ML14241A709
ML14241A709 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/27/2014 |
From: | Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV |
To: | Entergy Operations |
References | |
Download: ML14241A709 (226) | |
Text
Q1 - NRC recommended changes to Rev 1 Notes:
Rev 1 Notes are acceptable, however format/style below should be considered for future question submittals. Also, spell out RTR the first time used, and correct spelling of the word Reactor or Trip the Rector A. Incorrect. OP-2202.002 directs using AFW pump 2P-75 to feed the SGs. Plausible because EFAS is manually actuated during SPTAs, at Step 8.A (Contingency Actions), because FW will not be maintaining SG levels. However, during implementation of OP-2202.002, operators will secure 2P-7A/B and start 2P-75 to feed the SGs.
B. Incorrect. OP-2202.002 directs using AFW pump 2P-75 to feed the SGs. Plausible because EFAS is manually actuated during SPTAs, at Step 8.A (Contingency Actions), because FW will not be maintaining SG levels. However, during implementation of OP-2202.002, operators will secure 2P-7A/B and start 2P-75 to feed the SGs.
C. Correct. Based on OP-2202.002, Step 12.A (Contingency Actions), the operators are directed to start and commence SG feed with AFW pump 2P-75 using 2202.010, Standard Attachments, Attachment 46, EFW Flow.
D. Incorrect. OP-2202.002 directs using AFW pump 2P-75 to feed the SGs. Plausible because OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump AOP, does direct attempting to restart tripped MFP (Step 3.B - Contingency Actions) and then if Reactor power greater than 4% and feedwater cannot be restored, then trip the Reactor and go to SPTAs. Since the stem indicates that the CRS has directed a Reactor trip, if can be assumed that MFP B was not able to be started and feedwater restored using a Main Feedwater Pump.
References:
Add OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP to those already listed Change format for RTR to match others (OP-2202.002, RTR EOP, .)
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1925 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/28/2014 2:06:53 QID #: 1 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 00CE02K103 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Reactor Trip Recovery System Number E02 K/A EK1.3 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ERTR OBJ 1
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery): - Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Reactor Trip Recovery)
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 60% power
- "A" MFP has been tagged out for bearing replacement
- Annunciator 2K03 A-11 "FEED PUMP TRIP" is in alarm for "B" MFP
- CRS directs tripping the Reactor
- SPTAs have been completed
- Control Room has been informed that "B" MFP was tripped inadvertently by maintenance personnel
- OP-2202.002, Reactor Trip Recovery EOP, has been entered Upon completion of OP-2202.002, S/G levels will be maintained at 60% by ______________________ .
A. 2P-7A Emergency Feedwater Pump B. 2P-7B Emergency Feedwater Pump C. 2P-75 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump D. 2P-1B Main Feedwater Pump Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
S/G levels will lower rapidly with a loss of both feed pumps ("A" OOS and "B" Tripped) the ACA will direct entry into Loss of Feed Pump AOP. Step 3 contingency actions does direct placing the tripped MFP (do not know reason why it tripped) in service or Trip the Rector (which is the action given in stem as directed by the CRS). SPTAs are entered and direct actuating EFW due to the lowering S/G levels (this will start both "A" and "B" EFW pumps). At the completion of SPTAs, all safety functions will be satisfied and RTR will be entered. RTR will restore S/G levels by placing AFW pump (2P-75) in service and securing both EFW pumps.
C. Correct: based on OP-2202.002 step 12.A A. B. and D. Incorrect due to procedural guidance to place the AFW pump in service to restore S/G levels OP-2202.002 step 12.A
References:
OP-2203.012C, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K03 window A-10, Rev 030, pages 134 and 135 of 176 OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump AOP, Rev 013, step 3, contingency 3.E.1) and 2) page 2 of 11 Reactor Trip Recovery EOP, OP-2202.002, Rev 010, step 12.A, contingency A.1) page 6 of 17 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 1
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Reactor Trip Recovery Tech Guide, EOP-2202.002, Rev 010, step 12., page 19 of 33 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: added entry into RTR to bullet list. Reworded question (based on validate comments) added explanation to notes section.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 2
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1925 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 7:36:30 QID #: 1 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 00CE02K103 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Reactor Trip Recovery System Number E02 K/A EK1.3 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ERTR OBJ 1
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Reactor Trip Recovery): - Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Reactor Trip Recovery)
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 60% power
- "A" MFP has been tagged out for bearing replacement
- Annunciator 2K03 A-11 "FEED PUMP TRIP" is in alarm for "B" MFP
- CRS directs tripping the Reactor
- SPTAs have been completed
- Control Room has been informed that "B" MFP was tripped inadvertently by maintenance personnel
- OP-2202.002, Reactor Trip Recovery EOP, has been entered Upon completion of OP-2202.002, S/G levels will be maintained at 60% by ______________________ .
A. 2P-7A Emergency Feedwater Pump B. 2P-7B Emergency Feedwater Pump C. 2P-75 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump D. 2P-1B Main Feedwater Pump Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
A. Incorrect. OP-2202.002 directs using AFW pump 2P-75 to feed the SGs. Plausible because EFAS is manually actuated during SPTAs, at Step 8.A (Contingency Actions), because FW will not be maintaining SG levels. However, during implementation of OP-2202.002, operators will secure 2P-7A/B and start 2P-75 to feed SGs.
B. Incorrect. OP-2202.002 directs using AFW pump 2P-75 to feed the SGs. Plausible because EFAS is manually actuated during SPTAs, at step 8.A (Contingency Actions), because FW will not be maintaining SG levels. However, during implementation of OP-2202.002, operators will secure 2P-7A/B and start 2P-75 to feed the SGs.
C. Correct. Based on OP-2202.002, Step 12.A (Contingency Actions), the operators are directed to start and commence SG feed with AFW pump 2P-75 using OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Attachment 46, EFW Flow.
D. Incorrect. OP-2202.002 directs using AFW pump 2P-75 to feed the SGs. Plausible because OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump AOP, does direct attempting to restart tripped MFP (Step 3.B - Contingency Actions) and then if Reactor power greater than 4% and feedwater cannot be restored, then trip the Reactor and go to SPTAs. Since the stem indicates that Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 1
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 the CRS has directed a Reactor trip, it can be assumed that MFP "B" was not able to be started and feedwater restored using a Main Feedwater Pump.
References:
OP-2203.012C, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K03 window A-10, Rev 030, pages 134 and 135 of 176 OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump AOP, Rev 013, step 3, contingency 3.E.1) and 2) page 2 of 11 OP-2202.002, Reactor Trip Recovery EOP, Rev 010, step 12.A, contingency A.1) page 6 of 17 EOP-2202.002, Reactor Trip Recovery Tech Guide, Rev 010, step 12., page 19 of 33 OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP, Rev 014, step 8.A.1 page 10 of 19 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: added entry into RTR to bullet list. Reworded question (based on validate comments) added explanation to notes section.
Rev. 2, updated per NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 2
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1926 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/28/2014 3:42:52 QID #: 2 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000008A230 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 3 System
Title:
Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief System Number 008 K/A AA2.30 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.3 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 17
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: -
Inadequate core cooling Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has been taken off line due to indications of a LOCA inside Containment
- SPTAs are complete and OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, has been entered
- Pressurizer level 90% and trending up
- Pressurizer pressure 1055 psia and trending up
- Tc 468°F and lowering
- Th 552°F and rising
- Average CET temperature 558°F and rising
- Containment pressure 25 psia The RCS leak is in the Pressurizer ___________ space and natural circulation ________ established.
A. water; is B. water; is not C. steam; is D. steam; is not Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
A steam space leak will cause PZR level to rise (venting off of the steam space) the insurge will cause PZR heaters to energize (colder water entering into the PZR from the RCS) Containment Spray will actuate and the RCPs will be secured (directed by procedure, section 1, step 16, page 11) cooling flow is lost to the reactor vessel head region, combined with low RCS pressure, a void will form. Natural Circulation is not established [<30°F MTS and >50°F delta between Th and Tc]
References:
OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, Rev 014, section 3, step 7.A. contingency A.2) d), page 31 of 67 EOP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident Tech Guide, Rev 014, section 3, step 7, page 90 of 140 Historical Comments:
New Question Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments (mwf 1/28/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 3
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1927 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/28/2014 3:45:38 QID #: 3 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000112120 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 Safety Function 3 System
Title:
Large Break LOCA System Number 011 K/A 2.1.20 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.6 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has experienced a LOCA
- OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, is being implemented
- Pressurizer pressure is 1450 psia
- Pressurizer level is 32% and trending up
- Margin to Saturation (MTS) is 32°F and stable
- Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS) indicates level 01
- Containment temperature 210°F and trending down
- Containment pressure is 22.3 psia and trending down
- Emergency Feed Actuation Signal (EFAS) has actuated and "A" and "B" S/G levels are 25%
- "A" and "B" Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pumps are running on recirculation Terminate/Throttle criteria has NOT been met for High Pressure Safety Injection [HPSI] due to _________________ .
A. Pressurizer level is too low B. Containment pressure is too high C. Feedwater flow to the S/Gs is too low D. Margin To Saturation (MTS) is too low Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
Containment is in a "Harsh Environment" condition (>200°F) which changes the values used to determine HPSI Terminate/Throttle criteria. (numbers to be used are bracketed) pressurizer level is required to be 50% or greater with the given conditions. Containment pressure is not included in the criteria to terminate HPSI. Steam Generator levels are adequate for HPSI termination. Margin to Saturation is greater than 30 degrees F which meets HPSI termination criteria.
References:
OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, Rev 014, section 3, step 15, page 35 of 67 EOP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident Tech Guide, Rev 014, section 3, step 15, page101 of 140 STM 2-75, Reactor Vessel Monitoring System, Rev 6, section 2.1 page 3 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments, added STM reference (mwf 1/28/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 4
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1928 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 8:03:27 QID #: 4 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000015K101 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
017 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunction System Number 015 K/A AK1.01 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CIRC OBJ 4
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions: - Natural circulation in a nuclear reactor power plant Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has been tripped from 100% power
- Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) have been secured due to a power issue
- SPTAs are complete
- OP-2203.013, Natural Circulation AOP, is being implemented OP-2203.013 directs maintaing Margin to Saturation (MTS) ______ or greater to minimize reactor vessel head voiding. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is determined to be void free if Pressurizer level ____________ with Pressurizer spray in service.
A. 30°F; goes up B. 30°F; is stable C. 50°F; goes up D. 50°F; is stable Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
The Natural Circulation AOP requires a higher MTS [>50°F] step 5 and has the operator verify stable pressurizer level when Pzr spray is in service to check the RCS is void free. The Reactor Coolant Pumps malfunctioned due to a power issue and were secured. The operational implication is that the operators must recognize that while in the Natural Circulation AOP, the MTS minimum value is 50 degrees F. The operators must also know that head voiding is a concern while on natural circulation. So the question asks the operator how to recognize if the RCS is void free during natural circulation conditions by monitoring the Pressurizer level effects while Pressurizer spray is in service.
References:
OP-2203.013, Natural Circulation AOP, Rev 014, step 5, page 3 of 32 and step 32 page18 of 32 AOP-2203.013, Natural Circulation Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 5, page 2 of 32 and 18 of 32 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments (mwf 1/21/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 5
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1929 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 7:13:54 QID #: 5 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000022K103 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 2 System
Title:
Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup System Number 022 K/A AK1.03 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RP-ACCP OBJ 2
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: - Relationship between charging flow and PZR level Question:
(REFERENCE PROVIDED)
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Annunciator 2K12 B-3 "HEADER FLOW LO" comes into alarm
- Charging Header Flow (2FIS-4863) is reading 15 gpm
- Letdown Flow (2FIS-4802) is reading 26 gpm
- Pressurizer level is 60.0%
Assuming no further changes in charging or letdown flow and NO operator action, the first backup Charging Pump (CCP) would reach its auto start setpoint in approximately ______ minutes.
A. 7 B. 9.5 C. 11 D. 15 Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
Student should know that Pzr level setpoint is 60% at 100% power. Pzr level would decrease by 15 gpm with the stated conditions. 15 gpm in [from charging] minus (26 gpm out [from letdown] plus 4 gpm out [from controlled Bleedoff] ) equals -
15 gpm from the primary. Pzr level is 53.5 gallons per percent. 53.5 gal/% x 3.1% = 165.85 gallons required to be lost from the system to reach the 1st CCP auto start setpoint. [165.85 gals / 15 gpm = 11.06 minutes]
A. Incorrect: Number is based on using the VCT gallons per percent and accounting for RCP controlled Bleedoff flow: 15 gpm in [form charging] minus [(26 gpm out [from letdown] plus 4 gpm out [from controlled Bleedoff] )] = -15 gpm from the primary. VCT level is 33.8 gallons per percent. 33.8 gal/% x 3.1% = 104.78 gallons required to be lost from the system to reach the 1st CCP auto start setpoint.
[104.78 gals / 15 gpm = 6.98 minutes B. Incorrect: Number is based on using the VCT gallons per percent and not accounting for RCP controlled Bleedoff flow: 15 gpm in [form charging] minus [(26 gpm out [from letdown] ] = -11 gpm from the primary. VCT level is 33.8 gallons per percent. 33.8 gal/% x 3.1% = 104.78 gallons required to be lost from the system to reach the 1st CCP auto start setpoint. [104.78 gals / 11 gpm = 9.5 minutes D. Incorrect: Number is based on using the Pzr gallons per percent and not accounting for RCP controlled Bleedoff flow: 15 gpm in [form charging] minus (26 gpm out [from letdown] = -11 gpm from the primary.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 6
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Pzr level is 53.5 gallons per percent. 53.5 gal/% x 3.1% = 165.85 gallons required to be lost from the system to reach the 1st CCP auto start setpoint. [165.85 gals / 11 gpm = 15.07 minutes
References:
OP-2305.002, Reactor Coolant Leak Detection, Rev 024, exhibit 1, page 39 of 54 [PROVIDED to STUDENT]
OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K12 window B-3, Rev 044, page 36 of 116 STM 2-04, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev 29, PZR level control program diagram, page 78 STM 2-03-1, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, Rev 16, section 3.1 page 15 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments, added STM references (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 7
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1930 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 7:16:35 QID #: 6 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000025A103 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) System Number 025 K/A AA1.03 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SDC OBJ 3
Description:
Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: -
LPI pumps Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 5
- RCS level is currently 24" from the bottom of the hot leg
- "A" LPSI pump [2P-60A] is in service
- "B" LPSI pump [2P-60B] is in standby
- Annunciator 2K12 A-8 "Instr Air Press HI/LO" comes into alarm
- Annunciator 2K07 C-7 "LPSI PUMP MOTOR AMPS HI/LO" is in alarm
- ATC reports "A" LPSI pump amperage and flow rate is oscillating
- CRS has entered OP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP Using OP-2203.029, the CRS would direct _______________________ .
A. placing "B" LPSI pump [2P-60B] in service B. placing HIC for LPSI Discharge Header valve 2CV-5091 in MANUAL C. throttling LPSI Discharge Header valve 2CV-5091 Bypass valve 2SI-5091-3 closed D. securing "A" LPSI pump [2P-60A] and transition to OP-2202.011, Lower Mode Functional EOP Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: With a Loss of IA, the flow control valve will fail open causing high system flowrate. The Loss of SDC AOP, step 12 contingency C.1) and 2) will direct securing the in service SDC pump and entering the Lower mode Functional EOP A. Incorrect: The AOP would not direct placing the standby pump in service with signs of pump cavitation B. Incorrect: placing the HIC in MANUAL would try and send a signal to the valve, but the valve will not response due to the Loss of Instrument Air Pressure C. Incorrect: Normal configuration for 2SI-5091-3 is closed (the temperature control valve bypass valve is normally throttled open when on SDC]
References:
OP-2203.012G, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K07 window C-7, Rev 031, page 52 of 71 OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K12 window A-8, Rev 044, page 85 of 116 OP-2203.029 Loss of Shutdown Cooling Rev 016, step 12, page 8 of 18 Technical Guideline OP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, Rev 016, step 12, page 13 of 19 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 8
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 9
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1931 Rev: 0 Rev Date: 9/26/2013 3:05:02 QID #: 7 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 000026K302 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 8 System
Title:
Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) System Number 026 K/A AK3.02 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SWACW OBJ 11
Description:
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: - The automatic actions (alignments) within the CCWS resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS Question:
The PURPOSE for the CCW/ACW Return Isolation Valves (2CV-1543-1/2CV-1542-2) to automatically A. open on a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) to ensure cooling to the RCP seals is maintained B. open on a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) to cross-tie Loop 1 and Loop 2 Service Water returns C. close on a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) to separate Loop 1 and Loop 2 Service Water returns D. close on a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) to isolate seismic Category 1 piping from seismic Category 2 piping Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: MSIS and SIAS will CLOSE the inlets and outlets to CCW system to separate it from the Service Water system. SW provides cooling to components that are not safety related and therefore not seismic category 1. MSIS separates the seismic category 1 piping from the seismic category 2 piping.
A. Incorrect: MSIS will close 2CV-1543-1 and 2CV-1542-2. These valves are normally open to provide SW return flow from the CCW Heat Exchangers and the Main Chiller condensers to the SW return header. SW provides cooling to the CCW Heat Exchangers which provides cooling to the RCP seals.
B. Incorrect: MSIS will close 2CV-1543-1 and 2CV-1542-2. Loop 1 and Loop 2 Service Water returns are crosstied during an MSIS actuation via the Emergency Cooling Pond return valves.
C. Incorrect: MSIS will close 2CV-1543-1 and 2CV-1542-2, so the first half of the answer is correct. But Loop 1 and 2 Service Water return headers will still be crossed tied with these return valves closed via the Emergency Cooling Pond return valves.
References:
System Training Manual (STM) 2-42, Rev 36, section 3.5.12, pages 36 and 37, and section 3.6.15.1, page 46, Simplified Service Water drawing, page 61 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 10
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1933 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 8:01:49 QID #: 9 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC Bank QID #1495 Search 000029A112 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) System Number 029 K/A EA1.12 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-DSS OBJ 4
Description:
Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a ATWS: - M/G set power supply and reactor trip breakers Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Pressurizer Transmitters 2PT-4600-2 AND 2PT-4600-4 that supply signals to the Diverse Scram System (DSS) have failed HIGH The direct effects of these conditions would cause ________________________.
A. These conditions would cause two Reactor trip circuit breakers to open AND NO Reactor trip B. These conditions would cause four Reactor trip circuit breakers to open AND a Reactor trip C. These conditions would cause only the #1' CEA MG Set output contactor to open AND NO Reactor trip D. These conditions would cause the #1 and #2 CEA MG Set output contactors to open AND a Reactor trip Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: These conditions would cause the 'A' and 'B' CEA MG Set output contactors to open AND a Reactor Trip.
A. Incorrect: These pressure transmitters are independent of the pressure transmitters that feed RPS and Reactor trip breakers would not open initially but all 8 circuit breakers eventually would trip open due to LPD and DNBR trips.
B. Incorrect: Same reason as above C. Incorrect 2 out of 4 ATWS pressure transmitters failing high will give a full output opening both disconnect contactors causing a Reactor trip
References:
STM 2-63-1, Diverse Scram System, section 2.1, pages 3 and 4 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1495 used on 2008 NRC Exam Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 12
ES-401 Sample Written Examination Form ES-401-5 Question Worksheet Question Number: 11_(NRC proposed changes to Rev1)
(REFERENCE PROVIDED)
Consider the following:
- A Steam Line Break has occurred on the B Steam Generator (S/G) outside Containment
- Main Steam Isolation (MSIS) has automatically actuated
- OP-2205.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP, has been entered
- B Steam Generator (S/G) level indicates 0 (zero) wide range
- RCS Tcold has been stabilized at 398oF using the A S/G
- RCS Thot has been stabilized at 400oF using the A S/G
- Average CET temperature indicates 400oF In accordance with OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, to prevent pressurized thermal shock (PTS) from causing brittle fracture of the Reactor Vessel, RCS pressure should be reduced below ________ psia using ______ spray.
A. 1540 ; Aux B. 1540 ; Main C. 1800 ; Aux D. 1800 ; Main Proposed Answer: __B:__1540; Main__
Explanation:
A. Correct pressure but incorrect spray. With the rupture outside containment but upstream of the MSIV, RCPs would still be running and Main spray is available and it would be used by procedure.
B. Correct pressure and correct spray. Using OP-2202.10, Standard Attachments, Attachment 1, P-T Limits, the second bullet states Use 200oF MTS line for PTS limit for uncontrolled RCS cooldown below 500oF Tcold. With conditions given in the stem, this line is the one to be used.
The bullet also directs use of RCS Thot in forced circulation to determine RCS MTS. Given in the stem, Thot is stabilized at 400oF. Using line B on the graph, 400oF RCS temperature correlates to 1540 psia. Since RCPs would still be running, use of Main spray is correct.
C. Incorrect pressure and incorrect spray. 1800 psia is plausible because it is the value that correlates to 400oF RCS temperature if the applicant incorrectly uses dashed curve D, PRI/SEC S/G DP LIMIT. Since RCPs would still be running, Aux spray is incorrect.
D. Incorrect pressure and correct spray. 1800 psia is plausible because it is the value that correlates to 400oF RCS temperature if the applicant incorrectly uses dashed curve D, PRI/SEC S/G DP LIMIT. Since RCPs would still be running, Main spray is correct.
Technical Reference(s): 1) OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP, Rev 014, step 30, page 12 of 41
- 2) EOP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 30, page 41 of 76
- 3) OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Attachment 1, page 5 of 204 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Attachment 1, page 5 of 204_
Learning Objective: A2LP-RO-EESD objective 8_
Question Source: Bank # ______
Modified Bank # ___X___ (Note changes or attach parent)
New _______
Question History: Last NRC Exam parent from NRC 2005 exam_(attached)___
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge _____
Comprehension or Analysis __X__
Question Level of Difficulty: __3__
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 __7__
55.43 _____
Comments:
NRC QID #0458 used on 2005 NRC Exam, changed stem conditions, changed answer and changed order of answers.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 Bank: 1935 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/31/2014 1:14:52 QID #: 11 Author: foster Lic Level: RS Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 00CE05A202 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Excess Steam Demand System Number E05 K/A EA2.2 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EESD OBJ 8
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): - Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments Question:
Consider the following:
During an ESD event, you were assigned by the CRS to complete step 12 of Emergency Operating Procedure OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Deman EOP, which states "When RCS Tcold less than 510°F, then reduce the number of RCPs as follows."
The procedural action taken is to "Verify a maximum of one RCP is running in each loop" but the actual concern is to address core lift problems with greater than _________________.
A. three RCPs running below 505°F B. three RCPs running below 500°F C. two RCPs running below 505°F D. two RCPs running below 500°F Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
Per the ESD EOP basis document, the concern with running greater then three RCP's below 500 degrees F is core lift.
References:
EOP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand Basis Document, Rev. 013, page 25 of 76 2102.010, Plant Cooldown ANO-2 EOP Setpoint Document, setpoint B.5 ANO-2 Final Safety Analysis Report Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments. Corrected notes to include explanation that the Steam break is outside of the Containment Building. Added Thot to stem and changed Tcold to 398 degrees. Added Reference Provided to allow use of OP-2202.010 Attachment 1. (mwf 1/29/14)
Rev. 2: changed question to one recommended by NRC. (mwf 1/31/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 14
New Question for Q11_Rev2 proposed Same KA E05.EA2.2, All new question for this KA.
Consider the following:
During an ESD event, your were assigned by the CRS to complete step 12 of Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-2202.005, Excessive Steam Demand, which states:
The procedural action taken is to Verify a maximum of one RCP is running in each loop but the actual concern is to_______________.
A. address core lift problems with greater than three RCPs running below 505oF B. address core lift problems with greater than three RCPs running below 500oF C. address core lift problems with greater than two RCPs running below 505oF D. address core lift problems with greater than two RCPs running below 500oF Proposed Answer: B core lift is a concern with greater than 3 RCPs below 500F ANO -Please add the distracter pedigree here References provided:________None___
References for question
- 2. 2102.010, Plant Cooldown.
- 3. ANO-2 EOP Setpoint Document, setpoint B.5.
- 4. FSAR
Question Number: 12_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Proposed Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to high Containment Building pressure
- Containment Building pressure is 24 psia and trending up
- Annunciator 2K01 B-7 LO RELAY TRIP for 2A1 is in alarm
- Neither.
- A Steam Generator.
- B Steam
- SPTAs have been completed RCS cooling would be accomplished from the Control Room by starting ________Condensate Pump because _______________.
A. A (2P-2A); there is no control power for the B pump B. B (2P-2B); the MFIW signal cannot be overridden for the A pump C. C (2P-2C); the MFIW signal cannot be overridden for the D pump D. D (2P-2D); there is no control power for the B pump Proposed Answer: __D_
Explanation:
Distracters A and C are not correct because condensate pumps A and C are both powered by 2A1, which has a lockout on the bus and the second part of the distracter is not needed. For distracter B although it is correct that the MFIW signal cannot be overridden for the A pump (second part is true) the B pump has no DC control power because of (ANO put in reason here)and therefore cannot be started from the control room.
This makes D the only correct answer for both parts and involves knowledge of the interlocks and features from the control room ANO please verify this is correct!
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1936 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 9:06:59 QID #: 12 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 00CE06K201 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Loss of Feedwater System Number E06 K/A EK2.1 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOSF OBJ 3
Description:
Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Feedwater) and the following: - Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to high Containment Building pressure
- Containment Building pressure is 24 psia and trending up
- Annunciator 2K01 B-7 "LO RELAY TRIP" for 2A1 is in alarm
- Neither Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump is available
- "A" Steam Generator (S/G) Level is 200" (WR) and trending down
- "B" Steam Generator (S/G) Level is 21% (NR) and trending down slowly
- SPTAs have been completed RCS cooling would be accomplished by starting ______ Condensate Pump from the Control Room.
