ML17305A385

Proposed Tech Specs,Including Page 3/4 1-2 Re Reactivity Control Sys Shutdown Margin,Supporting Cycle 3 Operation

ML17305A385
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/06/1989
From:	ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
Shared Package
ML17305A384	List: ML17305A383 ML17305A385
References
NUDOCS 8911150089
Download: ML17305A385 (58)

Text

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bio C4nges 4o fJ 'is ~~ye REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ReCe~e nce >nor SHUTDOWN MARGIN - K " ANY CEA WITHDRAWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 a.. .The SHUTDOWN,HARGIN.shal.l be greater .than or.,equal,to that shown in "Figure 3:1'-1A, and

b. For T ld less than or. equal to 500'F, KN 1 shall be less than 0.99.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3", 4", and 5" with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn.

ACTION:

a0 With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than that in Figure 3.1-1A, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN Is restored, and

'b;- ...Mith T..Td.less.thanker..equal to 500 F and KN greate~ than or equal 1

to 0.99, immediately vary CEA positions and/or initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 26 gpm to the reactor coolant system of a solution containing greater than or equal to 4000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required KN is restored.

1 SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2. 1 With any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to that in Figure 3. 1. 1A:

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after detection .of an inoperable CEA(s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the CEA(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable CEA is immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be'untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable CEA(s).

See Special Test Exceptions 3. 10. 1 and 3. 10.9.

89iii5QQ89 85'ii06 PDR ADOCK 05000529' P PDC PALO VERDE " UNIT 2 3/4 1-2 AMENDMENT NO. 13

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4 l00 200 300 400 500 600 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE <'F)

F1GURE 3.l- lA SHUTDOWN MARCIN VERSUS COLD LEG T MPERATUR:

PALO YK UNIT Z 3/4 1-2a ~c'HOPcHi NO

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'0 100 200 300 400 500 600 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE (oF)

FIGURE 3.1-1A SHUTDOWN MARGIN vs. COLD LEG TEMPERATURE PALO VERDE UNIT 2 3/4 i-2a

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Rege.ence O Jy REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREHENTS (Continued)

Mhen in HODE 1 or HODE 2 with k ff greater than or equal to 1.0, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that CEA group withdrawal is within the .Transient. Insertion. Limits .of. Specification 3. 1.3.6.

t C. Mhen in HODE 2 with k ff less than 1.0, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior te achieving reactor criticality by verifying that predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

d. Prior to initial operation above 5X RATED THERHAL POMER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3. 1. 3. 6.

e. Mhen in HODE 3, 4, or 5, at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of at least the following factors:

1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2. CEA position

3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature, Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

5. Xenon concentration, and

6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.2.2 Mhen in HODE 3, 4, or 5, with any full-length CEA fully or partially withdrawn, and T ld less than or equal to 500 F, KN 1 shall be determined to be less than 0.99 at. least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by consideration of at least the following factors.

1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,

2. CEA position,

3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature

4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation.

5. Xenon concentration, and

6. Samarium concentration.

4.1. 1.2.3 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1.0X delta k/k at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4. 1. l. 2.1. e or 4.1.1. 2. 2. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 1"3 AHENDHENT NO. 13

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N. Changes ta k4's p, BORON DILUTION ALARMS Rale~ence Only

>> LIHITIHG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.7 Both startup channe1 high neutron flux alarms shall be OPERABLE.

APPL'ICABIEITY MODES'"; '4;-5-;-and 6.

ACTION:

'Hith one startup channel higtt neutron flux alarm inoperable:

1. Determine the RCS boron concentration when entering MODE 3, 4, 5, or 6 or at the time the alarm is determined to be inoperable.

From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency in Tables 3.1-1 through 3.1-5 by either boronometer or RCS sampling"".

b. With both startup channel high neutron flux alarms inoperable:

1. Determine the RCS boron concentration by either boronmeter and RCS sampling"" or by independent collection and analysis of two RCS samples when entering Mode 3, 4, or 5 or at the time both alarms are determined to be inoperable. From that time, the RCS boron concentration shall be determined at the applicable monitoring frequency in Tables 3. l-l through 3. 1-5, as applicable, by either boronmeter and RCS sampling"" or by collection and analysis of two independent RCS samples. If redundant determina-tion of RCS boron concentration cannot b'e accomplished immediately, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIOHS or positive reactivity changes until the method for determining and confirming RCS boron concentration is restored.

