ML13016A280
| ML13016A280 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 01/07/2013 |
| From: | Zoia C D Operations Branch III |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML11354A210 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML13016A280 (119) | |
Text
1. 2012 ILT RO 1 Given the following conditions:
- Unit 1 is operating at 18% power
- Frequency on 1A01 and 1A02, Non
-safeguards 4160V Busses, momentarily drops to 55 HZ for one (1) second
Which of the following would be the expected positions for the RCP breakers and the Reactor trip breakers?
RCP Breakers Reactor Trip Breakers A. Open Open B. Open Shut C. Shut Shut D. Shut Open
Explanation:
A: Correct: Underfrequency trip for RCP's is 57 hz for 0.35 sec. Rx Trip Breakers open on a signal from the RCP breaker trip.
B: Incorrect: It is correct that the RCP breaker trips on underfrequency, however since the P-7 permissive is met, this will cause a Reactor trip due to both RCP breakers tripping open.
C: Incorrect: Underfrequency trip for RCP's is 57 hz for 0.35 sec. Rx Trip Breakers open on a signal from the RCP breaker trip.
D: Incorrect: Underfrequency trip for RCP's is 57 hz for 0.35 sec. There is no underfrequency trip for the Reactor trip breakers, Rx Trip Breakers open on a signal from the RCP breaker trip.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the reactor trips, automatic functions and interlocks associated with the Reactor Protection System and its major components. Description should include actuation setpoints, actuation logic, logic acceptability, requirements to enable actuation, and protection afforded. (053.02.LP0273.0
- 07)
- Unit 1 is at 100% reactor power
- RCS Pressure starts to continuously LOWER - Pressurizer Level starts to rise Which of the following describes the event and the INITIAL response of the Charging System?
A. Pressurizer PORV opened; therefore the automatic charging pump will speed up to maintain level.
B. Pressurizer insurge due to loss of electrical load; therefore the automatic charging pump will slow down to LOWER level. C. Pressurizer safety opened; therefore the automatic charging pump will slow down to LOWER level. D. LOCA in Loop 'A' Hot Leg; therefore the automatic charging pump will speed up to maintain level.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Correct steam space leak but opposite charging system response.
B: Incorrect: Pressurizer level will rise on loss of load due to RCS temperature rising. but RCS pressure would not lower. Correct response of the charging system for rising level.
C: Correct: Indications are of a Pressurizer vapor space leak. With the size of the leak, pressure is lost in the RCS causing an insurge in the Pressurizer thus automatic charging will slow down to maintain programmed level.
D: Incorrect: LOCA will cause RCS pressure to lower but at the same time Pressurizer level to lower. Correct event for pressure to lower but opposite charging system response.
Learning Objective: EVALUATE the plant indications associated with a failed PORV or Safety Valve (043.03.LP2463.010)
- A Safety Injection has actuated on Unit 2
- CCW flow to the RCP Thermal Barrier HX has been lost
- No charging pumps are running
- A transition has been made to EOP
-1.1, SI Termination What action is INITIALLY taken associated with RCP seal cooling and what is the reason for the action?
A. CCW flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers and then a charging pump is started, to prevent RCP shaft warping.
B. A charging pump is started and then CCW flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers, to prevent steam binding of the CCW system.
C. RCP seal injection is isolated before starting a charging pump, to avoid initiating seal cooling since RCP seals are already heated up.
D. CCW flow is established to the RCP thermal barriers, to prevent thermal shock to the RCP seals.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: CCW flow is eventually aligned, but due to the time the RCP seals have had no cooling, they must be isolated prior to providing cooling to prevent damage. Since the shaft of the RCP is vertical, shaft warping is not the concern but shocking the seals is.
B: Incorrect: Charging is started at this time, but not until seals are isolated. Steam binding of CCW is a common precaution in several procedures associated with CCW.
C: Correct: Due to the time the RCP seals have had no cooling, they must be isolated prior to providing cooling to prevent damage.
D: Incorrect: Thermal shock to the seal package is correct but CCW is isolated not aligned.
Learning Objective: IDENTIFY the bases for the steps in the Emergency Operating Procedures. (031.02.LP0405.005)
- Unit 1 is responding to a loss of offsite power
- Both Emergency Diesel Generators G
-01 and G-03 have started and loaded onto their respective buses
- Safety Injection did NOT actuate - Pressurizer level is 25%
What must be done to energize 1T
-1C, Backup Group C Heaters?
A. Restore power to 1B-01. Then turn the 1T
-1C control switch to ON. B. Reset the 1B
-03 Non Safeguards Equipment lockout.
Leave the 1T
-1C control switch in AUTO. C. Turn the 1T
-1C control switch to OFF. Then turn the 1T
-1C control switch to ON. D. Place 1HC-431K, Pressurizer Pressure Controller, in MANUAL and raise the controller output.
Leave the 1T
-1C control switch in AUTO.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Power to 1B
-01 is not restored via EDG's, this bus is still de
-energized with the loss of offsite power. To reset heaters the control switch must be taken to off first.
B: Incorrect: 1B-03 has power restored via EDG's. Equipment lockout does strip loads but is actuated with an SI, which has not occurred. Resetting the lockout is a common task in the EOP network.
C: Correct: Power is available for the C bank of heaters. This breaker is stripped on undervoltage and can be reset by taking the associated control switch to off and back to on.
D: Incorrect: In normal no loss of power situations taking HC
-431K to manual is a way to turn on pressurizer heaters.
Learning Objective: Given access to the Site Specific Simulator or specific plant conditions RESPOND to the following conditions:
- d. Loss of Electrical Busses (055.03.LP2440.002)
- An automatic reactor trip signal was generated while operating at rated power.
- The reactor trip breakers are stuck shut.
According to CSP
-S.1, which of the following satisfies both of the procedural requirements to verify that the reactor is subcritical?
A. Power range channels indicate between 3
-4% and LOWERING. and Emergency boration is lined up correctly and injecting.
B. ALL rods indicate that they are fully inserted.
and Intermediate Range SUR is zero or negative.
C. Power range channels indicate between 3
-4% and LOWERING. and Intermediate Range SUR is zero or negative.
D. ALL rods indicate that they are fully inserted.
and Emergency boration is lined up correctly and injecting.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: The check for PR <3
-4% and lowering is correct. Although emergency boration is not stopped until the reactor is verified sub
-critical, adequate emergency boration is not an indication of subcriticality.
B: Incorrect: The check that all rods are inserted is not done to verify subcriticality. Although the student can plausibly associate "all rods in" with subcriticality, this parameter is checked in the next step to determine boration requirements for required shutdown margin. The check for IR SUR to be zero or negative is one of the two things that must be met.
C: Correct: CSP-S.1 require reactor power to be <5% AND IR SUR to be zero or negative in order for the reactor to be considered subcritical.
D: Incorrect: The check that all rods are inserted is not done to verify subcriticality, as noted above. Although emergency boration is not stopped until the reactor is verified sub
-critical, adequate emergency boration is not an indication of subcriticality.
Learning Objective: LIST the major actions accomplished by the Subcriticality Critical Safety Function Procedure. (043.03.LP1996.012)
- 6. 2012 ILT RO 6 For a design basis Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident it is assumed that the ruptured S/G does not release steam ___________.
A. after 30 minutes B. after 44 minutes C. prior to S/G overfill D. prior to S/G NR offscale high Explanation:
A: Correct: FSAR states S/G steam releases will be allowed up to 30 minutes post SGTR. The Operators will take action per the EOP network to meet FSAR requirements.
B: Incorrect: The 44 minutes is mentioned in the FSAR as the postulated time the break flow will be terminated for a SGTR.
C: Incorrect: Prior to overfill is the term used of when break flow must be terminated by to prevent water release from the S/G safeties. This condition is the S/G filled up to the MSIV's.
D: Incorrect: S/G NR off scale high is a common condition reached in a SGTR event. This term is used in procedures when determining actions to stop break flow.
Learning Objective: STATE the plant systems and operator actions that are required to show protection against core damage during a Steam Generator Tube Rupture event.
(031.02.LP0441.004)
- Unit 1 was at 100% reactor power
- Twenty minutes ago, an RCP flywheel catastrophically failed
- AFW flow of 115 GPM per SG was established in EOP
-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection'
- ECA-2.1, 'Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators', feed control step is in progress
- SG 'A' WR level is 200 inches and LOWERING - SG 'B' WR level is 100 inches and LOWERING - RCS temperature is now 400
°F and LOWERING Which of the following actions will the crew take regarding AFW flow to the Steam Generators per ECA
-2.1 and what is the reason for this action?
A. Maintain AFW flow at 115 GPM to each SG, since 230 GPM flow is required to maintain adequate heat sink.
B. Secure AFW flow to 'B' SG and raise AFW flow to 'A' SG to 230 GPM to isolate feed to the more severely faulted SG and maintain adequate heat sink.
C. Secure AFW flow to 'B' SG and maintain AFW flow to 'A' SG at 115 GPM since 115 GPM flow is directed to minimize RCS cooldown and 'B' SG level is lowering faster.
D. Reduce AFW flow to 50 GPM to each SG to minimize cooldown while maintaining both SGs in a wet condition.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: ECA-2.1 directs lowering feed flow if cooldown of 100F/Hr has been exceeded. Although RED path for heat sink will be indicated when flow is lowered, the operator will be in control of temperature and CSP
-H.1 will not need to be entered.
B: Incorrect: It is desired to maintain a minimum amount of flow to each SG when both are depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner.
C: Incorrect: The direction is to minimize feed flow but maintain flow to both.
D: Correct: 50 GPM per SG is directed. Examinee will need to calculate a cooldown rate (570F
- 400F = 170F in the last 20 minutes). If cooldown rate has not exceeded 100F/hr, if cooldown was not excessive, 'A' would be correct.
Learning Objective:
STATE the entry conditions and IDENTIFY the major actions for the following procedures:
- d. ECA 2.1.
(031.02.LP0465.001)
- Unit 1 is at 85% reactor power.
- 1CS-2190, P-28A Main Feed Pump Discharge MOV, begins to close due to an electrical malfunction.
Which of the following automatic OR manual actions will be required to recover Steam Generator levels?
A. Crew must manually lower Turbine load to lower steam flow.
B. Turbine Runback will automatically lower steam flow.
C. 1CS-2273, LP FWH Bypass valve, will automatically open to raise feed flow.
D. Crew must manually open Main Feed Regulating valves to raise feed flow.
Explanation:
A: Correct: When the discharge MOV begins to close, a loss of feedwater from the corresponding pump is assumed. Therefore, actions are taken as if the pump is lost, so lowering the turbine load is the required action.
B: Incorrect: Loss of feedwater flow will not immediately cause an automatic turbine runback. If the low feed condition is allowed to continue, reactor will trip on low SG levels prior to a runback.
C: Incorrect: CS-2273 will open to raise condensate pressure (results in flow increase) to the feed pumps if inadequate. This is opposite of what would happen with a feed pump discharge MOV going shut.
D: Incorrect: Opening MFRVs will not address the loss of flow from one feed pump. MFRVs will automatically open in response to loss of flow but flow from one MFP will be inadequate for 85% power once discharge valve goes fully closed.
Learning Objective:
Given access to appropriate equipment/indication, DIAGNOSE malfunctions associated
with the following systems: Main Feedwater. (055.03.LP2439.001)
-power alignment when a reactor trip occurred. The reactor operator noted the following:
- A 2X-04 Station Aux Transformer lockout had occurred
- 4160 VAC Safeguards Busses 2A
-05 and 2A-06 were deenergized
- All four EDGs fast started but had not loaded on to any safeguards busses The crew has entered ECA
-0.0, Loss of All AC
Which of the following actions would successfully manually energize a 4160 VAC Safeguards Bus?
(Assume sync scope used as required and no bus lockouts)
A. Place the G01 Mode Selector Switch to EXERCISE and manually close the G01 EDG output breaker to bus 2A
-06. B. Crosstie bus 1A
-04 and bus 2A
-04 and close the normal supply breaker for 2A
-05. C. Crosstie bus 1A
-03 and bus 2A
-03 and close the normal supply breaker for 2A
-05. D. Place the G03 Mode Selector Switch to EXERCISE and manually close the G03 EDG output breaker to bus 2A
-05. Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Switch operation is correct, but incorrect EDG for the bus listed.
B: Incorrect: Electrical alignment is correct but for bus 2A
-06, the opposite train power supply. C: Correct: Per ECA
-0.0 one of the potential correct electrical busses and alignment is listed.
D: Incorrect: Correct switch operation, but incorrect EDG for the bus listed.
Learning Objective: Given access to the Site Specific Simulator, IMPLEMENT appropriate actions if the EDG does not start satisfactorily. (031.02.LP0462.007)
- All systems in normal at
-power lineup
- P-112B, CR AC Chilled Water Recirc Pump is RUNNING - P-112A, CR AC Chilled Water Recirc Pump control switch is in AUTO and the pump is in STANDBY - Unit 2 experiences a loss of the safeguards busses
- Applicable EDGs subsequently load on to restore their respective busses What is the expected status of the CR AC Chilled Water Recirc Pumps?
P-112A P-112B A. Not Running Not Running B. Not Running Running C. Running Not Running D. Running Running
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Although the 'B' train of recirc pumps would de
-energize, the 'A' train of pumps (powered from a Unit 1 bus, 1B-31) would start on lowering chill water pressure.
B: Incorrect: The 'B' train of recirc pumps would de
-energize on the loss of 2B
-31. C: Correct: The 'A' train of pumps (powered from a Unit 1 bus, 1B
-31) would start on lowering chill water pressure. D: Incorrect: The 'B' train of recirc pumps would de
-energize and the 'A' train of pumps (powered from a Unit 1 bus, 1B
-31) would start on lowering chill water pressure.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the interlocks and automatic actuation setpoints associated with the Control Room Ventilation System and its major components.
(052.07.LP0359.004)
- Unit 1 is at 100% power
- All bistable status lights go dark on 1CO4 Which of the following would cause the above indication? What would be the appropriate procedure to enter?
A. Failure of the D
-02 bus; enter EOP
-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.'
B. Failure of the D
-03 bus; enter AOP
-0.0, 'Loss of Vital DC.'
C. Failure of the YELLOW instrument bus; enter AOP
-0.2, 'Loss of Safety Related Instrument Bus.'
D. Failure of the WHITE instrument bus; enter AOP
-0.2, 'Loss of Safety Related Instrument Bus.'
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: A loss of DC Bus D
-02 would cause a dual unit trip and would be appropriate to enter EOP
-0, but that would not cause all the bistable lights to go out.
B: Incorrect: A loss of DC Bus D
-03 would not cause all the bistable lights to go out.
C: Correct: Upon a loss of the Yellow instrument bus, the bistable lights lose power.
D: Incorrect: A loss of the White instrument bus, would cause most of the white powered bistable lights to illuminate.
Learning Objective: For a loss of Red, Blue, White or Yellow Instrument Bus, DESCRIBE the major effects on the plant/unit operation. (054.02.LP0123.011)
- 12. 2012 ILT RO 12 The DC Distribution is in a normal alignment when the D07 Battery Charger AC Supply Breaker trips open.
Which of the following action(s) will be taken?
A. D09 Battery Charger will have to be manually aligned to charge Battery D05.
B. Ensure D09 Battery Charger automatically aligns to charge Battery D05.
C. Shift Unit 1 and 2 RED Instrument Busses to their Alternate Inverters.
D. Restore DC Control power to all Unit 1 'A' Train 4160 and 480 VAC Busses.
Explanation:
A: Correct: Battery chargers have to be manually aligned to their respective batteries.
B: Incorrect: Battery chargers no not automatically align, but the inverters they supply do auto shift.
C: Incorrect: The DC System supplies power to the instrument bus inverters. A loss of a battery charger does not mean a loss of the DC bus or battery.
D: Incorrect: The DC System supplies control power to various electrical busses. A loss of a battery charger does not mean a loss of a DC bus or battery.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the procedures which govern the operation of the DC Electrical System. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed and Auxiliary Operators. (054.03.LP0121.009)
- Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at rated power
- Unit 2 is in MODE 3, cooling down for a refueling outag
- e. - The electric plant is in a normal alignment for this plant configuration.
- P-32B, C and E Service Water Pumps are RUNNING. A reactor trip and safety injection occurs on Unit 1. Upon the trip, the following malfunctions occur:
1X04 LV Station Auxiliary Transformer LOCKS OUT G02 Emergency Diesel Generator FAILS to start 1A52-60, G01 Diesel Generator to Bus 1A05 Breaker FAILS to close Which of the following describes ALL the RUNNING service water pumps two minutes later?
(Assume no operator action)
A. D, E, and F B. C, D, E, and F C. B, C, D, and E D. B, C, D, E, and F Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Plausible but incorrect because though the G03 EDG does start, the 1A06 bus is not de
-energized B: Correct: Although all SW pumps would get a start signal with the EDG output breakers closing, those powered from 1B03 fail to start due to a loss of power. C: Incorrect: Plausible but incorrect because though the G02 EDG does not start, the 2A05 bus is not de
-energized D: Incorrect: A misunderstanding of the busses that are energized in this case or the power supplies to the Service Water pumps could lead to a plausible but incorrect answer.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the interlocks associated with the Service Water System and its major components. (051.06.LP0086.005)
- The unit experienced a large break LOCA
- The crew is in the EOP network preparing to restore Instrument Air to Containment
- Only 1 train of Safety Injection could be reset
- All available IA Compressors are operating What action(s), if any, will the operators take to restore IA to Containment?
