ML20050C172
| ML20050C172 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1982 |
| From: | Shotwell J MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050C171 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-81-063, EA-81-63, NUDOCS 8204080237 | |
| Download: ML20050C172 (21) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9
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BEFORE THE COMMISSION Irt the Matter of )
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BOSTON EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-293 (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) ) (EA 81-63)
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BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS PETITION TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDING FOR MODIFICATION OF PILGRIM STATION OPERATING LICENSE ?
JO ANN SHOTWELL Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Public Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place,19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 April 2, 1982 8204080237 820402 PDR ADOCK 05000293 G PDR
O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA O NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION g In the Matter of )
BOSTON EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-293 (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) ) (EA'81-63)
BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS D IN SUPPORT OF HIS PETITION TO INTERVENE IN PROCEEDING FOR MODIFICATION OF PILGRIM STATION OPERATING LICENSE On January 18, 1982, the Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued an Order modifying the operating license for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts [ hereinafter, " Order"). On February 17, 1982, D
Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, filed a Petition with the Commission, pursuant to S189 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.
S2239 f a), seeking to intervene on behalf of the citizens of Massachusetts in the license amendment proceeding initiated by the Order. Attorney General Bellotti further requested, D
pursuant to Section 189 (a) , that the Commission hold an adjudicatory hearing on the proposed license amendment.
On February 26, 1982, Boston Edison Company [ hereinafter, D
"the Licensee"] filed a Response to the Attorney General's Petition, urging that the Petition be denied. On March 2, D
D
f I) C C) 1982, the Commission's Staff likewise filed an Answer opposing the Attorney General's Petition. The Attorney General submits this Brief in support of his Petition to address the issues O raised in these two responses.
One of the Licensee's challenges to the Attorney General's Petition -- namely, that there is no license amendment
'O proceeding in which to intervene -- will not be addressed in any detail here, since the NRC Staff concedes that such a proceeding is ongoing and acknowledges the applicability of O
Section 189 (a) to Commission enforcement orders which amend licenses.1/ For Licensee's argument see Licensee's Response te Petition of the Massachusetts Attorney General to Intervene O
in Proceeding for Modification of Pilgrim Station Operating License [ hereinafter, " Licensee's Response"], at 2; For Staff's acknowledgement that Section 189 (a) intervention rights do O
, apply see NRC Staff's Answer Opposing Request for a Hearing By the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
' hereinafter, " Staff's Answer"], at 4-5 et seq..
O 1/ Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.
O S2239 (a) , provides intervention and hearing rights in
" proceeding [s]" to amend licenses. As the Staff tacitly acknowledges, the NRC has no authority under the Atomic Energy Act to amend an operating license except in the context of a proceeding subject to Section 189 (a) . Thus, as the Staff expressly admits, the issuance by the Office of Inspection and
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- Enforcement of its Order modifying the Pilgrim license triggered the intervention and hearing rights accorded by Section 189 (a) .
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O O The Staff and Licensee both challenge the Attorney General's Petition on the ground that he lacks the requisite standing to intervene in this preceeding under Section 189 (a) .
O According to the Staff, to have such standing the Attorney General must claim that he is adversely affected by the terms
-of the Order. See Staff's Answer, at 9 et seg. According to O the Licensee, the Attorney General must oppose the amendment.
See Licensee's Response, at 3-4. There is'no precedent in judicial opinions over the last quarter century for such a O limited view of standing. Moreover, adoption of this limited view would violate the terms and conflict with the underlying purposes of Section 189 (a) of the Atomic Energy Act.
The Staff correctly recites the modern requirements for _
judicial standing, which apply as well to this administrative proceeding, when it states that it must appear that "a cognizable interest of the petitioner might be adversely affected if the proceeding has one outcome rather than another" and that the petitioner's interest is within_the zone of O See Staff's interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act.
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Answer, at 10. Having properly stated the applicab1e test, the Staff than abandons it in favor of a more limited view of O
standing -- namely, one which would require that the petitioner's interest be assessed against the terms of the I& E Order which initiated this proceeding, rather than
.O against the possible outcomes of the proceeding. Thus, the I
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- O Staff maintains, the Attorney General has no standing "in the absence of an allegation that the Director's Order has harmed l
[his] interests." See Staff's Answer, at 11-12 (Emphasis O Supplied). Likewise, the Licensee argues that no hearing i
should be granted because the Attorney General "is not aggrieved by the order in question . . .". See Licensee's l 10 Response, at 4 [ Emphasis Supplied].