2. When in MODE 5 with the RCS level below the centerline of the hotleg or MODE 6, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one.

startup channel high neutron flux alarm is restored to OPERABLE status.

C. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMEHTS

4. 1. 2. 7 Each star tup channel high neutron flux alarm shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

j "Within hour after the neutron flux is within the startup range following a reactor shutdown.

"arith one or more reactor coolant pumps (RCP) operating the sample should be obtained from the hot leg. With no RCP operating, the sample should be obtained from the discharge line of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump operating in the shutdown cooling mode.

PALO VERDE " UNIT 2 3/4 1"14

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a. A CHANNEL CHECK:

1. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

2. When initially setting setpoints at the following times:

a) One hour after a reactor trip.

b) After a controlled reactor shutdown: Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after the neutron flux is within the startup range in HODE 3.

b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST every 31 days of cumulative operation during shutdown.

PALO VERGE UNIT 2 3/4 1-15

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. TABLE .3. 1-2 REOUiRED MONITORING FREOUENCEES FOR BACKUP BORON DiLUTTON DETECTiON AS A FUNCTLON OF. OPERATiNG CHARGiNG PUMPS ANO PLANT OP RATiONAL MODES FOR 0.. 8 ) K 0 0.97 ff eff Ndmber o'f Ooeratino Charging Pumps OP ERATIONAL NODE 0 1 2 12'hours '~hours Z. 0

-'hour 0.g Ob'/

4 not on SCS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 5 not on SCS 8 hours 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 4 h 5 on SCS 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> OHA OHA Notes: SCS = Shutdown Cooling System OHA = Operation not allo~ed PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-17 AHEHDHEHT NO.

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g TABLE 3. 1-3 REQUIRED. MONITORING FREQUENCIES FOR BACKUP BORON DILUTION GETSl":TMN'-%5 A FUNCTION'F 'OPERATrNG CHARGiNG PUrlPS AND PLAN r OPERAI IONAL MODES FOR 0.07 > K > 0.96 m.f f Number'f Ooeratina "Charaina OPERATIONAL MODE 0,. .....1... 2 Pumos 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ~hour 0,5 4 not on SCS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 1 hour 5 no'n SCS 8 hours 3' hours 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> s 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 4 & 5 on SCS 8 hours 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ONA Notes: SCS = Shutdown Cooling System ONA = Operation not allowed PALO V-"-DE - U'GT 2 3/4 1-18 AM"NOl1ENT. HO. l 3

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TA8LE 3 1 REOUIREO-MONITORING FREQUENCIES FOR BACKUP BORON OILUTIOH OETECTION AS A FUNCTION OF OPERATING CHARGENG PUMPS.

ANO PLANT OPERATIONAL MQOES FOR K f>> ( 0. 5 OPERATIONAL Number of Ooeratina Charging Pumps MOOE 0 1 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 6 hours ours 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Qt 4 not on SCS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 6 hours 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 5 not on SCS 8 hours 6 hours 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 4 & 5 on SCS 8 hours 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 24 hours 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 2 hours Hote: SCS = Shutdown Cooling System PALO VEROE - UNIT 2 3/4 1-20 AM HOM~'4T 'eO l3

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3j'4':1 REACTIVITY-CONTROL SYSTEMS Re.fere c e C'n ly BASES 3f4..~ .~RATION"CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN and K The function of SHUTDOWN MARGIN is to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical following a design basis accident or anticipated operational occur-rence. The function of K is to maintain sufficient subcriticality to pr e-clude inadvertent criticallihy following ejection of a single control element assembly (CEA). During operation in MODES 1 and 2, with k greater than or equal to 1.0, the transient insertion limits of Specificat'fQ 3. 1.3.6 ensure that sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN is available.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN is the amount by which the core is subcritical, or would be sub'critical immediately following' reactor trip, considering a single malfunction 'resulting'in the highest worth CEA failing to inse~t. KN is a measure of the core's reactivity, considering a single malfunction reshlting in the highest worth inserted CEA being ejected.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout the core life as a func-tion of fuel depletion and reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature (T ). The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T at no-load opNMing temperature, and is associated with a postulated ste38 Pine break 1 accident and the resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis af this accident, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to control the reactivity transient and ensure that the fuel performance and offsite dose criteria are satisfied. As (initial) T decreases, the potential RCS cooldown and the resulting reactivity transit/3 are less severe and, therefore,,the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN also decreases. Below T of about 210'F, the inadvertent deboration event becomes limiting with rN)IIct to the SNUTOQNN MARGIN requi re-ments. Below 210'F, the specified SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that sufficient time for operator actions exi'sts between the initial indication of the deboration and the total loss of shutdown margin. Accordingly, with at least one CEA partially or fully withdrawn, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are based upon these limit-ing conditions' Additional events considered in establishing requirements on SHUTDOWN MARGIN that are not limiting with respect to the Specification limits are single CEA withdrawal and startup of an inactive reactor coolant pump.

