Text

Technical Specification Change TS-07-04, Reactor Trip System/Engineered Safety Feature Logic, Reactor Trip Breaker Allowable Outage Time, and Surveillance Testing Interval Relaxations
	ML071660106
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	06/08/2007
From:	Smith J D; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	TS-07-04, WBN-TS-07-04
	Download: ML071660106 (116)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 JUN 0 8 2007 WBN-TS-07-04 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No.50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 -TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE TS-07-04, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM/ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE LOGIC, REACTOR TRIP BREAKER ALLOWABLE OUTAGE TIME, AND SURVEILLANCE TESTING INTERVAL RELAXATIONS The purpose of this letter is to request that Appendix A of Facility Operating License NPF-90, Watts Bar Unit 1 Technical Specifications, be amended in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.The proposed amendment affects several Technical Specification sections to allow relaxations of various Reactor Trip System/Engineered Safety Feature logic completion times, bypass test times, allowable outage times, and surveillance testing intervals previously reviewed and approved by NRC under Westinghouse WCAP-14333-P-A (Technical.

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 418, Revision 2) and WCAP-15376-P-A (TSTF 411, Revision 1) and incorporates TSTF Travelers (listed in the table below which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431,"Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants:" Printed on, recycled paper kjQ&~ ee U.S. Nuclear Page 2 JUN 0 8 2007 Regulatory Commission TSTF No.! Incorporated Description Date of NRC Rev No. into NUREG Approval 1431, Rev No. Letter 169/1 1 Deletion of Condition 10/31/2000 3.3.1.N 311/0 0 Revision of 04/21/1999 Surveillance Frequency for TADOT on Turbine Trip Functional Unit 411/1 3 Surveillance Test 08/30/2002 Interval Extensions for Components of the Reactor Protection System (WCAP-15376-P-A) 418/2 3 RPS and ESFAS Test 04/02/2003 Times and Completion ,Times (WCAP-14333-P-A)

Provided in Enclosure 1 is a description and justification of the proposed amendment.

Annotated versions of the affected Technical Specification pages are provided in Enclosure 2.Enclosure 3 provides for information only the annotated version of the TS bases pages. Enclosure 4 provides the plant specific confirmation that analysis and component failure probabilities are applicable to WBN as required by condition 1 of both WCAP safety evaluation reports. Portions of Enclosure 4 are proprietary to Westinghouse.

Enclosure 5 provides a non-proprietary version of the document contained in Enclosure 4.Accordingly, Enclosure 6 includes a Westinghouse Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, and an accompanying Affidavit signed by Westinghouse, the owner of the information.

Also included are a Proprietary Information Notice and a Copyright Notice. The affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission, and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b) (4) of 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations.

TVA respectfully requests that the Westinghouse proprietary information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 JUN 0 8 2007 Correspondence regarding the proprietary aspects of the Westinghouse report listed above, the Copyright Notice, or the supporting Westinghouse affidavit, should reference CAW-07-2275 and should be addressed to J. A. Gresham, Manager, Regulatory compliance and Plant Listing, Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b) (1), a copy of this proposed license amendment is being forwarded to the state designee for the State of Tennessee.

There are no regulatory commitments in this submittal and TVA has not defined a specific schedule or milestone by which the approval of the amendment is needed. However, the surveillance frequency relaxations allowed by this amendment will allow for improvement in Maintenance Rule unavailability for several components, including the Reactor Trip.Breakers.

There, TVA requests approval as soon as practicable.

TVA requests that once the amendment is approved, 120 days be allowed for implementation.

If you have any questions about this proposed change, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 8th day of June 2007.Sincerely, j. D. Smith Manager, WBN Site Licensing and Industry Affairs (Acting)Enclosures cc: See page 4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 JUN 0 8 2007 Enclosures cc (Enclosures):

NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Mr. Brendan T. Moroney, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08G9a One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Lawrence E. Nanny, Director Division of Radiological Health 3 rd Floor L & C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, Tennessee 37243 ENCLOSURE 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 390 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NUMBER 07-04 TVA'S EVALUATION

1.0 DESCRIPTION

This letter proposes an amendment to Appendix A, "Technical Specifications (TS)," of the WBN Operating License, NPF-90. The proposed amendment affects several Technical Specification sections to allow relaxations of various Reactor Trip System/Engineered Safety Feature logic completion times, bypass test times, allowable outage times, and surveillance testing intervals previously reviewed and approved by NRC under Westinghouse WCAP-14333-P-A (Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 418, Revision 2) and WCAP-15376-P-A (TSTF-411, Revision 1) .(WCAP-14333-P-A and WCAP-15376-P-A are henceforth referenced as WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376.)

The proposed amendment also incorporates approved TSTFs-169 and 311, which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants."

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

The proposed changes, as approved in WCAP-14333 (TSTF-418, Revision 2)and WCAP-15376 (TSTF-411, Revision 1), allow increases in the bypass test times for instrumentation channels and Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs); test completion times for instrumentation channels, logic cabinets, master and slave relays, and RTBs; and surveillance test intervals for instrumentation channels, logic cabinets, master relays, and RTBs. The proposed changes in these test times and frequencies are listed in Section 3.0 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 of this Enclosure.

In addition, the proposed amendment implements approved TSTFs-169 and 311, which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants." The TS markups are provided in Enclosure

2. The following numbered listing of proposed changes (1-33) identifies the basis (TSTF) and the affected Functions for each change. Note that the referenced Conditions, Surveillance Requirements, Functions, and notes reflect the WBN TS and are, in some cases, numbered differently than the equivalent items in NUREG 1431 and the TSTFs.El-I ENCLOSURE 1 1. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition D and associated Required Actions. Power Range Neutron Flux -High (Function 2a). TSTF-418.2. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition E and associated Required Actions. Power Range Neutron Flux -Low (Function 2b) and Power Range Neutron Flux-High Positive Rate (Function 3a). TSTF-418.3., Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition M and associated Required Actions. Undervoltage RCPs (Function

11) and Underfrequency RCPs (Function 12).TSTF-418.4. Changed TS 3.3.1 Condition N description and Required Action N.2 to indicate applicability to both Reactor Coolant Flow -Low single loop (Function 10a) and two loop trip (Function 10b) functions which are being combined by this change into a single Function 10. TSTF-169.5. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition N and associated Required Actions. Reactor Coolant Flow -Low (Function 10). TSTF-418.6. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition 0 and associated Required Actions. Turbine Trip -Low Fluid Oil Pressure (Function 14a). TSTF-418.7. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition P Required Actions. Safety Injection (SI) Input from ESFAS (Function 15)and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 19). TSTF-418.8. Changed bypass time and completion times (TSTF-418) and deleted Note 2 (TSTF-411) for TS 3.3.1 Condition Q and associated Required Actions. Reactor Trip Breakers (Function 17).9. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition U and associated Required Actions. SG Water Level Low-Low (Function 13). TSTF-418.10. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition V and associated Required Actions. SG Water Level Low-Low -Vessel AT (Functions 13a and 13b). TSTF-418.11. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition W and associated Required Actions. Overtemperature AT (Function 6), Overpower AT (Function

7) and Pressurizer Pressure -High (Function 8b). TSTF-418.12. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition X and associated Required Actions. Pressurizer Pressure -Low (Function 8a) and Pressurizer Water Level -High (Function 9). TSTF-418.E1-2 ENCLOSURE 1 13. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition Y Required Actions. Turbine Trip -Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Function 14b). TSTF-418.14. Changed SR 3.3.1.4 TADOT Frequency.

RTBs (Function

17) and RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms (Function 18).TSTF-411.15. Changed SR 3.3.1.5 Actuation Logic Test Frequency.

Automatic Trip Logic Function 19. TSTF-411.16. Changed SR 3.3.1.7 COT Frequency.

Instrumentation Functions 2a, 2b, 3a, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 9, 10, 13, 13a, and 13b. TSTF-411.17. Changed SR 3.3.1.14 TADOT Frequency.

Turbine Trip -Low Fluid Oil Pressure and Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Functions 14a and 14b). TSTF-311.18. Combined TS 3.3.1 Reactor Coolant Flow -Low single loop and two loop trip Functions 10a and 10b into a single Function 10 and deleted associated Notes (g) and (h). TSTF-169.19. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition C Required Actions. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays for Safety Injection (Function ib), Containment Spray (Function 2b), Containment Isolation

-Phase A (Function 3a(2)), Containment Isolation

-Phase B (Function 3b(2)), and Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump (Function 7a).TSTF-418.20. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition D and associated Required Actions. Safety Injection on Containment Pressure -High (Function ic), Safety Injection on Pressurizer Pressure -Low (Function id), Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure -Low (Function le), Steam Line Isolation on Steam Line Pressure -Low (Function 4d(1)), and Steam Line Isolation on Steam Line Pressure -Negative Rate -High (Function 4d(2)). TSTF-418.21. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition E Required Actions. Containment Spray on Containment Pressure -High High (Function 2c), Containment Isolation

-Phase B on Containment Pressure -High High (Function 3b(3)), and Steam Line Isolation on Containment Pressure -High High (Function 4c). TSTF-418.22. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition G Required Actions. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays for Steam Line Isolation (Function 4b) and Auxiliary Feedwater (Function 6a). TSTF-418.23. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition H Required Actions. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays for Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation (Function 5a). TSTF-418.E1-3 ENCLOSURE 1 24. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition I and associated Required Actions. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation on SG Water Level High-High (Function 5b) .TSTF-418.25. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition K and associated Required Actions. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump on Refueling Water Storage Tank Level -Low coincident with SI and Containment Sump Level -High (Function 7b). TSTF-418.26. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition M and associated Required Actions. Auxiliary Feedwater on SG Water Level Low-Low (Function 6b). TSTF-418.27. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition N and associated Required Actions. Auxiliary Feedwater on SG Water Level Low-Low -Vessel AT (Functions 6b(1) and 6b(2)) .TSTF-418.28. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition 0 and associated Required Actions. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation on Main Steam Valve Vaults Water Level -High (Functions 5d and 5e). TSTF-418.29. Changed SR 3.3.2.2 Actuation Logic Test Frequency.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Functions ib, 2b, 3a(2), 3b(2), 4b, 5a, 6a, and 7a. TSTF-411.30. Changed SR 3.3.2.3 Master Relay Test Frequency.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Functions ib, 2b, 3a(2), 3b(2), 4b, 5a, 6a, and 7a. TSTF-411.31. Changed SR 3.3.2.4 COT Frequency.

Instrumentation Functions Ic, id, le, 2c, 3b(3), 4c, 4d(1), 4d(2), 5b, 6b, 6b(1), 6b(2), 7b, 8b(l), and 8b(2). TSTF-411.32. Changed SR 3.3.6.2 Actuation Logic Test Frequency.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Function 2. TSTF-411.33. Changed SR 3.3.6.3 Master Relay Test Frequency.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Function 2. TSTF-411.

3.0 BACKGROUND

The WBN TS were initially developed as Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) based on Revision 0 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants," and proposed changes to the NUREG incorporated in Revision 1.The TSTF process is an industry and NRC controlled process for proposing and incorporating improvements to the ISTS. The revisions proposed by this amendment impact Technical Specifications 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS)Instrumentation," 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation E1-4 ENCLOSURE 1 System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and 3.3.6, "Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) Instrumentation," and are based on four TSTFs (169, 311, 411 and 418). All of the above TSTFs have been incorporated into the current revision of NUREG 1431 (Revision 3.0 dated March 3, 2004).The initial issue of the WBN TS included the relaxation of RTS and ESFAS test times, allowed outage times (AOT) / completion times (CT), bypass test times (BT), and surveillance test intervals (STI) which were justified in the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Technical Specification Optimization Program (TOP)document WCAP-10271-P-A and supplements thereto (References 11 and 12). The justification was based on the high reliability of the protection system equipment and the small impact of the changes on overall plant risk.WCAP-14333 (TSTF-418)

WCAP-14333 provides the justification for increasing the bypass test times and the completion times for RTS and ESFAS instrumentation.

The approach used in WCAP-14333 is consistent with that established by the WOG TOP, including fault tree models, actuation signals, component reliability, and most of the test and maintenance assumptions.

Several enhancements in modeling were implemented as discussed in the WCAP. The changes justified in WCAP-14333 are summarized in Table 3.1 below.Table 3.1 WCAP-14333 RTS and ESFAS Completion Time and Bypass Test Time Changes Component Completion Time Bypass Test Time Analog Channels 6+6 hours to 72+6 hours 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Logic Cabinets 6+6 hours to 24+6 hours no change Master & Slave 6+6 hours to 24+6 hours no change Actuation Relays These improvements will allow additional time to perform maintenance and test activities, enhance safety, provide additional operational flexibility, and reduce the potential for forced outages related to compliance with the RTS and ESFAS instrumentation Technical Specifications.

Industry information has shown that a significant number of trips that have occurred are related to instrumentation test and maintenance activities, indicating that these activities should be completed with caution and sufficient time should be available to complete these activities in an orderly and effective manner.E1-5 ENCLOSURE 1 The NRC issued a Safety Evaluation on July 15, 1998, approving WCAP-14333.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company submitted a License Amendment Request on October 13, 1999, for the Vogtle Units 1 and 2 to adopt the relaxations that were generically approved in WCAP-14333.

As a result of the NRC review of this application, incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) values were developed generically for all WOG plants. License amendments were issued for Vogtle approving the changes proposed in WCAP-14333.

WCAP-15376 (TSTF-411)

WCAP-15376 provides further improvements to the RPS, building on the approved changes of WCAP-10271 and WCAP-14333 and including changes to the fault tree models and incorporation of updated component failure probability data. WCAP-15376 provides the justification for increasing the bypass test time and the completion time for the reactor trip breakers and for increasing the surveillance test intervals for the reactor trip breakers, instrumentation channels, logic cabinets, and master relays of the RPS instrumentation.

The changes justified in WCAP-15376 are summarized in Table 3.2 below.Table 3.2 WCAP-15376 RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Interval and Completion Time Changes Component Surveillance Test Completion Time and Interval Bypass Time Analog Channels 3 months to 6 months No change Logic Cabinets 2 months to 6 months No change Master Relays 2 months to 6 months No change Slave Relays No change No change Reactor Trip 2 months to 4 months AOT: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .Breakers Bypass Time: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .The approach used in WCAP-15376 is consistent with the NRC's approach for using probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the licensing basis as presented in Regulatory Guides 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis," and 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking:

Technical Specifications." The approach E1-6 ENCLOSURE 1 addresses the impact on defense-in-depth and safety margins, as well as an evaluation of the impact on risk. The risk evaluation considers the three-tiered approach as presented by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.177 for the extension to the RTB completion time.TSTF-169 TSTF 169 combines the single loop and two loop Reactor Coolant Flow Low reactor trip functions (3.3.1-i0a and 10b) into one function.

Table 3.3.1-1 notes g and h associated with this function are deleted, Condition N description is revised and Condition X is no longer applicable to this function.

This change resolves an inconsistency with respect to the WCAP-10271 analyses by removing the potential for exceeding the AOT allowance evaluated in the WCAP.TSTF-311 The proposed change revises the Frequency of SR 3.3.1.14 for performing a TADOT for Turbine Trip on Low Fluid Oil Pressure and Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Functions 14a and 14b) .The LCO requires the Functions to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-9 (50% RTP). The change will allow the test to be performed at power prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock instead of prior to reactor startup while continuing to ensure that the functions will be OPERABLE when required.4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 4.1 WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 This analysis follows the implementation guidelines provided by the WOG for WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 and addresses the conditions and limitations specified in the NRC's safety evaluations (SE) for the WCAPs. In addition, although not specifically listed as a condition in the SEs, one commitment is addressed as stated in the response to NRC RAI 18 (Reference 10).The analysis demonstrates the applicability to WBN of the generic analyses performed to support the changes.The approach used in this program and presented in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 is consistent with the approach established by WOG TOP. The changes justified in the WCAPs were evaluated using a probabilistic risk assessment approach.

The analyses included assessment of the impact of the changes on signal unavailability and plant risk. The justification for the acceptability of the changes was the small increase the changes had on plant risk. The probabilistic risk analysis, benefits of the program and E1-7 ENCLOSURE 1 conclusions, and the relationship of the Technical Specification changes to the analysis are discussed in the WCAPs.4.1.1 Risk Evaluation The changes being considered in this analysis were evaluated consistent with the three-tiered approach defined in Regulatory Guide 1.177. Tier 1 addresses PRA insights and includes the risk analyses and sensitivity analyses to support the proposed Technical Specification changes. Tier 2 addresses avoidance of risk-significant plant configurations.

Tier 3 addresses risk-informed plant configuration control and management.

4.1.1.1 Tier 1, PRA Capability and Insights The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant PRA model was used for the generic risk analysis documented in WCAP 14333 (Reference

2) and WCAP 15376 (Reference 3). Enclosure 4 addresses the applicability of the generic analysis to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The remainder .of this section summarizes applicable information from references 2 and 3, and the associated NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Reports, References 18 and 21.WCAP 14333 The NRC evaluation of WCAP-14333 is documented in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Reference

18. The staff used a three-tiered approach in its evaluation.

The first tier evaluated the PRA model and the impact of the change on plant operational risk.The staff's review focused on the approach taken to develop a model and its capability to analyze the risk stemming from the proposed changes.Most of the fault trees used in the WCAP-14333 analysis came directly from the WCAP-10271 analysis that had been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC staff. Additional fault trees were developed as necessary to model the addition of operator actions either to manually trip the reactor or to initiate safety injection.

Major aspects of the PRA modeling used in the WCAP-14333 analysis were evaluated including data, screening and truncation limits, level of detail, sensitivity, and uncertainty.

Assumptions for the analysis are provided in Reference 2, paragraph 7.2. The NRC staff found these aspects of the PRA modeling to be reasonable.

The common cause failure approach and the approach to assess the unavailability of components due to maintenance activities were changed from the WCAP 10271 analysis to provide a more E1-8 ENCLOSURE 1 representative analysis.

These modeling approaches are discussed in Reference 2, paragraph 7.1.The risk quantification conservatively did not take credit for potential trip reduction due to the implementation of revised technical specifications.

Sensitivity cases were quantified to show the potential impact on plant safety due to trip reduction (Reference 2, paragraph 8.1).In response to a NRC staff request, Westinghouse performed sensitivity studies on several important parameters assumed in the risk analysis, i.e., human error probability, maintenance frequency, common cause failure probability, and ATWS mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) availability.

The studies indicated that the impact of the variation in those parameters on plant risk is insignificant (Reference 18).The NRC staff qualitatively considered the impact of the proposed TS changes on the risk from external events such as fire and earthquake events. From its review, the NRC staff found that the proposed TS changes will have only a very small impact on the risk from external events; that small impact on risk is acceptable to the NRC staff.The impact of the proposed changes on CDF and LERF are provided in TSTF-418, Revision 2, Table 1.3 (which presents the same information contained in Table 8.4 of WCAP-14333) and Table 1.4 (which presents the same information provided in the response to RAI Question 13 in OG-96-110, Reference 8), respectively.

The CDF and LERF values are provided for the pre-TOP, TOP, and the WCAP-14333 proposed changes. The ACDF and ALERF values are also provided referenced to pre-TOP and TOP conditions.

The results of a sensitivity analysis are also provided that credit a 0.5/year reduction in the reactor trip initiating event frequency due to reduction in the number of analog channel tests. The ICCDP and ICLERP values are provided in Table 1.5 of TSTF-418, Revision 2 (which presents the same information as in RAI Question 11 in OG-96-110).

The ACDF, ICCDP, ALERF, and ICLERP values provided in the WCAP and subsequent RAIs met the criteria of small changes in risk defined in RG-1.174 and 1.177. Based on the Tier 1 evaluation, the NRC staff found that the PRA model used for the proposed TS changes in WCAP-14333 is reasonable.

WCAP-15376 The NRC staff evaluation of WCAP-15376 is documented in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Reference

21. The PRA model used in E1-9 ENCLOSURE 1 WCAP 15376 is similar, but not identical, to the model used in WCAP-14333.

The WCAP-14333 model has been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC staff.In previous studies, the logic cabinets were modeled to the component level using generic data. In the WCAP-15376 analysis, the logic cabinets are modeled at the card level. This was done because industry-specific failure rate data is available at the card level. Westinghouse collected card failure data via an industry survey. The results of that survey are considered proprietary by Westinghouse.

In WCAP-15376 independent models were developed for selected RPS signals. These signals include safety injection; pressurizer pressure low interlocked with P-Il; auxiliary feedwater pump start signal from steam generator level io-io in one loop;reactor trip single source from pressurizer pressure high;reactor trip diverse source from pressurizer pressure high or over temperature delta T. The safety injection and reactor trip signals were evaluated with and without manual reactor trip. The proposed TS changes were evaluated both individually and combined with changes proposed in WCAP-14333 for the bounding SSPS plant.The results were consistent with those reported in WCAP-14333.

Assumptions for the analysis are provided in Reference 3, paragraph 8.3.2.A review of WBN maintenance records for SSPS determined that the failure data for SSPS cards was bounded by the component failure data and corrective maintenance intervals reported in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376.

Therefore, these analyses are considered applicable to WBN.Common cause failure modeling, based upon the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) method, is described in reference 3, paragraph 8.3.1.The risk quantification conservatively did not take credit for potential trip reduction due to the implementation of the revised analog channel STIs in WCAP-10271 (Reference 3, paragraph 8.4).Section 8.4 of WCAP-15376 provides the risk analysis results for the proposed changes in CT and STI. The ACDF and ALERF values are provided in Tables 8.29 and 8.32, respectively, referenced to a base case which represents the changes previously approved in WCAP-14333.

The response to NRC RAI Questions 4 and 11 in WOG letter OG-02-002 (Reference

9) provided the impact of the requested Completion Time change (24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months CT plus 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to reach MODE 3, or a total of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ) on ICCDP and ICLERP for a El-10 ENCLOSURE 1 RTB undergoing preventative or corrective maintenance with the associated logic train inoperable for the bounding 2/3 logic.The risk metrics as identified in RG 1.174 and 1.177 were met for the proposed changes.The NRC staff found that the quality of the PRA was sufficient for the evaluation of the proposed changes.Cumulative Change WCAP-15376 provides the cumulative change to CDF from technical specification changes associated with both WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 (Reference 3, paragraph 8.4.4). The ACDF and ALERF values are cumulative from WCAP-10271 to WCAP-15376.

The ALERF acceptance criterion is satisfied.

The ACDF acceptance criterion going from WCAP-10271 to WCAP-15376 is slightly exceeded.

This is addressed in WCAP-15376 Section 8.4.4 and Table 8.33. The cumulative ACDF from pre-TOP conditions to WCAP-15376 conditions is discussed using the sensitivity analysis values from Table 8.4 of WCAP-14333 for 2/4 logic and 2/3 logic combined with the ACDF values from Table 8.29 of WCAP-15376.

The cumulative ACDF for the 2/4 logic is 5.7E-07 per year, which is close to but slightly exceeds the acceptance criterion of 5E-7. The cumulative ACDF for the 2/3 logic change is 1.1E-06 per year, which slightly exceeds the acceptance criterion.

However, at WBN, since the DCCP is only changing from the TOP to WCAP-15376 conditions (not pre-TOP), the ACDF acceptance criterion is satisfied.

Another consideration in support of meeting the ACDF acceptance criterion with the extended completion times is the avoidance of shutdown risk.4.1.1.2 Tier 2, Avoidance of Risk-Significant Plant Configurations Tier 2 requires an examination of the need to impose additional restrictions when operating with the proposed changes in order to avoid risk-significant equipment outage configurations.