3 Section 189 (a) does not permit such a narrow reading of its grant of intervention and hearing rights. That section
- O provides, in pertinent part, that In any proceeding, under this chapter, for the granting,
- suspending, revoking or amending of any license . . . the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any jO person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, t
and shall admit any such person as a party to such i
proceeding.
4 42 U.S.C. S2239(a) (Emphasis Suppliedl. It is clearly the
!C) proceeding in its entirety, and not the particular terms of any
$ order or application initiating the proceeding, acainst which the interests of a petitioner must be assessed. If it appears lO that a cognizable interest of the petitioner might be adversely affected'by the outcome of the proceeding and that the petitioner's interest is within the zone of interests protected I by the Atomic Energy Act, then the petitioner has standing to exercise his S189 (a) intervention and hearing rights. See ,
Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor) ,
I) 12 NRC 367, at 372 (1980). .
e d
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) The Attorney General seeks intervention in the instant license amendment proceeding to assist the Commission in its efforts to protect the health and safety of citizens of the
) Commonwealth of Massachusetts, interests which are clearly -
within the zone of interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act. See 42 U.S.C. S2012(d). It is equally clear that these
) interests could be adversely affected by some of the possible outcomes of this license amendment proceeding. In commencing this proceeding, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement found
) that there have been " substantial serious breakdowns in Boston Edison Company's management controls related to the Pilgrim facility" and that the "public health, safety, and interest"
) require that_significant changes be made in the Licensee's control of licensed activities. See Order at 6. Because of
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the perceived urgency of the threat to public health and
) safety, the I & E Order was made immediately effective. See Order at 6; Staff's Answer, at 2. If, in the course of this proceeding, the Commission or its Staff requires the wrong, or
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insufficient, changes in the Licensee's management systems and -
controls, then this threat to public health and safety will continue. If the Commission or its Staff fails to require that
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changes be made in a timely fashion, then the threat to public health will be needlessly extended. If the Licensee fails to -
implement properly all necessary changes to its management
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systems and controls, the threat to public health may continue indefinitely.
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33 The importance of a licensee's management systems and controls to the assurance of public safety is nowhere made clearer than in the Commission's own discussions of its
- O reliance on such management controls. The General Counsel to the NRC has discussed the relationship between licensees and 1
the Commission as follows:
In an audit review process, some but not all aspects of plant design and operation are reviewed. . .. There is no reasonable way that the NRC-could duplicate the thousands of man hours spent by the utility and its contractors in plant design, quality assurance, and development of ig) operating procedures.
Memorandum dated August 17, 1980, to Members af the Commission from Leonard Bickwit, attached to decision in VEPCO (North Anna iO Unit 2), 12 NRC 137, 143 (1980). The Commission's audit process "does not attempt to perform a 100% verification of all phases of the licensee's program," but rather attempts to
- () evaluate "whether or not the licensee's management control system are [ sic] working." Carolina Power and Light Co.
(Shearon Harris Units 1, 2, 3, 4), 10 NRC 37, 56 (1979).
.O Thus, once the NRC's faith in a licensee's management systems and controls fails, neither the Commission nor the public can be assured that the plant is being operated safely.
CJ Obviously, then, the interests of the citizens of Massachusetts may be adversely affected by the outcome of this proceeding which seeks to determine what changes must be made in Boston I) . Edison's management systems and controls to assure the safe operation of the Pilgrim facility. Recognizing this fact, the a
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() Licensee and Staff argue that it this not enough to confer standing upon the Attorney General; that he must further be aggrieved by or oppose the terms of the I & E Order which O initiated this proceeding. The Staf f's and Licensee's positions rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of this proceeding.
The Staff and Licensee repeatedly refer to the instant proceeding as an enforcement action and rely on Commission 1 decisions made in the context of enforcement actions. And it O
is certainly true that initiation of a license amendment proceeding is one method available to the Commission for enforcing the Atomic Energy Act and NRC regulations. However, O
this proceeding is not merely an enforcement action against the Licensee. It is also a proceeding to amend an operating license, in which parties other than the Licensee and the NRC
~O have an interest.
Thus, the decision in Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Projects, Units 1 and 2) , 12 NRC 281 (1980), relied upon O
by both the Licensee and the Staff, is inapposite. In South Texas petitioners were denied the right to a hearing to present evidence that an Order to Show Cause issued by the O
Commission would not sufficiently protect public health and safety. That Order to Show Cause was solely an enforcement order, and did not also commence a license amendment proceeding. Under.5234 of the Atomic Energy Act, it is the
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- 5) Commission, and not the public, which assesses civil penalties and controls enforcement policy. Unlike statutes having _
citizens' suit provisions, the Atomic Energy Act does not grant 0 the public a right to institute enforcement proceedings.