A. Manually hold the switch open for IA
-3047 OR IA-3048, Instrument Air to Containment Isolation Valve, while having an AO locally gag the valve open.
B. Manually open IA
-3047 AND IA-3048, Instrument Air to Containment Isolation Valves. C. Manually open IA
-3047 OR IA-3048, Instrument Air to Containment Isolation Valve.
D. IA to Containment cannot be restored at this time due to IA
-3047 and IA
-3048, Instrument Air to Containment Isolation Valves, remaining shut.
Explanation:
A: Correct: Since only 1 train of SI was reset, the IA to Containment Isolation valves will subsequently automatically shut upon being opened. An AO will be needed to locally gag one valve once it is held open from the Control Room. B: Incorrect: Since only 1 train of SI was reset, the IA to Containment Isolation valves will subsequently automatically shut upon being opened.
C: Incorrect: Since only 1 train of SI was reset, either IA to Containment Isolation valves will subsequently automatically shut upon being opened.
D: Incorrect: The AO's can locally gag these valves open even with a shut signal.
Learning Objective: RECOGNIZE and ANALYZE the response of the Instrument and Service Air Systems to a Safety Injection. (052.06.LP0338.006)
- 15. 2012 ILT RO 15 Following a Unit 1 reactor trip and safety injection, the crew is performing actions of EOP-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.'
The following conditions exist:
- Both SG pressures are 1000 psig and STABLE - Both SG NR levels are approximately 25% and STABLE - AFW is supplying the SG's
- RCS pressure is approximately 1000 psig and STABLE - RCS temperature is 545
°F and slowly LOWERING - RE-214, PAB Vent Stack Exhaust Monitor is in HIGH ALARM - RE-106, Unit 1 Sampling Room Low Range Monitor is in HIGH ALARM - Containment pressure is 0.5 psig and STABLE Which of the following procedures will provide principal mitigation for this event? A. EOP-1, Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant B. EOP-1.1, SI Termination C. EOP-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization D. ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Indications given are for a LOCA outside containment, which can be diagnosed in EOP
-1, but actions taken for mitigation are in ECA 1.2.
B: Incorrect: Based on the above indication, LOCA outside of containment is in progress. A transition to SI termination would not be correct.
C: Incorrect: It is plausible to recognize that there is a LOCA but fail to recognize its location inside containment could lead to EOP
-1.2. D: Correct: Indications given are for a LOCA outside containment, which can be diagnosed in EOP
-1, but is mitigated in ECA 1.2.
Learning Objective: STATE the entry conditions and IDENTIFY the major actions for the following procedures:
- d. ECA 2.1 (031.02.LP0465.001)
- A Large Break LOCA has occurred.
- Containment pressure is 30 PSIG and slowly lowering
. - RWST level is 8% and stable. - Required actions have been taken per Attachment B of CSP
-Z.1, 'Response to High Containment Pressure', to place 'A' Train of Containment Spray on sump recirc using 'A' train of RHR as the suction source.
- 'A' RHR pump subsequently trips.
What will happen to the 'A' Containment Spray Train?
A. 'A' Containment Spray pump will trip when RHR discharge pressure is <210 PSIG.
B. 'A' Containment Spray pump will continue to run, manual action will be needed to secure 'A' Containment Spray pump.
C. With 2SI-871A, Containment Spray pump RHR Suction OPEN, the 'A' Containment Spray pump breaker will open on interlock when the 'A' RHR pump breaker opens.
D. 2SI-870A, RWST to 'A' Containment Spray pump, will automatically open to supply RWST water to Containment Spray pump.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: RHR discharge pressure must be <210 PSIG to open the SI
-871, RHR to CS valves, but does not trip the pump B: Correct: CS pump will not trip automatically in this case; the pump will need to be manually stopped.
C: Incorrect: This interlock would be prudent, but it does not exist.
D: Incorrect: This interlock would protect the CS pump suction, but could allow sump recirc back into the RWST. There is no such interlock
Learning Objective/#:
DESCRIBE the interlocks associated with the Containment Spray System and its major components. (051.03.LP0064.004)
- A loss of heat sink has occurred on Unit 2, due to a loss of feed.
- The crew is establishing RCS 'Bleed and Feed' in accordance with CSP
-H.1, 'Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.'
- The RO opens one PORV and reports that the other PORV will NOT open. Which of the following describes the consequences of the PORV failure?
A. The RCS may not depressurize quickly enough to ensure sufficient SI flow to provide RCS heat removal, and other RCS openings may have to be established.
B. The open PORV will be returned to automatic operation and will be able to provide adequate SI flow only if additional RCS openings are established.
C. The open PORV will be returned to automatic operation and will be able to provide adequate SI flow only if secondary depressurization is initiated.
D. 'Bleed and Feed' cooling of the RCS must be terminated and secondary depressurization to inject condensate pump flow must be immediately initiated.
Explanation:
A: Correct: If two PORVs can not be opened in order to establish a bleed path, alternative paths are established in order to provide additional vent capability.
B: Incorrect: The open PORV will not be returned to automatic. This is a "feed and bleed" approach that will not allow sufficient SI flow. Additional RCS opening will need to be established.
C: Incorrect: The open PORV will not be returned to automatic. Actions to line up a source of makeup will be taken to support secondary depressurization but this will not result in adequate SI flow.
D: Incorrect: The bleed and feed alignment is not terminated. If an adequate vent path is not available, the Bleed and Feed alignment is maintained with additional actions taken to inject water into the steam generators
Learning Objective: STATE how RCS Bleed and Feed is initiated and how it provides adequate core cooling. (043.03.LP1998.004)
- Both Units are operating at rated power.
- The crew entered AOP
-0.1, 'Declining Frequency on the 345 KV Distribution System.' - Both Units were tripped based on grid frequency.
- Subsequently, ALL lines coming into the switchyard were lost.
What is the expected response of the 13.8 KV System?
A. 13.8 KV breakers have an undervoltage trip function and should have ALL opened. B. 13.8 KV breakers have no undervoltage trip function and should have remained aligned as they were prior to the trip.
C. ONLY the breakers associated with H01 13.8 KV Bus should have tripped on undervoltage to aid in restoration of power via G05 Gas Turbine.
D. G05 Gas Turbine should have automatically fast started and the output breaker closed in on H01 13.8 KV Bus.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Plausible because most breakers in the plant have UV trip functions associated with them.
B: Correct: 13.8 KV breakers do not have UV trip functions.
C: Incorrect: G05 is used to restore power in this condition, but the breakers must be manually aligned. Plausible due to the importance of G
-05 in station blackout response.
D: Incorrect: G05 has a fast start function but must be manually started and aligned in this condition. G05 will auto close onto the 13.8 KV system during normal start operations.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design bases, physical locations and operating characteristics of the 13.8 KV System and major components. (054.02.LP0122.001)
- The unit just entered Mode 1 following a refueling outage
- A dropped control rod has occurred
- The crew is implementing AOP
-6A, 'Dropped Rod' to stabilize the plant
- Reactor Coolant Tavg is 538
°F and stable What action, if any, should the crew take regarding Tavg?
A. Restore Tavg to within 7
°F of program within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
B. Restore Tavg to
> 540°F within 30 minutes.
C. Restore Tavg to
> 540°F within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
D. There are no Tavg limits due to the >5% step change in power.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Correct caution used in several AOP's for RCS temperature. Incorrect action, which is to restore within two hours.
B: Correct: Per TS 3.4.2 the temperature must be restored within 30 minutes. This is also required by AOP
-6A and OP1C.
C: Incorrect: Correct temperature limit but wrong time.
D: Incorrect: Plausible because a common misconception is DNB Technical Specifications temperature limits do not apply when in a transient condition.
Learning Objective:
LIST the major actions for the following Abnormal Operating Procedures:
- a. AOP 6A (054.03.LP2441.004)
- Charging Pump 1P
-2A is running in AUTO - Charging Pump 1P
-2B is in OFF - Charging Pump 1P
-2C is running in MANUAL 1LT-428 Pressurizer Level Transmitter (Blue) fails LOW. Assuming NO operator action, which of the following correctly describes the change for the given parameters?
A. Seal injection flow will remain the same, labyrinth seal P will remain the same.
B. Seal injection flow will remain the same, Charging line flow will lower.
C. Seal injection flow will rise, Charging line flow will remain the same.
D. Seal injection flow will rise, labyrinth seal P will rise.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: If it assumed that the seal injection flow remains the same, the labyrinth seal P would not change, but this is an incorrect assumption. The failed low controlling channel causes the auto pump to speed up, therefore raising the seal injection flow.
B: Incorrect: The failed low controlling channel causes the auto pump to speed up, therefore raising the seal injection flow.
C: Incorrect: Correct regarding seal injection although the charging line flow will rise due to the charging up speeding up.
D: Correct: Auto charging thinks Pressurizer level is low so it will speed up the auto charging pump which injects more water causing labyrinth seal P to rise.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the automatic functions and interlocks associated with the Pressurizer, Level Control, Pressure Control, and Relief System and its major components. (051.01.LP0078.004)
- Unit 1 is in MODE 6
- Core reload is in progress
- Audible count rate is selected to SR N32
- 1N-41 Power Range Detector failed high and preparations are being made to remove it from service
- The RO notes the audible count rate in the Control room stopped working Which of the following additional indications would explain the loss of source range counts?
A. 1N-35 Intermediate Range has failed HIGH. B. Field report that PP
-1 Unit 1 Containment Power Panel has de-energized. C. 1N-43 Power Range detector has failed HIGH. D. 1Y01 Red Instrument Bus has de-energized.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: 1N-35, feeds in to the re
-energization of the SR NIs as well as the permissives to manually de
-energize them, however, it will not cause them to de
-energize in this situation.
B: Incorrect: The audible count rate in containment would be lost with the PP
-1 being deenergized, however, this would not affect the control room audible count rate.
C: Correct: Upon failure of the 1N
-43 Power Range instrument, the P
-10 permissive is satisfied which will cause the SR NIs to deenergize.
D: Incorrect: An instrument bus failure coupled with a N
-41 out of service could cause the P-10 to be satisfied, however, the Red instrument bus powers the N-41 which would have no affects on P
-10.
Learning Objective: Concerning the Nuclear Instrumentation System, EXPLAIN the following:
- b. Audio Count Rate Circuitry (053.03.LP2416.012)
Power is at 7% by Nuclear Instruments during a plant startup.
Intermediate Range NIS channel 1N
-35 Instrument Power has FAILED. The following steps of 0
-SOP-IC-001-RED, 'Routine Maintenance Procedure Removal of Safeguards or Protection Sensor From Service
- RED Channels', for the failed channel were completed:
The Level Trip switch on the 1N
-35 drawer was POSITIONED to BYPASS for corrective maintenance.
Instrument power fuses are REMOVED for the 1N
-35 drawer.
The following list of Annunciators and Status Lights are LIT on 1C04: 1. NIS TRIP BYPASSED
- 2. N-35 OR 36 INTERMEDIATE RANGE LOSS OF DETECTOR VOLTAGE
- 3. N-35 INTERMEDIATE RANGE LOSS OF COMPENSATING VOLTAGE
- 4. OP/OT T TURB RB TC405BD
- 5. INTERM RANGE TRIP NC35F
- 6. INTERM RANGE P
-6 NC35D Which of the following lists ALL of the above indications that are expected to be LIT for removing 1NI
-35 from service?
A. 1, 2, 4 and 6 B. 1, 3, 5, and 6 C. 1, 2, 3, and 5 D. 1, 3, 4 and 5
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: OP/OT T Turb Runback has no input from the Intermediate Range NI's. Also, INTERM RANGE P-6 NC35D is OFF in this situation.
B: Incorrect: INTERM RANGE P
-6 NC35D is OFF in this situation.
C: Correct: "NIS TRIP BYPASSED" comes in when taking the NI to Bypass. The rest come in on the removal of the NI instrument power fuse.
D: Incorre ct: OP/OT T Turb Runback has no input from the Intermediate Range NI's.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the operational setpoints for interlocks, permissives, and automatic actions associated with the Nuclear Instrumentation System. (053.03.LP2416.011)
- 23. 2012 ILT RO 23 The crew is responding to a Unit 1 'A' Steam Generator Tube Leak using AOP-3, 'Steam Generator Tube Leak', with the following plant conditions:
- 'A' S/G pressure is 965 psig
- 'B' S/G pressure is 925 psig
- RCS depressurization is in progress Which of the following is the HIGHEST indicated core exit temperature that provides 30
°F subcooling after completion of the RCS depressurization?
A. 507 °F B. 512 °F C. 535 °F D. 542 °F Explanation:
A: Incorrect: The wrong steam generator was chosen, using 940 psia. This would yield a 537
°F Sat. Temp, and then with 30
°F subcooling, it would be
507°F. B: Correct: The correct steam generator was chosen, using 980 psia. This would yield a 542
°F Sat. Temp, and then with 30
°F subcooling, it would be 512°F. C: Incorrect: The wrong steam generator was chosen, using 925 psig vice 940 psia. This would yield a 535
°F Sat. Temp, but does not take in to account the 30°F subcooling.
D: Incorrect: The correct steam generator was chosen, using 980 psia. This would yield a 542
°F Sat. Temp, but does not take in to account the 30
°F subcooling.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the plant and operator(s) response to the following conditions:
- d. Steam Generator Tube Leak (055.03.LP2438.001)
-2019, 'B' Train Steam Supply to the Unit 2 Turbine Driven AFW pump.
The RP supervisor responsible for the evolution contacts the Control Room to inform the operators of RMS alarms which would be expected to be received during the performance of the radiography.
Which of the following Radiation Monitors would be included in the report by the RP supervisor?
A. RE-223B, Background Monitor for Waste Distillate Tank Overboard Monitor B. 2RE-217, Unit 2 CC Water Liquid Monitor C. 2RE-232, Steam Line 2B Monitor D. RE-218B, Background Monitor for Waste Disposal Liquid Monitor
Explanation:
A: Correct: RE-223 and its background monitor are very near 2MS
-2019 B: Incorrect: 2RE-217 is on the 8' of the PAB, however the CCW heat exchangers and Surge Tank are right by 2MS
-2019. C: Incorrect: The steam supply line to the TDAFW pump starts near the MSIV for the main steam line which makes this plausible.
D: Incorrect: If candidate reverses the locations of RE-218 and RE
-223, which are both overboard discharge monitors, this would be plausible.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design bases, physical locations and operating characteristics of the RMS and major components. (051.07.LP0275.001)
- 25. 2012 ILT RO 25 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a Steam Line Break occurred inside containment on 'A' Steam Generator.
Several Containment Spray and Cooling system failures have resulted in the crew entering CSP
-Z.1, Response To High Containment Pressure.
Which of the following actions in CSP
-Z.1 helps to limit the containment pressure transient?
A. Feed 'A' S/G at only 50 gpm to minimize liquid inventory.
B. Align the hydrogen recombiner to minimize the potential for hydrogen burn.
C. Manually isolate feedwater to 'A' S/G to minimize the mass and energy release.
D. Perform a rapid cooldown of the RCS using 'B' S/G to reduce the energy input to containment.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: This action is directed in some situations within the EOP network. However in this case, feed flow should be isolated.
B: Incorrect: Hydrogen Recombiner is used for a high hydrogen concentration in containment not high pressure. Plausible answer with the event at Fukashima and the recombiner is in EPIP 10.3.
C: Correct: This action minimizes energy into containment thus reducing pressure.
D: Incorrect: This action could result in entry into CSP
-P.1, which would unnecessarily challenge an additional fission product barrier.
Learning Objective: STATE the major actions accomplished by the CSP
-Z Series procedures for Containment Critical Safety Functions. (043.03.LP2000.006)
- A LOCA has occurred on Unit 2
- An ORANGE Path has developed on Containment Critical Safety Function due to Sump B level
- All automatic actions have occurred
In accordance with CSP
-Z.2, 'Response to Containment Flooding', which of the following would most likely cause this condition?
A. Service Water leak in containment B. Reactor Make Up Water leak in containment C. Component Cooling Water leak in containment D. Main Feedwater line rupture inside containment
Explanation:
A: Correct: Service Water system has the potential to introduce large amounts of water into containment if a leak occurs.
B: Incorrect: Reactor Make Up water is inside containment but is normally isolated. RMUW has the potential for large volume of water but at a low flow.
C: Incorrect: CCW is a potential source of water inside containment but not at a sufficient volume to cause entry into CSP
-Z.2. D: Incorrect: MFW is a source of water into containment but due to system design it is isolated to prevent entry into CSP
-Z.2.
Learning Objective: State the Red Path and Orange Path entry conditions for CSP
-Z.1 and Z.2 from memory. (043.03.LP2000.002)
- Unit 2 experienced a LOCA from full power.
- Containment pressure peaked at 4.5 psig and has now stabilized at 3 psig.
- Containment radiation peaked at 3E4 R/Hr and is now stable at 1.5E1 R/Hr.
- RCS Subcooling is 40
°F and stable.
- SI Pumps are injecting water
- The crew has completed immediate actions in EOP
-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection' and is diagnosing the event.
What should the status of the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) be?
A. Current containment parameters exceed adverse containment setpoints requiring tripping of the RCPs.
B. Current containment conditions are treated as adverse until the TSC performs an evaluation, RCPs require tripping.
C. Containment did NOT reach adverse conditions thus the RCPs can continue to operate. D. Current containment parameters do NOT exceed adverse conditions thus the RCPs can continue to operate.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Current parameters are not adverse, although the RCPs will need to be tripped. B: Correct: Current conditions are not adverse but are still treated as adverse until the TSC evaluates the cumulative dose affects inside containment.