A. "A" (2P-2A)
B. "B" (2P-2B)
C. "C" (2P-2C)
D. "D" (2P-2D)
Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: For the given conditions, a SIAS, CCAS, EFAS, CSAS, and a MSIS are all present. The CSAS and MSIS signals, along with the MFWIS, will isolate feed and steam to/from the containment to minimize the energy release into containment. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP, would be entered due to 2 events in progress (ESD and Loss of Feedwater) Normally the EFW pumps would supply feedwater for RCS heat removal but they are unavailable. AFW pump is powered from 2A1 is unavailable. The Functional would direct over riding the MFWIS signal on either the "B" or "C" condensate pumps by opening the control power breakers. This action makes the "B" and "C" Condensate Pumps unavailable to be started from the Control Room. "A" Condensate Pump is not available due to 2A1 being locked out. So the only remaining option is to start "D" Condensate pump from the Control Room.
A. Incorrect: "A" Condensate pump is unavailable because 2A1 is locked out.
B. Incorrect: "B" Condensate pump is unavailable because it has not control power. The action in the EOP to open "B" and "C" Condensate Pump control power breakers made "B" unavailable for start from the Control Room.
C. Incorrect: "C" Condensate Pump is unavailable because 2A1 is locked out.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 16
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14
References:
OP-2203.012A, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K01 window B-7, Rev 045, page 98 of 179 OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP, Rev 016, HR-2 step 38.E page 60 of 95 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Attachment 57 step 2 page 176 of 204 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Attachment 50 step 3 page 146 of 204 EOP-2202.009, Functional Recovery Tech Guide, Rev 017, HR-2 step 38 page 260 of 341 STM 2-20, Condensate System, Rev 14 section 2.3.4 page 15 STM 2-70, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, Rev 18, section 2.2.4.1 pages 5 and 6, MFWIS table page 55 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments. Corrected notes to include explanation. Updated references. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 17
NRC proposed changes to Q15_R1 Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Annunciators XXXXX and YYYYY are in alarm As the RO you are asked by the CRS to verify status of ESFAS channels at Panel 2C03. Based on the above plant status, you expect __________.
A. only Trip Path-1 status lights are out B. only Trip Path-2 status lights are out C. Trip Path-1 and Trip Path-3 status lights are out D. Trip Path-2 and Trip Path-4 status lights are out Proposed Answer: C Trip Path-1 and Trip Path-3 status lights are out Explanation:
ANO- please provide the applicable alarm(s) for loss of 2RS-1 bus in the stem of this question (dont provide the lost bus to them).
Please provide complete pedigree here.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 Bank: 1939 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/31/2014 10:40:1 QID #: 15 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000057A204 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus System Number 057 K/A AA2.04 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESFAS OBJ 6
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: - ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status indicators Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is at 100% power
- Annunciator 2K01-F10, "2RS1 INVERTER TROUBLE" comes into alarm
- Annunciator 2K01-J10, "DIST PNLS 2RS1/2RS3 GROUND" comes into alarm
- 2RS-1, 120 Vital AC Bus, voltage is reading 0 volts on SPDS As the RO you are asked by the CRS to verify status of ESFAS channels at Panel 2C03. Based on the above plant status, you expect _______________.
A. only Trip Path-1 status lights to be out B. only Trip Path-2 status lights to be out C. Trip Path-1 and Trip Path-3 status light to be out D. Trip Path-2 and Trip Path-4 status lights to be out Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
2RS-1 powers the RED train (channel 1) components. Each Logic Matrix has 2 individual 12v power supply, powered by a different vital bus. A failure of 2RS-1 would cause one side of the AB Logic Matrix ladder, which would cause the AB1 and AB3 Logic Matrix relays to de-energized. This causes the AB1 contact in the Trip Path-1 circuit to open which de-energizes the Trip Path-1 circuit and makes the indication light on 2C03 go out. The AB3 contact will also open in the Trip Path-3 circuit, which causes the Trip Path-3 circuit to de-energized and the status light on 2C03 will go out.
References:
STM 2-70, Engineered Safety Features Actuation system, Rev 18, section 2.0 pages 2-4, section 3.2.8 pages 20-21 STM 2-70, Engineered Safety Features Actuation system, Rev 18, Drawing on page 68 and 78 OP-2107.008, 120 VAC and 125 VDC Bus Outage, Attachment A, 2RS1 Loads, Page 1 of 3 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments. Kept K/A and wrote another question. (mwf 1/29/14)
Rev. 2: changed to incorporate Kelly's suggested question. (mwf 1/31/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 20
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1940 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 3:27:23 QID #: 16 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: Modified NRC Bank QID #0462 Search 000058K302 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Loss of DC Power System Number 058 K/A AK3.02 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.0 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-A125V OBJ 3
Description:
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: - Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- The RED battery (2D11) disconnect, 2D-51, has been tagged OPEN in preparations for a battery cell change out
- Battery Charger, 2D31A, is supplying 2D01
- 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later
- Annunciator 2K01 A-10 "CONT CENTER 2D01 UNDER VOLT" comes into alarm
- The IAO reports Battery Charger 2D31A has 0 VDC output
- All other systems and components operate as designed
- The CRS has entered OP-2203.037, Loss of 125 VDC AOP In accordance with OP-2203.037, the CRS would direct placing ALL points on EITHER _________________________ in bypass to prevent ________________________.
A. channel 1 (2C23-1) OR channel 2 (2C23-2); inadvertent Reactor trip B. channel 1 (2C23-1) OR channel 3 (2C23-3); inadvertent Reactor trip C. channel 1 (2C23-1) OR channel 2 (2C23-2); inadvertent actuations if the Reactor were to trip D. channel 1 (2C23-1) OR channel 3 (2C23-3); inadvertent actuations if the Reactor were to trip Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: The loss of 125VDC AOP will direct bypassing all points in either Channel 1 or Channel 3 to prevent inadvertent actuations of Green train components. If this action were not performed and the Reactor were to trip, both red train Vital AC buses would be de-energized causing actuations on the ESFAS actuations that come in when the parameter is low.
A. Incorrect: The Reactor will not inadvertently trip because the Inverters swap to Alternate Source when the Charger trips.
B. Incorrect: The Reactor will not inadvertently trip because the Inverters swap to Alternate Source when the Charger trips.
C. Incorrect: The Loss of 125V DC AOP instructs the operators to bypass all point on Channel 1 or Channel 3. Channel 2 is powered from the DC train that still has power.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 21
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14
References:
OP-2203.012A, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K01 window A-10, Rev 045, page 125 of 179 OP-2203.037, Loss of 125 V DC AOP, Rev 009, section 2, step 5 page 6 of 57 AOP-2203.037, Loss of 125 V DC Tech Guide, Rev 009, section 2, step 5 page 6 of 57 STM 2-32-5, 125 Vdc Electrical Distribution, Rev 19, section 2.7.2 page 15, and simplified drawing page 24 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #0462 used on the 2005 NRC Exam Rev. 1, corrected based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 22
Q16_R1 (NRC proposed changes)
Proposed Question:
A. Proposed Answer:
Explanation:
The proposed changes submitted in Rev 1 of this question now meet the KA for knowledge of the reasons for the actions but now it needs to have all the pencil marks typed up and submitted and the complete pedigree needs to be updated (the notes section as ANO calls it) to explain why an inadvertent rx trip is not a correct reason for two of the distracters as well as the trip discussion they had before in the original question for the other part of the distracters and the correct answer.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1941 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 3:40:31 QID #: 17 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: ANO BANK QID ANO-OpsUnit2-09557 Search 000065K303 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 8 System
Title:
Loss of Instrument Air System Number 065 K/A AK3.03 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ALIA OBJ 3
Description:
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: - Knowing effects on plant operation of isolating certain equipment from instrument air Question:
During a Loss of Instrument Air, CEDM coil temperatures will be monitored. This is due to a loss of air to A. CEDM Cooling Fan Dampers B. Containment Chilled Water Isolation Valves C. CEDM Cooling Water Temperature Control Valves D. Containment Cooling Fan Dampers Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
A. Incorrect: The CEDM Cooling Fan Dampers are Motor Operated not Air Operated.
B. Correct: The Containment Chilled Water Isolation Valves fail closed on Instrument Air, which isolates chilled water to the CEDM Cooling Fans.
C. Incorrect: The CEDM Coolers do not have temperature control valves D. Incorrect: The Containment Cooler Dampers are motor operated.
References:
STM 2-45, Main Chill Water System, Rev. 18, pages 1 and 23. (mwf 1/30/14)
Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Used ANO Bank question ANO-OpsUnit2-09557 per NRC suggestion. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 23
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1945 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 11:30:1 QID #: 21 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC Bank QID #1728 Search 000033K301 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 7 System
Title:
Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument System Number 033 K/A AK3.01 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: OBJ
Description:
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation: - Termination of startup following loss of intermediate-range instrumentation Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 2 with a Reactor Startup in progress
- OP-2102.016, Reactor Startup, is in progress
- Annunciator 2K10 K-4 "STARTUP CHANNEL 1 TROUBLE" comes in alarm
- Annunciator 2K10 K-5 "STARTUP CHANNEL 2 TROUBLE" comes in alarm
- The CRS declares Startup Channel #1 and #2 INOPERABLE OP-2102.016 _________________.
A. allows the startup to continue because Startup Channels are not required in this mode B. allows the startup to continue as long as boron samples are taken every 15 minutes C. does NOT allow the startup to continue because BOTH Startup Channels are required to be OPERABLE during the startup D. does NOT allow the startup to continue because a minimum of ONE Startup Channel must be OPERABLE during the startup Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
The Startup Channels provide source and intermediate range indication during the reactor startup. The Startup Channels are the primary means of monitoring neutron count rate during a startup.
C. Correct: OP-2102.016 limit and precaution 5.9 that states if unexpected conditions arise the reactor should be place in a safe condition, this is also covered during the pre-job brief, also step 7.38 A. Incorrect:
B. Incorrect: There are no contingency actions that can be taken if Startup Channels are lost so that the reactor startup can continue.
D. Incorrect, BOTH Startup Channels are required to be OPERABLE to perform reactor startup.
References:
STM 2-67-1, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation, Rev 11 section 2.1 page 2 and section 2.3.3 page 8 OP-2102.016, Reactor Startup, Rev 021 section 5.0, step 5.9 page 5 of 31 and Attachment C section 1.0 page 28 of 31 OP-2203.012J, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K10 window K-4, rev 039 page 54 of 84 T.S. 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown instrumentation OP-2203.012J, Annunciator Corrective Actions window 2K10 K-5, rev 039 page 61 of 84 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 28
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Tech Spec 3.9.2, refueling instrumentation Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1728, used on 2011 NRC Exam. Original QID 121 was used on the 1998 NRC Exam Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments. Updated notes to explain that Startup Channels serve the purpose of Intermediate range instrumentation during a reactor startup. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 29
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1947 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 11:30:0 QID #: 23 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000037A211 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 3 System
Title:
Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak System Number 037 K/A AA2.11 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-APSEC OBJ 3
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: - When to isolate one or more S/Gs Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has shutdown due to a 1 gpm tube leak in the "A" Steam Generator (S/G)
- SPTAs are complete
- A natural circulation cooldown is in progress due to a common problem with the RCPs
- OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP, is being implemented
- "A" S/G hot leg temperature is 537°F
- "A" S/G cold leg temperature is 508°F "A" S/G ______________ isolation criteria of OP-2203.038, based on _______ leg temperature.
A. meets; hot B. does not meet; hot C. meets; cold D. does not meet; cold Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
OP-2203.038 AOP directs isolating the leaking S/G when Thot is <535°F. The given conditions place the plant in natural circulation which will have a large loop temperature differential. Student has to know both isolation critieria is based on Thot, not Tcold and <535°F.
References:
OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP, Rev 014, step 25, page 17 of 32 AOP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 25, page 25 of 81 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 31
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1948 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 12:18:0 QID #: 24 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 0000672431 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 9 System
Title:
Plant Fire on Site System Number 067 K/A 2.4.31 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO AFIRE OBJ 2
Description:
Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- The Control room gets a report of a fire at the cooling tower
- OP-2203.034, Fire and Explosion AOP, has been entered For this event, the ____________________ would respond to the fire and, at a MINIMUM, a ________________________
must be dispatched to the scene as a communicator to coordinate with the Control Room.
A. ANO Fire Brigade; knowledgeable member of plant staff B. ANO Fire Brigade; operator qualified Waste Control Operator (WCO)
C. London Fire Department; knowledgeable member of plant staff D. London Fire Department; operator qualified Waste Control Operator (WCO)
Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
IAW OP-2203.034, Fire and Explosion AOP section 4
References:
OP-2203.034, Fire and Explosion AOP, Rev 015, section 4, steps 2 and 5, page 24 of 36 AOP-2203.034, Fire and Explosion Tech Guide, Rev 015, section 4, steps 2, page 37 of 44, and step 5, page 39 of 42 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments. Changed distractor to say "operator qualified as WCO". (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 32
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1949 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 8:40:10 QID #: 25 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000068K318 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 8 System
Title:
Control Room Evacuation System Number 068 K/A AK3.18 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ARS OBJ 1&2
Description:
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: - Actions contained in EOP for control room evacuation emergency task Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Unit 1 Halon system is inadvertently discharging into the Control Room envelope
- The Unit 2 Shift Manager directs the Unit 2 Control Room to be evacuated
- OP-2203.030, Remote Shutdown AOP, has been entered Prior to exiting the Control Room, OP-2203.030 verifies both ______________________ to prevent A. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed; overpressurizing the Main Condenser B. Main Feedwater pumps tripped; overpressurizing the Main Condenser C. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed; overcooling the RCS D. Main Feedwater pumps tripped; overcooling the RCS Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: The Remote Shutdown AOP verifies both MFPs are tripped prior to exiting the Control Room [step 7] to minimize the possibility of overcooling the RCS due to over feeding.
A. Incorrect: Closing the Main Steam isolation Valves (MSIVs) prior to exiting the control room would prevent feeding the S/Gs with the MFPs [no steam to drive them] but is not directed in Remote Shutdown AOP [it is an action specified by the Alternate Shutdown AOP].
B. Incorrect: , Both MFWPs are tripped prior to exiting the Control Room, but not to prevent overpressurizing the Main Condenser. The MFWP Turbines do exhaust to the Main Condenser, but in a Remote Shutdown scenario the Main Condenser is available.
C. Incorrect: Closing the Main Steam isolation Valves (MSIVs) prior to exiting the control room would prevent prevent overcooling of the RCS, but is not directed in Remote Shutdown AOP [it is an action specified by the Alternate Shutdown AOP].
References:
OP-2203.030, Remote Shutdown AOP, Rev 014, step 7 page 2 of 49 AOP-2203.030, Remote Shutdown Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 7 page 9 of 26 Historical Comments:
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 33
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Rev 1 changed question to ask a reason for actions based on NRC comments. Notes and References changed. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 34
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 19-Feb-14 Bank: 1949 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 8:40:10 QID #: 25 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000068K318 10CFR55: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45 Safety Function 8 System
Title:
Control Room Evacuation System Number 068 K/A AK3.18 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.2 SRO Imp: 4.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ARS OBJ 1&2
Description:
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: - Actions contained in EOP for control room evacuation emergency task Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Unit 1 Halon system is inadvertently discharging into the Control Room envelope
- The Unit 2 Shift Manager directs the Unit 2 Control Room to be evacuated
- OP-2203.030, Remote Shutdown AOP, has been entered Prior to exiting the Control Room, OP-2203.030 verifies both ______________________ to prevent A. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed; overpressurizing the Main Condenser B. Main Feedwater pumps tripped; overpressurizing the Main Condenser C. Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closed; overcooling the RCS D. Main Feedwater pumps tripped; overcooling the RCS Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: The Remote Shutdown AOP verifies both MFPs are tripped prior to exiting the Control Room [step 7] to minimize the possibility of overcooling the RCS due to over feeding.
A. Incorrect: Closing the Main Steam isolation Valves (MSIVs) prior to exiting the control room would prevent feeding the S/Gs with the MFPs [no steam to drive them] but is not directed in Remote Shutdown AOP [it is an action specified by the Alternate Shutdown AOP].
B. Incorrect: Both MFWPs are tripped prior to exiting the Control Room, but not to prevent overpressurizing the Main Condenser. The MFWP Turbines do exhaust to the Main Condenser, but in a Remote Shutdown scenario the Main Condenser is available.
C. Incorrect: Closing the Main Steam isolation Valves (MSIVs) prior to exiting the control room would prevent prevent overcooling of the RCS, but is not directed in Remote Shutdown AOP [it is an action specified by the Alternate Shutdown AOP].
References:
OP-2203.030, Remote Shutdown AOP, Rev 014, step 7 page 2 of 49 AOP-2203.030, Remote Shutdown Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 7 page 9 of 26 Historical Comments:
Rev 1 changed question to ask a reason for actions based on NRC comments. Notes and References changed. (mwf 1/22/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 30
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 19-Feb-14 Rev 2: Changed distractors and notes [ 1/29/2014]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 31
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1951 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 12:23:5 QID #: 27 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 00CE09K102 10CFR55: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3 Safety Function 0 System
Title:
Functional Recovery System Number E09 K/A EK1.2 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFRP OBJ 1&4
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Functional Recover): - Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Functional Recovery)
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power
- "A" Steam Generator has a 0.12 gpm tube leak
- Containment Pressure, Temperature and Humidity are trending up
- Containment Low Range Rad monitors are trending up
- SPTAs are complete
__________________ EOP would be entered, and to control secondary contamination,
_________________________________ would be implemented.
A. Steam Generator Tube Rupture; Standard Attachment 10, SG Isolation B. Steam Generator Tube Rupture; Standard Attachment 17, LOCA Isolation C. Functional Recovery; Standard Attachment 10, SG Isolation D. Functional Recovery; Standard Attachment 17, LOCA Isolation Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
Conditions given indicate 2 events in progress (SGTR and LOCA) which is an entry condition for the FRP. Standard 0 is directed by the FRP (HR-2 step 16) to isolate the "A" S/G and control secondary contamination.
References:
OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP, Rev 017, section HR-1, step 13 page 10 of 95 EOP-2202.009, Functional Recovery Tech Guide, Rev 016, section HR-1, step 16 page 239 of 341 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 021, Att. 10 pages 26 and 27 of 204 and Att. 19, pages 62-66 of 186 Historical Comments:
Rev 1 changed question based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 36
Q29 Suggested Revisions - TJ Farina Suggested revisions are in RED font.
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is tripped due to a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
- OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, is being implemented
- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is water solid During water solid operations, placing letdown in service would cause __(1)____ to RAPIDLY lower. Void formation in SG U-tubes is minimized by maintaining BOTH SGs pressure __(2)___
than RCS pressure.
(1) (2)
A. Pressurizer level; less B. Pressurizer pressure; less C. Pressurizer level; greater D. Pressurizer pressure; greater Answer: B
[Source: 2202.010 STANDARD ATTACHMENT 34: RCS WATER SOLID OPERATIONS, Step 2]
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1953 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 4:34:00 QID #: 29 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 004000K530 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.7 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) System Number 004 K/A K5.30 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVCS OBJ 2
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: -
Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS components during solid plant operation Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is tripped due to a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
- OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, is being implemented
- The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is water solid During water solid operations, placing letdown in service would cause _______________ to RAPIDLY lower. Void formation in SG U-tubes is minimized by maintaining BOTH SGs pressure _______ than RCS pressure.
A. Pressurizer level; less B. Pressurizer level; greater C. Pressurizer pressure; less D. Pressurizer pressure; greater Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
Per OP-2202.010 Standard Attachment 34, in a solid plant condition small changes in either temperature or level will cause a large change in pressure and to minimize void formation in SG U-tubes by maintaining BOTH SGs less than RCS pressure.
References:
OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, Rev 014, section 2 page 14 of 67 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment, Rev. 022, Attachment 34, RCS Water Solid Operations, Step 2, page 109 of 205 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: changed based on NRC feedback. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 37
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1953 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 4:34:00 QID #: 29 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 004000K530 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.7 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) System Number 004 K/A K5.30 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVCS OBJ 2
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: -
Relationship between temperature and pressure in CVCS components during solid plant operation Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is tripped due to a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
- OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, is being implemented
- The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is water solid During water solid operations, placing letdown in service would cause _______________ to RAPIDLY lower. Void formation in SG U-tubes is minimized by maintaining BOTH SGs pressure _______ than RCS pressure.
A. Pressurizer level; less B. Pressurizer level; greater C. Pressurizer pressure; less D. Pressurizer pressure; greater Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
Per OP-2202.010 Standard Attachment 34, in a solid plant condition small changes in either temperature or level will cause a large change in pressure and to minimize void formation in SG U-tubes by maintaining BOTH SGs less than RCS pressure.
References:
OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, Rev 014, section 2 page 14 of 67 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment, Rev. 022, Attachment 34, RCS Water Solid Operations, Step 2, page 109 of 205 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: changed based on NRC feedback. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 37
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1954 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 12:29:2 QID #: 30 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 005000K201 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) System Number 005 K/A K2.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ECCS OBJ 12
Description:
Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: - RHR pumps Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 6
- Startup #3 Transformer is supplying plant 'in-house' loads
- Startup #2 Transformer handswitches are OUT of Pull-to-Lock (PTL) for 2A1 and 2A2
- The Alternate AC Diesel Generator (AACDG) is Available
- #2 EDG is OOS for maintenance
- "A" Spray pump (2P-35A) is aligned for Shutdown Cooling and is in service
- Annunciator 2K01 A-3 "L.O. RELAY TRIP" for Startup #3 comes into alarm
- NO operator actions have been taken OP-2203.029, Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP, entry conditions ____________ and the "A" Spray pump (2P-35A) ________
running.
A. have been met; is B. have not been met; is C. have been met; is not D. have not been met; is not Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
The "A" Spray Pump is powered off of the RED vital AC train (2A3) which is supplied by 2A1 non vital switchgear. Offsite power to the site during an outage is supplied by the Startup #3 transformer with the Startup #2 transformer in standby (available for fast transfer) to both RED and GREEN buses. A Startup #3 Lockout will initiate a fast transfer of 2A1 to Startup #2. The safety bus will not see a loss of power and the Spray pump will continue to run. The Loss of SDC Entry conditions are not met and the control room staff would respond to the Startup #3 Lock out per the ACA.
References:
OP-2107.001, electrical System Operations, Rev. 104, Note before section 7.0 step 7.2 page 26 of 311 STM 2-14, Shutdown Cooling System, Rev 11, section 2.2.2 page 12 Historical Comments:
Rev 1 changed question based on NRC comment to capitalize annunciator name. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 39
Q31 Suggested Revisions - TJ Farina REVIEWER COMMENT:
Is there ever a time LPSI discharge would recirc back to suction piping? If not, then that distractor is implausible.
REVISED OPTION:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power due to a LOCA 15 minutes ago
- RCS pressure is 1400 psia and slowly trending down
- All systems operate as designed Low Pressure Safety Injection system (LPSI) ____ be injecting into the RCS and the Low Pressure Safety Injection pump recirculation flow path would be _________ .
A. would; aligned to Refueling Water Tank (RWT)
B. would not; aligned to Refueling Water Tank (RWT)
C. would; isolated D. would not; isolated Answer:
B. Correct
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1955 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 12:30:2 QID #: 31 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 006000K409 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 2 System
Title:
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) System Number 006 K/A K4.09 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ECCS OBJ 13
Description:
Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: - Valve positioning on safety injection signal Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power due to a LOCA 15 minutes ago
- RCS pressure is 1400 psia and slowly trending down Low Pressure Safety Injection system (LPSI) injection MOVs are ________ and the LPSI pump recirculation valves to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) would be ____________ .
A. open; open B. open; closed C. closed; open D. closed; closed Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A Safety Injection Actuation (SIAS) occurs when RCS pressure drops below 1650#. The SIAS will start the LPSI pumps and open the injection MOVs to the RCS. The LPSI pump recirc flowpath is aligned to the RWT, if a Recirc Actuation Signal (RAS) occurred the LPSI pump is tripped and the recirc flowpath valves would go closed, isolating the LPSI recirc flowpath from the RWT. A RAS is not actuated based on the time given [15 minutes] the RWT holds enough inventory to supply the ECCS pumps for 30 minutes during a DBA. The given conditions does not indicate a DBA in progress [RCS pressure 1400#
and slowly trending down] therefore the LPSI recirc flowpath valves to the RWT are open.
References:
STM 2-05, Emergency Core Cooling System, Rev 27, section 4.4.2, pages 36 and 37 STM 2-08, Containment Spray System, Rev 22, section 3.1.1 pages 7 and 8 Historical Comments:
Rev 1 based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 40
NRC proposed changes to Q32_R0 (TJF)
ORIGINAL QUESTION:
Consider the following:
-Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
-Annunciator 2K07 A-1 "SIAS ACT" is in alarm
- The Reactor did not trip
- RCS pressure 2200 psia and steady
- Containment parameters are normal and steady The CRS has entered the appropriate AOP and would direct the CBOT to override and _______ _
A. open Service Water (SW) to Aux Cooling Water (ACW) supply isolation valves B. open the Component Cooling Water (CCW) isolation valves to the containment building C. close the ECCS Containment Sump isolation valves inside the containment building D. close the ECCS Containment Sump isolation valves outside the containment building Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
Action is in accordance with the Inadvertent SIAS AOP REVIEWER COMMENT:
Distractors C and D are essentially the same. Is there a time when it would be procedurally directed to close one but not the other Ctmt Sump isolation valve? If not, replace one with a new distractor.