K requirements vary with the amount of positive reactivity that would be in(reduced assuming the CEA with .the highest inserted worth ejects from the core. In the analysis of the CEA ejection event, the K requirement ensures that the radially averaged enthalpy acceptance criterion ik'satisfied, considering power redistribution effects. Above T cold of 500 F, Doppler reactivity feedback is sufficient to preclude the neeald for a specific KN requirement. With all CEAs fully inserted, KN and SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements are equivalent in terms of minimum acceptable cire boron concentration.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-1 AMENDMENT NO 13 csicc<,,'c, e i cT">r >" s"Av

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e.'j,an)es Vn p )p REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ~ ~ <v- e, H c e Dn ly BASES SHUTDOWN MARGIN and K (continued)

Other technical specifications that reference the Specifications on SHUTS.MRQIN.'.or .K " .are: -3/4; 1.2, BORATION SYSTEMS, 3/4. 1.3, MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES, 3/k.9.1, REFUELING OPERATIONS-BORON CONCENTRATION, 3/4.10. 1, SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND KH - CEA WORTH TESTS, and 3/4. 10.9, SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND KN

- CEDMS TESTING.

1 1

3/4. 1. 1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (MTC)

The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are pro-vided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and the transient analysis remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance requirements for measuremerit of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to'he reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurances that the coeffi-cient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

3/4. 1.1. 4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperature less than 552 F. This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range, and (3) consistency with the FSAR safety analysis.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 1-la AMENDMENT HO:

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3/4. 2. 4 DNBR MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.4 The DNBR margin shall be maintained by one of the following methods:

a. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service, and either one or both CEACs are operable); or

b. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR decreased by the allowance shown in Figure 3. 2-1 (when COLSS is in service and neither CEAC is operable); or Operating within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-2 using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and either one ot both CEACs are operable); or

.d Operating within the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2-2A using any operable CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is operable).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 above 20K of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With the ONBR not being maintained:

1. As indicated by COLSS calculated core power exceeding the appropriate COLSS calculated power operating limit; or

2. With COLSS out of service, operation outside the region of acceptable operation of Figure 3.2"2 or 3.2-2A, as applicable; within 15 minutes initiate corrective action to increase the DNBR to within the limits and either:

a. Restore the DNBR to within its limits within 1 hour, or

b. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to 20K of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.2.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.4.2 The DNBR shall be determined to be within its limits when THERMAL POWER is above 20K of RATED THERMAL POWER by continuously monitoring the core power distribution with the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or, with the COLSS out of service, by verifying at least once per 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that the DNBR, as indicated on any, OPERABLE DNBR channel, is within the limit shown on Figure 3.2-2 or Figure 3.2-2A.

4. 2. 4. 3 At least once per 31 days, the COLSS Margin Alarm shall be verified to actuate at a THERMAL POWER level less than or. equal to the core power operating limit based on DNBR.

" UNIT 3/4 2-5 AMENDMENT NO 19 PALO VERDE 2

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BASES Fa~ R'e,fevt.~ce u~Ly AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT - T (Continued)

Pt.lt/Punt lt is the ratio of the power at a core location in the presence of a tilt to the power at that location with no tilt.

The AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT allowance used in the CPCs is defined as the value of CPC addressable constant TR-1.0.

3/4. 2. 4 DNBR MARGIN The limitation on DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX represents a conservative envelope of operating conditions consistent with the safety analy-sis assumptions and which have been analytically demonstrated adequate to main-tain an acceptable minimum DNBR throughout all anticipated operational occur" rences. Operation of the core with a DNBR at or above this limit provides assurance that an acceptable minimum DNBR will be maintained in the event of a

.loss of flow transient.

Eithe'r of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the DNBR channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the. core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the DNBR does not violate its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core operating limit corresponding to the allowable minimum DNBR. The COLSS calculation of core power operating limit .

based on DNBR includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability/confidence level, that the core power limits calculated by COLSS (based on the minimum DNBR Limit) is conservative with respect to the actual core power limit. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertaintie's associated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering heat flux, state parameter measurement, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow, and core power measurement.