C: Incorrect: If the examinee's belief is that containment adverse conditions did not exist, then the RCPs would be able to continue operating.
D: Incorrect: While it is true that current conditions are not adverse, the RCPs will need to be tripped.
Learning Objective: DISCUSS the bases for various EOP foldout page items included in the EOP set. (031.02.LP1829.003)
- - The unit was operating at rated power when the reactor tripped.
- The Reactor Coolant Pumps were secured 5 minutes later due to plant conditions.
Which of the following control board indications are NO LONGER reliable?
A. RCS wide-range temperatures due to reduced RCS loop flows.
B. RCS narrow
-range temperatures (Tave) due to reduced RCS bypass loop flows.
C. Core exit thermocouples (CET's) due to reduced core bypass flow.
D. RVLIS narrow range level indication due to lowered core DP.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: RCS wide range temperatures are reliable even though there is reduced RCS flow during natural circulation.
B: Correct: Tave is inaccurate due to no RCS flow through the RTD Bypass manifold during natural circulation.
C: Incorrect: Core exit thermocouples still indicate properly even though there is reduced flow during natural circulation.
D: Incorrect: With the RCP's not running narrow range RVLIS is what we use for water level indications in the core.
Learning Objective: IDENTIFY and DESCRIBE the Control Room controls, alarms, and indications associated with the Reactor Coolant System including:
- a. Location and function of component and/or system operating controls and control stations. b. Alarming locations and response to major system and component alarms.
- c. Plant, system, and component conditions or permissive required for Control Room operation.
- d. Setpoints associated with major system alarms and/or setpoints.
(051.01.LP0231.009)
- Unit 1 is at rated reactor power.
- 1HC-130, NRHX Letdown Outlet Temperature Controller, output fails LOW. What is the impact on the NRHX flow and RCS boron concentration?
(Assume no operator action)
A. CCW flow will rise; RCS boron concentration will lower B. CVCS flow will lower; RCS boron concentration will lower.
C. CVCS flow will lower; RCS boron concentration will rise D. CCW flow will rise; RCS boron concentration will rise.
Explanation:
A: Correct: The failure, 1HC
-130 low, causes 1CC
-130 to open, raising CCW flow; which in turn causes letdown temperatures to lower. This will cause the demineralizer to retain boron, lowering the RCS boron concentration.
B: Incorrect: Examinee may assume that TCV(1CC-130) is on the letdown side of the NRHX, vice the CCW side. If this mistake is made and examinee realizes that colder letdown temperatures will cause the demineralizer to retain boron, then this would be selected C: Incorrect: Examinee mistakenly places TCV on letdown and does not understand demineralizer effect D: Incorrect: If examinee fails to understand temperature effect on boron, this would be selected.
Learning Objective:
LIST the symptoms/indications of CVCS malfunctions (055.03.LP3718.001)
- Unit 1 is in MODE 5.
- RCS Temperature is 175ºF and stable.
- 'A' RHR pump and heat exchanger are in service and aligned to the RCS.
- 'B' RHR Train is secured. - 'A' Train RHR flow is being maintained at 1500 GPM in AUTO.
- A 100 GPM leak develops in the 'A' RHR heat exchanger.
Which of the following describes the plant response to these conditions?
(Assume NO operator action)
(1RH-624 is 'A' RHR HX Outlet FCV, 1RH
A. - 1RH-624 will close slightly to maintain HX outlet temperature.
- 1RH-626 position will not change.
B. - 1RH-624 will open slightly to maintain constant HX flow.
- 1RH-626 will close slightly to maintain RHR return temperature.
C. - 1RH-624 position will not change
- 1RH-626 will open slightly to maintain constant RHR return flow.
D. - 1RH-624 position will not change
- 1RH-626 will close slightly to maintain constant RHR return flow.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect, see C.
B: Incorrect, see C.
C: Correct, RH
-624 is a manually controlled valve with RH
-626 sensing a lower flow due to the leak and therefore adjusts itself open to raise flow to maintain 1500 GPM.
D: Incorrect, correct RH
-624 response but opposite RH-626 response.
Learning Objective: Predict the effects and Recognize the associated corrective actions for malfunctions of the RHR system.
(051.03.LP0069.010)
- Unit 2 has experienced a large break LOCA
- The crew has entered EOP
-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection'
- During the performance of immediate actions 2A06 4160 VAC Safeguards Bus faulted - You are the Third License and have been tasked with completing EOP
-0 Attachment A What indications are there for 2P
-15B Safety Injection Pump and associated suction valve (2SI
-896B); what actions, if any, will be taken?
A. Breaker 'GREEN' light LIT; leave pump switch in 'AUTO'. 2SI-896B NO lights LIT; leave valve OPEN. B. Breaker 'WHITE' light LIT; place pump switch in 'PULLOUT'. 2SI-896B RED' light LIT; locally SHUT valve. C. Breaker 'RED' light LIT; leave pump switch in 'AUTO'. 2SI-896B 'RED' light LIT; leave valve OPEN. D. Breaker 'RED' light LIT; place pump switch i n 'PULLOUT'. 2SI-896B NO lights LIT; locally SHUT valve.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: The SI signal cause the breaker for the SI pumps to shut, regardless of whether or not the 4160V safeguard bus has power. Due to loss of 2A06, 2P-15B is not running; this is then addressed in the Att. A of EOP
-0 B: Incorrect: The 'WHITE' indicator is a common indication for a lockout, placing the pump switch is correct. The SI Pump Suction valve will lose indications, though the correct thing to do in this situation is to locally shut it.
C: Incorrect: SI Pump Breaker indication is correct for being shut, though the pump should be placed in PULLOUT due to no power to it. The SI Pump Suction valve will lose indications, the valve should be locally shut.
D: Correct: SI Pump Breaker indication is correct for being shut, the pump switch should be placed in PULLOUT due to no power to it. The SI Pump Suction valve will lose indications, the valve should be locally shut.
Learning Objective: STATE the power supply to the Safety Injection System components:
- a. Safety Injection Pumps
- b. Motor Operated Valv es (051.03.LP0066.003)
- 32. 2012 ILT RO 32 Which of the following relief valves discharge to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT)? A. 1WL-1712, Reactor Coolant Drain Tank relief valve B. 1CV-283A, 'A' Charging Pump Discharge relief valve C. 1CC-762A, RCP Thermal Barrier relief valve D. 1CV-203, Letdown Line relief valve Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Relieves to the containment.
B: Incorrect: Relieves to suction of charging pumps.
C: Incorrect: Relieves to the containment.
D: Correct: Relieves to the PRT.
Learning Objective: Draw and Discuss a one line diagram of the CVCS. Discussion should include flowpaths/flow ratings, major components, and interfaces with other major systems.
(051.02.LP0079.002)
- 33. 2012 ILT RO 33 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers are in a NORMAL alignment with the exception of HX
-12B CCW Heat Exchanger being isolated and partially drained for a maintenance activity associated with its relief valve, CC
-721B. Operators are in the process of filling and venting HX
-12B per 1-SOP-CC-002, 'Component Cooling System Drain and Refill', in support of PMT.
What indications will be seen in Control if the relief valve CC
-721B leaks by its seat? A. Continuously lowering level in Unit 1 CCW Surge Tank ONLY. B. Lowering level in Unit 1 CCW Surge Tank and rising level in Unit 2 CCW Surge Tank. C. Continuously lowering level in Unit 2 CCW Surge Tank ONLY. D. Level perturbations in Unit 1 CCW Surge Tank due to relief valve return flow.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Plausible as several relief valves go to the atmosphere/WHUT in the CCW system B: Correct: All relief valves on the CCW HX's relieve to Unit 2 CCW Surge Tank.
C: Incorrect: 'B' is a swing heat exchanger and could be assumed lined up to Unit 2.
D: Incorrect: Level perturbations are notes in 1
-SOP-CC-002 and can occur when filling the system, but not due to a lifting relief. Plausible if examinee thinks relief goes to Unit 1 CCW Surge Tank and is causing level changes.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design bases, physical locations and operating characteristics of the Component Cooling Water System and major components. (051.06.LP0084.001)
- 34. 2012 ILT RO 34 Which of the following describes the mode of operation for the pressurizer PORVs during a normal plant cooldown with the Reactor Coolant System temperature at 300°F?
A. BOTH PORV control switches in AUTO BOTH trains of LTOP ARMED BOTH block valves are OPEN and their supply breakers OPEN B. BOTH PORV control switches in AUTO BOTH trains of LTOP ARMED BOTH block valves are OPEN and their supply breakers SHUT C. ONE PORV control switch to AUTO ONE train of LTOP ARMED ONE block valve OPEN and its supply breaker OPEN D. ONE PORV control switch in AUTO ONE train of LTOP ARMED ONE block valve OPEN and its supply breaker SHUT Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Power is maintained to the both block valves in case of LTOP failure.
B: Correct: When aligning the PZR PORV's for LTOP Operation (~330F to 340F), both PORV's are checked to be in AUTO, the associated relief valves OPEN C: Incorrect: Both PORV's are shifted to LTOP operation by 300
°F D: Incorrect: Both PORV's are shifted to LTOP operation by 300
°F Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the requirements for operability verification of the Low temperature overpressure Protection System. (055.01.LP0272.008)
- The unit is starting up from a mid
-cycle outage and is at 28% power.
- PT-482, Steam Generator Pressure Loop A (Blue) channel previously failed HIGH and has been removed from service IAW 0
-SOP-IC-001 Blue, Removing Safeguards or Protection Sensor from Service.
- While I&C was collecting comparison data from PT
-468, Steam Generator Pressure Loop A (Red) channel, an inadvertent short caused PT
-468 output to fail LOW. What is the status of the MFRV, MFRV Bypass Valves and MFIV's?
MFRV's MFRV Bypass's MFIV's A. THROTTLING SHUT OPEN B. SHUT SHUT SHUT C. SHUT THROTTLING OPEN D. SHUT SHUT OPEN Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Upon SI actuation, the MFIV shuts. The slugging feature is removed on Unit 1, not on Unit 2 for the MFRV. Plausible if the student fails to understand/note the effect of the actions taken to remove PT
-482 from service (no reactor trip or SI).
B: Correct: Removal of PT
-482 causes one of the inputs to SI actuation to come in. Upon the failure of PT
-468 LOW, the 2/3 logic for SI actuation based on low S/G pressure is complete which in turn causes the feedwater isolation sequence. Once received, all of the valves will begin to shut.
C: Incorrect: The MFRV Bypass valve and MFIV receive a shut single upon a SI actuation. This is plausible if the student misunderstands the effects of the instrument failure and determines a reactor trip has occurred with no AFW actuation on low S/G level.
D: Incorrect: Upon SI actuation, the MFIV shuts. This is plausible if the student misunderstands the effects of the instrument failure and determines a reactor trip has occurred with AFW actuation on low S/G level.
Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the function and/or purpose, design bases, and operating characteristics of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and its major components/subsystems including:
- e. Feedline Isolation (053.06.LP0486.001)
- Unit 2 was at full power.
- 2X04 Auxiliary Transformer locked out.
- 'A' Main Steam Line developed a line break.
- 'A' Main Steam Line pressure lowered to 530 PSIG. - EDG's G03 and G04 failed to start.
For the following valves, which of the following would be the expected valve alignment :
- 2SI-878 B/D, Loop B Safety Injection valves
- 2SI-852 A/B, Core Deluge valves
2SI-878B/D 2SI-852A/B A. Open/Open Shut/Open B. Shut/Shut Open/Shut C. Open/Open Open/Shut D. Open/Shut Open/Shut Explanation:
A: Incorrect: The loop B safety injection valves should be open for this condition. The SI-852 Core Deluge Valves should open. The 852A being shut would be correct if student does not apply the correct power supply.
B: Incorrect: Core Deluge Valves get an SI signal to open, Loop B SI valves get an open signal but are already open, condition if examinee thought 878
-B/D were 'B' train with no power to open and confused them with SI
-878A/C vessel injection valves.
C: Correct: Loop B SI valves are normally open and with only 1 train of power only one of the core deluge valves will open.
D: Incorrect: Loop SI valves get an SI signal to open, correct if examinee thinks all 'A' train valves should open.
Learning Objective: STATE the power supply to the Safety Injection System components:
- a. Safety Injection Pumps b. Motor Operated Valves (051.03.LP0066.003)
- 37. 2012 ILT RO 37 Containment temperature has increased from 90ºF to 120ºF due to a Containment Cooling malfunction.
If the plant is stable at 100% power and there are negligible RCS or Containment pressure changes, which of the following describes the effect of the rise in containment temperature on the Pressurizer level indicated by the Pressurizer level control channels?
A. Indicated level will be HIGHER than actual level because the reference leg fluid density decreases.
B. Indicated level will be HIGHER than actual level because the elevated containment temperature causes increased flashing in the reference leg.
C. Indicated level will be LOWER than actual level because the reference leg fluid density decreases.
D. Indicated level will be LOWER than actual level because of the elevated containment temperature causes increased flashing in the reference leg.
Explanation:
A: Correct: Temperature rise of water will lower density. With a lower density on the reference leg and no change in Pressurizer level, indicated level goes up.
B: Incorrect: Correct actual level response but wrong reason.
C: Incorrect: Wrong level response but correct reason.
D: Incorrect: Wrong level response and reason.
Learning Objective: Given a potential failure mode for a differential pressure cell used for level indication, DESCRIBE how indicated level will be affected:
- c. Temperature changes (KFI04L.04C)
- 38. 2012 ILT RO 38 Containment Spray is operated during a Large Break LOCA with suction from the RWST until _____________.
A. RWST is less than 17%, then suction is transferred to RHR sump recirculation only if containment pressure is less than 5 psig B. RWST is less than 17%, then transferred to RHR sump recirculation C. RWST level is 34% and then secured to conserve inventory D. At least 17% of the NaOH Tank has been added to Containment, and then secured to conserve inventory.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Correct RWST level, but securing the pump is not dependent on containment pressure.
B: Correct: Per EOP
-1.3 if spray is still required it will be transferred to RHR sump recirculation as a suction source when the RWST is less than 17% level.
C: Incorrect: 34% is the level in which sump recirculation is initiated. This is plausible if the student believes that spray will be secured at this time.
D: Incorrect: EOP-1.3 makes a check at step 5 to see if the Containment Spray Pumps must be started to adjust pH. The step has Spray Pumps started if not running and adequate NaOH has not been injected. Students commonly confuse this action with requirements to secure Spray Pumps.
Learning Objective:
Given the appropriate condition/parameters and access to the site specific simulator, IMPLEMENT the following procedures for the specified condition:
- Low Head Injection (031.02.LP0435.010)
- Unit 1 was at 15% reactor power - Main Steam Line Break on 'B' SG has occurred inside containment
- An automatic Reactor Trip and Safety Injection occurred
- The following parameters are now noted:
- Containment pressure is 7 PSIG and RISING - Tcold is 450ºF and LOWERING - 'B' Steam flow is 1.8 x 10 6 lbm/hr - 'A' Steam flow is 1.0 x10 6 lbm/hr - 'B' MSIV is SHUT - 'A' MSIV is OPEN Which of the following is correct regarding the 'A' MSIV?
A. 'A' MSIV should have closed due to High Containment Pressure.
B. 'A' MSIV should have closed due to Low Tavg and High Steam Flow coincident with the SI signal.
C. 'A' MSIV is in the proper alignment but will close if 'A' High
-High Steam Flow bistable actuates coincident with the SI signal.
D. 'A' MSIV is in the proper alignment but will close if containment reaches High Containment Pressure setpoint.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Main Steam Line Isolation occurs at 15 PSIG in containment.
B: Correct: The following items will shut the MSIVs:
High CTMT Pressure of 15 PSIG OR Presence of SI and 1. High Steam Flow with Tavg <543ºF OR 2. High-High Steam Flow at about 0.522 x 10 6 lbm/hr In this case, there is still about high steam flow from the 'A' SG. MSIV should have shut due to Hi Steam Flow and Lo Tavg. C: Incorrect: MSIV is not in proper alignment, plausible if high steam flow, Low Tavg interlock is forgotten.
D: Incorrect: MSIV is not in proper alignment. Plausible if examinee recognizes that 15 PSIG in Containment is Main Steam Line Isolation Setpoint, but fails to recognize other signal present.
Learning Objective:
STATE the plant systems that provide protection against core damage during a faulted steam generator. (031.02.LP0441.003)
-3C, 'Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown', using the Condenser Steam Dumps.
Which of the following statements describes the basis for COOLDOWN pressure/temperature limits?
A. The controlling location is at the outside of the vessel wall because the thermal gradients produce compressive stresses there.
B. The controlling location is at the inside of the vessel wall because the thermal gradients produce compressive stresses there.
C. The controlling location is at the outside of the vessel wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses there.
D. The controlling location is at the inside of the vessel wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses there.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Wrong location and the wrong type of stress.
B: Incorrect: Inside the vessel wall is the correct location but the wrong type of stress.
C: Incorrect: Wrong location but tensile stresses are correct.
D: Correct: Tensile stresses are produced on the inside wall of the vessel during a cooldown.
Learning Objective: EXPLAIN why cooldown is often the more limiting case for Reactor Vessel stress consideration. (043.02.LP0448.004)
- 41. 2012 ILT RO 41 With Unit 1 at 83% power, which of the following failures will cause RCS Tavg to INITIALLY RISE
? A. 1LI-471 'B' Steam Generator Yellow Channel Narrow Range Level fails LOW. B. 'A' Steam Generator Feed Pump Discharge MOV spuriously closes.
