 1, 2, and 3.

Duke installed the final AIS modification on Oconee Unit 3 during the Spring 2003 Outage. Notification of completion is provided in accordance with the NRC request in letter dated September 26, 2001 that issued the AIS license amendment.

The revised Technical Specification pages are included in Attachment 1. Attachment 2 contains the markup of the current Technical Specification pages.

The Technical Justification for the amendment request is included in Attachment 3. Attachments 4 and 5 contain the No Significant Hazards Consideration Evaluation and the Environmental Impact Analysis, respectively.

V www. duke-energy. corn

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 10, 2003 Page 2 This proposed change to the TS has been reviewed and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee and Nuclear Safety Review Board.

Implementation of these changes will not result in an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

The Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report has been reviewed and no further changes are required.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this proposed amendment is being sent to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control for review, and as deemed necessary and appropriate, subsequent consultation with the NRC staff.

If there are any additional questions, please contact Boyd Shingleton at (864) 885-4716.

Very t 1 yours, R. A s. Vice President Oconee Nuclear Site

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 10, 2003 Page 3 cc: Mr. L. N. Olshan, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-14 H25 Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. M. C. Shannon Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station Mr. Henry Porter, Director Division of Radioactive Waste Management Bureau of Land and Waste Management Department of Health & Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 10, 2003 Page 4 R. A. Jones, being duly sworn, states that he is Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Site, Duke Energy Corporation, that he is authorized on the part of said Company to sign and file with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission this revision to the Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55; and that all the statements and matters set forth herein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge R. A s, Vice President Oconee Nuclear Site Sbsc bed and sworn to before me this /0 day of LjL 2a>/ , 2003 otary Public My Commission Expires:

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission July 10, 2003 Page 5 bcc: w/attachments D. A. Baxter B. H. Hamilton W. W. Foster R. E. Hall D. A. Lee L. F. Vaughn L. E. Nicholson C. J. Thomas - MNS M. T. Cash - GO G. D. Gilbert - CNS J. E. Burchfield R. T. Repko T. D. Curtis B. J. Acampora R. A. Knoerr J. H. Bryan R. V. Gambrell ELL NSRB Commitments Document Management Reene' V. Gambrell

July 10, 2003 Page 1 ATTACEMENT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION Remove Page Insert Page Technical Specifications Table of Contents ii Table of Contents ii 3.3.11-1 3.3.11-1 3.3.12-1 3.3.12-1 3.3.13-1 3.3.13-1 3.3.25-1 to 2 3.3.25-1 3.3.26-1 to 2 3.3.26-1 3.3.27-1 to 2 3.3.27-1 Technical Specifications Bases Table of Contents ii Table of Contents ii B 3.3.11-1 to 5 B 3.3.11-1 to 5 B 3.3.12-1 to 2 B 3.3.12-1 to 2 B 3.3.13-1 to 4 B 3.3.13-1 to 4 B 3.3.25-1 to 6 B 3.3.25-1 B 3.3.26-1 to 3 B 3.3.26-1 B 3.3.27-1 to 3 B 3.3.27-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.8 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ............................... 3.3.8-1 3.3.9 Source Range Neutron Flux ............................................ 3.3.9-1 3.3.10 Wide Range Neutron Flux..................................................................3.3.10-1 3.3.11 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Instrumentation ......... 3.3.11-1 3.3.12 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Manual Initiation ........ 3.3.12-1 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels ........ 3.3.13-1 3.3.14 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Initiation Circuitry ....................... 3.3.14-1 3.3.15 Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) Closure ....................... 3.3.15-1 3.3.16 Reactor Building (RB) Purge Isolation - High Radiation ... 3.3.16-1 3.3.17 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Automatic Transfer Function .... 3.3.17-1 3.3.18 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Voltage Sensing Circuits ... 3.3.18-1 3.3.19 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) 230 kV Switchyard Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP) ... 3.3.19-1 3.3.20 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSI) CT -5 Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP) .................................. 3.3.20-1 3.3.21 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Keowee Emergency Start Function ... 3.3.21-1 3.3.22 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function .............................. 3.3.22-1 3.3.23 Main Feeder Bus Monitor Panel (MFBMP) ............................. 3.3.23-1 3.3.24 Not Used ............................. 3.3.24-1 3.3.25 Not Used ............................. 3.3.25-1 3.3.26 Not Used ............................. 3.3.26-1 3.3.27 Not Used ............................. 3.3.27-1 3.3.28 Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Auto-start Circuitry ................. 3.3.28-1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ............................................ 3.4.1-1 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits ............................... 3.4.1-1 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality ............................... 3.4.2-1 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits ............................... 3.4.3-1 3.4.4 RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2............................... 3.4.4-1 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3......................................................................3.4.5-1 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 ii Amendment Nos. , , I

AFIS Instrumentation 3.3.11 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.11 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.11 Four AFIS analog instrumentation channels per steam generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig.

ACTIONS

-------------- ---- --- - --------------------------- I- - - -- -_

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One analog channel A.1 Place channel in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable or tripped. bypass.

B. Two analog channels B.1 Restore channel(s) to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable. operable status.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.1 1-1 Amendment Nos. , & I

AFIS Manual Initiation 3.3.12 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.12 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Manual Initiation LCO 3.3.12 Two AFIS Manual Initiation switches per steam generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig.

ACTIONS

&aTC 1J-I I---- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- - -- -_

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One manual initiation A.1 Restore manual 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months switch per SG initiation switch to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

B Two manual initiation B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months switches per SG AND inoperable. .-

OR B.2 Reduce main steam 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months header pressure to Required Action and < 700 psig.

associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.12-1 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

AFIS Digital Channels 3.3.13 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels LCO 3.3.13 Two AFIS digital channels per steam generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig.

ACTIONS ANOTE.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One digital channel A.1 Restore digital channel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

B. 'Two digital channels B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months inoperable.

AND OR B.2 Reduce main steam 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months Required Action and header pressure to 700 associated Completion psig Time of Condition A not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.13.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.13-1 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

Not Used 3.3.25 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.25 Not Used I OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.25-1 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

Not Used I 3.3.26 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.26 Not Used I OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.26-1 Amendment Nos. I ,& I

Not Used 3.3.27 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.27 Not Used I OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.27-1 Amendment Nos. I

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels .............................. B 3.3.13-1 B 3.3.14 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Initiation Circuitry . B 3.3.14-1 B 3.3.15 Turbine Stop Valves (TSV) Closure . B 3.3.15-1 B 3.3.16 Reactor Building (RB) Purge Isolation - High Radiation ................. B 3.3.16-1 B 3.3.17 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Automatic Transfer Function ............ B 3.3.17-1 B 3.3.18 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Voltage Sensing Circuits......... B 3.3.18-1 B 3.3.19 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) 230 kV Switchyard Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP) ........... B 3.3.19-1 B 3.3.20 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) CT-5 Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP) ............................ B 3.3.20-1 B 3.3.21 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Keowee Emergency Start Function ................ B 3.3.21-1 B 3.3.22 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function .B 3.3.22-1 B 3.3.23 Main Feeder Bus Monitor Panel (MFBMP) .B 3.3.23-1 B 3.3.24 Not Used .B 3.3.24-1 B 3.3.25 Not Used .B 3.3.25-1 B 3.3.26 Not Used .B 3.3.26-1 B 3.3.27 Not Used. B 3.3.27-1 B 3.3.28 Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Standby Pump Auto-Start Circuitry ....... B 3.3.28-1 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 ii Amendment , , I

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.11 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.11 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND A Main Steam Une Break (MSLB) can lead to containment overpressure, unacceptable thermal stresses to the steam generator tubes, and significant core overcooling. Main and Emergency Feedwater must be promptly isolated to limit the effects of a MSLB. The AFIS instrumentation is designed to provide automatic termination of feedwater flow to the affected steam generator. The AFIS instrumentation automatically terminates Main Feedwater (MFW) by tripping both MFW pumps and closing the affected steam generators main and startup feedwater control valves and block valves. Although the main and startup feedwater block valves are automatically closed, their closure is not credited for mitigation of a MSLB. The AFIS instrumentation automatically terminates emergency feedwater (EFW) by stopping the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump (TDEFWP) and tripping the motor-driven emergency feedwater pump (MDEFWP) aligned to the affected steam generator. Manual overrides for the TDEFWP and MDEFWP's are provided to allow the operator to subsequently start the EFW pumps if necessary for decay heat removal.

In addition, AFIS instrumentation provides runout protection for the EFW pumps in the event of a MSLB and certain large break MFW line breaks with the pump in the automatic mode of operation.

Main Steam header pressure is used as input signals to the AFIS circuitry.

There are four pressure transmitters per steam generator with each feeding a steam pressure signal to an analog isolation module. The output of the analog isolation module provides an analog signal to a processor module that actuates isolation functions at desired setpoints. One pressure transmitter per steam generator, associated Integrated Control System (ICS) signal isolator(s) and analog isolation module inputs constitute an AFIS detection analog isolation channel.

