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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 ML17313A3131998-03-21021 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980301,surveillance Test Deficiency Found During Qaa Leads to TS 3.0.3/4.0.3 Entry.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Responsible for Inadequately Performed SR Were Coached ML17313A2251998-03-0505 March 1998 LER 93-005-00:on 930309,CR Personnel Discovered Missed TS LCO Action & Subsequently Performed Surveillance Satisfactorily.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Disciplinary Action issued.W/980305 Ltr ML17313A2241998-02-26026 February 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980130,reactor Protection & ESFAS Instrumentation Not Bypassed within one-hour Allowed by TS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Expectation to Detect Alarm Conditions Was Emphasized to CR Personnel ML17313A2081998-02-10010 February 1998 LER 97-007-00:on 971006,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Shutdown Cooling Flow During Modes 5 & 6 Operation.Independent Investigation of Event Was Conducted IAW APS CA program.W/980210 Ltr ML17313A2041998-02-0505 February 1998 LER 97-006-00:on 971028,missed TS 4.0.5 SR Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Independent Investigation of Event Is Being Conducted IAW W/Aps Corrective Action Program ML17313A1201997-11-12012 November 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971020,manual Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Vibration & Bearing Temp Increases in Reactor Coolant Pump. Caused by Failed Lower Journal Bearing.Bearing Assembly Was Disassembled,Inspected & Rebuilt ML17312B7181997-10-0707 October 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970907,inadvertent Loss of Power & EDG Start Occurred Due to Procedural Error.Changed Train a & Train B Edg/Ist ST Procedures to Consistently Reflect Proper Pretest Staging Hand switches.W/971007 Ltr ML17312B7051997-09-26026 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970215,seven Main Steam Safety Valves Were Found Out of Tolerance Prior to Refueling Outage.Safety Analysis Performed Based Upon as-found MSSV Data Which Demonstrated That MSSVs Would Perform Safety Functions ML17312B5531997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970528,SR for Core Protection Was Not Performed Due to Inadequate Procedures.Revised Procedures ML17312B5501997-07-0707 July 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970211,notified of Trevitest Activities Indicating That Total of Seven MSSVs Had as-found Lift Set Pressures Greater than 3 Percent Allowed by TS 3.7.1.1. Investigation Conducted.Seven MSSVs replaced.W/970707 Ltr ML17312B4971997-06-13013 June 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970531,RT Occurred.Caused by Spurious Opening of All Four Rt Switchgear Breakers.Independent Investigation of Event Being Conducted in Accordance W/Util Corrective Action Program ML17312B1461996-12-17017 December 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 961119,surveillance Test Deficiencies Were Found During GL 96-01 Review Leading to TS 3.0.3 Entries. Caused by Increase in Scope of Required Testing.Supplement Will Be submitted.W/961217 Ltr ML17312A9511996-09-0404 September 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960809,open Auxiliary Bldg Door Caused Full Bldg Essential Filtration Inoperability.Caused by Personnel Error.C/As Under consideration.W/960904 Ltr ML17312A8641996-07-17017 July 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960621,inaccurate Gas Calculations for Post Accident Sampling Sys Occurred.Caused by Surveillance Test Worksheet Errors.Independent Investigation of Event Being conducted.W/960717 Ltr ML17300B2541996-06-11011 June 1996 LER 96-001-01:on 960404,inappropriate Grounding of Equipment Resulted in Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant. Established Fire Watches Required for Affected Areas ML17312A8081996-06-0909 June 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960514,Tech Spec Violation Occurred Due to Erroneous Surveillance Requirement.Caused by Incorporation of C-E Generic Ts.Investigation Being conducted.W/960609 Ltr ML17312A7751996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960122,missed Surveillance for Logic Check of Logs 1 & 2 Safety Excore Bypasses.Caused by