ML17331A943

LER 90-010-01:on 900824,discovered That Routing Cable Associated W/Unit 1 Low Shutdown Indication Panels Not in Compliance w/10CFR50,App R.Minor Plant Mod Initiated to Provide Encl (Wrapped) Around Subj conduit.W/930813 Ltr

ML17331A943
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	08/13/1993
From:	Blind A, Brewer S INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-010, LER-90-10, NUDOCS 9308200131
Download: ML17331A943 (8)

Text

ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REGULAT+INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO!YSTEM (RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:9308200131 DOC.DATE: 93/08/13 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET¹FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BREWER,S.J.

Indiana Michigan Power Co.BLINDFA.A.

Indiana Michigan Power Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 93-010-01:on 900824,routing of cable for Units 1 6 2 not in compliance w/10CFR50,App R.Initiat plant modifications for cable compliance.Rev corrects error in identified control room instrumentation during fire.W/930813 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA DEAN,W INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRIL/RPEB R~QS SPLB G FIL 02 RGN3 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE F J~H NRC PDR NSIC POOREFW~2 2 1 1 1 1 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACI'HE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.504-2065)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 30 ENCL 30 I'X Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant~One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 lNDIAMA NlCHletAN POWER August 13, 1993 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No.50-315 Document Control Manager: In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ort S stem the following report is being submitted:

90-010-01 Sincerely, A.A.Blind Plant Manager/sb Attachment c: J.B.Martin, Region III E.E.Fitzpatrick P.A.Barrett R.F.Kroeger W.E.Walters-Ft.Wayne NRC Resident Inspector B.A.Wetzel-NRC M.R.Padgett G.Charnoff, Esp.D.Hahn INPO S.J.Brewer B.A.Svensson;-OA i3~f'.9308200i3i 9308i3 PDR ADOCK 050003i5 8 PDR NRC FORM 366 (569)VS.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)APPROVED OMB NO.3)504)104 EXPIRES: 4I30I92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUESTt 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (Pc)30).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555.AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 131500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME lll D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PA E 3)o 5 o o o 31 510(-05" 10CFR50 Appendix R Deficiencies Resulting in Potential Loss of Local Shutdown Indication Panel Function EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER IS)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sl MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL r..epi NUMBER N'c>NUMSE R MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES D.C.Cook-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBERISI 0 5 0 0 0 316 0 8 249 09 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 1 3 9 3 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE IS)jth's xc NCi...Cv':

POWER LEVEL'1 p p y'v'0.402()t) 20A05(el(1 (0)20AOSle HI)(Q)20,405(sl(1) liiil 20.405 (4)(I)(lr)20.405(e l (1)(r)20.405(c)BOM(e)II!50M(e)(2)50.73(el(2) ll)50.73(sl(2)

Iiil 50.73ls)(2)liiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I 50.73(el l2)lie)50,'73(s)(2)(r)50.73(s)(2)lr)I)50.73(~)(2)(xiii)IA)50.73(e I (2)ls)ill (5)50.73(~I l2)I x)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE RLDUIREMENTB of 10 cFR (i: Icsrcc onr ot mtNr oi tnr fottowinpl Ill 73.71(o)73.71(cl OTHER ISpectiy in Apttrect Orlow end in Text, Hi)C Form 36SAJ NAME S.J.Brewer-Nuclear Safety, Licensing and Assessment, Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 61 422 3-2 02 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT l13)CAUSE SYSTFM COMPONENT MANUF AC.TVRER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TVRER EPORTABL TO NPRDS 5~8%SKI&SVPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES Iif yet, compirte EXPECTED SVS4IISSIOH DATfi NO ABSTRACT ILlmit to 14IX)tprcrt, i.r., rppmximetriy fifteen sinplr g>>cr typrwn'ttrn imrsl IIS)EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE IISI MONTH DAY YEAR The purpose of the revision is to correct an error in the identified control room instrumentation available during a fire in Unit 2 fire area 29.The revision also is in response to a commitment in LER 50-316 f93-005 dated-5/20/93.The commitment in LER 50-316 893-005 was to revise this LER upon re-evaluation of the Appendix R compliance strategy for the sub)ect fire areas.On August 24, 1990, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode Six, it was discovered that the routing of cable associated with the Unit 1 Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels was not in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.On September 6, 1990, i.t was subsequently di.scovered that a simi.lar condition existed for the Unit 2 LSI panels.The immediate corrective action taken was initiation of plant modi.fications to bring the subject plant cabling into compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.All identified areas are provided with adequate fire detection and suppression to substantially mitigate the impact of a fire on normal and LSI instrumentation.