REVISED OPTION:
Consider the following:
-Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
-Annunciator 2K07 A-1 "SIAS ACT" is in alarm
- The Reactor did not trip
- RCS pressure 2200 psia and steady
- Containment parameters are normal and steady The CRS has entered the appropriate AOP and would direct the CBOT to override and _______ _
A. open Service Water (SW) to Aux Cooling Water (ACW) supply isolation valves B. open the Component Cooling Water (CCW) isolation valves to the containment building C. close the HPSI Orifice Bypass Valves (2CV-5103-1 and 2CV-5104-2)
D. close the ECCS Containment Sump isolation valves outside the containment building Answer:
A. Correct
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1956 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 12:32:3 QID #: 32 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 006000A213 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 2 System
Title:
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) System Number 006 K/A A2.13 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-INAD OBJ 1&2
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Inadvertent SIS actuation Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Annunciator 2K07 A-1 "SIAS ACT" is in alarm
- The Reactor did not trip
- RCS pressure 2200 psia and steady
- Containment parameters are normal and steady The CRS has entered the appropriate AOP and would direct the CBOT to override and ___________________ .
A. open Service Water (SW) to Aux Cooling Water (ACW) supply isolation valves B. open the Component Cooling Water (CCW) isolation valves to the containment building C. close the ECCS Containment Sump isolation valves inside the containment building D. place Containment Spray Pumps in Pull-to-Lock (PTL)
Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A: Correct. An Inadvertent SIAS will cause the SW to ACW Supply Isolation Valves to close. These valves have to be overridden and opened to prevent a Turbine Runback and is directed early on in the AOP.
B: Incorrect. SIAS does not automatically close the CCW isolation valves to the containment building.
These will not have to be opened during an Inadvertent SIAS condition.
C. Incorrect. The inside Containment Sump Suction Isolation Valves are normally open and do not receive an SIAS. They do receive a RAS and the Inadvertent RAS AOP directs overridding and closing these valves during an Inadvertent RAS. This action is done in the Inadvertent RAS AOP to prevent draining the RWT to the Containment Sump.
D. Incorrect. The Containment Spray Pumps do not receive a SIAS and will not have to be secured during an Inadvertent SIAS.
References:
OP-2203.012G, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K07 window A-1, Rev 030, page 4 of 70 OP-2203.018, Inadvertent SIAS AOP, Rev 010, entry section, page 3 of 52 AOP-2203.018, Inadvertent SIAS Tech Guide, Rev 009, page 6 of 60 Historical Comments:
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 41
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Rev 1 added notes to explain incorrect answers and their credibility. Changed D distractor to secure Spray Pump.(mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 42
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1957 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/22/2014 1:10:25 QID #: 33 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC Bank QID #1742 Search 007000A102 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.5 Safety Function 5 System
Title:
Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System ( System Number 007 K/A A1.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Imp: 2.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ 25
Description:
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: - Maintaining quench tank pressure Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Annunciator 2K10 D-4 "QUENCH TANK PRESSURE HI" is in alarm
- 2PIS-4694, Quench Tank Pressure, is 42 psig and slowly trending up
- 2LIS-4694, Quench Tank Level, is 78% and slowly trending up A possible source of inleakage to the Quench Tank is from ________________________ and the Quench Tank would be drained to the __________________ to clear the alarm.
A. RCS High Point Vents; Containment Sump B. RCS High Point Vents; Reactor Drain Tank C. Pressurizer Spray Valve Stem leakoff; Reactor Drain Tank D. Pressurizer Spray Valve Stem leakoff; Containment Sump Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
B. Correct: RCS high point vents discharge into the quench tank and the quench tank is vented to the Reactor Drain Tank A. Incorrect: RCS high points vents do go to the Quench Tank but venting to the containment sump is not an option in the OP-2103.007. The quench tank vent path could be aligned to the containment atmosphere thru the high point vent header but is not procedurally driven in the given mode.
C. Incorrect: Pressurizer Spray Valve Stem leakoff is not directed to the Quench tank but the Reactor Drain Tank.
D. Incorrect: Pressurizer Spray Valve Stem leakoff is not directed to the Quench tank but the Reactor Drain Tank.
References:
OP- 2203.012J, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K10 window D-4, Rev 039, page 48 of 84 STM 2-52, Liquid Radwaste/Boron Management system, Rev 17, section 3.1, page 13 STM 2-03, Reactor Coolant System, Rev 22, section 2.3, pages 23 and 24 OP-2103.007, Quench Tank and Reactor Drain Tank OPS, Rev 023, section 7.6, page10 of 30 Historical Comments:
used on 2012 NRC Exam Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 43
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 44
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1960 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 10:07:2 QID #: 36 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: Modified NRC Bank QID #1523 Search 010000K601 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 3 System
Title:
Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) System Number 010 K/A K6.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.7 SRO Imp: 3.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-PZR OBJ 4&5
Description:
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: - Pressure detection systems Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- The "A" Pressurizer Pressure Control Channel is in service
- Annunciator 2K12 E-6 "CNTRL CH 1 PRESSURE HI/LO" comes into alarm
- "A" Pressurizer pressure instrument (2PS-4626A) reads 1400 psia
- "B" Pressurizer pressure instrument (2PS-4626B) reads 2200 psia
- No Operator action has been taken The Pressurizer backup heater breakers would _______________ and the Proportional Heaters would go to a
______________ firing rate.
A. open; maximum B. close; maximum C. open; minimum D. close; minimum Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
The pressure control system would see the false low pressure and with the control channel indicating <25 psia below setpoint (2200 psia @ 100% power) the backup heaters breakers will close and energize all Backup Heaters and send a maximum fire command to the proportional heaters.
References:
OP- 2203.012J, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K10 window E-6, Rev 039, page 68 of 84 STM 2-03-01, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control, Rev 16, section 2.0 pages 8, 11 and 12 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1523 used on 2008 NRC Exam Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 47
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1961 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 10:07:3 QID #: 37 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 012000A403 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 Safety Function 7 System
Title:
Reactor Protection System System Number 012 K/A A4.03 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RPS OBJ 10
Description:
Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: - Channel blocks and bypasses Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is performing a plant cooldown As the RCS is cooled down, the Low RWT Level/Low PZR Pressure Bypasses are ____________ bypassed and the HI/Low S/G Level Bypasses are ____________ bypassed.
A. manually; automatically B. automatically; manually C. manually; manually D. automatically; automatically Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
There is no automatic function to go into bypass for both but either will automatically come out of bypass. The Low RWT Level/Low PZR Pressure Operating Bypass will come out of bypass when RCS pressure is >436 psia and the HI/Low S/G Level Operating Bypass will automatically come out of bypass when RCS Th is >195F
References:
OP-2102.010, Plant Cooldown, Rev 049, section 9.6 page 23 of 54 and section 9.18 page 30 of 54 STM 2-63, Reactor Protection system, Rev 11, section 6.2.2.2 and section 6.2.2.3 page 44 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 48
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1962 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 10:08:5 QID #: 38 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 013000K301 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.6 Safety Function 2 System
Title:
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ( System Number 013 K/A K3.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ECCS OBJ 4
Description:
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ESFAS will have on the following: - Fuel Question:
To limit the peak cladding temperature of the fuel, the Emergency Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) is used to actuate components in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and together they are designed for a loss or malfunction of:
A. a failure of a single active component during the injection mode OR a failure of a single active or a single passive component during the recirculation mode B. a failure of a single active component during the injection mode AND a failure of a single active component and a single failure of a passive component during the recirculation mode C. a failure of a single passive component during the injection mode OR a failure of a single active or a single passive component during the recirculation mode D. a failure of a single passive component during the injection mode AND a failure of a single active component and a single passive component during the recirculation mode Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
Design bases for ECCS
References:
STM 2-05, Emergency Core Cooling System, Rev 27, section 1.1 pages 1 and 2 Tech Spec 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 bases STM 2-70, Engineerd Safety Features Actuation system, Rev 18, section 2,2,1 page 5, Table on page 8 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments to make B and D distractors sound more plausible. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 49
Q38_R1: NRC comments Upon further review of the question and KA, the proposed question is not a good match to the KA.
The KA is asking for knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of ESFAS on the fuel. The question, as proposed, is asking for knowledge of the design requirements of a system that is actuated by an ESFAS signal in response to a design basis LOCA (where the system design is to provide for core cooling that is indirectly related to the KA).
A better KA match would be a question that asks what would be the effect of failure of the ESFAS to generate an actuation signal(s) whose purpose is to protect the fuel.
For example - feel free to develop another question Which ESFAS signal(s), if not generated, would have the effect of more extensive core damage?
A. Only SIAS B. SIAS and CIAS C. CIAS and CSAS D. EFAS, SIAS and RAS The Lesson Plan should be the one used to teach ESFAS and the Reference should be STM 2-70, ESFAS.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1963 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 12:48:5 QID #: 39 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC Bank QID #1749 Search 026000K408 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 5 System
Title:
Containment Spray System (CSS) System Number 026 K/A K4.08 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.1 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SPRAY OBJ 4
Description:
Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: - Automatic swapover to containment sump suction for recirculation phase after LOCA (RWST low-low level alarm)
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a Design Based Accident (DBA) LOCA
- One (1) hour has elapsed The suction source for the running Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) pumps is aligned to ____________________
and adequate core heat removal would be verified using _______________ .
A. Refueling Water Tank (RWT); Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve B. Refueling Water Tank (RWT); Exhibit 3, LPSI Flow Curve C. Containment sump; Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve D. Containment sump; Exhibit 3, LPSI Flow Curve Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
The RWT inventory will be transferred into the containment building in approximately 30 minutes following the Design Based Accident (DBA) LOCA. When RWT level reaches 6% (RAS actuation setpoint) the ECCS suction header automatically swaps to the containment sump. The LPSI pumps will trip on the RAS to prevent pump damage and cavitation of the HPSI and Spray pumps due to the LPSI high flowrate. LPSI pumps cannot be restarted unless RAS is reset or leads are lifted.
Exhibit 2 shows the expected flow for given RCS pressure that is required for Inventory and Heat Removal.
References:
EOP 2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, exhibit 2, page 181 of 204 STM 2-05, Emergency Core Cooling System, Rev 27 , section 1.3, pages 2 and 3 STM 2-08, Containment Spray System, Rev 22, section 3.1.1, pages 7 and 8 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #749 used on the 2006 NRC Exam Rev 1 verified that nothing else would start the pump during this time frame. Clarified question statement. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 50
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1966 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 1:29:01 QID #: 42 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 039000A404 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS) System Number 039 K/A A4.04 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOSF OBJ 3&4
Description:
Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: - Emergency feedwater pump turbines Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is recovering from a complete loss of feedwater event
- 2P-7B is out of service for maintenance
- "A" S/G level 12% trending down
- "B" S/G level 19% trending down
- The WCO just reported she has reset 2P-7A and it is ready for start OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP directs controlling the initial feed rate to the Steam Generators to prevent
____________________ and this would be accomplished by ________________________ .
A. damaging the feed ring; throttling the injection valves B. damaging the feed ring; controlling pump speed C. overcooling the RCS; throttling the injection valves D. overcooling the RCS; controlling pump speed Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
With S/G level <49%, the feed ring is uncovered and the water will flash to steam. There is a possibility of collapsing the feed ring when cold feed water is restored. The EOP direct controlling feedwater flow to <150 gpm to minimize the chance of feed ring damage. 2P-7A is the steam driven EFW pump and its S/G feed injection valves are not throttlable. The EOP directs controlling pump speed to control feed rate. This scenario also assumes 2P-7B is out of service and not available to start. 2P-7B is normally the first choice when restoring feedwater in a loss of feedwater event.
References:
OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP, Rev 011, step 12 page 5 of 25 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment, Rev 022, Att. 54 step 3 page 1 of 3, step 9 page 3 of 3 EOP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater Tech Guide, Rev 009, step 12 pages 19 and 20 of 62 Historical Comments:
Rev 1 added 2P-7B OOS in stem. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 53
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1967 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 1:32:12 QID #: 43 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #0669 Search 059000K303 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.6 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Main Feedwater (MFW) System System Number 059 K/A K3.03 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-FWCD OBJ 14
Description:
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW System will have on the following: - S/Gs Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 80% power
- The "A" Feed Water Control System (FWCS) Master Controller, 2FIC-1029, has been placed in MANUAL due to a malfunction
- The Unit now trips
- No Operator actions are taken The "A" Steam Generator level would ________________ rise and operator action _________ required to prevent a High Level Override (HLO) from occurring.
A. continuously; is B. continuously; is not C. initially shrink then slowly; is D. initially shrink then slowly; is not Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
With the Master controller in manual the response to a reactor trip are unaffected allowing Steam Generator levels to be maintained by the RTO signal. When the RTO condition has cleared [level >55% after 60 seconds] operator action would be required to prevent S/G levels from continually rising as set by the manual demand on the master controller pre trip.
References:
STM 2-69, Feedwater Control System, Rev 13, section 2.1 page 3, section 2.7 page 31, and section 3.3 page 39 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #0669 used on the 2003 NRC Exam Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 54
Comments on Question 43, Revision 1 There was no additional information provided on function of the HLO feature. This is needed to support why the proposed correct answer is correct.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1968 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 5:39:58 QID #: 44 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 059000A207 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Main Feedwater (MFW) System System Number 059 K/A A2.07 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP_RO-AMFP OBJ 3
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Tripping of MFW pump turbine Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has completed a plant startup and is raising power
- Current power is 5% and trending up
- "A" and "C" Condensate Pumps (2P-2A and 2P-2C) are running
- "A" Main Feed Pump (2P-1A) is in operation
- "B" Main Feed Pump (2P-1B) is idling for oxygen control
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2P-75) is running
- 2P-75 Discharge to MFW Flow Control valve (2CV-0762) is open
- Both Emergency Feedwater Pumps (2P-7A and 2P-7B) are in standby
- Annunciator 2K03-A8 "FEED PUMP TRIP" is in alarm for "A" MFP
- OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump AOP has been entered The Main Feedwater Control System will _________________.
A. automatically raise 2P-1B speed and Steam Generator levels will be maintained at setpoint B. automatically throttle Main Feedwater Regulating Valve and Steam Generator levels will be maintained at setpoint C. require manual operator action to raise 2P-1B speed to restore Steam Generator levels to setpoint D. require manual operator action to throttle Main Feedwater Regulating Valve to restore Steam Generator levels to setpoint Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
C. Correct. With 2P-1B idling for oxygen control, its speed controller is in manual and speed is too low to feed the Steam Generators without the operator manually raising speed. This action is directed by the AOP to restore SG levels.
A. Incorrect. 2P-1B speed will not automatically raise because the speed controller is in manual while idling.
B. Incorrect. The FWCS will open the MFRV's to try and restore level, but 2P-75 will not provide enough flow to restore SG level at 5% power. Per the procedure, it will only provide enough flow for 4% reactor power.
D. Incorrect. Manually opening the MFRV's will not restore level to setpoint. 2P-75 will not provide enough flow at 5% to maintain Steam Generator levels at setpoint.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 55
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14
References:
OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump, Rev. 014, page 2 of 11, Step 3.A and Step 3.C STM 2-19-2, EFW & AFW Systems STM, page 27, Section 3.2 OP-2106.007, Main Feedwater Pump and FWCS Operation, Rev. 052, page 36 of 113, Step 9.6 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, reworded stem and distractors to address NRC comments on K/A match. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 56
The submitted Revision 1 was re-written to address the a) portion of the K/A statement, but deleted any testing of the b) portion of K/A A2.07.
A proposed modification to Revision 1 addressing the entire K/A statement is as follows:
Q44_R1 (NRC proposed changes to Rev1)
Proposed Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has completed a plant startup and is raising power
- Current power is 5% and trending up
- "A" and "C" Condensate Pumps (2P-2A and 2P-2C) are running
- "A" Main Feed Pump (2P-1A) is in operation
- "B" Main Feed Pump (2P-1B) is idling for oxygen control
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2P-75) is running
- 2P-75 Discharge to MFW Flow Control valve (2CV-0762) is open
- Both Emergency Feedwater Pumps (2P-7A and 2P-7B) are in standby
- Annunciator 2K03-A8 "FEED PUMP TRIP" is in alarm for "A" MFP
- OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump AOP, has been entered The Main Feedwater Control System will . In accordance with OP-2203.027, the first action taken to address the Main Feedwater Pump trip is to .
A. automatically maintain Steam Generator levels at setpoint; place B Main Feedwater pump (2P-1B) in service B. automatically maintain Steam Generator levels at setpoint; attempt to restart A Main Feedwater pump (2P-1A)
C. require manual operator action to restore Steam Generator levels to setpoint; place B Main Feedwater pump (2P-1B) in service D. require manual operator action to restore Steam Generator levels to setpoint; attempt to restart A Main Feedwater pump (2P-1A)
Proposed Answer: __C.__
Explanation:
C. Correct. The FWCS will open the MFRV's to try and restore level, but 2P-75 will not provide enough flow to restore SG level at 5% power. Per the Contingency Actions in OP-2203.027, it will only provide enough flow for 4% power. Therefore, manual operator action is required to restore levels to setpoint. In OP-2203.027, the Contingency Actions for Check at least ONE
MFW pump operating, the steps are lettered, not bulleted. Therefore, the actions have to be performed in order. The first action is to attempt to place the standby MFW pump in service.
Therefore, B Main Feedwater pump (2P-1B) would be placed in service.
A. Incorrect. Although OP-2203.027 requires placing 2P-1B in service first, the FWCS, with the feedwater supply from 2P-75, would not be able to automatically control level.
B. Incorrect. The FWCS, with 2P-75, would not be able to automatically control level. In addition, attempting to start the tripped MFP is the second prioritized action in OP-2203.027, Contingency Action 3.
D. Incorrect. Although manual operator action is required, the action cited from OP-2203.027 is the secondary action.
Technical Reference(s):
OP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feedwater Pump, Rev. 014, page 2 of 11, Step 3.A and Step 3.C STM 2-19-2, EFW & AFW Systems STM, page 27, Section 3.2 OP-2106.007, Main Feedwater Pump and FWCS Operation, Rev. 052, page 36 of 113, Step 9.6 OP-2203.012C, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K03 Window A-8, Rev. 029, Page 87 of 176 AOP-2203.027, Loss of Main Feed Water Pump Tech Guide, Rev. 013, Step 3, Page 5 of 18 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: No Learning Objective: A2LP-RO-AMFP objective 3_
Question Source: Bank # ______
Modified Bank # ______ (Note changes or attach parent)
New ___X___
Question History: Last NRC Exam ___
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge _____
Comprehension or Analysis __X__
Question Level of Difficulty: __3__
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 __5__
55.43 _____
Comments:
Took portions of Revisions 0 and 1 of the question and formed one question. This is proposed to address both the a) and b) portions of the A2.07 K/A statement.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1969 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 4:43:48 QID #: 45 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 061000K502 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.7 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) Syste System Number 061 K/A K5.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 11
Description:
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the AFW System: -
Decay heat sources and magnitude Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power
- EFAS has actuated to both Steam Generators
- 'A' Steam Generator level is 5%
- 'B' Steam Generator level is 7%
15 minutes post trip, the required flow of greater than or equal to __________________________ from the Emergency Feed Water (EFW) system is required to adequately remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).
A. 150 gpm to each Steam Generator B. 485 gpm to each Steam Generator C. 150 gpm total flow to the Steam Generators D. 485 gpm total flow to the Steam Generators Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
Total required EFW flow post trip is greater than or equal to 485 gpm total flow to the Steam Generators is required to remove decay heat.
References:
OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions, Rev. 14, step 8 contingency A.2, page 10 of 17 EOP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions Tech Guide, Rev. 014, step 8, page 19 of 42 EOP Setpoint Document Setpoint F.3, Rev 13, section F.3, page 111 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, added the word "heat" after decay, rewrote question to raise the difficulty level per NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 57
Comments on Question 45, Revision 1 Questions/comments on Revision 1:
- 1. Is there significance to the timing of 15 minutes post trip? Does that affect whether the proposed correct answer is the correct one?
- 2. The minimum feedwater flow criteria for SGs both lower than 10% level is greater than 485 gpm. The question says greater than or equal to.
- 3. The basis for 150 gpm being a plausible distracter needs to be provided to defend why it yields incorrect answers.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1970 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 6:10:59 QID #: 46 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 005000A101 10CFR55: 41.5 / 45.5 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) System Number 005 K/A A1.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-TS OBJ 1
Description:
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RHRS controls including: - Heatup/cooldown rates Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 5
- A loss of Shutdown Cooling (SDC) has occurred with an initial Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature at 1402 is 174°F
- At 1404, RCS temperature has risen to 177°F If NO operator actions are taken, at what time will the RCS reach the temperature requirement to enter Mode 4?
A. 1412 B. 1413 C. 1420 D. 1422 Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
C. Correct: With a Loss of SDC a Heatup will occur. the heatup rate for above conditions is 1.5°F/minute (177°F - 174°F = 3°F divided by 2 minutes = 1.5°F) The lower temperature for entry into mode 4 is 200°F.
time difference, 201°F - 177°F = 24°F divided by 1.5°F/min = 16 minutes. 1404 + 16 minutes = 1420 A. Incorrect: number based on the difference between 177°F but dividing by 3°F/minute (if they did not take into account for the 2 minutes between temperature readings)
B. Incorrect: number based on 174°F vs. 177°F and dividing by 3°F/min D. Incorrect: number based on 174°F vs. 177°F
References:
T.S. Table 1.1 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: changed anwsers to match stem. Old answers were calculated off of 174°F instead of 177°F changed caluations from 200F to 201F per NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 58
Recommendation to Question 46, Revision 1 Revise the question to say ..at what time will the RCS first reach the temperature requirement to enter Mode 4?
Note: the italics are not required in the question, it is just to denote what word is being proposed for addition.
Comments on Question 47, Revision 0 There are no apparent changes to the question, references, or justifications. The question still does not match the K/A statement for Question 47 in the ES 401-2, Revision 2. It needs to be replaced or revised to address the K/A statement.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1972 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/22/2014 9:47:11 QID #: 48 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 062000A212 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 6 System
Title:
A.C. Electrical Distribution System System Number 062 K/A A2.12 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SPRAY OBJ 8&13
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the A.C. Distribution System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Restoration of power to a system with a fault on it Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power due to a large break LOCA
- Annunciator 2K09 B-3 "2A4 L.O. RELAY TRIP" is in alarm
- Containment Pressure is 25 psia and trending up
- Annunciator 2K06 A-1 "2P-35A FAILURE ON ESFAS" is in alarm OP-2203.012F, Annunciator Corrective Actions for 2K06 A-1 directs "A" Containment Spray pump (2P-35A) and breaker __________________________________________ .
A. are not required to be investigated prior to start due to no other alarms associated with the pump are in B. are required to be investigated prior to start due to possible electrical fault on the 4160V Bus C. are not required to be investigated prior to start due to a safety function not being met D. are required to be investigated prior to start due to #1 EDG running Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
C. Correct: The applicant should access the impact of the malfunction on the A.C. Distribution System
[Loss of Green train vital power, loss of Red Train Spray Pump] and use the guidance in the ACAs to mitigate the consequences of the A.C. Bus and Pump by verifying no damage to the pump power supply
[breaker] and restore of power to the "A" Spray Pump. Annunciator 2K06 A-1 "2P-35A failure on ESFAS" will come into alarm 45 seconds after the pump received its auto start command (CSAS) and the pump did not start. With a bus lock out on 2A4 [Green Train] the "B" Spray pump [green Train] is unavailable along with the Containment Coolers [Green Train]. With Containment Building pressure trending up, starting the "A" spray pump [Red Train] is needed to meet the containment safety function.
1 start attempt is allowed by the ACA if an emergency condition exists and the bus is powered from offsite. The Red bus (2A1/2A3) is aligned to offsite with the given conditions.
A. Incorrect: The ACA does not allow a start attempt solely based on no other associated pump alarms are in, i.e. an investigation of the pump prior to start would be required even without any other associated pump alarms if 2P35B was running.
B. Incorrect: is not required to be investigated prior to a start attempt per the ACA.
D. Incorrect: The ACA would require the pump to investigated prior to a start attempt if the bus was powered from a EDG. The #1 EDG is running (started by the SIAS @ 18.3#) but is not tied to the bus.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 60
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14
References:
OP-2203.012F, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K06 window A-1, Rev 037, page 4 of 79 COPD-032, Transient Conduct of Operations, Rev 003, section 9.3 page 18 of 41 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, swapped distracters A and D for symmetry (mwf 1/22/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 61
Q48_R1 (NRC proposed changes to Rev1)
Original comments stated that question was classified as unsatisfactory because of its faulted 2x2 logic (an applicant could get the correct answer without having knowledge to answer both parts of the question). Revision 1 provided by the licensee did not address this issue.
A question in the correct format is proposed as follows:
Proposed Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power due to a large break LOCA
- Annunciator 2K09 B-3 "2A4 L.O. RELAY TRIP" is in alarm
- Containment pressure is 25 psia and trending up
- Annunciator 2K06 A-1 "2P-35A FAILURE ON ESFAS" is in alarm OP-2203.012F, Annunciator Corrective Actions for 2K06 A-1 __(1)_____ "A" Containment Spray pump (2P-35A) to be started without assessment because (2) .