WCAP-14333 Westinghouse performed an evaluation of equipment according to its contribution to plant risk while the equipment covered by the proposed changes is out of service for maintenance or testing in response to RAI Question 18. Westinghouse performed an importance analysis for 25 top events for each of the test or maintenance configurations associated with the proposed TS changes. The analysis determined the system importances for plant configurations with no ongoing test or maintenance activities (all components available) and, then, for plant El-11 ENCLOSURE 1 configurations with test or maintenance individually on analog channels, logic trains, master relays, and slave relays. It was assumed that during test or maintenance activities the corresponding component/train was unavailable.

The system importances for both cases were compared.

The importance rankings for systems did not change for the analog channels, master relays, or slave relays. For the case of a SSPS logic train in maintenance, the following systems had a relatively significant increase in their importance ranking: Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW), reactor trip, high pressure injection, low pressure injection, and containment cooling.The response to RAI Question 11 also discussed an inoperable logic train as the only configuration that would significantly impact core damage. Therefore, it is concluded that the only plant configuration with proposed TS changes implemented with a significant impact on CDF or the relative importance of other systems is one logic train inoperable.

Therefore, the Tier 2 limitations are only appropriate when a logic cabinet is out of service. There are no Tier 2 limitations when a slave relay, master relay, or other analog channel is out of service.WBN uses a risk matrix in plant procedure TI-124, "Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix" (Reference 15), to determine risk significant equipment outage configurations.

The matrix currently addresses trains of SSPS removed from service, and analog channels placed in trip or bypass (most testing at WBN is performed with the channel in bypass). With a train of SSPS removed from service, the risk matrix currently prohibits several systems including the reactor trip breakers and auxiliary feedwater system level control valves from being removed from service.Incorporation of the evaluation and results from WCAP-14333 at WBN will involve modifying TI-124 to discuss the implications of removing a logic cabinet from service and limit the simultaneous removal of Tier 2 functions from service. There will be no restrictions applied when a logic train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass allowance.

Entry into these conditions is not typically planned during power operation other than for surveillance testing. Since these Conditions are typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the following Tier 2 restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition entry. If this situation were to occur during the extended CT, the Tier 3 Configuration Risk Management Program discussed below will assess the emergent condition and direct activities to limit risk. There will be no Tier 2 limitations when a slave relay, master relay, or other analog channel is out of service.El-12 ENCLOSURE 1 The following restrictions are applicable to incorporate the evaluation and results from WCAP-14333: " To preserve ATWS mitigation capability, activities that degrade the ability of the AFW system, reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure relief system (pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and safety valves), AMSAC, or turbine trip should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

To preserve loss of coolant accident mitigation capability, one complete emergency core cooling system train thatcan be actuated automatically must be maintained when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance." To preserve reactor trip and safeguards actuation capability, activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

Activities in electrical systems (e.g., AC and DC power) and cooling systems (e.g. essential service water and component cooling water) that support the systems or functions listed in the first three bullets should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

That is, one complete train of a function that supports a complete train of a function noted above must be available.

To preserve capabilities to prevent large early releases, activities that degrade the ability of the containment spray system, air return fans, and ice condenser should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

WCAP-15376 WCAP-15376, section 8.5, provides recommended Tier 2 restrictions when a RTB train is inoperable for maintenance.

These restrictions do not apply when a RTB train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass allowance.

Entry into a Condition where an RTB train is removed from service is not a typical pre-planned evolution during power operation, other than for surveillance testing. Since this Condition is typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the following Tier 2 restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition entry. If this situation were to occur during the extended 24-hour CT, the Tier 3 Configuration Risk Management Program discussed below will El-13 ENCLOSURE 1 assess the emergent condition and direct activities to limit risk.The following restrictions will be put in place:* The probability of failing to trip the reactor on demand will increase when a RTB train is removed from service;therefore, systems designed for mitigating an ATWS event should be maintained and available.

RCS pressure relief system (pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and safety valves), AFW flow (for RCS heat removal), AMSAC, or turbine trip should not be scheduled when a RTB is inoperable for maintenance.

Due to the increased dependence on the available reactor trip train when one logic train or one RTB train is inoperable for maintenance, activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable should not be scheduled when a RTB is inoperable for maintenance.

Activities in electrical systems (e.g. AC and DC power) and cooling systems (e.g. essential service water) that support the systems or functions listed in the first two bullets should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

That is, one complete train of a function that supports a complete train of a function noted above must be available.

4.1.1.3 Tier 3, Risk-Informed Configuration Risk Management Tier 3 requires a proceduralized process to assess the risk associated with both planned and unplanned work activities.

The objective of the third tier is to ensure that the risk impact of out-of-service equipment is evaluated prior to performing any maintenance activity.

The following is a discussion of the program in place at WBN.At WBN, the following procedures control the risk evaluation process and aid in the avoidance of risk-significant plant configurations." Standard Programs and Processes (SPP) 7.1, "Work Control Process"" Technical Instruction (TI) 124, "Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix" El-14 ENCLOSURE 1 SPP-7.1 specifies the general responsibilities and standard programmatic controls for the work control process. This procedure applies to all work activities that affect or have the potential to affect a plant component, system, or unit configuration.

WBN's long-term maintenance plan is a product of the preventive and surveillance process and specifies the frequency for implementation of maintenance and surveillance activities necessary for the reliability of critical components in each system. An established 12-week rolling schedule includes the preliminary defense-in-depth assessment, which documents the allowable combinations of system and Functional Equipment Groups (FEGs) that may be simultaneously worked online or during shutdown conditions.

FEGs are sets of equipment that have been evaluated for acceptable out-of-service combinations.

They are used to schedule planned maintenance and establish equipment clearances.

Predetermined FEG work windows are established for online maintenance and outage periods. The work windows are based on recommended maintenance frequencies and sequenced to minimize the risk of online maintenance.

Work windows are defined by week and repeat at 12-week intervals.

The work windows ensure required surveillances are performed within their required frequency and that division/train/loop/channel interferences are minimized.

The WBN scheduling organization maintains a long-range schedule based on required surveillance testing of online activities and plant conditions.

The surveillance testing schedule provides the "backbone" for the long-term maintenance plan. Other periodic activities (preventive maintenance items) are scheduled with related surveillance tests to maximize component availability.

FEGs are used to ensure work on related components is evaluated for inclusion in the work window. Related corrective maintenance activities are also evaluated for inclusion in the work window provided by surveillance and preventive maintenance performance.

The inclusion of identified work in the FEG work window with the surveillance tests and preventive maintenance items maximizes component availability and operability.

The TI-124 risk assessment methodology is used for online maintenance activities.

For online maintenance, a risk assessment is performed prior to work window implementation and emergent work is evaluated againstthe assessed scope.El-15 ENCLOSURE 1 In general, risk is evaluated based upon the WBN Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) and maintaining defense in depth relative to key safety functions.

The TI-124 risk assessment guidelines utilize the results of the WBN PSA. Other safety considerations, such as Technical Specifications, maintenance rule risk significant systems, structures, and components (SSCs), and significant changes in weather or offsite power availability, are considered in the site-specific configuration risk management program (CRMP) and are used to determine which system, component, and FEG combinations may be worked online. In addition, an assessment of scheduled activities is performed before implementation of a work window. The assessment includes reviews for the following: " The schedule is evaluated against the risk bases outlined in the WBN PSA.* Maximizing safety (reducing risk) when performing online work.* Avoidance of recurrent entry into a specific limiting condition for operation (LCO) for multiple activities.

Activities that require entering the same LCO are combined to limit the number of times an LCO must be established, thus maximizing the equipment's availability." If the risk associated with a particular activity cannot be determined, site engineering is requested to perform a risk assessment." Implementing compensatory measures and requirements for management authorization for higher risk configurations.

Paragraph (a) (4) of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," became effective in November 2000. The requirements of (a) (4) and the CRMP as defined in RG 1.177 appear to overlap in certain areas.This was acknowledged by NRC in the "Statement of Considerations" for 10 CFR 50.65 (Federal Register:

July 19, 1999, Volume 64, Number 137). In this statement, NRC indicated that, after the revision to 10 CFR 50.65 is effective, NRC will expeditiously support licensee requests to remove the CRMP requirements from plant TS. Considering this, a description of the CRMP will not be added to the Technical Specifications.

El-16 ENCLOSURE 1 4.1.1.4 Maintenance Rule Control In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.177, paragraph 3.2, corrective action for RPS/ESFAS hardware within the scope of the proposed TS changes which fails to meet performance criteria will include an evaluation to determine if the AOT or STI should be decreased.

4.1.2 Safety

Evaluation Conditions NRC approval of WCAP-14333 was subject to the following conditions requiring plant-specific information:

1. Confirm the applicability of the WCAP-14333 analyses for the plant.2. Address the Tier 2 and Tier 3 analyses including the Configuration Risk Management Program insights and confirm that these insights are incorporated into the decision making process before taking equipment out of service.NRC approval of WCAP-15376 was subject to the following conditions requiring plant-specific information:

1. Confirm the applicability of the topical report to the plant and perform a plant-specific assessment of containment failures and address any design or performance differences that may affect the proposed changes.2. Address the Tier 2 and Tier 3 analyses including risk significant configuration insights and confirm that these insights are incorporated into the plant-specific configuration risk management program.3. The risk impact of concurrent testing of one logic cabinet and associated reactor trip breaker needs to be evaluated on a plant-specific basis to ensure conformance with the WCAP-15376-P, Rev. 0 evaluation, and RGs 1.174 and 1.177.4. To ensure consistency with the reference plant, the model assumptions for human reliability in WCAP-15376-P, Rev. 0 should be confirmed to be applicable to the plant-specific configuration.

5. For future digital upgrades with increased scope, integration and architectural differences beyond that of Eagle 21, the staff finds the generic applicability of WCAP-15376-P, Rev. 0 to future digital systems not clear and should be considered on a plant-specific basis.El-17 ENCLOSURE 1 6. An additional commitment from the response to NRC RAI Question 18 in Reference 10 requires that each plant review their setpoint calculation methodology to ascertain the impact of extending the COT Surveillance Frequency from 92 days to 184 days.WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 SE Condition 1, Topical Report Applicability Determination In order to address SE Condition 1 for both WCAPs, Westinghouse issued implementation guidelines for licensees to confirm the analyses are applicable to their plant. The applicability evaluation is provided in Enclosure 4.WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 SE Condition 2, Tier 2 and Tier 3 Analyses SE Condition 2 for both topical reports is addressed above under the Tier 2 and Tier 3 discussions.

WCAP-15376 SE Condition 3, Concurrent Testing Risk The response to NRC RAI Question 4 in Reference 9 provided the ICCDP for the configuration where both the logic train and associated RTB are out of service for preventive maintenance for a total time of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , which includes a CT of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months plus 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to enter Mode 3.The ICCDP for 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months of unavailability for this configuration is 3.2E-07, which meets the RG 1.177 acceptance criteria of less than 5E-07. Since this ICCDP value is based on the logic train and reactor trip breaker being out of service concurrently for 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , bypassing one logic train and associated RTB train for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for testing will also meet the RG 1.177 ICCDP guideline.

SE Condition 3 is addressed by demonstrating the applicability of the WCAP-15376 analysis as discussed in the response to SE Condition 1 (see Enclosure 4).WCAP-15376 SE Condition 4, Human Reliability The evaluation of the applicability of the model assumptions for human reliability in WCAP-15376 to WBN are provided in Enclosure 4.WCAP-15376 SE Condition 5, Future Digital Upgrades This condition does not currently apply to WBN. Future digital upgrades will require separate evaluation.

El-18 ENCLOSURE 1 WCAP-15376 RAI Question 18 Commitment, Setpoint Calculations The response to this RAI in Reference 9 noted that plant-specific RTS and ESFAS setpoint uncertainty calculations and assumptions, including instrument drift, will be reviewed to determine the impact of extending the Surveillance Frequency of the COT from 92 days to 184 days.The rack drift terms used in the applicable WBN RTS and ESFAS setpoint calculations are documented in WCAP-12096 (Reference 13). For the Eagle 21 process protection channels, the calculations include a conservative one-year drift allowance.

The Eagle 21 system is designed to continuously perform self-diagnostics and self-calibration of analog input signals so that drift is continuously corrected.

This feature will not be affected by the proposed changes to the COT frequency.

Further, a board which failed auto calibration would be alarmed by the system. Based on the use of a conservative drift allowance in the setpoint calculation and the continuous auto-calibration of the Eagle 21 channels, it is concluded that the setpoint calculations for the Eagle 21 channels are not impacted by the increase in the COT surveillance frequency.

The rack drift value used for the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) racks is a generic value for analog channels as documented in Reference

13. In support of the COT extension from 92 days to 184 days, WBN analyzed drift data for NIS Technical Specification reactor trip and permissive functions using a large population (more than 500 data points) of as-found and as-left values from COT performances over more than four fuel cycles. Typically, no adjustments were required for long intervals, i.e., since the bistable setting was found to be within the as-left tolerance, it was left in the as-found state, in some instances for as long as three cycles without adjustment.

In no case did the as-found value exceed the acceptable as-found allowance.

In only two cases did the as-found values exceed the acceptable as-left allowance, thereby requiring adjustment to within the as-left allowance, and in both instances, the as-found value was still within the acceptable as-found allowance.

The data shows that drift is minimal for these channels and is well within the uncertainty allowance.

Therefore, it is concluded that increasing the COT surveillance interval will have no impact on the Power Range NIS setpoint calculation.

4.1.3 Plant-Specific Evaluations of Functions not Evaluated Generically in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Insert 7 of TSTF-411 Revision 1 and Insert 14 of TSTF-418 Revision 2 state that in order to apply TS relaxations to plant-El-19 ENCLOSURE 1 specific functions not evaluated generically, licensees must submit plant-specific evaluations for NRC review and approval.Section 4.0 of TSTF-418 states that several utilities completed plant-specific evaluations to demonstrate that the changes in WCAP-10271 and its supplements are applicable to functions not generically evaluated.

As noted in Section 11.0 of both WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376, as well as in TSTF-418, the changes approved in the WCAPs are also applicable to those plant-specific functions for which evaluations have been performed to demonstrate applicability of WCAP-10271.

Therefore, for those cases, additional plant-specific evaluations are not required to demonstrate applicability of WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 to these plant-specific functions.

As indicated previously, the initial issue of the WBN TS included the changes which were justified in WCAP-10271 and its supplements (References 11 and 12). An evaluation of the applicability of the generic analyses to the WBN RTS and ESFAS functions was performed and is documented as Reference 9 of TS Bases 3.3.1 and Reference 10 of TS Bases 3.3.2. This applicability evaluation documented an additional evaluation of those WBN functions which were not generically evaluated in WCAP-10271 and demonstrated applicability of the WCAP-10271 analyses to certain plant-specific functions.

These plant-specific evaluations included the Eagle 21 digital process protection system and, therefore, the changes in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 are also applicable to Eagle 21.Based on the above, the changes in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 are applicable to the following plant-specific functions which were not generically evaluated:

(1) Reactor Trip on SG Water Level Low-Low with Trip Time Delay (Function 3.3.1-13), (2) Auxiliary Feedwater actuation on SG Water Level Low-Low with Trip Time Delay (Function 3.3.2-6b), (3) the Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump on Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Low coincident with Safety Injection and Containment Sump Level High (Function 3.3.2-7b), and (4) Feedwater Isolation on Main Steam Valve Vaults Water Level High (Functions 3.3.2-5d and 5e).4.2 Other TSTFs TSTF-169 TSTF-169 combines the single loop and two loop Reactor Coolant Flow Low reactor trip functions (3.3.1-10a and 10b) into one function.

In addition, Table 3.3.1-1 notes g and h associated with this function are no longer required and are deleted, the Condition N description is revised, and Condition X is no longer applicable to this function.El-20 ENCLOSURE 1 This change resolves an inconsistency with respect to the WCAP-10271 analyses by removing the potential for exceeding the AOT allowance evaluated in the WCAP. As described in the TSTF justification, if a single Reactor Coolant Flow channel is inoperable above P-8, Action N.1 requires the channel to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or power reduced below P-8 within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months . If the channel cannot be tripped, the Applicability of the two-loop trip function is entered (below P-8) and Action X.1 again requires the channel to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or power reduced below P-7 (per Action X.2) in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Since many loop components are common to both trip functions, sequential entry into N then X would allow a 22 hour2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months AOT when only a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AOT for maintenance was evaluated in WCAP-10271 and its supplements.

A 22 hour2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months allowance is also inconsistent with the TOPS Guidelines, WOG-90-18, dated 11/1/90. The changes to AOT and BT are justified by WCAP-14333.

TSTF-311 The proposed change revises the Frequency of SR 3.3.1.14 for performing a TADOT for Turbine Trip on Low Fluid Oil Pressure and Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Functions 14a and 14b) to be consistent with the applicability for these Functions.

The LCO requires the Functions to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-9 (50% RTP). Currently the test is required to be performed prior to reactor startup if it has not been performed within the previous 31 days. The change will allow the test to be performed at power prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock instead of prior to reactor startup.Since these reactor-trip-on-turbine-trip Functions are not required until reactor power is above the P-9 setpoint, testing in MODE 1 prior to reaching 50% power will continue to ensure the Functions will be OPERABLE when required.

These Functions can be tested at power with minimal perturbations to plant systems.4.3 Deviations from Approved Changes WCAP-14333 (TSTF-418)

TSTF-418 Revision 2, Inserts 1, 2 and 3 were not included in proposed change based on the following justification:

The Functions do not have installed bypass capability.

The bypass test Note is already included in the WBN TS.El-21 ENCLOSURE 1" For 3.3.1 Condition Q, Reactor Trip Breakers (Function 17), the changes in TSTF-418 were superseded by TSTF-411, which did not include Note 3 (Insert 3). WBN is implementing option 3 of TSTF-411 Insert 6." WBN TS does not have a reactor trip function for RCP Breaker Position (Function 3.3.1-11 in TSTF-418) or the applicable Conditions L (existing) and M (proposed).

The TSTF-418 changes to TS Section 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP)Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation, do not apply to WBN and, therefore, are not implemented, due to differences between the WBN TS and NUREG 1431 format of Section 3.3.5. The Completion Time for Required Action A.1 will remain 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .WCAP-15376 (TSTF-411)

TSTF-411 Revision 1 change in frequency for SR 3.3.1.8, which applies to the source and intermediate range flux instrumentation, was not included in the proposed change because the Gamma-Metrics equipment used at WBN for the source and intermediate ranges was not evaluated in the WCAP.TSTF-169 As a result of combining the single loop and two loop Reactor Coolant Flow Low reactor trip functions into one function, Condition N for the single loop function was deleted and the remaining Conditions of 3.3.1 were renumbered in the TSTF. The WBN implementation of this change retains Condition N for the function and Condition X is no longer applicable to the function.Condition X is still applicable to other Functions.

TSTF-311 No deviations.

5.0 REGULATORY

SAFETY ANALYSIS The proposed amendment would revise TS sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.6 to implement relaxations of Reactor Trip System and Essential Safety Features Actuation System test times and test intervals previously reviewed and approved by the NRC under Westinghouse WCAP-14333-P-A (TSTF-418, Revision 2) and WCAP-15376-P-A (TSTF-411, Revision 1). The proposed amendment also incorporates approved TSTFs-169 and 311, which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants." El-22 ENCLOSURE 1 It is important to note that Diablo Canyon (another Eagle 21 plant) has submitted (February 13, 2004 and received approval (January 5, 2005) of similar changes as proposed in this amendment request.5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration The following evaluates the proposed amendment to determine whether a significant hazards consideration exists by addressing the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c): 1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed changes do not result in any modifications to RTS and ESFAS hardware, design requirements, or functions.

No system operational parameters are affected.

The protection system will continue to perform the intended design functions consistent with the design bases and accident analyses.

The proposed changes will not modify any system interfaces and, therefore, could not increase the likelihood of an accident described in the UFSAR. The proposed amendment will not change, degrade or prevent actions, or alter any assumptions previously made in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident described in the UFSAR.Plant-specific evaluations confirm the applicability of the WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 analyses to WBN. Implementation of the approved changes is in accordance with the conditions of the NRC safety evaluations for these reports and will result in an insignificant risk impact.The proposed changes to the completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequencies reduce the potential for inadvertent reactor trips and spurious actuations and, therefore, do not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the allowed completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequencies do not change the response of the plant to any accidents and have an insignificant impact on the reliability of the RTS and ESFAS signals. The RTS and ESFAS will remain highly reliable and the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the risk of plant operation.

This is demonstrated by showing that the impact on plant safety as measured by core damage frequency is less than 1.OE-06 per year and the impact on large early release frequency is less than 1.0E-07 per year. In addition, for the completion time El-23 ENCLOSURE 1 change, the incremental conditional core damage probabilities and incremental conditional large early release probabilities are less than 5.OE-07 and 5.OE-08, respectively.

These changes meet the acceptance criteria in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Therefore, since the RTS and ESFAS will continue to perform their functions with high reliability as originally assumed, and the increase in risk as measured by CDF, LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP is within the acceptance criteria of existing regulatory guidance, there will not be a significant increase in the consequences of any accidents.

The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained.

The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures.

The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.

Therefore, this change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed amendment does not require any design changes, physical modifications or changes in normal operation of the RTS and ESFAS instrumentation.

Existing setpoints will be maintained.

The changes do not affect functional performance requirements of the instrumentation.

No changes are required to accident analysis assumptions.

The changes do not introduce different malfunctions, failure modes, or limiting single failures.

The changes to the completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequency do not change any existing accident scenarios nor create any new or different accident scenarios.

El-24 ENCLOSURE 1 Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined.

The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by these changes.Redundant RTS and ESFAS trains are maintained, and diversity with regard to the signals that provide reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation is also maintained.

All signals credited as primary or secondary and all operator actions credited in the accident analyses will remain the same. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The calculated impact on risk is insignificant and meets the acceptance criteria contained in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Although there was no attempt to quantify any positive human factors benefit due to increased completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequencies, it is expected that there would be a net benefit due to a reduced potential for spurious reactor trips and actuations associated with testing.Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.Conclusion Based on the above, it is concluded that operation of WBN Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

5.2 Applicable

Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The regulatory bases and guidance documents associated with the RTS and ESFAS functions affected by the proposed changes include: GDC-13 requires that instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated El-25 ENCLOSURE 1 systems.GDC-20 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed (1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditionsand to initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety.GDC-21 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed for high functional reliability and testability.

GDC-22 through GDC-25 and GDC-29 require various design attributes for the protection system(s), including independence, safe failure modes, separation from control systems, requirements for reactivity control malfunctions, and protection against anticipated operational occurrences.

Regulatory Guide 1.22 discusses an acceptable method of satisfying GDC-20 and GDC-21 regarding the periodic testing of protection system actuation functions.

These periodic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performance that is required of the actuation devices in the event of an accident.Regulatory Guide 1.174 describes a method for using probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed decisions on changes to the licensing basis. Regulatory Guide 1.177 addresses evaluating the impact of technical specification changes on defense-in-depth and safety margins and describes a three-tiered approach to the risk evaluation.

Implementation of the proposed changes will not compromise compliance with the requirements of these documents.

Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2)such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, a significant change in the types of or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or a significant increase in individual or El-26 ENCLOSURE 1 cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c) (10). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-1431, Revision 3, "Standard Technical Specification Westinghouse Plants." 2. WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1, "Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998.3. WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003.4. TSTF-169, Revision 1, "Deletion of Condition 3.3.1.N." 5. TSTF-311, Revision 0, "Revision of Surveillance Frequency for TADOT on Turbine Trip Functional Unit." 6. TSTF-411, Revision 1, "Surveillance Test Interval Extensions for Components of the Reactor Protection System (WCAP-15376-P-A)."1 7. TSTF-418, Revision 2, "RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times (WCAP-14333-P-A)." 8. Westinghouse Owners Group letter OG-96-110 dated December 20, 1996 (copy included in the back of Reference 2 above).9. Westinghouse Owners Group letter OG-02-002 dated January 8, 2002 (copy included in Appendix D of Reference 3 above).10. Westinghouse Owners Group letter OG-01-058 dated September 28, 2001 (copy included in Appendix D of Reference 2 above).11. WCAP-10271-P-A Supplement 2, Revision 1, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," June 1990.12. WCAP-10271-P-A and Supplement 1-P-A, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," May 1986.13. WCAP-12096 Revision 9, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems Watts Bar Unit 1 Eagle 21 Version," March 2005.14. TVA WBNP Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Summary Report, Revision 3, June 2005.15. TVA WBN TI-124, "Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix," Rll.El-27 ENCLOSURE 1 16. TVA Calculation CN-NUC-WBN-NTB-WBNOSG4031, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown per 10CFR50 Appendix R, R33.17. TVA WBN TI-119, "Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting

-l0CFR50.65," R27.18. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Approval of WCAP-14333P (Proprietary) and WCAP-14334NP (Non-proprietary), "Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," 7/15/1998.

19. Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis.20. Regulatory Guide 1.177, An Approach for Plant-Specific Risk-Informed Decisionmaking:

Technical Specifications.

21. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, WCAP-15376P, Rev 0, "Risk-Informed assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," Westinghouse Owners Group Project No. 694, 12/20/2002.

22. SPP-7.1, TVAN Standard Programs and Processes, "On Line Work Management." El-28 ENCLOSURE 2 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 390 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NUMBER 07-04 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES -MARKED PAGES I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST 3 .3-2 3 .3-3 3 .3-5 3 .3-6 3 .3-7 3 .3-8 3 .3-9 3.3-10 3.3-11 3.3-12 3.3-14 3.3-17 3.3-25 3.3-26 3.3-27 3.3-28 3.3-29 3.3-30 3.3-31 3.3-55 II. MARKED PAGES See attached.

TSTF::418, R2:: REPLACE WITH 12 RTS Instrumentation

... .... ... ...3 .3.1:CONDITION REQUIRE ACTION COMPLETION TIME,........-, i, , i " ~ ~. ........... ...., -, -,", C. One channel or train i noperabl e.C.I C.2: Restore channel. or train* to OPERABLE.status. ..Open RTBs 48:hours 49. hours 4.I O. One. Power Range Neutron :Flux-High channel inoperable.

- ... ...- NOTEi -L ..-- ..The inoperable be bypassed forý up:to' mIhours for surveillance:te'fing and setpoint adjustment ofother channels.D:.,1.. Place channel in.. ..trip (. ... .0.-1.2 Reduce.THERMAL POWER to RTP.QR TSTF 418, R2 REPLACE WITH7 8)iiii)!)))i 7 2)iii~ i))) ))))))))))

0.2.11 Place trip.channel in AND Only required to :be performed when-the Power Unge Neutron Flux iinput .to QPTR is: inoperable.

DI.2:2 Perform: SR 3.2.4.2.DR D4.31 Be in MODE 3.(cont.inued)

Watts :Bar-Uni~t 1 3ll3 :

RTS& Instrumentation

3.3.1 ACTIONS

continued):

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION:

TIME, , .. .. ..........,. .== ...........j ............ ....... .., .......E. ..One channel inoperable.

The Inoperable cha 1may be byp~assed for up: ,to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for:surveillance.

ting of:other' channel s.El.I Placec:.hannel, in trip.TSTF 418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 78 OR LZ 6e:in MODE 3.1..F. THERMAL POWER: > P1-6: and <:P-0:i, :one!I ntermediate::i Range Neutron Flux. channel inoperable..

Fý 1.OR F.2 Red.o.ce THERMALýto ý-c Pý-:6ý1.:POWER-:2 hours.IncrnseJHERMAL POWER :toý-> Plwl,0ý2: ho~urs G:ý T.H.E.4mAL POWER: > P`6 6. i Suspend operations, lmed-iately and. P-10, ýtwo involving.,posit.ive Intermediati:'Range reactivity.

additions.

Iýieutron.:Flux:thannels inoperab.le, ANQ G.: 2: ReducelkOKALPOWER

12. :hours to 0.....................

....R. THERMAL POWER.< Pý-6, H.1ý :Restore::channel(s) to Pri:or to.one or-two OPERABLE.::-status.

lAcreasing aermed i at.e...Range THERMALPOWER.to Notron.:..Flux channel s > P76 ffioOrable:;

...................................................(continu.0d).

Watts.$Ar.-Unit I 1.3-3 RTS Instrumentation 3.3.41 TSTF 418, R2 REPLACE WITH 7 2ii i i i i i i i ii i i i i i i i i i TSTF 418, R2 REPLACE WITH TSTF 169, Ri REPLACE WITH P -7.~iiiiiW iiiiiiiii Watts:Bar-Unit 13 3.375 RTS Instrumentation

3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRE ACTIONI COMPLETION TIME 0. One Low Fluid ýOilI Pressure Turbine Trip.hanneli i:;noperable,--------------

-,NOTE ------------.The Inoperable

cha 1 may be bypassed :fr f up to: 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s: Cor surveillance

s. 0.1 place channel in:: TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 7 6ii i i i i ii i i i i i i ii i i i i i i 0.2 Reduce THERMAL .IPOWER to: < P-g.4 J.P..*., One train i noperable.

.--

NOTE----------

One tra~in -may beq:bypanssed for Sup to .4.ho urs for.urveillance tes~ting provided: the other :traini:s .OPERABL:E..

P.1 Restore train: to OPEMRABLE:status OR P.2 Be in MODE 3.TSTF-411, :Rl REPLACE WITH 24.............

.(continued)

Watts ..Ba~r-Uni 1, .3 1!. 3-6:

RTS .Instrumentation

3.3.l irioperabl e., 7STF-11,RT I (conti nued)Watts Bar'Unit I L.3rl

ýRTS Instrumentation 3.31.1 AeTTANýý tionninuedl C....... I CO.MPLETION TIME CONDITION

~~REQUIRED

'ACTIONCOPEONTM T. :One trip mechanism 1T.1 Restore inoperable

48: hours inoperabl e for:one trip .mec hanism to RTB. OPERABLE status.OR T.r:2.1 Be in MODE: 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months AND T2.2 Ope~n:RTB..

.55 hours6.365741e-4 days 0.0153 hours 9.093915e-5 weeks 2.09275e-5 months U On.:e Steam Generator; Water Level: Low-Low cha~nnel inoperable.

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 One. chann may:be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveil.l4 testing.tl.P1 Place channel.in

t r ip.TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72:P~ AND V.1.2.OR, V..2 For. the:affected pr Iotection, set,.: set:the Trip Tmej:o elay: (Ti) to match the Trip :Time Delay.:.(TH).

Beý in MODE.3 .78 (continuued)

Watts Bar-Unit 3:1:.13.:

RTS Instrumentation 3..3. 1 ACTIONS (continued CONDITION JREQUIRED ACTION : COMPLETION TIME........IIITII..II..............

..... I IT.. -i:.: ........:......:.V. One.:Vessel aT channel i noperabl e., NOTE-- 7 -----------

One ,channel may be bypassed for .up. to:F1hour.s .far: ,surveila testing:."V Set the: Trip:: Time Delay threshold power r v level for (TS) and (TM) t: O' power. " ORu V 2 Be in MODE 3:.Ill ......(W;.: One: channel inoperable.

------

One chanqe-1 may be bypassed for up t Uhours for for r }vnce testing.-TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 7 2i~ iiiiii iiiii~ iiiiiii 78~))i: P c .~iiii!.W.I1 Place trip.:channel in OR:\N Be in:MODE.:3.

I. ' 1~X. One channel inoperable.

NOTE------

One0 .nay be: bypassed for up:t 4 t ours for surveill testing.TSTF-418, R2:: REPLACE WITH... 72 7 8iiiiiii iiiiiii OR Pl ace: channel in trip.Reduce: THERMAL POWERýto < P-7..X. t (continued)

Watts Bar-tUnit1r r:3 .3L.

RTS. Instrumentation6 3i3 .1!ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION J REQUIRED ACTION Ii TIO TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 Y. One, two: or three: Turbine ::Stop. Valve Cliosure :channels i4noperable.

.Y.1 DR Y:.z PIace :channel(s) i~n 0hour s Reduce THERMAL POWER to <. P-9..76.. .. ....'" ...................... ".. .L.. .... .. ...........Z. :Two:RTS Trains 17.1 Enter ICO: 3.02.1 Immed iately inoperable

................... ......, .............." " ............SURVEILLANCE REQUJREMENTS

.-------

NOTE------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.1-I to ::determine::whth:

SR:s apply :for e~ach :RTS: Function..-.-....----------------

--.......... .................... .SURVE1 LLANCE. FREQUENCY............SR 3:3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3..1.2 ----------

---- NOTES.:--

.1i Adjustýý NIS channel: if:' absol:ute di fference is.: > 2Y.2. Required to-be performed:

wi.thin 12::hours after THERMAL*POWER is i 15% .:R~IP. ...... ....Compare results of c heat :24 hours balance calculation to::Nuclear Instrumentation System (.NIS), channel.:output.... .. ... ..( c.. ..:(*on~t:nued)4:

Watts: Bar-Unit .1:3.+3716]

RUS Instrumentat omn 31.3.1 SURVEILLANCEUREQUIREMENTS (continued), SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.

iSR a.3.3,1.3:

~-----------NOTES----------

1. Adjust NJIS channel: if absolute-difference iS : 3%.2. Required to be performed within: 96::hours::

after THERMAL POWER :is..> 15i RTP.: Compar, e results of the i:ncore detector measurements to NIS:. AFD.31 effective full':power days (EFIPD).SR 3.;3.1:.4:

-:---:--- -NOTE-------------

This Surveillance must be: performed on. the: reactor trip bypass -:breaker prior to placing the bypa-s: breaker- in service.Perlform TAOT.-TSTF-411, Ri REPLACE WITH 62:RED. TEST...., ...........-:- , ....SR 3.R3..5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.1 days. on a:GERED TEST I_SR 3.3-1.6-~~~~NOTE---------

Required t:Obe performed:

within: 6 days: after THERMAL POWER jIs::; -S0% :RTP..--- --- ---Calibrate excore channels :to agree with incore detector measurements.

TSTF-411, Ri REPLACE WITH 92 92 E P .................I ...........(continued)

Watts Bar-Un it I3 RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1: kIIiViFTi i1 AN.F RFflIIT~FI4FNT~ (enntinued~

-......:...1. -t--.-*i --,__________________

SURVE ILLANCE FREQUENCY t SR: 3.3.1.7 For Functions:-and

.3 ('Power Range: Fnstrumentation), 2 this Survei lance: hal:1 inclrudentverification) thati:Snterllock e h0ls inc the rerquird istate for existinge unit condi t i ronese.on ti n ...---- .------ ..- ...- ..- .-.9? ays TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WITH iiiiiiiii1 8 4 i~ iiiiiii Perform: COT....................ý ý I ý I -ý ý ý ý .....................I .... ..............-SR: 13.3..18.---------

...... NOTES ------------------

1. :,Not requiired:

to be performed for Source Range- instrumentation prior to entering MODE 3 from tODE 2 until 4.hours a fter entry ýinto:MODE 3...2. This Surve.illance shall include, verification that interlock P-6 :is in the: required state for existing§.unit ctonditions., r orm o.... .. ... .Perform tOt.--:- --- NOTE- --..Only: required when:: not ..:performed within previous:31 days.Prior. to reactor startup Four hours::after: reducing! 0owerbellow

.... lO for: intermediate range instrumentation.

ýAND.hours after reducing power below P-6:for source rang e inst rumnentation:

AND:Every 31 days,:thereafter, (continued).Watts Bar-Unit:

1-13-.3 1:2

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEI.LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE:

FREQUENCY S R .3 1 .4 ' -------N O E I ----~ ---- NT-- -- -Verification of setpoint :i nto required.

...Only: required--- --- -- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- when. not,.performed within previous 31 days Perform TADOT. PriHor- to reactor startup SR .... ..... ... ....... .. .. ..........

3.3: 1 .. 5 : , --=,- ' .'NO E , ---- =. ., SR 3.3. 1. ------ --N T --_ ._ _ _ _.Neutron: detectors

are exc! uded. :f rom response:

time :testing.

.Verify RTS RESPONSE TIME is ::within imifts. 1.8 months on :a STAGGERED TEST:BASIS TSTF-311, RO REPLACE WITH Prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock whenever the unit has been in MODE 3, if not performed within the previous 31 days Watts: Bar-Unit:.I3 3,37'14 TSTF-169, Ri REPLACE WITH ( f)ii ii i i i ii l : i ii i i~RT5S.Instnrmentation 3..1.Taba .3A.1-1 (pag Ie 3: of 9)Reac~tor Trip. system. Instrumentiatijon

/ * ., .,/.......

...........

,..* / ......: : .........

...: .CABLE MODES NMINAL.O~tR ~THER SPECIFIED REPXQUIRED StJRViLI.ANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION:

NDITI .ONS UIANNIE1S C0ND-ITIONS:.

RE .U .W.MEJTS VALUE SF IPOINT:9 ioswtvi Water 1 3. X 0SR 3.3.13 .92.7% 92% span.. .:S R 3 .3 7 :Sp a n SR 33.117: spa M~W-Low TSITF-.1169, R11- MOVE INFORMATION OFBOUPT E'j, :S cL4oo 'I .3pcr. N S3.3.ý1. 1 9.-1% 90%:flow loop: :.SR 3.3.1.7 flow SR 3.3.1.10* \SkS13:31 5?* 3.3.1f5.R T '\s 3crX R.31.07 fv oopSR331.7 fidb"\R 331,10 KOO ..33J.15 LI. Undcol e M.uSR:3.31.9 4734V 4830 V:u, 33.9.. RCPS R: I 10 inc "" "R :.33 .1 .15 .......S(f): Above he P-7 (Low. Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.: (g) Above the P-8 (Power Range: Neutron. Flux): interlock.(h) Above the P-7. (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) and beloaw the iP-8 (Power Range:Nutrozn Flux) interlock.

Watts Bar-Unit 2 1 1 . Amendmeant.

.47:

ESFSAS: Instrumentation 3.3. 2 ACTIONS [continued)

CONDITION IREDACTCOMPLETION TIME C. one train: inoperable.

C .-.----NOTE One. trainmay be bypassedjfor up.:to.4-hours for surveillance testing: p o rovided the other train is OPERABLE.:

Rest~ore to OPERABLE status.Be :i n MODE 3..TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 C .2:..AND:Be in: MODE 5:.:I: TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 24 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 7 2== = = = == = = = = = = == = = = = = =78i~ iiiiw T~ iiiiiii::8..: 4- : : :: : : : : 4 -. 4.). One: channel:.inoperable..

D:.I\ .- ----.... NOTE- ...-- ...' bOne :channe:l i:may- be::b assed for up to.4 o !urs Jfor ..veillance testing;I.1 Pace: t.r:I p ..channel in OR D0.2. 1 Be in, MOODE 3.AND D.Z.2 :Be in: MODEý 4.I (Continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 13-31 3-:25.

iESFASi Inst rumentati.on 3 .3:32: ACTIONS (continuedi)

...........

C N .D.I... .R E...... A TI N C E...:CONDIT ION REQUI!RED i ACTiION :COMPLET ION TIMEýE. One Containment Pressure channel inoperable..

......FSF-18 ] -2 One-nel maybe'bypass~ed

..for UP: to hours for.surveil lance testing.Place channel in bypass:.6 1_2ours 18ours.E.2.1 Be in MODE 3.AND E. 2.2 Be in MODE:4..I ..................F. One channel or train inoperable.

VF.I'Restore chan.ne ).:or.train to .OPERABL:E statu:s. .:ORA VF.:2,.1 Be :in *MODE :3:.48 hour5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months shours:60. hours AND V:. 2 .2i.Be in MODEA4..............i(cont inued).Watts.tBar-Unit I.3.3-26:

ESFAS Instrumentation

... ....... .3 .i ACTIONS (r~nnt.intu~d'i ACTI ONS .- .tR ATNO E N T CONDITION

".REQUIRED.ACTION

_OMLET ION : TIME G. One train inoperable.

G.1I-ýNOTE-----

One: t rai vmay be bypassed for :up to 41 hours4.74537e-4 days 0.0114 hours 6.779101e-5 weeks 1.56005e-5 months for surveillance testing provided the other train. is, OPERABLE:.;

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 2 4iii;;;; !!i i:ii 3 0:: : : :: : : : : : :: : : : : : Restore. trainn .to OPERABLE .status...OR G. 2..1 Be InA MODE: 3.AND.2:Be in MODE:4.36 H... One train :inoperable.

H.1-.NOTE----'One .train may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for: survei1lance.

test~ing provided the. other:train is OPERABLE.w.

TSTF-418, R2 RE PLACE WITH 24 Restore: train: to OPERABLE status.:;OR H.2 :1:Be in MODE 3.AND: H.2.2 Be in MODE ý 41.30 36 I-*.-----.---------**--------.---.--.

I (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit :1 1A:. 3:27:

ESFAS :Instrumentation

.. .... .3 .3 .2:I. One Steam Generator Water Level- High H-igh channel Ainoperabl e...TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 I--.::-.*NOITE--.-----....

One channel *m ay be passed for up to., 4 Ihours 'for rvei I lance testing.TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH Place trip.channell in 72 OR 1.2.!1 Be in MODE: 3.78.OR 11.2.2ýBe .in MODE. 4.84 J. One Main Feedwater Pumps .trip c thannel: inoperabIe.

Res.tore channel :to OPERABLE status." Be :in :MODE 3..K. One channel inoperable.

test'ing.

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH Place channel bypass.in Ours: 72 OR (cont inued)Watts Bar-Uni't 1: 3.34+8 ESFAS Instrumentation TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH K. (continued)

K.:2. 1. Be in MODE: 3.78 AND: K.:2.2: Be :in: MODE 5.108 L. One P-ll interlock channel inoperable.

L..1 Verify, interlock is in required ýstateJ for.existi.ng unit:condit:ion.

I hour*r 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months OR:L2I, Be in :MODEi 3..AND L.2.2 Be in MODE 4.: 13: hours (continued).:

Watts Bar-Unit 1!A-,329 ESFAS I nstrumentat ion 3.3.2 AflIONS (cont1nu~cfi CONDITTION REQUiRED ACTION COMPETIO TIME W. .ýOne Steam: Generator:.WaLter Level:- -Low,- -Low:.ch annel Inoperable.

-~~-NOTE.------

One :chan ay be: bypassed for up t.4 ours for su~rvei'll:

.testing:.M.1. Place channel in trip.AND M. ]2.2 For the. affected: TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 7 2ii:i~ ii iiiiiii~7 8i; i i i ii i i i i i ii i i i i l l 8 4ii : i i : i : i i i i i i i i i l I protection.

set,, set.the Tip Time Del.ay (TO) to match-the.

Trip: Time. DelAY(m:TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE. WITH:: 1.2 OR M. 2. 1. Be j .in MODE :3:.,.:AND.\2, Be in:MDE4 N. One.Vessel AT channel inoperable,.,-..

One chaL ay be bypassed for.Up ours:for s u.r v el. .ae t.estinq..

TSTF-418, RP2 N.OR Set thek Trip.T-ime.Delay :threshold powqer level for (TME and (T.m) to 0% power...Be in MODE 3-..REPLACE WITH ii~ iiiiiii72 il 7 8 ! ! : i !i ! ! ! ! ! ! !i i ! i [ i i (continued).Bar-Unit

!1 3.33 3.1-30.

ESFAS Instrumentation

3.3.2 ACTIONS

(Continued):

I I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPL ETION T"IME r : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : I I-0. One MSVV Room Water Level Hi h4 channnel.in operabZe TSTF-418, R2-REPLACE WITH 12----- --NOTE- -----------.The inoperable mayIbe bypassed fq lfor up. to 4 IhouIs for. survef. 1Ing of* "".... TI .n'I' " : .-"- :..LUrs Shours I T"ST -: R2 REPLACE WITH 7 2~:!!!iii!iiiiii iii 7 8~iiiiiiiiiiiii iiii:0 .1::OR 0.2 Place channel in trip Be ir MODE:. 3.--------SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS Refer.to Table 3.31.- to determine whitchSRs apply for each ESFAS: Function................

...............

T S T 4 1 1 , R (continued)

Watts Bar.-Unit 1.3: 3.3r-3l:

.Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3 6 TSTF-411, Ri INSERT---------------------------

NT-----NOE-------------------------------------------

This surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation.

ere=r to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply fox each Containmrent Vent Isolation Furiction,...... ./ / ~ ..........SR P3.3.6. Perform CHANNEL CHECK.O 12 ou REPLACE____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___WITH SR 3.3.6.2 Perform:ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, :3 dason 92ýSTAG RED T SR .33.6,3 Perform: MASTER: RE AY TET.. -3 days on 92 STAi~GGERE T1 BASIS., ,,, , , ......, : ., .., .. ., .. ., , ,,,::s T G E p E D ; :T.. ..............i~ i ............ ..... .. .......................................SR 3.3.6.4 erformcO.

92 .d. --yS SR 3.3-6.5 Periorm S LAVE E LAY TEST, days OR, 18 muonths for Westinghouse type::AR relay~s.SRý 3.34:6..6

NOTE-----------

Ver ifica tion o~f :setpoinit is, not Oiquired.Perform TADOT. 18 months.S 3.3.6.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRA5ION.

.18 months:.Watt~s Bar-Unit , 1: ý343-55 .Amendment 17 TSTF-411, Rl:: INSERT v: ::: :.----------------------

I----I----NOTE

This surveillance is only applicable to the master relays of the ESFAS instrumentation.

ENCLOSURE 3 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 390 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NUMBER 05-01 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES -MARKED PAGES I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 3.3-23 3.3-24 3.3-25 3.3-26 3.3-33 3.3-34 3.3-41 3.3-42 3.3-46 3.3-47 3.3-48 3.3-50 3.3-51 3.3-52 3.3-53 3.3-56 3.3-57 3.3-58 3.3-59 3.3-61 3.3-62 B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B 3. 3-62a 3.3-63 3.3-102 3.3-103 3.3-104 3.3-105 3.3-106 3.3-107 3.3-108 3.3-109 3.3-110 3.3-111 3.3-112 3.3-113 3.3-114 3.3-115 3.3-116 3.3-118a 3.3-120 3.3-160 3.3-162 II. MARKED PAGES See attached.

RT< :ns3tir-amntatcn.