Thus, the Commission correctly decided that the petitioners in South Texas had no right to a hearing on the sufficiency of its O Order to Show Cause.
While correct in the context of an enforcement action which does not also involve a license amendment, South Texas has no j O
relevance to this case. This distinction between enforcement and licensing actions was recognized in the South Texas decision itself, which emphasized that the petitioners could j O
raise the same issues which they sought to raise in response to the Order to Show Cause in an operating license proceeding that was under way for the same plant.
O It is true that the Commission has on occasion confused enforcement proceedings with S189 (a) proceedings. See Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), 11 NRC 438 (1980); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1) , CCH Nuclear Reg.
Rep. 130,483 (1980). In Marble Hill the Commission denied standing to citizens seeking a hearing on an order suspending construction. Although that order did initiate a proceeding and trigger hearing rights under S189 (a) , the Commission viewed
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it solely as an enforcement action and based its denial of a O
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' C) hearing on the need to conserve inspection and enforcement resources. Concern over resources cannot nullify the express grant of intervention and hearing rights in Section 189 (a) .
O The Staff relies on these same Commission decisions which confuse enforcement and licensing actions for the proposition that "the Commission may restrict the enforcement order to the O question of whether a particular remedy should be imposed. . .".
Staff's Answer, at 13. Again, the Commission clearly has control over the scope of its enforcement actions, provided C) they do not initiate proceedings subject to Section 189 (a) .
Whenever the Commission seeks to amend an operating license, however, Section 189(a) requires that a hearing be held upon
() request to allow for Commission and public consideration of any interests which may be affected by the license amendment proceeding. The Commission cannot limit the scope of such a hearing, except to assure that it is restricted to the, subject matter of the proposed amendment.2/
The Staff purports to base its restricted view of standing O under Section 289 (a) not only on Commission decisions, but also on judicial concepts of standing. See Staff's Answer, at 9.
O 2/ The federal cases cited by the Staff in support of its attempt to limit the scope of the hearing required by Section 189 (a) do not, in fact, provide such support. The case of BPI
- v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974), simply permits the Commission to require parties exercising their intervention and O hearing rights under Section 189 (a) to submit statements of the issues with respect to which they seek to participate. And the other federal cases cited in the Staf f's Answer, at page 13, have no relevance whatsoever to license amendment or other licensing proceedings.
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O But the Staff's and Licensee's limited view of standing finds no support in modern judicial opinions. Since the early 1960's, standing has been extended in the administrative field 3 to cover an increasing range of affected interests. In the words of one commentator, standing has been extended to the point where, "[p] resumptively, any class of interests which the 3 administrator is required by statute (either implicitly or explicitly) to consider in framing agency policy is entitled to standing." See Richard B. Stewart, "The Refcrmation of American Administrative Law," 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, at 1726-27, and the cases cited therein, at 1727, n. 286 (1975).
One of the landmark cases in this expansion of standing was Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In that case the FCC had denied two local viewers, a local church, and a national church O organization the right to intervene in an agency proceeding fcr the renewal of a television license. The FCC had also refused to order an evidentiary hearing on the petitioners' J The Circuit Court held that " responsible challenges.
representatives" of the viewing public have standing as
" parties in interest" to appear before the FCC to contest
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renewal of a broadcast license and that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the issues raised by the petitioners' claims. The Court further held that the FCC's mandate to l~
protect the public, interest did not justify denial of
O C) intervention. The Court explained its rulings as follows:
The Commission's denial of standing to Appellants was based on the theory that, absent a potential direct, substantial injury of adverse effect from the administrative action under consideration, a petitioner has no standing before
() the Commission and that the only types of effect sufficient to support standing are economic injury and, electrical interference. . ..
O The Commission's rigid adherence to a requirement of direct economic injury in the commercial sense operates to.give standing to an electronics manufacturer who competes with the owner of a radio-television station only in the sale of appliances, while it denies standing to spokesmen for the listeners, who are most directly concerned with and O intimately affected by the performance of a licensee.
Since the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude those with such an obvious and
() acute concern as the listening audience. This much seems essential to insure that the holders of broadcast licenses be responsive to the needs of the audience, without which the broadcaster could not exist.
O Nor does the fact that the Commission itself is directed by Congress to protect the public interest constitute adequate reason to preclude the listening public from assisting in that task. The Commission of course represents and indeed is the prime arbiter of the public interest, but its duties O and jurisdiction are vast, and it acknowledges that it cannot begin to monitor or oversee the performance of every one of thousands of licensees. ... -
C) The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it O becomes clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which stands up under the realities of O
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actual experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely on it. ...