The four AFIS analog channels per steam generator feed two redundant digital channels. Each digital channel provides independent circuit functions to isolate each steam generator. If the logic is satisfied, a trip output is energized. The use of an energized to trip processor module ensures that a loss of power to the digital channel will not result in an inadvertent feedwater isolation. If either digital channel is actuated, feedwater is isolated to the affected steam generator. Energizing the trip outputs results in closure of contacts in various control circuits for systems OCONEE UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3.3.1 1-1 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.11 BASES BACKGROUND and components used for the MSLB and feedwater line break mitigation.

(continued) Therefore, when the trip outputs are actuated, the systems and components perform their isolation functions. Other features of the digital channels include a test/manual initiation pushbutton and an "enable" or "arming" switch. An AFIS digital channel is defined as an analog isolation module, two digital 2 out of 4 logic modules (a Trip Module and a Trip Confirm Module), the Enable/Disable pushbutton, the associated output relays, the trip relay outputs to the feedwater pumps, the redundant switchgear trips for the MDEFWP, the solenoid valves for the MFCV &

SFCV, the trip solenoid valves for the feedwater pumps, and the TDEFWP trip function. There are two digital channels per steam generator. The two logic modules of each digital channel are configured in a two out of two logic arrangement. In this configuration a random failure of one of the logic modules will not result in a spurious actuation or preclude a valid AFIS actuation. In addition, a random failure of one of the logic modules will not preclude a valid AFIS actuation due to the redundant digital channel. While AFIS provides isolation of the feedwater block valves, this is not a credited function and is not a requirement for digital channel operability.

The AFIS digital channels are enabled and disabled administratively rather than automatically. Appropriate operating procedures contain provisions to enable/disable the digital channels.

APPLICABLE Based on the containment pressure response reanalysis, the containment SAFETY ANALYSES design pressure would be exceeded for a MSLB inside containment without immediate operator or automatic action to isolate main feedwater to the affected steam generator.

In addition, prompt operator or automatic action would be required to isolate EFW to the affected steam generator to limit the resultant thermal stresses on the steam generator tubes following a MSLB.

Main Steam header pressure is used as input signals to the AFIS circuitry.

When a MSLB is sensed, or upon manual actuation, main feedwater is terminated by tripping both MFW pumps and closing the affected steam generators main and startup feedwater control valves and block valves.

Although the main and startup feedwater block valves are automatically closed, they are not credited for mitigation of a MSLB. In addition, EFW is terminated by stopping the TDEFWP and tripping the MDEFWP aligned to the affected steam generator. Manual overrides for the TDEFWP and MDEFWP are provided to allow the operator to subsequently start the EFW pumps if necessary for decay heat removal.

The AFIS Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).

OCONEE UNITS 1 23 B 3.3.1 1-2 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.11 BASES (continued)

LCO This LCO requires that instrumentation necessary to initiate a MFW and EFW isolation shall be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders the affected analog channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the Function.

Four analog channels per SG are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure prevents Feedwater isolation. Each AFIS analog channel includes the sensor, ICS signal isolator and an analog isolation module.

I APPLICABILITY The AFIS Function shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig because the SG inventory can be at a high energy level and contribute significantly to the peak pressure with a secondary side break. Feedwater must be able to be isolated on each SG to limit mass and energy releases to the reactor building. Once the SG pressures have decreased below 700 psig, the AFIS Function can be bypassed to avoid actuation during normal unit cooldowns. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the energy level is low and the secondary side feedwater flow rate is low or nonexistent. In MODES 4,5, and 6, the primary system temperatures are too low to allow the SGs to effectively remove energy and AFIS instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS If a channel's trip setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or any of the transmitter or signal processing electronics, are found inoperable, then the Function provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the unit must enter the appropriate Conditions.

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for analog channels associated with each SG.

A.1 Condition A applies to failures of a single AFIS analog channel. With one channel inoperable or tripped, the channel(s) must be placed in bypass within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Bypassing the affected channel places the Function in a two-out-of-three configuration. Operation in this configuration may continue indefinitely since the AFIS Function is capable of performing its isolation function in the presence of any single random failure. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is adequate to perform Required Action A.1.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3.3.11-3 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.11 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued)

With two channels inoperable or if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A can not be met, the channel(s) must be returned to service within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . An inoperable channel includes any channel bypassed by Condition A.

C.1 and C.2 With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and main steam header pressure must be reduced to less than 700 psig within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.11.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; therefore, it is key in verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the transmitter or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. If the channels are normally off scale during times when surveillance is required, the CHANNEL CHECK will only verify that they are off scale in the same direction. Off scale low current loop channels are verified, where practical, to be reading at the bottom of the range and not failed downscale.

A continuous, automatic CHANNEL CHECK function is provided by Software. If a channel is outside the criteria, then an alarm is provided to the control room. Manual performance of the CHANNEL CHECK is acceptable.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, 3 B 3.3.11-4 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.11 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.11.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. Since the probability of two random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period is extremely low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due to failure of redundant channels. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but potentially more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.

SR 3.3.11.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed by comparing the test input signal to the value transmitted to the Calibration and Test Computer.

This enables verification of the voltage references and the signal commons. This will ensure the channel will perform its intended function.

The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience, with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel in any 31 day interval is a rare event.

SR 3.3.11.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channels adjusted to account for instrument drift to ensure that the instrument channel remains operational between successive tests. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall find that measurement errors and setpoint errors are within the assumptions of the setpoint analysis. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, 3 B 3.3.11-5 Amendment Nos. , , & I

AFIS Manual Initiation B 3.3.12 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.12 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Manual Initiation BASES BACKGROUND The AFIS manual initiation capability provides the operator with the capability to actuate the isolation function from the control room. This Function is provided in the event the operator determines that the Function is needed and does not automatically actuate. This is a backup Function to the automatic Feedwater isolation.

The AFIS manual initiation circuitry satisfies the manual initiation and single-failure criterion requirements of IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The Feedwater Isolation Function credited in the safety analysis SAFETY ANALYSES is automatic. However, the manual initiation Function is required by design as backup to the automatic Function and allows operators to actuate Feedwater Isolation whenever the Function is needed. Furthermore, the manual initiation of Feedwater Isolation may be specified in unit operating procedures.

The AFIS manual initiation function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2).

LCO Two manual initiation switches per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE. The Feedwater Isolation function has two actuation or trip" digital channels, channels 1 and 2. Within each digital channel actuation logic there are two manual trip switches. When the manual switch is depressed, a full trip of actuation digital channel 1 or 2 occurs.

I APPLICABILITY The AFIS manual initiation Function shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig because SG inventory can be at a sufficiently high energy level to contribute significantly to the peak containment pressure with a secondary side break. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the SG energy level is low and secondary side feedwater flow rate is low or nonexistent.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.12-1 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

AFIS Manual Initiation B 3.3.12 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for manual initiation switches associated with each SG.

A.1 With one manual initiation switch per steam generator inoperable, the manual initiation switch must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion lime of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is based on unit operating experience and administrative controls, which provide alternative means of AFIS initiation via individual component controls. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is consistent with the allowed outage time for the components actuated by the AFIS.

B.1 With both manual initiation switches per steam generator inoperable or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met, the Unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and the main steam header pressure reduced to less than 700 psig within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging Unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.12.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires the performance of a digital CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST to ensure that the channels can perform their intended functions.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgment and operating experience that determined testing on an 18 month interval provides reasonable assurance that the circuitry is available to perform its safety function, while the risks of testing during unit operation is avoided.

REFERENCES 1. IEEE-279-1971, April 1972.

2. 10 CFR 50.36.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.12-2 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels BASES BACKGROUND The four AFIS analog channels per steam generator feed two redundant feedwater digital channels. Each digital channel provides independent circuit functions to isolate each steam generator. If the logic is satisfied, a trip output is energized. The use of an energized to trip processor module ensures that a loss of power to the digital channels will not result in an inadvertent feedwater isolation. If either digital channel is actuated, feedwater to the affected steam generator is isolated. Energizing the trip outputs results in actuation of contacts in various control circuits for systems and components used for the MSLB and feedwater line break mitigation. Therefore, when the trip outputs are actuated, the systems and components perform their isolation functions. An AFIS digital channel is defined as an analog isolation module, two digital 2 out of 4 logic modules (a Trip Module and a Trip Confirm Module), the Enable/Disable pushbutton, the associated output relays, the trip relay outputs to the feedwater pumps, the redundant switchgear trips for the MDEFWP, the solenoid valves for the MFCV & SFCV, the trip solenoid valves for the feedwater pumps, and the TDEFWP trip function. There are two digital channels per steam generator. The two logic modules of each digital channel are configured in a two out of two logic arrangement. In this configuration a random failure of one of the logic modules will not result in a spurious actuation or preclude a valid AFIS actuation. In addition, a random failure of one of the logic modules will not preclude a valid AFIS actuation due to the redundant digital channel. While AFIS provides isolation of the feedwater block valves, this is not a credited function and is not a requirement for digital channel operability.