Therefore, this event did not adversly impact the health and safety of the public.NRC Fottn 365 (569)

NRC FORM 344A (4$9)U.S.NUCLEAR AEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVED OMB NO.S(500(05 EXPIRES: el30N2 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 500 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(5041041.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (41 55GVCNTIAL r(2 NVM IIEVISION NVM 5O PAGE (3)TEXT lll more epece lr rer)o(red.

Iree eddldorml llRC%%drm 35EABI (12)o 5 o o o 315 9 0 010 01 02 OF 0 5 Co ditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 in Mode 6.Descri tion of Event On August 24, 1990, it was discovered that the routing of cables associated with the Unit 1 Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels was not in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements.

A postulated fire in any of three Unit 1 fire areas could have resulted in an inability to maintain power to the LSI panels.The.following describes the analysis performed.

Unit 1 Fire Areas 40 (Zone 41), 48 (Zone 55), and 49 (Zone 56).The area analyses performed identified that a fire in any one of these fire areas could have eliminated both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 power to the Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels.The discrepant cable in question was cable 1-29685G (EIIS/ED-CBL3) which runs between panels 1-LSI-6 and 1-LSI-6X.A fault of this cable due to a fire would have eliminated the Unit 2 Alternate feed-to the Unit 1 LSI panels.The Unit 1 normal power feed to the LSI panels was already assumed lost for a fire in any of these areas because various cables associated with the availability of MCC 1-ABC-B would have been lost.On September 6, 1990, it was subsequently discovered that a similar condition existed for the Unit 2 LSI panels.A postulated fire in one of the Unit 2 fire areas could have resulted in an inability to maintain power to the LSI panels.The following describes the analysis performed.

Unit 2 Fire Area 29 (Zones 24, 25)The area analyses performed identified-that a fire in Fire Zone 24 would have faulted both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 power to the LSI panels.The discrepant power source to the Unit 2 LSI panels runs in Fire Zone 24 which also contains the Unit 2 normal source cable 2-12467 (EIIS/ED-CBL3).

Although 2-12467 also runs in Zone 25, 1-1936R does not.Fire Zones 24 and 25 are separated by a three-hour fire-rated wall.NRC Form 344A(509)

NRC FORM 35SA)509)ILS.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO.31504)0>>

EXPIRES:>>/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST.'00 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAQEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINQTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150410i).

OFFICE OF MANAQ E MENT AND BUDGET, WASH INQTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME 11)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 12)o 5 o o o 315 LER NUMBER 15)YEAR<~SEQUENTIAL

)~AEVI>>ION>0?3 NUM>>II.sW: NUMB>>A 90-010-01~AOE C))03oF 0 5 TEXT///mor>><<ec>>4 r>>r/unrL u>>>>>>~Ar/IC form Sr/SAS/(ill Cause of Event The condition was the result of insufficient scoping for 10CFR50 Appendix R design changes.Insufficient controls were in place to ensure that new cables added to the plant complied with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements.

nal sis of Event This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(C) in that the condition was outside the design basis and not covered by the plant's.operating and emergency procedures respectively.

Unit 1 Fire Areas 40, 48 and 49 Analysis Fire Area 402 Our Safe Shutdown System Analysis (SSSA)shows that for a fire in Area 40 control room indications equivalent to those found on the LSI cabinet would be lost.Due to cable misrouting, the LSI panel indications would also have been lost.Further investigation revealed the reason that the control room indication would have been lost is because one of the alternate sources to the CRID panels, the isolimeters, is located in this area.What the SSSA does not show is that the preferred source to the GRID panels would have been available.

The inverters are located in Fire Area 41 (Fire Zone 42C).Therefore, normal control room indication of process monitoring would have been available for fire in Area 40.b.Fire Areas 48 and 492 Under conservative assumptions of loss of function for an area fire, the SSSA shows that for a fire in Areas 48 and 49 both the control room and the LSI panel indications would have been lost.However, Fire Areas 48 and 49 are provided with adequate suppression and detection to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSI instrumentation.