________(1)_________ (2)_____________
A. directs EDG #1 is supplying power to its safety bus B. directs the Core Heat Removal safety function is not met C. prohibits EDG #1 is supplying power to its safety bus D. prohibits the Core Heat Removal safety function is not met Proposed Answer: __B__
Explanation:
B. Correct: To determine the correct answer, the applicant has to determine the effects of the 2A4 bus lockout during the LOCA. With the LOCA, ESFAS would start both EDGs. The 2A4 bus lockout prevents EDG #2 and offsite power from supplying this bus. EDG #1 has started, but with offsite power available, offsite power will continue to supply power to bus 2A3.
Procedure OP-2203.012F, ACA for 2K06 A-1, Step 2.3.1, directs the start of 2P-35A without assessment. The basis for this is provided in procedure COPD-032, Section 9.3. With offsite powered to a bus supplying a component that failed to automatically actuate, it directs that one attempt to start the component be attempted. This is because the safety function that the component addresses is not being fulfilled. With no Containment Spray pumps running, the Containment Heat Removal safety function is not being met. See the Note prior to Step 2.2 in procedure OP-2203.012F, ACA for 2K06 A-1.
A. Incorrect: It is true that starting 2P-35A is directed, but it is not because EDG #1is supplying power to its safety bus. Offsite power is being supplied to the safety bus.
C. Incorrect: Due to the situation, an attempted start of 2P-35A is directed. In addition, the electrical supply to the Red Train safety bus is offsite power.
D. Incorrect: Due to the situation, an attempted start of 2P-35A is directed. It is plausible that an assessment could be required prior to meeting the safety function. For example, if EDG #1 was supplying its safety bus, even with the Containment Heat Removal safety function not met, an assessment would be required per procedure COPD-032, Section 9.3, second bullet.
Technical Reference(s):
OP-2203.012F, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K06 window A-1, Rev 037, page 4 of 79 COPD-032, Transient Conduct of Operations, Rev 003, section 9.3 page 18 of 41 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: No Learning Objective: A2LP-RO-SPRAY objectives 8 and 13_
Question Source: Bank # ______
Modified Bank # ______ (Note changes or attach parent)
New ___X___
Question History: Last NRC Exam ___
Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge _____
Comprehension or Analysis __X__
Question Level of Difficulty: __4__
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 __5__
55.43 _____
Comments:
Took Revision 1 initial conditions and developed a 2x2 format question.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1973 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 5:50:58 QID #: 49 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC BANK QID #1758 Search 063000K402 10CFR55: 41.7 Safety Function 6 System
Title:
D.C. Electrical Distribution System System Number 063 K/A K4.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ED125 OBJ 1
Description:
Knowledge of D.C. Electrical System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: -
Breaker interlocks, permissives, bypasses and cross-ties Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- DC control power has been lost to the 2A2 non-vital 4160 V bus Which of the following would describe the operation of the breakers on 2A2?
A. Breakers would trip open and operation would only be possible by local manual means B. Breakers would be able to be operated remotely but automatic trip functions would not be functional C. Breakers will remain in their "as is" condition and operation would only be possible by local manual means D. Automatic breaker trips would remain functional but remote operation of breakers would not be possible Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
C. Correct: 125 VDC power provides the motive power for remote breaker operations and permissives, and breaker bypass interlocks. This would prevent any remote manual operations and automatic breaker cycles.
A. Incorrect: Tripping breakers open requires 125 VDC power B. Incorrect: There are no remote operations without DC control power D. Incorrect: For both reasons above
References:
STM 2.32-2, High Voltage Electrical Distribution, Revision 26, Section 6.2.2, page 63 Historical Comments:
NRC BANK QID #1758 used on 2009 NRC Exam Rev. 1, reworded distractor B to make more clear based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 62
Comments on Question 49, Revision 1 The change did not address the concern.
The basis for the proposed correct answer says that the loss of 125 VDC control power prevents any remote manual operations. Based on Answer Cs wording, local manual means must be available as the only option for operating the affected breakers.
When the wording of distracter B is reviewed, it says Breakers would be able to be operated remotely.. Is operating a breaker by local manual means, considered remotely? An applicant could argue if this is vague that operating the breaker by local manual means can be completed outside the Control Room, so it is remote. If there is a specific site definition for remotely that will ensure that distracter B is not correct, it needs to be documented in the question notes. If there isnt a basis, the next best thing would be to modify distracter B to say Breakers would be able to be manually operated remotely,..
The goal is to have all the terms clear so that there is no room to argue that there are two correct answers.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1974 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/21/2014 9:08:19 QID #: 50 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: Modified NRC BANK QID #1659 Search 064000K608 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System System Number 064 K/A K6.08 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EDG OBJ 11&12
Description:
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G System: - Fuel oil storage tanks Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- #2 EDG monthly surveillance, OP-2104.036, Emergency Diesel Generator Operations, Supp. 2B, is in progress
- #2 EDG is currently tied to the grid and is consuming 2.4 gallons of fuel oil each minute
- #2 EDG fuel oil transfer pump (2P-16B) is running and filling #2 EDG fuel oil day tank (2T-30B)
- Annunciator 2K08 K-1, "FUEL SYSTEM TROUBLE" comes into alarm
- The EDG watch reports 2K128 "FUEL X-FER PUMP INOPERABLE" is in alarm
- Both indicating lights are out on the local panel for 2P-16B
- #2 EDG fuel oil day tank (2T-30B) level is 480 gallons
- NO operator action is taken Based on these conditions, approximately how long can #2 EDG continue to operate at the current load until Tech Spec Minimum Day Tank Volume is reached?
A. 37 minutes B. 75 minutes C. 125 minutes D. 200 minutes Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
B. Correct: T.S. Minimum Day Tank Volume is 300 gallons. 480 - 300 gallons divided by 2.4 gpm is equal to 75 minutes A. Incorrect: number based on current level to the low level alarm value 391.3 gallons (480-391.3 =
88.7 gallons divided by 2.4gpm = 36.95 min, rounded up to 37 minutes)
C. Incorrect: based on T.S. min 300 gallons divided by 2.4 gpm = 125 min D. Incorrect: based on 480 gallons divided by 2.4 gpm = 200 minutes
References:
OP-2203.012H, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K08 window K-1, Rev 037, page 12 of 50 OP-2203.012U, Annunciator Corrective Actions 2K128, Rev 020, page 25 of 33 T.S 3.8.1.1 part b Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 63
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Historical Comments:
NRC BANK QID #1659 used on 2009 NRC Exam.
REV. 1: Question has been modified by changing which EDG (B vs. A), changed volume of day tank (from 500 gallons to 480 gallons), and changed fuel oil consumption rate (2.4 gpm vs. 2.2 gpm)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 64
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1975 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/21/2014 3:54:45 QID #: 51 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 039000A205 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS) System Number 039 K/A A2.05 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: OBJ
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Increasing steam demand, Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is at 20% power and rising after an outage
- 2CV-0402, "A" MSR Reheat Steam Low Load Valve (RSLLV), controller is in automatic IAW OP-2106.009, Turbine Generator Operations
- 2PIT-0407, 'A' MSR Shell pressure input into RSLLV controller 2PDI-0402, fails and causes the RSLLV for the 'A' MSR to fail open Based on the above conditions, 'A' MSR outlet temperature would ____________ and OP-2106.009 Attachment F, 2nd Stage Low Load Control, would be used to ____________ RSLLV to prevent large temperature mismatches on the Low Pressure Turbine inlet.
A. rise; manually throttle B. rise, manually close C. lower, manually throttle D. lower, manually close Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
The ability to predict the impact of the operations on the MRSS is addressed in the NOP (att. F) because Reactivity impact of directly adjusting Main Steam flow/pressure [MSR 2nd stage heating is supplied from main steam system and opening the RSLLV will raise steam flow therefore raise reactor power (change reactivity)] and based on the prediction of the Reactivity Potential, a reactivity brief per COPD-30 is required and the notes and cautions in the Attachment F is use to control and mitigate the consequences of the increasing steam demand,
References:
OP-2106.009, Turbine Generator Operations, Rev 071, Att. F step 4.0 page 86 of 143 STM 2-16, Reheat Steam, Rev 8 section 3.3.1.3 pages 5 and 6, simplified drawing page 17 Historical Comments:
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 65
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1975 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 4:13:22 QID #: 51 Author: Simpson Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 039000A205 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS) System Number 039 K/A A2.05 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.3 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: OBJ
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Increasing steam demand, Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is at 20% power and rising after an outage
- 2CV-0402, "A" MSR Reheat Steam Low Load Valve (RSLLV), controller is in automatic IAW OP-2106.009, Turbine Generator Operations
- 2PIT-0407, 'A' MSR Shell pressure input into RSLLV controller 2PDI-0402, fails and causes the RSLLV for the 'A' MSR to fail open Based on the above conditions, 'A' MSR outlet temperature would ____________ and OP-2106.009 Attachment F, 2nd Stage Low Load Control, would be used to ____________ RSLLV to prevent large temperature mismatches on the Low Pressure Turbine inlet.
A. rise; manually throttle B. rise, manually close C. lower, manually throttle D. lower, manually close Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A. Correct. Second stage heating comes from Main Steam. When the RSLLV fails full open, it causes more Main Steam flow to go to the second stage heating coil, which causes MSR outlet temperature to go up. Attachment F contains instructions to throttle the RSLLV to prevent large temperature mismatches on the Low Pressure Turbine inlets.
B. Incorrect. Fully closing the RSLLV will isolate steam to the 2nd stage heating coil for the MSR causing Low Pressure Turbine inlet temperature to go to low and would cause a temperature mismatch.
C. Incorrect. Low pressure turbine inlet temperature would go up, not go down.
D. Incorrect. Low pressure turbine inlet temperature would go up, not go down.
References:
OP-2106.009, Turbine Generator Operations, Rev 071, Att. F step 4.0 page 86 of 143 STM 2-16, Reheat Steam, Rev 8 section 3.3.1.3 pages 5 and 6, simplified drawing page 17 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 64
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: changed distractors to better match K/A per NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Rev. 2: Updated notes. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 65
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1976 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 11:33:4 QID #: 52 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC Bank QID #1538 Search 073000K101 10CFR55: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 4 Safety Function 7 System
Title:
Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System System Number 073 K/A K1.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RMON OBJ 9
Description:
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRM System and the following systems: - Those systems served by PRMs Question:
In accordance with OP-2104.014, Supplement 1, Unit 2 Liquid Radwaste Release Permit, placing the selector switch for Process Liquid radiation monitoring instrument 2RITS-2330 in ___________ would cause its meter output to exceed the dump permit high alarm setpoint and close the 2T-69B tank isolation valves, 2CV-2330A and /or 2CV-2330B.
A. HV (High Voltage)
B. PULSE CAL C. CHECK SOURCE D. LEVEL CAL Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
The LRW/BMS Process Radiation Monitor, 2RITS-2330, provides an automatic closure of 2CV-2330A and/or 2CV-2330B.
This automatic feature occurs on a high alarm that is determined by the Unit 2 Liquid Radwaste Release Permit (OP-2104.014, Supp 1). Going to PULSE Cal will raise the detector radiation output above the alarm setpoint causing the valves to go closed. Testing of this interlock will prevent discharging liquid waste above the design limits.
References:
OP-2104.014, LRW and BMS Operations, Rev 054, supplement 1 section 7.0 steps 7.3 and 7.4 STM 2-62, Radiation Monitoring System, Rev 20, section 2.2.6.1 page 20 STM 2-52, Liquid Radwaste / Boron management System, Rev 17, simplified LRW/BMS drawing page 35 Historical Comments:
QID #1538 used on the 2008 NRC Exam Rev 1: changed to incorporate NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 66
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1977 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 2:19:32 QID #: 53 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 076000A302 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Service Water System (SWS) System Number 076 K/A A3.02 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 11
Description:
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SWS, including: - Emergency heat loads Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power due to a LOCA
- Pressurizer pressure has lowered to 1400 psia Service Water ______________ be aligned to Containment Coolers and _______________ be aligned to Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger.
A. would; would B. would; would not C. would not; would D. would not; would not Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
B. Correct. Pressurizer pressure of 1400 psia causes SIAS and CCAS. CCAS aligns Service Water to the Containment Coolers and SIAS isolates Service Water to the SFP Heat Exchanger.
A. Incorrect. Service Water is isolated to SFP Heat Exchanger during a SIAS.
C. Incorrect. Service Water is aligned to Containment Coolers during a CCAS and isolated to the SFP Heat Exchanger during a SIAS.
D. Incorrect. Service Water is aligned to the Containment Coolers during a CCAS.
References:
STM 2-42, Service Water & Auxiliary Cooling Water System Training Manual, Rev. 36, pages 76 and 77 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: changed to better align with K/A per NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 67
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1984 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 4:26:45 QID #: 60 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC BANK QID #1487 Search 028000A203 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 5 System
Title:
Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control Syste System Number 028 K/A A2.03 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CONH2 OBJ 2&4
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the HRPS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - The hydrogen air concentration I excessof limit flame propagation or detonation with resulting equipment damage in containment Question:
The Hydrogen analyzers are placed in service within _______ minutes of the beginning of an accident to ensure a representative sample is obtained. A DETONATION inside the containment building is likely to occur if hydrogen concentration reaches ____ %
A. 70; 4 B. 70; 18 C. 90; 4 D. 90; 18 Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
The Hydrogen analyzers have a 20 minute transport time from when started to when an representative air stream is being sampled. Actions in the EOPs (LOCA, ESD, Functional Recovery) required the start of the analyzers within 70 minutes for this reason. 4% hydrogen concentration is right at the flammability limit inside containment. At 18% hydrogen concentration a detonation would occur.
References:
STM-2-06, Containment Combustible Gas Control System, Rev 12, section 1.5 pages 5 and 6 and section 4.2 page 24 Historical Comments:
NRC BANK QID #1487 not used on any previous NRC Exam Rev. 1, replaced Violent with detonation (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 75
Question Number: 63_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Given the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a loss of condenser vacuum
- A consistent 55°F/hour cooldown has been established over the last hour on the DOWNSTREAM atmosphere dump valves with SDBCS in automatic
- The SDBCS is in its normal at-power alignment
- Annunciator 2K12 A-8 IA Pressure HI/LO comes into alarm
- Instrument Air header pressure is reading 0 psig
- NO operator actions are taken The RCS cooldown limit _____(1)_____ be exceeded due to _____(2)_____.
A. Would; the downstream atmosphere dump valves failing open B. Would; the upstream atmosphere dump valves failing open C. Would not; the downstream atmosphere dump valves failing closed D. Would not; the upstream atmosphere dump valves failing closed Proposed Answer: __C___
Comments: Recommend deleting the word DOWNSTREAM to remove the cueing that made this question unsat. Recommend adding a statement about SDBCS being in its normal at-power alignment to provide information to the candidates about status of the upstream ADVs.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1987 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 12:07:2 QID #: 63 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 041000A301 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass System Number 041 K/A A3.01 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SDBCS OBJ 20
Description:
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SDS, including: - RCS T-ave. meter (cooldown rate)
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a loss of condenser vacuum
- A consistent 55°F/hour cooldown has been established over the last hour on the DOWNSTREAM atmosphere dump valves with SDBCS in automatic
- Annunciator 2K12 A-8 "IA PRESSURE HI/LO" comes into alarm
- Instrument Air header pressure is reading 10 psig and trending down
- NO operator actions are taken The RCS cooldown limit ____________ be exceeded due to ________________________________ .
A. would; the downstream atmosphere dump valves failing open B. would; the upstream atmosphere dump valves failing open C. would not; the downstream atmosphere dump valves failing closed D. would not; the upstream atmosphere dump valves failing closed Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
The downstream atmosphere dump valves fail closed on a loss of Instrument Air stopping the cooldown and the upstream atmosphere dump valves do fail open on a loss of Instrument Air but are normally manually isolated from the Main Steam header, therefore would not affect the RCS.
References:
Tech Spec 3.4.9, Pressure/Temperature Limits STM 2-23, Steam Dump & Bypass Control System, Rev 16, section 1.2 pages 1 and 2 , section 1.2.2 pages 4 and 5, section 4.0 page 31 OP-2203.021, Loss of instrument Air AOP, Rev 015, Attachment "A", page 18 of 108 OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K12 window A-8, Rev 036, page 85 of 116 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, reworded per NRC comments (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 78
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 Bank: 1987 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 5:23:07 QID #: 63 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 041000A301 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.5 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass System Number 041 K/A A3.01 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SDBCS OBJ 20
Description:
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the SDS, including: - RCS T-ave. meter (cooldown rate)
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a loss of condenser vacuum
- A consistent 55°F/hour cooldown has been established over the last hour on the atmosphere dump valves with SDBCS in automatic
- The SDBCS is in its normal at-power alignment
- MSIVs are open
- Annunciator 2K12 A-8 "IA PRESSURE HI/LO" comes into alarm
- Instrument Air header pressure is reading 10 psig and trending down
- NO operator actions are taken The RCS cooldown limit ____________ be exceeded due to ________________________________ .
A. would; the downstream atmosphere dump valves failing open B. would; the upstream atmosphere dump valves failing open C. would not; the downstream atmosphere dump valves failing closed D. would not; the upstream atmosphere dump valves failing closed Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
The downstream atmosphere dump valves fail closed on a loss of Instrument Air stopping the cooldown and the upstream atmosphere dump valves do fail open on a loss of Instrument Air but are normally manually isolated from the Main Steam header, therefore would not affect the RCS.
References:
Tech Spec 3.4.9, Pressure/Temperature Limits STM 2-23, Steam Dump & Bypass Control System, Rev 16, section 1.2 pages 1 and 2 , section 1.2.2 pages 4 and 5, section 4.0 page 31 OP-2203.021, Loss of instrument Air AOP, Rev 015, Attachment "A", page 18 of 108 OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K12 window A-8, Rev 036, page 85 of 116 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, reworded per NRC comments (mwf 1/29/14)
Rev. 2, changed wording based on NRCcomments [mwf 1/30/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 78
Question 64_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 97% power
- OP-2106.009, Supplement 3, Turbine Generator Valve Stroke Test surveillance is in progress OP-2106.009 directs placing first stage pressure feedback in service because first stage pressure feedback ____(1)____. If first stage pressure feedback is NOT placed in service, when stroking a high pressure turbine control valve closed the reactor coolant system temperature initially ____(2)____.
A. (1) will open the other high pressure turbine control valves to compensate for the closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve (2) increases B. (1) will open the other high pressure turbine control valves to compensate for the closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve (2) remains the same C. (1) will lock the other high pressure turbine control valves in place and uses steam bypass valves to compensate for closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve (2) increases D. (1) will lock the other high pressure turbine control valves in place and uses steam bypass valves to compensate for closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve (2) remains the same Comments: Per procedure 2106.009, first stage pressure feedback opens the other high pressure turbine control valves to maintain turbine load NEAR pre-test values. Due to stroke time, the opening of the other high pressure turbine control valves is slightly delayed. Therefore the RCS temperature will initially increase due to the lower steam demand versus steam supply, resulting in less heat transfer in the steam generators and a high reactor coolant system temperature. This makes answer A correct. Distractor B is incorrect but plausible if the candidate does not take into account the delayed response of the other high pressure turbine control valves. Distractors C and D are incorrect because first stage pressure feedback opens the other control valves, not steam dumps, but is plausible because the procedure has instructions for using steam dumps to maintain the power level constant while reducing turbine load.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1988 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 4:29:11 QID #: 64 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 045000K106 10CFR55: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 4 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System System Number 045 K/A K1.06 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Imp: 2.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-TURBC OBJ 32
Description:
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MT/G System and the following systems: - RCS, during steam valve test Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 97% power
- OP-2106.009, Supplement 3, Turbine Generator Valve Stroke Test surveillance is in progress OP-2106.009 directs placing first stage pressure feedback in service because first stage pressure feedback
______________. If first stage pressure feedback is NOT placed in service, when stroking a high pressure turbine control valve CLOSED the RCS temperature initially ______________.
A. will open the other high pressure turbine control valves to compensate for the closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve; increases B. will open the other high pressure turbine control valves to compensate for the closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve; remains the same C. will lock the other high pressure turbine control valves in place and uses steam bypass valves to compensate for closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve; increases D. will lock the other high pressure turbine control valves in place and uses steam bypass valves to compensate for closure of the tested high pressure turbine control valve; remains the same Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A. Correct. Per procedure OP-2106.009, first stage pressure feedback opens the other high pressure turbine control valves to maintain turbine load NEAR pre-test values. Due to stroke time, the opening of the other high pressure turbine control valves is slightly delayed. Therefore the RCS temperature will initially increase due to the lower steam demand versus steam supply, resulting in less heat transfer in the steam generators and a high RCS temperature.
B. Incorrect. Plausible if the candidate does not take into account the delayed response of the other high pressure turbine control valves.
C. Incorrect. First stage pressure feedback opens the other control valves, not steam dumps but is plausible because the procedure has instructions for using steam dumps to maintain the power level constant while reducing turbine load.
References:
OP-2106.009, Turbine Generator Operations, Rev 071, Supplement 3 pages 110, 112, 115, 116, and 119 of 143 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 79
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: changed question based on NRC feedback. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 80
Question Number: 66_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Comments: Remove the open reference to make this a closed reference question. The question is then no longer a direct look-up and becomes SAT.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14
References:
EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Rev 014, Attachment 9.1 page 1 of 1 [PROVIDED to STUDENT]
Historical Comments:
Bank: 1990 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 4:54:24 QID #: 66 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012107 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.7 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ 2
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Question:
Per OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, what demarkation is used in the Emergency Operating Procedures to indicate corrected parameter values for harsh containment environmental conditions?
A. Asterick beside the paramater value B. Solid black square beside the parameter value C. Parenthesis around the parameter value D. Brackets around the paramater value Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct. Per OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, Brackets are used to indicate corrected parameter values for harsh containment environment conditions.
A. Incorrect. Asterick is used to indicate a continuous action step in the EOPs.
B. Incorrect. A solid black square is used to indicate a floating step in the EOPs.
C. Incorrect. Parenthesis are used around component numbers in the EOPs.
References:
OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, Rev. 11, page 34 of 73 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, rejected original K/A 2.1.7 due to being an SRO duty. Replaced with K/A 2.1.7 and new question. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 82
Question Number: 66_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Comments: Correct spelling of the words demarcation, asterisk and parameter Per OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, what demarkation is used in the Emergency Operating Procedures to indicate corrected parameter values for harsh containment environmental conditions?
A. Asterick beside the paramater value D. Brackets around the paramater value Submit corrections as Rev 2
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 1990 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 2:43:08 QID #: 66 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012107 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.7 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EAOP OBJ 2
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Question:
Per OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, what demarcation is used in the Emergency Operating Procedures to indicate corrected parameter values for harsh containment environmental conditions?
A. Asterisk beside the parameter value B. Solid black square beside the parameter value C. Parenthesis around the parameter value D. Brackets around the parameter value Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct. Per OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, Brackets are used to indicate corrected parameter values for harsh containment environment conditions.
A. Incorrect. Asterick is used to indicate a continuous action step in the EOPs.
B. Incorrect. A solid black square is used to indicate a floating step in the EOPs.
C. Incorrect. Parenthesis are used around component numbers in the EOPs.
References:
OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User's Guide, Rev. 11, page 34 of 73 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, rejected original K/A 2.1.7 due to being an SRO duty. Replaced with K/A 2.1.7 and new question. (mwf 1/29/14)
Rev. 2: corrected misspellings per NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 82
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1991 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/22/2014 1:34:09 QID #: 67 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012119 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.12 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.19 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SPDS OBJ 5
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power
- Annunciator 2K04 G-9 "MSSV VALVE OPEN" is in alarm The CRS would direct the CBOT to determine which Main Steam Safety Valve is open by using the _________________
screen on the ______________ .
A. Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC); Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS)
B. Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer (PSHT); Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS)
C. Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC); Plant Monitoring System (PMS)
D. Main Steam mimic; Plant Monitoring System (PMS)
Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A. Correct: ICC on SPDS mimics the RCS and Secondary system to the MSIVs and the MSSVs will change colors to show if open or not B. Incorrect: does not have MSSV status C. Incorrect: ICC on PMS mimics the RCS and Secondary system to the MSIVs (similar to SPDS) but the MSSVs do not change colors D. Incorrect: does not have MSSV status
References:
STM 2-76, Safety Parameter Display System (Common Unit), Rev 11, section 2.3.7 page 22 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: changed based on NRCcomments [mwf 1/22/13]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 83
Question 67_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Comments: The K/A selected (2.1.19) makes it difficult to write a non-system specific question as the K/A requires ability to evaluate system status using the plant computer. If the question has not already been reworked, recommend rejecting this K/A and selecting another K/A from Section 2.1 (Conduct of Operations) to replace it. If KA is rejected, ensure ES-401-4 and outline are updated accordingly.
One possible KA replacement is KA 2.1.21, Ability to verify a controlled procedure copy RO 3.5/SRO3.6 (Possible new question)
Consider the following:
- A job is in progress that will last several weeks
- The procedure has been verified at the start of the job
- A pre-job brief has been completed for all participants How often is the procedure required to be verified/validated to be current?
A. each shift B. once a day C. every 7 Days D. only prior to start of the job I believe the correct answer is C, need to verify in 1000.6 Control of Procedures (we do not have that electronically). Provide reference once question is approved.
All of the distractors are creditable base on common sense and normal frequency of evolutions conducted at power plants Note: This was originally sent as NRC recommendations to Q67_R0, but you had submitted R1 to the question before you received our comments. We edited our original recommendations and now this document is NRC recommendations to Q67_R1.
Question 69_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Recommend replacing current question with the following revision to remove the reverse logic and make it more operationally valid.
