Information Notice 1993-72, Observations from Recent Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Pilot Team Inspections

Observations from Recent Shutdown Risk and Outage Management Pilot Team Inspections

ML031070092
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	09/14/1993
From:	Grimes B K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-93-072, NUDOCS 9309090243
Download: ML031070092 (8)

Ku UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September

14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 93-72: OBSERVATIONS

FROM RECENT SHUTDOWN RISK AND OUTAGE MANAGEMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to inform addressees

of observations

from recent shutdown risk and outage management

pilot team inspections.

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background

Events that occurred during the past several years have caused the NRC staff to be increasingly

concerned

about plant safety during shutdown operations.

The Diablo Canyon event of April 10, 1987, in which boiling of the reactor coolant resulted from a loss of decay heat removal, highlighted

the fact that operation

of a pressurized-water

reactor with a reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory

is a particularly

sensitive

condition.

Based on its review of that event, the staff issued Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal," October 17, 1988, which requested

that licensees

address certain generic deficiencies

to improve safety during operations

with a reduced RCS inventory.

More recently, Incident Investigation

Team report, NUREG-1410,"Loss of Vital ac Power and the Residual Heat Removal System During Mid-Loop Operations

at Plant Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990," emphasized

the need for risk management

of shutdown operations.

Discussions

with foreign regulatory

organizations

support NRC staff findings that the core-damage-frequency

for shutdown operations

may be a substantial

fraction of the total core-damage

frequency.

Description

of Circumstances

Between December 1991 and April 1993, the NRC staff conducted

five pilot team inspections

to assess the effectiveness

of industry initiatives

for improving shutdown safety. The inspections

were performed

at Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 2 [NRC Inspection

Report (IR) 50-270/91-202], Indian Point Nuclear 9309090243

-U 1?-.crn-9

.3 IN 93-72 September

14, 1993 Generating

Station, Unit 3 (IR 50-286/92-901), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (IR 50-275/92-201), Prairie Island Nuclear Generating

Plant, Units 1 and 2 (IR 50-282/92-201;

50-306/92-201), and Cooper Nuclear Station (IR 50-298/93-201).

Approximately

one week of each inspection

focused on licensee pre-outage

planning and control processes

and 8 to 10 days focused on licensee implementation

of the outage.In the pre-outage

portion of the inspection, the inspectors

evaluated

the following:

(1) management

involvement

in and oversight

of the outage planning process, (2) planning and scheduling

of outage activities, especially

the relationships

between significant

work activities

and the availability

of electrical

power supplies, decay heat removal systems, reactor coolant system RCS inventory

and containment

integrity, (3) the process for developing

individual

work packages to ensure coordination

with other activities, and (4)operator response procedures, contingency

plans and training for mitigation

of loss of decay heat removal capability, loss of RCS inventory

and loss of electrical

power sources during shutdown conditions.

The inspectors

walked through procedures

related to shutdown safety to determine

if the specified

activities

could be accomplished

in the allotted time frames and to verify that the procedures

could be implemented

considering

probable equipment

availability.

The inspectors

reviewed training records on outage procedures

to determine

if the training was adequate and that, when appropriate, additional

training was provided as the procedures

were revised.The inspectors

also evaluated

the probable effects of environmental

conditions

such as temperature, steam and flooding on the performance

of activities

that would be required to mitigate adverse shutdown events.In the implementation

portion of the inspection, the inspectors

evaluated:

(1) the control of changes to the outage schedule, control of work activities, and control of system alignments, (2) the working relationships

and communication

channels between operations, maintenance

and other plant support personnel, (3) the conduct of operations

personnel

both inside and outside of the control room regarding

awareness

of plant status, control of plant evolutions, response to alarms and other abnormal indications, (4) the completeness

and effectiveness

of shift turnovers, (5) whether maintenance

and modification

work was performed

in accordance

with current written and approved procedures

and appropriate

post-maintenance

testing was required and performed, and (6) the adequacy of management

involvement

and oversight

of the conduct of the outage as it progressed.

Other areas observed were, plant housekeeping, normal and emergency

plant lighting, configuration

control, radiological

controls, equipment

labeling and status tagging, vital area access control, use of overtime and licensee control of contractor

work including

contractor

training and qualifications.

Discussion

In general, the inspectors

found that licensees

had instituted

programmatic

changes developed

from guidance contained

in a Nuclear Management

and Resources

Council document, NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines

for Industry Actions to

TV IN 93-72 September

14, 1993 Assess Shutdown Management." The team inspectors

found individual

examples of licensee failure to follow procedures

but more importantly

the inspectors

identified

two areas of more general concern: (1) risk assessment

for pre-outage

planning, emergent work and schedule changes, and (2)implementation

of defense-in-depth

methodologies

for equipment

availability.

A general discussion

of these areas is provided below. Specific details of the findings are contained

in the inspection

reports referenced

above.Risk Assessment

for Pre-Outage

Planning, Emergent Work and Schedule Changes The inspectors

found that licensees

used various programmatic

controls to assess shutdown risk factors during initial outage planning, emergent work and schedule changes. Assessment

methodologies

used for initial outage planning ranged from following

minimum guidelines

for equipment

availability

to performing

a probabilistic

risk assessment

of scheduled

outage activities.