NRC Form 356A 15$9)

NRC FORM 388A (889)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO.3)504)08 EXPIRES: O)30NQ ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50J)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REQARDINQ BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8)YEAR I))OISSQUSNTIALg~ASVISIQN PA IIUM SII'A NUM SII~AQE I3)TEXT lit mon JOoco*roOIdmd.uso oddldoool HRC FomI 388AQJ (17)o oooo 315 9 0 010-01 040" 0 5 Anal sis of Event Unit 2 Fire Area 29 (Zones 24 and 25)Analysis: Although power to the LSI panels would be lost for a fire in zone 24, necessary control room indication would still have been available with the exception of RCS temperature (RCS cold leg temperature could have been derived indirectly from the available steam generator pressure instrumentation.

According to our Safe Shutdown Systems Analysis, a fire in Fire Area 29 (Zones 24 and 25)would not have eliminated process monitoring indication in the control room for steam generators 1 and 4.The following indication would have been available in the Unit 2 control room: 2-BLP-112 2-BLP-142 2-MPP-210 2-MPP-240 2-M31 2-NLP-151 or 2-NLP-153 2-NPS-121 SG 1 Water Level (normal range)SG 4 Water Level (normal range)SG1 Pressure SG 4 Pressure Source Range Monitoring Channel 1 Pressurizer Water Level RCS Pressure (wide range)**Subsequent investigation indicates that 2-NPS-121 would not have been available since the cable for 2-NPS-121 was unprotected and is also routed through zone 24.Loss of 2-NPS-121 during a potential fire in zone 24 could have been compensated for through the use of a contingency procedure within the emergency operating procedures.

This procedure provided for the use of test instruments connected to the RVLIS cabinet in the control room to read RCS pressure.Control room operators were trained on the use of this procedure.

These indications could provide an indirect means of determining RCS temperature.

This area is provided with adequate detection and suppression to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSI instrumentation.

NR 0 FomI 388A (589)

NRC FORM355A (549)U.S.NUCLEAR AEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVEO 0MB NO.31504'105 EXPIRES(tl30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 508)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BUADEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOAOS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4301, U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK AEDUCTION PROJECT (31504)04), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET.WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (I)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (5)ttQVtNTIAL NVM tR RtVI510N NVM tR PAGE IS)TEXT llf mctt Sotto lt tNFdctd, oto tddidootl NRC FomlÃ)4'tl (17)0 5 000 315 9 0 010 01 05 oFo 5 Conclusion In conclusion, the condition did not adversely impact the health and safety of the public due to the fact that Areas 40, 48 and 49 of Unit 1 and Area 29 of Unit 2 and provided with suppression and detection to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSZ instrumentation.

Also, a large portion of the station's normal instrumentation would remain functional since fires propagate at a finite rather than causing an instantaneous loss of function for an entire area.Corrective Actions Unit One A plant Temporary Modification was initiated which installed a 1 ampere fuse in 1-LSI-6 on the load side of the 1>>29685G cable.This way a fire in the fire areas of concern would not eliminate the ability of providing Unit 2 power to the LSI panels.~Ukt Tee A plant Minor Modification was initiated to provide a one-hour fire enclosure (wrapped)around Conduit 2-12467 that exists in Fire Zone 24.Conduit 2-12467 was in 10CFR50 Appendix R compliance on 9/20/90.Subsequent investigation has revealed that when modifications 2900-B.04 (October 5, 1990)and 12-3053 (December 19, 1990)were completed/installed the sub)ect cable no longer needed to be wrapped because zone 24 could now be categorized as meeting Appendix R ZIZ.G.1 criteria due to the installation of additional instrumentation.

Zn addition, there is suppression and detection in the area.~Ge eral Our program for ensuring continued 10CFRSO Appendix R compliance will be revised.It is anticipated that this revision will be in place by March 1, 1991.Failed Com onent Identification None Previous Similar Events 050"315/90-0083 10CFR50 Appendix R deficiencies resulting in potential loss of auto-start of service water pumps due to incorrect implementation of design change.NRC Fonll 35SA (589)