Proposed Question:
Which of the following procedure changes would qualify as a change in procedure INTENT?
A procedure revision _______________ .
A. to correct a typo that would send the performer to the wrong procedure section if followed.
B. that asks that a detailed component location be added to the existing procedure to aid in locating the component in a high radiation area.
C. to reword the purpose section of the procedure to make it more descriptive but does not allow performance of a new or unrelated function.
D. request that would delete a required hold point in the original procedure.
Correct Answer: D Reference 1000.006 page 5 section 4.9.2
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1993 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/22/2014 10:30:2 QID #: 69 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: Modified NRC Bank QID #40 Search 1940012206 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.6 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-PRCON OBJ 1
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures.
Question:
Which one of the following is NOT an example of a procedure INTENT change?
A. Minor alterations to the purpose for clarification B. Reducing the margin to nuclear safety C. Deleting a portion of the acceptance criteria D. Changing the scope of the procedure Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
OP-1000.006, Procedure Control step 4.9.1 minor changes to the purpose section of a procedure is permitted as long as it does not allow the procedure to accomplish a function it was not intended for. B, C, and D are Incorrect, per the procedure, all are definitions of an INTENT change
References:
OP-1000.006, Procedure Control, Rev 065, step 4.9 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #40 used on 1998 NRC Exam Rev. 1: added procedure noun name to notes Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 85
Question 70_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
You have been assigned a task that has been classified as an IPTE (Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions).
IAW EN-OP-116, Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions procedure, during an IPTE brief, ALL of the items on the IPTE Pre Job Checklist (i.e. Tech. Specs., TRM, ODCM, Fire Protection, FME, etc) should be discussed _________ they are applicable to the evolution.
Likewise, an IPTE Post Job Brief Checklist ______ required to be performed for ALL infrequently performed tasks and evolutions.
A. only if; is B. whether or not; is C. only if; is not D. whether or not; is not Correct answer: A Comments: EN-OP-116 states that items on the pre-job checklist SHOULD be discussed, not that they are REQUIRED to be discussed. Recommend editing the stem as above to bring it into alignment with the procedure.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1994 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 3:22:33 QID #: 70 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012207 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.7 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Imp: 3.6 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-PRCON OBJ 16
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests.
Question:
You have been assigned a task that has been classified as an IPTE (Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions).
IAW EN-OP-116, Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions procedure, during an IPTE brief, ALL of the items on the IPTE Pre Job Checklist (i.e. Tech. Specs., TRM, ODCM, Fire Protection, FME, etc...) should be discussed _____________ they are applicable to the evolution. Likewise, an IPTE Post Job Brief Checklist ________ required to be performed for ALL infrequently performed tasks and evolutions.
A. only if; is B. whether or not; is C. only if; is not D. whether or not; is not Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
As described in procedure which makes B, C, and D incorrect.
References:
EN-OP-116, Infrequently Preformed Tests or Evolutions, Rev 012, section 5.3, page 16 of 35 and section 5.2.5, page 14 of 35 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, reworded stem to include the work 'should' to more closely align with the procedure wording. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 86
Question 71_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Comments: The K/A selected (2.2.42) makes it difficult to write a non-system specific question when the K/A references the use of system parameters to make a determination, requiring system specific knowledge. If the question has not already been reworked, recommend rejecting this K/A and selecting another K/A from Section 2.2 (Equipment Control) to replace it.
One possible replacement K/A: 2.2.35 Ability to determine the Technical Specification Mode of Operation RO 3.6/SRO 4.5 (NEW)
Given the following conditions
- Reactor power is 0% on Power Range NIs
- Tcold is 218 F
- Keff - .90 The plant .
A. is currently in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.
B. is currently in Mode 4, Hot Shutdown.
C. will enter Mode 5 when average coolant temperature is reduced to < 210 F.
D. will enter Mode 6 when average coolant temperature is reduced to <= 150 F.
Correct Answer: B Explanations:
A. Is credible because you are close to transitioning to mode 5 at <= 200 F B. Correct C. Credible because 210 F is close to the mode change value of 200 degrees D. Credible as mode 6 is achieved when avg temp drops below 140 degrees not 150 degrees
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1995 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/23/2014 3:26:15 QID #: 71 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC BANK QID #1706 Search 1940012243 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.43 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-OPSPR OBJ 4
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.
Question:
Consider the following:
- An annunciator is comeing in and out of alram a distraction to the Control Room staff
- The CRS has declared it a Nuisance Alarm
- The Shift Manager has given permission to pull the annunciator card
- OP-1015.001, Conduct of Operations, section 10.0 is being implmented Concurrence from the _________________ must be obtained to ensure that pulling the annunciator card has no effect on continued system operability and a _________________________________
is required to be installed on the pulled annunciator card stored inside the annunciator panel?
A. System Engineer; Equipment Out of Service or Caution tag B. System Engineer; Work Incomplete or Temporary Services and Equipment tag C. Shift Technical Advisor; Equipment Out of Service or Caution tag D. Shift Technical Advisor; Work Incomplete or Temporary Services and Equipment tag Answer:
D. Shift Technical Advisor; Work Incomplete or Temporary Services and Equipment tag Notes:
A and B are incorrect because the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) performs the system operability not the system engineer.
The system engineers technical knowledge may be relied upon to make the appropriate operability call- but the final determination will be made by the STA. A and C are incorrect because there are no Equipment Out of Service Tags, and a Caution Tag is a specific tag, not a generic tag as called for in the procedure. According to OPS expectations, Temporary Services and Equipment (TSE) Tags should be used but the procedure still calls for Work Incomplete Tags or other generic identification tag.
References:
OP-1015.001, Conduct of Operations, Rev 100, steps 10.1.1 (B) and 10.1.4 (A)
Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1706 used on the 2009 NRC Exam Rev. 1, replaced K/A and replaced question. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 87
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 Bank: 1995 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/23/2014 3:26:15 QID #: 71 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NRC BANK QID #1706 Search 1940012243 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.43 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.0 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-OPSPR OBJ 4
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.
Question:
Consider the following:
- An annunciator is coming in and out of alarm, causing a distraction to the Control Room staff
- The CRS has declared it a Nuisance Alarm
- The Shift Manager has given permission to pull the annunciator card
- OP-1015.001, Conduct of Operations, section 10.0 is being implemented Concurrence from the _________________ must be obtained to ensure that pulling the annunciator card has no effect on continued system operability and a(n) _________________________________
is required to be installed on the pulled annunciator card stored inside the annunciator panel.
A. System Engineer; Equipment Out of Service or Caution tag B. System Engineer; Work Incomplete or Temporary Services and Equipment tag C. Shift Technical Advisor; Equipment Out of Service or Caution tag D. Shift Technical Advisor; Work Incomplete or Temporary Services and Equipment tag Answer:
D. Shift Technical Advisor; Work Incomplete or Temporary Services and Equipment tag Notes:
A and B are incorrect because the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) performs the system operability not the system engineer.
The system engineers technical knowledge may be relied upon to make the appropriate operability call- but the final determination will be made by the STA. A and C are incorrect because there are no Equipment Out of Service Tags, and a Caution Tag is a specific tag, not a generic tag as called for in the procedure. According to OPS expectations, Temporary Services and Equipment (TSE) Tags should be used but the procedure still calls for Work Incomplete Tags or other generic identification tag.
References:
OP-1015.001, Conduct of Operations, Rev 100, steps 10.1.1 (B) and 10.1.4 (A)
Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1706 used on the 2009 NRC Exam Rev. 1, replaced K/A and replaced question. (mwf 1/29/14)
Rev. 2, corrected spelling, made changes based on NRC comments [mwf 1/30/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 87
Question 72_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power
- A 20 gpm tube leak in B Steam Generator occurs upon trip
- OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP, is being implemented
- CRS has directed the IAO to perform OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Attachment 19, Control of Secondary Contamination To prevent an inadvertent radiological release, OP-2202.010, Attachment 19, Initial Actions would direct _________.
A. aligning Steam Generator Blowdown to the SU/BD DIs B. starting all available Auxiliary Building Exhaust fans (2VEF-8s)
C. securing the Turbine Building sumps to the Unit 1 Oily Water Separator D. isolating the discharge flowpath from the Unit 1 Oily Water Separator to the lake Comments: In the original version, distractor A could also be considered correct as there are words about coordinating with chemistry to align S/G blowdown as part of the long term actions.
By adding the words Initial Actions, to the stem, it makes distractor A incorrect, and leaves C as the only correct answer.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1996 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 3:31:44 QID #: 72 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC Bank QID #1681 Search 1940012311 10CFR55: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.11 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-APSEC OBJ 5&9
Description:
Radiological Controls - Ability to control radiation releases.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power
- A 20 gpm tube leak in "B" Steam Generator occurs upon the trip
- OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP, is being implemented
- The CRS has directed the IAO to perform OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment 19, Control of Secondary Contamination To prevent an inadvertent radiological release, the initial actions of Standard Attachment 19 would direct A. aligning Condensate Flow to the 2T-94B DI B. starting all available Auxiliary Building Exhaust fans (2VEF-8s)
C. securing the turbine building sumps to the Unit 1 Oily Water Separator D. isolating the discharge flowpath from the Unit 1 Oily Water Separator to the lake Answer:
C Correct Notes:
Att. 19 directs securing the Turbine building sump pumps to prevent an inadvertent release and to monitor a release through this flowpath
References:
OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP, Rev 014, step 7 page 4 of 32 EOP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage Tech guide, Rev 014, step 7 page 10 of 33 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Attachment 19 pages 61 thru 64 of 204 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1681 used on the 2009 NRC Exam Rev. 1, reworded distractor A to make incorrect. Reworded questions stem based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 88
Question 73_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 6
- A SDC train is in service
- WCO is investigating a noise in the room and calls for assistance
- CRS has sent the CBOT into the Auxiliary Building to help the WCO
- CBOT has been informed that the current measured dose rate in the A ESF pump room is 700 mrem/hour The A ESF pump room would be posted as a ____________ and, due to the posting for this area, Radiation Protection (RP) Personnel CONTINUOUS coverage ______ required for the CBOT.
A. High Radiation Area; is B. High Radiation Area, is not C. Locked High Radiation Area, is D. Locked High Radiation Area, is not Comments: Technical Specification 6.7.1.e Administration Controls, requires that for HRA entry, the dose rate must be determined and entry personnel knowledgeable, or be continuously escorted by RP. By rewording the stem slightly, it removes the confusion as to whether the CBOT had been informed of the current dose rate in the A ESF pump room.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1997 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 3:38:46 QID #: 73 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: Modified NRC Bank QID #1782 Search 1940012313 10CFR55: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.13 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-RADP OBJ 7
Description:
Radiological Controls - Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 6
- "A" SDC train is in service
- RCS cleanup is in progress following Hydrogen peroxide addition
- General area dose rate in the "A" ESF pump room is 700 mr/hour
- The WCO is investigating a noise in the room and calls for assistance
- The CRS has sent the CBOT into the Auxiliary Building to help the WCO
- The CBOT is knowledgable about the dose rates in the "A" ESF pump room The "A" ESF pump room would be posted as a __________________ and, due to the posting for this area, Radiation Protection (RP) Personnel CONTINUOUS coverage _______ required for the CBOT.
A. High Radiation Area; is B. High Radiation Area; is not C. Locked High Radiation Area; is D. Locked High Radiation Area; is not Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
The room should be posted as a High Radiation Area due to the dose rate is <1000 mrem. A High Radiation area has a dose rate >100 to <1 rem. Access to a High Radiation area does not required continuous RP coverage
References:
Tech Spec 6.7.1, Administration Controls EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Rev 8, section 5.3 [18] page 12 of 38 EN-RP-101, Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Rev 8, section 3.0 [16] and [17] page 8 of 43 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1782 used on 2011 NRC Exam Rev. 1; removed the word "Area" from the stem after the first blank (repeated word). Added information to stem as suggested by NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/2014)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 89
Question 74_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) will give direction to GO TO another AOP, EOP or Normal Operating Procedure (NOP).
Which of the following describes the term GO TO?
A. Complete the controlling procedure and then enter the procedure you were directed to GO TO B. Immediately exit the controlling procedure and then enter the procedure that you were directed to GO TO C. Continue with the controlling procedure and perform the procedure that you are direct to GO TO in conjunction with it D. Immediately enter and complete the procedure you were directed to GO TO then return and complete the controlling procedure Answer: B (changed from C)
Comments: The original distractor D required STA concurrence and was not plausible. The revised distractor is more plausible in that operators might believe that they need to return to the original procedure after completing the GOTO procedure. This makes the revised distractor D plausible but incorrect.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1998 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 3:33:44 QID #: 74 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: Modified ANO Bank QID #ANO-OPS2-13018 Search 1940012405 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.4.5 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.7 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 3
Description:
Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of the organization of the operating procedures network for normal, abnormal, and emergency evolutions.
Question:
Abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), and Emergency operating procedures (EOPs) will give direction to "GO TO" another AOP, EOP or normal operating procedure (NOP).
Which of the following describes the term "GO TO"?
A. Continue with the controlling procedure and perform the procedure that you are directed to "GO TO" in conjunction with it B. Complete the controlling procedure and then enter the procedure that you were directed to "GO TO" C. Immediately exit the controlling procedure and then enter the procedure that you were directed to "GO TO" D. Exit the controlling procedure when plant conditions allow, then enter the procedure that you were directed to "GO TO" Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide uses the term "GO TO" to depart from the current procedure or step in the procedure and enter either another step in the current procedure or a different procedure altogether. It is used when the current procedure or step is not working and will help the implementer with plant conditions and direct entry into a procedure that will help.
References:
OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide, Rev 011, section 4.4 page 3 of 73 , and section 4.40.10 page 11 of 73 Historical Comments:
ANO Bank QID #ANO-OPS2-13018 Rev. 1, reworded D distractor to make more credible based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 90
Question 74_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOPs) and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) will give direction to GO TO another AOP, EOP or Normal Operating Procedure (NOP).
Which of the following describes the term GO TO?
A. Complete the controlling procedure and then enter the procedure you were directed to GO TO B. Immediately exit the controlling procedure and then enter the procedure that you were directed to GO TO C. Continue with the controlling procedure and perform the procedure that you are direct to GO TO in conjunction with it D. Immediately enter and complete the procedure you were directed to GO TO then return and complete the controlling procedure Answer: B (changed from C)
Comments: The revised distractor is more plausible than exiting a procedure simply based on plant conditions.
Re-order distractors from shortest to longest.
Note: We had sent recommendations to Q74_R0 but you submitted R1 prior to receiving our recommendations. These recommendations are to R1.
Question 75_R0 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- An Annunciator check is being performed for the shift turnover checklist
- Alarm panels 2K01 through 2K07 do not alarm
- OP-2203.042, Loss of Annunciators AOP, has been entered In accordance with OP-2203.042, the operators would ______.
A. maintain steady state plant conditions.
B. perform a one (1) hour rapid plant shutdown.
C. perform a two (2) hour normal plant shutdown.
D. trip the plant and enter the SPTAs.
Comments: The original question asked what the CRS would do, which does not provide a good legal basis for the question and answers, so the revised question ties the answers to what the procedure would direct based on the initial conditions, which provides the necessary legal basis.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 29-Jan-14 Bank: 1999 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/29/2014 4:23:41 QID #: 75 Author: foster Lic Level: R Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012432 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.4.32 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-PANN OBJ 8
Description:
Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.
Question:
Consider the following
- Unit 2 is at 100% power
- No annunciators will alarm on Annunciator panels 2K01 thru 2K12
- OP-2203.042, Loss of Annunciators AOP, has been entered Per OP-2203.042, the required action is to _______________.
A. immediately commence a plant shutdown due to the inability to monitor the plant B. maintain steady state plant conditions due to the inability to monitor the plant C. immediately commence a plant shutdown due to the loss of COLSS D. maintain steady state plant conditions due to the loss of COLSS Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
2K01 thru 2K12 are all the annunciators on the front panels.
B. Correct: Plant maneuvers are not recommended or required without remote monitoring capability (annunciators) steady state plant operation is preferred.
A. Incorrect: An immediate plant shutdown is not directed by the AOP. A plant maneuver could be required per Tech Specs, but not in this case.
C. Incorrect: An immediate plant shutdown is not directed by the AOP. A plant maneuver could be required per Tech Specs, but not in this case.
D. Incorrect. The AOP does require the plant to be maintained at steady state plant conditions, but COLSS is not lost, just the ability to continuously monitor COLSS. The required action is for the operators to continuously monitor COLSS on the plant computer.
References:
OP-2203.042, Loss of Control Room Annunciators AOP, Rev 006, step 3 page 2 of 20 AOP-2203.042, Loss of Control Room Annunciators Tech Guide, Rev 005, step 3 page 6 of 12 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, reworded question and distractors to make all choices more credible per NRC comments. (mwf 1/29/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 91
Question 75_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 downpower is planned for surveillance testing
- Annunciator check is being performed for the shift turnover checklist
- Alarm panels 2K01 through 2K07 do not alarm
- OP-2203.042, Loss of Annunciators AOP, has been entered In accordance with OP-2203.042, the operators would ________. The fault __________
propagate to other alarm panels.
A. not perform the downpower; could B. not perform the downpower; could not C. use alternate indications to perform the downpower; could D. use alternate indication to perform the downpower; could not Answer: A Comments: The original question asked what the CRS would do, which does not provide a good legal basis for the question and answers, so the revised question ties the answers to what the procedure would direct based on the initial conditions, which provides the necessary legal basis. Also, by altering the stem to include a downpower, it provides the opportunity to test the applicants on whether or not the downpower could continue, which the AOP does not allow, except in the case of exceeding Technical Specification limits.
Since the downpower is for a surveillance, there is no indication of exceeding a Technical Specification limit, so the downpower would not be performed. The procedure does allow operators to downpower using alternate indications if a limit is exceeded, so this makes distractors C and D plausible but incorrect. The second piece is a caution from the AOP, which states that fault may propagate from 2K01 through 2K12, making answer A correct. Distractor B is plausible if the applicant cannot remember if the alarms are all on the same circuit.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2000 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 8:54:44 QID #: 76 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000009A206 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 3 System
Title:
Small Break LOCA System Number 009 K/A EA2.06 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 6
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: - Whether PZR water inventory loss is imminent Question:
(REFERENCE PROVIDED)
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- "C" HPSI pump (2P-89C) is OOS for maintenance
- "C" CCP (2P-36C) is aligned to Green
- ATC reports Containment parameters are trending up (pressure, temperature, radition, and humidity)
- Pressurizer level is 60%
- Volume Control Tank (VCT) level is 72%
3 minutes later:
- Pressurizer level is 59%
- VCT level is 71%
Unit 2 now trips due to a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)
- Annunciator 2K08 C-2 "ENGINE/EXCITER SHUTDOWN" for #1 EDG is in alarm
- CBOT reports "B" HPSI pump is running without discharge pressure
- RCS Leakrate does not change post trip Based on conditions above, the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory (Pressurizer level) ________ recover (trend up) and after performing SPTAs, the CRS would diagnose entry into _________________________________.
A. would; OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage B. would; OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident C. would not; OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage D. would not; OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
The leakrate is based on 55.3 gallons per percent in the pressurizer x 1% change in level = 55.3 gallons 33.8 gallons per percent in the VCT x 1% change in level = 33.8 gallons, 55.3 + 33.8 = 89.1 gallons / 3 minutes (time frame the leakrate data was taken) = 29.7 gallon/minutes RCS leakage. SIAS would be actuated due to the RCS leakage and with the loss of offsite power (LOOP) and the #1 EDG not supplying the bus (exciter shutdown) only Green Train components will be available for makeup sources. With the "C" HPSI (swing) pump OOS and the failure of the "B HPSI pump the 2 CCPs (with a capacity of 44 gpm each) would be available to makeup to the Pressurizer (the "B" LPSI pump would be running but RCS pressure would Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 92
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 be to high for injection (RCS makeup > RSC leakage) therefore Pressurizer level would trend up at approximately 1% /
minute. With a leakrate of 29.7 gpm entry conditions for OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage. Exhibit 8 will direct the CRS to diagnose LOCA due to a RCS leak with a LOOP.
A. Incorrect. Pressurizer level would be trending up, but it is incorrect to diagnose Excess RCS leakage AOP. Per Exhibit 8 of Standard Attachments, when an AOP is combined with a LOOP, the associated EOP is diagnosed, which is the LOCA EOP.
Plausible because the Excess RCS Leakage AOP could be diagnosed coming out of Standard Post Trip Actions B. Correct. Pressurizer level would be recovering and per Standard Attachments Exhibit 8, Excess RCS Leakage AOP plus a LOOP EOP results in a diagnosis of the LOCA EOP.
C. Incorrect. Per the calculation above, Pressurizer level would be recovering not going down. Plausible because the candidate could calculate the wrong leakrate.
D. Incorrect. Per the calculation above, Pressurizer level would be recovering not going down. Plausible because the candidate could calculate the wrong leakrate.
References:
[PROVIDED] OP-2305.002, Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection, Rev 024 Exhibit 1 page 39 of 54 OP-2203.012H, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K08 window C-2, Rev 037, page 15 of 50 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Exhibit 8 page 193 of 204 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1; changed second bullet pump noun name to match pump number (when from "A" to "C")
fourth bullet, added radiation to the list of parameters trending up (based on validator comments), corrected leakrate number in notes from 89.2 to 89.1 (calculation iwas correct) and added CCP capicity of 44 gpm. Updated notes to show why each distractor is plausible but incorrect. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 93
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2001 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 8:46:17 QID #: 77 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: Modified NRC Bank QID #1566 Search 0000402402 10CFR55: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Steam Line Rupture System Number 040 K/A 2.4.2 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.5 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-COLSS OBJ 17
Description:
Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power
- RCS pressure is 1800 psia and lowering
- Containment pressure is trending up
- Containment High Range Radiation Monitors are in alarm and rising
- Containment Low Range Radiation Monitors are reading 10 mr/hr and stable
- 'A' SG level is 18%
- 'B' SG level is 20%
- 'A' SG pressure is 730 psia and lowering
- 'B' SG pressure is 900 psia and slowly lowering
- Assume no operator actions have been taken The CRS would diagnose _________________ and EFW would be aligned to ____________.
A. OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, 'B' SG only B. OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP, 'A' and 'B' SGs C. OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP, 'B' SG only D. OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP, 'A' and 'B' SGs Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
A. Incorrect. LOCA EOP would not be diagnosed in this scenario because the Containment Low Range Radiation Monitors are reading normal and stable and 'A' SG pressure is lowering. The Containment High Range Radiation Monitors are in alarm and rising, which could distract the applicant, but the coaxial cables for these radiation monitors have been susceptible to thermally induced currents which make them read false high during an ESD. Plausible because all the other indications are consistent with a LOCA.
B. Incorrect. LOCA EOP would not be diagnosed in this scenario because the Containment Low Range Radiation Monitors are reading normal and stable and 'A' SG pressure is lowering. The Containment High Range Radiation Monitors are in alarm and rising, which could distract the applicant, but the coaxial cables for these radiation monitors have been susceptible to thermally induced currents which make them read false high during an ESD. Plausible because all the other indications are consistent with a LOCA.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 94
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 C. Correct. ESD EOP diagnosis is correct based on lowering RCS pressure, Containment Low Range Radiation Monitors stable, and 'A' SG pressure trending down. MSIS actuates at 751 psia. Both Steam Generators will be fed by EFW until 751 psia is reached. At that point, the EFAS initiation logic would isolate EFW flow to the affected SG 'A'. SG 'B' would continue to be fed by EFW.
D. Incorrect. ESD EOP diagnosis is correct based on lowering RCS pressure, Containment Low Range Radiation Monitors stable, and 'A' SG pressure trending down. MSIS actuates at 751 psia. Both Steam Generators will be fed by EFW until 751 psia is reached. At that point, the EFAS initiation logic would isolate EFW flow to the affected SG 'A'. SG 'B' would continue to be fed by EFW. So what makes this distractor incorrect is that 'A' SG would not be fed with pressure less than 751 psia.
Plausible because 'A' SG would be fed until 751 psia is reached and then it would be isolated by the EFAS initiation logic.
References:
STM 2-19-2, EFW & AFW Systems, Rev. 35, Section 2.3.3.1, page 22 STM 2-62, Radiation Monitoring System, Rev. 21, Section 2.1.2, page 11 OP-2202.005, ESD EOP, Rev. 014, Entry Conditions, page 1 of 41 OP-2202.003, LOCA EOP, Rev. 014, Entry Conditions, page 1 of 67 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1566, used on the 2008 NRC Exam Rev. 1: Rewrote questions to change from Overcooling AOP to ESD EOP per NRC comments to better match K/A. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 95
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2002 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 8:55:45 QID #: 78 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000055A201 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Black System Number 055 K/A EA2.01 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 17
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: - Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Alternate AC Diesel Generator (AACDG) is OOS for maintenance
- A Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) now occurs
- Upon the trip neither Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is running
- IAO is unable to start either EDG
- SPTAs are complete CRS would diagnose entry into ___________________________ and Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Controlled Bleedoff (CBO) Flow would be aligned to the _________________________.
A. OP-2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power EOP; Quench Tank (QT)
B. OP-2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power EOP; Volume Control Tank (VCT)
C. OP-2202.008, Station Blackout EOP; Quench Tank (QT);
D. OP-2202.008, Station Blackout EOP; Volume Control Tank (VCT)
Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
The student should recognize a Station Blackout is in progress (due to the LOOP, AACDG OOS and neither EDG starting)
The CRS would diagnose the Station Blackout EOP using Standard Attachments Exhibit 8, Diagnosis Flow Chart. Without power to the non-vital buses, there would be no Instrument Air pressure and the CBO flowpath to the VCT would isolate (valves fail close) which will align CBO to the QT through the CBO relief valve.