Trio SetDoints and Allowable Values Trip setpoints are the nominal values that are user defined in AFIS software. AFIS software is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for analog CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy.

The trip setpoints used in the AFIS software are selected such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment induced errors for AFIS channels that must function in harsh OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-1 Amendment Nos. , , I

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 BASES BACKGROUND Trin Setpoints and Allowable Values (continued) environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49, the Allowable Values specified are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits.

The actual nominal trip setpoint entered into the software for low MS pressure is 550 psig and the rate of depressurization setpoint will be 3 psl/sec. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within Us required Allowable Value.

Setpoints, in accordance with the Allowable Values, ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment functions as designed.

Each analog channel can be tested online to verify that the setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. The analog CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed by comparing the test input signal to the value transmitted to the Calibration and Test Computer.

This enables verification of the voltage references and the signal commons to ensure the analog channel will perform its intended function.

A continuous, automatic analog CHANNEL CHECK is provided by AFIS software. If the channel is outside acceptance criteria, an alarm is provided to the control room.

APPLICABLE AFIS circuitry is installed equipment necessary to automatically isolate SAFETY ANALYSES main and emergency feedwater to the affected steam generator following a MSLB. The AFIS circuitry provides protection against exceeding containment design pressure for MSLB's inside containment and provides protection against exceeding allowable thermal stresses on the steam generator tubes following a MSLB.

Main Steam header pressure is used as input signals to the AFIS circuitry.

When a MSLB is sensed, or upon manual actuation, MFW is terminated by tripping both MFW pumps and closing the affected steam generators main and startup feedwater control valves and block valves. Although the main and startup feedwater block valves are automatically closed, they are not credited for mitigation of a MSLB. In addition, EFW is terminated by stopping the TDEFWP and tripping the MDEFWP aligned to the affected steam generator. Manual overrides for the TDEFWP and MDEFWP's are provided to allow the operator to subsequently start the emergency feedwater pumps if necessary for decay heat removal.

The AFIS logic channels satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 1).

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-2 Amendment Nos. , , I

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 BASES (continued)

LCO Two AFIS digital channels per steam generator shall be OPERABLE. Both logic modules of a digital channel shall be in the untripped condition for the digital channel to be considered OPERABLE.

I APPLICABILITY The AFIS digital channels shall be OPERABLE in MODES I and 2, and MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig because SG inventory can be at a high energy level and can contribute significantly to the peak containment pressure during a secondary side line break. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the energy level is low and the secondary side feedwater flow rate is low or nonexistent.

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for logic channels associated with each SG.

A.1 With one digital channel inoperable, the inoperable digital channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is based on unit operating experience and administrative controls, which provide alternative means of AFIS initiation via individual component controls. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is consistent with the allowed outage time for the components actuated by AFIS.

B.1 and B.2 With both digital channels inoperable or the Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the Unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and the main steam header pressure must be reduced to less than 700 psig within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging Unit systems.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-3 Amendment Nos. , , I

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.13.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST to ensure that the digital channels can perform their intended functions. The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgment and operating experience that determined testing on an 18 month interval provides reasonable assurance that the circuitry is available to perform its safety function, while the risks of testing during Unit operation is avoided.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-4 Amendment Nos. , , I

Not Used l B 3.3.25 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.25 Not Used OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.25-1 Amendment Nos. , , & I

Not Used B 3.3.26 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.26 Not Used OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.26-1 Amendment Nos. I

Not Used l B 3.3.27 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.27 Not Used OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.27-1 Amendment Nos. , ,& I

July 10, 2003 Page 1 ATTACHMENT 2 tL&RUP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.8 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ............................... 3.3.8-1 3.3.9 Source Range Neutron Flux .............................................. 3.3.9-1 3.3.10 Wide Range Neutron Flux .............................................. 3.3.10-1 3.3.11 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Instrumentation . 3.3.11-1 f 3.3.12 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Manual Initiation ....... 3.3.12-1 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels ........ 3.3.13-1 3.3.14 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Initiation Circuitry ....................... 3.3.14-1 3.3.15 Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) Closure ....................... 3.3.15-1 3.3.16 Reactor Building (RB) Purge Isolation - High Radiation .... 3.3.16-1 3.3.17 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Automatic Transfer Function ... 3.3.17-1 3.3.18 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Voltage Sensing Circuits ... 3.3.18-1 3.3.19 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) 230 kV Switchyard Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP)........................................................................3.3.19-1 3.3.20 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) CT - 5 Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP) ... 3.3.20-1 3.3.21 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Keowee Emergency Start Function ... 3.3.21-1 3.3.22 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Manual Keowee Emergency Start Function .3.3.22-1 3.3.2 Not used Main Feeder Bus Monitor Panel (MFBMP) .3.3.23-1 3.3.2 - ................... .. ..... 3.3.24-1 3.3.25 Main St m Line Br k (MSLB) Dtection a Feedwater iso tion Instru en.ati. .. ............... ..... 3.3.25-1 3.3.26 Main team Line reak (MSL Detectio and Feedwer Isolation Mual Initiatio ............. .... .....3.3.26-1 3.............

3.3.27 in Steam e Break (M B) Det n and Fee ater JIsolatlor ,ogicChan ................... , . 3.3.27-1 3.3.28 Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Auto-start Circuitry ................. 3.3.28-1 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ............................................ 3.4.1-1 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits ............................... 3.4.1-1 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality ............................... 3.4.2-1 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits ............................... 3.4.3-1 3.4.4 RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2............................... 3.4.4-1 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3 ............................... 3.4.5-1 OCONEE UNITS 1,2, & 3 ii Amendment Nos.l , 00, 30

AFIS Instrumentation 0 3.3.11 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.11 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.11 Four AFIS analog instrumentation channels per steam generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE.

--- --------- -- --- NOT-- _---- - --

Not ap licable on ea Unit until a r completio of the Automtc Fee ater Isolatio ystem modf cation on th respective U it.

-- --- - - -- ---- t - -- -- -

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig. FF2 'I ACTIONS

--- - --- a------------ --- ----- NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One analog channel A.1 Place channel in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable or tripped. bypass.

B. Two analog channels B.1 Restore channel(s) to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable. operable status. I y

OR /

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.1 1-1 Amendment Nos. 32 0,X291& 10 I

AFIS Manual Initiation 3.3.12 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.12 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Manual Initiation LCO 3.3.12 Two AFIS Manual Initiation switches per steam generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE.

- ---------------- ----- NOT---- --

Not ap cable on ea Unit until a r completio of the Auto tic Feed dater Isolatio ystem modfcation on th respective U it.

APPLICABILITY: arr 7-MLJUUI x A! v4 I ano Z, ei^f-MODE 3 with main steam header pressure > 700 psig.