B~s e ~APPL 1CAE~L1~~I.CC, and APPL1CM~ ILITY... .ru r ........ !a .. ..........

r~r.42ACt':

t~rip it- a',txa~teda prelor to th zrorzr.Pr~s ~erLeE 'zitc1'yter, A touth char-nel is..ý ey -v h~1i~p ir~'~Lot trio 4-ve'l~hct due: to a1 " a1'.*Wf:M3 thaýC safe'ty wtlve 0. to 2L L 6.~r CI tcac'TcI h ji orre GU ee:*[TSTF-169, R DELETE In MOD i :.; t har ,.s a tc,.'-Lhta' f oC,/< ,r f .1 1 n ow!ý tn: EP SLEýL This tri lo ýurct~orn a--' om ca 1.1-ýle :6 ~cr-ili vw-~ by: the P Ine1 On bel~' o w.o V-7 P kEi-aw. t'-e p w týv t tr. t Peýr oolato FColaft 4 L0*1 ti N~~~~ ~~ ::t~o~i I Io- 4..... !I 0w caecto e .c o 'o Th.ICC rLr~tIeeR~a~o:C~i.qa,-rd chanrMoIq Pc Ci o .r Ec C.PFRA5LF in.MODE I abo.ve I ~ ~ ~ h .MO2i:atv a *: ** ~ I{ .o.~TSTF-169., Ri INSERT Above the P-7 setpoint, the reactor trip on low flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled.Watts sai:ýnlt I l3.Kz T 3 :.3- 20,.

aTSTF-:l:169, 1i INSERT and above the P-7 setpoint,~i 1013 0 ot,~ n' c"o: or ~* ~'.~~.i' ~'i~Cl TSTF-169, RI t'! :a:tt -z a1 tr-1'ý-Q:1r" !'r1'P mc~i~~l 6I 1: ... -e lower P-b'el REPLACE WITH ' .I -i t 10. The -eac?_-, Cool~ant I'low ":-n --ri~n seto-Mr-an

___________~Valtie are speitiv I I'L W11aI.C a tý.TSTF-169, Ri -hr.iuh -he t'iI"I1 a'ý6 s fec nEd',.n INSERT.because..of...the higher power level.TSTF-169, Ri DELETEl<ReAc~ ~"~"1 ~ , 7177 .1 an rrr 'is t o' fi L:_1 *.: L Q I~ ~ ~~ý' c.- s1' sc t~ o~c~~ 1o*te o.1 "A U, rea rerlsc 'Re ~' b~l~ c* Te O "' -~~ t'e~P-actor c oolat At*::Th~~r.

I- ^ a jii rc a C -~ t p i t ~ o r' i S.irtr L 1 c-cU Qc-l.4Z ... .. ....qic~ a us .-coni e.-rn a t El 1.,~ .)Y \~~~&o~~~~e~

t>ie r i ta~-a'A.1: o cv 1ký-' s~ 6 P. in t o u t -tw 6c tr-- ;r r, r 4 eeW- a o ho oc iru~ -U I -TSTF-l69, Ri INSERT Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on low flow are automatically blocked since there is insufficient heat production to generate DNB conditions.

['.1'Auenie .4-

A "T "R 'O Pq ac .e 1,lit Li-19 R. 'A a t c 'G.12..........t

-~ ~ ~ ~ 7 1 fi 7-p -~r.*d e .% : iý ý --a f." ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ --1et A'W!7 ey-RTS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1 BASES,: APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, nLCO and. ....APPLICA8LITY

.12. Underfreguency.Reactor Cool ant Pump.s. (contilnued) thereby reducing their coastdown time followi ng a pump trii. The proper coastdowný time :is equired so that reactor heat can be .'removed, immediately -after reactor] tri The freq uencc of each: RCRP bus, is monitore d.Above the P-7 setpoi aý l is..os f frequency detected, on two:: or more:,RCP buse, 11,initiate a reactor trip.Thi!s trip Functi will n trip beforee the Reactor Co0olant n low-Low w L a Trip Setpo int is reached Time :de~lays: .are: incoirporated-.

int the ncy RCPs channels :to prevent reactor tri ps.due:::to mom ntary eIl. ec:tr.i c¢al power transients.

The LCO.. re iuires one Underfrequency RCP cInannel per bus::tosbe PERABLE.L MInMDE I above the setpoint:, the Unde-rfrequency.RCPs trip: must be:OPERABLE.ý Beow the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trip:s on loss of flow are automat:icaliy CS biocked since no conce.ivable power distribultions could occur :that.: would ca:use a ONE concern at ýth is .low power level.. Abave ýjtheo P.-7 ssetpoint, the react.or .riip .o.n l o:ss f flow: in two.or more RCS loops is. automaticall enabled...::,,:::,:TSTF-169, Ri INSERT in two or more R loops.13. Steam. Generator W:a't.er Level -Low :Low Los fthe. steaim generator as Qa :heat :s:nk can :be caused ..by the losiofnormal f-e:edwatera s t a:t i or black.okut or a feedl ine rupture. :Feed-i inze rup:tures esidecontainment are: protac:ted Dy tLhe 01'1timn high trip Function, bas:ec on a 1994 IVA analysis (Ref. 3).i Feedline.

r!upýtures oulsi-de.containment and the other cauustes o;'f t he heat si nk 0 s-s, are protected by :the :SG: Water LaeieV- Low -Low. t.r:i P F:unctUi:

on.The SG WaterLevrel-Low LowIo trip Function.

ensures sthat protectioný

is provilded against. a of: hea:t:: sink V and actuates the AFW System prior :.uncIoveri:ngý t.he. SG: tube s:.:: :The SGs are the heat si nk for th.e reac t or. In order to act as a. +heiatt si nk, he :SGs must contain a minimum :amount of:: water. A nafrrow range. low low: levei: in any SG. is indicaltive of :a loss of :heat. sink for tbeThe level ,tansmitters provide i npUt to (canti nueui, W "at t s: Bar-Un r -i3t: 1:2 B :3.1,:-25:

.RT$ Instrumeinta t-. on-3. 3 3.BýASES APPL IABE SAFETY A4ALYSE.r1ý LCCi and: APPL ICALIMITY 16.. Rector-Tip

..Inter~locks: (continued)

Above. the P6. interlocc setpoint, the-IS. Source.range lveU Lton. Flux reactcr Itrip may bei and thisjFunct on ro longer te necessary.

Ir MODE,,..i 5, or :6, the Pi6 interlock is not required to be :PER-ALE, because the NIS SourceýRange :is prov dng core praotection-i 10. Pow er Reactcr T-iossBlcck.ý P-7.The Low. Power Rý ' r. Trps B-ck 7 fitero is. atua teC by furom .e ither the Poer. Range&Neutron. P-A., or thie Turbine lnpiuuls.-Pressure, P-13. interlocki The :LC requi Ifo.r nteei ock ensureis that :the- follI ow.ng Functionsar oni) on 1 ric[rea si ng p er Uthe P -nnterlocka au toMa t'aIlIy enabl es:: reactcr tkrips. on: the:f l c,,i, ng.Funct i or.SýP rsUszer Pressure-Low,,,:

.Press~ur.zer Wate,. L.ve.r---Hich:

!React;o r C.:oo:ant::.F Wow :[os):* Under /0 1ý ei RCPs ::. and:" Unde&f re"Quency RC Psi.ihez..e re:ctor are eo ry d::wher opera:in above she P-7, ^se~pot.(.a~pxima~t~eiy"i power)0. he eajctor:t:rips pr;idecprotectiOn against te: :DNu .i.m.. :.Below. the P7 setpoin..kthe RCS 3s capable of provid.ng ma'tur al any RC .:rurzit.ig

.(2) On deecreasing.

power, the P-7 :i nte ,rlock autremiai tat y b locks: reactor t-rips on:: the:f ol:I owir' g Funct i ons:Pressuri zer:ý Plressure-L-,:.Pressurlzer wat:er.Level -H.gn.TSTF-169, Ri REPLACE WITH (in two or more RCS-loops)L:ot ne4 l~~~atzsCO Ba-Ui 1B3.2 Waus :Bar-unlt B, Revision 13 Ajiendment 7

RT$. Instrumeritati on:..1R1321............. ........APPLICALE

....t SAFETY ANALYSEt LCO:. and: APPLICAER1LITY C, TSTF-169, Ri DELETE Low Power Reactor Trihos Flnock. (continuedY ReaCtor Coitlant Flow-Lo, .Two Loops RCfPs; :and Underfrequency RCPs.::Setpon't ard Al.owable Value. are not.a poli cab:le to the: PR7.V nterl ock because:::J.

is:. a.lo 9 i.C Furnct."i on and thus has no par;ameter vil th w.hJch to: :a~ssoc:ate.

an. LSSS.The P-7 *nter:ock is a logic Function.and not identlt:y Therefoe.* reures: oe channe: per t(rain: oqf IO, iReactor Tips Block: : 7 i:nerlock to ni.:MO) 1.1 .with.train.

the LCO Power be OPER.ABLE The o1 .potertips:

aire bloked the. P 7 se. tooint :.and .bumb! iove the seP p.0 nu1L.in: MODE 2. .,. .6. 1 .ths IFunc ti.or does not have: to :be: OPERABEbecause the. int&er7.ck prfo. IS tsFunriC.110T when: poer leve drops!:0 pr. .hich is: in MODE I.Pow Rance Neutron Flu.. P-8* ....... ...............The: Power Ranie:- Neutroin .Fux, P-8 interrlock

i:s:actuatedtv:.6.

ox:ately.48%1 p.oerd as :eterminec ,v L.o-out-cffour.NI$

power rannge detectors.

Aue pro;xRimatel:

p y 48Opowerr the P 8 irtir1ock:-D,; ath1l C ow r ,heactoz Coolnt:-o , ow reaýctor on l tow f:lcw-in one or more RCS .lcps :on inrcreasing power.: The ILO equ irementhfe.-t:h s trip Function.ensures t'-:l' p.otýecticn,; orovided ag;zins ::a Soss of fovl Y r -0 R o l!thalt d esU in SO cn~dit ons. .n ..e. core .when greater t'han lapproi!ma~te:b i4y .i: :eio.t : On: decne~asi rg :po-wer, thez reac:tor::.

ii:o.ni lw flow :ii .iy kop isýautom~atkd l.ja: t .b ck!ed. ** '0The LfO :requir dhannels of Power:: Range Neut:r~on:

iFlux.. & ihtrlcktCo be O.tRABL1 in.1. ' * " '" Watts Bar-iUni:t 1 B 3,: 34'ReViSion 13 Amendment:

7 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH BASES _____- 72 RTIS. I nstrumentatV ch....... ... .. :8 : 3. 13 ]: CT:ont:: S(co~nt in ued:): TSTF-418:

R2::::::... REPLACE..W1ITH:::*::::::::

Reference 14 I11 D ,L. 2 1 0 2. and. 13 Cond i tcn D apphles t o the, Power Rariga Neutron FlTux-!Hg ,Function:

.......I S pw, r'I range cetectors provide : u t to h:the -CRD System and t e SG Wa ter Level Cn trol Sys em "nd: therefore have ýa t Wq. of dfour tripplofc A kno inoperabl:n

channel must be plalced in `the. tripped':

cond ion. This results i~n a artiai ti ontin requir oi...one,:-ýout:-o -th eeoicora tjton. :The E .oursý &Hc~ed.~n ~ th~ ~rnpr~hi~rh~nr...

t-ho frir~~r~.~

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 78 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 TSTF-418, R DELETE r In.addition to pl acng.the:

inoperable chane. in. the tripped diticn. THEPRYAL POWER rniustbe re4duced to 5 :-RTP within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .Reducing the: power leývel:peet orat-or of e:Lie core with rada.l pwie r isItrbutions beyord te design]Ui:4 imLs, : Wi:h one of the, NIS power ran-e

.)r~ate :1/4: of the radial oower.: d.istribut i on ing cap iýty isl los t\As an. alternative to the :above actions, the irbopeý-able lonel can be: pl~acedI in te.I tripoed condition wti: n" I6liours and the QPTR :mnitKd: once h:.ours as per 1 .13,2 `4 I:QPTRý venr if ica',n Calcati a t TR every 12.::hurs compensates

47for: the lost: monitoring crpab.-.li ty due-].to :the inoperable NIS power range channe and .a los:.. .tinor un.. r ...... ..o w l s . 75t R, eI The 6: hour Comp!et-ior T ifAand te '2:hour Frequercyar.

~ ,: ~ " ~RANT POWER TILT:(QPTR)..As .an alteer.atiVeto the above act~ions.

tie pl:an t t be pllaced in= ere thiIIFunct ion is nol.onger-equired OPERABLE.Twelve, ours are:allowed to pl:aze tt.e ph ant i ,DE t. rireason.able

e..based Aon:pe4aJ ing experi ce. to reach M7DE:3 from- fullI power in:an rderly: a nd withoumIt chl lengi p systes I e c i ei rd cannot: be coirpiDeted winhin their lailoed C mplietioh TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH Seventy-eight TSTF-418:,:::

R2 INSERT The 78-hour Completion Time includes 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for channel corrective maintenance and an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for the MODE reduction as required by Required Action D.3.The Requi red:. Act!ions .have -beer- .mod::fled by a alIows placing the. i noperable:

channein tIhe ccndilticnfoIr up to lhours whi:e paeformirng su rveill1: _l:ance tes:in fother' chan1eis :T'e Note :1routiJ Ncte hat: le.I O TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITHS 8is 2 1 J .......(onti nu ecd)-4'eid L L: tDd T7 1:U I L 3:

URTS Ins.trumentatioln

.... 1B3:.3 1.....ES.ArT l TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH TSTF-418, R2....REPLACE WITH Reference 14 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72-.D 2, A.. 0.2 2:.A6:D c t, 1 C mied).. ...... ... .. ..... .... ..... .......O! ::i 0 .:7 , iO ~ R i O : .i : O :, : O t n i d alows: placing he 7ncperabhe tha, m ý t:in:he bypass:Cond:ltic i to ow set loint adjus)t nts: of: other Channels;,hen reqire to reduce th e set poin : :accorda.nce wi:t'hll-,tnher 7T chn , t:f S Th j h ow r it limit ' h'us tifj:edin eference 7*

0.2,2 has been modified by :a Note wich only r: r SR. 3.2:,2.4A.?

to be- performed:

i f Power Ra!- e .Neutronp:Flux input. to:.QPTR becones iFane'able.

Faiure oflý a component

in the Po.-wer Range NeutrInOFluxchanniml wih renders:the High Flux tri p FunctIn inoperablemay.

rot affect capability to m-onitor.

QPTR.,.:.

As such, .determnnin.

OPTR, usirng t: e movabl e ":1n.ore cetectors:

once' per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .may:no.t be. necessary....

-. E:. anI .E.2R Cor'ditibn

£ lesl to the -f~o116iq ireactoý'

tr1Fuip tir:* Pqw e r nce .tron Fl ux-Ldw: and Fl Poer:Ra ge Neutrov ý'I-UHigh PaS i t'.ive RAte:A kno. wn i.1 .noperam.

hannel inus eplaced in the trirope6d condt:ion::

w:in 6 ours, Placin he: cha nnenl: In týthe t d: condition results in a parti ci:--t .ogic for uat.ion f t.:. the.two-out-o6f-three trips and one-out-of-:thl iC: f Or actuation olf the two-ouit-of -foul, tri :s:.. .Th 6hour's allowedl.. .-I h " r : : Ik s ..-1 .* .: : :. : .: to placerathe hannel in tr,:i c~ondition is Putfe neferente 7 If thoe in r ,:xchan.el cannot be placed In the trip ccnd within Ithe secf Ied Ciyn.letlon Time, the ,T1rn: must:ý. plaed in a-MOIDr where tnnese.. Functions are t reqi', ed OPERABLE P;An a Idttinal 6:hburs i]s ai cwen to:p e the pIan t in MNODE 3. : Six h obur:s is a .r easOnab'le:

t'IMe.Yed on operatin experiene.

to place:the -ant in MOtE.3 from fu01 power in an orderly.:rmanner and without :chal IIencing The ired Actions h. Deen 'dif ied by .a ,Note :th..:t allows g: .the o" ra chainei : "in the: bypassed co-dition0 fo to .4 ou.rs w .l fo.rmIng rau survei 1lanc~e tes th o-t heNc-nes T k'u :m limit is justified I. Keren 7 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH Reference 14.-11 .... .. ........Watts Bar-unit:B 3**.-.:3-42.

ýAmendent:

18*Revi s:i on :27.

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 14A BASES ,_____-I___

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 p i.. TSTF-418, R2 TSTF-169, Ri REPLACE WITH.Placing the channel in the tripped condition when above the P-8 setpoint results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel in the same loop to initiate a reactor trip. Two tripped channels in each of two RCS loops are required to initiate a reactor trip when below the P-8 setpoint and above the P-7 setpoint.

This Function does not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint because there is no loss of flow trip below the P-7 setpoint.There is insufficient heat production to generate DNB conditions below the P-7 setpoint.The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allowed to place the channel in the tripped condition is justified in Reference

14. An additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , is allowed to reduce THERMAL Power to below P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERAB3LE status or placed in trip within the specified Completion Time.Allowance of this time interval takes into consideration the redundant capability provided by the remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the protection afforded by the Function associated with Condition N.I I M.1 add .2 Condi lo M applies to the follow ng eactor trip Functions:

Und-rvoltage RCPs; and TSTF-418, R2:. REPcLACE 1 Unde frequency RCPs. .... .WITH Wit one hannel inoperable, th mop le hann 1 pla ed in the tripped condition with 6 h rs. 1 cha nel i the tripped conditio results a par lal trip cc ition requiring only one: a ditional an t) initiate a eactor rip above the P-7 s tpoint a below tie P,8 se point. These Functions do ot have o be OPERkBLE below th P-7 se point because the are no oss of flov trips ow the -7 setpoint.

The hours allowed to p ace. the c annel i t e tripped condition is justified in R ferenc 7. An additional 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is allowed to reduce T ERMAL I to below P-7 if t inoperable chaniel cannot restored to OPERABLE status placed in trip qithin the pecified Completion Time.llowance of this time inter al takes into consid ration the.edundant capability provid d by the remaining relundant OPERABLE channel, and the ow probability of occurrence of an event during this pen d that may require the rotection afforded by the Functio Conditi )n M.The .Required Actions av~e )y--Not( that allows placing the e r DELETE t e p sed nfrup to u,e oijuFt -=igru surveillance 11 the oth channel. Th hour tirie li~mit is. justified inRee 7 N:. I and N.2 Condition N s to the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low i Kl or trip Function.

With one. channel inoper,.H operable channel must be placed in trimpwithin w'*Z-1ourS, Il ý'ne chal \e] cannot be rt ord to\OPER ABLE. L, l~at or the laced in trip the\6 hours,\ "TIE M L P(ER be re ced blw "he P8stoink lwi in, he )ext hours\ Tslce~s -e unit in~ MOD lw he is o long r ap~plicable.

This trip ,does ot ave~to the F-A setpoi~nt~ecause\

-:...TSTF-418, R2 (continued)

REPLACE WITH 72 B 3.3-46 RTS .Instrumentation.

B: 3.3.4 BASES TSTF-169, Ri DELETE ]TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 121 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH Reference 14 ]NI i]:and.N 4 I:2 (clonitinued) kher R trip:nctior provvi e core roteclton beli kthe-iP-e. o A. I r, 6 hoLs ed to stor-2 he cha t i toos.. place tn trip nd the:4 add i iorna1 ýurs.1.al 1 d o ed u c iERMAL t below: the setpo " adre j stifile- :in I e rence TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH Placing the channel he :equed have been :modied: by a. Note.that...... .. c q .a + Iableý:.channe-1t he bypas:e1 S urve i :1 an:.channel.

i els.. Thle lsn.b Pressure.

Wita: chan e i+: .bperabyes the 0.op ourab.u:.r ts tet bb, pase d i n the tri ped condi in S ours. d~f :laei~in Th~e, itiripped:

coin~ditiao-t~hi r:lesu!!t~s ,ir. .a. "pirtii l. .ondit~ior only' on~el aidditiot:ndal ch.An.elo initiatea racytor.trp If pth chantimel..

toun r*bel

t.

sltiatLS o' .pl alced .the; tr:~iipped.:

coIF It :IO 1tH poer ni t hi, d. be 1 the P:1 se+.t.1 1eei U!, 0ý Iozr and 1 2e oR2h 1 C~na r t i un. a)Junn ; :ito~ t r b irtd cric p : on Low Flu 4 hc- u 1 Piresc u-re WithHduie chan areoperut.e&

tne : enfe re.n h F -j ps t:ac e::iLaedi the erb hann~el cnd jh~ b hi~:rondieit~hn

~o~r ,uip to41 h0Urs w~ile L/su01ea:c testin f d'. handij reul s.o rnden b: iv.. app1i a.te: ýr~ .the t::t i,;+ If 4e~I channl canot.r jti,:addryess he::.the; L cr i~a F. c th i on S 1~, 4 kP%nc ions. .i:t "P :rain itnop b1:h e Ant hos a re..l.[.. 1. a n d ...1 P ~ 1 L~n ~ 0 1.11 ' t hý ! f ~rn SFSre/cAtr

:: : :: : :......:::

:.::L::I::A_:::r ip: TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 REPLACE WITH 24 I3-VA TSTF-41:8, R2 REPLACE WITH Rfrence::14

.......Watts E~a.r-4Y.it v 9-- ---

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 24 RWiS instrumentation.

iB 3:. 3.1i fBASES.........................

....I TSTF-418, R2 INSERT The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed to restore the inoperable RTS Automatic Trip Logic train to OPERABLE status is justified in Reference 14.TSTF-411, RI REPLACE WITH 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months are allowed for train corrective maintenance TSTF-411, Rl INSERT The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is justified in Reference 15.P:,.. and P.2: (continued) to restore the train to .OPERA LE statuJ.(Requiir.edfP.1) or the .plant ýmust e plac MODE 3 Within the.next 6 hors "The CoMpltet~i.

on ime of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (Requi.red:

Action: P I) i s reas6nable coans dein:n a .in thnUis..Condition:.

the remainiing OPERA LE train.is adequate to...:perform the i safety::functiion.

an given the low probability of an. event interval.

The. :Completion VTirle loi 6 ::hours (fRequired Acttion RP.2)i is :reas:on.ible, 'based on.toperatingeper~ience:, to reach MODE 3 :from full power in an.orderly maanner and w~ithut. challenging:

plant systems:, The Re quired Actions have :bb en modi'fied by a Note that allows bypass ing one. trai~n u to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillanc*:e testing, th.e o:thler It an :1 s :.OPE RABL E:...Condition Q.. applii.e:s to the RT8:s 'n -MODES 1. aid:::2. These actions address :the: trai:n :o0rient '.n :-, t:h: Riý for tthe RBVs. With one tralin inoperable, I hour ed týo restore the' train. to OPERABLE sta: ~r 3 It15: bp_ptaced in !MOD 3 nith in the next The:.Completion Ti mle of6 hk0us. i.s reasonable. oper ating:e.xperience, to. .:re ach. M.ODE :3 full power ijln an orderlIyV iannei- and wAthouti havebemneina nlantodifie:d " :: .he h -0 Not: iýr 1 uei and teb 'no prp ed rh oi: r1hn%0 ~ Cri-1 OonLE rI e. 2alrso e RIB to b Ny ,~ f f rsfr 'au dowen ano ) n'týI ceov I m. ~ ~ ~ f ansý sisi h te rin is IPR~ e th. 64: I h..e 6,parimi i ustifi-hned in .:f ti0 7as Cc:nrditein r'app::ie to the I i6 and .oP-niOinerocks.

Witr one~~~~~~~~~~

chnc inpial fos:eo:o~w o ~-tto- u 4V e ov i ed :0t I caontiued TSTF-411, Rli REPLACE WITH Placing the unit in Mode 3 results in Condition C entry while RTB(s) are inoperable.