359 F.2d at 1000, 1002-1004.
() As the Court noted in Church of Christ, there is "nothing unusual or novel in granting the consuming public standing to challenge administrative actions." 359 F.2d at 1002. See, O e.g., Davis v. namnev, 490 F.2d 1360 (3rd Cir. 1974)
[ purchasers of FHA-insured homes have standing to challenge FHA f ailure to require compliance with local housing codes];
Bradlev v. Weinberaer, 483 F.2d 410 (1st Cir. 1973) [ patients receiving and doctor using drug have standing to challenge assertedly too stringent labelling requirements); Federation of O Homemakers v. Butz, 466 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1972) [ consumer standing to challenge adequacy of meat labellingl; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
O 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966)[ spokesmen for
" aesthetic, conservation, and recreation" interests to be affected by proposed power project have standing). It is O
equally well-established that consumers and others who have standing to seek judicial review of agency actions must be granted standing before the administrative agency, since "[t]he O
right of judicial review cannot be taken as fully realized
. . . if appellants are excluded from participating in the O
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C) proceeding to be reviewed." National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, at 736 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See also American Communications Ass'n v. U.S., 298 F.2d 648, O 650 (2d Cir. 1962); Seaboard Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert, denied, 339 U.S. 963 ;
(1950).3/
O Thus, the judicial concepts of standing upon which the
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Staff purports to rely do not support its extremely restricted view of the right to participate in this license amendment O
proceeding. Like the viewing public in United Church of Christ, supra, the " consumers" of nuclear power have a right to participate through " responsible representatives" in any O
proceeding involving the terms upon which the holder of an operating license will be allowed to continue operation.
O 3/ Under traditional principles of standing, persons denied access to judicial review were nonetheless frequently permitted to intervene in proceedings before the agency. See, e.g.,
O ;;t:3 burgh & W. Va. Ry. v. U.S., 281 U.S. 479 (17T5); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. U.S., 281 U.S. 249 (1930). With the i modern expansion of standing or. judicial review, the rights to l seek judicial review and to intervene in agency proceedings have become virtually coextensive. See FCC v. NBC Co. (KOA) ,
319 U.S. 239 (1943). See generally, Richard B. Stewart, "The
() Reformation of American Administrative Law," 88 Harv. L. Rev.
1669, at 1748-1752.
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.O C) Contrary to the Staff's assertions, the NRC is not the only protector of the public interest. See Staff's Answer, at 12.
Especially since the accident at Three Mile Island, it has O become clear that the Commission needs the assistance of public representatives to protect the public health and safety. Thus, the Commission's own Special Inquiry Group called for increased b public participation in NRC licensing activities. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Special Inquiry Group, Mitchell Rogovin, Director, "Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and the Public" ["Rogovin Report"], Vol. 1, at 142-43 (1979).
lior is concern over Commission resources adequate justification for denial of public participation in this O See Staff's Answer, at 1 and 15. As the D.C.
proceeding.
Circuit stated in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. F.C.C.,
265 F.2d 364, 367in.1 (D.C. Cir. 1959) , quoted with f avor in O National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, supra, at 738,
"[el f ficient and expeditious hearings should be achieved, not 1
by excluding parties who have a right to participate, but by O
controlling the proceeding...". See also, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, supra, at O
o-
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() 1006 ["The fears of regulatory agencies that their p ocesses will be inundated by expansion of standing criteria are rarely borne out. Always a restraining factor is the expense of O participation in the administrative process, an economic reality which will limit the number of those who will seek participation...."1 O In summary, then, the Staff and Licensee attempt to use a standing doctrine, which finds no support in the Atomic Energy Act or judicial concepts of standing, to insulate NRC license O
amendment proceedings from public participation and scrutiny.
Such an interpretation violates the express terms of Section 189 (a) , which clearly provides that, once the Commission elects O
to initiate a license amendment proceeding, all parties whose interests may be affected by that proceeding must be allowed to participate and given an adjudicatory hearing upon request.
The Commission has initiated a proceeding to amend the Pilgrim Station operating license to correct the deficiencies which exist in the Licensee's management systems and controls. The O
Attorney General need not show that the citizens of Massachusetts are harmed by the requirements which the Staff has thus far imposed in this proceeding, but rather that the interests of Massachusetts citizens could be adversely affected by the Staff's actions and/or the Licensee's responses O
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throughout this proceeding. That showing has been made and the Attorney General's Petition must be allowed.
While not precisely on point, the decision of the D.C.
