ML17334B682
| ML17334B682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1998 |
| From: | FITZPATRICK E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| AEP:NRC:1260G2, NUDOCS 9802120299 | |
| Download: ML17334B682 (28) | |
Text
CATEGORY1REGULAT5INFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIOYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9802120299DOC.DATE:98/01/30NOTARIZED:~NODOCKETFACXL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316.DonaldC.CookNuclear'PowerPlant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFITZPATRICK,E.XndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)
SUBJECT:
RespondstoNRC971126ltrreviolationsnotedininspon970804-0907.Correctiveactions:RWSTleveltapshavebeenmovedfr'omdischargelinetodedicatedinstrumentareathatisnotsubjecttofloweffects.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofViolationResponseNOTES:ERECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD3-3PDCOPIES'ECIPIENTLTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME11HICKMAN,JCOPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL:AEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN3FILE011111111111118FILECENTERCBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS21111111111EXTERNAL:LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDR1111NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXT1111DENOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVED"BYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR17ENCL17 IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleDriveBuchanan,Ml491071395INDIANAMICHIGANPOWERJanuary30,1998AEP:NRC:1260G2DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskMailStop0-Pl-17Washington,D.C.20555-0001Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2INTERIMRESPONSETODESIGNINSPECTIONREPORTFromAugust4,1997,throughSeptember12,1997,theNRCconductedadesigninspectionatCookNuclearPlant.Zntheinspectionreport,datedNovember26,1997,wewererequestedtoprovideaschedulewithinsixtydays,detailingourplanstocompletethecorrectiveactionsfortheopenitemsthatwerelistedinappendixAoftheinspectionreport.Theinspectionreportalsonotedthatwewereexpectedtoevaluatetheapplicabilityoftheresultsandspecificfindingsofthisinspectiontoothersystemsandcomponentsthroughouttheplant.~g)Jt~VTheattachmenttothisletterprovidesaninterimresponsetotheinspectionreport.ItprovidesthestatusofthespecificitemslistedinappendixAofthereport.Specifically,itprovidesalistingoftheopenitems,includingastatementregardingouragreementwiththecharacterizationoftheitem,andascheduleforcompletingremainingworkrelatedtothespecificitem.AsaresultoftheAEdesigninspectionfindings,theNRCissuedaconfirmatoryactionletter(CAL)detailingspecificitemsthatmustberesolvedpriortorestartofourunits.TheCALalsorequiredustoperformashorttermassessmenttodeterminewhetherthetypesofproblemsidentifiedexistinothersafetysystems,andiftheyimpactoperability.TheCALalsonotedthat,inthelongterm,wearetoevaluateourprogramstoensurethesetypesofproblemsdonotrecur.TheresultsofourshorttermprogramwereprovidedtotheNRCinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3,datedDecember2,1997.Subsequently,additionalinformationwasprovidedtotheNRCregardingreviewsofcalculations,theadequacyofour10CFR50.59program,andthedevelopmentofourshorttermassessmentprogram.ThisinformationwasprovidedtotheNRCinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G4,datedDecember24,1997.Znadditiontothereviewsconducted'aspartofourshorttermprogram,weconductedadditionalreviewsof10CFR50'9screeningsandevaluations,anddesignchanges.TheresultsoftheseadditionalreviewswereprovidedtotheNRCinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G5,datedDecember31,1997.ThesereviewswerediscussedwiththeNRCduringameetingonJanuary8,1998,andduringthatmeeting,wealsopresentedadescriptionofourdesignbasesreconstitutionproject.ThisprojectwillintegrateandenhanceseveralexistingprogramssuchastheUFSARrevalidation9802120299980i$0PDRADQCK050003i56PDRlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll.lllllll+~p(