The Required Actions ,,:,have been modified by a Note. The Note:.,allows one train to bebypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.The 4-hour time limit is justified in Reference 15.'I

'RTS Instrumentation

B 3:. 3..1 BASES* ........ ....... ... ...' .............. ..ACTIONS& 1:1 T:21] anQ T.2 (continued)

The, CorTpleiou Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is a reaSon able..time, basedýon operating experience, toa reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and withou" challenging plait systems.With the RTBs open and the plant in MODE.3, this trip: Function is nolonger:.required to :be OPERABiLE.

The affected RTB shall not be bypassed while one:of Te. diverse :features, i s. inoperable except: for the. time:. required to perform maintenance to one of the: diverse.:featu:res.

The :alIowable time.for:

performing maintenance of the:divers:e feaatues is hou~rs for. the under Coditio :.Q, The? Completii:n.

Tiime of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months for Required iActon T i s reasonable.

consijder-i ng t4hat in tnthis Cond iIt ilon there is ýone remaninitr.

diverse. featur-e fcr tihe affected RTB,l and one OPERABGLE RTB capabRe of perforning the4 .safety .funct ion and.gi ver the low probability of an evenit

during this itnterval.

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH ...72 ._Covcdi t)on.:U. apip. i es: to: Ke: Steam Genera r.Water Level-72. .:L ow reator trip Fction,1.known inoperable hannel mustbe restored ABLE: status .0or placed 'T the tripped condition wthi 6 ho-uIrs.PlnaO the. cha el. iný the. trippled c*.oindi :tionhe reqpup i:rts only: on ot f oic fr attio of the two ou t oth~ree:ýtrifb. Th1 6 huS: allowed: to !ace th L iTI4perd lechnlýin the t ri p pe 0condit ion is justified.

in Re f Erence Ifa hananel "a iIs, i.t: i p Ta ed Antetipd O~to and does.ot a:::ffect..

theý T TD: p mt Calculai s for .:C ri.r.a in.:ing.:OPERABL:E.

channels.:

t.is ithen nr -sary for thýe.opera tor to6 force the use ofl. theh -shorter :i T i d y by adjUstiment the single ste:am g tonr:ie Ixay calculation (s to. match the multi ple:e .eneat a or t*ime: delay calculation (TM) for .the aiffect protectio set.,......................

lt ro!ug~h :the M:ac~iti:ne.

iiint~erface.. : : 'TSTF-418, R2...If the channel] cannot be: restored+

or placed in-REPLACE WITH the ripped coendi tio* withinhe specified the st be pl:: acedL Pa :O.0W.ere h es'Eunc.tions are 14.Inot. requ.red OPERABLE, An add.-itiional 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s: i :... aiowe .to (cbnt i n ue~d}.. ........ ..... -..... ..... .......... ...Watts. Bar,-U4it , 3-8::3 .1.3ý50O RIS lnstrumientati~on RAS ES.... I, -a nd U.:2: (continued)

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 14 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH iiiiiii~ii .ii iii12iiii place :the p1ait in MODE 3. Six. hours, is a re ason able.: tir.C based.on operating experi.ence, to: pl:ace, the:..plant:

in.. MODE 3 from.111ODE"E 1 from ful .:power in an ord;ery mranner.nd.without

!Cha4] enginq:: p an.t. sy. steim s.:The R equIJrd Actions.:

have. been mo'if ied by a: Nole that a: I ows. p.!lac i rg Ia n: 1, e:r. albl c: I in the bypaissed:.

..oC.Wdi.Oil:.

tion fo'r up t o 4 hpour.irs while:: e~rforming roUti:neýs urve~ill:a n c te0s t ing o 9 th e ot her' canne s. T he I so channel t be:p ced In by as for upeto 4 for testiny::of the .s channelI Howevefr.

0 y kchanoe 1 may bI placAed in byw at a one t Th 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months !time ] -ilt jLuS :ti:ie:ýd*

in R f c:V.n.Ief kd V /,.applie 0: to the Vessel Equivalent

to Power.reactor. tip Funp t i o. n Failei:e of the ves~sel channel input.(failure of ."more: th ar.: oinec T7Hr RTO or fAilure: of both: Tý RTDs) 110 ca1:Cu.aýtiO.n fo.r :a proterct ionl t. ThiSresulis in. the.re2'!:(:rer1eint

tnhat the operato-r adjust the: threchoid piower el-! farn zero secoon ds ti5 m t ..de: 7 d v:froi 5:00o( RIP to 0 0. RRTP.:th~rouogh:

th t... hi ntl ] rf~a.ce...t..ne....,oper e achael anol. b6 re-tored cr th't hr P. shI.d po0.4 er: eve: tfor ze s. tst dc.j a d:d-:u:-: w"thit n Ath s p ied :f o p Pi't-i on ... "ar r: :t L..-. .a caced i ra MODE Fuct c tillns. ot ., p ..... An add ...... .be CPERAFBLE

.n 0itioni o: U a 1.oec to.ol~art in MIODr :: $iy ho0ur s raub tv e* " .x" e .... " to pl ace th:. plaýrt MI OD E I frofrm ::full power ri anr el.ln<a:::.

tr.-.halt T]er]igi:g T rriP:S P.eCl r e d Ac-r : :s have b een. o.Ji: a. Not h a *lo. s .":) ..17 , i n t he b._ : ..rnc. ti on or p 14. hours..whi pe rf arri rCC nil-i- ,j of es ."l;;ws, a cha- n el i n b-ý:pl.aced in binas f .u i .for festirn of: t ht byp -ed cn h ian w '.v n rhamnne tia hr p~ ac inqwp~sS at a n e tfmce hf0l hu:a tiame Il.:i, rit (s i J4 U sltJ f14 ed.: in Re fiee,-. n " " TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH iiiii~i~ i~~iii~iiiii~iiii iiiiii14~

l~i~ii i Watts I R : 3 .......P RTS lInstrumentation B 3.;3.1 BASES......-............................................................................................* .....-: ..-.....ACT IONIS.(Corltiptued)

CI and:c W:ea2fu Co:ndi:tio.en.

W :iappliie~s toe the;follo0wi~ng

re~ac.tor

tri~p f:unctiors::

:Overtemperature:

AT;-::Overpower 1A; and: TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 14 ....TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 14*-Prels.ssurizer Pressure-High A known inoperabochanne .tý e ppl acedý fn the tripOped on~dition wiithi n Placing the cha nel in the t ri ppedý cond i ti.o suj-l s ip condition:

requirirg only one-:out-o.f-totw logic fo,.r actu tion of the two-out-of -three trips and ic fr actuatito.n:..

of the two-n.ut-of-tfour trips.,, The hours allowed to p ace.the:t in perbl'1hann e rin te tripp.ed condition is justif ite.d. in Referen Al I th e perabe. chanrnel cannot be. restore ::or placed *n the trip. cord it ion with~in: the ýsp0ec ifij-ed Complet~ion T1ime, th p]an t: mus:t be placed :rin. ýa: .MODE where .these Funct tIons are ri not::required:

OPERABLE .:An addtin :a 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is allowed t.place tihe:-pPlantiinOtD::olDE3::.3.:

S::ix hours 'is: a :.reas o nabl:e::tilme:,.

based on to:place:

the .plantin ME 'forom fu l poIwer .1 an: orderly manner and without challengingsy s te Te: Re quilred Actio.ns ha vo becn mro& y a Note tha: at IowsqV pACig an r i noic3f ann] i~n: the:byuas~sed I"cunditio for up to I 4 rs, wh:il ee erfor m:i n .rUtine i ne s'urveillac t-o est -PIPthrca:n~s.Te~~~

all Io ws: a "charinel Vto :be placed byPtpaos for I o4i s for.terting of the :bypas stetd-cha~ne oweveor.ý only. or".,channel.

may be, p:laced: .inbypass at a. on.e. Itie. T hetj.ou.r t- ..ei jtbustfited in Refrence X.ýI a~nd X. 2 Condition X ap001ies .to the fobloIwnQ reactor.trip.

fu:Cti.QsFn: , Pressurize Pre:ssjre..L.ow; P Pr seriiLs si t e0.er Le:veli-Hi.h; and ( o n t. ionuý dO)Watts Bar-Unit:

1.3I RTS Instruimentation BASES TSTF-418, R2 DELETE................TSTF-418, R.2 REPLACE WITH With one channel inoperable, the inoperable channel must be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . Placing the channel in the tripped condition when above the P-7 setpoint results in a partial trip condition requiring only one additional channel to initiate a reactor trip.These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE below the P-7 setpoint since there is insufficient heat production to generate DNB3 conditions X.. and X.2.fcontiinued) 7--I 4, Nct cýo 6

F1ýb;ý ~ 0"ýýI With aonie channel inoperable, the inoperablTe:

channel mu st:: be placed:in the tripped condition.

within1 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , Placing the channel::, in the t~ripped:

conditi-n resul ts :in a part.i.alI t ri"pI conditioi r equir.ing only :one additi:onal channel: to ini tiate:a reactor trip abOve:the 1PW7 setpoint &and below: the .:P-8: setpoAnt..

hese Funci ons do nq have.to: be C.PER. BLE:::.below the P .setpoint

because there areýc, no: loss: of flow t iri ps below:.the P- 7: s~etpoi nt.. The 6:hours allowed. to:pl]:aceie the c~nannel in: the tr:i pped conditi~on i.s just ified i: nRkef.efeence:

7. An:-additional

6 fhours :is alldwed* to reduce THERMAL POWER to below: P-7: if the inoperabl'e.. 0cannot be restored :to: OPERABLE statui0s or placed in tri.p: wihin the specified Completion Time.T" Allowance of this time interval take.s into consideration the redundant capabillity provided by the.:remaininq redundant OPERABLE a .nd, theý iOi r p`robabili ity of! occurrence of a-,(event thics period that.a require the :protection afforded:

by t-he. unctions associ:ated with Cond ion :X.below tne P The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months place the c tripped con justified i 14. An add.hours is a]reduce THEF below P-7 i i.noperable be restorec status or p within the-Completion TSTF REPL TSTF REPL s allowedton t.e Pequired Actions..

have be.n. modlified by a: Note that.hannelithed allows placi9g an i .rab-e channl in thie bpassed::hne .t oho s: -whi iine, thef n r : idition is c d. up to1 hInr S.l .....e:n:Reference

..o te]ti.of the 0Sherc:O.......

sO litional 6 alo' hr Qc be placed in:~s fr r 4in.lowed to f Ir incg of A t.hpe abIpan hore'i on r-MAL POWER to ::0::y::li 0 .&t aPa. .S S t irm r.4.f the tl i i it " e.....channel cannot to OPERAB3LE

_______laced in trip specified C0 h. Y a. pe to the ..rbine B p I Va Time. :::::: .ne, two or tht:- tiaml e, jerS 'e r c ..Qha:nnels must be p1 t:d .in the e-. i.J.i hn 6 tours. tic all I v ~e s niuz : tlp_-418, R2 fJI Jly I .. n.order for .he reac.or trip Iral p , c ne e:d ted, .i i naccept: ble !op1/2:. Pre thain :IT'r'r ACE WITH tp/Va!e C1Losuire cha r e in Ahe codintc W .or 'ore channeis in tnie tr ip copdi ýti o0 , a r:ea' Vtoý12: tr p condi~titon xoS:s. Mt.l .of I the i: inr :TulPil: \.V1' a-- ceane s1' r" e ,U- i b ert r rec~~~ctor~F Iro k-i 11,0 Lhn~ -1.i e r'e'Stvd oLEk-418, R2 ~ tts o u~ nte rpc~i TSTF-41.8.,.R2.

rL to-belov, L h.& ~CP r, t ~it:hi ACE ITHThea ors llowd t ~ ~nr~u'r; REPLACE WITH 7trp cond:ition a-d the 4::hours all:owed 72 .. .... ..fi..in ..... ...............

... 14 .,.TSTF-418, R::2:::::::::

REPLACE WITH" Watts Bar-:Lr- i t. B 3 14 5 i RTS Instrumentation.

B 31..31 iBASES :: ....... ................. ......SURVEILL:ANCE:

SR 3:3.3i1<3:

REQUIREMENTS.(conFti. nued) cSR 3om3.13 copares. the .inCocre system to the NIS channelI output every .31 EFPD. if 1t.he absolI uteL djifference

-is c. P--,i the: NBs chsannel is still OPERABLE, but must be r-eadjLsted'..

If the NIS Channel cannot be: properly readjusted, the.channel is : decl .ared inoperable.

This Suorveillance is perFormed to verify the f(AI) input to: the: Overtemperature AT Function.Two: Notes modify SR 3.3.3..Note.

indicates that the.exco~re NIS. :Channel shall be adjusted :if..the-absolute.di ifference

between.:

the i ncore .and: AFD i s 3%.No.te: 2-cl:.rifies thlat. the. Surveillanceis required.

only ...iif.reactor power: is15% RTP and that 96 hurs: is al lowed.for perforhmi ng the. ffirst Survei:llI!ance aftýer: reaching 15'% RIP,.Th.i's survilance s.typicall.y.

peformed at50% RTP ... to ensure the results of :the evaluation are more accurate and the adjustments more rel iable. Nin ety-,six::

(96). hours are.allowed to. ensure: Xenon. stabilTity and all:ow. for int rumentation al ignments.:The Frequenicy of every 31 EFPD is: adequate.-

It is based o~n unit. operati:ng consideriing .instrumient rel,1iability and Operatig his:tory-datza for, in:strument drift.ýAlso,:the.

slow cha-nge.s in neutron fluxduri:ng the fuel cyvcl}eý* can. be detected, during this. inte.val.TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WITH:1

ýR : L43 :.:i iis :h per~f'or.rmýnc.Lýe of:.a: :TADDI ev 1on: a 62 .t.......R...

TEST BAS.S. T..i. test s"hall verf OPERABIT b ic t Jof the end devkies.The R:79 test sh:all include separate.

ver1ification of the.undervol tage and shunt t rip mec.hrani sms:. Indenende t veri:fica.ion i Of RTB undervoltage.

a-nd :shunt tribp Functi i.s i not required :ýf or the bypass br-ecak:ers,..

No capability i:S provi:ded

for, pPerforming such .a t.eAst aýt .power. The byp-ass.brelak:er test shall: include a lo.al shunt trig. ýA Not h<I.eben .n.aded ..'to indicate that thiS, te:.t.mu-st.

e- p-eý fo , .the..bpAss Ibreaker prio :to ac::int: in: serv;iceý.(t trt n u ed).f at.t5 : lbar- Urlitý :1 .3:B: 3./3.: 56 TSTF-REPLA 3AS ES RTSý In~strumentation 411, Ri R 3 31A~CE WITH TSTF-411, Ri 92 REPLACE WITH SP .1,3, J, 4 (cont i: Add) 62 cSURVEILLANCE R F 0 U I. E iM ENTS:... I .1 .1 4 adequate.

It is basel on. industry operating I eri~i%::in~stu' t~r~el~iia~b~i.iity:and oper.ating.history I TSTF-411, Ri REPLACE WITH justified in Reference 15.TSTF-411, Ri REPLACE WITH 92 TSTF-411, Rli REPLACE WITH justified in Reference 15.-LL+/-SR 3.3 1.5 SR ý3.3 1. 5 is. the of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.The:: :iSPS. is tested ev 3, ays oqn a:ý STAGGERED BWASI.S usi g semiautomlat~ic tester. :The :trainý bein6g tested i s.d in th0e:y. onitioni thu s preve ning .i5ad.v.e r.t e.nt.adcltuation.

Throbgh: thel: semi aut.oaMtic tester..a .l: a possiibll.e:

l oga ns, and withi ut ap1licable permnissives, are:.- .foreach!

pfrotection The Frequency:of er 31. .a's :on"a STAGGERED:.TESTBASI`:SS:

i uP q " ba sed on.. industry I opera:ting..ex:p.er ienCel. coPnsi !deri ng instrume'nt re:liabilit.y and qper:a.ing:

hi :s tory. daata.ISR 3.31.1 6 /:SR 3.3 .1.6 j.:.::a brat.i on of the excore chan*nPes:

t~o:- l.e ncre ch~anlels-If :.measureit:

do:lno~t..agree.

the::excore .cbhain~r s are:: not dec-ar-ed Ioperabli:

bu tI must b cal ibrate~d to- aq ee: wi i t h:" iinore detector omeasuremenits.

if the.ex channeL.c ,nnnt.be adju:ted, :.tlne! channels are:.S decl-ared -noPperable.,.

T'sSieil.ne i pSer ormedt: tývie-rify the: f(i)j nput ..tO : C teo :A. lote miocies SR 3.3.1... RieNOt: sat"es..t thnt : h Surv P1ilac is reqi only if regtC po;rv 0fP.a .'d: that 6 days: is-- allow.ed f .or verfor(Ring .th. f.:. r Ls su.ýrveill ance: :after reachilng

50 RTP.the Frequ enzv:o f :92 FPD: is adeqia:e :t-i.sbased o'i indu s t~ry:: oper a ti:ing: i explerieicee, t ion- de i. : ent.rel::i:.ab

i: ty and operating h: i:tsqtovr::

d:a.ta.:-or i: wistrum:en:t .......*/ ./ ... / ..r ...... ...... ...../ .......[ ...' '.7 6,.ts Ea- U ý, 1 + 1.-5 iBi 3.. 3:: 5iI

.R.S BInstrumentat ion 8B3.3. 1.BASES SURVEI LLANKE RE QU I R EMENT S (conrt inue d)TSTF-411, Ri REPLACE WITH 184 TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WITH 184 TSTF-411, R1i REPLACE WITH References 9 and 15.SR: 3. 31.7 SR .3.:3.1 .7 is the performance of a .COT .every21day:s.

A: COT i Is performed on each requireId, channel to en~s~ure t.he entirýeý channel will perfcrm the initended::

F not ion..Setpoijnts must be Within the Allowable

V ues specified in3:;3,; i ]. .The difference between the current ":as found" values and :the: previous test "as e ft. v a lues must. be consi stent wi t.h, .the dr i ft aIlI owance used in the setpo fnt tmethodology.::

The setpoin~t shall be .eft set consi stent : with the:assumptions of the current un It specific setpoint methodology..

The "as found" and Ga.s: lef t" Values mustiso b1 e recorded and: reviewed for con6.sistency with1 the assu s of Re:ferences andi :,... .....i ..SR 3.3.1..7 i s modIfi:ed bLy a No(te that thi:s tes shall:1 includje vtei ation that the P-O interlock is n. th 0e required state for the exist ing :unit conditi1 The Frequency as is ju:sti fied in, Refence.7 except for Funct;ioni

{ ' tificaton ofor Funco is p ro.i tieid

.9 S 3 ..3... .S.R 3 .3 1: .8 A.:S.: :the. e rfo rmace of a. CIT :as described in SR.: 3:. 1. 7,. .i is modified 1i.. " .Noit ]prov:ideýesý a 4 hoti~ur. dJel:ay in the rmen t!t perform th is sU ~el 1:1 an.ce or!-5ource ranqpe instrumimrtat iii when:i entei r VO:DE 3:.:fom .ODE ::21.. Thi:s. Note :allows a noi:d. shutdown 1o 0 p roceed wtota ea o test0n Ei 2u a rd: for .;a shlort tinre: in MODE 3 .until the RTBs. :re oQpe and SR. .3, 3 .::0 I d J reoolaier req d to be perfo rned If ft ht,:h:un:it S.. to be in MO.[DE 3 with the RTBs closed for .reat~i- thank 4:hour th~iis Survei11anCe .must be per:fo rmed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after entry ilnto MDE.3I. No te. 2. sltaite:s that this teit salI iinc lunde.:.ver.ifficalti on: tha.::t he ýP-P6 in.nterlock

`S: in the s*ate fd the. exlistin g. :nit iconrdi t i on,:. The Frequncy is nuod i fi ed ::by:: a: Note: that .ll :S surve:i I.I ance to a U teisfied if it...has Ibeen petrfoqrmed

'Wi thUiri 31 days pr:e. p tr o I:re aL Lton startup and&. :4 .ihu:rS zfte: .Ae :rd, ICi r gr pow e. r: 1owP:-O 1andK Rt.. Theb: eucy of ",p rio.o Yt.0 startup" en sure S t:ii s: urvei 1 i:s :pri or toý(cont inuv-r, att" Bar-Unit I 3.-S B :3::.:3:-

58 RTS Instrumentatlion

B 3.:3:.BASES 5I.'RW I LLANCE F:LQ U I R E M E' T5 I DELETE I sR 3.s3.1. (continued) criticla oper-atitns aand applies to the source and ipnt-er.mfddiate range iins~trfument channels.

The Frequ:ency of, "4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s: after reducing :.:beow. P-10" (appl.i- able e 1:.to intermediate channel s) and: !"4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s: at:r reducing-power below P. 6 " (appi ic.abe to source range channels) alloS a norm.al :::shutdown be c::oGampl.eted.

and: the unit removed.fJrori tLhe MODE of Apptlic:abil

it:y o::r'Of.r t hi:s surveillance with:out a:-dpt: .Y: :tn

required by this surveillance.:

Thea Frequency if :ý er there aft er a p.plI ie s i f t h e plaqt. remains ýi h1 ::ýofi yafter the initial n c e s of Yrior tc re Ac totr startou r. hur .A n i.A.:iI ityVor thi~s .s~urveiflance ii < P-ior fo t:he. r I low and intermed iate ranrje chanhel s: and: <P ::P6 :f-h: n .els .Once theiunti.t

.in MODE: 3* thii s.surveillance is :no longer:requiqred:.

If power:. is to :beined :, .P.-:10 or P-6 for -mre than: 4: hours, then the testin g requi red by: Jthis .surveillarxce mustM d pri.orto the: expiration of.the. 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months limi:it. Fou:r a rea sonable tie toý complete the required te~stingi br p.aC,¢the.init, ii .:.a MODE w#r.i tis sutrve i1 lanc(1 is rno lon ."*r(:q4jIi:ived.

This: ftest fens th t: the N S1iso-u[7.67I liý t .of P i i a : a- ,'I i n d YraJ , ' .n g l h.6w Ihi i [ ; a p M L 7 REPLACE WITH source and intermediate range channels are OPERABLE channels* nor~iq to, tain e rPeactqd critical., ndrc cfter.I rddu~ci.power into th l:* PKiY or:..< p6 r / 5 4 ho uirs i ... ..... ... ...... .jR 3 3...SR 3.K .19 is the:

c0 a TYA}DT arJ d .s: P V-1 0 1 eve.ry :92 d.ys, as :Justi f ie d i .. ..... e The SR is modi fi e d by,:. a -Note that e xcludes: venr .iF .itn'slet.pi01ints.

from: the TADOT thii:S SR: a .1 o

age and icl~y. :s2tlpuoH~rt:

.... e ) t .. .e, S e.. b0 ..a .t;: b , :.. n c h :. a ra t...,: o.: .:L O:c ,-eni:f: at ion requ ,rhes elCab ra.., bC.-i. .'A I I .. ..:a.cco~ipl j ~shed dur ing.: he.

1....Watts Bar-Uni I3: ..,j~

RT$S.I nst rumem ta:tict.:B 3.3.,1 BASES SUR.VEilANCE SR 3,3-1.11 (conti-:ue..

QREU 'RtMENTS: th pe potenr, t i al for .Can unpl anned trans i ent if tfhe. Surýei n.l.a C e we re perf ormecd :w i t h. :t he rea c a t Ip oPwer, ..:Opera t- ' tniq experience has shown: these components usuzally past: ýie: Surveillance when p erfo:rmed

'on the S1m8nth:Frequency.

