05000306/FIN-2010012-02
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate 50.59 Evaluation for New Manual Operator Actions |
| Description | A Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1), Changes, Tests, and Experiments, was identified by the inspector for the licensees failure to provide an evaluation that adequately documented why implementing new manual operator actions during periods of adverse weather, which isolated portions of the component cooling water system susceptible to hazards associated with tornado-generated missiles, did not present a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the updated safety analysis report (USAR). The licensee initiated CAP 1257118, 50.59 Screening Not Sufficient 122 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Component Cooling Loss, and, at the end of the inspection, was in the process of correcting the deficiency. The violation was determined to be more than minor because the inspector could not reasonably determine that the changes would not have ultimately required prior NRC approval. Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are dispositioned using Traditional Enforcement process instead of the SDP because they are considered to be violations that could potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. However, if possible, the underlying technical issue is evaluated under the SDP to determine the severity of the violation. In this case, the inspector determined that the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Tables 3b and 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspector answered Yes to Question 5 under the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone column of the Phase 1 worksheet because the inspector concluded that the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to a severe weather initiating event. Based upon Phase 3 SDP evaluation performed by a NRC Region III Senior Risk Analyst (SRA), the inspector concluded that the issue was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors concluded that this finding was cross-cutting in the Problem Identification and Resolution area, corrective action component, because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions as necessary. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000306/2010012 Section 4OA4 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 95001 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Thomas J Giessner |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000306/2010012 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||