ACTIONS t C- i ti--- e is----------------------- ------ N I---- ---

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG.

~~~

_~~ ~ ~~ --- - -- --

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One manual initiation A.1 Restore manual 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months switch per SG initiation switch to I inoperable. OPERABLE status.

B Two manual Initiation B.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months switches per SG inoperable. AND OR B.2 Reduce main steam 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months header pressure to Required Action and < 700 psig.

associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.12-1 Amendment Nos. W, 0 & 0 l

AFIS Digital ChannelsW 3.3.13 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels k LCO 3.3.13 Two AFIS digital channels per steam generator (SG) shall be OPERABLE. /

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig.

ACTIONS

.ATP.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG.

_~~~~~~~ -- -- - - -- - - - -- - -- - -- - - - __- -- - -- - -- - - -_- - - - -- - ---

I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One digital channel A.1 Restore digital channel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.3.1 3-1 Amendment Nos. 6, 0/& 0 I

[ LB D ectior nd Fdedwter Is tionXstrur entan 3.3.25 Not Used I e e IKI1TI I A=rTArIrfI O.0 I4 0lUIVIN I I A I IWNj' 3.3.25 [Maiwb-eam U71 9 eak (M+) Detdfion an eedw9 rlsolatoi lnstru/entatio/ I 3.3.25 on and Feedwater Isolation (SG) shall be OPERABLE.

picable on each Unit until after Feedwater Isolation System modif APP LITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main stea eader piressure 2 700 psig except feedwater co ol valves (MIFCVs) and startup feedwai valves ( Vs) are closed. z ACTIONS A. One or more Feedwater Isolation Functions wth one channel inope e.

One oj.niore Feedwater 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Issaffon Functions with AXo or more channels inoperable.

18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months OR Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

Close all MFCVs and SFCVs.

+.1 ~Perform CHANNEL CHECK 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.325.2 --

Only applicable O oifications are/

implementet allow online testing./

Pepfm"CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. / 1 days SR 3.3.25.9/Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION/' 18 monthsl Amendment Nos. 320,320, &

I M4LB Dtionnd F dwar solion anua/nitia n]

3.3.26 l1 ot Ued 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 4 ak (W$8(B) D~? oaxeed~atr isosol 9 nimaj nita 3.3.26 [M iR-rea L I O3.3.26 Two MSLB Det nd Feedwater Isolation manual initn witches

/ ~~~~~~shall beg ABLE./

--- 7/------------------------- NOTE---

pplicable on each Unit until after complen of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System modificat on the respective Unit.

APPABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main ste header pressure 2 700 psig except whe 1lmain feedwater trol valves (MFCVs) and startup feedwa c oento valves Csare closed.

ACTIONS COND ! ( I REQUIRED ACTION/ COMPLETION TIME

/

A. 0 anual initiation A.1 Restore nual 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months itch inoperable. initi n switch to ERABLE status.

4 B. Two manual initiation Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months switches inoperable.

AND OR B.2.1 Reduce main steam 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months Requ Action and header pressure to a lated Completion < 700 psig.

ime of Condition A not met. OR B.2.2 C se all MFCVs and 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months FlCVs.

Oco U T1, 2, &3 3.3.261 mendment Nos. 320, 3 03320, 0 & 3202

flan niti&n Z ~3.3.26 REQUIRES r~ IKMflV 3.3.26-2 :Nos. 320, 320, & 320

, SLB Dectiogy nd Fdedw er Is dtionleogic/han s l

3.3.27 iNotUsed I 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.27 [Mai-<eam LpS~eak (AZB) Deq 4 n an,'eedw6rlsola@/0nLogic Iannei J I CO 3.3.27 Two MSLB Dete and Feedwater Isolation Logic chann sail be OPERABLE/\

_/

-.-.----------------- ------ NOTE--------- ---------

i plicable on each Unit until after comple of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System modifica on the respective Unit.

MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with main ste eader pressure 2 700 psig except whe I main feedwater rol valves (MFCVs) and startup feedwat control valves Vs) are closed.

ACTIONS COND tREQUIRED ACTI COMPLETION TIME

-7 I z A. 0 gic channel A.1 Restore aInel to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months operable. OP LE status.

a a "oo, B. Two logic channels Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months inonerable.

AND OR/

B.2.1 Reduce main steam hours Required ion and header pressure to assoc Completion < 700 psig.

11 of Condition A not Y e~~~~t. OF B.2.2 Clo MFCVs I and S Vs. 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months XC ,2 3.3.271 Amendment Nos. 320 1,30,&32

Is itiongichan

/ 3.3.27 3.3.27- Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & 320

TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels ............................. B 3.3.13-1 B 3.3.14 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump Initiation Circuitry .B 3.3.14-1 B 3.3.15 Turbine Stop Valves (TSV) Closure .B 3.3.15-1 B 3.3.16 Reactor Building (RB) Purge Isolation - High Radiation ................ B 3.3.16-1 B 3.3.17 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Automatic Transfer Function .......... B 3.3.17-1 B 3.3.18 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Voltage Sensing Circuits ......... B 3.3.18-1 B 3.3.19 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) 230 kV Switchyard Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP) ........... B 3.3.19-1 B 3.3.20 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) CT - 5 Degraded Grid Voltage Protection (DGVP) ............................ B 3.3.20-1 B 3.3.21 Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Keowee Emergency Start Function ................ B 3.3.21-1 B 3.3.22 mergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Manual Not Used Keowee Emergency Start Function ............................. B 3.3.22-1 B 3.3.23 am Feeder Bus Monitor Panel (MFBMP) .B 3.3.23-1 B 3.3.24 Not Used .B 3.3.24-1 B 3.3.25 amS am Line Br ak (MSLB) D tection a Feedwater Isation Inst ....................... B 3.3.25-1 B 3.3.26 Mai Steam Lin reak (MSLrDetectio and Feedw er Isolation M,; nual B 3.3.261

.nitiatio.....

B 3.3.27 am Steam ne Break (M B) Dete on and Fee water Isolatio L ic Chan .... .............. B 3.3.27-1 B 3.3.28 Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) Standby Pump Auto-Start Circuitry ....... B 3.3.28-1 OCONEE UNITS 1,2, & 3 ii Amendmenj 0,X20;i4

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.11 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.11 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND A Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) can lead to containment overpressure, unacceptable thermal stresses to the steam generator tubes, and significant core overcooling. Main and Emergency Feedwater must be promptly Isolated to limit the effects of a MSLB. The AFIS instrumentation is designed to provide automatic termination of feedwater flow to the affected steam generator. The AFIS instrumentation automatically terminates Main Feedwater (MFW) by tripping both MFW pumps and closing the affected steam generators main and startup feedwater control valves and block valves. Although the main and startup feedwater block valves are automatically closed, their closure is not credited for mitigation of a MSLB. The AFIS instrumentation automatically terminates emergency feedwater (EFW) by stopping the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump (TDEFWP) and tripping the motor-driven emergency feedwater pump (MDEFWP) aligned to the affected steam generator. Manual overrides for the TDEFWP and MDEFWP's are provided to allow the operator to subsequently start the EFW pumps if necessary for decay heat removal.

In addition, AFIS instrumentation provides runout protection for the EFW pumps in the event of a MSLB and certain large break MFW line breaks with the pump in the automatic mode of operation.

Main Steam header pressure is used as input signals to the AFIS circuitry.

There are four pressure transmitters per steam generator with each feeding a steam pressure signal to an analog isolation module. The output of the analog isolation module provides an analog signal to a processor module that actuates isolation functions at desired setpoints. One pressure transmitter per steam generator, associated Integrated Control System (ICS) signal isolator(s) and analog isolation module inputs constitute an AFIS detection analog isolation channel.

The four AFIS analog channels per steam generator feed two redundant digital channels. Each digital channel provides independent circuit functions to isolate each steam generator. If the logic is satisfied, a trip output is energized. The use of an energized to trip processor module ensures that a loss of power to the digital channel will not result in an inadvertent feedwater isolation. If either digital channel is actuated, feedwater is isolated to the affected steam generator. Energizing the trip outputs results in closure of contacts in various control circuits for systems OCONEE UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3.3.11-1 [BAAS R3)i1SI91 DATED 04&796I Aendment Nc

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.11 BASES (continued)

BACKGROUND and components used for the MSLB and feedwater line break mitigation.

(continued) Therefore, when the trip outputs are actuated, the systems and components perform their isolation functions. Other features of the digital channels include a test/manual initiation pushbutton and an Uenabler or harming" switch. An AFIS digital channel is defined as an analog isolation module, two digital 2 out of 4 logic modules (a Trip Module and a Trip Confirm Module), the Enable/Disable pushbutton, the associated output relays, the trip relay outputs to the feedwater pumps, the redundant switchgear trips for the MDEFWP, the solenoid valves for the MFCV &

SFCV, the trip solenoid valves for the feedwater pumps, and the TDEFWP

/

trip function. There are two digital channels per steam generator. The two 4*

logic modules of each digital channel are configured in a two out of two logic arrangement. In this configuration a random failure of one of the logic /

modules will not result in a spurious actuation or preclude a valid AFIS /

actuation. In addition, a random failure of one of the logic modules will not /

preclude a valid AFIS actuation due to the redundant digital channel. Whil AFIS provides isolation of the feedwater block valves, this is not a credited id function and is not a requirement for digital channel operability.

The AFIS digital channels are enabled and disabled administratively rather than automatically. Appropriate operating procedures contain provisions to enable/disable the digital channels.

APPLICABLE Based on the containment pressure response reanalysis, the containment SAFETY ANALYSES design pressure would be exceeded for a MSLB inside containment without immediate operator or automatic action to isolate main feedwater to the affected steam generator.

In addition, prompt operator or automatic action would be required to isolate EFW to the affected steam generator to limit the resultant thermal stresses on the steam generator tubes following a MSLB.

Main Steam header pressure is used as input signals to the AFIS circuitry.

When a MSLB is sensed, or upon manual actuation, main feedwater is terminated by tripping both MFW pumps and closing the affected steam generators main and startup feedwater control valves and block valves.

Although the main and startup feedwater block valves are automatically closed, they are not credited for mitigation of a MSLB. In addition, EFW is terminated by stopping the TDEFWP and tripping the MDEFWP aligned to the affected steam generator. Manual overrides for the TDEFWP and MDEFWP are provided to allow the operator to subsequently start the EFW pumps if necessary for decay heat removal.

The AFIS Instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3.3.11-2 (BA* O 4 O77Ifl 5.S94DT l Amendment No

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 1 BASES (continued)

LCO This LCO requires that instrumentation necessary to initiate a MFW and EFW isolation shall be OPERABLE. Failure of any instrument renders the affected analog channel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the Function.

Four analog channels per SG are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single failure prevents Feedwater isolation. Each AFIS analog channel includes the sensor, ICS signal isolator and an analog isolation module.