Procedural Error.Log Power Functional Test Revised to Check Logs 1 & 2 Bypasses Regardless of Power level.W/960517 Ltr ML17312A7511996-05-0606 May 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 960404,smoke Discovered in Back Boards Area of CR by Security Officer,Performing Hourly Fire Watch Tour. Caused by Improperly Grounded Circuit.Investigation for Inappropriate Grounding of Low Voltage Power Sys Initiated ML17312A7241996-04-25025 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960401,inappropriate Work Practice Resulted in Esfa of Train B Edg.Night Order Was Issued to All Three Units Describing event.W/960425 Ltr ML17312A6861996-04-0606 April 1996 LER 95-007-01:on 950512,determined That Bench Settings of air-operated Letdown & Containment Isolation Valves Adversely Affected Ability of Valves to Perform 10CFR50 App R Safety Function.Affected Valves Modified ML17312A5631996-02-22022 February 1996 LER 95-016-00:on 951212,containment Spray TS Violation Occurred Due to Unrecognized Valve Failure.Shim/Band Was Placed Around Stator of 1JSIBUV665 Motor Operator to Maintain Stator in Correct position.W/960222 Ltr ML17311B3381996-01-0909 January 1996 LER 95-014-00:on 951209,reactor Tripped Following Degradation of Main FW Flow.Caused by Malfunction of Fwcs Power supply,NNN-D11,transfer switch.NNN-D11 Aligned to Normal Power supply.W/960109 Ltr ML17311B3331995-12-31031 December 1995 LER 95-013-00:on 951201,AFW Sys Was Outside Design Basis of Plant.Caused by Design Error.Performed Assessment to Demonstrate That Existing Condition Does Not Pose Addl Safety concerns.W/951231 Ltr ML17311B2801995-11-23023 November 1995 LER 95-011-00:on 951018,identified Procedural Deficiency W/Msiv & FWIV ISTs Due to Personnel Error.Verified Operability of MSIVs & FWIVs.W/951123 Ltr ML17311B2531995-10-20020 October 1995 LER 95-002-00:on 950924,identified That Abnormal Blowdown Valves to Blowdown Flash Tank (Bft) Isolated,Resulting in Reactor Core Power Exceeding 3,800 Mwt Due to Personnel Error.Procedure for Aligning Blowdown to Bft Revised ML17311B1991995-09-21021 September 1995 LER 95-010-00:on 950727,equipment Qualification of Air Handling Unit Caused Essential Cw Pump to Be Inoperable. Used Work Orders to Drill Weep Holes in Motor Lead Connection boxes.W/950921 Ltr ML17311B1741995-09-0404 September 1995 LER 95-004-01:on 950329,containment Electrical Penetration Overcurrent Protective Devices Found Outside Design Basis. Caused by Error on Part of Original Architect Engineer. Modified Affected Circuits Critical to Normal Operational ML17311B1561995-08-27027 August 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950729,switchyard Voltage Dropped Below Administratively Imposed Limit of 524 Kv for Approx 10 Seconds Due to Transient Grid Voltage.No C/A Taken Since Transmission Sys Transient Short duration.W/950827 Ltr ML17311B1551995-08-25025 August 1995 LER 95-002-01:on 950303,identified That Slb Analyses Failed to Consider as Initial Condition One Percent SDM for All Rods in (ARI) Due to Lack of Coordination & Unclear Div of Responsibilities.Ari Core Data Book SDM Curves Modified ML17311B1211995-08-16016 August 1995 LER 95-005-00:on 950717,RT on Low SG Water Level Was Result Following Degradation of MFW Flow.Completed Evaluation of Event ML17311B0841995-07-28028 July 1995 LER 94-005-01:on 941019,completed TS Required Shutdown Due to Expiration of LCO Time Limit.Design Change Options Identified & Will Be Reviewed to Determine If Valve &/Or Motor Operator Replacement or Mod Necessary ML17311B0721995-07-20020 July 1995 LER 95-004-00:on 950706,identified Four Occassions Between 950407 & 0630 When Conditional Surveillance in TS LCO 3.8.4.1 Action a Not Performed Due to Inattention to Detail. CR Copy of Temporary Procedure 40TP-9ZZ04 Corrected ML17311B0081995-07-0606 July 1995 LER 95-003-00:on 950613,TS LCO 3.0.3 Entered Following Loss of Both Trains of Essential Cw Sys & Both Hydrogen Recombiners.Caused by Spurious Actuations Due to Broken EDG Speed Probe Connector.Connector replaced.W/950706 Ltr 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
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ACCELERATED D'RIBUTION DEMONSTTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 9007240200 DOC.DATE: 90/07/20 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi, 05000528 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BRADISH,T.R.
Arizona Public Service Co.(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power LEVINE,J.M.
Arizona Public Service Co.(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 90-009-00:on 900620,failure to satisfy medical requirement for operator license.'/9 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES'/05000528 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA PETERSON,S.
INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DS P NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE i J~H LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT NOTES: COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD CHAN,T ACRS AEOD/DS P/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NRR/DST/SELB 8D RR PLB8D1 REG FILE 02 I LE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROiv1 DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 36 ENCL 36 t4 JAMES I/I.LEVINE'ICE PRESIDENT IIUCI.E4R PRODUCTION'rizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P OBOX 52034~PHOENIX, ARLZONA 85072-2034 192-00680-JML/TRB/KR July 19, 1990 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sirs:
Subj ect: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 1 Docket No.STN 50-528 (License No.NPF-41)Licensee Event Report 90-009-00 File'0-020-404 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER)No.90-009-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.
In accordance with 10CFR50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER t'o the Regional Administrator of the Region V office.If you have any questions, please contact T.R.Bradish, Compliance Manager at (602)393-2521.Very truly yours, JML/TRB/KR/dmn Attachment CC: W.F.Conway J.B.Martin D.H.Coe T.L.Chan A.C.Gehr A.H.Gutterman INPO Records Center'all with attachment)
+O(I/gl(h I~OO POO/QO PDR ADOL r~O5OOO,".h2'"'Pt:Ir'.
'
l NRC FORM 38sl (64)9)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)APPROVED OMB NO, 31500104 EXPIRES: 4l30i92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS AEGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F630), U.S.NUCLEAR REGVLATORY COMMISSION.
WASHINGTON.
DC 20555.'AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (II DOCKET NUMBER 12)PA E 3 Palo Verde Unit l TITLE I4)Failure to Satisf Medical Re uirement For 0 eratorts License 0 5 0 0 0 5 2 1 OF 06 EVENT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)REPOAT DATE (7)O'THER FACILITIES INVOLVED (SI MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR mvOL SEQVENTSAL
'(~.i N UM 8 8 A".Fvrh<rSUMBEle MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES Palo Verde Unit 2 DOCKFT NUMBER(5)0 5 0 0 0 5 2 9 06 20 9 0 9 0 0 0 9 000 7 0 p Palo Verde Unit 3 o so o o530 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL p p 20.402(o)20.405 (e I (1((il 20.405 (e)(1)(ill 20.405(~)(1)(i(I)20A05 (e)(I I(iv)20.405(~l(1)(v)20.405(cl 50.38(c)III 50.38(c)(2)50.73(~I (2)li)50.73(~)(2)(El 60.73(~l(2)(ii)l LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(~)(2)(iv)60.73(~I I 2)(v)50.73(~)(2)(v)I)60.73(e)(2)(xiii)(AI 50,73(e)(2)(xiii)
IS)50.73(~)(2)lx)THIS REPORT Is SUBMITTED PUASUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 cFR (): JChech one or more ol rhe lollow'npl (11)73.71(h)73.71(cl OTHER (SpecRy In Aostrect Oelow end in Text.iYRC Form 368A)NAME T.R.Bradish, Compliance Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 60 23 93-2 52 l COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS JIEPORT (13)CAUSE SYST EM COIISPONENT MANUFAC.TVREA EPORTABLE TO NPRDS Q%%g',.Nih)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANVFAC.TURER EPORTABI.E TO NPRDS.M@M'UPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114)YEs ill yn, compine ExpEcTED$UBhrlsslDIY DATE)X NO ABSTRACT (Limit to lc00 sprees, le., epproximeteiy lilteen sinpre spore rypewrirren linn/(181 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR On June 20, 1990, at approximately 1530 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY), Palo Verde Unie 2 was in Mode 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN), and Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) when review of the reactor operator license holders'iennial medical examination documentation identified that several license holders had not received biennial medical reexaminations in accordance with 10CFR55.21 and some medical examinations did not exactly follow the guidance contained in ANSI/ANS-3
'-1983,"Medical Cereification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants." The root cause of the event is that an adequate tracking system for reactor operator biennial medical reexaminaeion did not exise.In addition, Medical Department personnel performing medical examinations did noe exactly follow ehe guidance of ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983.
As corrective action, the affeceed reactor operators were removed from licensed activities and received medical reexaminations prior to resuming licensed activities.
Also, administrative procedures are being developed eo delineate the requirements necessary in order eo fully comply with 10CFR55.21 and 55.25.There have been no previous similar events reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73.
NRC Form 388 (84)91
NRC FORM 366A (669)US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO 0MB NO.31500104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 500 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530>, U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
WASHINGTON.
DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500(04), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON.
DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (II DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)yEAR Sg+$SCOVENTIAL NVMOS4 46VISIQN NVMOO4 PAGE (3)Palo Verde Unit 1 TEXT/I!more space is rotor/tr/ost addrr'one//VRC Form 366A's/(ll)o s o o o 5 2 8 9 0-0 0 9 0 0 0 2oFO 6 I.DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED: Inieial Conditions:
On June 20, 1990, at approximately 1530 MST, Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY)at normal operating temperature and pressure;Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN)with Reactor Coolant Systein (RCS)(AB)at approximately 145 degrees.Fahrenheit and approximately 95 pounds per square inch-absolute, and Palo Verde Unie 3 was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at approximately 100 percent power.Reporeable Evene Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):
Event Classification:
Condieion prohibited by the PVNGS Technical Specificaeion Section 6.0,"Administraeive Controls." On June 20, 1990, a review of the reactor operator license holders'iennial medical examination documentation identified thae several license holders (ueility, licensed)had not received biennial medical reexaminations in accordance with 10CFR55.21 and some medical examinations did noe exactly follow the guidance contained in ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983,"Medical Certification and Monitoring of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants." Subsequently, an independent investigation of this event was conduceed in accordance with the PVNGS Incident Inveseigation Program.As part of the investigation, the Medical Department personnel (utility, non-licensed) reviewed each current license holder's medical file back to 1987 to ensure that'each license holder had received a medical examination conforming to the regulations in 10 CFR55.21, 55.23, and 55.27: The results of the investigation were as follows: Thirty-nine (39)license holders, who were determined to have current medical examinations, were found eo have not been in conformance with 10CFR55.21
[i.e, the interval'etween previous medical examinations exceeded the two year (biennial) requirement) ae some time since 1987.Nine (9)license holders'ere found not to be in-conformance with 10CFR55.21 as they had exceeded the two year.(biennial) medical examination requirement.
Six'6)Iiconse holders, who were determined to have current medical examinations, were found to have not been in NRC Form 366A (669(
k (1 NRC FORM 356A (669)VS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO.31504)104 E XP I R E S'/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PJ)30).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500104).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)YEAR gP SEQUENTIAL N U rso E R PrS.REVISION~~NUUSER PAGE (3)Palo Verde Unit 1 o s o o o 5 2 8 9 0-0 0 9 0 0 0 30FO 6 TEXT/I/mort spsst/s rsOIr/rtd.
oss sddr)/orrs/
AIRC Form 35r/A'4/((7)4 conformance with 10CFR55.33 upon initial license issuance.The medical examinations conducted as part of their initial application were found to be incomplete as they did not include all requirements of ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983.
Two (2)licensed holders were found not to be in conformance with 10CFR55.33 as they did not have a currently valid medical examination and were not yet due to receive their...first biennial medical examination following license issuance.The medical examinations conducted as part of their initial application were found to be incomplete as they did not include all requirements of ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983.
One (1)license holder did not meet the requirements of 10CFR55.33(a)(1).
Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event: Not applicable
-no structures, systems, or components were inoperable at the start of the event which contributed to this event.D.Cause of each component or system failure, if known: Not applicable
-no component or system failures were involved.Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known: Not applicable
-no component failures'were involved.For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected: Not applicable
-no component failures were involved.For a failure that rendered a train of a safety system inopeiable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service: Not applicable
-no failures were involved which rendered a train of a safety system inoperable.
NRC Form 366A (64)9)
I I NRC FORM 365A (6J)9)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROV EO OMB NO, 31500(ot EXPIRES: 4130(92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: SOD HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IPJ(30).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)50010(>.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER (2)I.ER NUMBER (6)YEAR ss2rs scovsNTIAL lSPP A(vl5lorr NVMSSA AX NUMttt PAGE (3)Palo Verde Unit 1 TEXT lll mort sptst ls rtrrrdrtd, tst tddisitttl A'RC Form AM'sl (17)o 6 o o o 5 2 8 90-009-00 0 4DF 0 6 H.Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error: Not applicable
-there have been no component or system failures or procedural errors identified'.
Cause of event An independent investigation of this event has been conducted in accordance with the PVNGS Incident Investigation Program'.As part of the investigation, a determination of the cause of the event was performed.
The investigation determined that the root causes are as follows: No integrated program existed that assigned the responsibility or accountability (to a single person or group)to maintain license holders'edical requirements current.In addition, an adequate system did not exist to track the status of the license holders'iennial medical reexaminations.
Therefore, forty-eight (48)license holders exceeded the two year medical examination requirement specified in 10CFR55.21 (SALP Cause Code D: Defective Procedures).
The Medical Department personnel performing the medical examinations did not exactly follow the guidance contained in ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983.
The nurse (utility, non-licensed) believed that the APS physician (contractor, non-licensed) was able to waive certain portions of the medical examination.
The physician was not familiar with the guidance provided in ANSI/ANS-3.4-1983 (SALP Cause Code A: Personnel Error).Therefore, eight (8)license holders received incomplete initial medical examinations.
The APS physician was not familiar with the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR55.25 when the reactor operator notified the physician of a medical condition that may have caused the reactor operator to not meet the requirements of 10CFR55.21 (SALP Cause Code A).No unusual characteristics of the work location (e.g., noise, heat, poor lighting)directly contributed to this event.Safety System Response: Not applicable
-there were no safety system responses and none were necessary.
NRC Form 366A (669) v Jl NRC FORM 366A (649)US.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION 0 APPROVED OMB NO.31500108 EXPIRES: O/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50A)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F430), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHING'TON OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31500)04).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503, I FACILITY NAME.11)DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)YEAR NM SeOVSNTIAL
~o Nits NVIaotN iN>II 1 V IS IO N NVMStrr PAGE (31 Palo Verde Unit 1 TEXT/I/more spare/s reoor/ed, use addi(iona/HRC Form 366A's/(12)p 5 p p p 5 2 8 9 0 0 0 9 0 0 05oFO 6 K.Failed Component Information Not applicable
-no component failures were involved.II.ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT No adverse safety consequences or implications resulted from this event.lOCFR55.33(a)(l) states that the Commission will approve an initial application for a license, if it finds that the applicants"medical conditions and general health will not adversely affect the performance of assigned operator job duties or cause operational errors endangering public health and safety." PVNGS does not rely solely on the biennial medical examination to ensure that a license holder meets the r'equirements of 10CFR55.21.
In accordance with the continual behavior observation program, the supervisor is responsible for monitoring the individuals who he or she supervise and for reporting to the Fitness for Duty Administrator any observations of behavior which indicates that a person may not be fit for duty for any reason (e.g., stress, fatigue, injury or illness).In addition, each employee at APS shall report to his or her immediate supervisor any instance of actual or suspected behavior which may indicate that a person is not fit for duty.As, required by the fitness for duty program, the one reactor operator undergoing treatment with a substance prescribed by a licensed physician reported this to his supervisor.
The supervisor notified the Medical Department.
At the time of notification, the APS physician did not believe that the reported condition would result in operator incapacitation.
However, some restrictions (e.g., no stair climbing, no operation of power tools, no driving on site, and no working alone in the control room)were to be in effect for the duration of the medication.
No unusual behavior has been reported in this time frame related to the license holders described in Section I.B.Thus, this event represents no impact to the health and safety of the public.III.CORRECTIVE ACTION: Immediate:
After identifying the license holders who were not administratively qualified, the Medical Department personnel immediately contacted the appropriate supervisors.
Each of the affected license holders was restricted from performing licensed activities until the appropriate medical examination could be administered.
The Medical Department notified the Licensing Department of the reactor operator who did not meet the requirements of 10CFR55.21.
APS is preparing a report in accordance with 10CFR55.25 to notify NRC Form 366A (6J)9)
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