U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2AEP:NRC:1260G2program,thedesignbasesdocumentreconstitutionprogram,andthenormaloperationsprocedureupgradeprogram,andisconsideredtobepartofthelongtermprogramtheNRCdiscussedintheCAL.TheinformationwepresentedattheJanuary8,1998,meetingwasdocketedinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G6,datedJanuary8,1998.ThelettersdescribedhereinareconsideredtobepartofourresponsetotheAEdesigninspectionreport,andareherebyincorporatedbyreference.Wearecurrentlyintheprocessofconductingadditionalreviewsofprevious10CFR50.59screeningsandevaluations,aswellasself-assessmentofprocessesthathadthepotentialtomakechangestotheplantoutsideofour10CFR50.59programs.Wewillsupplementthisletterwithanotherletterprovidingourbasisforconsideringtheunitsreadyforrestart.Underseparatecorrespondence,wewillalsodefineourlongtermprograminaccordancewiththeCAL,andwillprovideanadditionalsubmittalinconnectionwiththeNRC's10CFR50.54(f)letterconcerningtheadequacyandavailabilityofdesignbasesinformation.WetaketheNRC'soverallfindingsandconclusionsfromtheAEdesigninspectionseriously,andareaggressivelypursuingthespecificissuesaswellastheprogrammaticissuesassociatedwiththesefindings.Sincerely,E.E.FitzpatrickVicePresident/vlbAttachmentJ.A.AbramsonA.B.BeachMDEQ-DW&RPDNRCResidentInspectorJ.R.Sampson ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1260G2INTERIMRESPONSETODESIGNINSPECTIONREPORT AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page1ITEMNO.URI-01IssueApparentfailuretorecognizeandevaluateallRWSTlevelmeasurementerrorsanduncertainties.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2A).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Theconditionhasbeencorrected.RWSTleveltapshavebeenmovedfromthedischargelinetoadedicatedinstrumentareathatisnotsubjecttofloweffects.Allothersafetyrelatedlevelloopswerereviewedforpossibleflowinteraction.Threesafetyrelatedsystemswereidentifiedashavinginstallationswherepotentialflowinducederrorsmayexist.Thesesystemswere:condensatestoragetank(CST)levelinstruments,mid-looplevelinstruments,reactorvessellevelindicationsystem(RVLIS).AnalysisoftheCSTindicatedthatasmallflowinducedbiascouldpotentiallyexistfortheCSTinstrumentsatpeakauxiliaryfeedwaterflow.Noadverseimpactsonsystemoperabilitywereidentifiedrelatedtothisinstrumentconfiguration.Theflowinducederrorsforthemid-looplevelinstrumentswerefoundtobenegligible.Allflowinduced'errorsidentifiedintheRVLIShadbeenpreviouslyaccountedforintheoriginaldesign.Instrumentuncertaintycalculationswererevisedtoaddressflow-inducederrorsthatincludepipeentrancelosses,pipepressuredropsandBernoullieffects.Theinstrumentandcontrolsectionengineeringguide(EG-IC-004)hasbeenrevisedtoensuretheproperevaluationoflevelinstrumentloopsinthefuture.Allactionshavebeencompleted.ITEMNO.URI-02IssueIncorrectRWSTlevelacceptancecriterionspecifiedintechnicalspecification(T/S)surveillanceprocedurecouldhaveallowedtheRWST'leveltobelessthantheT/Srequirement.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionZIZ(DesignControl)(El.l.1.2A2).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.TheT/Ssurveillanceprocedure(1/2-OHP4030.STP.030)hasbeenrevisedtoincludethecorrectRWSTlevelacceptancecriterion.Theproceduresforremoving'theresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopfromservice,01-OHP4021.017.003and02-OHP4021.017.003,havealsobeenrevisedtoensurethattheT/Slimitsaremet.TheinstrumentuncertaintyprogramisbeingexpandedasdescribedinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3,datedDecember2,1997,attachment3.Allitemsarecomplete.