C. The air supply isolation to 'B' Main Feedwater Bypass Valve is inadvertently closed.
D. 1PI-482A 'A' Steam Generator Blue Steam Pressure Channel fails HIGH. Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Opposite plant response for a controlling S/G level transmitter, the channel listed is a controlling channel.
B: Correct: With less feed flow going to the S/G's, less heat is removed, therefore Reactor Coolant Temperature will rise.
C: Incorrect: This valve is not open at 83% power and could be misunderstood to be a main feedwater regulating valve failure which would cause this response.
D: Incorrect: This failure will cause steam flow going high which in turn would cause feed flow to go up which would cause Reactor Coolant Temperature to lower.
Learning Objective:
PREDICT/EXPLAIN the primary and secondary plant effects for a Loss of Normal Feedwater and potential impact on safety limits.
(043.02.LP2462.004)
- Unit 1 is at 75% power
- 1P-28A, 'A' Main Feedwater Pump has just tripped What turbine load does AOP
-2B, 'Feedwater System Malfunction', direct the operator to establish?
A. < 50% B. < 55% C. < 60% D. < 65% Explanation:
A: Incorrect: This is a number seen in AOP
-17A which would be used to lower power.
B: Incorrect: Plausible as it is between half power and the actual limit.
C: Correct: AOP directs power to go less than 60% for loss of a main feed pump.
D: Incorrect: Plausible as it is near the limit and the unit would likely maintain SG levels at 65%.
Learning Objective:
Given access to the Site Specific Simulator or specific plant conditions, Evaluate plant indications associated with the following events:
- b. Feedwater System Malfunction.
(055.03.LP2439.004)
- P-38A, Standby Steam Generator Feed Pump is OOS for an oil change
- An electrical perturbation in the switchyard has caused:
- 1F52-122 Unit 1 345 KV Generator Output Breaker to TRIP - 1A06 4160 VAC Safeguards Bus to LOCKOUT - Unit 1 has entered CSP
-H.1, 'Loss of Heat Sink' due to spurious Low Suction Pressure Trips on all operating AFW Pumps Which of the following are potential feedwater sources that could be used during the implementation of CSP
-H.1? A. Unit 1 Main Feedwater Pumps, 1P-29 TDAFW Pump, and 2P
-53 MDAFW Pump.
B. Unit 1 Condensate Pumps, 1P
-29 TDAFW Pump, and 1P
-53 MDAFW Pump.
-38B SSG Pump, and 1P
-53 MDAFW Pump.
D. P-38B SSG Pump, 1P
-29 TDAFW Pump, and 2P
-53 MDAFW Pump.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: No power available to 1A01 and 1A02 4160 VAC busses therefore no power for the Main Feedwater Pumps. 1P
-29 TDAFW Pump is not affected by the loss of AC power.
B: Incorrect: No power available to 1A01 and 1A02 4160 VAC busses therefore no power for the Condensate Pumps or 1P
-53 MDAFW Pump (1A
-06 Bus lockout). 1P
-29 TDAFW Pump is not affected by the loss of AC power.
C: Incorrect: No power for 1P
-53 MDAFW Pump (1A
-06 Bus lockout). There are no cross unit capabilities for the turbine driven AFW Pumps. D: Correct: P-38B SSG Feed Pump and 2P
-53 are powered off of Unit 2 and 2P
-53 can be cross
-tied to feed the Unit 1 Steam Generators. 1P
-29 TDAFW Pump is not affected by the loss of AC power.
Learning Objective:
State the power supplies for the following Auxiliary Feedwater components:
- a. Electrical Driven AFW Pumps (052.05.LP0169.003)
T= 0 sec 1P
-53, Motor Driven AFW Pump, received an AUTO start signal.
T= 10 sec T
-24A/B Condensate Storage Tank levels are 1.5 FT and LOWERING. T= 15 sec 1P
-53 suction pressure is 5.5 psig and LOWERING. T= 30 sec The 3rd License notices 1AF
-4067, 1P-53 AFP Suction from SW MOV, is SHUT. What action(s), if any, should be taken?
A. No action is required, 1AF
-4067 will AUTO open, monitor the system for proper operation.
B. Send the AO to LOCALLY OPEN 1AF-4067. C. MANUALLY override and START P
-38A and P-38B SSG Feed Pumps.
D. Secure 1P-53, MANUALLY OPEN 1AF-4067 and then restart 1P
-53.
Explanation:
This question tests both parts of the listed K/A. The "use procedures" part of the K/A is implicitly tested by OM 3.7 provisions being needed to arrive at the correct answer. We did not list OM 3.7 in the stem to avoid leading the candidate to the answer.
A: Incorrect: This is plausible as either a low
-low-low level OR low suction pressure (14 sec delay) will auto swap over to the SW system.
B: Incorrect: 1AF-4067 should have started to auto open at time 10 seconds, pump will trip after 21 seconds of low suction pressure. By the time the valve is opened locally, the 1P
-53, MDAFW pump, would have tripped.
C: Incorrect: This is a common RNO action in emergency procedures to supply water to the S/G's in case of the TDAFW or MDAFW Pump failures.
D: Correct: The 1P
-53, MDAFW pump, is manually tripped prior to 21 seconds per OM 3.7, in order to protect the equipment. 1AF
-4067 should have started to auto open at time 10 seconds, pump will trip after 21 seconds of low suction pressure.
Learning Objective:
ANALYZE the effects of component malfunctions on operation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. (052.05.LP0169.006)
- 45. 2012 ILT RO 45 You are the Third License performing TS 81, 'Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly test'. G01 EDG has just been synchronized to the grid with conditions established for the required 60 minute test run. The following G01 conditions are then noted: KW loading is 2850 KVAR loading is 475 out Amps are 380 Speed is 900 rp m Voltage is 4150
Based on these indications, what actions are you going to take?
A. Reduce VARS by going to lower on the voltage regulator control switch.
B. Trip the EDG to prevent exceeding the maximum voltage ratings of the supplied loads. C. Lower KW load by going to lower on the governor control switch.
D. Continue monitoring G01 until the required test run is satisfied.
Explanation: Per TS-81 page 26 for the 60 minute run KW loading should be 2600
-2700 kW, 300-800 KVARS and amp are not to exceed 450.
A: Incorrect: VARS are within limits so this action is inappropriate.
B: Incorrect: Tripping the diesel can protect it but the given voltage ratings are in the normal band.
C: Correct: Going to lower on the governor will lower KW loading. D: Incorrect: This would be correct if all the EDG parameters were within specifications.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the procedures which govern the operation of the Diesel Generator System.
Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed and Auxiliary Operators.
(054.02.LP0133.006)
- Both units are in a normal full power electrical line up - An H02 13.8 KV Bus Lockout occured 1 minute ago What is the status of Unit 1 Safeguards Busses?
A. 4160 VAC and 480 VAC Safeguards Busses are AUTOMATICALLY powered from offsite due to the 13.8 KV fast bus transfer.
B. 4160 VAC and 480 VAC Safeguards Busses are AUTOMATICALLY powered from EDG's. C. 4160 VAC Safeguards Busses are powered from EDG's and the 480 VAC Safeguards Busses will have to be MANUALLY re-energized.
D. 4160 VAC Safeguards Busses will have to be MANUALLY re-energized from EDG's and then the 480 VAC Safeguards Busses will AUTOMATICALLY be re-energized.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Certain 13.8 KV electrical malfunctions cause the 13.9 KV fast bus transfer to operate and then busses remain powered automatically from offsite power.
B: Correct: With this malfunction and electrical line up all 4160 VAC and 480 VAC Safeguards busses are automatically powered from the EDG's. The EDG's power up the 4160 VAC busses with the 480 VAC busses having no UV trip feature, they ride the bus.
C: Incorrect: The first part of this statement is true regarding 4160 Safeguards busses. 480 VAC busses are manually aligned in RNO actions of EOP
-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection immediate actions or ECA
-0.0 Loss of All AC RNO actions. D: Incorrect: The first part of this statement is NOT true regarding 4160 safeguards busses. 4160 VAC busses are manually aligned in RNO actions of EOP
-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection immediate actions or ECA
-0.0 Loss of All AC actions.
The EDG's power up the 4160 VAC busses with the 480 VAC busses having no UV trip feature, they ride the bus.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the interlocks associated with the 4160 VAC Electrical System and its major components. (054.01.LP0007.004)
- 47. 2012 ILT RO 47 According to AOP 0.0, 'Vital DC System Malfunction,' a loss of which of the following would cause a DUAL UNIT TRIP
? A. D01 B. D13 C. D18 D. D21 Explanation:
A: Correct: Loss of D01 or D02 will cause a dual unit trip.
B: Incorrect: Loss of D13 will trip Unit 2 C: Incorrect: Loss of D18 will trip Unit 2 D: Incorrect: Loss of D21 will trip Unit 1
Learning Objective:
Given access to the appropriate equipment indication, DIAGNOSE and DESCRIBE the plant and operator(s) response to the following condition:
- a. Loss of a DC Bus (055.03.LP3456.001)
- D-01/D-03 125V DC Bus Under/Over Voltage alarm is LIT - D-07 Battery Charger Trouble alarm is LIT - Unit 2 RO determined D
-07 tripped off and D01 voltage is AT the alarm setpoint What is the expected voltage and what are the implications of these alarms?
Voltage Implications A. 105 Volts Battery D05 will continuously discharge B. 105 Volts DC Bus Voltage is at Tech Spec minimum C. 127 Volts DC Bus Voltage is at Tech Spec minimum D. 127 Volts Battery D05 will continuously discharge
Explanation:
A: Incorrect, alarm comes in earlier than this value, correct implication.
B: Incorrect, alarm comes in earlier than this value. Plausible to have an alarm near TS minimum voltage.
C: Incorrect, alarm warns of slightly lower than normal voltage to give the CR time to address the failure prior to other, more drastic, conditions.
D: Correct, alarm warns of slightly lower than normal voltage to give the CR time to address the failure, battery discharges with no charger.
Learning Objective: Identify and Describe the Control Room controls, alarms, and indications associated with the DC Electrical System (054.01LP0121.06)
- Both Units are at rated power.
- G04 EDG is tagged out due to fuel oil contamination discovered in the G04 EDG Day Tank. - G04 EDG Day Tank is drained.
- G03 EDG is aligned to 4.16 kV buses 1A06 and 2A06.
- A fault occurs on Low Voltage Station Transformer 2X04.
- All systems function normally with the exception that G03 EDG fails to start due to a major mechanical failure.
- Operations personnel are attempting to restore G04 EDG to service. P-207B G04 EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump ___________?
A. CANNOT be used to refill the G04 Day Tank since P
-207B is powered from 480 VAC MCC 2B40 B. CANNOT be used to refill the G04 Day Tank since P
-207B is powered from 480 VAC MCC 1B40 C. CAN be used to refill the G04 Day Tank since P
-207B is powered from 480 VAC MCC 2B40 D. CAN be used to refill the G04 Day Tank since P
-207B is powered from 480 VAC MCC 1B40.
Explanation:
A: Correct: Power is lost to 2B40 once 2X04 is lost, therefore P
-207B is not available to refill G04 Day Tank.
B: Incorrect: P-207B is powered from 2B40; P
-206B is powered from 1B40.
C: Incorrect: P-207B can be aligned to fill G04 Day Tank, but power is lost to 2B40 once 2X04 is lost, therefore P
-207B is not available to refill G04 Day Tank. D: Incorrect: P-207B is powered from 2B40; P
-206B is powered from 1B40.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the interlocks and automatic actuation setpoints associated with the Diesel Generator System and its major components. (054.02.LP0133.004)
- G04 EDG will be operated per TS
-84, 'Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly' Who is required to be notified, if anybody, that G04 will be synchronized to 2A06 4160 Safeguards Bus?
A. No external notifications are required to be made.
B. The Duty and Call Supervisor will be notified at the start and completion of TS
-84. C. NextEra Nuclear Duty Officer is notified that G04 will be tied to the grid.
D. American Transmission Company (ATC) is notified that electrical switching limitations are in effect.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Notifications are made per TS
-84, as well as NP 2.1.5, Electrical Communications, Switchyard Access and Work Planning B: Incorrect: The DCS maybe informed of the start and completion of TS
-84, but he is NOT REQUIRED to be informed.
C: Incorrect: No notification is made to the Nuclear Duty Officer based on G04 on the grid. D: Correct: Notifications are made per TS
-84, as well as NP 2.1.5, Electrical Communications, Switchyard Access and Work Planning, to ATC.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the procedures which govern the operation of the Diesel Generator System.
Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed and Auxiliary Operators.
(054.02.LP0133.006)
- Unit 2 'A' Steam Generator has a Tube Rupture.
- The following RMS alarms and valve positions are noted:
- RMS ALARMS:
- 2RE-222, Unit 2 SGBD Tank Area Monitor in ALERT - 2RE-219, Unit 2 SGBD Sample Line Monitor in HIGH ALARM - VALVE POSITIONS:
- 2MS-5958, Unit 2 'A' SG BD Isolation valve
- CLOSED - 2MS-5959, Unit 2 'B' SG BD Isolation valve - CLOSED - 2MS-2040, Unit 2 SGBD Tank Outlet Isolation valve
- CLOSED - 2MS-2083, Unit 2 'A' SGBD Sample Isolation valve
- OPEN - 2MS-2084, Unit 2 'B' SGBD Sample Isolation valve
- OPEN Are the listed valves in the required position for the given alarm conditions?
Why or why not?
(Assume no operator action)
A. Yes, the Sample Isolation valves will go closed if 2RE
-222 goes into HIGH Alarm. B. Yes, the Sample Isolation valves do NOT automatically close on RMS alarms and will need to be manually closed, if desired.
C. No, with 2RE
-219 in HIGH Alarm, all listed valves should be closed.
D. No, since the SG Tube Rupture is on the 'A' SG, only 2MS
-5958 and 2083 should be closed. The remaining valves should all be open.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: This would be correct if 2RE
-222 was in high alarm and 2RE
-219 was in alert. B: Incorrect: This distractor tests the knowledge of which radiation monitor controls which valves.
C: Correct: In this case, all listed valves will shut on 2RE
-219 High Alarm.
D: Incorrect: This is plausible if candidate fails to recognize that high radiation on one SG will isolate BD from both.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the interlocks associated with the Steam Generator Blowdown System and its major components: Blowdown Isolation Valves, Blowdown Tank Outlet Valve, Blowdown Sample Valves. (052.02.LP0037.004)
- Both units are at full power.
- The 'B' Gas Decay Tank is being discharged per OP
-9D, 'Discharge of Gas Decay Tanks.'
Which of the following is required by the Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Setpoint and Response Book (RMSASRB) if RE
-214, 'Aux Building Vent Exhaust Monitor' detector goes into FAIL HIGH?
A. Ensure RE-315, 'Aux Building Exhaust Low Range Gas Monitor' is available as a back-up discharge monitor.
B. Ensure RE-325, 'Drumming Area Exhaust Low Range Gas Monitor' is available as a back-up discharge monitor.
C. Contact RP to perform grab samples of Aux Building Exhaust every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
D. Verify the Gas Decay Tank discharge has automatically isolated.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: RE-315 is not used as a backup monitor, but provides a redundant indication to RE
-214. RE-315 is in the same exhaust stack.
B: Incorrect: RE-325 does not provide backup or redundant indication to RE
-214. RE-325 is in line with RE
-214. C: Incorrect: Samples may be drawn, but no requirements for 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> samples.
D: Correct: Per RMSASRB, RE
-214 should shut the Vent Gas Release Valve RCV
-014, as well as shifting the PAB Ventilation to align the carbon filter.
Learning Objective: ASSESS the effects of malfunctions in the Radiation Monitoring System. (053.05.LP0286.004)
- Both units are in MODE 1
- A Unit 2 reactor trip occurs and safety injection is MANUALLY actuated - 2X04 LV Station Auxiliary Transformer locked out
- The crew is responding per EOP
-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection'
- G-04 EDG failed to start
- EOP-0 Attachment 'A', Automatic Action Verification has just been completed Considering Service Water ONLY; which of the following describes the plant response? (2SW-2907 and 2908, Containment Ventilation Cooler Emergency Flow Control Valves) A. 2SW-2907 and 2SW
-2908 BOTH automatically opened. B. 2SW-2907 and 2SW
-2908 BOTH remained shut.
C. 2SW-2907 automatically opened and 2SW
-2908 remains shut.
D. 2SW-2907 remains shut and 2SW
-2908 automatically opened. Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Normal response when power is available for both safeguards trains.
B: Incorrect: Correct in that one valve would remain shut.
C: Correct: One train of safeguards power should have been restored via G02 EDG (Train A). 2SW
-2907 would have opened and 2SW
-2908 would remain shut due to no available power.
D: Incorrect: Opposite of what happens.
Learning Objective: STATE the power supplies for the Service Water Pumps and Motor Operated Valves. (051.06.LP0086.004)
- Unit 1 is at 100% power.
- Instrument Air has been isolated to Unit 1 containment due to an Instrument Air leak. How will this isolation impact Normal Letdown, Pressurizer Sprays and PORV operation (assume 10 minutes have passed since isolation)?
Normal LD PZR Sprays PORVs A. Not Avail. Failed Closed On N 2 Backup B. Available On N 2 Backup On N 2 Backup C. Available Failed Closed Failed Closed D. Not Avail.
On N 2 Backup Failed Closed
Explanation:
A: Incorrect, letdown cannot operate without IA, spray has nitrogen back up, PORVs have nitrogen back up but it is not aligned at power.
B: Incorrect , letdown incorrect, spray correct, PORVs have nitrogen back up but it is not aligned at power.
C: Incorrect, letdown incorrect, spray incorrect, PORV correct.
