ML041660004

Correction to Issuance of Amendment No. 172, Stretch Power Uprate (Tac No. MB9031)

ML041660004
Person / Time
Site:	Kewaunee
Issue date:	06/16/2004
From:	Lyon C NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD3
To:	Coutu T Nuclear Management Co
Lyon C, NRR/DLPM, 415-2296
References
TAC MB9031
Download: ML041660004 (4)

Text

June 16, 2004 Mr. Thomas Coutu Site Vice President Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Management Company, LLC N490 State Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216

SUBJECT:

KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - CORRECTION TO ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 172, STRETCH POWER UPRATE (TAC NO. MB9031)

Dear Mr. Coutu:

On February 27, 2004, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment No. 172 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-43 for the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). Amendment No. 172 approved the KNPP 6.0-percent stretch power uprate and revised the Operating License and Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML040430633). On April 19, 2004, the NRC issued a correction letter (ML040930072) due to errors discovered on pages 33, 48, and 49 of the safety evaluation (SE) for Amendment No. 172.

A typographical error was discovered in Section 3.2.2.12.2.15, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), on page 48 of the safety evaluation issued on April 19, 2004. This section should have referred to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.67, rather than 10 CFR 67. The regulatory requirements for which the NRC staff based its acceptance included 10 CFR 50.67, as noted in the April 19, 2004, cover letter. Enclosed is the corrected SE page 48.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (301) 415-2296.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate III Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-305

Enclosure:

Corrected SE page 48 cc: See next page

ML040430633). On April 19, 2004, the NRC issued a correction letter (ML040930072) due to errors discovered on pages 33, 48, and 49 of the safety evaluation (SE) for Amendment No. 172.

A typographical error was discovered in Section 3.2.2.12.2.15, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), on page 48 of the safety evaluation issued on April 19, 2004. This section should have referred to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.67, rather than 10 CFR 67. The regulatory requirements for which the NRC staff based its acceptance included 10 CFR 50.67, as noted in the April 19, 2004, cover letter. Enclosed is the corrected SE page 48.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (301) 415-2296.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Carl F. Lyon, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate III Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-305

Enclosure:

Corrected SE page 48 cc: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC TBoyce PDIII-1 R/F RidsAcrsAcnwMailCenter RidsNrrDlpmLpdiii RidsRgn3MailCenter (PLouden)

RidsNrrDlpmLpdiii1 GHill (2)

RidsNrrPMFLyon RidsOgcRp RidsNrrLATHarris ADAMS Accession Number: ML041660004 OFFICE PDIII-1/PM PDIII-1/LA PDIII-1/SC NAME FLyon THarris LRaghavan DATE 6/15/04 6/15/04 6/16/04 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant cc:

John Paul Cowan David Zellner Executive Vice President & Chairman - Town of Carlton Chief Nuclear Officer N2164 County B Nuclear Management Company, LLC Kewaunee, WI 54216 700 First Street Hudson, MI 54016 Mr. Jeffery Kitsembel Electric Division Plant Manager Public Service Commission of Wisconsin Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant PO Box 7854 N490 Highway 42 Madison, WI 53707-7854 Kewaunee, WI 54216-9511 Manager, Regulatory Affairs Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant N490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216-9511 David Molzahn Nuclear Asset Manager Wisconsin Public Service Corporation 600 N. Adams Street Green Bay, WI 54307-9002 Resident Inspectors Office U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N490 Highway 42 Kewaunee, WI 54216-9510 Regional Administrator Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210 Lisle, IL 60532-4352 Jonathan Rogoff Vice President, Counsel & Secretary Nuclear Management Company, LLC 700 First Street Hudson, WI 54016 Larry L. Weyers Chairman, President and CEO Wisconsin Public Service Corporation 600 North Adams Street Green Bay, WI 54307-9002

evaluates the consequences of a control rod ejection accident to determine the potential damage caused to the RCPB and to determine whether the fuel damage resulting from such an accident could impair cooling water flow. The NRC staffs review covers initial conditions, rod patterns and worths, scram worth as a function of time, reactivity coefficients, the analytical model used for analyses, core parameters which affect the peak reactor pressure or the probability of fuel rod failure, and the results of the transient analyses. The NRCs acceptance criteria are based on GDC-28 for ensuring that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents do not result in damage to the RCPB greater than limited local yielding and do not cause sufficient damage to significantly impair the capability to cool the core. Specific review criteria contained in SRP Section 15.4.8 and used to evaluate this accident include: (1) Reactivity excursions should not result in a radially averaged enthalpy greater than 280 cal/gm at any axial location in any fuel rod, and (2) The maximum reactor pressure during any portion of the assumed excursion should be less than the value that will cause stresses to exceed the Service Limit C as defined in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

The NRC staff previously reviewed and approved the licensees analyses related to the RCCA ejection at the stretch power uprate level of 1772 MWt as part of KNPP fuel transition amendment. The licensee utilized NRC-approved methodologies to evaluate this transient and demonstrated that all acceptance criteria are satisfied. The licensee analyzed both the Framatome ANP fuel and the new Westinghouse 422V+ fuel for this event, and the results demonstrate that the new Westinghouse 422V+ fuel is more limiting. The NRC staffs review and approval of this transient for the stretch power uprate is discussed in detail in Section 2.4.2.15 of the fuel transition amendment.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees analyses of the rod ejection accident and concludes that the licensees analyses have adequately accounted for operation of the plant for the fuel upgrade and the proposed stretch power uprate and were performed using acceptable analytical models. The NRC staff further concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that appropriate reactor protection and safety systems will prevent postulated reactivity accidents that could (1) result in damage to the RCPB greater than limited local yielding, or (2) cause sufficient damage that would significantly impair the capability to cool the core. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the plant will continue to meet the requirements of GDC-28 following implementation of the proposed fuel upgrade and stretch power uprate. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed fuel upgrade and stretch power uprate acceptable with respect to the rod ejection accident.

3.2.2.12.2.15 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

A SGTR event causes direct release of radioactive material contained in the primary coolant to the environment through the ruptured SG tube and SG safety or atmospheric relief valves.

Reactor protection and ESFs are actuated to mitigate the accident and restrict the offsite dose within the guidelines of the 10 CFR 50.67 limits. The NRC staffs review covers postulated _

initial core and plant conditions, method of thermal and hydraulic analysis, sequence of events assuming with and without offsite power available, assumed reactions of reactor system components, functional and operational characteristics of the RPS, required operator actions consistent with the plant EOPs, and the results of the accident analysis. A single-failure of mitigating system is assumed for this event. The NRC staff review for SGTR discussed in this section is focused on the thermal and hydraulic analysis for the SGTR in order to: (1) support ENCLOSURE