,Parameters required to maintain the margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the limits of Figures 3.2-2 and 3.2-2A can be maintained by uti'lizing a predetermined DNBR as a function of AXIAL SHAPE INDEX and by monitoring the CPC trip channels. The above listed uncertainty and penalty factors are also included in the CPCs which assume a minimum core power of ZOX of RATED THERMAL POWER. The 20K RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being less accurate below 20K core power.

Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings.

A DNBR penalty factor has been included in the COLSS and CPC DNBR calcula-to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each 'ions assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher average burnup will experience a greater magnitude of rod bow. Conversely, lower burnup assemblies will experience less rod bow. In design calculations, the penalty for each batch required to compensate for rod  !

bow is determined from a batch's maximum average assembly burnup applied to the batch's maximum integrated planar-radial power peak. A single net penalty for COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

PALO VERDE " UNIT 2 B 3/4 2-3 AMENDMENT HO. 19

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g es REGULATING CEA INSERTION LIMITS gegqye~cQ c7NLP LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 1.3.6 The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the withdrawal sequence, and to the insertion limitsSS shown on Figure 3. 1-3"" when the .COLSS is in service or shown on Figure 3. 1-4"~ when the COLSS is not in service. The CEA insertion between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Trans-ient Insertion Limits is restricted to:

Less than or equal to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval,

b. Less than or equal to 5 Effective Full Power Days per 30 Effective Full Power Day interval, and C. Less than or equal ta 14 Effective Full Power Days per 18 Effective Full Power Months.

APPLICABILITY: MODES l~ and 2"¹.

ACTTON:

With the regulating CEA groups inserted beyond the Transient Insertion Limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4. 1.3. 1.2, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> either:

1. Restore the regulating CEA groups to within the limits, or

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the CEA group position using Figures 3.1-3 or 3.1-4.

b. With the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> interval, operation may proceed provided either:

1. The Short Term Steady State Insertion Limits of Figure 3;1-3 or Figure 3. 1-4 are not exceeded, or

2. Any subsequent increase in THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 5X of RATED THERMAL POWER per hour.

"See Special Test Exceptions 3. 10.2 and 3. 10.4.

SMith K ff eff greater than or equal to 1.

""CEAs are fully withdrawn in accordance with Figure 3. 1-3 or Figure 3~ 1-4 when withdrawn to at least 144.75 inches.

¹¹A reactor power cutback will cause either (Case 1) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Group 4 and 5 to be dropped with no sequential insertion of additional Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) or (Case 2) Regulating Group 5 or Regulating Group 4 and 5 to be dropped with all or part of the remaining Regulating Groups (Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) being sequentially inserted. In either case, the Transient Insertion Limit and the withdrawal sequence of Figure 3. 1-3 or Figure 3. 1-4 can be exceeded for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

PALO VERDE - UNIT:.2 3/4 1-29

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RGLLED BY USE%'o C4Nqg5 +o +4>5 PcxQE ACTION: (Continued) R pZevewce O~ tg C. Mith the regulating CEA groups inserted between the Long Term Steady State Insertion L'imits and the Transient Insertion Limits for intervals greater than 5 EFPO per 30 EFPO interval or greater than 14 EFPO per 18 Effective Full Power Months, either:

'1. Restore the regulating groups to within the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or

2. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REOUI REMENTS

4. 1.3.6 The position of each:regulating CEA group shall be determined to be within the Transient Insertion Limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when the POIL Auctioneer Alarm Circuit is inoperable, then verify the individual CEA positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The accumulated times during which the regulating CEA groups are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limits but within the Transient Insertion Limits shall be determined at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

1 CGNTRGLLED BY uSER

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS Refe ence ~y BASES 3/4. 1. 3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable oower distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of CEA misalignments are limited to acceptable levels.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied bj additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met.

The ACTION statements applicable tq a stuck or untrippable CEA, to two or more inoperable CEAs, and to a large misalignment (greater than or equal to 19 inches) of two or more CEAs, require a prompt shutdown of the reactor since either of these conditions may be indicative of a possible loss of mechanical functional capability of the CEAs and in the event of a stuck or untrippable CEA, the loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

For small misalignments (less than 19 inches) of the CEAs, there is (1) a small effect on the time-dependent long-term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints, (2) a small effect on the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, and (3) a small effect on the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with small misalignments of CEAs permits a 1-hour time interval during which attempts may be made to restore the CEA to within its alignment requirements. The 1-hour time limit is sufficient to (1) identify causes of a misaligned CEA, (2) take appropriate corrective action to realign the CEAs, and (3) minimize the effects of xenon redistribution.