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page2ITEMNO.URI-03ANDURI-04IssuesApparentfailuretoconsiderpotentialforvortexingandairentrainmentwhenestablishingtheRWSTLow-LowLevelsetpoint10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2A3).Apparentfailuretotakepromptcorrectiveactionafterthe1993SBICIfindingregardingthepotentialforvortexingandairentrainmentintheRWST,andafterdocumentedbythelicenseein1995inCR95-1015.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionXVI(CorrectiveAction)(El.1.1.2A3).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationoftheseissues.CalculationENSM970606JJR,Revision2,establishedvortexlimitsandprovidedinputtoECP1-2-I9-03,Calculation3,whichestablishestheRWSTlow-lowlevelsetpoint.ENSM970606JJR,Revision2,alsodeterminedthatpastoperabilitywasnotcompromised.ECP1-2-I9-03hasbeenrevisedtoincorporatevortexing.Weagreethatourcorrectiveactionsonthismatterwerenottimely.Ourcorrectiveactionsprogramwasre-engineeredinMay1996.Oneoftheissuesthatpromptedtherevisionoftheprogramwasaninconsistencyincompletingcorrectiveactionsforconditionreports,selfassessments,andauditfindingsinatimelymanner.Wecontinuetomonitortheprogressoftheprogramthroughthecorrectiveactionprogramcontinuousimprovementteam(CAPCIT).Allactionsarecomplete.Asapointofinformation,thesitevicepresidentiscurrentlyprovidingmanagementoversightofarootcauseanalysisteamthat.isdeterminingthecauseofcontinuedpoorperformancein'thisareaasdocumentedinCR=97-3360:Inaddition,wewillbepartic'i'patinginanindustryprojectsponsoredbyEPRIplantsupportengineeringsubcommitteetodevelopguidancetooptimizeengineeringactivitiesinsupportofcorrectiveactionprograms.ZTKMNO.URI-05IssueTheuncertaintycalculationsforthecontainmentandcontainmentsumplevelinstrumentationloopsdonotaccountfortheimpactonthepost-accident.containmentwaterlevels(ECPs1-2-N3-01,1-RPC-14,and2-RPC-14),anddonotconsiderthepotentialforvortexing,airentrainment,ornetpositivesuctionheadrequirements.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2B3).
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page3StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.ECP12-00-14hasbeenrevisedtoincludevortexing,airentrainmentandNPSHrequirements.Emergencyoperatingprocedures(EOPs)1/2-OHP4023.ES-1.3havebeenrevisedtoproperlyincorporateconcerns.WestinghousehasperformedanevaluationofthepeakcontainmentpressurebasedonthecurrentrevisionofES-1.3.Westinghouseiscurrentlyverifyinginputstotheevaluationandwillcompleteitsanalysis.Thiswillbecompletedpriortorestart.ITEMNO.URZ-06IssueApparentfailuretodemonstrate,usingdesignbasesdocumentation,thattherewasadequatecontainmentrecirculationsumpwatervolumefollowingaloss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA).10CFRPart50.46(emergencycorecoolingsystem[ECCS]performancecriteria)(E1.1.1.2C).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Newanalysesforcurrentoperationshavebeencompleted.Ithasbeenconfirmedthat,forbothpostulatedlargeandsmallbreakLOCAsanadequatevolumeofwaterwouldberesidentinthecontainmentstructure,andthatadequatecommunicationexistsinthecontainmentsubcompartmentboundariestoensuresufficientdrainagetothecontainmentrecirculationsump.Additionally,ithasbeenconfirmedthat,forcurrentoperation,forpostulatedLOCAstherewouldbenoimpactonthecontainmentintegrityanalysisandsufficientwaterexiststomaintainthecoresubcritical.Theseanalysesincludedextensivereviewsoflossofinventorytovariouscontainmentvolumesandconcludedtheselossescouldbetolerated.\InourletterAEP:NRC".0900K,datedOctober8,1997,aT/SchangewassubmittedthatincreasedminimumicecondensericeweightsandallowedconsiderationofwaterfromicemeltinconjunctionwithwaterfromtheRWST,whichincreasessumpwatervolumefollowingaLOCA.T/Samendments220forunit1,and204forunit2,wereapprovedbytheNRConJanuary2,1998.Allactionshavebeencompleted.ITEMNO.URZ-07IssueApparentfailuretoprecludeasingleactivefailurewhenperformingchangestotheplant,whichiscontrarytotheassumptionsintheupdatedfinalsafetyanalysisreport(UFSAR)andthedesignbases.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIZI(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2D).
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page4StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.1/2-OHP4023.ES-1.3wererevisedtotransferboththeeastandwestRHRpumpsfromtheRWSTtotherecirculationsump.SubsequenttothetransferoftheRHRpumpstotherecirculationsump,RHRsupplywillbeestablishedtothesafetyinjection(SI)pumpsandthecentrifugalchargingpumps(CCPs).AftertheRHRsupplyisestablishedtotheSIpumpsandCCPs,theirRWSTsuctionvalveswillbeclosed.Thenewswitchoversequencewillprecludethesituationwhereasingleactivefailurewouldcausearedundanttrainfrombeingimpacted.ThisrevisionwasimplementedonJanuary2,1998.Theprocedure,revision2,whichcreatedthesinglefailurevulnerability,occurredin1992.Sincethattime,thereviewprocessforEOPshasbeenimproved.Currently,therearemulti-disciplinereviewsfromtechnicallyqualifiedpersonnel.Thisprocesshasbeeneffectiveinidentifyingandcorrectingproceduralproblems.ThenatureoftheincorporationoftheunacceptableECCSlineupinRevision2ofOHP4023.ES-1.3,"ATransfertoColdLegRecirculation",wouldsuggestthatthiswasanisolatedcase.Policy800000-POL-2300-04,"DefinitionandUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Attachment3ofthispolicyprovidesspecificdirectiononthedefinitionanduseofthe"singlefailurecriteria".Withinthetextofattachment3,aspecificexampleofan"activefailure"iscitedas"thefailuretocontinuetorun".TrainingforpersonnelimpactedbytheissuanceofthispolicywascompletedinNovember1997.Asdescribedinattachment4toourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3,acontributingfactortotheECCSswitchoverprocedureissuewastheaspectofthedesignthatcrosstiestheECCSsystemtrainsthroughacommonrecirculationsuctionsourcefortheintermediateandhighheadinjectionpumps.Weperformedareviewofothersafetysystemswithcrosstiecapabilities,eitherbetweentrainsorbetweenunits,toprovidereasonableassurancethatsinglefailurecriteriahavebeenappropriatelyconsideredandthatproceduresallowingtheuseofthecrosstieshavebeenproperlyevaluated.Systemsreviewedwereauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW),essentialservicewater(ESW),chemicalandvolumecontrol(CVCS),componentcoolingwater(CCW),andelectricaldistribution.Nooperabilityconcernswereidentifiedwiththeuseofsafetysystemcrossties.Allactionsare'complete.ITEMNO.URI-08IssueApparentfailuretomaintainthe1/4"containmentreci'rculationsumpparticulateretentionrequirement,whichcouldallowtheECCSthrottlevalvesandcontainmentspraynozzlestobecomeinoperable.10CFRPart50.46(ECCSperformancecriteria)(E1.1.1.2E2).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page5Inlate1996(unit2)andearly1997(unit1)ventsinthesumptopcover,whichwerenotpreviouslyprovidedwithparticleretentionscreens,wereincorrectlypluggedtoaddressthethreatofforeignmaterial.Theseventshavebeenreinstalledwithappropriateparticleretentionscreens.Allactionshavebeencompleted.ITEMNO.URI-09ECCSpumpsuctionvalvesnotleak-ratetestedtoconfirmaccidentanalysisassumption.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionXI,(TestControl)(E1.1.1.2G4).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.TestingwasperformedonthevalvesthatwerenotpreviouslytestedforpotentialleakagebacktotheRWST.ThetestresultsshowedthatthetotalleakageforthesepathsbacktotheRWSTwaswellbelowthe10gpmvalueintheUFSAR.Theleakagesforeachofthevalvestestedisasfollows:Unit1andUnit2Unit1andUnit2Unit1andUnit2Unit1Unit2IMO-910IMO-911IMO-261RH"130RH-1300gpm0gpm0gpm0gpm0.48gpm.Allcorrectiveactionsarecompleted.Thesevalveswillbeincludedinthein-servicetestingprogramproceduresbyJune1,1998.ITEMNO.URI-010IssueApparentfailuretodemonstrate,usingdesignbasesdocumentation,thattheplantcouldperformaT/S3.0.3.shutdownin36hoursto2004F,usingoneCCWtrainanddesign-basesassumptions.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionZII(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2B).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Theoriginalsingletrain36hourcooldownanalysisallowedthecomponentcoolingwatersupplytemperaturetoreach1204F.OperatingproceduresacknowledgethatCCWsupplytemperaturecouldelevateto1204Fduringsomecooldownevolutions.Contrarytothis,thedesignbasesCCWsupplytemperatureasdetailedintheUFSARwas954F.Acooldownanalysishadnotbeencompletedtoshowthata36hoursingletraincooldowncouldbeachievedwiththeCCWsupplytemperaturelimitedto95F.Inaddition,theanalysisofrecordhadincorrectlymodeledtheCCWheatexchangerascounterflowinsteadofTEMAtypeE.Duetotheseerrors,wecouldnotdemonstratetheplantcouldperforma36hourshutdownusingdesignbasesassumptions.