SR 3J.3I.-1 2 SR is. the.perfrmance of a COT of Is i.nte~rl:oc.ks ev .ery IS. Months.The Frequnyis.

b.sed on.the known reliabillity

the, interlocks.:

and :.the mul:tlchannel r .edundancy avatlabl.e, :a nd has: been tsown.to be acceptable through

expeerience..SR, 3. 3. 1 i3 SR 3.3.1.13 is the perfoman.ce oft:a TADOT o.f the:: Maual Reactor Tripi, Trip Ifrom Manual :Si:, and: the Reac-tor Trip. from Automaticý S: Input:: fromSAS. This .TADOT is peirformed every 1:8 .mon'ths:.

Tihe test shalli:ndependently., verify. the- OPERABI L ITY Of the undbxrvdltageýý and ::shun#t,ý tri.p..mechani sms for these Reactor Tip Fuicti ons for the ReAct:r Tri:p. Breaker-sý.

The. tesi: s.. hall also verify. OFPE£RABILITY of.the Reactor Trip. Bypass reaers for these Functicns Indep endent Verif:ication of the Reactor Tri Bypass Breake-undervoltage, and shunt trijp mechanisms 7s not required.The Frequency is based orn the..kn]w, re:. 5::bi:. ty: qf :t.h.fun tions and thremuitichannel*.eddaic: lab:e: :.c..t).eer, shown, to be: a:cceptable through:-.era..::.experience.

. h: SR:::ij:s modified by::a .ioe thrat IexcNuces .er.i. atOn .sep.6pint*s from the TADOT.. The:.:Funnctions

eed ha.e r.c-betpo bhts ass:ociated wiith: them.REPLACE WITH::::::::::::::::::::::::::::P( .. .. ': :::: .. ...7 C)exceeding the P-9 F3U ..cti on. This TADOT : :as descrie n S-- ... 3 3 1 .interlock whenever rd P the unit has been in N.te stat that thi Surveillance is :not r lujrd if J .MODE 3. This the peiu 1dy, Vrha...... :oY vo~4~tt.s L~r-LThit>

I B 3.3-61 8: :3,:3. 6.:1 R I.S~~ 3ntrrrraio

.6A SEES.ýSOIRQE1 LLA HE TSTF-311 REPLACE WITH exceeding the P-9 interlock.

Wa3tt~s iar 4Jm;SR P 14 (c qnt in u e ti! :heini etooin r' no hv :)n, pc liirr& fo~r ths SuH,- 3n,, P~fwt Cf Tv'trw reactor c' ri tcalI Thi~~es 'not e~ promd w tr.reactor a% k:'owqer a nd ius. t h Ee or,- ofor-d tar oý~R '51/2 w verfe i NA%"dual d.1arII n_:~ ic. resos ~e r ~ ~ or eqpu& a t Ima f<Lm t' va1J :acsuec ~rk qit a -uricut d fn~ssReso t~~~~n~~~

tPi:r. 6c~t -r!tr 3 " nl3.e ii. /0Lnc RPe... -i rmn-s M~a ruaL eii' '~f )Tdb1 LIn~"~ r. bcn: Le o mrrmled in the , Tlie, i~ses rnodpl L -z r a o, U) al elapsed ie.trom7.at thL :slSor hq i 'i mt. at *nrtL.e-i F thech remhL ui red funkcItribna

ýt' e cntoln shut~wnrod fuly iser~-iw te ractor c:'e.ýFo r an nels. th at I ircd ue dyr arn tr ans f er Ftvnctiors

(~~148V ea/ag, rate Ila etc ) Li response6 time Letmy nt p- bmrred .0 h the: transfer i-unction se[. to on.with :the"~Frsos ie, ~.te-n t e I t- r,', pons 1m est can be ~rcmdwith J ~rsat tt ri ~mn c~~ cdasuP~~t:h

-,me ,ns-an:s:

are.:.set at the 1r rnal nil va: :T h e.resports ti'emyoneurdya series P seqpentilal.

test~s S,~ thFtI rtr rso ux-< -.isk. theeuCjre icsp,~ verh i~ f rici b- d c bv response in , s'1n0 ay SrE o n_ a 'Ove I arpping or total chaninel im~~~ur~~~

ris or sy i. g~~tu on aoc ena.i Prcoesr and r~u~Al~iesponse:

tim~e:, wi~i t atual riasyujcnP.tirua te ts on he rm'ri~der of :the. cha ri 1 h, )j V- o~'ir s e deo on: ac c t~b 1e respo'n-s timre L'~ ,rs J.d~t1c: noi or p~o.r 4r'rp ts 2 in_ ae Is'~ C?? OA E:

t (4§~ 'o +/-t muesu remne .,-mg.tl in vendor: engi vneer nu ,rei ficar-i ohs 1. CAP l3'32, 3: 1 fl~ison 2.. ET1 mfaol Seso Time~s: TeaS LI qLqu ' i ftd. tes e b as is ad me:thoddogy

F1/2rpns t 1 rda Ie~~ mess tns. iný the over a iI"rI z at.i onf the cnne respoWsa tMe.frspc~

i- nti fled in t.WrAD, tC or v~ler -Icatiofl e, (I'rs bior typeý mi S~ L &~ 6 s 1tr~tdb______________________________......__________

....i ........ ...(coni nwe~* Amendment t,

SPRV. Tntcrrai~LJVELAN CEl SP,~. .2311 "Conitirl~ued), REQU t EWDIT3 W~AP-1dO'A

?i I~vsin. A r.-,t 0n of P c-dc.'and Frn -ýbogy: a U5 crm alIca- ,e ~ -Pm s-eir ina.ta io tUa 7epn iie ()hqa~'a -~f hr~the prki-tectibn vtr i snJt h*11/4TSTF-411, Ri trs ollr~~trq m vit -yc~pw per t io n a ser~vice and::re. L,(rif 'd folWri rnitea INSER r da sit .-Ty aff~ pr~ v- In q'-e eiect< a r-ar worý: does not 1 pact, respi.~r~pc1~

t~h p~s ~dfor. repair are nif tnc 't, Z.~ a LIe Spec I' comTpo!,ýrts ic 1 enzi~d the: W.A P m~y be replaedýoU. Onrt.ao e n ie eXa Dle ee eon te d: be dic ~f t c.U -no ~avi t~he..nrlj

~sgrn Ty icf a: As 2 pporepriat-e each. channel 's re~spo~nsa mlust be verified.evvrv IRP O 'i o,*, a, STAGGERED TEST17 13AS IS.. Tes ti nqlof the f ino, artuiltibri devi resýi n lc td"ed in the teStirig.:

RO:rersD*ns times cai lot bt- determwed-dur ino mi~t ipeiratiOn eaue quliprner-oyeration is ~i red to mieasure.

respon se tim,-s , Ex rience nem shmim Utfin; compomevnts iially p ass '-h i:s survei~llance-wen pert'Tm!ýJ Atte : mon-th F req ueTI T' ieefore. .tnl Ue:F er eýy, a s zo n c '.u dd: to be acceptl P t ~ a. ar e"i aW.J:I ty s 3c n~t-S 3, 31-4,5 is rdf ieoi b a. No te. statl'rig that neutr~on: de~tectors

ar'e: fromd~ irRTS RESP.&ISE Tm tes tirq:, hs: in 6te i S necesý v eas e ~ff;~1t ~n gir ati n a~appropri ate: de~etz, t lusg& Exc.l:] n u hedtetr ars , ccta bIc tdus--: Pthp rpirwc Iles of -d eec-ýtor operatn~on ensure& .a:V r~trlall wv rc ýntcle rcs-n Wats Br-niv 2)2- vaý :Revi.i~on

.3'iArnenulle oPt.:

~v t~Z~ien~ 3..........FREFZ FN'OES 1 atts Baz TSAR, SeD-tiorn 6-, E:- 1:erz.!~~3 d~tJ &+/-LFS. S,.ckior o: r0 :ncc r.i t 71yts TSUE 279+I157.1. "C.'it~erio, fo~r:P c~~.£~~v:o euiý-:r :o< ~ n ttes.ArLL5 G Ekt Z.111 6f t t: ~piCf S7cI 'ii , I l1 Nl,: tt-,u ,ý J 00.0. ,~*v ~ ~ ~ ~ *.* ~ ~ cr V~~t~3j *3e-A~Jrii*t 2': Amene1dzmt-eýt

24. 4-7 ES FAS: 1:6 In'tuMe nt aL ion i3: 3.32 B3AS ES... ......................

ACTIONS.813 1ad82. cn~ud-o lat.io faiu of .one or ch:n s in:one train r:nh.-.ndrs thte tr~un .i inoperable.

Condition

.. therpre:, er.ncopasses both situations.

[he ied Com feti0r Ti.e.i.s rpeaort o biabe F.consideri ig that tit heer e: are: two automatic.

PC:t:U(at`Qni t-a is and an:tfiher

..iimhal :i.j Ani atJ nt tra i nr-D E .: r

'ion, a1~d the l6w A.II event iring du.r ingl gthi Q, intrval:.

If the :train c~annot.oe restoed to OPERABLE4 stat.us, the pl"an tmust.be pla:ced i n a :M.ODE( in.Which.:.tihe L.! does not appl]y. his i:s done by tile plant in at IleA s t NODE..3 w.i~tiin an:n additional Ctious (54 ho6rs tota" ý:tl ime) and i:n. !5 %wi:thin an n ad diola" :hourS. !34 :s ttt il .eItii- The allow'iabbe

&oricn e in es: ari i :jron abl eb ab:sedo :opera t i 9g.exIpeC i.encce. to. r:eachý the:. reu ired.plant condt:i:6on.s fron.:.:, il pbiwer condlition s 1iýn: an o.derly :nanner and wiit hiout chalc.~ii

pl:ant~ system.I The allowance of 4.8hour S jl ti.i: ed in Reference V7 TSTF-418, R2.C, .2 .1 and: ..2: INSERT The 24hours Cond'ition C a'IPP ie.s 1ti the automatic actuation logic and T h e. ....h. ... .... .... ... ..II .... ...a, c t i~~~. Ui 0[:sr,:t~

f, c, ý:ti. ; F, oza allowedfo restoring'fhjts.

in :thfr the. fokai:ii functiio:

e inoperable train.TsT R2 to OPERABLE status are justified in REPLACE WITH Reference

17. sP e A: A... .*

Switch.Vn:r to Con d tmie u.: S um h i s.ca c ia on. :.a dd r th: he t raiBn: tor.:it.ntath te SSP :0 nd~'emaeand JlV 1 .ifon traini is oerable;pla. :ed -:ini a 140DE:c:in vih ci h::the ~LiO: do~e&. DLb~ anipily. ThMi~s i~s.ao l e allan G Iti h o p1 n. re a txaJt? t. t.n .irnDE 5a.(contf: nCnued:).....~~~~~~~~~~~~~Tm

.. re. ...*.......

ý1~at a r n.i t. I~3.-

ESFAS Irnstrumentafti3n 8 3.3. 2 BASE.S:........' : ................-. .........-= ... .........ACTIONS CA.1 :C:22.1: and C>2.2 (continued) within atn additinal1 30 hous (42 iours:-otal time). The Comple~t.on Tfimes are rasm e, ased on operatm9 exp erience,.

to. r:each the req ired ::plant.conditions from Iful power:: conditins in q an orde:r y manner and without.TSTF-418, R2.......The: Required.

Actions are mdi-ied :by a, Note that aliows one REPLACEWITH.

train to be bypassed or up to 4. hours, f or surveil ance:testing, provided the oth tain is hOPERABLE.

Thi 60 ..... allowance::s ba:sed n th ..rae iability:

analysi s as~sumption

of..WCAP:-:.10271- ReA f ' )that: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months iS theI avesra time requ i red:to. perform-channel surveill ance:.PA, Q..2. 1: and 02." TSTF-418, R2 Cond tion D appli~es to:: REPLACE WITH* .... ... ........ ... ...~ ~ c : z ~ :::::Co~ntai]nment

P~re ssur!e-FHi]g h;i iiiiiiiii:!i; :i :' T Pres s urizer Pressure-Low:;

steam Li.ne Pre~ssure-Low:;

arid... :Steam Line Pres:sure TSTF-418, R2 Rt-ih If one:: channel i.s inoperable k) iho,4rs are alowed:to restore REPLACE WITH the channel to OPMER-ILEý.

statust-r to, place it In the , r p--d cwOndit ion. fGenerally this Coqdition azpp to functions 72bthat operate on two-out-of-thre~e

]irfe.. .I er_ re .......of one: channel pl ace,ýs. the Function in a. cw- uout-of-twN configurat ion, Orech :rm i mist be trippec to lace the Func t i on.a onne-. o .o0fntree cOnfi g urfatt n nt(r tt sat is fis:redundancy requ:reien tis.TSTF-418, R2 INSERT The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allowed to restore the channel to OPERAB.LE~

status, orto place it in the tripped condition are justified in Reference 17.:.:....::

.... ... ...... ... .: ...:. ............." ...........". .... .............

....... .........'... .......... .;...... ...--Watts -B:rB-Unit U 1 B.--l0 103 BASESL ESFAS Instrumenitation,:E WITH :B 3.3,2 72 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ....... .... ... .....DtL D. 21. and R.2.2 (continued)

Failure to restore. te.inoprable channet .PERABLE status or place it in the trippd condi.tion within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months requires the pllant be placed i:nJIODE 3wi~thin the fbllowinq 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .a~nd MODE 4 :Wi~thin t.he next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .ACT IONSD TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 The al low,,d CoQplwtin.:Tme:

are reasonable, based on operazting experienc.e, to..rear-f tlhe requ:i~red":pl.an:t conditions orom. p cw riodil.ions:

i:n an o.r.d.erly:

manner and without challengi0ng 4pl sems.:. In:r..0DE 4, :th:ese Funct:ionis are The Reqti:i red Acti nsiid by a: Note. that: a~llos placinga n a hne 'bypassed.

codto or p 0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months wh ilei verfori roultine.surveiillarce t I Other chanelms.The.oT al lows a c han n el to: be plIa ce~d in byr),iaSS fo(,r: t;p 4 or for of th y. : Channel. H ever,: r y. o.ne channel nay be pAced in :bypass at any: one: ti me.. The TSTF-418, R2 DELETE-- ~ ~ ~ ~ : L.I, &* .rs, a~llo-wed foir -test'n~t~

are juIStificd.

i....TSTF-418, R2 nd E. 2...DELETE TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH TSTF-418,R2

.............

REPLACE WITH::::ý17?1 a................

II"iorl ' :[T,-- : ap ie .:./. Contai nrent Spray .Con:-jinMe(l r-H :gi* :Hi:gh.;.q t te-an: Lin.e 1ol:oiat,-ion Con aiinmtent Pressure Hiiigh:" High9;.01 Containment Phase:B. iola.ion:Containm.n..pressure-High High.None o-f these sighnals has in~pvt to a control f.unction.

Thus: two-out÷:bf-otf iLee logic is necessary

to meret ac-p.tabl6e woul.dro:-euirel ri ýt-)ipi..

a fai.ed channal. This.is unrdesiral".AIe bec(au:s~e a single failure .wuld thepn cause spurous.cont-c.i on -pray-.nitiatona , Spurious spray a ctuation.

i.S {rdesi.al e becauseo::df the clearnup:.

pr-e::s 2n Therefore, :the~s~e channely i-e.,d:siigned

'i th (.continued).

Watts Badr- U-it k 'L 1 Pi 3-::3.o10:4 ESFAS Instrumen P at io n B.3 3-3 2 EBASES A C"T T CjtJS L.*2 J 1 Pnd F? (continued).

TSTF-418, R.2 REPLACE WITH tw.ut;ofi- :logi~c SO that a faild Uc.anne:. .may be bypya.sc.ed rather than t-ipped: Note that: one c.hanel Pay. be bypass~ed and still satisfy tie single fdailur'criterion.

Furtheirmori`e, ..with one chIrannel byp a'ass.ed, ia single in~stru:mentation channel failure. will n.t. spuriously

initiia t e containment spray.To: avoiid Le irnadIertent

ac t:uion f containment spray an Phase.8 -cn ainment isolation.

the Ji6n0perab~l h.. ch an nel1 hsoul d1 not :be p.1 c in the: t~ri pEed condi:tJion.

I Anstead it is bypassed:

R ýstoring the channel.to .OPERAbLstaus, or pldaci -.oprable, channel iný the':bypass con.di1ti On withiq 6 h utr 1 iS Su f'fIci :na to. as~sure that the Functocn r~emi : R E .and minimizes the time that the 1unction may be. il a .pa 1a trýip codto asrirg:~eio.rab chIhrnul has f aJ ed: h (I b.) ..h:Comp1Ie tjonim i S fu'th'_st i F iedG balsed 'n the lcwr~a~iiL of ::a t n. ~ -&1 dur:ithi ine F va1.. i.FaIi:ure to restore channel to OPFR ts alu p I lac i in: the: con'ditob.

iti 6ý hours, redurstepatb lrdi MODE .ti ' o. in i ,lgoig 66 h~ours and MOH 4 with:ini the neext :6 hours. Thei allowedCompleti.onTimes are reas'onabl e, based on: operatig experience, to. rnech the Iequired plant conrSdnitions from .full power conditions in an orderly manner n : afit.out chzllenginq plant. systems. :In MODE 4., t:hesie.Funlctions.s are no lo T, jer requirAe:

IOPERABIEI REPLACE WVITH The Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one channel in bypass for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months while performing routine surveillance testing. The channel to be.tested can be ,tested in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass. The time limit is justified in Reference 17.S u edbActi n s. arc, :ieed:y a: h U Ie ddiitJon a Ch anne Lo be_ b, a ýs e d~ fi r up' t :4 hour. for.v vej1 Han. e:: t es~ti l~ac. i g a sec rid ah:r r. Ih hel~by, as s: tonhc tioan for up, to 4 hoaur s -Fo testji purp , es i~s aec M eble sod on res C fR ee FL: 21 -and. F 2.2 C ond:ititon::i F applie s t:o::* Manu al. nitia tion of Steam line. I:soi.a

LO~ss of Offs~ite Powpr;* uKi 1 i Fpnedwater PumP Slct 1ion a In L Surn Xt. ion 1lftscure-tLow; and.(con'ti nued)Vatts: Bar- Unlit 3 3. BTA- 105.

[SEAS. Tnstrum entat .i o.n: B 3_32 BA S ES.ACTIONINS.

F. 2' 2.. I.ýF (co nt;i n t ed)e ~' (-4 OtOl k TSTF-418, R2 INSERT The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed for restoring the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition are justified in Reference 17.tot th~t flionua]Initiatlion Faic te P-14 Interlock:

Funct 1o1'S, LhiS1~ a I io ddr.I~ n t rin u-r 1 ota i. f i S For thc. 10,S; of:.0 '1 f t~ Power Func i on thl' :action:.-eICC hi1e the: Iac k o f m anua I trp iP i'o fo~r a. fafl ed chan~ o th AW ystem pui'i)ý s~utti~on tra. sfer. ch alnelis;.hns: Actionm recognizes that. pla c in b fa4::f a hanne: H trip d:riAq: opI t) on is. niot :nece~ il : :CQ risevat ive C:1cticn Spuri'us:

triip 0,- t h i.s fin o u. ~ 1 ain th t:W J o .i:,S cr c e ~~t isat t:i frie1: t4 t ly :.cab e of. suor .o nv it I 1f :-I: trairi r'r cv, umnl isin rop he ,* 4,1) hours i d OW eo o .:r'c, t t r nJ t: to sP 'SL tatus .hepc IFCC fi.ed Cor jlet Tjm r Jn s. reas' -I c- dei in~g thi', natukir of F utI~~ the ia~ ~ cndanicv md t a- olow Ofbb I an event c, Jr r i v dijriqn th.Iý, -1'5erva-.J if p1 ý , ci e dd h' ri MI- '1" 3 vdlt nl hrc<6 h..rS an1d 1D ý4. rl h: tr, t h 6 f 1lowi:~ G: h C U.) sý The ..Cl~o-vd Eo t ti Orl iI S1( :.V 3 meeii .na cmVe, tM- s o n op er a tinc exp'l Ce C o.reach th~i re~qivjred paI orr)ii tto from.:ftill Powr4~Iin oreely mannr lcýand hUo la rhalir "~j]flg. Piran, sy S ms i 1'DDE 4: thN ýP!Tnt: does no bav e ainy Y aIaV J~ s iFft5:r ci ItII IH'ri~li upl i~iu UIS:- GU the p tCif 2f:ctions oted: above~,- G.:2:A G TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 2.4 Condi t 0 d es:i0 to 'the aut()S4 PfIC 41 CLtJ'6r'.

o. To~ ic: ad IC~tuat i'O i I elav&y [ci t ha S 3il eI~ I solati on and ANW actaLo'IHntir.Unn:;.

.00 a t J; l addresses the t. -ai ý ihiat~ipn of t-he SSPS :and triovC r1~ lIv for thký0 fIA 014 i*(.nS% If UrMe tU 1ýn i~opet aý-I =uo are ai1: vt -2 toi restoi athe IIrai' t~a CIPRAPBtE:

st-tus.. .1he Coinpi etjen. lime for retoiinc4.a train tofwP~1L ttsi esnbeOOiC

~t~there: iS -o'ther tnra im E~ 0 F 8L .an I:t: l ý ow b 1.oba i. Ttya QVCI (rl 0 C CUi) 1J(4 1-j din t!Ih i s iraitrr e i rv t t r,' in Ca. tbe tut e rt urn:ed: to01 O AtBL E st at u s the.:plant:

muet be, brogh. o MODUE w in I i -t ex nt 6 h o n'r s :adr 1"IC E 4 Withii tnUh OI~i in 6 :ho.urs. Th al w fnd C ornnii6i4.

ný I ini -j ,ýCwnptinwkfl Watts:: Bar...Uni.:

Ia-]0 63.

ESF.AS I ns..trumentati o"n B. 3.3.2:BASES... ................

...... .........* ... ... ..............

............ACTION'S G.. .2.1 ::and G ý 2 J: :.. (conJthin ued:): req edp clant cendit (ons from ful l.poer -ondit.on in:-an o-deQrl:y manner :and: witJhout p'ant systems.: Placing. t:1 e:e unit IMODE:4.removes

ý:a~lli requirements for: OPERABILITY:

of the protection channels and actuation Ofuhdions.

In this !1ODE:the plant doesnot :have ana.lyz -d tranients or :ndi ton,0 require the: exptlicit use of:the C ct io [I fur ,n (tAi o ns no t. e:d :a boD6ve:.Th' Rquired Acti o ns a.re rmodi fifed :by a 1Note t hat allo: :one trai in to be b-ypassedI for up Do 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . for srveilan~ce testinr:g proviied the, other tr-ain is OPERABLE,.

This'allowance iS based on the rel bility analysis ,:(Ref-: 7)assunption

that 4ihours is he a'eraqe time r eui ed t: p(erformj channel' surveillanceq.

TSTF-4 18, R2 INSERT : : f .2:1 :and H The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Condition:

Happl~ie-s t'O the: a'utorfatic datUtiMH0.1i Coq : and: allowed for actainrlyfo to uie. Tipo an Fee ter restoring the Isolation Function.

.. ..channel to OPERABLE status This acti:n addresses he: :traIi n.orientation of: the SSPS and or to place it in: the :Mater an ave.: relays forti s Function.

