05000306/FIN-2010005-04
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Appropriately Complete an Operability Determination on D5 EDG |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, on November 12, 2010, due to the failure to complete an immediate operability determination for the D5 EDG in accordance with Procedure FP-OP-OL-01, Operability/Functionality Determination. Specifically, operations personnel failed to properly assess the impact of a malfunctioning fuel oil transfer system on the ability of the D5 EDG to perform its safety function as required by the procedure. Corrective actions for this issue included declaring the D5 EDG inoperable; repairing the fuel oil transfer system equipment deficiency; satisfactorily testing the D5 EDG following the equipment repairs; providing additional training on the operability process to operations personnel; and implementing a daily management review of operability decisions. The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance, procedure quality, and configuration control attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. This finding also impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance because, although this potential design deficiency resulted in a loss of D5 EDG operability, it did not result in D5 inoperability for greater than TS allowed time, did not result in a loss of safety function for the Unit 2 EDGs and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program area because the licensee had not taken appropriate corrective actions to address a previously identified adverse trend regarding the adequacy of operability determinations. |
Site: | Prairie Island ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000306/2010005 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Brown D Mcneil J Dalzell J Giessner K Stoedter L Kozak P Zurawski R Lerch |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000306/2010005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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