D: Correct, spray has nitrogen back up aligned at all times, PORVs fail closed and letdown cannot operate with out IA.
Learning Objective: Recognize and Diagnose the effects of a loss of the Instrument and Service Air Systems on the following:
- e. CVCS h. Pressurizer Control (052.06LP0338.007)
- 55. 2012 ILT RO 55 Which of the following Safeguards Signals DIRECTLY causes a Containment Isolation Signal (CI)?
A. AUTO Safety Injection Signal B. MANUAL Safety Injection Signal C. Main Steam Line Isolation Signal D. AUTO Containment Spray Actuation Signal Explanation:
A: Correct: Auto safety injection sends a signal to the containment isolation circuit.
B: Incorrect: When manual safety injection is used, manual containment isolation is required. C: Incorrect: Safety injection sends a signal to the MSIV isolation circuit.
D: Incorrect: Containment spray is at 25 psig so a containment isolation signal should have been sent at 5 psig containment pressure.
Learning Objective: Describe the automatic functions associated with the ESFAS and its major components. Description should include ...actuation logic....
(053.06.LP0486.014)
- 56. 2012 ILT RO 56 Which of the following would occur if 1B01 480 VAC Bus was lost for 10 seconds? A. The Rod Drive Mechanisms would lose power and the control rods would drop into the core. B. The 'A' Rod drive MG set would trip and the 'B' Rod drive MG set would assume the full load.
C. The synchronizer would automatically re
-close the 'A' trip breaker when the voltage and frequency were matched.
D. Nothing, the Rod Drive MG set flywheel is designed to sustain a loss of power for up to 1 minute.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Only true if both trains are lost for rod drive MG sets. Bus 1B02 should be able to supply power for the CRDM's. Examinee may thing the MG sets are in series like the reactor trip breakers. B: Correct: MG sets are in parallel and if one goes away the other is able to assume full load.
C: Incorrect: This action occurs when the second MG set is started up to perform a reactor start up.
D: Incorrect: MG set flywheel is designed for up to a 1 sec loss of power and the RCP flywheels are designed for up to 1 minute of coastdown.
Learning Objective:
DRAW and DISCUSS a one
-line diagram of the Control Rod Power Supply System similar to TRHB figure 10.5.7. Discussion of this drawing should include system flowpaths and major components. (054.04.LP0213.002)
- 57. 2012 ILT RO 57 A Reactor Startup is in progress on Unit 1. The crew has just completed recording critical data. When the RO begins to withdraw control rods to raise reactor power, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instruments SUR lowers at a negative 0.3 DPM.
The following conditions exist:
- The Control Bank D step counter reads 131 steps.
- Individual Rod Position Indicators (IRPI) for Control Bank D Rods G3 and G11 indicate 0 steps.
Which of the following has occurred based on these indications?
A. The IRPI indicators have failed, Technical Specifications should be referenced.
B. The control bank step counter and associated IRPI indicators, along with the NIS indications are consistent with multiple dropped rods.
C. An ATWS condition exists since more than a single dropped rod would have resulted in a reactor trip.
D. The control bank D group step counter has failed, it should also read 0 steps if rods in this group are fully inserted.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Negative SUR indicates significant negative reactivity has been added.
B: Correct: Based on the immediate negative SUR upon raising reactor power and two IRPI indicating zero for Bank "D" rods, 2 drop rods are indicated.
C: Incorrect: Manual Reactor trip is procedurally required, but no automatic trip.
D: Incorrect: Bank "D" wouldn't be at 0 when critical. Desired is 100 to 150 steps.
Learning Objective:
LIST the symptoms/indications of the following:
- a. Dropped Control Rod
(055.03.LP2441.003)
- Unit 1 was at 26% power and increasing IAW OP
-1C, 'Startup to Power Operation'.
- A closure of BOTH Main Feedwater Regulating Valves results in a Reactor Trip.
- Both S/G NR levels are at 0%.
- It is now 30 seconds later.
What is the expected response of the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) and why?
A. AMSAC will NOT actuate because it was not armed.
B. AMSAC will NOT actuate because the time delay is not satisfied.
C. AMSAC will TRIP the Main Turbine and START the AFW pumps.
D. AMSAC will START the AFW pumps, and SHUT the SG blowdown isolation valves.
Explanation:
A: Correct: AMSAC does not arm until >30% turbine power.
B: Incorrect: If AMSAC were armed, the TD (27 sec.) is met.
C: Incorrect: If AMSAC were actuated, this would be correct.
D: Incorrect: If AMSAC were actuated, this would be correct.
Learning Objective:
Using a LOFWTT diagram, Demonstrate which combinations of inputs will result in LOFWT actuation. (053.02.LP1828.002)
- 59. 2012 ILT RO 59 The plant is at rated power and the following containment parameters are observed:
- Containment Average Temperature: 110 ºF
- Containment Humidity: 75%
- Containment Pressure: +1.4 psig What, if any, containment parameter is out of specification, and what action is required to return the parameter to specification?
A. Containment Temperature is out of specification, and running additional Fan Cooler Units is required.
B. Containment Humidity is out of specification, and running additional Fan Cooler Units is required.
C. Containment Pressure is out of specification, and performing a Containment forced vent is required.
D. All parameters are within specification for the Containment, no actions are required.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Containment average air temperature is within the TS limit of
< 120 ºF per LCO 3.6.5, Containment Temperature. B: Incorrect: There is no limit for humidity.
C: Correct: TS limit for pressure is
+ 1.0 psig. TSAC 3.6.4.A states restore pressure to within limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
D: Incorrect: Containment pressure TS limit is
+ 1.0 psig.
Learning Objective:
Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specifications requirements as appropriate. (057.02.LP3342.002)
- Unit 1 is operating at 100%
- All systems are in their normal lineups
- All control systems are in automatic
- The main turbine generator output breaker trips on a fault Which of the following describes the expected IMMEDIATE plant response?
A. S/G pressure RISES as main turbine is lost, S/G levels initially RISE due to swell. B. S/G pressure RISES as main turbine is lost, S/G levels initially LOWER due to shrink. C. S/G pressure LOWERS as main turbine is lost, S/G levels initially LOWER due to shrink. D. S/G pressure LOWERS as main turbine is lost, S/G levels initially RISE due to swell. Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Correct response with steam pressure rising but opposite level response.
B: Correct: Initially (prior to steam dumps opening), steam header pressure increases due to the loss of steam demand. The increased back
-pressure in the S/Gs partially suppresses boiling which causes shrink to occur in the S/Gs. The reduced steam demand inputs to the feed controller to reduce feed thus feed flow decreases.
C: Incorrect: Correct level response but incorrect pressure response.
D: Incorrect: Both indications are opposite of actual plant response.
Learning Objective:
EXPLAIN the phenomenon of Steam Generator 'shrink' and 'swell', and STATE the factors that determine their magnitude. (043.01.LP0446.003)
- The unit is at rated power.
- Tave has slowly RISEN 0.2 ºF in the last 5 minutes.
- Main Generator output has LOWERED 10 MWe. Which of the following describes the cause of the above indications?
A. Control Rod insertion B. RCS dilution C. Steam Generator Safety Valve leakage D. Condenser Air Ejector malfunction
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Rod insertion will cause Tave to go down.
B: Incorrect: RCS dilution will cause Tave to go up and MWe to stay the same. C: Incorrect: Steam Generator Safety Valve leakage will cause Tave to lower and MWe to stay the same.
D: Correct: An Air Ejector malfunction will cause non
-condensable gases to build in Main Condenser. As gases build, vacuum will decrease. If vacuum decreases, then backpressure is rising, which will cause a decrease in steam flow (Delta P from SGs to condenser lowers). When Steam flow through the turbine is reduced, electrical load will also be reduced. In this case, the steam flow change is transmitted back to the RCS, causing Tave to rise
Learning Objective: Given access to the Site Specific Simulator, EVALUATE plant indications associated with the following e vents: c. Loss of Condenser Vacuum (055.03.LP2439.004)
- 'A' Waste Distillate Tank (WDT) is on recirc per OI
-140B Standard Radioactive Batch Liquid Release
- WDT. - A sample has been drawn and is in the process of being analyzed.
- Later, the PAB AO realizes 'A' WDT level has risen 4% due to valve leakby.
What effect, if any, will this have on the release permit preparations for 'A' WDT?
A. The release preparations may continue as long as volume added to tank does NOT exceed 5% of total tank volume ONLY. B. The release preparations may continue as long as volume added to tank does NOT exceed 5% of total tank volume AND re-verification of sample analysis is done.
C. A new sample must be drawn, with NO minimum required recirculation.
D. The tank will require further recirculation and resampling prior to release.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Any time water is added to the tank the contents must be recirculated and sampled per procedure.
B: Incorrect: Any time water is added to the tank the contents must be recirculated and sampled per procedure.
C: Incorrect: Correct that a new sample must be drawn, incorrect regarding recirculation.
D: Correct: Any time water is added to the tank the contents must be recirculated and sampled per procedure.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the procedures which govern the operation of the Liquid Waste Disposal System. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed and Non
-
Licensed Operators. (051.04.LP0063.004)
- Refueling operations are ongoing in containment.
- 1VNPSE-3244, Purge Supply Valve is OPEN. - 1VNPSE-3212, Purge Exhaust Valve is OPEN. - 1W-2A, Purge Supply Fan and 1W
-6A Purge Exhaust Fan are RUNNING. - 1RE-305, Containment Purge Exhaust Low Range Gas monitor goes into HIGH ALARM due to a fuel handling accident.
What effect will this alarm have on the Containment Purge System?
(CVI - Containment Ventilation Isolation)
A. - Supply and Exhaust valves will shut from CVI.
- Both fans will trip on interlock.
B. - Supply valve will shut from CVI; Exhaust valve remains open.
- Supply fan will trip from CVI; Exhaust fan remains running.
C. - Exhaust valve will shut from CVI; Supply valve remains open.
- Exhaust fan will trip from CVI; Supply fan remains running.
D. - Supply valve will shut from CVI; Exhaust valve remains open.
- Supply fan will trip on interlock; Exhaust fan remains running. Explanation:
A: Correct: All fans and valves will be secured after a CVI signal.
B: Incorrect: Incomplete correct answer, supply fan trips from interlock and the exhaust will get secured as well as supply.
C: Incorrect: Partial correct answer with the exception of the exhaust fan operation and supply is secured.
D: Incorrect: It is plausible to maintain the exhaust valve open and exhaust fan running to maintain a negative pressure on Containment and thereby minimize possible leakage out
.
Learning Objective: Describe the interlocks associated with the Containment Ventilation System and its major components:
- f. Radiation Monitor Actuations (051.05.LP0057.004)
K-2A Instrument Air Compressor is in CONSTANT K-2B Instrument Air Compressor is OOS Z-31, Instrument Air Dryer relief valve is failing open Which of the following correctly states the expected response of the Instrument Air System as the leak worsens?
(Assume no operator actions)
A. Instrument Air header pressures will eventually return to normal after Z
-31 Instrument Air Dryer automatically isolates the leak on high DP.
B. Instrument Air header pressures will continue to lower due to the leak. PCV
-3079, Service Air/Instrument Air Cross-connect valve will eventually open to try and restore Instrument Air header pressure.
C. Instrument Air header pressures will lower and IA
-3000-S, Z-39 IA Dryer Bypass valve, will open cross
-connecting the north and south Instrument Air Headers.
D. Instrument Air header pressures will lower and IA
-3094-S, Z-31 IA Dryer Bypass valve, will open to isolate the leak.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: There are no automatic isolations for high deltaP on the IA dryers.
B: Correct: As IA header pressure lowers there are various automatic compressor starts (including SA) and as pressure lowers the SA system is automatically cross
-connected to the IA system to help maintain operating pressure.
C: Incorrect: This valve will open automatically at 80 psig in the IA header but the north and south headers are already cross
-connected.
D: Incorrect: This valve will open automatically at 80 psig in the IA header but the leak will remain aligned.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the interlocks and automatic actuation setpoints associated with the Instrument and Service Air Systems, and major system components.
(052.06.LP0338.004)
- A report has come into the Control Room about a fire in the Main Turbine
- A HAD actuation has occurred on one of the Main Turbine bearings.
- The automatic Ansul System actuation has failed.
What action must be taken to MANUALLY actuate the Main Turbine Ansul System? A. Operate a manual pull station located near the Lube Oil Reservoir to initiate actuation on all main turbine bearings simultaneously.
B. Operate a manual pull station on the 44' Turbine Hall to initiate actuation on the affected Main Turbine bearing.
C. Depress a pushbutton located on the 26' Turbine Hall to initiate actuation on the affected Main Turbine bearing.
D. Depress a pushbutton on the rear of C01 to initiate actuation on all main turbine bearings simultaneously.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: A main turbine Ansul station is on the 26' turbine hall near the lube oil reservoir. The lube oil reservoir has its own deluge system which one might think is related to the Ansul system. The manual actions also only send Ansul to the actuated bearing.
B: Correct: There are manual actuation stations at each bearing on the 44' of the turbine hall.
C: Incorrect: There are manual actuations for the Main Turbine Ansul station on the 26', there are 2 different manual actions needed to send Ansul to the affected Main Turbine bearing.
D: Incorrect: There are manual pushbuttons for all the automatic fire system water deluge valves (not ANSUL) on the rear of C01 in case the automatic signal does not process through.
Learning Objective:
IDENTIFY and DESCRIBE the local controls, alarms, and indications associated with the Fire Protection System including:
- a. Location and function of component and/or system operating controls and control stations.
(052.01.LP0003.007)
- The crew is responding to a reactor trip and safety injection due to a Large Break LOCA.
- The Reactor Operator is in the process of performing immediate actions from memory. - You are the Third Reactor Operator addressing alarms.
- The Reactor Operator informs the SRO that Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) trip criteria is met and is preparing to secure the RCP's.
What action should you take as the Third Reactor Operator?
A. Continue addressing alarms, securing RCP's in this situation is appropriate.
B. Advocate to the crew to wait on securing RCP's until immediate actions are completed and verified.
C. Make a plant announcement that RCP's are being secured, and then continue to address alarms.
D. Provide the Reactor Operator a peer check to ensure RCP's are secured per foldout page criteria.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Securing the RCP's per foldout page criteria is not allowed until after immediate actions are read and verified.
B: Correct: Securing RCP's is done after immediate actions are completed and verified. Advocating for the crew to wait on tripping RCP's is appropriate.
C: Incorrect: The operators routinely announce on the gaitronics the starting and stopping of large pieces of equipment. This announcing is optional in the Emergency Operating Procedures. However, RCPs should not be tripped until after immediate actions are read and verified.
D: Incorrect: The Third Reactor Operator is routinely required to provide peer checks. Peer checks are optional during Emergency Procedure implementation but are regularly done. However, RCPs should not be tripped until after immediate actions are read and verified.
Learning Objective:
(SD 86.1 02.01.06) Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients
- 67. 2012 ILT RO 67 Which of the following components would require double isolation while creating a clearance boundary?
A. P-87, Lube Oil Storage Tank Pump B. P-207A, G02 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump C. T-33B, Instrument Air Receiver D. P-42A, Water Treatment Acid Pump Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Lube Oil is flammable and an environmental hazard but not considered hazardous for double isolation.
B: Incorrect: Fuel oil is flammable but not considered hazardous requiring double isolation.
C: Incorrect: Air pressure does not get high enough to be considered high energy.
D: Correct: Per OP
-AA-101-1000 Fleet Clearance and Tagging high energy or hazardous systems require double isolation whenever possible.
Learning Objective:
(SD 86.1 02.01.26) Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).
- 68. 2012 ILT RO 68 1P-15A Safety Injection Pump is posted as GUARDED EQUIPMENT. A contractor has called you, Unit 1 Reactor Operator, and requested permission to erect scaffolding inside the posted area.
Are activities allowed to be performed in the area of 1P-15A and if so, with whose authorization?
A. No activities are allowed.
B. Yes, Unit 1 OS.
C. Yes, the Work Control Center Manager.
D. Yes, the Operations Manager.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Generally no activities are allowed around and above guarded equipment due to the safety significant need of the equipment. Exceptions are approved by the Operations Manager.
B: Incorrect: Plausible as the unit SRO is asked or informed for virtually everything.
C: Incorrect: Plausible, as routine work activities and questions are handled by the WCC. D: Correct: Per NP 2.1.8 the Operations Manager must give permission.
Learning Objective: Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during power operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, and coordination with the transmission system operator. (SD 86.2 02.02.17)
- 69. 2012 ILT RO 69 Which of the following is an acceptable action prior to performing a Technical Specification Surveillance test?
A. Perform service water flushing of Containment Accident Fan Cooling coils prior to the performance of a normally scheduled TS 33, 'Containment Accident Recirculation Fan Cooler Units (Monthly) Unit 1.'
B. Vent 1P-15A, Safety Injection Pump, casing prior to performance of IT 01 Train A, 'High Head Safety Injection Pumps And Valves Train A Unit 1.'
C. Operate 1P
-29, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump per OI 62B, 'Turbine
-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System (P
-29)' just prior to performing IT 08, 'Cold Start of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump and Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1.' D. Taking SW-2891, 'South SW Hdr Xconn Valve' to shut and then stroke timing SW
-2891 open and then shut per IT 07G, 'Service Water Valves (Quarterly).'
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Flushing the service water lines prior to performing TS 33 would not give as-found test results for accident fan cooler performance. This would be considered pre
-conditioning and not allowed.
B: Correct: Venting the casing of a Safety Injection Pump is allowed and performed prior to pump testing.
C: Incorrect: IT 08 is a cold start of the TDAFW Pump and operation just prior to the test would be considered pre
-conditioning and not allowed.
