05000395/LER-1993-004

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LER 93-004-01:on 930629,missed Surveillance Occurred,Per TS 4.3.2.1,Table 4.3-2.2.b.Caused by Personnel Error in Documenting Test Discrepancy.Operations Personnel Took Part in Discussion of Importance of post-test.W/930830 Ltr
ML20057A220
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 08/30/1993
From: Proper J, Skolds J
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-004, LER-93-4, RC-93-0232, RC-93-232, NUDOCS 9309130226
Download: ML20057A220 (4)


LER-2093-004,
Event date:
Report date:
3952093004R00 - NRC Website

text

10CFR50.73

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, South Carohna Electne & Gas Company John L Skolds g s r_ ,- ,. >

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::s August 30, 1993 Refer to: RC-93-0232 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 LER 93-004, Revision 1 In compliance with a request from Mr. R. C. Haag, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, attached is Licensee Event Report No.93-004, Revision 1, for the '

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification Section 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3-2.2.b and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience. +

Very truly yours, o [ <

John L. Skolds JWP/JLS/nkk Attachment c: 0. W. Dixon (w/o attachment) L. J. Montondo R. R. Mahan (w/o attachment) NRC Resident Inspector R. J. White J. B. Knotts Jr.

S. D. Ebneter INP0 Records Center S. R. Hunt Marsh & McLennan L. D. Shealy NSRC B. C. Williams RTS (ONO930049)

K. W. Woodward Files (818.05 & 818.07)

T. L. Matlosz Central File System J. I. Byrd lf 9309130226 930830 PDR ADOCK 05000395

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2 l At approximately 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> on June 29, 1993, Operations personnel identified a noncompliance with the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.3.2.1, Table 4.3-2.2.b in that XVG030058-SP had not been stroked f rom its associated relay during the 3 performance of the required surveillance testing, due the lack of power available to the valve. The personnel involved failed to note this as a test discrepancy d'3 ring the performance or review of this test. i Plant safety was not compromised by the missed surveillance. The appropriate procedure was  ;

performed on June 29, 1993, which confirmed that the valve was fully functional and capable i

of performing its intended safety function. '

Operations personnel have taken part in a discussion of the importance of the post-test  !

review process required and proper documentation of test discrepancies. I 1

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EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION:

XVG03005B-SP, Secondary Isolation Valve for Reactor Building Spray Sump "B" 3 IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT:

Personnel error in documenting the test discrepancy.

DISCOVERY DATE: June 29, 1993 at approximately 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br />.

REPORT DATE: July 26, 1993 This report was initiated by Off-Normal Occurrence report 93-049.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

Previous missed surveillances due to personnel error have been reported to the NRC:

LER 91-005, submitted on August 26, 1991 ; LER 92-002, submitted on February 28, 1992; LER 92-005, submitted on June 29, 1992.

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At approximately 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> on June 29, 1993, Operations personnel identified a i noncompliance with the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 4.3.2.1, ,

Table 4.3-2.2.b in that XVG030058-SP had not been stroked from its associated relay during the performance of the required surveillance testing, due to the lack of power available to the valve.

STP-125.011 " Integrated Safeguards Test B Train", was performed on April 22, 1993.

This test is more comprehensive than STP-105.016, "Deisel Generator and Charging pump Slave relay ". Therefore, credit for the quarterly STP-105.016 was taken under STP- l 125.011, which is performed every eighteen months.

During the performance of STP-125.011, two valves were determined to be deenergized, XVG030058-SP and XVG088128-SI. XVG08812B-SI was identified as a test discrepancy and retested on April 22, 1993 under STP-105.016 satisfactorily. However, XVG03005B-SP was not identified as a test discrepancy by the personnel performing the test, or by the post-test reviewers.

On June 29, 1993, a post-test reviewer discovered the test discrepancy. A retest was i completed within the grace period of STP-125.011, but not within the grace period of STP-105.016.

i CAUSE OF EVENT:

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The cause of this event was lack of documenting the test discrepancy by the personnel involved.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Plant safety was not compromised by the missed surveillance. The appropriate procedure i was performed on June 29, 1993, which confirmed that the valve was always fully j functional and capable of performing its intended safety function.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: I A su,veillance task sheet was manually initiated and successfully completed on June 29, 1993 at approximately 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />.  ;

Operations personnel have taken part in a discussion of the importance of the post-test I review process required and proper documentation of test discrepancies.

ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: ,

None  ;

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