APPLICABILITY The AFIS Function shall be OPERABLE In MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig because the SG inventory can be at a high energy level and contribute significantly to the peak pressure with a secondary side break. Feedwater must be able to be isolated on each SG to limit mass and energy releases to the reactor building. Once the SG pressures have decreased below 700 psig, the AFIS Function can be bypassed to avoid actuation during normal unit cooldowns. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the energy level is low and the secondary side feedwater flow rate is low or nonexistent. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the primary system temperatures are too low to allow the SGs to effectively remove energy and AFIS instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS If a channel's trip setpoint is found nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or any of the transmitter or signal processing electronics, are found inoperable, then the Function provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the unit must enter the appropriate Conditions.

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for analog channels associated with each SG.

A.1 Condition A applies to failures of a single AFIS analog channel. With one channel inoperable or tripped, the channel(s) must be placed in bypass within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Bypassing the affected channel places the Function in a two-out-of-three configuration. Operation In this configuration may continue indefinitely since the AFIS Function is capable of performing its OCONEE UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3.3.11-3 ,SS R3)i1SI9f DAT6D 04{7196 IAmendment No

s-K.

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 1 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued) isolation function in the presence of any single random failure. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is adequate to perform Required Action A.1.

B.1 With two channels inoperable or if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A can not be met, the channel(s) must be returned to service within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . An Inoperable channel includes any channel bypassed by Condition A.

C.1 and C.2 With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and main steam header pressure must be reduced to less than 700 psig within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.11.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter Indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; therefore, it is key in verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including Isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the transmitter or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the criteria, it Is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. If the channels are normally off scale during times when surveillance is required, the CHANNEL CHECK will only verify that they are off scale in the same direction. Off scale low current loop channels are verified, where practical, to be reading at the bottom of the range and not failed downscale.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3.3.11-4 lBA S R I1SIC4 DAY1 04 7/

Amendment Nos.

AFIS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.11.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS A continuous, automatic CHANNEL CHECK function is provided by Software. If a channel is outside the criteria, then an alarm is provided to the control room. Manual performance of the CHANNEL CHECK is acceptable.

The frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. Since the probability of two random failures in redundant channels in any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months period is extremely low, the CHANNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of loss of protective function due to failure of redundant channels. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but potentially more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.

SR 3.3.11.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed by comparing the test input signal to the value transmitted to the Calibration and Test Computer.

This enables verification of the voltage references and the signal commons. This will ensure the channel will perform its intended function.

The Frequency of 31 days is based on operating experience, with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel in any 31 day interval is a rare event.

SR 3.3.11.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the sensor. The test verifies the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channels adjusted to account for instrument drift to ensure that the Instrument channel remains operational between successive tests. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall find that measurement errors and setpoint errors are within the assumptions of the setpoint analysis. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the assumptions of the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency is based on the assumption of an 18 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2,3 B 3.3.11-5 [ BS VISI DA/ED 017y2 I

[Amendment Nos.

AFIS Manual Initiation B 3.3.12 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.12 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Manual Initiation BASES BACKGROUND The AFIS manual initiation capability provides the operator with the _

capability to actuate the isolation function from the control room. This Function is provided in the event the operator determines that the Function is needed and does not automatically actuate. This is a backup Function to the automatic Feedwater isolation. l The AFIS manual initiation circuitry satisfies the manual initiation and single-failure criterion requirements of IEEE-279-1971 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The Feedwater Isolation Function credited in the safety analysis SAFETY ANALYSES is automatic. However, the manual Initiation Function is required by design as backup to the automatic Function and allows operators to actuate Feedwater Isolation whenever the Function is needed. Furthermore, the manual initiation of Feedwater Isolation may be specified in unit operating procedures.

The AFIS manual initiation function satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2).

LCO Two manual initiation switches per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE. The Feedwater Isolation function has two actuation or trip" digital channels, channels 1 and 2. Within each digital channel actuation logic there are two manual trip switches. When the manual switch is depressed, a full trip of actuation digital channel 1 or 2 occurs.

This LCis modified a Note whi indicates e requiremen are applica e to a Unit er completio of the AFIS iodfication the resp lye Unit. a is necessa since the sp ciication is b on 0sed e Uni design afte implementati of the modi cation.

APPLICABILITY The AFIS manual initiation Function shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig because SG l inventory can be at a sufficiently high energy level to contribute significantly to the peak containment pressure with a secondary side break. In l MODES 4, 5, and 6, the SG energy level is low and secondary side feedwater flow rate is low or nonexistent.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.12-1 Amendment Nos.W0,M2, 8/32< of

AFIS Manual Initiation l/

B 3.3.12 L BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for manual initiation switches associated with each SG.

A.1 With one manual initiation switch per steam generator inoperable, the manual initiation switch must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is based on unit operating experience and administrative controls, which provide alternative means of AFIS initiation via individual component controls. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is consistent with the allowed outage time for the components actuated by the AFIS.

B.1 With both manual initiation switches per steam generator inoperable or the /

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met, the Unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and the main steam header pressure reduced to less than 700 psig within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging Unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.12.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires the performance of a digital CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST to ensure that the channels can perform their intended functions.

The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgment and operating experience that determined testing on an 18 month interval provides reasonable assurance that the circuitry is available to perform its safety function, while the risks of testing during unit operation is avoided.

REFERENCES 1. IEEE-279-1971, April 1972.

2. 10 CFR 50.36.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.12-2 Amendment Nos.(300 2, 3 6 Al

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.13 Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels BASES BACKGROUND The four AFIS analog channels per steam generator feed two redundant feedwater digital channels. Each digital channel provides independent circuit functions to isolate each steam generator. If the logic is satisfied, a trip output is energized. The use of an energized to trip processor module ensures that a loss of power to the digital channels will not result in an inadvertent feedwater isolation. If either digital channel is actuated, feedwater to the affected steam generator is isolated. Energizing the trip outputs results in actuation of contacts in various control circuits for systems and components used for the MSLB and feedwater line break mitigation. Therefore, when the trip outputs are actuated, the systems and components perform their isolation functions. An AFIS digital channel is

//

defined as an analog isolation module, two digital 2 out of 4 logic modules (a Trip Module and a Trip Confirm Module), the Enable/Disable pushbutton, the associated output relays, the trip relay outputs to the feedwater pumps, the redundant switchgear trips for the MDEFWP, the solenoid valves for the MFCV & SFCV, the trip solenoid valves for the feedwater pumps, and the TDEFWP trip function. There are two digital channels per steam generator. The two logic modules of each digital channel are configured in a two out of two logic arrangement. In this configuration a random failure of one of the logic modules will not result in a spurious actuation or preclude a valid AFIS actuation. In addition, a random failure of one of the logic modules will not preclude a valid AFIS actuation due to the redundant digital channel. While AFIS provides isolation of the feedwater block valves, this is not a credited function and is not a requirement for digital channel operability.

TriD Setpoints and Allowable Values Trip setpoints are the nominal values that are user defined in AFIS software. AFIS software is considered to be properly adjusted when the "as left" value is within the band for analog CHANNEL CALIBRATION accuracy.

The trip setpoints used in the AFIS software are selected such that adequate protection is provided when all sensor and processing time delays are taken into account. To allow for calibration tolerances, instrumentation uncertainties, instrument drift, and severe environment induced errors for AFIS channels that must function in harsh OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-1 LB 1i/SIDh

ŽS DAftD 017/I I I Amendment PNos.l

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 BASES BACKGROUND Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values (continued) environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49, the Allowable Values specified are conservatively adjusted with respect to the analytical limits.

The actual nominal trip setpoint entered into the software for low MS pressure is 550 psig and the rate of depressurization setpoint will be 3 psi/sec. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value.

Setpoints, in accordance with the Allowable Values, ensure that the consequences of accidents will be acceptable, providing the unit is operated from within the LCOs at the onset of the accident and the equipment functions as designed.

Each analog channel can be tested online to verify that the setpoint accuracy is within the specified allowance requirements. The analog CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed by comparing the test input signal to the value transmitted to the Calibration and Test Computer.

This enables verification of the voltage references and the signal commons to ensure the analog channel will perform its intended function.