F f on train the tripped is i aperablJhour'sareJ al:lowed to restore-t e t a'int condition are ERABLE: stas o h ihe plaft :must be :p laced 3'ith.ir justified.in

hours and .-n 1'1DE 4 in the fol:lo.wing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . u he Reference

17. C omip on o restoIring a train to OPERABLE qstats iF a 1reaoa c ns ide t: htha:t is 'anothe"r r iin OPABLE, and:the Uw probabCI:iitCy of.an: event occ q rri ng du:rmig t s TSTF-418, R2. interval.

The allowed Coniil&tion iiIs are rcasbnabl

, R Wd onpa ting rr e, toa 11 lto reach MODE 4 frorm powcr cr ri:t ions iin a .orerly manner and vithout ch4 eirgpn t. yteriS~ T~hesti 1Uhfuncons ar no C1n~r requiredI in e ODE 143 p1!,ac ing thly:plant.

in> M1':ODE.1::

I reIMove6s ili1 requie~en:t S :for oP'B [IT: of] :te pI- roLection channels and act-l attio)n IFunctitoncs..

In thjis M.: LE, the pIar...It dc ,es not have analzyedt:ransents or condit:ions

tha:t requiire.

ithe use :of thfe protection f~unc t i~on noted :above.The :Required 1Act i o hs are mod fied by.d a N0ot e that a:ll o0ws Voie 1train to Le bypassed for: up to 4 ho:urs for sorvei!l:anc-:E.

tes~ting provided*

the other is. OPERABLE Th'is allowance i:s based oin. the r:liabilit

analyl:silsý (Ref. 7)Watts B4ar-U't BI-:B 8 ESFAS nst-ru:mertatton

.3. 3Z BAES:.ACTIONS.TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 TSTF-4l8, R2 REPLACE WITH The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allowed to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to place it in the tripped condition are justified in Reference 17.11.:i 1 ::.i?.: and ,: nu~ed)a.s U p:t:ion that. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .:st. the pe4- O.ro.. c:h:ann n:el sur %eFi:1la hkc C.a-verIPage

ime to*~~~~~ -. ..< ../ ..........

I applies S.GQ.te',l.v-i High: a(t:4141.-

S.one channel is i: pera 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s:.are allowed to restore o.ne:

1t.o: OPER LC. ta .to pla.ce: it: in: the trip ped:onditi :.. r t .. ipp:ed:c:ondition, 'the Function on rt t) h Con s sfe n af e 31.I ce Fa il:ure o restore the inopermbc e: channcin:}

to: OP- E 1 StatUS or place it in-the et di It cn d it in Withi 1.11 1bur's requires-thelot tob b6:p4 ~Med in: 3 n 6E ..rs 1in MODE. 4 in the f- 1, iq l[ours S alof Copeto TSTF-418, R2 on oeaýgexoine to reach` WIDE 4 fr in an (oIrde-rly marine!; and:::[ witho*t REPLACE WITH plant. :, tm.J -In OM4 h Funct-ions a: h2ojui red OF"A~tE 72 2Rc5equired

.s h~,v 1:' w r-ip bv a v~ etat azl 1ow. :l an .inuperai" h7r: : y ' ed condtn : tor .tp r hours whi f i surrveii]

e t :tJ ngq t h er ch a nr 1s Th i .ls alo a anl t* ~c t :p] !acind '.n bypass foru to.4L ours or tes tiwrwj ofo the hb ap's seed. {'i nnhe:l: H'2;eve I r-, I If.-p i D i \a S I a v C CA t\ "t no. abý ci Ln ntr r~e od o dV4 a ow, fo~ a s~ o n dra l L th Ayp P PC hr s nq, rýustli ied P 3/4rn 7 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed for testing are justified by Reference 17.J .r Congdition apples. to the AFW pu:mp stalrt-on trip o:f all NMF1:pumps.. ...** *Th:e :OPERA B.LITY of :the AWFW Sys:tem must be. assuw-ed :by aio.wing automnatic start:of the: AFW. ::Syste. pIFps a chatmnnel i:s inoperabl]:L

48: arallowed to rtUrn. it (c qnit i n ued~Watts: tBard) it 133l 3 W.1 108 EISFASý Ins~tru-ment ati on R 3.3.2 BAS ES... ...............

Ac IorNS J. anl J. Z (continue:an 016EIARLElstatus, Hf theý Funct ion:ca~nnot`

be returned to.an OPRABLF.statu.s, .6 houirs are alloWed to place the plant in 17ODE 3. The allowed Comp Ietiion Time of 6 hour- is ir:a~so~-ia~l a&( n ,operating:

experience,.to toeah OD 3 from full power condition.s iJn. ýan orderly manner and: :without: chiallengi ng, plant systems:.

I n MODE 3.:: theý p-lanirt doe snot a~ve any analyzed transients or::conditions t4hat rqire the.explicit usr. ( of the pr!)otection::funfction nioted above: The: aztl owance: of 4S hoforý to :the train to an 0oPERA L F* stiaus ji js cifed i n, k efe:rance:nc 7.K, K .1: and K.2.Codi -tA, iuon K a pp0. i~e:s: to dý.RWSTL Lvel.+. Low I Coi ncidetit.t.

th Safety InJection and. Coinci~dent

.with Cortaihmient Snu SLeve-l-High " ....:RWS T.Level. -coincident With SI and ::Co nci'denL Con tia~i nmen~t. Suminp Level -High:p:ovides

u:ati.on C" swift.0hlvr:

t:o the.co'ntai:nment sumV. Note t~ this

~'&rsthe compatrators:

to. e.crqi to perfor t h e ir.............

r.qui.e ction. The failure- of up to tw'o chanen.ls

will nolt REPLACE WITH rlKpe:raion o .f t Is Functiln:.:

Ho e:v'e r, placing a f~ailed ci nT in the trip:ped:

coniditibn could ies ltn a: 2 r(atr..itc ver. to the s~utip, prior: to thcý- nij 1. i c'of"._the ii n mtie". RWST. :, I mPlacing IthC, In p ýab e chnnl bass re t na tooto~ r~1 CGn r: t, I eN w sa sliiees. the requirement.

to i I no!t fa :ur withOu t:.x :-,b'ifi g a CtLIa' ir- of ..s 1ihv i n v .;..va -tqorijng the c[annJ to OPRAiLLE statu: orp1 c he nopeab -chiannel in thob'- s coi ion wi hr hours is SUi -it to entur that the Functionriaw' n SYRABLE, anid min nJ e:s thth a1tt a ht F u nction ma'y in.a: partIlal trip l cw 'on (a Ssulm ino h irio r h ha nel hil a. T..oh 6: h~owj 'op or.t n fth- anne:..

be returned to OPE, :SB LU u :a ced0 in tihe bypaJ'ss cond t i thi 6Ohos,3 thl plantr-ust be brought to MOCE 3 -vi t h in t ollowin I hours n OE5wt h...... g::::::::

.... L... ..a d : U H :5 w h J h -TSTF-418, R2 n mpl etion i:ba sed.on operating experience, to"reac~h.

tb -reu"ired:

plant RELAE IT rcndtirtons from full :power cniin inanordrl,-y manner: and ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I wihtthODEg~gpand:ysea 5 the parnt-ences 10, 17, and 19. n iht hlnigpltssts (cootfinueC)ý Refe Watts. Bar-unit I R "1. 1 1:]j:

IESFAS: Instrumentation B FA.S ES.ACT 6%N K, .K.21 and K.2.2 .(tontinued.)

J:REPIACE WITH TeRequired Actions are modified by a Note that allows placing one channel in bypass for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months While performing routine surveillance testing. The channel to be tested can be tested in bypass with the inoperable channel also in bypass.The time limit is justified in Reference 17.!does: not have. any c.alyzed.transients or.cond-itions thalt re.,qu.ir er the explicit use of.the protection functions noted aboeoe.. C ....e re ns. :ar, e. modA f ied. by ýa: Note -that:: alliows pla:cinl a cond.channel in the bypass ond.tion for Up to.4 thour-1s for surv eilla n ce test ing', The :PIt.ot.oa].

oF 12 hovurs:to rJeach MOE 3 and 4hours for, a second chanr Cef to bG byt p U."oassed is ac-eptatleý bas:edI on .the r-esults:of Refe: erce .7.an. ... L. 2.2.COI~dA tiorn L ap;PAiesi.:e9s to to, P-I 1 interlo-cik:.

...With non han nprabie, th-.re 4he ato "": "t " verify tha.the interlockoý i: .is n L reqtire.d s.aI:o the condition.

Thi a. onihi m;ýiýn:iu aly accomil:slhes the, finctioion:

of the inte.rkock..:, e rmi r ieon must be mail: within Iou.The I h*u' Comwletion Time is.equl <t" the time: ali owd: b.LCO :30.3 to int.iat. shut(do0wn, actionsn.n...n even t Of a.Comprl:]ete loss of.ISFAS function.

If the: interlock is:::not .:,in the :requi red state. (6r plac;d in the* relu ie~d. sta te). for the-ex i:sti nc i plant. conJition., the pl'ant. must..be pl:aced: i"n MODE: 3 within the next i6...hours nd MOUE 4_wi thin the followin9.

S:hours. The allo6wed Comp#letion Time. s ar e re asronable, bas~ed on týo reach te riequired plant condi-tOins fJI:fiul.:ll .nrcoit ioun s itn an o rdely manner and: w ith.iout ch allIOg iriing 0 s .tP.1iacving t~h.e i:in MODE 4 removes all. requtierrenrts Ifor OPERABILITY of. .e (co n tin ut; d): 'Watts~ Bar-UJnit I £ .-i.:B.: 3:÷ 3 O:

TSTF-418, R2 E.SFAS nstrumentation REPLACE WITH 313 BASES. 72.~. ............... .... ........ ...........

ACT T IOjS M. 1.1 and_ M-2 C(onti nueld)"Conditiion M:1 is appl'iicabJle too. :tih S erLe. 1 terLow Function.

.......TSTF-418, R2 known channel inoperable:

must: be restdord:

to: RSE*REPLACE WITH tuIs, or. placed in the trip pd cond. ti.n. i h i .oUr i:::: : canne: in[he.::tlfippe di.dtionin to restore the parti- 1 tiipP .condii onl on uo logi channel to f or ac tlon of tile two Out o:f thao tr op J -6 urs OPERABLE status or allo: wed 4 he e to place it cnion is i ti f ied i~n Re feec 7.T If :(I:. t t fails., it is placq t.in tb .r ipd -condiior:;

TSTF:4l8,R

.or noR2t af f ct t her 0 i acfl eu a t it w eft i: t he REPLACE WITH rtrnamnari ispERABLE C s. Itis tWhon necessary.

for the cper ator: to t, c t. u o th t bhor t'e T:TD TJiin b e.] a y by i~a.dju tsment i :l~\ to We !1 dey Cv ra~lcu tiT (:T t:)ar ac u p~S i:' del:a y cal culý 0. mli : 4 R for the.:affetcd o iun s tthrihtThe Mt M R41 chirin terface: TSTF-418, R2 1 i]:f~h iooperabl]e chan" canot be rstOred .r e J......LAChE WTH t e ,PCEI.I h o .ion whi.n :th&. speci:fi ed Compei.en.c.

li .the_ plIant must 11e plcdiMD ihnte lown 6 17. .hours and. MODE thin the next. 6. bors. The al.lomwed Com~pletion 11tries, ar-c rca npea~ ýng.....................................

C~ :~ im S .based. on::ope~raiting::

exp-erien.e, to: tIhe a plat: ih:n:: MO .3 f.'or 'oMOE I: fvlil.: powe r. oditn, s n a n. o1ý r" d er mya n n re. an d A ho i ut n :pliant s:Yst~ems:.

". ...:The Re-quired ha beni modified:

by a tihat al ows i p !-ac in"ga... a.. ..bl e ých.ann:el in ,4 6e. bvo :.assed t-cnd:i ti cn f or -M 1uj while. 'erorni di routine Survei 11 amc: es t i h~er channel s:. Teh. s allows a d ar tI I o b l ace a:ss hr up ] ::our&TSTF-418,R2 1 fretio f h ncrIrn'i-or channel ray b placed in by pass at ~oneý tIne. ::4 -REPLACE WITH fi ie rf ie ! U.12o d V .TSTF-418; R2 REPLACE WITH (coat iud'I Wat t S:DSar.unmitm

.]B :. 3' 1, 1, : I ES.F ASBIn3tu :en .tin B, 3.13-.2ýBASES ACTIONS: oc n ti~ ued)ý4,i .and :.:2 N applies to the Vesse:. 4l LEtuI t Power jailure. ofAhe: vessel .T .ch-annel input Of :more. than.one::T RTD or fail u0re :o. both T. RTDs) wil~l. affect the ITTD.ca]i cu.y!a1t:i on for.

set .This. .. sreSl : in the requremnt hattheoe ato adjujst :the threshol d: Power:eve:. for:.zero

se~conds.

time delay from 5o%: RTP:tLo 0% RTP:, th..rq:ugh: -the lMan-a eie interface.

If the i Jno pe r abl e: :ch an1e10 cannot be restored or the thrcshol.d..

power level. for zero secondfs ti me delay adjustedSPekified Con,!letion Ti me, the musL be.plae i'thOE hre is Functioný is not required to be OPERA.BLE.

E :An:: add: iti i o on AlI 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months i S-s IalI owed 1t0o place the.p:1 ant: in 1O11DE .: Si x h h-:ic: hr s iis a reasonable t ime based on tin9: :emxpperienche, 1o place the plant in tLDE 3. from IMODE 1:: .fUllI power int an orderl"y.anrc" and: without.c¢hal]il e~n gi] g: n !: s t.; : t: ern. s ........ .The Required Actji.o n s have be n modi fied by a t h tha t all:ows cing an * ........ ;n the by0 ds:sed ondi.ionl o ut. ifo Ae nh .rou :itie S's ' 0, ."a~ 77 ....... ....in i v a'Oi~le:

e j I~n R2: 6 Iý .TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 12 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 17 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH 72 C,ý1OnditAon 0 8-01 i es: to Nort-h Or South 1lSVV Rc-17 Water Level I. oi n. channe, is i.noperabie-ouPrs arýe :. ed to raestore that cdhann.l Lo. ..P.R .ABLE. ., r p. I plac,:e i f i t ,:he tri.pped Cw, idI Lit on: 1: a:l:.ac ad .i h t trie r n i ei c, , thneie Fun t.i on.IS- l:It a jpar ial 1t1)ip 7l *nIe one,-out:-of -two::i:O i 11: l t i : u :i: t t n. 1h 6 , :al :U-ed to e.:i the,. ped coi ndition i.s us.tffed Rinefeferenc~e 1 'TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH mnd References

10. and 17:ýWatts: Bar-.UnMit.:

I3 18. 3:. 3:.11:2 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH.... 72 ESFAS: Instrumentation

ýB 3.3-2 BASES r AIC iONS1 INSERT hour RE PLACE WITH 12 SURVEILLANCE R EQU [IREMENTIS 02and .0.2 o TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH References 10 and 17.Fa~ilre tor~es:oe .the inope rable cha'\nel ERABLE status or" p-itaeC1:.

in th:e thr.i. )pped condition wthii 6 ours requires tllan.tto be paced.in MOE 3 :within:h::

owinq 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The: al:loed.Completion lwim.o- is reasonrabe ba.s ad: on opera:ting. e r ei ncle to ro-ach MuDE .3 :f rom ffu:llýpmWr condi ti ons: o.nrderl1y mtan.ner.and withotlt .....chall eng i:ng pl ant. sy.tems..

in NODE .3, these funct ions fare no: lnger requi re: OPERABLE.Ihe: PRequir.-ed Acti s Ia mod ifid by :a Noteý that allows pla-cing A b T chr 4.: he bY passed testi: f the other channels.

The 4: our t:ie imi is: justified in: Retrencf .11.The SRsfo.. foS. Fu10in:cFti .ontm are: :ideintified.

b- the SR s c C, 1n of T.abl:e 3 T.2l Aote has 6 e added to the SR Tale 1o.o ct ari ni,: t it ha t able 3..3..2 ,1etemirnes

,,hich SRs ap:v:to Which ESFAS Note that .each: channel of :r0cess pot fpn srppI iac esbpoth trai:n~s .f.. o be:. SFAS. When ttesLing chan-e] !i, Aand traian: :B:vmus~tbe examiinei,-

SiiHarly, train A and train B, mU s t :be, cxumu.ped

wbh en c ,a nne I. c hanel III, an hanel IV.. theLCA.BA IO -and COTs are perf ormedP manner t.hlat i s cons stQe .t w.fith thýý..assumnp:t

.in.analytica1 ly. .:C.l! i a ti. Ahe ret uiired cýhannel acCur cie:s (cont riued).Watts 8ar*-UnJit

.13 13 1:"3::-:3

[SEAS .Ir tureen tatin B- .3.2.BA S ES.SURVIE iTLiANCiE Te:. v.:.:Ut.n i..im jS ssoc i at ed wi~th4the EAGE -REQUIREMENTS:

Pr.oes Protection Syst-mh::.

h :;..an: in.sta.Ied by.poass::(continued) capabili:ty,:

andl may be te~sted: i:n ei:.thbe4r .the:itr ip: or bypa'Ss'mode, :as apprwoved In ::Ref erence7. h-en testing is perform:ed.

Vinte: bypass mode the :SSPS :'input:re.lalys are::not-operdted, as:

in Pefer.enceO

10. The i nput: r.0elays are .checked.duri n the.:.HANN EL .CA.IBRNAI.ON every :monhs.Per.tforman:ce.

o:- the CHANINE. CHECK onc every ::2. hoUrs ensures that. a rgross ni aur instI ume rtuti i I h:as. no0t oc ý,u:rre kd. A CHANEL. CHEC:K is ial :y : cm.arison:

of the zparameter indIcate on:o: c hann i to a .im .ar parametfer on other::ha:s. :ft, is .ased on"i L ssu'i a ptiS that in.strurit chanrod s men i Lor i f-- ppsm pran li~ ouI d re a d'ap.prox~iraitdy:

t sai' .v~a iu r Si~gfii"iat:

devi at~ionsu :.betweent

thpe: twe: t es co ld :be an:indi~cation of: excealiVe .i hins trunter.dri ft. i n c:f the channelis:or of somethlnc even umoi ci:sericus. " A"iAEL CHECK wi dettect: gross tcha, n. I faiuire; i ' lIey to voerifying14 the min Liruml-t:at ion can v: U'es LO' :1e;rý t9e. pIropekrl Y b.6:t een. each.CHAMNE L :,CAL BRAT JON Ag" eee men cr1.t-e .a a e d e:termitI

d: by based.o:n: a uc1Rhbinatio.

of t.e rhanel iitrunent unce rat antines, i:nclud-ing indication:

afnd reli~abi~Ity.

If a.channel is: qiutside::

tle cri teria, it Flay Vbe ai-ýind.i:hictn:

that: the.senscr. or the igiiaI-prrocessi g: ecu?9 pment has dri: fte ed outsiide i ýts li1 t.The. Freaquency ish base d -on o e0pex:pie-in thlat:de mion.strates..channfl u e.. :Ic is r :r, Th e CH iNi A N tANNE L CHECK.-uppi me.:ts less: ornal but nore :requ *nt, ihe-ks or c:hacI s du ring, ope: aet.at:on~al:, Ose of the: di::sPlayS:

aisii o: t the W P t h: t e L c-. ai- tinns.:.pI.ac~ed!

in thie iorn th~u~s actu~ation. h eLr, ia:ll piaSis~ii:.e~

s e7(e. :. o .i ,..i .... ..... .. ...T q::O95::Td:,,cOeu-)h tn h tlei nn s, aw u~. om t iw c t. u .ef a l I::ida ! .p e:ur i. s: it- e~s c- Di a ion -,dw b~ pp Ia TýpevO 's re! .Watts R ar-. Uinit .I IB 3. 3 -] :14.

ESFAS:I! nstrlumetaIt 1 On J :.3:2 BASE S SIJRVE I LLAIcE REO U I AEME NTS TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WITH 92 TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WITH justified in Reference 18.TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WTTH 92_R 2:2__ (contiued).are tested for ekah protection function, In :add:iton .he mas-ter:.re1iy.Ciol i :is pulsei teSited for continuity:.

This " ven f.es: that the i.c modul es are OPERABLE and that there i:s 3r! flt!CCt Voltage path ýto the master relay coils The :FreqUency f everI n31:) a's on a STAGGERED TFStc Rr SR 3 :3,2.1:SR 3,2,:3 is the performance.

of a PLASTER RELAY TEST. The, MASTER RELAY TEST 'is the energizing of the ma ster re l a y verifying contact coperation and a lOw voltagecontinuity c:heck ,of the slave reliay O .upon* master relay :contact operatio:.

a low voltage isinjected.to.the sla4e:rel ay-7i7-s vo I cage TiCent :to.ck u the sl ave relay, but 1arge S path.ity. This test iýs perforn'ed everyý, days:on a.TAGGE IR 'E T , A SI: -.ienz)771cd

e. rdenn stru r r e I ya~ eain trd TSTF-411:, R1 i REPLACE WITH The Frequency of 92 days is justified:ýýin Reference 18.I SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3 ,:2.4 is -the.perforance

o a COT A:COT is performed on.:each required channel to: ensure the entire: channewl 11pertcfm.the intendedU Function.Set.o.nts must be fouýd:%iiJthin the :Altlowable Valýuesý:spec.i fied in Table3.1 -.The di ffierence:

between the :current "as- found val:ues.andthe test "asle.:left'*

v:aluesn:ust be :consistent with the, drift usedI. in the setpoint methodocgy'.

The ,setpoint shaIl be left set conslstent with the assumrptons:

of the :" ren. f un it a "":ifi et point methodology.,.The ".as. found' and "'as le-1ft" values lus~t also he recor and re v Iewed for cons istency. With the :ýassvm tionsý: o' .NT n rv~arex.Te\1s15Ton nys\ s .. h a i~ie d eeon rthJog (ReN 6)TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WITH.... Reference 6.(continrued)

Watts:.Ba.r.

Unit 1:B 3.3,:!i5:

r : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : TSTF-411, R1 ESFAS: Instruntat i.on TSTF-411, RiB 13 32 REPLACE WITH REPLACE WITH eASES184____________________18 SO RVE ILLAN CE S 3324 (Continued):

IIREIMENS The. Frecuencgy:

of E y ays. .is just .T- i fe d -in Referenc1ceE7 excepr.fOlb:giin tin 7: ,The FreqpuencY.

ýfor Function 7 is justI:ified

" in_ Fee I erence 101 TSTF-411, R1 SRP: 1C WIT S 3. 5.. is. t e- e r a AVE RELY ATEST- The References 10.and 18. SSLAVE RELAY TEST Is the eriergizinq of the:slave relays.Contact is.: erified :-n :one o~f two ways. Actuation equ ipment that may be :*operated i'nthe.design mitigatiPon.DE:

is::

to funttio~n:,o.::or is.. pl! ac'ed. in :a condition where ,the r el ay contact: operaton can: be verified without operaStion of the. equipment.ý

Actualtion equipment that mayy not be.operaterJ i:n. the destign 'mitigation:.MOOE is preented::

from operation by the:,SLAVE RRLAYTEST cFrcit. Four this 1atter, c::Aas.. contact operation .s verified by. a continuity c heck of. the circuit. containing the slave relay This test is performed every 92 days The FIrequercy is adequate.based on industry operating experience, considering.

ins~t~rument reli :i tand: .operati.ng::

history. daitýa.For:ESFAS slave. relays whih :are Westinghouse type AR relays. the SLAVE REL.Y TEST is iperformed every 18months The frequency is based :on: the rel ay assessment presented In

Reference:

13. This reliability.

assessment is rel'ay specific and appli es on ly to wes.tingho se: ype: AR relays: wi:th ýAC ýco o:lote:::that., for normma:l ly energized the relays may requir:p&e'iddi.:rep!acement in..rdane with thei gUgida.ce given. i

Reference:

13:.Th 1i SRp I s: modifi ed by a:Note, which states that performance of: th.is test is not required.:.or those re.a.s. tested by £...........