D: Incorrect: Stroke testing a normally open valve is done in the shut direction first and then the open direction. Cycling the valve prior to stroke timing would be considered pre
-conditioning and not allowed.
Learning Objective: Knowledge of pre
- and post-maintenance operability requirements. (SD86.2 02.02.21)
- Unit 1 tripped 4 minutes ago due to a Turbine Generator failure
- Unit 2 2X-04 LV Station Transformer faulted 3 minutes ago
- No operator actions have been taken P-38A, Standby Steam Generator Feed Pump will start if __________.
A. its control switch is taken to START with NO other action B. IF the control switch for 1P
-53, Motor Driven AFW Pump is placed to PULLOUT C. its control switch is taken to START after the Override Switch is placed in OVERRIDE D. with an automatic start signal present Explanation:
A: Incorrect: With no auto start signal present for the MDAFW Pumps this would start P-38A. There is an auto start signal present for Unit 2 MDAFW Pump with the loss of safeguards power and EDG output breaker closure. There should also be a start signal for Unit 1 MDAFW Pump with levels in the S/G's shrinking low enough after the trip from full power.
B: Incorrect: There is a pullout signal on the logic sheet that could be confused to allow the start of P
-38A. C: Correct: The override switch needs to be taken out of normal (as shown on the logic) to override in order to start P
-38A with an automatic start signal to the MDAFW pumps.
D: Incorrect: If the logic is mis
-read one could think the automatic start signal for the AFW system is tied into the P
-38 start circuit.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the interlocks, automatic actuation setpoints, and permissives associated with major components of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. (052.05.LP0169.004)
- 71. 2012 ILT RO 71 Prior to moving irradiated fuel assemblies with the Spent Fuel Bridge and the Spent Fuel Handling Tool, we ensure that long
-handled tools have holes drilled in them.
Why do we require long handled tools to fill with water while working in the SFP?
A. Filling the tools with water helps minimize buoyancy for easier handling of fuel assemblies.
B. To prevent radiation streaming from highly radioactive material stored under water.
C. The water provides shielding which minimizes spurious Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor Alarms.
D. Keeping the inside of the tool wet prevents airborne conditions from developing thus minimizing personnel exposure.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Buoyancy is not an issue with fuel assembly weight.
B: Correct: Minimizes radiation exposure to the upper body.
C: Incorrect: Streaming radiation from the tool would not affect ARM's in the area.
D: Incorrect: A common practice to minimize airborne is wetting surfaces.
Learning Objective/#:
Describe the function, purpose, design basis, physical location, and operating characteristics of the Spent Fuel pool Equipment. (112.01.LP0260.001)
- Refueling Operations are ongoing IAW RP
-1C, Refueling.
- You are the Manipulator Crane operator inside Containment.
- A fuel assembly has been removed from the core and is in the "UP" position within the Manipulator Mast.
- Control Room informs you that the "Spent Fuel Pool Temp High, Level High or Lo" Alarm is LIT. - A leak has been identified on the CAVITY DRAIN line. - You note a slowly lowering level in the Refueling Pool.
Which of the following is the proper location to place the fuel assembly?
A. RCCA Change Fixture B. Back in the Reactor Vessel C. Containment Upender in the horizontal position D. Within the Manipulator Mast Explanation:
A: Incorrect: RCCA change fixture would not be allowed, since the location of the leak is below the seal ledge.
B: Correct: P&L lists Reactor or SFP racks as the location for the F/A with the given leak location.
C: Incorrect: The upender is not allowed. Some facilities have the upender in the horizontal position as an allowed location for a leak above the seal ledge.
D: Incorrect: Leaving the F/A in the mast is not allowed in any case.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the purpose and DEMONSTRATE an understanding of the following procedures/conditions/requirements associated with refueling operations:
Controlling procedures for refueling outages. (055.02.LP2186.001)
- 73. 2012 ILT RO 73 The control room operators are responding to a SGTR. In order to cooldown the RCS and establish required subcooling margin, the operators dump steam to the condenser using the intact SG.
This method of RCS cooldown is preferred over dumping steam through the atmospheric of an intact SG because it . . .
A. minimizes radiological releases and conserves feedwater supply.
B. conserves feedwater supply and maximizes RCS subcooling.
C. reduces shrink experienced by the RCS and minimizes radiological releases.
D. minimizes RCS subcooling and thermal shock to the reactor vessel.
Explanation:
A: Correct: In the mitigation strategy for EOP
-3, the preferred method of RCS cooldown is via the Condenser Steam Dump vice the Atmospheric Steam Dump which minimizes the atmospheric releases and conserves feedwater supplies.
B: Incorrect: During the cooldown, while an adequate subcooling is being established for future pressure reduction, this is not dependent on whether Atmospheric Steam Dump or Condenser Steam Dump is used. Use of Atmospheric Steam Dump does conserve feedwater supplies.
C: Incorrect: Maintaining Safety Injection and charging to the RCS minimizes th e shrink experienced. Minimizing radiological releases is desired.
D: Incorrect: Thermal shock during rapid cooldown can be a plausible concern, and excessive subcooling is associated with higher pressure (and thus leakage). These factors are accounted for in the SGTR mitigative strategy which wants a maximum cooldown rate to target temperature.
Learning Objective:
LIST the major actions accomplished by the following procedures:
- b. EOP-3 (031.02.LP0441.002)
- 74. 2012 ILT RO 74 AOP-10A, 'Safe Shutdown
- Local Control', is being performed and Control Operators are performing assigned attachments. During the performance of the attachments, the Safety Injection pumps for both units are disabled by the operators.
(1) Where must the operator go to find the respective SI pump breakers?
(2) What is the reason for disabling the SI pumps?
(VSGR is Vital Switchgear Room, CSR is Cable Spreading Room)
A. (1) Unit 1 Breakers in VSGR, Unit 2 Breakers in EDG Building.
(2) Ensure SI pumps do not start and jeopardize RCS cooldown and depressurization efforts.
B. (1) 'A' Train Breakers in VSGR, 'B' Train Breakers in EDG Building.
(2) Prevent SI pumps from starting, which could take RCS solid and make pressure control difficult.
C. (1) Unit 1 Breakers in VSGR, Unit 2 Breakers in CSR.
(2) Ensure SI pumps are available if needed for RCS inventory control.
D. (1) 'A' Train Breakers in CSR, 'B' Train Breakers in EDG Building.
(2) Ensure SI pumps are available if needed for RCS inventory control.
Explanation: A: Incorrect: The Breakers are separated by Trains, not Units. SI injection would not prevent RCS cooldown.
B: Correct: All Train 'A' Breakers [1(2)AO5] are in the VSGR, and all Train 'B' Breakers [1(2)A06] are in the Outside EDG Building. Disabling the SI pumps prevents the SI pumps from starting, which could take RCS solid and make pressure control difficult.
C: Incorrect: The Breakers are separated by Trains, not Units. SI Pumps are not used for inventory control in this situation.
D: Incorrect: All Train 'A' Breakers [1(2)AO5] are in the VSGR. SI Pumps are not used for inventory control in this situation.
Learning Objective/#:
Given access to appropriate equipment, controls, or specific plant conditions DEMONSTRATE the ability to perform the following evolutions in accordance with applicable procedures:
- a. Control equipment locally to maintain both Units in a safe shutdown condition
- b. Open and/or close MCC load breakers
- c. Open and/or close B0 bus breakers
- d. Transfer breaker control power e. Open and/or close 4160 Volt breakers (055.03.LP1275.001)
-1B Steam Generator.
Fill in the blanks to appropriately characterize this leakage with regard to Emergency Action Levels.
Steam generator tube leakage is ______________
leakage. (IDENTIFIED/UNIDENTIFIED)
Tube leakage at this magnitude, (30 gpm),
a classifiable event. (IS / IS NOT)
A. IDENTIFIED IS NOT B. UNIDENTIFIED IS NOT C. IDENTIFIED IS D. UNIDENTIFIED IS Explanation:
IDENTIFIED leakage is a Technical Specification defined term that control operators need to know to determine LCO compliance. The Classifiable event threshold is 25 gpm, which has been exceeded. COs are expected to inform the OS when leakage thresholds have been exceeded.
A: Incorrect: IDENTIFIED leakage is correct characterization for the leakage. However, the classification threshold has been exceeded and the OS2 should be informed.
B: Incorrect: UNIDENTIFIED leakage is incorrect, and the threshold for unidentified leakage would have been exceeded.
C: Correct: IDENTIFIED leakage spec is 25 GPM which has been exceeded, leakage is classifiable and the OS2 should be informed.
D: Incorrect: UNIDENTIFIED leakage is incorrect, although the threshold for unidentified leakage would have been exceeded.
Learning Objective:
Relate plant and core conditions, parameters, dose projections, security and plant integrity to the initiating conditions which may result in an emergency classification
- Unit 1 is at 95% power
- Pressurizer and VCT levels begin to SLOWLY LOWER, prompting the crew to enter AOP-1A, 'Reactor Coolant Leak'
- Shortly after entering AOP
-1A, the Third license noted the following alarms came in and cleared:
- "1P-1A or B RCP LABYR SEAL WATER INLET or BEARING TEMP HIGH" - "1P-1A or B RCP LABYR SEAL P LOW" - "1P-1B RCP COOLING WATER FLOW LOW" annunciator is LIT - CCW Surge Tank level rose 4 inches, and STABILIZED
- Pressurizer and VCT levels have STABILIZED Which of the following actions should the SRO direct the operators to perform based on the above conditions?
(AOP-1B, 'Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction')
(AOP-9B, 'Component Cooling System Malfunction' )
(EOP-0, 'Reactor Trip and Safety Injection')
A. Continue in AOP
-1A; monitor RCPs seal parameters for degradation.
B. Transition to AOP
-1B; trip the Reactor, stabilize per EOP
-0, trip 1P
-1B RCP then isolate CC flow to the RCP per the AOP
-1B foldout page.
C. Transition to AOP
-9B; bypass and isolate the Seal Water Heat Exchanger per AOP
-9B, Attachment A.
D. Transition to AOP
-9B; ensure both RCPs have seal injection supply flow, then verify isolation of 'B' RCP thermal barrier cooling return, per AOP
-9B, Attachment B. Explanation:
A: Incorrect. AOP-1A will not address isolating the RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling return. Plausible if examinee does not recognize that a transition is made to AOP-9B for the risen level in the CCW surge tank. Could determine that the RNO is not needed since the level is stabilized.
B: Incorrect. Tripping the Reactor or RCP is not procedurally necessary at this time. Plausible if examinee believes that a trip is warranted due to the loss of labyrinth seal cooling to the RCP.
C: Incorrect. VCT level rose a finite amount then stopped. A Seal Water HX leak would make the VCT level rise until isolated. Plausible if examinee does not realize that this leak would cause VCT level to continually rise.
D: Correct. Based on the above indications, the unit is experiencing a RCS to CCW leak via the RCP thermal barrier. The thermal barrier will automatically isolate on high flow which make CCW surge tank level stabilize. AOP
-9B, Att. B will verify the isolation of the leak.
Learning Objective:
Given appropriate system/equipment conditions and indications, DIAGNOSE and respond to the following condition(s): Loss of CCW. (055.03.LP2444.08)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- The site has experienced an earthquake
- The crew is performing actions per CSP
-S.1, 'Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS' on Unit 2
- Four rods currently remain NOT fully inserted
- The reactor is verified to be subcritical
- Site Management has directed Unit 2 to be placed in Mode 5 for repairs What are the appropriate actions to be taken based on the current conditions? (EOP-0, 'Reactor Trip and Safety Injection')
A. Continue emergency boration, while transitioning to EOP
-0, until RHR is aligned for decay heat removal per OP 7A, 'Placing RHR System in Operation.'
B. Secure emergency boration and transition to EOP-0, step 3.
C. Establish normal boration to obtain adequate SDM while transitioning to EOP
-0, step 1 RNO.
D. Remain in CSP
-S.1, but implement actions for shutdown/cooldown per OP 3C, 'Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown' that do not interfere with CSP-S.1. Explanation:
A: Incorrect. Emergency boration is no longer required since the reactor is subcritical, though, SDM must be maintained in order to proceed to EOP
-0. B: Incorrect. SDM must be established prior to transition to EOP
-0. C: Correct. Per CSP-S.1, emergency boration is secured and normal boration is established to obtain SDM, while transitioning to EOP
-0. D: Incorrect. OP-3C should not be implemented in parallel to CSP
-S.1, only transition to be made is to EOP
-0. OP-3C would not be entered in to until completion of EOP 0.1, Reactor Trip Response, and OP
-3D, Post-Reactor Trip to Hot Standby.
Learning Objective:
IMPLEMENT the CSPs to respond to plant conditions where the Subcriticality Status Tree is not satisfied. (043.03.LP1996.01
- 1) 10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- 3. 2012 ILT SRO 78 Unit 1 was operating at rated power when a Steam Generator tube rupture occurred. The crew is responding per EOP
-3, 'Steam Generator Tube Rupture.'
- Cooldown to CET target temperature and depressurization to refill the pressurizer has been completed.
- The crew has just reached the point where they need to control RCS pressure and charging flow to minimize RCS to S/G leakage.
The following conditions exist:
- Pressurizer Level 20% and RISING SLOWLY
- Ruptured S/G NR Level 100% and STABLE - Ruptured S/G WR Level 400 inches and flat-lining on level recorder
- Ruptured S/G Pressure 1040 psig and STABLE - RCS Pressure 1020 psig and RISING SLOWLY Based on the above conditions, which of the following action(s) should the SRO direct? A. Raise charging flow and lower RCS pressure.
B. Raise charging flow and lower pressure in the ruptured S/G.
C. Raise charging flow ONLY. D. Reduce charging flow and lower RCS pressure.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. While charging flow should be raised, lowering RCS pressure will cause the contents of the SG to flow in to the RCS.
B: Incorrect. While charging flow should be raised, lowering the ruptured SG pressure will cause a reinitiation of break flow to occur.
C: Correct. Since pressures are higher in the SG than RCS (using the lowering column), the only concern is raising PZR level to equalize pressures.
Information in step 37 basis is needed to answer question.
D: Incorrect. Reducing charging flow will lower pressurizer level and reduce RCS pressure. This will cause backfill of the SG into the RCS.
Learning Objective:
Given access to the Site Specific Simulator and/or appropriate system conditions, RECOGNIZE conditions which might lead to ruptured Steam Generator depressurization and re
-initiation of break flow. (031.02.LP0441.013)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- Unit 1 was manually tripped due to Main Feed Pump issues and is being maintained in Mode 3.
- 1CS-466, 'A' Main Feed Regulating Valve failed to automatically shut and had to be manually shut.
- 1CS-476, 'B' Main Feed Regulating Valve, stuck partially open and had to be locally isolated.
- The Control Room got a field report that a dropped piece of scaffolding severed the air lines running to 1CS
-3124, 'A' Main Feed Isolation Valve.
Which of the following Technical Specification Action Conditions are required for Unit 1 based on plant conditions?
TSAC 3.7.3.A TSAC 3.7.3.B TSAC 3.7.3.D A. No entry Enter for 'B' MFRV only No entry B. Enter for 'A' MFIV Enter for 'B' MFRV only No entry C. Enter for 'A' MFIV Enter ONCE; Enter ONCE; for 'A' MFRV and 'B' MFRV for 'A' MFRV and
'A' MFIV D. Enter for 'A' MFIV Enter TWICE; once each Enter ONCE; for 'A' MFRV and
'A' MFIV Explanation:
A: Incorrect. 'A' MFIV is unable to be shut, therefore a TSAC entry (3.7.3.A) is required. TSAC 3.7.3.B must also be entered for 'A' MFRV, even though it is manually isolated. TSAC 3.7.3.D is required for the flowpath since 'A' MFRV failed to isolate within specification and 'B' MFRV failed to shut.
B: Incorrect. The entry to TSAC 3.7.3.A for 'A' MFIV is correct. TSAC 3.7.3.B must also be entered for 'A' MFRV, even though it is manually isolated. TSAC 3.7.3.D is required for the flowpath since 'A' MFRV failed to isolate within specification and 'B' MFRV failed to shut.
C: Incorrect. The entry to TSAC 3.7.3.A for 'A' MFIV is correct. The entry to TSAC 3.7.3.D is correct for the 'A' flowpath. The TSAC 3.7.3.B entry is incorrect because separate entries are made for the two valves.
D: Correct. 'A' MFIV is unable to be shut, therefore a TSAC entry (3.7.3.A) is required. TSAC 3.7.3.B is required because both 'A' and 'B' MFRVs have failed and separate entries are made for each valve. TSAC 3.7.3.D is required since 'A' MFRV and 'A' MFIV are inoperable in the same flowpath.
Learning Objective:
Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate. (057.03.LP3343.002)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases [10CFR55.43(b)(2)]
- 1X-04 LV Station Auxiliary Transformer lockout occurred
- G-01 EDG did not auto load on to 1A05, 4160 Safeguards Bus
- G-03 EDG tripped on overspeed
- Immediate actions have been completed
- The crew is responding to the loss of AC power
- G-01 EDG was subsequently aligned supplying 1A05
- 1A05 voltage and frequency are 4000 VAC and 59.0 H z - G-01 loading is 700 KW
- The Third License informs you G
-01 is NOT responding to adjustments Which of the following actions, if any, are required based on the plant conditions?
A. Utilizing AOP
-18A, 'Train 'A' Equipment Operation
-Unit 1', start G-02 EDG to supply 1A05 bus; then secure G
-0.0, 'Loss of All AC Power', secure G
-01 EDG and continue on in the procedure.