A. Incorrect. Because neither EDG could be started during SPTAs and the AAC DG is unavailable, both 2A3 and 2A4 are de-energized. This meets the entry conditions for the SBO EOP. Plausible because a LOOP does exist in the stem of the question.
B. Incorrect. Because neither EDG could be started during SPTAs and the AAC DG is unavailable, both 2A3 and 2A4 are de-energized. This meets the entry conditions for the SBO EOP. Plausible because a LOOP does exist in the stem of the question.
C. Correct. Because neither EDG could be started during SPTAs and the AAC DG is unavailable, both 2A3 and 2A4 are de-energized. This meets the entry conditions for the SBO EOP. Without power to the non-vital buses, there would be no Instrument Air pressure and the CBO flowpath to the VCT would isolate (valves fail close) which will align CBO to the QT through the CBO relief valve.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 96
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 D. Incorrect. Without power to the non-vital buses, there would be no Instrument Air pressure and the CBO flowpath to the VCT would isolate (valves fail close) which will align CBO to the QT through the CBO relief valve. Plausible because CBO is aligned to the VCT prior to the power failure and the power failure results in CBO being realigned to the QT.
References:
STM 2-04, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev 29, section 2.1 page 21 and simplified drawing page 62 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Exhibit 8 page 193 of 204 Historical Comments:
Rev 1: Changed Taxonomy from "F" to "H", swapped order of question/answers, added relief valve to flowpath of CBO to the QT. [mwf 1/27/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 97
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2003 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/27/2014 9:47:18 QID #: 79 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 000058A203 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Loss of DC Power System Number 058 K/A AA2.03 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.5 SRO Imp: 3.9 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ED125 OBJ 11
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: - DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- 2D02 Green Battery disconnect has been opened for maintenance
- Battery charger, 2D-32B, is in service
- Now 2D-32B the output breaker trips open The CRS would diagnose entry into ______________________________ and Pressurizer level would be maintained by cycling a Coolant Charging Pump (CCP) due to ______________ letdown isolation valve failing closed.
A. OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Action EOP; 2CV-4820-2, inside containment B. OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Action EOP; 2CV-4823-2 outside containment C. OP-2203.037, Loss of 125V DC AOP; 2CV-4820-2, inside containment D. OP-2203.037, Loss of 125V DC AOP; 2CV-4823-2, outside containment Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
With the Green Battery disconnected from its bus [2D02] the battery charger is supplying all green DC loads. When the chargers breaker trips open, a loss of green DC will occur. The unit will stay on line and the Loss of DC AOP would be entered. The outside containment letdown isolation valve [2CV-4823-2] is air operated and the air supply is controlled by a green DC solenoid. When green DC is lost, the valve will fail closed isolating letdown and cause Pzr level to be maintained by cycling CCPs.
A. Incorrect. The Unit does not trip automatically nor is it an action required by the AOP to trip the Reactor and go to SPTAs upon a loss of Green DC. Plausible because a loss of Green DC does automatically open 2 trip circuit breakers but this does not cause a Reactor trip.
B. Incorrect. The Unit does not trip automatically nor is it an action required by the AOP to trip the Reactor and go to SPTAs upon a loss of Green DC. Plausible because a loss of Green DC does automatically open 2 trip circuit breakers but this does not cause a Reactor trip.
C. Incorrect. The Loss of DC AOP is entered but the Letdown Isolation valve inside containment does not automatically close upon a loss of Green DC. Plausible because letdown does isolate on a loss of Green DC, but it is the Letdown Isolation valve outside containment that closes not the valve inside containment.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 98
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 D. Correct. With the Green Battery disconnected from its bus [2D02] the battery charger is supplying all green DC loads.
When the chargers breaker trips open, a loss of green DC will occur. The unit will stay on line and the Loss of DC AOP would be entered. The outside containment letdown isolation valve [2CV-4823-2] is air operated and the air supply is controlled by a green DC solenoid. When green DC is lost, the valve will fail closed isolating letdown and cause Pzr level to be maintained by cycling CCPs.
References:
OP-2203.037, Loss of 125V DC AOP, Rev 009, entry page 1 of 57, section 3 step 2.A. page 33 of 57 OP-2203.037, Loss of 125V DC Tech Guide, Rev 009, section 3 step 2entry page 45 of 75 STM 2-04, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev 29, section 2.1.5 page 6 and simplified drawing on page 62 STM 2-32-5, 125Vdc Electrical Distribution, Rev 19, section 2.7.2 page 15 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1; changed wording of stem. Added clarification in note section. Added STM 2-04 to the references for 2CV-4823-2 and STM 2-32-5 for modifications to the DC bus. Updated notes. [wmf 1/27/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 99
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2004 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/27/2014 10:21:2 QID #: 80 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0000622132 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Loss of Nuclear Service Water System Number 062 K/A 2.1.32 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.0 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-SWACW OBJ 13&15
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions.
Question:
Service Water Systems Operations procedure, OP-2104.029, has Limits and Precautions associated with the Emergency Cooling Pond (ECP) Level and Temperature Tech Spec 3.7.4.1.
Tech Spec 3.7.4.1 Bases, a MINIMUM indicated ECP level of ____ feet, based on soundings and includes measurement, calculation and other uncertainties (equivalent to 0.15 ft), ensures an adequate heat sink based on worst case initial conditions during a simultaneous shutdown of Unit 1 and emergency shutdown of Unit 2 following a Unit 2 LOCA.
Also, Operator action ________ credited to initiate makeup to ECP upon a loss of Dardanelle Reservoir to maintain the minimum water volume required for a 30 day supply of cooling water to safety related components without exceeding their design basis temperature.
A. 5.2; is B. 5.2; is not C. 5.5; is D. 5.5; is not Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
Aligns with T.S. 3.7.4.1 bases for the minimum indicated ECP level of 5.2 feet. This requirement is based on soundings and includes measurement, calculation and other uncertainties (equivalent to 0.15 ft) to ensure a minimum contained water volume of 70 area-feet crediting operator action to initiate makeup to ECP upon loss of Dardanelle Reservoir. The additional water added to the ECP during the time between first swapping the returns to the ECP and then later swapping the suctions to the ECP will maintain the ECP >70 area-feet and provide adequate supply of water for a 30 day supply of cooling water to ECCS components to operate without exceeding their design base temperature.
References:
OP-2104.029, Service Water Systems Operations, Rev 096, section 5.0 step 5.25 and 5.26 page 8 of 312 Tech Spec 3.7.4.1, ECP Level and Temperature requirements Tech Spec Bases B3.7.4.1, ECP Level and Temperature requirements OPS-B31, Unit 2 outside AO Logs, Rev 46, ECP Level reading, page 9 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1; changed rev number for OP-2104.029, verified no impct on question [mwf 1/27/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 100
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2005 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 9:42:33 QID #: 81 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: ANO Bank QID #ANO-OPS2-7035 Search 0000772236 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13 Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbanc System Number 077 K/A 2.2.36 Tier: 1 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EDHVD OBJ 9
Description:
Equipment Control - Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.
Question:
[REFERENC PROVIDED]
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- #2 EDG is out of service for its 18 month overhaul
- The Unit 2 control room has just been informed that Startup #2 (SU2) Transformer is Inoperable What action, listed below, is required FIRST?
A. Restore at least one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status B. Demostrate the operability of the remaining AC circuit C. Demonstrate the operability of #1 EDG D. Place the Unit in HOT STANDBY Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
T.S. 3.8.1.1 covers a varity of combinations of loss of power sources. Action 'c' covers a loss of an offsite source (SU2) along with the #2 EDG being unavailable due to planned maintenance. 3.8.1.1.c.1. required performance of OP-2107.001, Electrical System Operation, Supp. 4 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and at least every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
A. Incorrect: The stated condition is not outside T.S.3.8.1.1 LCO C. Incorrect: If an offsite power source was inoberable first, then a EDG became unavailable, then within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> oberalbility of the remaining EDG would have to be demonstrate D. Incorrect: No requirements to place the Unit in HOT STANDBY within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
References:
T.S. 3.8.1.1, Electrical Systems Modes 1-4 Historical Comments:
ANO Bank QID #ANO-OPS2-7035 Rev. 1: Changed the wording of the distractors to match Tech Spec action statement wording. Incorporated NRC comments and reworded distractor C per NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 101
Comments on Q81_R1 There are a couple follow-on comments:
- 1) Text was added indicating that this question will now have a reference provided (the word REFERENCE is misspelled, by the way). The reference needs to be clearly identified on the Worksheet and needs to be sent to NRC (if we dont already have it) so we can review it prior to accepting the question as satisfactory. The reference will also need to be included in the revised question file when the exam is submitted again.
- 2) On answer B, revise it to say Demonstrate the operability of the remaining offsite AC circuit. The word offsite is used in the Technical Specifications text (LCO 3/4.8.1, Action c.1).
- 3) There are still some minor edits that were identified on the worksheet we sent to you as comments for R0 on January 26th.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2006 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 9:43:14 QID #: 82 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: ANO Bank QID #ANO-OPS2-6094 Search 0000052222 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod System Number 005 K/A 2.2.22 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.0 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ACEA OBJ 2
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Question:
After realignment of an Inoperable Control Element Assembly (CEA), OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction AOP, directs maintaining Reactor power constant for at least one hour prior to performing a power escalation.
Per the CEA Malfunction Tech Guide, the reason for this one hour hold is _______________________ .
A. to allow ASI to stabilize prior to performing the power escalation after realignment of the CEA B. to prevent pellet-cladding interactions caused by the redistribution of core power from the misaligned CEA C. to prevent exceeding the COLSS ASI operational limit of +/- 0.27 when performing the power escalation after realignment of the CEA D. to prevent exceeding the Tech Spec limits on Azimuthal Tilt (Az Tilt) caused by the redistribution of core power from the misaligned CEA Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
Per the AOP tech guide, reactor power is maintained constant for at least one hour to prevent pellet-clad interactions caused by the redistribution of core power from the misaligned Control Element Assembly (CEA)
References:
OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction AOP, Rev 020, step 33 page 13 of 27 AOP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction Tech Guide, Rev 020, step 33 page 27 of 34 Historical Comments:
ANO Bank QID #ANO-OPS2-6094 Rev. 1; changed order of answers per NRC comment and corrected other wording per NRC comments. [mwf 1/30/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 102
Comments on Q82_R1 The changes made addressed BTLs markups. It is satisfactory from that perspective.
The question is SRO level of knowledge, but it isnt clear how this ties to the K/A statement.
The question doesnt appear to test knowledge of the LCOs or Safety Limits. If applying the AOP is implementing a Surveillance Requirement driven by the LCO Action Statement for one CEA inoperable, then the tie could be established. With the given references, this isnt clear.
If the tie to the KA can be established, enhance the Notes and submit as R2.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2007 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 9:55:36 QID #: 83 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC Bank QID #1569 Search 000024A201 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Emergency Boration System Number 024 K/A AA2.01 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.1 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFRP OBJ 4
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: - Whether boron flow and/or MOVs are malfunctioning, from plant conditions Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Annunciator 2K12 B-2 "HEADER PRESS LO" for the Coolant Charging Pumps (CCPs) comes into alarm
- Annunciator 2K12 B-3 "HEADER FLOW LO" for the CCPs comes into alarm
- Volume Control Tank (VCT) level is 58% and lowering
- The WCO reports a rupture in the CCP suction header downstream of the RWT supply valve, 2CV-4950-2 and check valve
- OP-2203.036, Loss of Charging AOP, has been entered and the CRS directs tripping the Unit
- The ATC reports 3 CEAs did not fully insert on the trip and reactor power is 0.2% and steady
- SPTAs have been completed The CRS would diagnose _____________________________ and Emergency Boration would be accomplished by A. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP; aligning CCP discharge to the #1 HPSI header B. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP; lowering RCS pressure and starting a HPSI pump C. OP-2203.032, Emergency Boration AOP; aligning CCP discharge to the #1 HPSI header D. OP-2203.032, Emergency Boration AOP; lowering RCS pressure and starting a HPSI pump Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
With the given conditions entering Functional Recovery and depressurizing the RCS to allow using HPSI to emergency borate is correct. The location of the charging suction header rupture is unisoable from the rest of the system rendering all CCPs incapable of adding inventory to the RCS. With >1 CEA not fully inserted and reactor power >.1% and stable requires the addition of boron to meet shutdown margin. The Emergency Boration AOP does contain direction to depressurize and use a HPSI pump but it is not addressed on the exhibit 8 as an option to enter post SPTAs with the reactivity safety function not met. Standard Attachment Exhibit 1, Emergency Boration, would have been attempted during SPTA's, but would have not have been successful. Emergency Boration AOP is not one of the procedures that can be diagnosed coming out of SPTAs.
References:
OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K12 window B-2, Rev 044 page 18 of 116 OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K12 window B-3, Rev 044, page 36 of 116 OP-2203.036, Loss of Charging AOP, Rev 011, step 8, contingency 8.2) page 7 of 24 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 103
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, Exhibit 8 page 193 of 204 OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery, Rev 017, entry section step 11.A page 10 of 45 OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery, Rev 017, section RC, Reactivity Control Decision Tree page 1 of 11 and section RC-3 step 4 contingency colume OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP, Rev. 014, Step 3.C (Contingency), page 3 of 19 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Exhibit 1, Emergency Boration, Rev. 022, page 179 of 204 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1569 used on the 2008 NRC Exam Rev. 1: changed RWT to CCP suction from 2CV-4850-2 to 4950-2, added check valve to location, added simiplified drawing of CVCS to show location of break. Incorported NRC comments into notes and references. [mwf 1/27/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 104
Comments on Q83_R1 From S. Hedger:
The markups provided by BTL have been addressed. IF the question is written to the correct K/A (see below), it is satisfactory.
If ES-401-2, Revision 2, is the written exam outline of record, then this question is not written to the K/A in the outline.
- For Tier 1, Group 2, in the SRO section, there is an outline selection for 024 Emergency Boration, G 2.4.41, Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.
- The proposed question is written to 024 Emergency Boration, AA2.01, Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: Whether boron flow and/or MOVs are malfunctioning, from plant conditions Either the K/A was rejected and should be justified with a newer revision to the exam outline, or the question provided does not meet the K/A statement.
From B. Larson:
The ES-401-4, Record of Rejected KAs, Rev 1, does have an entry for changing the KA for this question. It states There is not an E-Plan associated with Emergency Boration. Selected 024 AA 2.01 as the replacement K/A. If the 401-4 entry is correct, then R1 is sat for the examiner review.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2008 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/22/2014 10:40:2 QID #: 84 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 0000692101 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.13 Safety Function 5 System
Title:
Loss of Containment Integrity System Number 069 K/A 2.1.1 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVENT OBJ 15
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 4 and heating up
- Control Board panel walkdowns are being performed in preparations to enter Mode 3
- CBOT reports Containment Purge system isolation valves are open with keys inserted The required action to comply with Tech Spec, 3.6.1.6 and restore Containment Purge system to an Operable status would be to verify Containment Purge isolation valves closed with keys removed within the maximum allowed time of
______________________ because, per the Tech Spec bases, the valves have not demonstrated capability of being closed during a ______________________ inside Containment .
A. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
B. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; Excess Steam Demand (ESD)
C. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
D. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; Excess Steam Demand (ESD)
Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
Technical Specification 3.6.1.6 requires all three Containment Purge Isolations in the supply and exhaust ducts to remain closed and keys removed during modes 1-4. These valve are only opened in Modes 5 and below to ensure Containment Integrity is maintained in Modes 1-4. Per T.S. Bases, Purge valves are required to be closed with keys removed due to the valves have not demonstrated capability of being closed during a LOCA
References:
Technical Specification 3.6.1.6, Containment Ventilation System and Bases Historical Comments:
Rev. 1, reworded question statement and changed distractors to make all of them credible per NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 105
Comments on Q84_R1 From S. Hedger:
In Revision 1 to the question, the K/A statement has changed. It changed from 069 Loss of Containment Integrity, K/A A2.02, to K/A G2.1.1. In looking at this, and Question 83, I suspect that a swap of the A2 and G K/As for these was completed. However, it this isnt something that has been negotiated, it is captured here for follow up.
The question has been revised to test an additional area of knowledge that is SRO-only in nature. Therefore, this is now a SRO-only question. There is no justification for the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time requirement being plausible, but it is better than the previous options. It is satisfactory.
From B. Larson:
ES-401-4, Record of Rejected KAs, Rev 1, does NOT contain an entry for changing the KA for this question. The change from an A2 to a Generic affects the Category Points for Tier 1, Group
- 2. Without a more detailed review, it appears as if now there is only 1 question for Tier 1, Group 2 which is not acceptable. Note 1 on the ES-401-2 form states Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines. This needs to be resolved.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2009 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 10:03:1 QID #: 85 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: Modified NRC BANK QID #0522 Search 00CA11A201 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function 4 System
Title:
RCS Overcooling System Number A11 K/A EA2.1 Tier: 1 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.9 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ACOOL OBJ 1&3
Description:
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (RCS Overcooling): - Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a rupture in the EH system
- SPTAs have been completed
- IAO reports steam in the Turbine building basement
- "A" S/G pressure is 900 psia and slowly trending down
- "B" S/G pressure is 890 psia and slowly trending down The CRS would diagnose entry into ______________________ and direct ________________________ .
A. OP-2203.011, RCS Overcooling AOP; closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
B. OP-2203.011, RCS Overcooling AOP; actuating Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS)
C. OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP; closing the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)
D. OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP; actuating Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS)
Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A. Correct: OP- 2202.010, Standard Attachment diagnostics will direct entry into RCS Overcooling AOP unless the overcooling is excessive causing a Main Steam Isolation signal, then the Excess Steam demand EOP would be entered.
B. Incorrect: Entry conditions are met and actuating MSIS is directed in step 2 if S/G pressure is below the MSIS setpoint, but S/G pressures are above the MSIS setpoint.
C. Incorrect: the entry conditions for ESD are not met per the dianositic flow chart (exhibit 8) due to the MSIS setpoint has not been reached (<751 psia) closing the MSIVs is not directed D. Incorrect: the entry conditions for ESD are not met per the dianositic flow chart (exhibit 8) due to the MSIS setpoint has not been reached (<751 psia) actuating MSIS is directed in step 5.
References:
OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Rev 022, exhibit 8 page 193 of 204 OP-2203.011, RCS Overcooling AOP, Rev 005, Entry Conditions page 1 of 9 and step 3 page 2 of 9 AOP-2203.011, RCS Overcooling Tech Guide, Rev 005 Entry Conditions page 3 of 15 and step 3 page 6 of 15 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #0522 used on 2005 NRC Exam Rev. 1: NRC editorial comments (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 106
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 107
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2010 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 10:16:5 QID #: 86 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 012000A203 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 7 System
Title:
Reactor Protection System System Number 012 K/A A2.03 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RPS OBJ 10
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Incorrect channel bypassing Question:
[REFERENCE PROVIDED]
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- Channel 1 Pressurizer (PZR) pressure transmitter (NR), 2PT-4601-1, has failed LOW
- CBOT bypasses ONLY point 5 (PZR pressure - HIGH)
Failure of another PZR pressure (NR) transmitter would cause a Reactor trip on ____________. This trip could of been prevented by applying Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 _______________ to bypass additional points in Channel 1.
A. Linear Heat Rate (LPD) and Departure form Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR); Action 2 B. Linear Heat Rate (LPD) and Departure form Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR); Action 3 C. Pressurizer pressure LOW; Action 2 D. Pressurizer pressure LOW; Action 3 Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
With one channel failed low (PZR pressure channel 1) LPD and DNBR will also be in a tripped condition on channel 1.
T.S.3.3.1.1 action b requires points 3, 4, and 5 in either tripped or bypass within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Without placing points 3 and 4 in bypass for channel 1 the reactor trip logic is in a 2 out of 4 logic with 1 point already tripped, therefore it would only take 1, more PZR pressure channel to fail low (which would also trip LPD and DNBR for that channel) to cause a reactor trip.
References:
T.S. 3.3.1.1 (PROVIDED to STUDENT]
STM 2-63, Reactor Protection System, Rev 11, section 6.2.1, pages 41 and 42 STM 2-03, Reactor Coolant System, Rev 22, section 2.2.5.1, page 17 STM 2-63, Reactor Protection System, Rev 11, section 4.3.5 page 24 STM 2-65-1, Core Protection Calculator System, Rev 17, section 2.2.3 page 6 and section 2.4.6 page 15 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: NRC editorial comments, added STM 2-63 and STM 2-65-1. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 108
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2011 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 10:18:5 QID #: 87 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 0130002222 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2 Safety Function 2 System
Title:
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ( System Number 013 K/A 2.2.22 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.0 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-RCS OBJ 16
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
Question:
Pressurizer Code Safety Tech Spec 3.4.3 LCO is based on preventing the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of _____________ psia with a loss of Main Turbine Generator and no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoint is reached and the Steam Dump Bypass Control System (SDBCS) _______ operation.
A. 2500; in B. 2750; in C. 2500; not in D. 2750; not in Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
D. Correct: During operations, the combine relief capacity of the code safeties is sufficient to limit RCS pressure to within its safety limit of 2750 psia assuming the reactor does not trip before the first RPS reactor trip setpoint is reached and without the SDBCS in operations (T.S. 3.4.3 bases)
A. Incorrect: 2500 psia is the code safety setpoint not the safety limit setpoint and the setpoint is based on the assumption the reactor does not trip before the first RPS reactor trip setpoint is reached and SDBCS is not in operation.
B. Incorrect: 2750 psia is the safety limit setpoint but assumes the reactor does not trip before the first RPS reactor trip setpoint is reached and SDBCS is not in operation.
C. Incorrect: 2500 psia is the code safety setpoint not the safety limit setpoint
References:
T.S 3.4.3, Safety Valves Operating and bases Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Rev. 1: NRC editorial comments, added explanation to the notes section Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 109
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2012 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 10:37:5 QID #: 88 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0260002120 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 Safety Function 5 System
Title:
Containment Spray System (CSS) System Number 026 K/A 2.1.20 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 4.6 SRO Imp: 4.6 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ELOCA OBJ 6
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- I&C is performing maintenance in 2C-39, the Engineered Safety Features Auctuation System (ESFAS) actuation cabinet
- Annunciator 2K07 D-1 "CSAS ACT" alarms
- Containment pressure 14.7 psia
- Containment temperature 112°F The CRS would enter _______________________________ and would direct _____________________ .
A. OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP; securing all Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs)
B. OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP; placing the "A" Spray Pump (2P-35A) in Pull to Lock (PTL)
C. OP-2203.041, Inadvertant CSAS AOP; secure all Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs)
D. OP-2203.041, Inadvertant CSAS AOP; place the "A" Spray Pump (2P-35A) in Pull to Lock (PTL)
Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
the Inadvertant Spray Actuation will cause a reactor trip and SPTAs will verify spray is not needed and direct placing the "A" Spray pump in PTL. Pre power uprate, an Inadvertant CSAS would have the operators trip the unit and secure the RCPs. Only the 'A' Spray pump inadvertently starts in this scenario. 'B' Spray pump is not running.
References:
OP2202.001, Standard Post Trip Action EOP, Rev 014, step 9.B page 16 of 19 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Rev. 1: NRC editorial comments. Changed Difficulty from 3 to 2. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 110
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2013 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 10:39:5 QID #: 89 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 061000A204 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) Syste System Number 061 K/A A2.04 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFW OBJ 10
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - pump failure or improper operation Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a disturbance on the Grid
- 500kV and the 161kV lines are de-energized
- Both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) are running
- Annunciator 2K08 B-3 "2A3 L.O. RELAY TRIP" is in alarm
- #1 EDG feeder to 2A3 (2A308) is open
- Annunciator 2K05 A-9 "2P7A TURB OVERSPEED TRIP" is in alarm
- "A" Steam Generator (S/G) level is 223" [WR] and trending down
- "B" Steam Generator (S/G) level is 123" [WR] and trending down
- SPTAs are complete The CRS would enter __________________________ EOP and the first mitigation strategy directed by the chosen procedure to remove Reactor Coolant System (RCS) heat is ___________________________ .
A. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater; resetting "A" EFW pump (2P-7A) and feeding S/Gs B. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater; energizing 2A3 with the #1 EDG and feeding S/Gs with the "B" EFW pump (2P-7B)
C. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery; energizing 2A1 with AACDG and feeding the S/Gs with the Auxiliary Feedwater pump (2P-75)
D. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery; implement Once Through Cooling Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A. Correct: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not Functional Recovery, because there is only one event in progress. Step 12 in the LOF EOP will direct restoring feedwater and the feedwater sources are listed in the preferred order ("B" EFW, "A" EFW, AFW, MFP, COND, Once Through Cooling) Step 12.B. directs establishing feed with "A" EFW pump using Standard Attachment 54 which will direct re-setting the overspeed trip device and restoring feed at <150 gpm.
B. Incorrect: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not Functional Recovery, because there is only one event in progress. Energizing 2A3 with the #1 EDG and feeding S/Gs with "B" EFW pump (2P-7B) but the "B" EFW pump is unavailable because 2A3 is locked out.
C. Incorrect: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not Functional Recovery, because there is only one event in progress. Energizing 2A1 with AACDG and feeding S/Gs Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 111
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 with Auxiliary Feedwater pump (2P-75) is directed in both LOF EOP and Functional Recovery, but it is not the preferred pump and Functional would reset the "A" EFW pump first also.
D. Incorrect: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not Functional Recovery, because there is only one event in progress. S/G levels do not meet Once Through Cooling criteria.