The CPCs provide protection to the core in the event of a large misalignment (greater than or equal to 19 in'ches) of a CEA by applying appropriate penalty factors to the calculation to account for. the misaligned CEA. However, this misalignment would cause distortion of the core power distribution. This distribution may, in turn, have a significant effect on (1) the available SHUTDOWN MARGIN, (2) the time-dependent long-term power distributions relative to those used in generating LCOs and LSSS setpoints, and (3) the ejected CEA worth used in the safety analysis. Therefore, the ACTION statement associated with the large misalignment of a CEA requires a prompt realignment of the misaligned CEA.

The ACTION statements applicable to misaligned or inoperable CEAs include requirements to align the OPERABLE CEAs in a given group with the inoperable CEA. Conformance with these alignment requirements bring the core, within a short period of time, to a configuration consistent with that assumed in generating LCO and LSSS setpoints. However, extended operation with CEAs significantly inserted in the core may lead to perturbations in (1) local burnup, (2) peaking factors, and (3) available SHUTDOWN MARGIN which are more adverse than the conditions assumed to exist in the safety analyses and LCO PALO VERDE," U

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 6'e fe~e~ce Dn ly BASES MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued) and LSSS setpoints determination. Therefore, time limits have been imposed on operation with inoperable CEAs to preclude such adverse conditions from developing.

Operability of at least two CEA position indicator channels is required to determine CEA positions and, thereby ensure compliance with the CEA alignment and insertion limits. The CEA "Full In" and "Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the CEAs are at either their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions. Therefore, the ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA position inoicators permit continued operations when the positions of CEAs with inoperable position indicators can be verified by the "Full In" or "Full Out" limi-.s.

CEA positions and OPERABILITY of the CEA position indicators are reouired to be verifiea on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more freauenz verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperaole.

These verification'requencies are adequate for assuring that tne apolicaole LCOs are satisfied.

The maximum CEA drop time restriction is consistent with -.he assumed CEA drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T cold. grea-er than or 1

equal to 552~F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures chai the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

Several design steps were employed to accommodate the possible CEA guide tube wear .which could arise from CEA vibrations when fully withdrawn.

Specifically, a programmed insertion schedule wi 11 be used to cycle the CEAs between the full out position (" FULL OUT" LIMIT) and 3.0 inches inserted over the fuel cycle. This cycling will distribute the possible guide tube wear over a larger area, thus minimizing any effects. To accommodate this programmed insertion schedule, the fully withdrawn position was redefined, in some cases, to be 144.75 inches or greater.

The establishment of LSSS and LCOs requires that the expected long- and short-term behavior of the radial peaking factors be determined. The long-term behavior relates to the variation of the steady-state radial peaking factors with core burnup and is affected by the amount of CEA insertion assumed, the portion of a burnup cycle over which such insertion is assumed and the expected power level variation throughout the cycle. The short-term behavior relates to transient perturbations to the steady-state radial peaks due to radial xenon redistribution. The magnitudes of such perturbations depend upon the expected use of the CEAs during anticipated power reductions PALO VERDE - U B 4 1

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C/TROLLED BY USER ~ 4 ~~>~ p+$ <

~p > REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS A/o Cka~ges ge(<~e~.~ O~pl BASES MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued and load maneuvering. Analyses are performed based on the expected mode of operation of the NSSS (base load maneuvering, etc.) and from these analyses CEA insertions are determined and a consistent set of radial peaking factors defined. The Long Term Steady State and Short Term Insertion Limits are deter mined based upon the assumed mode of operation used in the analyses and provide a means of preserving the assumptions on CEA insertions used. The limits speci-fied serve to limit the behavior of the radial peaking factors within the bounds determined from analysis. The actions specified serve to limit the extent of radial xenon redistribution effects to those accommodated in the analyses. The Long and Short Term Insertion Limits of Specifications 3. 1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 are specified for the plant which has been designed for primarily base loaded operation but which has the ability to accommodate a limited amount of load maneuvering.

The Transient Insertion Limits of Specifications 3.1.3.6 and 3.1.3.7 the Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits of Specification 3. 1. 3. 5 ensure that (1) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (2) the potential effects of a CEA ejection accident are limited to acceptable levels. Long-term operation at the Transient Insertion Limits is not permitted since such operation could have=

effects on the core power distribution which could invalidate assumptions used to determine the behavior of the radial peaking factors.