C. Per OI-168, 'Emergency Diesel Generator Operability', continue operating G01 maintaining EDG loading less than the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> load limit.
D. Utilizing AOP
-22, 'EDG Load Management', adjust G
-01 EDG loading by starting/securing equipment until voltage/frequency is within limits.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. Not procedurally written to load another EDG on to the bus, then secure the previously operating EDG.
B: Correct. ECA-0.0 has the operator secure the EDG if it can not maintain the required frequency or voltage.
C: Incorrect. EDG must meet the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> load limit, but it does not take account fo r the out of specification for frequency or voltage.
D: Incorrect. Starting and securing loads is not procedurally driven as an acceptable method to adjust frequency or voltage. AOP
-22 is a commonly used procedure to adjust loading on an EDG and could be used at this time to adjust the loading.
Learning Objective:
Given access to the site specific simulator, IMPLEMENT appropriate action if the EDG does not start satisfactorily. (031.02.LP0462.007)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- The site has experienced a loss of D
-03 DC Bus, recovery using D
-105 Battery is not possible at this time
- The crew is recovering D
-03 bus using AOP
-0.0, 'Vital DC System Malfunction'
- D-305, Swing Battery, has been disconnected from ALL Battery Chargers for the last 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Considering ONLY Swing Battery D
-305, what is the status of D
-305 and what action(s) are required for the current conditions?
(0-SOP-DC-003, '125 VDC, Bus D
-03 & Components')
A. OPERABLE; align D-305 and D-109 Swing Battery Charger to D
-03 using 0
-SOP-DC-003. B. OPERABLE; align D-305 and D-09 Battery Charger to D-03 using 0
-SOP-DC-003. C. INOPERABLE; declare LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources
- Operating NOT MET by entering TSAC 3.8.4.A until D
-305 is charged for an hour.
D. INOPERABLE; declare LCO 3.8.4 DC Sources
- Operating NOT MET by entering TSAC 3.8.4.A; declare LCO 3.0.3 and commence a dual unit shutdown.
Explanation:
A: Correct. A battery that is fully charged can be considered operable if it is not connected to a charger; AOP
-0.0 Step 21 RNO states that D
-305 Battery with the D
-109 Charger can be aligned to DC Bus D
-03. B: Incorrect. The battery is operable but the D
-09 Charger cannot be aligned with the D-305 Battery and DC Bus D
-03. C: Incorrect. The battery is operable and meets the requirements of LCO 3.8.4.
D: Incorrect. The battery is operable and meets the requirements of LCO 3.8.4.
Learning Objective:
Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate. (057.02.LP3344.002)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases [10CFR55.43(b)(2)]
Control Bank D Group Demand Counter is 202 steps IRPI for Bank D Rod C-7 indicates 210 steps IRPI for Bank D Rod K
-7 indicates 185 steps IRPI for Bank D Rod G
-3 indicates 206 steps IRPI for Bank D Rod G
-11 indicates 184 steps Rod movement last occurred at 0725 At 0845, Reactor Engineering completed an incore flux map and reported that the Percent (%) Margin from the flux map for is 1.78% and F Q(Z) is 3.87%.
Determine which of the following action(s), if any, are required to be performed?
A. No entries are required all control rods are within alignment limits.
B. Enter TSAC 3.1.4.B ONLY AND reduce RTP to
< 75% by 1045.
C. Enter TSAC 3.1.4.B and 3.1.4.D; reduce RTP to
< 75% by 1045 AND be in Mode 3 by 1445. D. Enter TSAC 3.1.4.A, 3.1.4.B and 3.1.4.D; reduce RTP to
< 75% by 1045 AND be in Mode 3 by 1545.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. Since RTP is >85% and rods < 215 steps, rods are required to be within
+ 18 steps of demanded position (184
- 220 steps) and within Table 3.1.4
-1 value. Rod K
-7 and G-11 falls outside of the required F Q value of 4.17% and 5.00%, respectively which requires a rod alignment of 16 steps.
B: Incorrect. More than ONE Rod (K
-7 and G-11) is NOT within alignment limits and a TSAC entry to 3.1.4.D is required.
C: Correct. Both K
-7 and G-11 rods are NOT within alignment. The unit must be <75% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
D: Incorrect. TSAC 3.1.4 A would not be entered. Plausible in that the examinee might believe this makes the rod inoperable.
Learning Objective: Given specific conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specifications requirements as appropriate. (057.02.LP3338.003)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases [10CFR55.43(b)(2)]
N H F
- Both units were at rated power
- PAB Ventilation was aligned as follows:
- W-30A, PAB Filter fan, was running, W
-30B secured
- W-21A, PAB Stack fan, was running, W
-21B secured
- PAB Ventilation filters were in the normal alignment
Subsequently, Unit 1 suffered a Loss of Offsite Power concurrent with a Large Break LOCA and RE
-214, Auxiliary Building Vent Exhaust Gas Monitor, is in HIGH alarm.
Determine if the PAB Ventilation System is OPERABLE and what action(s), if any, must be completed regarding PAB Ventilation.
A. OPERABLE; PAB Ventilation will remain running with the PAB Ventilation automatically shifting to the F
-23, PAB Ventilation Charcoal Filter.
B. OPERABLE; PAB Ventilation must be manually re
-started within 30 minutes of aligning RHR for containment sump recirculation with verification the PAB Ventilation automatically shifted to the F
-23, PAB Ventilation Charcoal Filter.
C. INOPERABLE; PAB Ventilation will automatically re
-start and the F
-23, PAB Ventilation Charcoal Filter, will have to be manually aligned. Enter TSAC 3.7.14A for Unit 1 and 2 until F
-23 is manually aligned.
D. INOPERABLE; PAB Ventilation will have to be manually started within 30 minutes of restoring AC power and the F
-23, PAB Ventilation Charcoal Filter, will have to be verified aligned. Enter TSAC 3.7.14A for Unit 1 and 2 until PAB Ventilation is started and F-23 is aligned.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. While the system is operable, the 'A' train PAB Ventilation will be stripped for EDG loading concerns on Unit 1 loss of offsite power (1B42). F
-23 will auto swap to the charcoal filters with a high RE
-214 RMS signal in the PAB Ventilation stack.
B: Correct. Per the EOP
-1.3 and TS 3.7.14 bases, manual restart of PAB ventilation must be done within 30 minutes of aligning RHR for sump recirculation.
EOP-1.3 will verify the PAB ventilation has automatically shifted to F
-23. C: Incorrect. As noted above, the system remains operable for these conditions. PAB ventilation will not auto start, but will be verified per EOP
-1.3. F-23 does not have to be aligned for system operability.
D: Incorrect. As noted above, the system remains operable for these conditions. PAB ventilation will have to be manually started, but the F
-23 filters should have automatically shifted to the charcoal filters. F
-23 does not have to be aligned for system operability.
Learning Objective:
Given specific plant conditions, ASSESS and APPLY Technical Specification requirements as appropriate. (057.02.LP3343.002)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Conditions and limitations in the facility license [10CFR55.43(b)(1)] AND Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases. [10CFR55.43(b)(2)]
- You are the Unit 2 Operations Supervisor.
- A fire is occurring in the Cable Spreading Room.
- Spurious cycling of equipment is affecting Unit 2 operation.
- Control of some safeguards equipment has been lost on both units.
- The fire has de
-energized 480 VAC Safeguards Busses 2B03 and 2B04.
- The Unit 1 Operations Supervisor responded as Fire Brigade Leader.
What actions are you going to take?
- Local Control')
(AOP-17A, 'Rapid Power Reduction')
(EOP-0, 'Reactor Trip or Safety Injection') (ECA-0.0, 'Loss of All AC')
A. Enter AOP-10A and manually trip Unit 1 and Unit 2 from the Control Room, THEN continue on in the procedure to locally place both units in hot shutdown.
B. Enter ECA-0.0 and perform actions to mitigate loss of power for Unit 2 while immediately conducting a rapid shutdown of Unit 1 per AOP
-17A. Perform local actions of AOP
-10A in parallel as needed to place both units in hot shutdown.
C. Enter EOP-0 and manually trip Unit 1 and Unit 2 from the Control Room. Perform local actions of AOP
-10A in parallel as needed to place both units in hot shutdown.
D. Enter AOP-10A and manually trip Unit 1 and Unit 2 from the Control Room, THEN continue on in the procedure to locally place both units in hot shutdown while locally performing ECA
-0.0 actions in parallel for Unit 2.
Explanation:
A: Correct. AOP-10A provides the guidance to respond to a fire in the CSR that results in loss of control of plant equipment. It will control Control Room evacuation and direct actions to locally place both units in hot shutdown.
B: Incorrect. Plausible that students might see loss of safeguards equipment control on Unit 1 as requiring a rapid shutdown. Plausible that ECA
-0.0 is needed to respond to loss of 480 VAC safeguards busses on Unit 2 because both 2B03 and 2B04 have been deenergized. ECA
-0.0 actions can not be accomplished in parallel with AOP
-10A. C: Incorrect. Plausible that students might believe that these degraded conditions require a manual reactor trip and entry into EOP-0 for both units. Actions of AOP-10A would not be performed in parallel with EOP
-0 as EOP-0 entry is not required during this event.
D: Incorrect. Correct response to enter AOP
-10A and manually trip both units from the control room. ECA
-0.0 actions are not required to be entered whe AOP
-10A is in effect.
Learning Objective:
Given access to appropriate equipment, controls or specific plant conditions, DEMONSTRATE the ability to perform the following evolutions in accordance with applicable procedures: Control equipment locally to maintain both units in a safe shutdown condition. (055.03.LP1275.001)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- Unit 2 Reactor has tripped and SI was initiated.
- The crew is performing the actions of EOP
-1, 'Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant'. - BOTH Source Range Instruments are NOT energized. - Intermediate Range SUR is
-0.3 DPM. - 'A' S/G NR level 78% and STABLE. - 'A' S/G pressure is 1040 psig and STABLE. - 'B' S/G NR Level 92% and STABLE. - 'B' S/G pressure is 1160 psig and slowly RISING. - Total Auxiliary Feedwater flow is 0 gpm.
- PZR level is off
-scale low.
- RCS pressure is 1450 psig and STABLE. - RCS Subcooling is 25°F and STABLE. - Core Exit Thermocouple Temperature is 580°F and STABLE. - RV NR Level is 40 feet and STABLE. - Containment Pressure is 3 psig and slowly RISING. You have been assigned to monitor Critical Safety Function Status Trees. Of the choices listed below, which could you recommend the OS2 implement at this time? A. CSP-H.2, 'Response to Steam Generator Overpressure'.
B. CSP-C.2, 'Response to Degraded Core Cooling'. C. CSP-S.2, 'Response to Loss of Core Shutdown'.
D. CSP-H.3, 'Response to Steam Generator High Level'.
Explanation:
A: Correct. Entry into CSP
-H.2 is the proper recommendation with the given plant conditions and listed choices. CSP-H.3 can be completed after CSP
-H.2. CSP-C.3 conditions are met but that is not a listed choice.
B: Incorrect. Orange path CSP
-C.2 entry conditions do not exist.
C: Incorrect. CSP-S.2 conditions are not met with >0.2 IR SUR.
D: Incorrect. Entry into CSP
-H.2 is at the SRO's discretion, but in order to get to CSP
-H.3, CSP-H.2 must have been entered prior to establishing conditions for CSP-H.3 entry.
Learning Objective:
Given the Critical Safety Function Status Trees, UTILIZE these status trees to enter the appropriate Critical Safety Procedures. (043.03.LP1995.011)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- The crew has entered EOP
-1, 'Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant'
- Containment pressure is 6 psig and SLOWLY LOWERING
- RCS subcooling is 85°F and STABLE - Pressurizer level is 14% and SLOWLY LOWERING
- RCS pressure is 1725 psig and SLOWLY LOWERING
- Total feed flow to the S/Gs is 230 GPM
- RWST level is 58% and SLOWLY LOWERING Based upon the current plant conditions, which of the following actions will be taken by the SRO?
A. Verify SI Termination criteria is met, THEN transition to EOP
-1.1, 'SI Termination.'
B. Continue with EOP
-1 UNTIL the transition to EOP
-1.2, 'Small Break LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.'
C. Check Containment Sump Recirculation Switchover criteria is met, THEN transition to EOP-1.3, 'Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation
- Low Head Injection,' and align RHR for sump recirculation.
D. Check Containment Sump Recirculation Switchover criteria is met, transition to EOP-1.3, THEN transition to EOP
-1.4, 'Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation
- High Head Injection,' and align RHR and SI for sump recirculation.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. SI termination criteria is NOT met due to Containment being adverse (>5 psig) and RCS pressure too low (>1825 psig) as well as PZR level too low (>34%).
B: Incorrect. Since Containment Sump Recirculation Switchover criteria (RWST level <60%) is met, a transition to EOP
-1.3 is warranted at this time.
C: Incorrect. A transition to EOP
-1.3 is correct, BUT the RCS break size is too small (>425 psig and <550 GPM RHR flow) to continue in that procedure to line up for sump recirculation.
D: Correct. Containment Sump Recirculation Switchover criteria (RWST level <60%) is met and the RCS break size is too small (>425 psig and <550 GPM RHR flow), a transition to EOP
-1.4 will be made once the crew enters EOP-1.3 and check the RCS break size at Step 2.
Learning Objective:
Given appropriate conditions, parameters and access to the site specific simulator, IMPLEMENT the following procedures for the specified conditions: EOP1.3/1.4 (to transfer to containment sump recirculation) (031.02.LP0435.010)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- The following annunciators are LIT: - Steam Generator 'A' Level Setpoint Deviation/Trouble
- Steam Generator 'A' Feedwater Flow Channel Alert
The RO and BOP inform you that:
- 2CS-466 Feedwater Regulating Valve is OPENING - NI power is RISING - 'A' Steam Generator steam flow is RISING on BOTH channels Which of the following describes the action(s) directed by the OS?
(AOP-24, 'Response to Instrument Malfunctions')
(AOP-2A, 'Secondary Coolant Leak')
A. Shift Steam Generator 'A' Feedwater Flow Control Transfer Switch per the Alarm Response Book and allow the plant to stabilize.
B. Take manual control of 2CS
-466 Feed Water Regulating Valve and 2MS
-2016 'A' S/G Atmospheric per AOP
-24 to return plant parameters to normal.
C. Take Condenser Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch to MANUAL per AOP-2A and ensure all steam dumps went shut.
D. Shift Steam Generator 'A' Steam Flow Control Transfer Switch per the Alarm Response Book and allow the plant to stabilize.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. This is an action in the alarm response, but due to the failed steam pressure channel it has no effect. Plausible if examinee does not diagnose conditions properly.
B: Correct. Steam pressure compensates steam flow and will fail flow in the same direction. Feedwater will attempt to compensate, the FRV will open and SG level will rise. This transmitter also supplies a signal to the 'A' S/G atmospheric controller making it open.
C: Incorrect. The RNO action for Condenser Steam Dump valves open is to "Locally" isolate the OPEN valves. Also, a failed open Condenser Steam Dump valve would affect both SGs simultaneously. Plausible if examinee does not diagnose conditions properly.
D: Incorrect. This is an action in the alarm response for the failed steam pressure channel that will fix the FRV operation, but the 'A' S/G atmospheric still remains open. Plausible if examinee does not diagnose conditions properly.
Learning Objective:
Given access to the site specific simulator of given specific plant conditions, RESPOND to the following: Loss of Instrumentation. (055.03.LP3455.002)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
Unit 1 entered EOP
-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection due to an instrument malfunction.
Pressurizer pressure peaked at 2425 psig.
Pressurizer pressure is 2100 psig and slowly LOWERING. The crew has taken a failed PORV to CLOSED and taken the associated block valve control switch to SHUT. "1T-2 PRT Press High Temp Hi Level Hi or Lo" alarm is LIT. 1T-2 PRT level is RISING. 1T-2 PRT Pressure is at 0 psig.
What are the expected PORV tailpipe temperature indications and what actions will be taken?
A. PORV tailpipe temperature would read approximately 350°F. The attempt to isolate the leaking PORV was unsuccessful; transition to EOP
-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. B. PORV tailpipe temperature would read approximately 350°F. The attempt to isolate the leaking PORV was successful; continue on in EOP
-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
C. PORV tailpipe temperature would read approximately 210°F. The attempt to isolate the leaking PORV was successful; continue on in EOP
-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
D. PORV tailpipe temperature would read approximately 210°F. The attempt to isolate the leaking PORV was unsuccessful; transition to EOP
-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Explanation: Examinee has to diagnose that the PORV is still leaking with rising PRT level and that the rupture disc is blown with a low pressure. Pressure should also be rising with a rising level.
A: Incorrect. PORV tailpipe temperature listed is about saturation temperature of the PRT at the highest pressure achieved prior to rupture disk blowing (100 psig) which is incorrect. Correct procedure transition is listed for a small RCS leak.
B: Incorrect. PORV tailpipe temperature listed is about saturation temperature of the PRT at the highest pressure achieved prior to rupture disk blowing (100 psig) which is incorrect. Incorrect procedure transition is listed for a small RCS leak past the PORV.
C: Incorrect. PORV tailpipe temperature listed is about saturation temperature of the PRT which is correct. Incorrect procedure transition is listed for a small RCS leak.
D: Correct. PORV tailpipe temperature listed is about saturation temperature of the PRT which is correct. Correct procedure transition is listed for a small RCS leak.