The inspection

team found that the risk assessment

aided the licensee in identifying

activities

that would be subject to high risk during the sched led outage. However, as the outage progressed, the risk assessment

became less valid because it was not updated as changes to the outage schedule occurreda In the areas of emergent work and schedule changes, the inspectors

found that three of the plants had a proceduralized

process to assess the effect of \emergent work or schedule changes on plant risk. The other two plants relied on a functional

review by planners, schedulers, and operators

to adjust the schedule appropriately

to reduce risk.The inspectors

found that all of the plants maintained

status boards or checklists

in the control room to assist the operators

in tracking the configuration

status of plant systems and to help identify potential risk-significant

activities.

Implementation

of Defense-in-Depth

for Equipment

Availability

The inspection

teams found that licensee implementation

of defense-in-depth

for equipment

availability

was inconsistent.

Although industry guidelines

for declaring

equipment "available" exist, the inspectors

found that the criteria for declaring

equipment

needed to ensure an appropriate

margin of safety"available" varied from licensee to licensee.

For example, declaring

that equipment

was "available" did not always include ensuring that support systems (e.g., cooling water and heating, ventilation

and air conditioning)

were also available.

At times, after maintenance

had been performed, equipment

was listed as "available" without the benefit of a post-maintenance

functional

test. The inspectors

also found that some equipment

was considered

to be"available" even though actions, such as removal of clearances

or realignment

of valves, would be required before the equipment

could perform its function.In addition to the above concerns, at most of the plants the team inspectors

found examples of failures to comply with technical

specification

restrictions

on overtime work in that management

approval to exceed overtime limits was inadequately

documented.

K-, This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices RSIB:DRIL:NRR

JDWilcox 07/02/93 RPB:ADM NBeeson 08/10/93 RSIB:DRIL:NRR

SSanders 07/02/93 OGCB:DORS:NRR

JLBirmingham

08 /1/ 93 J9 AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR

DNorkin 07/02/93 C70MO:DORS:NRR

iGHMarcus PT ;S/Al/93 D/DRIL:NRR

CERossi 07/10/93 D/DORS:NRR

BKGrimes 09/ /93 RSIB:DRIL:NRR

PSKoltay 07/06/93

-IN 93-xx September

xx, 1993 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• RSIB:DRIL:NRR

• RSIB:DRIL:NRR

JDWilcox SSanders 07/02/93 07/02/93*AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR

DNorkin 07/02/93> C/OGCB:DORS:NRR

GHMarcus/Wen

08/27/93*D/DRIL:NRR

CERossi 07/10/93 D/DORS:NRR

BKGrimes 09/ /93*RPB:ADM NBeeson 08/10/93*OGCB:DORS:NRR

JLBirmingham

08/27/93*RSIB:DRIL:NRR

PSKoltay 07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: OUTAGEIN.JLB

'-vJ IN 93-72 September

14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection

teams concluded

that NRC actions and industry initiatives

have increased

licensee awareness

of the risk associated

with shutdown and low power conditions.

The inspection

teams found that licensees

were aware of the necessity

for ensuring that required systems be available

and of the need to maintain the capability

of backup equipment

during an outage. However, the inspection

teams found that licensee interpretations

of industry initiatives

for addressing

shutdown risk varied greatly. This was demonstrated

by the various licensee interpretations

of industry guidelines

for declaring

equipment "available." This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Original signed by Brian K. Grimes Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• RSIB:DRIL:NRR

• RSIB:DRIL:NRR

JDWilcox SSanders 07/02/93 07/02/93*AC/RSIB:DRIL:NRR

DNorkin 07/02/93*C/OGCB:DORS:NRR

GHMarcus/Wen

08/27/93*D/DRIL:NRR

CERossi 07/1 dJ3 (qy*RPB:ADM NBeeson 08/10/93*OGCB:DORS:NRR

JLBirmingham

08/27/93*RSIB:DRIL:NRR

PSKoltay 07/06/93 DOCUMENT NAME: 93-72.IN

IN 93-72 September

14, 1993 Based on the five pilot inspections, the NRC inspection

teams concluded

that NRC actions and industry initiatives

have increased

licensee awareness

of the risk associated

with shutdown and low power conditions.

The inspection

teams found that licensees

were aware of the necessity

for ensuring that required systems be available

and of the need to maintain the capability

of backup equipment

during an outage. However, the inspection

teams found that licensee interpretations

of industry initiatives

for addressing

shutdown risk varied greatly. This was demonstrated

by the various licensee interpretations

of industry guidelines

for declaring

equipment "available." This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.C-Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: J.D. Wilcox, NRR (301) 504-1262 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

KJ Attachment

IN 93-72 September

14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-71 93-70 93-69 93-68 92-16, Supp. 2 93-67 93-66 93-65 Fire at Chernobyl

Unit 2 Degradation

of Boraflex Neutron Absorber Coupons Radiography

Events at Operating

Power Reactors Failure of Pump Shaft Coupling Caused by Temper Embrittlement

during Manufacture

Loss of Flow from the Residual Heat Removal Pump during Refueling Cavity Draindown Bursting of High Pressure Coolant Injection

Steam Line Rupture Discs Injures Plant Personnel Switchover

to Hot-Leg Injection

Following A Loss-of-Coolant

Accident in Pres-surized Water Reactors Reactor Trips Caused by Breaker Testing with Fault Protection

Bypassed 09/13/93 09/10/93 09/02/93 09/01/93 08/23/93 08/16/93 08/16/93 08/13/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and all radiography

licensees.

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized

water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit