05000282/FIN-2010003-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Section 50.65 (a)(iv) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires that licensees assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities prior to performing maintenance. Contrary to the above, on May 12, 2010, the licensee failed to properly assess and manage the risk associated with establishing the RCS as intact, releasing the containment airlock operator from duties, and the removal of equipment hatch from the Unit 2 containment. This resulted in Unit 2 entering an unplanned orange shutdown safety assessment path for the containment closure function. This issue was documented in CAP 1232396. Corrective actions included re-establishing the RCS as intact, closing the equipment hatch, re-instating the airlock operator, developing a procedure to clearly state the requirements to be met to declare the RCS intact, and a review of other outage activities to ensure that they were governed by specific procedures appropriate to the circumstance. The inspectors determined that the failure to properly assess plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(iv) was a performance deficiency that required an SDP evaluation. The inspectors consulted Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Rule Risk Assessment Significance Determination Process, and found that this appendix could not be used due to the qualitative nature of shutdown safety assessments. Appendix K suggested that qualitative risk assessment issues be evaluated through a management review performed in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M. The inspectors were concerned with this approach since Unit 2 was shut down at the time this finding occurred. The inspectors consulted a Region III Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) for additional assistance. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Significance Determination Process for Shutdown Conditions, the SRA determined that Unit 2 was in plant outage state #2. The SRA also found that the shutdown SDP stated that IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, should be used for shutdown findings related to containment issues. Using Section 4.0 of Appendix H, the SRA determined that this finding was a type B finding since it was related to a condition that had potentially important implications for the integrity of containment without affecting the likelihood of core damage. The SRA then used Section 6.2, Approach for Assessing Type B Findings at Shutdown, and determined that this finding was of low safety significance (Green) because it occurred during the late time window of the outage. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2010003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Langstaff R Orlikowski M Phalen K Stoedter D Jones L Haeg R Lerch P Zurawski D Betancourt |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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