Learning Objective:
STATE the major actions accomplished by each of the following Critical Safety Procedures: CSP
-H.1 - Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (043.03.LP1998.006) 10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
2B-43 Circulating Water Pumphouse MCC has been deenergized for maintenance and is not expected back for an additional 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. This has resulted in a loss of power to
SW-2911-BS North SW Zurn Strainer.
The North Zurn Strainer has remained aligned for operation (i.e., SW flowing through the strainer).
The South Zurn Strainer is aligned and in continuous backwash.
Which of the following describes actions, if any, to be taken per OI
-70, 'Service Water Operation', if the measured parameters are as follows:
North Strainer DP: 1.7 psid North SW Header Flow: 6000 gpm A. No further action is required.
B. Continue taking hourly readings of strainer dP and north SW header flow per Attachment D.
C. Continue taking hourly readings per Attachment D and contact the SW System Engineer. Improper instrument alignment and/or calibration may be suspected.
D. Manually backwash the North Zurn strainer per Attachment C and contact the SW System Engineer to determine necessary corrective actions.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. SW Strainer DP is >1 but <2, examinee may incorrectly apply step 2.1.2. There is flow through strainer with no backwash and the power will be out for more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
B: Incorrect. Step 2.1.3 for strainer DP and time OOS should be used. Examinee could misread Figure 1 and incorrectly apply step 2.1.3.e.(a) and continue taking readings per Att D.
C: Incorrect. Step 2.1.3 for strainer DP and time OOS should be used. Examinee could misread Figure 1 and incorrectly apply step 2.1.3.e.(b) and continue taking readings per Att D.
D: Correct. Step 2.1.3 for strainer DP and time OOS should be used. Examinee should determine step 2.1.3.e.(c) is applicable and perform Attachment C plus contact SW System Engineer.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the procedures which govern the operation of the Service Water System.
Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed and Auxiliary Operators. (051.06.LP0086.006)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- Unit 1 has experienced a large break LOCA with a loss of 'A' Train Safeguards Busses. - The crew has established 'B' RHR Train Containment Sump Recirculation per EOP-1.3, 'Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation
- Low Head Injection.'
- The 4th License has informed you that power has been restored to the 'A' Train Safeguards Busses.
- 1P-10B, RHR Pump, flow has begun to oscillate and discharge pressure has become erratic.
-1P-14B, Containment Spray Pump is RUNNING and NOT aligned for sump recirculation.
- Containment pressure is 20 psig and RISING slowly. Which of the following strategies is appropriate in mitigating the challenges?
A. Suspend EOP
-1.3, and enter CSP
-Z.1, 'Response to High Containment Pressure' IMMEDIATELY
. B. Enter ECA-1.3, 'Containment Sump Blockage.'
C. Continue with EOP
-1.3 and align Containment Spray train 'A' for recirculation.
D. Start ALL available Containment Accident Recirculation Fans and continue with EOP-1.3. Explanation:
A: Incorrect. Entry to a CSP during alignment for RHR sump recirc is not allowed until it is established and verified to be working properly. CSP's are monitored for information only.
B: Correct. Entry to ECA
-1.3 is due to the cavitating of the RHR pumps.
C: Incorrect. Aligning Containment Spray will cause the cavitating to become worse.
D: Incorrect. Starting all containment accident recirc fans is not procedurally driven per EOP-1.3, but is an option in the CSP's.
Learning Objective:
STATE the entry conditions and IDENTIFY the major actions for the following procedures: ECA
-1.3, Containment Sump Blockage (031.02.LP0465.001)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- Unit 2 has entered AOP
-6A, 'Dropped Rod,' due to J
-10 of Control Bank 'C' dropping - The crew is in the process of withdrawing J
-10 to match bank demand when the 'Rod Control System Urgent Failure' alarm comes in Which of the following is an appropriate action for the above conditions?
A. Direct the RO to stop rod motion and enter AOP
-6B, 'Stuck or Misaligned Control Rod.' B. All rod motion will AUTOMATICALLY stop, generate an Expedited Work Order per WM-AA-200, 'Work Management Process Overview'.
C. Direct the RO to continue rod withdrawal to bank demand position per AOP
-6A, this is an expected alarm.
D. An additional rod dropped, direct the RO to trip Unit 2 and enter EOP
-0, 'Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.'
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. 'Rod Control System Urgent Failure' is an expected alarm, entry to AOP
-6B is not required.
B: Incorrect. Rod motion will not cease automatically, 'Rod Control System Urgent Failure' is an expected alarm. C: Correct. 'Rod Control System Urgent Failure' is an expected alarm and noted procedurally as part of the restoration in AOP
-6A. D: Incorrect. 'Rod Control System Urgent Failure' is an expected alarm, a unit trip and entry to EOP
-0 is not required.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the response of the Rod Control system to failures and/or malfunctions of the following: Urgent Failure alarm (055.03.LP2441.002)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- 17. 2012 ILT SRO 92 During a Design Basis Accident LOCA, Sodium Hydroxide is added to the Containment Spray System to ensure a pH value in the acceptable range of 7.0 to 10.5.
Per the bases, the acceptable pH range is to _________?
A. keep boron in solution to minimize general corrosion on the recirculation piping B. scavenge the oxygen in solution to minimize general corrosion on the recirculation piping C. keep iodine in an iodate form and minimize caustic and chloride stress corrosion on mechanical systems D. reduce the amount of hydrogen production which minimizes caustic and chloride stress corrosion on mechanical systems
Explanation:
A: Incorrect: Adding NaOH does not help keep boron in solution, though maintaining a basic pH helps in minimizing corrosions.
B: Incorrect: Oxygen is scavenged in the RCS by Hydrogen. Removing Oxygen will help minimize general corrosion.
C: Correct: The NaOH added to the spray also ensures a pH value in the acceptable range of 7.0 to 10.5. The minimum pH in the containment sump needed to keep iodine in the iodate form is 7.0. A pH greater than 7 assures the continued iodine removal effectiveness. The maximum pH is based on Equipment Qualification considerations to minimize the occurrence of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components and is set to 10.5.
D: Incorrect: Correct reason with wrong chemical reason. Hydrogen is used in the RCS system to scavenge Oxygen.
Learning Objective: Discuss TS definitions, rules of usage, safety limits, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or less actions for systems, equipment, and bases of LCO's and Safety Limits.
(057.01.LP3336.017)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases. [10CFR55.43(b)(2)]
- Unit 2 is at 70% power
- The following alarms just LIT on 2C03 - "Motor Breaker Trip" - "2P-28A and B SG Feed Pump Seal Water P Low" - "Steam Generator A Level Setpoint Deviation Trouble" - "Steam Generator B Level Setpoint Deviation Trouble" - The 4th License reports the loss of 2P
-25B, Condensate Pump and 2CS
-2273, LP Feedwater Heater Bypass is OPEN. Which of the following procedurally directed actions will be implemented to mitigate the loss of the Condensate Pump?
A. Trip Unit 2 and then enter EOP
-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
B. Take MANUAL control of both Feedwater Regulating Valves to control S/G level and then enter AOP
-2B, 'Feedwater System Malfunction.'
C. Take MANUAL control of 2CS
-2273, LP Feedwater Heater Bypass to restore Main Feed Pump suction pressure per AOP
-24, 'Response to Instrument Malfunction.'
D. Enter AOP-2B, 'Feedwater System Malfunction' and then perform a downpower per AOP-17A, 'Rapid Power Reduction' until 2CS
-2273 automatically shuts.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. A loss of a Condensate Pump at 70% power does not require immediate tripping of the unit. Procedurally you try to stabilize the unit prior to this action. This would be an expected action at full power or if unable to lower power.
B: Incorrect. Taking manual control of FRV is not necessary on the conditions above. SG level deviation is a symptom of a loss of a Condensate Pump. The Feed Regulating Valves will open to compensate for the loss of the condensate pump causing cs
-2273 to open..
C: Incorrect. Taking manual control of 2CS
-2273 is unnecessary, automatic control is sufficient and procedurally required for the above transient. Procedurally if 2CS-2273 is open, power is reduced to get the valve closed in automatic. AOP
-24 is used to take manual control if examinee thinks there was a controller malfunction with CS
-2273. D: Correct. If a Condensate Pump trips, the load is reduced in order to maintain the Main Feed Pump suction above 190 psig. Reducing power is an RNO action in AOP
-2B. Power is rapidly reduced using AOP
-17A. Procedurally if 2CS-2273 is open, power is reduced to get the valve closed in automatic in order to get Main Feed Pump suction pressure above 190 psig.
Learning Objective:
Given access to the simulator, APPLY the appropriate guidance provided in the applicable AOPs for various system/component malfunctions. (055.03.LP2439.005)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- 19. 2012 ILT SRO 94 While loading fuel from the Spent Fuel Pool to Unit 1 core, a load deflection occurred at the SFP Upender. Fuel motion was secured for several hours to evaluate the fuel assembly.
Whose FINAL authorization must be obtained to recommence refueling operations?
A. Spent Fuel Pool Supervisor B. Core Load Supervisor C. Shift Manager D. Plant General Manager
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. Spent Fuel Pool Supervisor does not have the final authorization to recommence refueling operations but would be involved in the decision.
B: Incorrect. The Core Load Supervisor is involved in the decision to start and stop fuel motion and is the next to last approval with the Shift Manager having
'Final Authorization'.
C: Correct. The SM has the final authorization to recommence refueling operations.
D: Incorrect. Though the PGM's (typically senior management representative during an outage) concurrence is needed, the "Final Authorization" is given by the SM.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the procedures which govern Fuel Handling Operations. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions and notes associated with each operating procedure requiring consideration by Licensed and Non
-Licensed Operators. (112.01.LP0285.002)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Fuel handling facilities and procedures
[10CFR55.43(b)(7)]
- 20. 2012 ILT SRO 95 When a test or experiment is proposed which may affect the PBNP License or Technical Specifications, the activity is scrutinized using a multi
-phase process.
Which part of the process DETERMINES whether PBNP must obtain NRC approval PRIOR to carrying out the test or experiment?
A. 10CFR50.59 Screening B. Onsite Review Group (ORG) Review C. 10CFR50.59 Evaluation D. 10CFR50.59 Amendment Explanation:
A: Incorrect. The screening determines if an evaluation must be done.
B: Incorrect. The Onsite Review Group is part of the 10CFR50.59 process and reviews the evaluation paperwork.
C: Correct. The evaluation process is where the determination is made regarding whether prior approval is required.
D: Incorrect. A license amendment may be required based on the outcome of this process, but the amendment is not part of the 10CFR50.59 evaluation.
Learning Objectiv e: Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests. (SD 86.02.07)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility [10CFR55.43(b)(3)]
- Average Rx Coolant Temperature
- 215° F - Reactor Head Closure Bolts
- three have just been discovered detensioned
- Surveillances in progress
- None - Control rod position - fully inserted What is the reactor operating MODE?
A. Undefined B. MODE 4 C. MODE 5 D. MODE 6 Explanation:
A: Incorrect: MODE Undefined does not exist in Technical Specifications definitions but is plausible as procedurally we cannot get into this condition.
B: Incorrect: MODE 4 between 200ºF and 350ºF with head studs tensioned, plausible as the plant was in Mode 4 with temp >200ºF prior to the discovery.
C: Incorrect: MODE 5 below 200ºF with head studs tensioned, plausible examinee could think you drop down in modes for a refueling.
D: Correct: MODE 6 with at least 1 head stud detensioned, per definition.
Learning Objective: State the definitions of TS section 1.1.
(057.01.LP3336.09)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: (2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.
- A LOCA outside containment occurred at 0130.
- A Site Area Emergency was declared at 0140.
- The broken line was manually isolated locally, but the operator performing the task was injured and cannot leave the area on his own.
- Initial dose rate estimates are 110 R/hr gamma.
- The rescue time for a 2
-man team is estimated to be 10 minutes with a maximum of 15 minutes.
Under these circumstances, a rescue attempt _____________ .
A. by risk-informed volunteers may proceed ONLY with Emergency Director authorization B. is NOT allowed because whole body exposure would exceed the emergency limit C. may be made by qualified individuals selected and approved by the Reentry Team Coordinator D. may be made without special authorization since 10CFR20 exposure limits will NOT be exceeded
Explanation:
A: Correct. Since a dose of 27.5 REM is possible and it is necessary to rescue the injured operator, it is acceptable for the Emergency Director to approve this dose to carry out the rescue. The rescuers must volunteer to receive the exposure.
B: Incorrect. Attempt to save lives is allowed.
C: Incorrect. ED must approve the exposure.
D: Incorrect. Normal dose limits will be exceeded.
Learning Objective:
Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (SD 86.03.04) 10CFR55.43 Statement met: Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions [10CFR55.43(b)(4)]
- Waste Distillate Tank 'A' is being discharged overboard via Unit 2 service water. - 2RE-229, Unit 2 SW Overboard monitor, momentarily goes into a n ALERT status, and then clears.
- RE-223, Waste Distillate Tank Overboard monitor, is normal and is well below setpoint. Which of the following describes how the system will respond and what actions are now required?
A. Waste Distillate Overboard valve, BE
-FCV-LW-15, will automatically close. The alert condition on 2RE
-229 will need to be evaluated and a new Liquid Waste Discharge Permit MUST be completed prior to continuing the discharge.
B. Waste Distillate Overboard valve, BE-FCV-LW-15, will automatically close. Discharge may recommence using existing Liquid Waste Discharge Permit following the performance of RAM 3.1.1, Restarting a Liquid Batch Release.
C. Discharge will need to be manually secured while the discharge path is switched to Unit 1 SW Overboard, then discharge may be recommenced. Document change of SW alignment on the existing Liquid Waste Discharge Permit.
D. Discharge will need to be manually secured. Discharge may recommence using a new Liquid Waste Discharge Permit, following re
-sampling and analysis.
Explanation:
A: Incorrect. This would be true if RE
-223 alarmed, then the condition of RE
-229 would need to be evaluated and a new permit generated prior to continuing.
B: Incorrect. LW-15 does not automatically shut. If RE
-223 alarms, a new permit would need to be issued.
C: Incorrect. PBNP prohibits changing the discharge permit from one unit to the other. If the alignment needed to be changed, a new permit would need to be generated.
D: Correct. At the alert level, the discharge will need to be manually secured IAW AOP-4A and RAM 3.1.1. 2RE
-229 will not shut BE
-FCV-LW-15 automatically. The tank will have to be re
-sampled and a new permit issued.
Learning Objective:
DESCRIBE the procedures which govern operation of the Liquid Waste Disposal System. Description should include significant prerequisites, precautions, and notes associated with each operating procedure. (051.04.LP0063.004)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions [10CFR55.43(b)(4)]
- An event has occurred that has resulted in a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.
- The EOPs are currently being implemented.
- Prior to the trip, an AOP was being implemented to address plant equipment problems. - A second SRO is now coordinating the remaining actions in the AOP while the EOPs are being implemented. - A conflict has arisen between the EOP and the AOP regarding an electrical lineup. Which of the following describes the proper resolution of this conflict?
A. Guidance in the EOP must be followed since it is the controlling procedure.
The conflicting guidance in the AOP will NOT be performed.
B. Guidance in the AOP must be followed since the AOP was implemented first.
The conflicting guidance in the EOP will NOT be performed.
C. The SRO will consult with the DCS and follow guidance in either the AOP or the EOP, depending on the specific situation.
D. The SRO will invoke 10CFR50.54(x) and perform the procedure most appropriate for the situation.
Explanation:
A: Correct. Per OM 3.7, EOP must be followed since it is the controlling procedure.
B: Incorrect. Performing procedures in parallel shall NOT interfere with the performance of the EOP. Controlling procedure is the EOP, time of AOP entry does not make it the controlling procedure.
C: Incorrect. Performing procedures in parallel shall NOT interfere with the performance of the EOP.
D: Incorrect. Performing procedures in parallel shall NOT interfere with the performance of the EOP. 10CFR50.54 (x) would not be appropriate for this situation.
Learning Objective:
EXPLAIN and DEMONSTRATE the use and adherence requirements applicable to AOP and EOP sets. (LP3959.001)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations
[10CFR55.43(b)(5)]
- Source Range NI's 2.0 X 10E4 cps and LOWERING - Core Exit TC's 295°F and LOWERING - RCS Subcooling 69°F and STABLE - RCPs Tripped
- RVLIS NR 26 ft and LOWERING - Total AFW flow 230 gpm
- Narrow Range SG levels 30% (A) 34%(B) and RISING - RCS Pressure 190 psig and LOWERING - Cold leg Temp (Current) 312°F and LOWERING - Cold leg Temp (Hour ago) 541°F and STABLE - Containment Pressure 22 psig and RISING - Containment Sump 'B' Level 48 in and RISING Based on the above conditions, which of the following states the scanning requirements for the CSF Status Tree's per OM 3.7, AOP and EOP Procedure Use and Adherence?
A. Continuously B. 3 - 5 minute intervals C. 10 - 20 minute intervals D. Monitoring can be stopped Explanation:
A: Incorrect. CSF Status Tree may by continuously monitor but it is not the minimum prescribed procedurally.
B: Correct. CSF Status Tree minimum scanning requirements are designated in the RNO of Step 6, of CSP ST.0 and OM 3.7. An Orange Path entry for CSP
-P.1 is warranted; therefore scanning is to be completed at 3
-5 minute intervals.
C: Incorrect. An Orange Path entry is required, therefore frequent scanning is required. D: Incorrect. An Orange Path entry is required, therefore frequent scanning is required.
Learning Objective:
IMPLEMENT the Critical Safety Function Status Tree and Critical Safety Procedure rules of usage. (043.03.LP1995.013)
10CFR55.43 Statement met: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations [10CFR55.43(b)(5)]