A continuous, automatic analog CHANNEL CHECK is provided by AFIS software. If the channel is outside acceptance criteria, an alarm is provided to the control room.

APPLICABLE AFIS circuitry is installed equipment necessary to automatically isolate SAFETY ANALYSES main and emergency feedwater to the affected steam generator following a MSLB. The AFIS circuitry provides protection against exceeding containment design pressure for MSLB's Inside containment and provides protection against exceeding allowable thermal stresses on the steam generator tubes following a MSLB.

Main Steam header pressure is used as input signals to the AFIS circuitry.

When a MSLB is sensed, or upon manual actuation, MFW is terminated by tripping both MFW pumps and closing the affected steam generator's main and startup feedwater control valves and block valves. Although the main and startup feedwater block valves are automatically closed, they are not credited for mitigation of a MSLB. In addition, EFW is terminated by stopping the TDEFWP and tripping the MDEFWP aligned to the affected steam generator. Manual overrides for the TDEFWP and MDEFWP's are provided to allow the operator to subsequently start the emergency feedwater pumps if necessary for decay heat removal.

The AFIS logic channels satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 1).

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-2 fBAjS VISI9h DA ED 0(17/0]

I Amendment Nos.

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 BASES (continued)

LCO Two AFIS digital channels per steam generator shall be OPERABLE. Bothkl logic modules of a digital channel shall be in the untripped condition for the

{This digital channel to be considered OPERABLE.

LCO modified b a Note whi indicates t requiremen are applicab to a Unit a er completio of the AFIS resp dification o the e Unit. Thi is necessary ince the sp ification is b sed on t e Un esign after' plerrentatioro the modiffi n. / /

APPLICABILITY The AFIS digital channels shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig because SG inventory can be at a high energy level and can contribute significantly to the peak containment pressure during a secondary side line break. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, the energy level is low and the secondary side feedwater flow rate is low or nonexistent.

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS indicating that a separate Condition entry is allowed for logic channels associated with each SG.

A.1 With one digital channel inoperable, the inoperable digital channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is based on unit operating experience and administrative controls, which provide alternative means of AFIS initiation via individual component controls. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is consistent with the allowed outage time for the components actuated by AFIS.

B.1 and B.2 With both digital channels inoperable or the Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the Unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and the main steam header pressure must be reduced to less than 700 psig within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging Unit systems.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-3 BA S RISIO DATID04 7/

I Amendmen' t Nos.

AFIS Digital Channels B 3.3.13 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.13.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST to ensure that the digital channels can perform their intended functions. The Frequency of 18 months is based on engineering judgment and operating experience that determined testing on an 18 month interval provides reasonable assurance that the circuitry is available to perform its safety function, while the risks of testing during Unit operation is avoided.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.36.

, , , , , ,5 OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.13-4 B ES VISIPN DYED 0917%2l I lAmendmer it Nos. l

,SLB tectioand Isation Astru ledwer enta n B 3.3.25 I

, ^ ... ^_...._z._11_.s.

INot Used I b1J.3 INWKiUMLNIAIIUN I B3.3.25 Maj Stea ine Br ak (LLB) fetectjn anerater/ ] I Ms6ation stumerfaliorY-/ / /

BACKGROUND Th~LB Detection and Feedwater Isolation ig zentation is designed\

Xaress containment overpressurizationd steam generator tube load concerns by isolating main feedwater ) and stopping the turbine-I driven emergency feedwater pump4 EFW) from delivering feedwater to both steam generators during SLB and to mitigate core overcooling concerns. Inaddition, the B Detection and Feedwater Isolation instrumentation provid unout protection for the TDEFW pump ie event of a MSLB a certain large MFW line breaks with the p in the automatic mod f operation.

Steam nerator header pressure is used as inpyinals to the MSLB cr ry for detection and feedwater isolation hen a MSLB is sensed, or pan manual actuation, the main feedwacontrol valves (MFCVs) and startup feedwater control valves (SFC will be closed to isolate the MFW flow paths to both steam generat . In addition, the MFW pumps are tripped. The TDEFW pump w e inhibited from auto-starting or will be auto-stopped if it has are y started. A manual override for the TDEFW pump inhibit is providto allow the operator to subsequently start th TDEFW pump if essary for decay heat removal. These functi are credited for gating an MSLB. The function of closing the n and startup f water block valves is not credited in the MSLB alysis.

How r, the MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolatio rcuitry performs t unction.

There are three pressure transmitters per s m generator with each feeding a steam pressure signal to a si isolator (when used) and bistable. These bistables are calibra to provide an ON/OFF signal at the desired setpoint for actuation of feedwater isolation circuitry. A pressure transmitter and its ciated signal isolator(s) and bistable(s) constitute a MSLBdet analog channel.

The six MSLB de ion analog channels feed two redundant fldwater isolation dig iannels consisting of two single failure pr two-out-of-three logice rcuits. If the logic is satisfied, a master recoil is energized.

The u of an energized master relay ensures that of power to the I

. /_ /_

1 2 3 B !"3.2 Amendment Nos. 320, 320,,

/ LB Detection and Feedwater Isolation struma n o-t : / 4> / B 3.3.25 BASES I i

BACKGROUND gital channels will not result in an in adv feedwater isolation. If (continued) either digital channel is actuated, a fee ater isolation (i.e., MFW pumps trip, MFCVs and SFCVs close, and EFW pump inhibited from auto-starting or auto-stopped if runni will occur. Energizing the master relay results in closure of contacts various control circuits for systems and components. Therefore, en the master relay is energized, the s ms and components pert their isolation functions. Other feature the digital channels in de a test/manual actuation pushbutton, a rcuit seal-in after the maste elay is energized, a 2 second time delay prevent spurious act tion, and an enable" or arming" switch. e two two-out-of-three lo circuits, along with their associated enab switch, master relay, seal-i me delay, and test/manual actuation pubutton are considered a fe water isolation digital channel.

The feedwater isolation digital channele enabled and disabled administratively rather than automa Ily. Appropriate operating procedures contain provisions t nable/disable the digital channels.

LICABLE The MSLB Detection Feedwater Isolation instrumentation is utiliz AFETY ANALYSES to isolate main fe ater and stop the TDEFW pump from supplyi feedwater to steam generators in the event a MSLB occur his function is c dited in the MSLB analyses regarding contain nt response and ste generator tube loads.

m generator header pressure is used as input the MSLB circuitry for etection and feedwater isolation. When a MSL s sensed, or upon manual actuation, the MFCVs and SFCVs ar osed to isolate the MFW flow paths to both steam generators. In a ion, the MFW pumps are tripped. The TDEFW pump will be inhib' from auto-starting or will be auto-stopped If it has already started A manual override for the TDEFW pump inhibit is provided to allow t operator to subsequently start the TDEFW pump if necessary for ecay heat removal. All of these functions are credited for mitigating a SLB inside containment.

The MSLB Detection d Feedwater Isolation Instrumentation sates Criterion 3 of 10 C 50.36 (Ref. 1).

LCO This LC equires that instrumentation necessary to 1 I a feedwater isolati (i.e., trip the MFW pumps, close the MFC and SFCVs, inhibit the uto-start of or auto-stop the TDEFW pump hall be OPERABLE.

ilure of any instrument renders the affeote hannel(s) inoperable and reduces the reliability of the Function.

k OC ITS 12 3 B 33.2 Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & 3 20

M Detection and Feedwater Isolation In umentat B 3.3.25 l BS -

I LCO r analog channels per SG are required e OPERABLE to ensure I (continued) that no single failure prevents actuation o e MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolation instrumentation. ch MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolation instrumentati channel includes the sensor and measurement channel.

This LCO is modified by ote, which indicates the requirements not applicable to a Unit a r the completion of the Automatic Feedw er Isolation System ication on the respective Unit. This is cessary since the spec tion is no longer based on the Unit's de gn after implement of the modification.

APPLICABILITY e MSLB Detection and Feedwater solati Function shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2, and M 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig, because there i ignificant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. On e steam header pressure has decreased below 700 psig, ad ional time is available for the operator to manually isolate main and ergency feedwater to the affected steam generator. Thus, the F dwater Isolation Function can be bypassed to avoid actuation dun nomal unit cooldowns. Also during MODE 3, e Feedwater Isolaf Function is not required to be OPERABLE allI main feedwat control valves (MFCVs) and startup feedwater ntrol valves (SF s) are closed since the function of the instrum tation is alread tilled. In MODE 3 when the turbine header pr ure is < 885 psi utomatic actuation of the TDEFW pump is bloc, d. In MODES 4, 5, d 6,the energy level Islow and the secondary s feedwater flow rate is low or nonexistent. In MODES 4,5, and 6, the mary system temperatures are too low to allow the SGs t fectively remove energy and MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolation* strumentation is not required to be OPERABLE.

TIONS If a channel's trip setpoint is nd nonconservative with respect to the Allowable Value, or any o e transmitter or signal processing electro s, are found inoperable, n the Function provided by that channel t be declared inoperablnd the unit must enter the appropriate Co ons.

A Note has n added to the ACTIONS indicating that a parate Condition try is allowed for instrumentation channels sociated with each S eedwater isolation function).

k ,/ /~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A r

CONE TS 1, 2, & 3 B 3.3.25- Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & 320

M BDetection and Feedwater Isolation men B 3.3.25 BAES X

i Condition A applies to failures of a sin eMSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolation instrumentation channel i ne or more Feedwater Isolation Functions.

With one channel inoper in one or more MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolation F ction, the channel(s) must be placed in within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Tripping e affected channel places the Function one-out-of-two nfiguration. Operation in this configurat may continue indefinitely ce the MSLB Detection and Feedwater ation Function is capable actuating Inthe presence of any single r dom failure. The Corntion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is adequate to pert Required Action A.1.

B.1. .2.1. and B.2.2 With two channels in one or mo MSLB Detection and Feedwater IsolatiorI Function inoperable or the uired Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not t. the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and main stea eader pressure must be reduced to less than 700 psig or all MF $ and SFCVs must be closed within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . e allowed Comp on Time is reasonable, based on operating exp ience, to r..ntk *k- - r .rl.nit nnn.l.....a