." SR. 3.3.2':.i6i.3.6 is the. per forma.nceý of a TADOT :every..:-2.

days.This test is a -t-erk of :the Loss ..of OffTS te. Power unction 6-:d). AFW Pump :,Suction Transfer or Suct-ow f .r motor.driven and tirbi ne. driven :pu.n os (Funct~ions 6.fanid 6.g: respect W.iely). and Turbire Trip and Feecwater IS:olat-ion Main Stem.:Valve Vault Rooms Wat er Level -High (Furcticn 5 ... ....... ... ..The:SR :Sis.

by::a::. note that excliudes verification of setpoin:s for rel ays Rel'ay::setpi nts require iel:aborate bench calibrat on and. aire verified duri~ng C HCAN (EIL CALIB5RAt1-I:N.

Tre FrequEncy is aequate : It is: bNsd. on:r Industry operating

exoerience.

considering instr'ument reliabit ai OperatinghiS y dat ..... ..(conti nued)......... .. ............... .... ......* ....Watts :Ba-Urit:

I8 3.3-1ia 20.Amendmnt.

i1

[Lf TL AoCf E Sp i 32~.(u11re' REOQ1~~ET A i~j fi iivna t -n oTr ~res~rýý f-nslur im~A7 ie~'~rne epdne sim acril Dz 'I-TSTF-411, Ri n lhdi 0J~21av~~

/VTCSgA oc nat~ s,- t mire rn 1h , o i Fra I'ev 1 ii 1' * ~ ~i~f evti chresrc s ti me for Ti Scp rep s t e sý Lru be oi prm i pe tci me -rI "l (Reference 15)',cmnntiopra'wlsrc drve doHi'ricnteic th .(),1 a 1,El 1 rA ec repon~ Pioe C rote&.ect riu*.-- annl repairls Time dons.E" n rot inpc- thýb ae s nse.and thodol Steci fic cr pn o. a jIden Lr 1~n al~ r) rr may C repla1, l c ed wti thout I fi~a tip I I ur , c~n~e the 31)ri -3 a, tnrit tiefrrr~e , -eci s t .estn retu r t i np r i os i Lr m'ccf,,-,onent it operationga exprinc C hc .hw tha 9.miae iu jrceradt h 1- bt nota chaernely a~ ure a-di-ornie occurr; eenc rcls.al: .' r2e itir r timerprc jdeý th: pats.:use..:oý-, I C Wicon4.-7k -Ne d r-i l,ýC ýzov onor-.-U:

ii~ i~ e Ar ma ben int2

ESFAS I rlsurentat~iron BASES.REF ER EIC ES ( conti nued)TSTF-411, Ri; TSTF-418, R2 INSERT 17. WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1,"Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998.: 18. WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003.:.Code: ofFe al Peuitins:

Titlelo Far 50.'49, v~i r rment aiual ,f: i Cat, ir)c~ of:L- alEqipen I 1(.-ortmnt.

16 Sýa f~ tvn.fnN'i tr I ,,r Propr' PT1.li-5 :CA.2~5f.7j.

W'esttnghouseSton Z:td -) og~ fr Pi~teti Ys~tem. Watts Bar 1: arnd, 2:- M'rch 1997.* WrAP4271.PA.Suoppement

1. anjd:Suppl~ermnt:

2. Rv: Wvauation t' )f urveil anc'e Frecjuenc s :ard Cut, 0o: Ser Ji-2 Tfmfne, for t;oý. R."iGc'tor Prot.,!I .2on. Instr eit-ion? Systf7-m.<randEv I tio-r~ of Stkrveil1la3nCe.Frqoutz cies and GOr S,.-rv Ic e Tir; -fo~r tl'e Engine~ered

-.Safety Fea~ture,-A

~ ir Systent laylAS and.Juhe :1990.8. Wa tS 8:a~ Tkhiichm Peui r e e.1 ts :Mana jcio 39 c.fhihneeed

%t" ty Featm e Resporise Thmes.f ? 7 ete l bvenber 59, .1084, t or Ex>;ti ;n o Quartelrly St ave Rp: a et~r.Suplren 1 nd Su lPneý : .Revision

1. to Wats Bar, 19.Westinghouse letter to TVA, WAT-D-11248, W~tý..eslti~nggh seý to (WAT-U-83417').

e t~~:2ý,1v, ..Chargiqn/tLetdown Isolation Trarsi ets" 12: (T:231: 911231 8 ote0). " "o, , ............

... .121Z 0m i ci n Tfihang: ý No ti Ce VJ -`8213:6s.

aso i ateý* doc -rýW 13. ACP-I3377, Rev. 1 -R,-,Iiýb~i e Sti nghcs qy AR Iselays. Used Assess. a,,e of ý .As.:s SlAzve:RelTays.

14:. TA'.sLeterI to NRC dated Feb~'ua: Requ~est for:- TS Ame~ndmren:for TS Inst.eVnu 1ta -I ion.1,I 2* ESFAS T'~r -Tw Tev.irq R pl~rements, J.h ary.19036 ,I " :W2AP 14",3 A. R v3/4i .Oi1 v ~ ~ f.]l~~ ofr1d.Drr~re.'~t.~n Cn~M', nso~ Tam Teti 7 1: tc"e INSERT Y Westinghouse letter to TVA WAT-D-10128 MWatts 130ar-.n',t A B ý3 3-:20 Revis 'On 3.0.,A.::Arinfdfre nt: 231..24 Containment Vent Isolat ion.. I at if-,n 3. 3.3. E REQUJIREM]ENT S SR. 3..3.6.:1l Jpcontirlued)

Aqreemen t c:ri teri a :are determined by the .unit .staff., bas5ed on a combination df the channel. instrument unceritajln1,1es,.ncudi: ind~i~ca:i or.and readab!i.Aty.

If a :chananel.i outside the criteria, it may be an indicati:on cnhat .the;: sensidr o te ýýit ial pr.ocesl u h ifted outsirde its limit, TSTF-411:, Rl REPLACE WITH justified in Reference TSTF-411, Ri 1REPLACE WITH Z Z Z IZ ....................

iii9 2iiiiii Tlie Frequency.i~s based on,,oper.at.ing experience:

that.deonestraes channel :fai:iire

.it rare.T CA111N.EL CH-ECK su..iPpe.mernt es but imore frequeent, chezksl.f:.*ofl

channe!sduringq ormaý operational us~ lo the d'isplay associiated with tl-&e LCO.required channels.:

SR :3.3.:6.2:

SR:.>3-:1:.2 i:s:1:the Ipe rma.n-e9 of an: ACTUATION

LOGIC::TEST.:

F Te n einie.t. i.paced i n heI b co. ndi ti o n-:.thupreent~ing.

imadvertent actuation.

Through, th:ett rOjic{ t~estet-,-

all .possr+bl.e:

0 *comb~ination s, Witf~.and- rithou t applica b lep fe rMi s i, : e5 a-; TýýSe for e~ah*pait tion functio:n...

In: addiion., the. :master rela.y coill is pts tsed tfor conti~n.ity..

This vei tis th1i ti the I Uq..ar.e OPERABLE andi the e i r an intact vltacte signai.pit he ma'ter .elay coils!., his ýtes is .erored vry31 da1 Ys cn a SITAGGERED TEST P, Tht. 5 z euave .l -.e:e t i cxpa et ie ncee TSTF-41l, R1 INSERT The SR is modified by a Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation.

TSTF-411, R1 INSERT The SR is modified by a Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation.

SR. 3.6 :3 is the::perforrmance::of na MASTER REY TEST. TheRELAY .TEST i the. enero-zi ng.: of tihe master :rqlay, 9-rifyii tpera rid a low- vltaqu cc-,tiulity

.check o.:f thie ý:slav.. relay: coil. Upon master relay-taact-operatio~n, lwvoltagpAs injecýte-d t-o the 61lave valay: accil. Thi:s vltage.is.insufficent.

to pip-P-Ick u-p the slýave r elay, 1.00 iage eanough to demonstrate si ath co-tin .ult-v. ThiS t estt is :"erformed everý 31iays.:on a STAGGERED.

TEST. BASIS. The Surveiliance.. c-.acceptabhe -bated on instrument reliability arri :indu TSTF-411, Rl TSTF-411ý, :ýRl:ýREPLACE WITH REPLACE WITH justified in Reference

4. 92... ....... n n::: :: :: :: ::: : : :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: :: ::: :: :: :: : : .: : :: :: :: l : :: :: : : :: : :: :: :: :: ::o n::: :t:: :: ::: :: :: :: :: 85:3 35-60 Co.-tainment-Vent t n, 1c B3.3-61 BASES SURVE VAJCE:RQVIREMN

.To'C con inuecul S :R J:3. 26Af3 SR 33-6,.:G liss the performanceý o~f a TADOTL. hstes s*C:he k, o 0f te Naua 7cuio Fctio~ns an~d Is p Tformed: eve.y..1 .ons.. *Each** Manual. Actuation Function ;is tested up to, and jilcluding, th ase elycol.Kns

~nsta~ce:

the test include:s adctuation ofthe :end device.'i., Pumo starts:: vaL're cyclest et.).For the:se tets,' the relay trip setpoints are :-Lerl.i:ed

andc ad -Justed a.s The "rrequency::s based: on the known l}i A..i.. J. f the. Function and the redanc' available, and: jta been shoWn ::t be- a6cceptable thzough operang experience.

The. SR is: modlified by 1aNte that excludes of, setpoints during: the-T DOT. The Functions t et dhie..no sR 3e.s 3:a.6.AA CHANEL C WLIBRAT0Nt ls performed e ve .or approximawtelY.

at: everyrefueling." CHANEL CALi&RATZ.ON$

i .complete chec of th :instrumen t loop,.

the SensOr, The veritfies:

that the. channel iesponds to a inazisu red: pa rme~r~ithji the.noc~s~srane raMa nd .aczuaracy; The Freque.cy i: býased.on operating experience

and.i consistent w1ith the typical. industry refue.irniq4 CYC..ce.RZF'~kENC ES Ti-le M.i.. Code o~fIederal Regulations, Part 1.0.0:11,"Deterr. inat." o" : Exclusion Area, Low, Pop" ation z., .., ahd Popu4:aeioin.

Caeter

.,". ..2. NuR E( -13:66;, "In..i zen~t t~o T[ e chn ica l. S_ _ e' if..l". : t........ ..... e i fkaw-. on.ueVel l.ance Requi.enenýt, December 1992.3. KCA.-?138:T, Rev..I..1. .Re-liability Assess.ment.:of W6,stJnghouAse Type P.R Rel1ays Ulsed :as. SSPS Slave.:August. ...INSERT 4. WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003.watts Ea-nit.1 B 3".3-162 R evision 26 Ame~ndment::.7 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Safety Evaluation Condition 1 for WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Condition 1 of the Safety Evaluations for both WCAPs requires confirmation that the analyses and component failure probabilities are applicable to the plant and a plant-specific assessment of containment failures.

This evaluation follows the implementation guidelines issued by Westinghouse to address this condition.

Applicability Evaluation

](a~c The information provided confirms the applicability to WBN of the generic analyses of WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376.

WBN component failure data was not included in the reports since the data was collected prior to commencement of commercial operation.

A review of maintenance records for approximately four recent operating cycles shows that the component failure data and corrective maintenance intervals reported in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 are representative of WBN and, therefore, the analyses are considered to be applicable to WBN.Containment Failure Assessment I (a, c)E5-1 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version The WBN PSA includes all credible containment failure modes for an ice condenser containment.

Thus, the PSA provides the means to assess the impact of the proposed technical specification changes upon LERF. The appropriate risk measure to evaluate the impact on LERF is the Conditional Large Early Release Probability (CLERP).CLERP is defined as the conditional probability, given a core damage accident that the containment fails in such a manner as to result in a large early release. By comparing CLERP due to Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) scenarios to the CLERP due to all initiating events, it can be determined whether ATWS scenarios pose a significant threat to the containment.

Calculations of CLERP are provided in the table below. It can be seen that the CLERP for ATWS-related core damage events is less than the CLERP for all core damage events. It can therefore be concluded that ATWS events do not pose a significant threat to the containment.

This finding supports the conclusion that the proposed Technical Specification changes do not adversely affect defense in depth.CDF LERF CLERP ATWS 1.34E-6 2.28E-8 0.0170 All Initiators 1.41E-5 1.16E-6 0.0823 Safety Evaluation Condition 4 for WCAP-15376 Table 5 lists the operator actions credited in the WCAP-15376 analysis.

I (a, c)E5-2 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 1 WCAP-14333 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters Parameter WCAP-14333 Analysis Plant-Specific Assumptions Parameter Logic Cabinet Type SSPS or Relay SSPS Component Test Intervals z* Analog channels 3 months 3 months* Logic cabinets (SSPS) 2 months 2 months* Logic cabinets (Relay) 1 month NA* Master Relays (SSPS) 2 months 2 months* Master Relays (Relay) 1 month NA* Slave Relays 3 months 3 months 'u" Reactor trip breakers 2 months 2 months Analog Channel Calibrations 3" Done at-power Yes No 3* Interval 18 months 18 months 3 Typical At-Power Maintenance Intervals 4" Analog channels 24 months > 24 months* Logic cabinets (SSPS) 18 months > 18 months* Logic cabinets (Relay) 12 months NA" Master relays (SSPS) Infrequent Infrequent

Master relays (Relay) Infrequent NA* Slave relays Infrequent Infrequent

Reactor trip breakers 12 months > 12 months 4 AMSAC b Credited for AFW Credited for AFW pump start pump start Total Transient Event Frequency 3.6/year 2.56/year ATWS Contribution to CDF (current PRA model) 8.4E-06/year 1.34E-6/year E5-3 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 1 (continued)

WCAP-14333 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters Parameter WCAP-14333 Analysis Plant Specific Assumptions Parameter Total CDF from Internal Events (current PRA model)' 5.8E-05/year 1.41E-5/year Total CDF from Internal Events (IPE)9 Not Applicable 3.3E-4/year NOTES FOR TABLE 1 11. SSPS logic cabinets are included in WCAP-14333.

Therefore, the analysis is applicable to WBN.12. Since the WBN test intervals are equal to or greater than those used in WCAP-14333, the analysis is applicable to WBN.13. Since the WBN analog channel calibration interval is equal to or greater than that used in WCAP-14333, the analysis is applicable to WBN. Note that analog channel calibrations are performed at-power when feasible, but, otherwise, are performed during refueling outages.14. Since WBN maintenance intervals are equal to or greater than those used in WCAP-14333, the analysis is applicable to WBN. Note that the analysis applies to maintenance at power (i.e., maintenance activities which cause an analog channel, logic train, or RTB to be unavailable).

WBN typically performs preventive maintenance on the analog channels, logic trains, and RTBs while shutdown.15. Only corrective maintenance is done on the master and slave relays. The maintenance interval on typical relays is relatively long, that is, experience has shown they do not typically fail completely.

Failure of these relays usually involves failure of individual contacts.

Since WBN experience is that slave relay failures are infrequent, the WCAP-14333 analysis is applicable to WBN.16. AMSAC will initiate AFW pump start at WBN. Therefore, the WCAP-14333 analysis is applicable to WBN.17. Total frequency for initiators requiring a reactor trip signal to be generated for event mitigation, not including events initiated by a reactor trip.E5-4 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 1 (continued)

WCAP-14333 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters

18. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) is not modeled as an initiating event in the WBN PSA. Because it is a significant event, the accident sequences that involve ATWS have been pulled out of the individual initiating event groups and presented as a group. This was performed by grouping all sequences that have either Top Event RT (Reactor Trip) or RODS (Control Rods Fail to Insert) in the failed state and an end state of either LERF or NOLERF (the two possible core damage end states).19. The current WBN PSA model is revision 3 (Reference 14). The IPE submittal was made in September 1992 and was based on the plant design, procedures, and training in place in 1991.Since the original IPE submittal, the Watts Bar PSA model has undergone four update cycles:* Revision 1 of the IPE Submittal (April 1994) addressed numerous design changes, procedure upgrades and enhanced operator training." Revision 2 of the PSA Model (November 1999) included plant design changes as a result of the Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDA) study." Revision 2A of the PSA Model (May 2000) integrated the Level 2 model with the Level 1 model to allow calculation of the LERF. This modeling feature was incorporated with the model developed for an EDG AOT extension.

Revision 3 (June 2005) is the model of record. The WOG PSA peer review team reviewed a draft revision 3. Major changes in this revision were to update plant-specific data and initiating events, incorporate the Westinghouse seal-LOCA model, revise the main and auxiliary feedwater models to include all four steam generators, and eliminate the loss of shutdown boards as initiating events.The WOG PSA peer review team rated the WBN PSA elements at a minimum of grade 2, with most elements at grade 3C or 3. Of significance to this proposed technical specification change, the systems analysis element, the dependency analysis element, and the containment performance element were all rated grade 3. There were no A or B level findings related to reactor trip or ESFAS signals.20. Some slave relays are tested quarterly, but most are tested on a refueling frequency.

E5-5 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 2 WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters E5-6 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 2 (continued)

WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters Parameter WCAP-15376 Analysis Plant Specific I Assumption Parameter 1- t 4.(a,c)Notes for Table 2[(a, c)E5-7 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 3 WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Reactor Trip Actuation Signals Event WCAP-14333 and WCAP- Plant-Specific Parameter' 15376 Analysis Assumption E5-8 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 3 (continued)

WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Reactor Trip Actuation Signals WCAP-14333 and WCAP- Plant 15376 Analysis Assumption

](a c)Notes for Table 3 1 E5-9 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 4 WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signals L Safety Function Event WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Plant Specific Parameter' Analysis Assumptions

____ .1 _____ 1 _______ I _______ I+ + 4+ + 4.1.I (a, c)E5-10 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 4 (continued)

WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signals I Safety Function Event WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Plant-Specific Parameter'

_ I I Analysis Assumptions

.1. I I ""'Notes for Table 4[(ac)E5-11 ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 5 WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Human Reliability Analysis[Operator Action Are plant procedures in place that provide for operator action that results in a success path prior to the action becoming ineffective to mitigate the event?'i i& -(aC, Note for Table 5[(a, c)(a, c)E5-12 ENCLOSURE 6 Westinghouse Affidavit Proprietary Information Notice Copyright Notice E6-1 OWestinghouse Westinghouse Electric Company Nuclear Services P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355 USA Directtel:

(412) 374-4643 Directfax:

(412) 374-4011 e-mail: greshaja@wcstinghouse.com U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Our ref: CAW-07-2275 June 7, 2007 APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Subject:

WCAP-15376 Implementation Guideline for WCAP-15376-P-A, Rev. 1, "Approach to Address the Conditions and Limitations in the NRC's Safety Evaluation" (Proprietary)

The proprietary information for which withholding is being requested in the above-referenced report is further identified in Affidavit CAW-07-2275 signed by the owner of the proprietary information, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. The affidavit, which accompanies this letter, sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations.

Accordingly, this letter authorizes the utilization of the accompanying affidavit by TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1.Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the application for withholding or the Westinghouse affidavit should reference this letter, CAW-07-2275, and should be addressed to J. A. Gresham, Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355.

Very truly youis, J. A. Gresham, Manager Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing Enclosures cc: Jon Thompson (NRC O-7EIA)

CAW-07-2275 AFFIDAVIT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:

ss COUNTY OF ALLEGIHiENY:

Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared J. A. Gresham, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on behal r of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse), and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief: J. A. Gresham, Manager Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing Sworn to and subscribed before me this 7th day of June, 2007 Notary Public COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Notarial Sea)Sharon L. Markle, Notary Public Monroeville Boro, Allegheny County My Commission Expires Jan. 29,2011 Member. Peinsylvania Association of Notaries 2 CAW-07-2275 (1) 1 am Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing, in Nuclear Services, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse), and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public disclosure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing and rule making proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of Westinghouse.

(2) 1 am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations and in conjunction with the Westinghouse "Application for Withholding" accompanying this Affidavit.

(3) 1 have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Westinghouse in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.

(4) Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.(i) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse.(ii) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public. Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence.

The application of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis required.Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows: (a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without license from Westinghouse constitutcs a competitive economic advantage over other companies.

3 CAW-07-2275 (b) It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.(c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.(d) It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.(e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future Westinghouse or customer funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to Westinghouse.(f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.

There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following: (a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its competitors.

It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.(b) It is information that is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.(c) Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competitive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.(d) Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage.

If competitors acquire components of proprietary information, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.

4 CAW-07-2275 (e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.(f) The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.(iii) The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.(iv) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.(v) The proprietary information sought to be withheld in this submittal is that which is appropriately marked in WCAP-1 5376 Implementation Guideline for WCAP-15376-P-A, Rev. 1, "Approach to Address the Conditions and Limitations in the NRC's Safety Evaluation" (Proprietary) on behalf of the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG), being transmitted by TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 letter and Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, to the Document Control Desk. The proprietary information as submitted for use by the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group for TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit I is expected to be applicable for other licensee submittals.

This information is part of that which will enable Westinghouse to: (a) Provide risk-informed assessment of the RTS and ESFAS to extend the interval for surveillance testing.(b) Provide licensing defense services.Further this information has substantial commercial value as follows:

5 CAW-07-2275 (a) Westinghouse plans to sell the use of similar information to its customers for purposes of extending surveillance testing intervals.(b) Westinghouse can sell support and defense of extending surveillance testing intervals.

Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar assessments and licensing defense services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses.

Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.

The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive Westinghouse effort and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.In order for competitors of Westinghouse to duplicate this information, similar technical programs would have to be performed and a significant manpower effort, having the requisite talent and experience, would have to be expended.Further the deponent sayeth not.

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE Transmitted herewith are proprietary and/or non-proprietary versions of documents furnished to the NRC in connection with requests for generic and/or plant-specific review and approval.In order to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations concerning the protection of proprietary information so submitted to the NRC, the information which is proprietary in the proprietary versions is contained within brackets, and where the proprietary information has been deleted in the non-proprietary versions, only the brackets remain (the information that was contained within the brackets in the proprietary versions having been deleted).

The justification for claiming the information so designated as proprietary is indicated in both versions by means of lower case letters (a) through (f)located as a superscript immediately following the brackets enclosing each item of information being identified as proprietary or in the margin opposite such information.

These lower case letters refer to the types of information Westinghouse customarily holds in confidence identified in Sections (4)(ii)(a) through (4)(ii)(f) of the affidavit accompanying this transmittal pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(b)(1).

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ML071660106

Contents

Text

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.1.2 Safety

5.0 REGULATORY

5.2 Applicable

7.0 REFERENCES

3.3.1 ACTIONS

3.3.2 ACTIONS

Reference:

Reference:

Subject:

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ML071660106

Text

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.1.2 Safety

5.0 REGULATORY

5.2 Applicable

7.0 REFERENCES

3.3.1 ACTIONS

3.3.2 ACTIONS

Reference:

Reference:

Subject:

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