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2~Page6EvaluationandanalysiswerecompletedtoallowoperationoftheCCWsystemwithamaximumsupplytemperatureof120~F.Thisreviewwascompletedunderdesignchangepackage(DCP)12-DCP-855.Subsequenttothereview,achangetotheUFSARwasinitiatedtoallowtheCCWsupplytemperaturetoreach120'duringemergencycooldownandpost-accidentconditions.Theheatexchangermodelwascorrected.Anewcooldownanalysishasbeencompletedthatdemonstratesthecapabilitytoperforma36hourcooldownusingoneCCWtrainanddesignbasesassumptions.Allactionsarecomplete.ITEMNO.URI-011IssueApparentfailuretocorrectlytranslatetheas-builtdesignoftheCCWheatexchangerintosafetyrelatedcalculationsandanalyses.10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionIII(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2E2).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Priortothedesigninspection,theCCWheatexchangerwasincorrectlymodeledbybothusandWestinghouseasacounterflowheatexchanger.Contrarytothis,theCCWheatexchangerisaTEMAtypeEheatexchanger.Thisconditionresultedfromanerrorinthemodelingoftheheatexchangerduringoriginalplantdesign,whichwascarriedthroughtomorerecentcalculations.Theunit130%steamgeneratortubeplugginganalysishasbeencorrected.InourletterAEP:NRC:1223M,datedSeptember10,1997,werequestedthattheNRCsuspendreviewoftheunit2uprate.WesentateamtotheWestinghouseofficestoreviewtheanalysesofrecordforbothunits.TheteamdeterminedthatWestinghousehadmodeledothersafetyrelatedheat'exchangersproperly.It'asalsoconfirme'dthatHoltecInternational','hoperformedtheanalysisofrecordforthespentfuelpool(SFP)system,correctlymodeledtheSFPheatexchanger.Wethenreviewedintexnalcalculationstodetermineifsafetyrelatedheatexchangershadbeenmodeledproperly.Thisreviewconcludedthatthreeheatexchangerswereincorrectlymodeledinouranalyses.Specifically,theCCWheatexchanger,thedieselgeneratorjacketwatercooler,anddieselgeneratorlubeoilcoolerwerealsomodeledascounterflowheatexchangers,wheninrealitytheyareTEMA-Edesign.Reviewswereperformedtoensurethattheseheatexchangermodelingerrorsdidnotchangetheconclusionsofthesecalculations.TheseinternalcalculationswillberevisedtoensurethattheheatexchangersaremodeledproperlybyMarch31,1998.ITEMNO.URI-012IssueApparentlackofdocumentationtodemonstratethatthecontrolroomequipmentwasqualifiedatworstcaseoperatingtemperaturesinthe
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page7controlroom.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionZII(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2E2).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Thisissueaddressestheoperationoftheplantwithlakewatertemperaturesabove764F.Restrictionshavebeenplacedonplantoperationsuchthattheplantwillnotbeoperatedwithlaketemperaturesabove76'.Theserestrictionswillremaininplaceuntilallanalyses,10CFR50.59safetyevaluations,andthenecessaryapprovalsarecompletetochangethetemperature.ProcedureOHI-4013hasbeenrevisedtodirecttheuseofprocedure12-OHP4021.019.001ifthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureapproaches74.5'.Procedure12-0HP-4021.019.001hasbeenrevisedtorequirethatifthefloatingonehouraveragecirculatingwatertemperatureisgreaterthan75',unitshutdownshallbeinitiatedinbothunits.Thisprocedureacquiresthatifthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureisgreaterthan75.5',asindicatedbyinstrumentation,theESWsystemistobeconsideredinoperable.Allactionsarecomplete.ITEMNO.URX-013IssueApparentfailuretoanalyzeallpotentialfailuremodesofthe.instrumentairsystemthatcouldrenderredundanttrainsofsafetyrelatedequipmentinoperable.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIZI(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2F).,StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.DCP854addedsafetyvalvestoprovideoverpressureprotectionforthecontrolairheadersintheturbinebuilding,auxiliarybuilding,andcontainment.Althoughthismodificationwascompleted,webecameconcernedthatpressureaccumulationinthepipingtothecontainmentairheadersafetyvalvescouldbeexcessiveandwouldnotensurethatallcomponentsservedbytheheaderwouldbeadequatelyprotectedfromoverpressure.Anadditionalmodificationtocorrectthisconcernisinprogressandwillbecompletedpriortoenteringmode4.ITEMNO.URI-014IssueOperationoftheplantwithCCW-suppliedflowstosafetyrelatedandimportanttosafetycomponentscontrarytothevaluesstatedintheUFSAR.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionZIZ,(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2G).