frnm *. .11 n.urc4r C.II -Ar -rI A-I lQll AI LI I IVUlf WUYUIELIIUIUUI I1 IIVIIII Ull jJVV, WI IUILII H1ral I Ulvly manner d without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE 3 .3.25.1 REQUIREMENT Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK on every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not urred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the para r indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other chann . It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitorin e same parameter should read approximately the same val Significant deviations between the two instrument channels cou e an indication of excessive instrument d in one of the channels o f something even more serious. CHANN CHECK will detect oss channel failure; therefore, it is key in vfying that the instrument& n continues to operate properly between e CHANNEL FUNCTION EST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agree nt criteria are based on a combination of t hannel instrument un inties, including isolation, indication, and dability. If a channel is o side the criteria, it may be an indication th e transmitter or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside iimit. If the channels are I

OCONEE 4lTS 1,2, &3 B 33.25-4 Amendment Nos. 320, 3'20,, & 320

B Detection and Feedwater Isolation mentation B 3.3.25

/BASES /-

thin the criteria, it is an indication that the annels are OPERABLE. If the channels are normally off scale dun times when surveillance is required, the CHANNEL CHECK wil ly verify that they are off scale in the same direction. Off scale lov rrent loop channels are verified, where practical, to be reading at the ttom of the range and not failed downscale.

The Frequency, once every shift, is based on operating erience that demonstrat channel failure is rare. Since the probab" of two random failur in redundant channels in any 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months p od is extremely low, the NNEL CHECK minimizes the chance of of protective functi rdue to failure of redundant channels. Th HANNEL CHECK su rements less formal, but potentially more uent, checks of channel

,ERABILITY during normal operational of the displays associated with the LCO required channels.

SR 3.3.25.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTI AL TEST is performed on each required instrumentation ch el to ensure the channel will perform its intend function.

The Fre ncy of 31 days is based on operating experien with regard to, chan OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates t failure of more th one channel in any 31 day interval is a rare eve This SR is modified by a Note indicating that itnly applicable when modifications are implemented that allow o e testing.

SR 3.3.25.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION i complete check of the instrument channe including the sensor. Th est verifies the channel responds to a me red parameter within the cessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION lea s the channels adjusted to account for Inst ment drift to ensure that instrument channel remains operational b een successive t s. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall find th measurement errors an istable setpoint errors are within the assu ions of the setpoi analysis. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS mu e performed con tent with the assumptions of the setpoint lysis.

e Frequency is based on the assumptio f an 18 month calibration I interval in the determination of the mag ude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

0 ITS 1 2 3 B 33.2 Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & I

10 CFR 50.36.

2.

3. UFSAR Section Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & 320

ISLB Q0ectiorAnd F edw r Iso/tion anua nitia n B 3.3.26 A TIl^kI Not Used D Ph e% Il %-rl I& Af-I D 3.3 111 I fUMCN I A I II JI B 3.3.26 Ma eam Uir reak (WOB) De on apFe er Iso on Maral nitia n I

_~~~~~~~~~9 _K BACKGROUND Th LDetection and Feedwater Isolationgul nitiation capabilit Prvdes the operator with the capability toaethe isolation function I from the control room. This Function i ovided in the event the operator determines that the Function is ne and does not automatically actuate.

This is a backup Function to automatic Feedwater isolation.

The MSLB Detection a eedwater Isolation manual initiation cir ry satisfies the manu itiation and single-failure criterion requients of IEEE-279-1 971 ef. 1).

APPLICABLE Th eedwater Isolation Function credited in safety analysis is SAFETY ANALYSES utomatic. However, the manual initiatio rnction is required by design as backup to the automatic Function allows operators to actuate Feedwater Isolation whenever the nction is needed. Furthermore, the manual initiation of Feedwater lation may be specified in unit operating

/ ~~procedures.//

The MSLB Detectand Feedwater Isolation manual initiation fungo satisfy Criteri of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2).

LCO 0manual initiation switch per actuation channel and B) is required to e OPERABLE. The Feedwater Isolation functihas two actuation or trip channels, channels A and B. Within e channel actuation logic there is one manual trip switch. When anual switch is depressed, a full trip of actuation channel A or Bfcrs.

This LCO is modified by a No , which indicates the requirements are not applicable to a Unit after t completion of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System Modi tion on the respective Unit. This Is neces since the specificatf is no longer based on the Unit's design a r implementaton the modification.

APPLICABILITY The edwater Isolation manual initiation Functio be OPERABLE in DES 1 and 2, and MODE 3 with main ste header pressure 2 700 psig because there is significant mass an ergy in the RCS and steam I

2, 3 Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & 320 I

B !,3..- -,

LB Detection and Feedwater Isolation nual In

/~~~~ ~ 3.3.26l\

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

BASES / / \

APPLICABILITY enerators. Once the steam header pres re has decreased below 700 (continued) psig, additional time is available for th perator to manually isolate main and emergency feedwater to the a cted steam generator. Thus, the Feedwater Isolation Function e bypassed to avoid actuation during normal unit cooldowns. Dul MODE 3, the Feedwater Isolation man initiation Function is not r uired to be OPERABLE when all main feedwater control val (MFCVs) and startup feedwater contr yes (SFCVs) are cls since its function is already fulfilled. In E 3 when the turbine he r pressure is < 885 psig, automatic actu on of the turbine-driv emergency feedwater pump is blocked. MODES 4,5, and 6,t SG energy level is low and secondary s feedwater flow rate is lw oonexistent.

ACTIONS A.1 With one manual initiation swit inoperable, the manual initiation switch must be restored to OPEF E status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is bas on unit operating experience and administrati controls, which provi alterative means of MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolatign Function initiation via individual component co rols.

The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months n'pletion Time is consistent with the allowed o e time for the componts actuated by the MSLB Detection and Feed er Isolation Functio With both manual initiation switches mope le or the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditi A not met, the unit must be placed in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months a the main steam header pressure reduced to less than 700 psig or MFCVs and SFCVs must be closed within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed mpletion Times are reasonable, based on

/ ~~~~~operating experienct eh the required MODES from full power /

/ ~~~~~~~conditions in an o vanr and without challenging unit systemi SURVEILLANCE R332. //l REQUIREMENTS//

This SRiquires the performance of a CHANNEL FU CTIONAL TEST to ensur at the channels can perform their intend functions. The Fr uency of 18 months is based on engineeri judgment and operating Herience that determined testing on an 18 nth interval provides reasonable assurance that the circuitry is ilable to perform its safety function, while the risks of testing du nit operation is avoided.

\, 1, UNITS 2, & 3 B 6-2 Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & 320

2. 10 CFR 50.36.

3. UFSAR Section 6.2.1.4.

4. UFSAR Section 5.

B Nos. 320, 320, & 320

( /MSLZetectio/and/edy/tr Is/ation/ogic 0/hanni I B 3.3.27 NoAUe I B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.27 I RA'RPIR BACKGROUND The six B detection analog channels feed two undant feedwater isola digital channels consisting of two sin ailure proof two-out-of-e logic circuits. If the logic is satisfied,aster relay coil is energized.

/The use of an energized master relay e ures that a loss of power to the digital channels will not result in an~dvertent feedwater isolation. If either digital channel is actuated, a Fe water isolation will occur. Energizing master relay results in closu of contacts in various control circuits fo systems and componen herefore, when the master relay is en gized, the systems and co onents perform their isolation functions her features of the diaI channels include a test/manual actu n pushbutton, a circuit seal-j.after the master relay is energized, a 2 cond time delay to preven, purious actuation, and an uenabler or ing" switch. Each of the twp wo-out-of-three logic circuits, along wit eir associated enable s% i, master relay, seal-in, and time dela considered a feedwater solation digital channel.

APPLICE The MSLB Detection and F water Isolation instrumentation is utilized SAF ANALYSES to isolate main feedwate nd stop the TDEFW pump from supplying feedwater to both st generators in the event a MSLB occurs. T s function is creditin the MSLB analyses regarding containme esponse and steam g rator tube loads.

Stea nerator outlet pressure is used as input to t SLB circuitry for d tion and feedwater isolation. When a MSLB sensed, or upon anual actuation, the MFCVs and SFCVs will dosed to Isolate the MFW flow paths to both steam generators. addition, the MFW pumps are tripped. The TDEFW pump will be i ited from auto-starting or will be auto-stopped if it has already started d the switch for MS-93 is inthe AUTO position. A manual overri or the TDEFW pump inhibit is provided to allow the operator to subs entiy start the TDEFW pump if ecessa for heat removal. All of th functions are credited for mitigating a B inside containment.

The MSLB Dete on and Feedwater Isolation logic channe satisfy Criterion 3 o CFR 50.36 (Ref. 1).

I 0 1 2 3 B3327 Amendment Nos. 320, 320, & 320 -

B Detection and Feedwater Isolation ihannels B 3.3.27 BASE (continued) i i LCO o channels of MSLB Detection and Fe er Isolation automatic actuation logic shall be OPERABLE. Thy are only two channels of automatic actuation logic. Therefore olation of this LCO could result in a complete loss of the automatic Fu ion assuming a single failure of the other channel.

This LCO is modified by ote, which indicates the requirements ot applicable to a Unit a r the completion of the Automatic Feedwer Isolation System ication on the respective Unit. This is ssary since the spec~tion is no longer based on the Unit's de n after implemen n of the modification.

APPLICABILITY MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolatio automatic actuation logic channels shall be OPERABLE in MODE and 2, and MODE 3 with main steam header pressure 2 700 psig b use there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam gen tors. Once the steam header pressure has decreased below 0 psig, additional time is available for the operator to manually isolate sin and emergency feedwater to the affected steam generator. Thus, e Feedwater Isolation Function can be bypass to avoid actuation dup g normal unit cooldowns. Also, during MODE , the Feedwater lsolatio unction is not required to be OPERABLE whe l main feedwate ntrol valves (MFCVs) and startup feedwater trol valves (SF s) are closed since its function is already fulfille .ln MODE 3 when th rbine header pressure is < 885 psig, automati ctuation of the TDE pump is blocked. In MODES 4, 5, and 6,the ergy level is low a e secondary side feedwater flow rate is low onexistent.

ACTIONiS A.1 With one automatic actuation logic c nel inoperable, the channel must be restored to OPERABLE status thin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is based on unit oper ng experience and administrative controls, which provide alternative m ns of MSLB Detection and Feedwater Isolation Function initiat o via individual component controls. The 72 our Completion Time is co istent with the allowed outage time for the components actuat by the MSLB Detection and Feedwater Is tion Function.

B.1B./.and B.2.2/

both logic channels inoperable or the R red Action and associated mpletion Time not met, the unit must be ced in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and the main steam header press must be reduced to less than I E UNITS 1, 2, 3 B 3/27-2 Amendment Nos. 320, 320, &3 E 1, 2, & 3 0E UNITS B 342 Amendment Nos. 320,320, & 320

B Detection and Feedwater Isolation cCh

/~~ 3.3.27l\

~~~~~~~~~~~

BASES (continued) l Actions B .1B.2.1; and B.2.2 (continued) 700 psig or all MFCVs and SFCVs m be closed within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days 0.005 hours 2.97619e-5 weeks 6.849e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are rea nable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES f full power conditions in an orderly manner and without chall g unit systems.

SUFIVEILLANCE SR 3.3.27.1 RECWUIREMENTS This SR r res the performance of a CHANNEL FU IONAL TEST to ensure t the channels can perform their intend unctions. This test verifi Feedwater Isolation automatic actuation ics are functional. This te simulates the required inputs to the logic ircuit and verifies successful peration of the automatic actuation logic he Frequency of 18 months is I

// based on engineering judgment and o rating experience that determined testing on an 18 month interval pro es reasonable assurance that the circuitry is available to perform safetyfunction, while the risks of testing during unit operation is avoi 7

REERENCES 1. 10 CFR5O

2. UFS Section 6.2.1.4.

3. SAR Section 5.2.3.4

__~~~,&

UNI TS2& B 3A Amendment mend ment Nos.

Nos. 320, 320,33320, 20,7

July 10, 2003 Page 1 Attachment 3 Technical Justification

Background

Oconee Nuclear Station has common Technical Specifications for all three Oconee Units. Any differences in Technical Specification requirements between units due to design differences are handled by notes indicating the applicability of a Technical Specification requirement. Duke replaced the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) detection circuitry with the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) on each unit during recent outages with the last replacement being completed in the recent Unit 3 outage. Prior to beginning implementation of the AFIS modification, NRC issued a Technical Specification change that retained the Technical Specifications for MSLB detection circuitry and added Technical Specifications for AFIS. The LCO for each new AFIS Technical Specification was modified with a Note indicating that the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is not applicable on each Unit until after completion of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System modification on the respective Unit. Each Technical Specification LCO for the MSLB detection circuitry was modified with a Note indicating that the LCO is applicable on each Unit until after completion of the AFIS modification on the respective Unit.

Description of the Technical Specification Change and Technical Justification With the completion of the AFIS modification on all three Oconee Units, the MSLB detection circuitry Technical Specifications are no longer applicable and can be removed from Technical Specifications. Also, the AFIS Technical Specification LCO no longer needs to be modified by a note indicating that the LCO is not applicable on each Unit until after completion of the AFIS modification. Therefore, Duke proposes to eliminate these obsolete requirements.

1. Modify AFIS Technical Specifications LCOs 3.3.11, 3.3.12, and 3.3.13 are currently modified by the following Note:

July 10, 2003 Page 2 "Not applicable on each Unit until after completion of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System modification.,

Duke proposes to delete the LCO 3.3.11, 3.3.12, and 3.3.13 notes. The AFIS modification has been completed on all three Oconee Units; therefore, the LCO Notes are no longer needed and can be removed. The associated TS Bases is revised accordingly. This change is administrative since no requirements are changed.

2. Delete MSLB Detection Circuitry Technical Specifications LCOs 3.3.25, 3.3.26, and 3.3.27 are currently modified by the following Note:

"Applicable on each Unit until after completion of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System modification on the respective Unit' Duke proposes to delete the Technical Specifications 3.3.25, 3.3.26, and 3.3.27 for MSLB Detection Circuitry.

The AFIS modification has been completed on all three Oconee Units; therefore, the Technical Specifications are no longer applicable and can be removed. The Technical Specification numbers are retained with "Not UsedO placed after each since Oconee Technical Specification numbering continues after 3.3.27. The associated TS Bases is deleted and with the Technical Specification Bases numbers labeled "Not Used.' This change is administrative since no requirements are changed.

July 10, 2003 Page 1 Attachment 4 No Significant Hazards Consideration Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, Duke Energy Corporation (Duke) has made the determination that this amendment request involves a No Significant Hazards Consideration by applying the standards established by the NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.92.

This ensures that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated:

The proposed change to the Oconee Technical Specifications removes obsolete requirements associated with the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) detection circuitry that are no longer necessary because of the completion of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) modification on all three Oconee Units. AFIS replaced the MSLB detection system. As such, the proposed change is administrative. No actual plant equipment, operating practices, or accident analyses are affected by this change. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any kind of accident previously evaluated:

The proposed change to the Oconee Technical Specifications removes obsolete requirements associated with the MSLB detection circuitry that are no longer necessary because of the completion of the AFIS modification on all three Oconee Units. AFIS replaced the MSLB detection system. As such, the proposed change is administrative. No actual plant equipment, operating practices, or accident analyses are affected by this change. No new accident causal mechanisms are created as a result of this change. The proposed change does not impact any plant systems that are accident initiators; neither does it adversely impact any accident mitigating systems. Therefore, this change does

July 10, 2003 Page 2 not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change does not adversely affect any plant safety limits, set points, or design parameters. The change also does not adversely affect the fuel, fuel cladding, Reactor Coolant System, or containment integrity. The proposed change eliminates obsolete requirements and is administrative in nature.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

Duke has concluded, based on the above, that there are no significant hazards considerations involved in this amendment request.

July 10, 2003 Page 1 ATTACHMENT 5 Environmental Assessment Pursuant to 10 CFR.51.22(b), an evaluation of the license amendment request (LAR) has been performed to determine whether or not it meets the criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)9 of the regulations.

The LAR does not involve:

1) A significant hazards consideration.

This conclusion is supported by the determination of no significant hazards contained in Attachment 4.

2) A significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

This LAR will not significantly change the types or amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

3) A significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

This LAR will not increase the individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

In summary, this LAR meets the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 51.22 (c)9 of the regulations for categorical exclusion from an environmental impact statement.

ML032040581

Text

Subject:

Background

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