References:
OP-2203.012H, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K08 window B-3, Rev 037, page 26 of 50 OP-2203.012E, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K05 window E-9, Rev 039, page 77 of 86 OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP, Rev 010, step 12 page 5 of 25 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment, Rev 022, Att. 54 step 6.A page 2 of 3 and step 9 page 3 of 3 EOP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater Tech Guide, Rev 009, step 12 page 19 of 62 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Changed wording of question and added notes based on NRC comments. [mwf 1/30/14]
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 112
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 Bank: 2013 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/31/2014 8:22:59 QID #: 89 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 061000A204 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 4 System
Title:
Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) Syste System Number 061 K/A A2.04 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFW OBJ 10
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - pump failure or improper operation Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 has tripped due to a disturbance on the Grid
- 500kV and the 161kV lines are de-energized
- Both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) are running
- Annunciator 2K08 B-3 "2A3 L.O. RELAY TRIP" is in alarm
- #1 EDG feeder to 2A3 (2A308) is open
- Annunciator 2K05 A-9 "2P7A TURB OVERSPEED TRIP" is in alarm
- "A" Steam Generator (S/G) level is 223" (WR) and trending down
- "B" Steam Generator (S/G) level is 123" (WR) and trending down
- "A" S/G pressure is 1020 psia and slowly lowering
- "B" S/G pressure is 1010 psia and slowly lowering
- RCS pressure is 2100 psia and slowly rising
- SPTAs are complete The CRS would diagnose entry into __________________________ EOP and the first mitigation strategy directed by the chosen procedure to remove Reactor Coolant System (RCS) heat is ___________________________ .
A. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP; resetting "A" EFW pump (2P-7A) and feeding S/Gs B. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP; energizing 2A3 with the #1 EDG and feeding S/Gs with the "B" EFW pump (2P-7B)
C. OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP; resetting "A" EFW pump (2P-7A) and feeding S/Gs D. OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand EOP; energizing 2A3 with the #1 EDG and feeding S/Gs with the "B" EFW pump (2P-7B)
Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
A. Correct: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not ESD EOP, because there is not an ESD in progress. Step 12 in the LOF EOP will direct restoring feedwater and the feedwater sources are listed in the preferred order ("B" EFW, "A" EFW, AFW, MFP, COND, Once Through Cooling) Step 12.B. directs establishing feed with "A" EFW pump using Standard Attachment 54 which will direct re-setting the overspeed trip device and restoring feed at <150 gpm.
B. Incorrect: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not ESD, Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 111
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 because there is only one event in progress. Energizing 2A3 with the #1 EDG and feeding S/Gs with "B" EFW pump (2P-7B) but the "B" EFW pump is unavailable because 2A3 is locked out.
C. Incorrect: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not ESD, because a LOF event in progress.
D. Incorrect: Incorrect: The Loss of Feedwater EOP would be diagnosed after completion of SPTAs, not ESD, because a LOF event in progress.
References:
OP-2203.012H, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K08 window B-3, Rev 037, page 26 of 50 OP-2203.012E, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K05 window E-9, Rev 039, page 77 of 86 OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP, Rev 010, step 12 page 5 of 25 OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment, Rev 022, Att. 54 step 6.A page 2 of 3 and step 9 page 3 of 3 EOP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater Tech Guide, Rev 009, step 12 page 19 of 62 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Changed wording of question and added notes based on NRC comments. [mwf 1/30/14]
Rev. 2: Changed distractors based on NRC comments via telephone conversation with Kelly. (mwf 1/31/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 112
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2014 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 10:41:0 QID #: 90 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 064000A201 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System System Number 064 K/A A2.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 2&11
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Failure modes of water, oil, and air valves Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- A 3 gpm RCS leak has been detected
- A Loss of Offsite Power now occurs
- SPTAs have been entered
- Annunciator 2K09 D-1 "POTENTIAL ENGINE FAILURE" comes into alarm for #2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
- IAO has been dispatched and reports local alarm is "SERVICE WATER PRESSURE LO"
- IAO reports Scavenging Air Temperature is 160°F and rising
- ATC reports both lights above the #2 EDG Service Water supply, 2CV-1504-2, are out At the end of SPTAs, 2A4 Vital bus __________ be energized and the CRS would enter ______________________________
A. would; OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP B. would not; OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP C. would; OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage AOP in conjunction with OP-2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power EOP D. would not; OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage AOP in conjunction with OP-2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power EOP Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
With both lights above the #2 EDG Service Water supply, 2CV-1504-2, out coupled with Scavenging Air Temperature is 160°F and rising and low Service Water pressure, indicates the EDG cooling water supply valve has failed to fully open (2CV-1504-2 is a MOV and fails AS-IS). #2 EDG would be secured during SPTAs due to indications of no service water available.
The Excess RCS Leakage AOP entry conditions are meet prior to the plant trip but it is not design to handle a Loss of Offsite Power. Per the EOP/AOP User guide, if in the Excess RCS Leakage AOP with a LOOP, then go to the LOCA EOP.
References:
OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP, Rev 014, step 4.G page 5 of 19 EOP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions Tech Guide, Rev 012, step 4.G page 11 of 42 OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide, Rev 011, section 5.1.2, page 14 of 73 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 113
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 STM 2-42, Service Water & Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems, Rev 36, section 3.5.8 page 35 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Rev. 1: NRC editorial comments. Deleted information from notes section. Aded STM 2-42 to references. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 114
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 Bank: 2014 Rev: 2 Rev Date: 1/31/2014 8:12:56 QID #: 90 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 064000A201 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45. Safety Function 6 System
Title:
Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System System Number 064 K/A A2.01 Tier: 2 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.1 SRO Imp: 3.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 2&11
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Failure modes of water, oil, and air valves Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- A 3 gpm RCS leak has been detected
- A Loss of Offsite Power now occurs
- SPTAs have been entered
- Annunciator 2K09 D-1 "POTENTIAL ENGINE FAILURE" comes into alarm for #2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
- IAO has been dispatched and reports local alarm is "SERVICE WATER PRESSURE LO"
- IAO reports Scavenging Air Temperature is 160°F and rising
- ATC reports both lights above the #2 EDG Service Water supply, 2CV-1504-2, are out The CRS would direct securing #2 EDG due to the Service Water supply _______________. The CRS would diagnose entry into __________________.
A. MOV failing AS-IS; OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP B. AOV failing CLOSED; OP-2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident EOP C. MOV failing AS-IS; OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage AOP in conjunction with OP-2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power EOP D. AOV failing CLOSED; OP-2203.016, Excess RCS Leakage AOP in conjunction with OP-2202.007, Loss of Offsite Power EOP Answer:
A. Correct Notes:
With both lights above the #2 EDG Service Water supply, 2CV-1504-2, out coupled with Scavenging Air Temperature is 160°F and rising and low Service Water pressure, indicates the EDG cooling water supply valve has failed to fully open (2CV-1504-2 is a MOV and fails AS-IS). #2 EDG would be secured during SPTAs due to indications of no service water available.
The Excess RCS Leakage AOP entry conditions are meet prior to the plant trip but it is not design to handle a Loss of Offsite Power. Per the EOP/AOP User guide, if in the Excess RCS Leakage AOP with a LOOP, then go to the LOCA EOP.
References:
OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions EOP, Rev 014, step 4.G page 5 of 19 EOP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions Tech Guide, Rev 012, step 4.G page 11 of 42 OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide, Rev 011, section 5.1.2, page 14 of 73 Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 113
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 31-Jan-14 STM 2-42, Service Water & Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems, Rev 36, section 3.5.8 page 35 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Rev. 1: NRC editorial comments. Deleted information from notes section. Aded STM 2-42 to references. (mwf 1/30/14)
Rev. 2: Incorporated NRC comments based on phone conversation. Changed first half of question and changed distractors.
(mwf 1/31/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 114
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2015 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 1:29:23 QID #: 91 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 4 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 001000A218 10CFR55: 43.6 Safety Function 1 System
Title:
Control Rod Drive System System Number 001 K/A A2.18 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 3.2 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CEDM OBJ 14&15
Description:
Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CRDS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: - Incorrect rod stepping sequence Question:
[REFERENCE PROVIDED]
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 2 with a Reactor startup in progress
- "A" and "B" Shutdown Banks are fully withdrawn
- CEA Reg Groups are being withdrawn in Manual Sequential mode While the ATC is withdrawing CEAs by holding the Shim switch in "WITHDRAW" position he notes:
- Reg Groups 1 and 2 have reached the fully withdrawn position
- Reg Group 3 is at 102" and withdrawing
- Reg Group 4 is at 10" and withdrawing
- Reg Group 5 is at 10" and withdrawing
- Annunciator 2K10 E-1 "REG GROUP OUT OF SEQUENCE" comes into alarm
- Reactor is subcritical Control Element Assembly (CEA) motion would be stopped _____________ and based on OP-2203.012J, 2K10 E-1 ACA, the CRS would direct inserting Regulating Group 5 CEAs in manual __________________ mode to clear the alarm.
A. automatically; sequential B. manually; sequential C. automatically; group D. manually; group Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
C. Correct: CEAs are monitored for proper overlap during rod withdrawal. If proper overlap is not maintained, the alarm [Reg Group Out of Sequence] would alert the operations staff and CEA motion is automatically stopped [system interlock when withdrawing CEAs in Manual Sequential Mode] The CRS would use ACA guidance to recommence CEA motion in either manual group or manual individual mode.
A. Incorrect: CEA motion is stopped automatically but manual sequential is only used for CEA withdrawal Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 115
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 not insertion.
B. Incorrect: CEA motion is stopped automatically not manually. Manual sequential mode is only used for CEA withdrawal not insertion.
D. Incorrect: CEA motion is stopped automatically not manually.
References:
OP-2203.012J, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K10 window E-1 Rev 039, pages 9 and 10 of 84 [PROVIDED to STUDENT]
STM 2-02, Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System, Rev 21, section 4.2.1.4 page 27 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Updated based on NRC comments. Changed 10CFR55 reference to 43.6. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 116
Question 91_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is in Mode 2 with a Reactor startup in progress
- A and B Shutdown Banks are fully withdrawn
- CEA Reg Groups are being withdrawn in Manual Sequential mode While the ATC is withdrawing CEAs by holding the Shim switch in WITHDRAW position he notes:
- Reg Groups 1 and 2 have reached the fully withdrawn position
- Reg Group 3 is at 102 and withdrawing
- Reg Group 4 is at 10 and withdrawing
- Reg Group 5 is at 10 and withdrawing
- Annunciator 2K10 E-1 REG GROUP OUT OF SEQUENCE comes into alarm
- Reactor is subcritical CEA motion would be stopped automatically and the CRS would use procedure ___________
which initially directs the operators to ___________.
A. OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions AOP; insert Reg Group 5 CEAs in Manual Group to clear the alarm B. OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunctions AOP; ensure rod motion has stopped and notify I&C to perform troubleshooting on CEA Reg Group 5 C. OP-2105.009, CEDM Control System Operation; insert Reg Group 5 CEAs in Manual Group to clear the alarm D. OP-2105.009, CEDM Control System Operation; ensure rod motion has stopped and notify I&C to perform troubleshooting on CEA Reg Group 5 Answer: C Comments: Previous comment was that the question did not ask an SRO level of knowledge, so the proposed revision above changes the stem and answers to make the applicant choose the procedure that would be used to make the question SRO level. Per alarm response procedure OP-2203.012J, if the alarm is in due to improper reg group overlap, the direction is to reposition the group to clear the alarm using OP-2105.009, making answer C correct. The use of the CEA Malfunction AOP as a response to this event is plausible because of the groups getting out of sequence. However, this is not listed as an entry condition to the AOP, therefore
distractor A and B are plausible but incorrect. Notifying I&C to perform troubleshooting is listed as a step in the AOP, making distractors B and D plausible but incorrect. Troubleshooting would likely be performed due to the sequence problem, but it is not listed in the procedure, and would be performed after the operators insert Reg Group 5 to clear the alarm.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2016 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 1:27:33 QID #: 92 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 0160002107 10CFR55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45 Safety Function 7 System
Title:
Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS) System Number 016 K/A 2.1.7 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 4.4 SRO Imp: 4.7 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-CVCS OBJ 4&8
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit-2 is operating at 100% power
- Annunciator 2K12 G-5 "VCT 2T4 LEVEL LO LO" comes into alarm
- 2LIS-4857, VCT level on 2C09 reads 68%
- 2LR-4857, VCT chart recorder on 2C09 reads 68% and steady
- It has been determined 2LT-4861 has failed low
- RCS Tave 578°F and trending down
- Pressurizer level is 59% and trending down slowly The Control Room staff would determine there is a ______________________ event in progress and the CRS would initiate actions referencing ____________________________________ .
A. dilution; EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations B. boration; EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations C. dilution; EN-OP-111, Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) Process D. boration; EN-OP-111, Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) Process Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
Due to the false low VCT level signal, CV-4873-1, VCT outlet, would automatically close and 2CV-4950-2, CCP suction source from the RWT would automatically open aligning an Emergency Boration flowpath to the RCS. Once aligned, reactor temperature will trend down, reactor power will maintain somewhat constant due to steam demand not changing (MTG is controlled in manual). The CRS should recognize this and secure CCPs (or take manual control of the VCT and RWT valves and realign CCP suction to the VCT) referencing EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Section 5.4, Manual Control of Automatic Systems.
A. Incorrect. Based on the above note, there is a boration in progress, not a dilution.
B. Correct. Based on the above note, there is a boration in progress and the CRS would use the guidance in EN-OP-115 to manual control of the failed automatic system and restore the proper suction source to the Charging Pumps.
C. Incorrect. Based on the above note, there is a boration in progress, not a dilution.
D. Incorrect. There is a boration in progress, but EN-OP-111 does not contain the guidance to take manual control of an automatic system that is malfunctioning. Plausible because the operators will use the guidance in EN-OP-111 to create an ODMI for this malfunction, but that will be performed at a later time.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 117
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14
References:
OP-2203.012L, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K12 window G-5, Rev 044, page 58 of 116 STM 2-04, Chemical and Volume Control system, Rev 29, section 2.1.21.1 page 19 and simplified drawing page 63 EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 014, Section 5.4, page 23 of 89 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Rev. 1: NRC editorial comments. Changed Difficulty from 3 to 2. Changed distractors based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 118
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2017 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 12:26:4 QID #: 93 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 034000K401 10CFR55: 43.2 Safety Function 8 System
Title:
Fuel Handling Equipment System (FHES) System Number 034 K/A K4.01 Tier: 2 Group: 2 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Imp: 3.4 L. Plan: A2LP-SRO-TS OBJ 5
Description:
Knowledge of Fuel Handling System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: -
Fuel protection from binding and dropping Question:
Tech Spec 3.9.6, Refueling Machine Operability requires Refueling Machine (Main Bridge) to have a minimum lifting capacity of ______________ and have overload cut offs.
Per Tech Spec 3.9.6, the bases for these requirements is to ensure that the machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly, and the overloads ensure that _________________ is(are) protected from excessive forces.
A. 2000; core internals B. 3750; core internals C. 2000; refueling machine D. 3750; refueling machine Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
B. Correct: T.S. 3.9.6 limit and bases require the Refueling Machine to have a minimum lifting capacity of 3750 pounds and the overloads protect the core internals from excessive lifting forces.
A. Incorrect: 2000 pounds is T.S. 3.9.7, Crane Travel-Spent Fuel Pool Building, limit for loads carried over irradiated fuel in the SFP C. Incorrect: 2000 pounds is T.S. 3.9.7, Crane Travel-Spent Fuel Pool Building, limit for loads carried over irradiated fuel in the SFP D. Incorrect: 3750 pounds is the correct max weight per T.S. 3.9.6 but the limit is not based on protecting the refueling machine. T.S. bases states max limit is designed to protect the core internals.
References:
T.S 3.9.6, Refueling Machine and bases STM 2-51-1, Main Refueling Bridge & Reactor Bldg. Fuel Handling Equip., Rev 11, section 1.1 pages 1 and 2, section 2.2.6 pages 18 and 19 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Replaced with SRO only question based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 119
Question 93_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.6, Refueling Machine Operability requires the Refueling Machine (Main Bridge) to have a MINIMUM lifting capacity of __________ pounds and have overload cut offs.
Per TS 3.9.6, the bases for these requirements is to ensure that the machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel assembly, and the overloads ensure that the __________ is (are) protected from excessive forces.
A. 2000; core internals B. 3750; core internals C. 2000; refueling machine D. 3750; refueling machine Comments: Capitalized minimum for emphasis. Added units in the first sentence. Added minor editorial changes for clarity.
Comments - 2/18/2014 Q93 - file contains 2 Rev 0s, both with the same Rev Date: (10/22/2013). The question is clearly different on each rev. The one worksheet with Rev 0 written on top of the worksheet was the version that was submitted with the Draft Exam. That would make one of the Rev 0s actually Rev 1, and then Rev 1 would be Rev 2. In addition, we have comments we sent on Rev 1 (which is probably actually Rev 2).
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2018 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 11:17:5 QID #: 94 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012139 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.39 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.6 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: ASLP-SRO-OC OBJ 3
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of conservative decision making practices.
Question:
In accordance with EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operation, which of the following would be considered a NON-conservative decision making practice?
A. Reducing reactor power after a loss of the plant computer B. Re-energizing a Vital switchgear during an EOP after a potential fire on the bus C. An implementation plan being changed due to degrading trends D. Validating available information prior to taking any time critical actions Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
Based on EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operation, section 5.3 which describes the thought process utilized for making conservative decisions. Re-energizing a deranged electrical bus, even during implementation of an EOP, would not be a prudent action without having the bus inspected first.
References:
EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operation, Rev 014, section 5.3 page 22 of 89 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: corrected editorial NRC comments. This is an SRO topic that is taught in ASLP-SRO-OC. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 120
Question 94_R1 (NRC recommendations)
Revised Question:
In accordance with EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operation, which of the following would be considered a NON-conservative decision making practice?
A. Reducing Reactor power after a loss of the plant computer B. Validating available information prior to taking any time critical actions C. Re-energizing a vital switchgear during an EOP after a potential fire on the bus D. Consulting an off-shift system engineer before taking action in response to an unexpected system response Comments: Need to edit Rev 1 distractor C (now distractor D) to make it more plausible.
(Above is a possible replacement distractor)
Re-order distractors from shortest to longest, make two minor edits.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2019 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 11:27:5 QID #: 95 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NRC Bank QID #1711 Search 1940012101 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.1.1 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.2 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ARCSA OBJ 5
Description:
Conduct of Operations - Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.
Question:
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- A Loss of Stator Water Cooling has occurred
- Main Turbine Generator (MTG) runback is in progress The CRS would perform the Reactivity Brief as directed by _____________________________ and the brief
__________________________ commencement of boration or CEA insertion.
A. COPD-030, ANO Reactivity Management Program; must be performed prior to B. COPD-030, ANO Reactivity Management Program; can be performed after C. COPD-032, Transient Conduct of Operations; must be performed prior to D. COPD-032, Transient Conduct of Operations; can be performed after Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
COPD-032 contains guidance for briefs requirements during transients [section 20.0, step 20.3 page 28 of 41]. COPD-030, ANO Reactivity Management Program, Section 5.0, Step 5.5 statest that the required controls for planned reactivity evolutions are not applicable during AOP conditions.
References:
COPD-032, Transient Conduct of Operations, Rev 003 section 6.0 page 10 of 41 and 20.0 page 28 of 41 COPD-030, ANO Reactivity Management Program, Rev. 006, Section 5.0, Step 5.5 Historical Comments:
NRC Bank QID #1711 not used on a NRC Exam Rev. 1: Added COPD-030 as a reference. Added clarifying info in the notes. Clarified stem and distractors to ensure only one answer correct per NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 121
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2020 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 11:38:1 QID #: 96 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012214 10CFR55: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.14 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.9 SRO Imp: 4.3 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-ESPTA OBJ 3
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.
Question:
During an off-normal event (AOP or EOP entered), plant configuration control ____________ required to be maintained by use of the normal eSOMS program. A review of the AOP or EOP is required to be performed ____________ exiting the AOP or EOP to ensure correct plant configuration.
A. is; prior to B. is; after C. is not; prior to D. is not, after Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
A. Incorrect. OP-1015.021 step 9.1.6 on page 47 of 73 states that it is not required to maintain configuration with the normal configuration control means.
B. Incorrect. OP-1015.021 step 9.1.6 on page 47 of 73 states that it is not required to maintain configuration with the normal configuration control means.
C. Correct. OP-1015.021 step 9.1.6 on page 47 of 73 states that it is not required to maintain configuration with the normal configuration control means. COPD-032, step 12.1 on page 22 of 41 states that prior to exiting, configuration control will be re-established.
D. Incorrect. OP-1015.021 step 9.1.6 on page 47 of 73 states that it is not required to maintain configuration with the normal configuration control means. COPD-032, step 12.1 on page 22 of 41 states that prior to exiting, configuration control will be re-established.
References:
OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide, Rev. 011, Step 9.1.6, page 47 of 73 COPD-032, Transient Conduct of Operations, Rev. 003, Step 12.1, page 22 of 41 Historical Comments:
ANO Bank QID #ANO-OPS2-11280 Rev. 1: reworded stem and distractors to make all plausible.
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 122
NRC recommendation to Q96_R1 Question: 96 During an off-normal event involving the use of AOP(s) and/or EOP(s), plant configuration control is not required to be maintained by use of the normal eSOMS program. However, according to OP-1015.021, ANO-2 AOP/EOP User Guide, a review of the AOP(s) and/or EOP(s) is required to be performed ____________ exiting the AOP(s) and/or EOP(s) to ensure correct plant configuration.
A. prior to B. immediately after C. within one shift of D. within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of Answer:
A. Correct
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2021 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 1:30:07 QID #: 97 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 3 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012217 10CFR55: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 45 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.2.17 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 2.6 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-MNTC OBJ 13
Description:
Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator.
Question:
[REFERENCE PROVIDED]
Consider the following:
- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power
- 2P-35A, "A" Spray pump, is OOS for maintenance
- Annunciator 2K04 K-2 "ESF PROCESS SYSTEM INOP" is in alarm
- The lights are OUT for 2CV-1510-2, Service Water to Containment Fan Coolers 2VSF-1C/D
- IAO reports 2B63-E5, 480 VAC vital breaker for 2CV-1510-2, Service Water inlet to Containment Coolers is tripped
- The EOOS computer program has been taken out of service by the Safety Analysis Group Which of the following Risk Categories would apply to these conditions?
A. Green; Minimal Risk B. Yellow; Acceptable Risk C. Orange; High Risk D. Red; Unacceptably High Risk Answer:
C. Correct Notes:
COPD-024 Attachment 2 Table 7 on page 33 of 101 designates this configuration (1 containment spray train and one containment cooling train) as a ORANGE risk level.
References:
COPD 24, Risk Assessment Guidelines, Rev. 048, Attachment 2, Table 7 page 33 of 101 COPD 24, Risk Assessment Guidelines, Rev. 048, Section 9.2, page 19 of 101 OP-2203.012D, Annunciator Corrective Actions, 2K04 window K-2, Rev 036, page 23 of 94 Provide COPD 24 Attachment 2 [PROVIDED to STUDENT]
Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: clarified notes and references based on NRC comments. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 123
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2022 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 12:42:2 QID #: 98 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: F Source: NEW Search 1940012314 10CFR55: 43.4 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.3.14 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.4 SRO Imp: 3.8 L. Plan: ASLP-RO-EPLAN OBJ 4
Description:
Radiological Controls - Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
Question:
The following plant conditions exist:
- A Site Area Emergency has been declared
- You are the Shift Manager and still have Emergency Direction and Control
- The TSC and EOF is still in the activation process
- You have waived Federal 10CFR20 TEDE dose limit for a plant worker and directed him to perform an emergency repair to a valuable piece of plant equipment Which of the following is the maximum emergency TEDE dose you can authorize the plant worker to receive in accordance with OP-1903.033, Protective Action Guidelines for Rescue/Repair and Damage Control Teams, if he is directed to perform this emergency repair?
A. 5 Rem B. 10 Rem C. 25 Rem D. 50 Rem Answer:
B. Correct Notes:
Per OP-1903.033, Protective Action Guidelines for Rescue/Repair and Damage Control Teams, the limit to perform an emergency repair to a valuable piece of plant equipment is 10 Rem.
References:
OP-1903.033, Protective Action Guidelines for Rescue/Repair and Damage Control Teams, Rev. 023, section 6.0, page 5 of 15 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: replaced question due to overlap with A8 administrative JPM. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 124
NRC recommendation for Q98_R1 Question: 98
________ radiation from Kr-85 gas is a significant hazard in an accident involving spent fuel.
A. Alpha B. Beta C. Gamma D. Neutron Answer:
B. Correct
Reference:
Procedure 1905.001, Emergency Radiological Controls, Rev 19, Page 5, Step 6.1.6 KA - Radiological Controls - Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 Bank: 2023 Rev: 1 Rev Date: 1/30/2014 12:31:4 QID #: 99 Author: foster Lic Level: S Difficulty: 2 Taxonomy: H Source: NEW Search 1940012414 10CFR55: 41.10 / 45.13 Safety Function System
Title:
Generic System Number GENERIC K/A 2.4.14 Tier: 3 Group: 1 RO Imp: 3.8 SRO Imp: 4.5 L. Plan: A2LP-RO-EFRP OBJ 3
Description:
Emergency Procedures/Plan - Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP usage.