O Circuit in Sholly v. US NRC, 651 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is instructive on the proper interpretation of the/ hearing right accorded by Section 189 (a) .d/ In that case the D.C. Circuit 10 held that the Commission must provide a hearing, upon request, on any license amendment, even where it has determined that the amendment involves "no significant hazards consideration." 651 l 10 F.2d 780, at 789. It would be odd, indeed, if Section 189 (a) could now be interpreted so as to preclude a requested hearing on an amendment which not only involves significant hazards O
considerations, but in fact was made immediately effective because of the extent of the existing threat to public health l and safety.
'O Allowance of the Attorney General's Petition will not in any way render the Commission " powerless to take immediate ame gency action to ensure adequate protection of public health
'O and safety." See Staff's Answer, at 8. The Attorney General 1
does not dispute the Commission's authority to issue l O
4/ The Licensee claims that this decision is distinguishable Eecause it involved a license amendment proceeding which was initiated by a licensee's application, rather than by Commission action. See, Licensee's Response at 3. The Court nowhere accorded significance to that distinction.
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O enforcement orders having immediate effect. However, when that enforcement action takes the form of a proposed license amendment, as did the I & E Order in this case, it triggers the O right of interested citizens to a hearing. While the licensee must immediately comply with the terms of the order, a hearing (if requested) must still be held and further or different O action may be required by the Commission or a reviewing court as a result of the evidence produced at that hearing. It is in the interect cf all parties that such a hearing be held, if O possible, before the licensee is required to make significant changes in its operations since all changes are, in the words of the Staff, " tentative." See Staff's Answer, at 9. For that O reason, the Attorney General requested in his Petition that he be admitted to this proceeding before any further formal action was taken by the Staff in this matter. The Commission not O having yet acted on the Attorney General's Petition, the Staff is apparently proceeding to review the Licensee's submissions under the Order. Since any action taken as a result of this O review will be tentative and subject to revision following the hearing which must be provided in this matter, the httorney General urges prompt action on his Petition.
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The Staff, concluding incorrectly that the Attorney General's Petition need not be granted as a matter of law, argues against a discretionary allowance of intervention on the ground that "[ilf the Attorney General is dissatisfied with the O
O C) staff's future actions or the licensee's steps to comply with the Director's order, the Attorney General may file a request for action under 10 C.F.R. 52.206 on the basis of specific C) facts that demonstrate a need for further NRC action," See Staff's Answer, at 16. This suggestion is either disingenuous or the product of insufficient reflection. Unless and until O the Attorney General's Petition is allowed, he has no access to the " specific facts" which would allow him to " demonstrate a need for further NRC action." And the same applies to every
() other member or representative of the public. As the Commission's Staff well knows, the. Licensee's submissions to the Staff and its approvals which will be made part of the
( public record will not_begin to disclose the detailed nature of the problems in the Licensee's management systems or the compromises which the Staff has made in its approval of O corrective actions. See Rogovin Report, at 139.
In the Sholly decision, supra, the D.C. Circuit found that the Commission had two unlawful methods of attempting to O restrict the intervention and hearing rights of the public under Section 189 (a) -- namely, by making license amendments involving no significant hazards considerations effective O
immediately without notice or hearing and by describing orders which in fact amend licenses as something other than license amendments. See Sholly v. U.S. NRC, supra, at 785, n.15. What O
the D.C. Circuit apparently did.not know is that the O
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. C) ~ Commission's Staff continues to urge nullification of Section 189(a) by another method --
namely, the restriction of -
standing in license amendment proceedings to the utility or
^O other parties who assert that the proposed amendment goes too far. As Commissioners Bradford and Gilinsky observed in their dissenting opinion in Point Beach, supra, at 130,483.01 this
- O restriction on standing would allow "the public's opportunity to be heard when dangerous conditions are shown to exist at a plant [to bel foreclosed by a staff action resulting in minimal
'O improvement in safety."
Especially in view of the Circuit Court's opinion in Sholly, it would be unconscionable for the Commission to follow
!O the Staff's suggestion and find yet one more way in which Congress allegedly meant to restrict the public's right to know about and participate in licensing decisions.
Respectfully submitted,
- D By: / > f'- da- Y J Q NN SHOTWELL Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Public Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General
- O One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2265 Dated: April 2, 1982 O
N
O CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ,
m
() I, Jo Ann Shotwell, hereby certify that on April 2, 1982, I made service of the within document by mailing aggooy; thereo:f ?
postage prepaid, to:
Stephen G. Burns, Esq. L Office of the Executive Legal
() Director, MNBB-9604 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Thomas G. Dignan, Esq.
Ropes & Gray O 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Peter Bradford, Commissioner O U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 John F. Ahearne, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
)
Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner '
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Richard DeYoung, Director O office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .
Washington, D.C. 20555 O
J
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pNNSHOTWELL A&
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