05000282/FIN-2010002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Implement Operability Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V for the failure to adequately implement Procedure FP-OP-OL-01, Operability/Functionality Determination. The failure to adequately implement this procedure resulted in the completion of determinations which failed to fully assess the safety function of the equipment, failed to fully evaluate information contained in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, or included information which questioned the components ability to meet Technical Specification requirements. Corrective actions for this issue included initiating an adverse trend corrective action document, revising the impacted operability determinations, performing an apparent cause evaluation on the programmatic weaknesses, and implementing additional corrective actions as necessary. The inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor because the implementation weaknesses resulted in completing operability determinations which cast reasonable doubt on the continued operability of the equipment or demonstrated significant programmatic concerns that could lead to worse errors if not corrected. The inspectors determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because each of the conditions described in the determinations did not result in a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than the allowed outage time. The inspectors determined that this finding was cross-cutting in the Human Performance, Decision Making area because although the licensee had formally defined and communicated the authority and roles for decisions affecting nuclear safety, the implementation of these roles and authorities were not as designed. In addition, the interdisciplinary reviews of these safety-significant decisions were not always effective (H.1(a)). (Section 1R15.1 |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2010002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dunlop D Mcneil B Palagi M Phalen K Stoedter P Zurawski D Betancourt J Giessner |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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