Question:
Consider the following:
- An event has occurred on Unit 2
- OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP, entry section has been completed with the following status:
- Reactivity - SATISFIED
- Maintenance of Vital Aux (DC) - SATISFIED
- Maintenance of Vital Aux (AC) - SATISFIED
- RCS Inventory Control - CHALLENGED
- RCS Pressure Control - CHALLENGED
- RCS/Core Heat Removal - SATISFIED
- Containment Isolation - JEOPARDIZED
- Containment Temp/Press Control - JEOPARDIZED Which list is the correct order the CRS would address each safety function?
A. Reactivity, Maintenance of Vital Aux (DC), Maintenance of Vital Aux (AC), RCS/Core Heat Removal, RCS Inventory Control, RCS Pressure Control, Containment Isolation, Containment Temp/Press Control B. RCS Inventory Control, RCS Pressure Control, Containment Isolation, Containment Temp/Press Control, Reactivity, Maintenance of Vital Aux (DC), Maintenance of Vital Aux (AC), RCS/Core Heat Removal C. Reactivity, Maintenance of Vital Aux (DC), Maintenance of Vital Aux (AC), RCS/Core Heat Removal, Containment Isolation, Containment Temp/Press Control, RCS Inventory Control, RCS Pressure Control D. Containment Isolation, Containment Temp/Press Control, RCS Inventory Control, RCS Pressure Control, Reactivity, Maintenance of Vital Aux (DC), Maintenance of Vital Aux (AC), RCS/Core Heat Removal Answer:
D. Correct Notes:
After completing the entry section, the Functional Recovery procedure will prioritize safety functions in an order of most endangered (jeopardized) With the above conditions the student should determine: Reactivity is SAT; Maintenance of Vital Aux (DC) SAT; Maintenance of Vital Aux (AC) SAT; RCS Inventory Control CHALLENGED; RCS Pressure Control CHALLENGED; RCS/Core Heat Removal SAT; Containment Isolation JEPORIDIZED; Containment Temp/Press Control Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 125
Data for 2014 NRC RO/SRO Exam 30-Jan-14 JEPORIDIZED.
References:
OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery, Rev 015, entry section step 13.C., page 15 of 43 OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery, Rev 015, Success Path Tracking Page, page 28 of 28 EOP-2202.009, Functional Recovery Tech Guide, Rev 014, step 13.C., page 20 of 372 OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide, Rev 011, section 5.7, pages 20 and 21 of 73 OP-1015.021, ANO-2 EOP/AOP User Guide, Rev 011, Attachment A, page 50 of 73 Historical Comments:
Rev. 1: Rejected K/A 2.4.23 and replaced with K/A 2.4.14. (mwf 1/30/14)
Form ES-401-5 Written Exam Question Worksheet 126
Response Comments for Draft Exam 2 February 17, 2014 comments SRO Exam
- 1. Q77 - question is no longer a MODIFIED, it is NEW. Update and submit Rev 2 with explanation added for Rev 2. Changed to NEW question and changed to Rev 2.
- 2. Q78 - there are two copies of Rev 1, and they have different Notes and different Rev Dates. Change the Rev 1 dated 1/30/2014 to Rev 2 and add a description of Rev 2 to the Historical Comments. Changed the Rev. 1 dated 1/30/14 to Rev 2 and updated historical comments.
- 3. Q81 - For B change circuit to circuits. This was identified but missed. Changed circuits to circuit and changed to Rev 3.
- 4. Q84 - need to verify the Revision numbers. There are two Rev 1s with different answers. (Pages 2 and 3 of 10). How is it possible to have 2 different sets of answers yet the Rev Date blocks are identical? Deleted one of the Rev 1s.
- 5. Q85 - There are two Rev 1s with different Rev Dates. Is Rev 1 dated 1/30/2014 actually Rev 2? If so, update and add comment in the Historical Comments. Updated to Rev 2 and added historical comments.
- 6. Q93 - we sent Recommendations to Rev 1: no Rev 2 was returned. Deleted Rev. 1 dated 10/22/13. Created new Rev. 2 incorporating NRC comments.
Notes:
- 1. On several questions, the second page of the latest revision of worksheet is out of place
- its been the last page of the file. Caused by the way the pdf documents were merged together. Are in the correct order in our book and will be in next electronic transmission.
- 2. Have your team start looking at the RO questions, starting with Q1, and check all files for proper revision numbers (so we can track the pedigree of each question) and check that the worksheet pages are in the proper order (first page or two of the file should be the worksheet for the latest rev of the question, and then previous rev(s) worksheets. RO questions 1-50 are completed and are starting on 50-75.
- 3. Files should be in chronological order - for example: If the K/A was changed for Rev 0 question, then file should be Rev 1 (new question), Rev 1 reference material, then Rev 0 question, then Rev 0 reference material. As we are completing step 2 above, we are copying the reference material and putting it with each rev in chronological order.
- 4. Make sure we accurately identify all questions that were used on last 2 NRC exams, and all questions with Reference Provided. We have went back and identified all questions that were on the past 2 NRC exams and all questions with Reference Provided.
February 18, 2014 SRO Exam (continued)
- 1. Q88 - file is missing Rev 0 worksheet. We have the Rev 0 worksheet ready to scan when next electronic document is sent.
- 2. Q89 - file has 2 Rev 1s, dated 1/22 and 1/30. At first glance, I dont see any differences between the two worksheets. Either ensure they are the same and delete one of them (and then change Rev 3 to Rev 2) or find out if they are different, then change one of them to Rev 2 (with a comment as to what was changed in Historical Comments). Also, the second page of the Rev 3 worksheet was the last page of the file. Deleted Rev 1 dated 1/22. Will correct order of scanned documents when next electronic doc is sent.
- 3. Q90 - second page of Rev 2 worksheet was the last page of the file. Will correct the order of scanned docs when next electronic doc is sent.
- 4. Q91 - confirm NO reference provided. File has 2 Rev 1s dated 1/22 and 1/30. The only difference I see is that the one dated 1/30 has a Rev 1 entry in the Historical Comments section. Either ensure they are the same and delete one of them (leave Rev 2 as Rev 2) or find out if they are different, then change one of them to Rev 2 (with a comment as to what was changed in Historical Comments) and then change Rev 2 to Rev 3. Also, the second page of the Rev 2 worksheet was the last page of the file. Deleted Rev 1 dated 1/22.
- 5. Q92 - second page of Rev 1 worksheet was the last page of the file. Will correct order of scanned docs when next electronic doc is sent.
- 6. Q93 - [file contains 2 Rev 0s, both with the same Rev Date: (10/22/2013). The question is clearly different on each rev. The one worksheet with Rev 0 written on top of the worksheet was the version that was submitted with the Draft Exam. That would make one of the Rev 0s actually Rev 1, and then Rev 1 would be Rev 2. In addition, we have comments we sent on Rev 1 (which is probably actually Rev 2).] - comments sent to Clay via email. Deleted Rev. 1 dated 10/22/13. Created new Rev. 2 incorporating NRC comments.
- 7. Q94 - (Rev 2 is a new question based on a new K/A. Was this K/A discussed with NRC examiner? We had sent comments on Rev 1 to make the question acceptable - why was the K/A changed? Also, the notes for Rev 2 in the Historical Comments section doesnt identify that a new K/A was selected. Was this new K/A added to the written exam outline and included on the ES-401-4, Record of Rejected K/As?) This question is Q95, not Q94. We need Rev 2 of Q94. Also, there are 2 Rev 1s in the file, dated 1/22 and 1/30. The one dated 1/30 has a note in Historical Comments and the other doesnt.
Questions 94 and 95 corrected in Exam bank. Kept Rev 1 dated 1/30.
- 8. Q96 - file has 2 Rev 2s, appear to be the same. File has 2 Rev 1s, dated 1/30 and 1/22, and questions are clearly different. Need to resolve revision status with remarks updated accordingly in the Historical Comments section. Deleted Rev 1 dated 1/22. This question was never submitted.
- 9. Q98 - file is missing Rev 1 and Rev 0. Will include all revs when next electronic doc is sent.
- 10. Q99 - page 2 of worksheet was the last page in the file. Correct order in book, will be in correct order when next electronic doc is sent.
- 11. Q100 - page 2 of worksheet was the last page in the file. Also, file is missing Rev 1 worksheet. Will include rev 1 in next electronic doc sent. Correct order in book, will be correct order when next electronic doc is sent.
- 12. Q83- Incorporated Rev 0 changes. No changes needed per Rev 1 comments from Larson and Hedger.
Question Technical Review RO Draft Written Exam 2 February 20, 2014
- 1. Q4
- a. Rev 0 was Unsat due to K/A mismatch. How does question address operational implication of natural circ? See R0 comments.
- 2. Q7
- a. Rev 0 identified question as Unsat since part 2 of all answers are unique. That is still true on Rev 3. What value is there in asking part 1 of the question?
- b. Why did you put on a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) back into all answers?
- 3. Q10
- a. First bullet in stem - refers to 80 gpm tube leak, then next bullet says SG Tube Rupture. Would it be more accurate to call the 80 gpm leak a rupture?
- 4. Q11
- a. In stem, the word Demand is misspelled (Deman).
- b. In stem, the step in 2202.005 is 14, not 12. I have Rev 14 of the EOP. It is step 12 in the ESD Tech Guide, which is Rev 13. Im guessing the EOPs and their Tech Guides are kept at the same revision so update question stem to step 14 and update References EOP-2202.005 Basis Document to Rev 14.
- c. Since the question is referencing a step in 2202.005, add 2202.005 to References.
- d. Also, since the step is in quotation marks, change to WHEN RCS TC less than 510°F, THEN reduce number of running RCPs as follows:
- e. Also, delete Emergency Operating Procedure after step 14 of
- f. Change Taxonomy from H to F. LOD is still 4.
- g. In Notes, should be greater than three
- 5. Q12
- a. How did validation go for this question? Im wondering what the value of the 2nd part of the answer is since all answers are different for part 1.
- c. Also, change Pump to pump after Condensate.
- 6. Q14
- a. Recommend deleting ONE (1) in your database - no revision required.
- 7. Q15
- a. For A - should be status light (not lights)
- b. For B - should be status light (not lights)
- c. For C - should be status lights (not light)
February 21, 2014
- 1. Q17
- a. Since question was replaced, change Taxonomy to F, LOD = 3.
- 2. Q18
- a. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes D-B-C-A. In short, swap A and D. Correct answer stays the same.
- 3. Q19
- a. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes B-C-A-D. Correct answer becomes C instead of B
- 4. Q20
- a. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes A-D-B-C. Correct answer becomes D instead of B
- 5. Q21
- a. Im crying Uncle on this question. Im not convinced you cant write a question using the other K/A, but given the circumstances On this question, answers A and D are marginally plausible. Make sure ES-401-2 and 4 get updated.
- 6. Q22
- a. Historical Comments state Rev 1 is due to correcting formatting - I dont see any change. What changed?
- 7. Q24
- a. Editorial edits:
- Second bullet: Delete The, capitalize Room and Cooling Tower
- Stem: after at a MINIMUM, a(n) ________ vice just a
- b. Recommend adding additional Notes to your database - not required
- 8. Q25
- a. Rev 2 note says Changed distractors and notes. What changed in the distractors?
- b. Minor edit in stem - third bullet, delete The Revision not required.
- 9. Q26
- a. Since no revision was submitted based on Examiner comments, I conclude you feel R0 meets the intent of the K/A - yes?
- b. For C and D - what is a Pressurizer High Point vent valve? Do they exist?
What is the reference for them?
- c. What reference identifies the location of the ECCS vent valves being on Panel 2C09?
- d. Why is Panel 2C336-1 plausible?
- e. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes C-D-A-B. Correct answer becomes C instead of A
- f. Third bullet - delete first word The
- 10. Q27
- a. This is an SRO-only question (see p. 8 of Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions). Removing The CRS would diagnose from the stem doesnt change the knowledge required. Revised the question to keep the same bullets (except that the SG tube leak is a rupture at 75 gpm), but ask what procedure would be entered (the operational implication is that two events requires entry into the FRP which is RO level knowledge). LOD=2, but it is what it is. A: SGTR EOP, B: ESD EOP, C: LOCA, D: FRP.
- b. 2nd bullet - change 0.12 to 75; change leak to rupture
- c. 3rd bullet - lower case pressure, temperature and humidity
- d. 4th bullet - capitalize Monitors Rev 2 Question Technical Review RO Draft Written Exam 2 February 21, 2014
- 1. Q17
- a. Since question was replaced, change Taxonomy to F, LOD = 3.
- 2. Q18
- a. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes D-B-C-A. In short, swap A and D. Correct answer stays the same.
- 3. Q19
- a. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes B-C-A-D. Correct answer becomes C instead of B
- 4. Q20
- a. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes A-D-B-C. Correct answer becomes D instead of B
- 5. Q21
- a. Im crying Uncle on this question. Im not convinced you cant write a question using the other K/A, but given the circumstances On this question, answers A and D are marginally plausible. Make sure ES-401-2 and 4 get updated.
- 6. Q22
- a. Historical Comments state Rev 1 is due to correcting formatting - I dont see any change. What changed?
- 7. Q24
- a. Editorial edits:
- Second bullet: Delete The, capitalize Room and Cooling Tower
- Stem: after at a MINIMUM, a(n) ________ vice just a
- b. Recommend adding additional Notes to your database - not required
- 8. Q25
- a. Rev 2 note says Changed distractors and notes. What changed in the distractors?
- b. Minor edit in stem - third bullet, delete The Revision not required.
- 9. Q26
- a. Since no revision was submitted based on Examiner comments, I conclude you feel R0 meets the intent of the K/A - yes?
- b. For C and D - what is a Pressurizer High Point vent valve? Do they exist?
What is the reference for them?
- c. What reference identifies the location of the ECCS vent valves being on Panel 2C09?
- d. Why is Panel 2C336-1 plausible?
- e. Arrange answers shortest to longest: A-B-C-D becomes C-D-A-B. Correct answer becomes C instead of A
- f. Third bullet - delete first word The
Rev 2
- 10. Q27
- a. This is an SRO-only question (see p. 8 of Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions). Removing The CRS would diagnose from the stem doesnt change the knowledge required. Revised the question to keep the same bullets (except that the SG tube leak is a rupture at 75 gpm), but ask what procedure would be entered (the operational implication is that two events requires entry into the FRP which is RO level knowledge). LOD=2, but it is what it is. A: SGTR EOP, B: ESD EOP, C: LOCA, D: FRP.
- b. 2nd bullet - change 0.12 to 75; change leak to rupture
- c. 3rd bullet - lower case pressure, temperature and humidity
- d. 4th bullet - capitalize Monitors
Rev 3 Question Technical Review RO Draft Written Exam 2 February 21, 2014
- 1. Q28
- a. My notes show this question was identified as Unsat due to LOD=1. Even the Notes section states this is applying generic fundamentals (and the ref material is Generic Fundamentals training material), which isnt allowed on our exam. Do you have a Bank question for this K/A? If not, I suggest a question where a malfunction of RCPs causes flow imbalance between SGs.
- 2. Q29
- a. Changed LOD=3, recommend deleting The in third bullet. Revision not required.
- 3. Q30
- a. Notes say Rev 2 - corrected formatting of question. What changed?
- b. Recommend deleting The from fourth bullet in database. Rev not required.
- 4. Q32
- a. Rev 0 comment - how does this question meet both parts of K/A?
- c. Arrange answers from shortest to longest: A-B-C-D to B-D-C-A. Correct answer changes from A to B
- d. Delete The from third bullet
- e. In B and C, capitalize Containment Building
- f. In D, lower case pumps following Spray
- 5. Q33
- a. Rev 1 states based on NRC comments - I dont see that anything changed?
- b. Third bullet - lower case pressure
- c. Fourth bullet - lower case level
- d. Stem - add in accordance with OP-2103.007, Quench Tank and Reactor Drain Tank OPS after to the Quench Tank is from ____ and so make it the only correct answer. Explanation for A says its possible to go to Containment Sump but not procedurally driven so need to remove all possibilities for appeals.
- e. Stem -replace the word drained with vented to match procedure.
- f. Explanations for C and D dont address part 2 of the answer.
- 6. Q35
- a. Swap C and D so answers go from A-B-C-D to A-B-D-C. Correct answer remains the same - B
- b. Change LOD=3
- 7. Q36
- a. Historical Comments, Rev 2 states corrected formatting of question What changed?
- b. Recommend deleting The in second bullet, and capitalize Heater after Backup in stem, and change LOD=3 in your database - no revision required.
- 8. Q37
- a. Arrange answers from A-B-C-D to C-B-A-D. This changes correct answer from C to A
- 9. Q38
- a. Arrange answers from A-B-C-D to B-C-D-A. This changes correct answer from A to B
Rev 4 Question Technical Review RO Draft Written Exam 2 February 23, 2014
- 1. Q43
- a. Rev 2 - Notes say With no operator action, SG levels would continue to rise until the HLO setpoint of 82% level was reached. At that point, the HLO signal goes around the Master controller and straight to the individual component controllers Is this correct? The answer C says operator action IS required to prevent a HLO from occurring. If the HLO signal goes around the Master controller, why is operator action required? Also, OP-2106.007 says if the controller is in manual, HLO signals can NOT perform their function.
- b. Is the stem correct to say prevent a HLO from occurring or should it say minimize moisture carryover?
- 2. Q44
- a. Is it normal for 2P-75 to be running for the conditions given in the stem (startup completed, raising power, current power 5% and trending up)? If so, when is 2P-75 procedurally secured?
- b. A - Part 1 states the FCS will automatically raise 1B speed and SG levels will be maintained at setpoint, but part 2 says to place 1B in service how can part 1 be true if 1B isnt in service? Not plausible. Also, the Notes for A discuss 2P-75, not raising 1B speed. Why not use a 2x2 question format? Part 1 is either automatically maintain SG levels at setpoint OR require manual operator action to restore SG levels to setpoint. Part 2 is either place B Main Feedwater pump (2P-1B) in service OR attempt to restart A Main Feedwater pump (2P-1A).
(This is what the Examiner proposed to Revision 1.)
- 3. Q45
- a. Comment to Rev 1 wasnt addressed: What is significance of 15 minutes after trip? Is it a carryover from Rev 0? If left in the question, does it have the possibility of confusing the applicants?
- b. Comment to Rev 1 wasnt addressed: Why is 150 gpm plausible for A and C?
- 4. QQ47
- a. For you database - recommend putting bus at end of stem and remove from each answer, adding commas after bus in A and B (like C and D), and Notes should identify at least one major load for each distractor. Rev not required.
- b. Adding the voltage of the bus could be considered cueing (applicant could reduce incorrect choices by half just knowing RCPs are 6900 V). Revision not required.
- c. Not just related to this question, but why did you remove question numbers from the ES-401-2? How do you relate a K/A to a specific question?
- 5. Q48
- a. Changed LOD=3 and Taxonomy changed to H. No revision required.
- 6. Q49
- a. Comments were provided on Rev 1 - were they addressed? Comments:
The change did not address the concern.
The basis for the proposed correct answer says that the loss of 125 VDC control power prevents any remote manual operations. Based on Answer Cs wording,
Rev 4 local manual means must be available as the only option for operating the affected breakers.
When the wording of distracter B is reviewed, it says Breakers would be able to be operated remotely.. Is operating a breaker by local manual means, considered remotely? An applicant could argue if this is vague that operating the breaker by local manual means can be completed outside the Control Room, so it is remote. If there is a specific site definition for remotely that will ensure that distracter B is not correct, it needs to be documented in the question notes.
If there isnt a basis, the next best thing would be to modify distracter B to say Breakers would be able to be manually operated remotely,..
The goal is to have all the terms clear so that there is no room to argue that there are two correct answers.
- b. Answers are adequate, but more complicated than necessary for LOD=2 knowledge.
- c. If the question or format is changed, then swap C and D for shortest to longest. This will change right answer from C to D
- 7. Q50
- a. Comments on Rev 0 said Bank, not Mod Bank. Why still Mod Bank?
- 8. Q52
- a. Change Taxonomy from H to F. Rev not required.
- 9. Q53
- a. Update database: LOD=3, add the to stem be aligned to the Spent Fuel Revision not required.
- 10. Q55
- a. Add greater than to post-RAS flow per LOCA EOP, step 22.C. Should read and greater than _____ gpm post RAS.
- 11. Q56
- a. Arrange answers from A-B-C-D to B-C-A-D. This changes correct answer from B to C
- b. Change taxonomy from H to F.
- c. In stem, change the following sets of conditions
- 12. Q57
- a. Arrange answers from A-B-C-D to B-D-C-A. Correct answer remains C
- 13. Q58
- a. Change taxonomy from H to F.
- b. Prefer shortest to longest, not longest to shortest.
- c. Rev not required.
- 14. Q59
- a. Update your database: second bullet, annunciator alarm in all caps; third and fourth bullet, Level is level. No rev required.
- 15. Q60
- a. How does this question address either part of the K/A? Predicting the impacts (detonation - which is given in the stem) and no procedure is referenced in the stem or identified as a Reference.
- b. Notes section doesnt address why 90 minutes is plausible, other than 20 + 70 =
- 90. Why is 90 min important.
Rev 4
- 16. Q61
- a. Third part of all answers (supply/exhaust fan trips 10 seconds later) is not required as it offers no discriminatory value. 2 x 2 format.
- b. Change taxonomy to H
- c. Question is Bank, not Modified.
- 17. Q62
- a. In stem: Capitalize Monitors, and Control Room
- b. Arrange shortest to longest: A-B-C-D to C-D-A-B. Would change correct answer from B to D
- c. Rev not required.
- 18. Q63
- a. LOD = 3
- b. First bullet: Capitalize Condenser
- c. Second bullet: Capitalize Atmospheric Dump Valves
- d. Fourth bullet: delete The
- e. Rev not required
- 19. Q66
- a. K/A mismatch - How does knowing what symbol is used for Harsh Containment conditions equate to evaluating plant performance and making operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation?
- 20. Q67
- a. Ensure ES-401-3 and -4 get updated.
- 21. Q70
- a. LOD=3, rev not required.
- 22. Q71
- a. LOD=3
- b. Delete The from 2nd and 3rd bullets
- c. Based on last sentence of Notes section, is a PIF required?
- d. Revision not required.
- 23. Q72
- a. Could reword stem to eliminate all bullets, but not wrong as is. To prevent an inadvertent radiological release during implementation of OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP, the initial actions of
- b. Taxonomy is F, not H
- c. Delete The from 4th bullet
- d. Question is Modified Bank
- e. A - aligning Condensate flow to 2T-94B-DI
- g. C - securing Turbine Building Sump pumps to Unit 1 Oily Water Separator (seems more accurate to secure a Sump pump than to secure a Sump)
- h. D - isolating discharge flowpath from Unit 1 Oily Water Separator to Lake
- i. Recommend adding Notes to identify why distracters are plausible
- j. Rev not required unless C is changed by adding the word pump
- 24. Q73
- a. LOD=3
- b. Could delete first 3 bullets, but not wrong as is
- c. 3rd bullet: Hydrogen Peroxide
- d. 4th bullet: General area dose rate in A pump room
- e. 5th bullet: Delete The
- f. 6th bullet: Delete CRS has sent CBOT into Auxiliary Building to help WCO
- g. CBOT is knowledgeable about dose rates in A ESF pump room
- h. Stem: Delete The and lower case personnel
Question Technical Review SRO Draft Written Exam 2 Generic Question:
- 1. Why do most of the SRO-only questions have RO lesson plans identified? Are there SRO lesson plan numbers available?
- 1. Q76
- a. Will a 1% change in PZR level cause a change in Letdown? Concern is that the PZR level control system will automatically adjust to a lowering level so the info in the question stem would not be accurate. PZR level would not be 59% in 3 minutes if the level control system responds as designed.
- b. The value used for Volume vs Level for the PZR is not correct. Per the ref, it is 53.5 gal/%, not 55.3. This affects the leakrate calculation (29.1 gpm vs 29.7) but doesnt affect the correct answer since it is still within the capacity of available CCPs.
- c. The Notes section states SIAS would be actuated due to the RCS leakage - is this true? With two available CCPs (B & C) after the Reactor trip, how will pressure lower enough to initiate an SIAS with only a 29.1 gpm leak?
- d. Explanation for C is incorrect - the second half should state that is it plausible because the applicant may not recognize Excess Leakage plus LOOP is LOCA EOP.
- 2. Q:88
- a. Question on Rev 0 asked why just A spray pump since procedure says both.
Note on Rev 1 says Only the A Spray pump inadvertently starts in this scenario. B Spray pump is not running. How does the applicant know this?
- 3. Q:90
- 4. Q92
- a. Not having a procedure for this event could be an Appendix B violation. Make sure this gets submitted for evaluation after the exam is completed. Does ANO still think this question should be used on the written exam?
- 5. Q95
- a. Comment on Rev 0 stated COPD-030 could be correct and identified page 10, Section 4.5, 11th bullet. Rev 1 Notes says COPD-030 not correct but identified Section 5, Step 5.5. What about Section 4.5, 11th bullet since it specifically identifies transients? Could the applicant argue this bullet also makes Answer B as correct? Also, recommend adding the applicable AOP to the Notes section to directly relate given conditions in the stem do constitute entry into an AOP, thus making COPD-030, Step 5.5 more applicable.
- 6. Q98
- a. FYI - changed LOD to 4. Also, Notes dont appear to have been updated. No revision required but updates should be made to your database.
- 7. Q99
- a. FYI - changed LOD to 3. No revision required.
- 8. Q100
- a. Second bullet - Rev 0 identified Owners should be Owner but not corrected. If okay with ANO, no revision is required but you should correct in your database.