The PVNGS CPC and COLSS systems are responsible for the safety and monitoring functions, respectively, of the reactor core. COLSS monitors the ONB Power Operating Limit (POL} and various operating parameters to help the operator main-tain plant operation within the limitirtg conditions for operation (LCO). Operat-ing within the LCO guarantees that in the event of an Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO), the CPCs will provide a reactor trip in time to prevent un-acceptable fuel damage.

The COLSS reserves the Required Overpower Margin (ROPM) to account for the Loss of Flow (LOF) and CEA misoperation transients. When the COLSS is Out of Service (COOS), the monitoring function is performed via the CPC calculation of DNBR in conjunction with Technical Specification COOS Limit Lines (Figures 3.2-2 and 3.2-2A) which restricts the reactor power sufficiently to preserve the ROPM.

The reduction of the CEA deviation penalties in accordance with the CEAC (Control Element Assembly Calculator) sensitivity reduction program has been performed. This task involved setting many of the inward single CEA deviation penalty factors to 1.0. An inward CEA deviation event in effect would not be accompanied by the application of the CEA deviation penalty in either the CPC DNB and LHR (Linear Heat Rate} calculations for those CEAs with the reduced penalty factors. The protection for an inward CEA deviation event is thus accounted for separately.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-6 AMENDMENT NO. 19

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EINTROLLNED BY UsER REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

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Q ) lg BASES MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Continued)

If an inward CEA deviation event occurs, the current CPC algorithm applies two penalty factors to each of the DNB and LHR calculations. The first, a static penalty factor, is applied upon detection of the event. The second, a xenon redistribution penalty, is applied linearly as a function of time after the CEA drop. The expected margin degradation for the inward CEA deviation event for which the penalty factor has been reduced is accounted for in two ways.

The ROPM reserved in COLSS is used to account for some of the margin degrada-tion. Further, a power reduction in accordance with the curve in Figure 3. 1-2A is required. In addition, the part length CEA maneuvering is restricted in accordance with Figure 3. 1-5 to justify reduction of the PLR deviation penalty factors.

The technical specification permits plant operation if both .CEACs are considered inoperable for safety purposes after this period.

PALO VEROE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-7 AMENOMENT NO.

f NTROLLED BY USER POMER OISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/<. 2.7 AXIAL SHAPE INOEX LIMITING CQNOITION FOR QPERATIQN 3.2.7 The core average AXIAL SHAPE INOEX (ASI) shall be main-ained within the following limi s:

COL S QP WBL

-" "" < ASi

-D.z,g 0 27

b. COLSS OUT OF SERVICE (CPC)

-0.20 < ASI < + 0.20 APPLICABILITY: MOOE 1 above 20K of RATEO THERMAL POMER".

ACTION:

Mi h the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX outside its above limits, res ore the core average ASi to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce THERMAL POSER to less than 20~ of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIR""MENTS channel

~,

4.2.7 The core average AXiAL SHAPE INOEX shall be determined .o be within i s limit at lees- once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> using the COLSS or any OPERASLE Core Protec=ion Cal cul a.or, .

See Special Test Excep.ion 3.~0.2.

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PALO VEROE - UNiT 2 3/4 2-~1

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CNTROLLED BY USER POMER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS a Q~o ~)<> +~ +~'~ P P(p < T~ g~g ~ Zf) CrI< 0 W ly

('-:."., BASES 3/4.2.5 RCS FLOM RATE This specification is provided to ensure that the actual RCS total flow rate is maintained at or above the minimum value used in the safety analyses.

The minimum value used in the safety analyses is 95K of the design flow rate (164.0 x 10 ibm/hr) or 155.8 x 10 ibm/hr. The actual RCS flow rate is deter-mined by direct measurement and an uncertainty associated with that measurement is considered when comparing actual RCS flow rate to the minimum required value of 155. 8 x 106 ibm/hr.

3/4.2.6 REACTOR COOLANT COLD LEG TEMPERATURE This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of reactor coolant cold leg temperature is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

I 3/4. 2.7 AXIAL SHAPE'NDEX This specification is provided to ensure that, the actual value of the core average AXIAL SHAPE INDEX is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

3/4. 2. 8 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE This specification is provided to ensure that the actual value of pressurizer pressure is maintained within the range of values used in the safety analyses.

PALO VERDE - UNIT 2 8 3/4 2-4 AMENDMENT NO. 19

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