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page8StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.AflowrangewasestablishedforeachcomponentcooledbytheCCWsystem.Specifically,aminimumflowratewasestablished(orverifiedtobecorrect)toensurethateachcomponentreceivedsufficientcoolingandamaximumflowratewasestablishedtoprotecteachcomponentfromdamagingflowrates.Currentflowrateshavebeenconfirmedwithinthenewlimitsandtheselimitswillbeincorporatedintotheflowbalanceprocedurepriortoitsnextuse.WithrespecttothespecificissueoftheCCWflowtotheRCPthermalbarrierheatexchanger,theminimumflowrequirementwasdecreasedfrom35gpmto24gpm.A10CFR50.59evaluationhasbeencompletedandthenewflowrateswillbeincludedinthenextUFSARupdate.ITEMNO.URI-015IssueApparentfailuretoestablishcontrolstopreventpotentialoperationoftheCCWsystemwiththeCCWheatexchangersabovethemaximumfoulingfactorvalueestablishedbytheGL89-13testingprogram.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII,(DesignControl)(El.2.1.2H).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.MaximumallowableCCWheatexchangerfoulingwithinthegenericletter(GL)89-13servicewaterprogramhasbeensetatthedesignmaximumfoulingvalue.Thisacceptancelimitdoesnotprovidemargintoensurethatheat.exchangerfoulingstaysbelowthemaximumlimitduringthenextoperatingcycle.Asapointofinformation,sincetheGL89-13programhasbeeninplace,theCCWheat'exchangershavebeenvisuallyinspectedduringallexceptonerefuelingoutage,whereinspectionwasnotnecessaryforoneheatexchangerbasedontestresultsindicatingzerofouling.Whenheatexchangerswereopenedforinspection,theywerecleanedtoensurethey.enteredthesuccessiveoperatingcyclewithminimumfouling.TheprocedureusedtocollectdataandmeasureCCWheatexchangerfoulingfactorwillberevisedpriortoitsnextuse,unit1refuelingoutagein1999,toincludeamarginbetweentheacceptancelimitandthemaximumfoulinglimit.Thisprovidesassurancethatthemaximumfoulingwillnotbeexceededduringthenextoperatingcycle.Instrumentationuncertaintieswillbeconsideredforinclusionindeterminationofthetestacceptancecriteria.ITEMNO.VRZ-016IssuePerformancetestingoftheemergencydieselgenerator(EDG)heatexchangerswasnotabletodetectdegradation,asrequiredbythe AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page9licensee'sGL89-13testingprogram.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionXI,(TestControl)(E1.2.1.2H).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.ThemethodcurrentlyusedtotrendEDGheatexchangerdegradationisineffectivebecauseheatexchangeroutlettemperatureiscontrolledbyautomaticvalvesthatregulatetemperature.Pastinternalinspectionoftheseheatexchangershasdemonstratedthattheseheatexchangersareingoodcondition,andprovidesassuranceofcurrentoperability.Specifically,theEDGaftercoolers,whicharethefirstofthreeEDGheatexchangersarrangedinseries,areinspectedeveryotherrefuelingoutage,andhavebeenobservedtobeclean,withtheexceptionofsomeminorsedimentthatcollectsinthebottomoftheheatexchangerswhenisolated.Inspectionoftheothertwoheatexchangers,thoughnotonapredeterminedperiodicity,hasproducedsimilarresults.ThemethodtotrendEDGheatexchangerdegradationisunderreviewtodetermineifamethodologycanbedevisedthatprovidesmoremeaningfulresults.TheGL89-13programwillberevisedbyJune30,1998,toeitherincorporateamoremeaningfultestmethod,orincludeabetterdefinedscheduleforinspectingtheinternalsoftheseheatexchangers.ITEMNO.URI-017IssueInadequatejustificationtoreturntheunit2250VDCbatterytrainCDtoanoperablestatus(E1.3.1.2).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Thetwoissuesidentifiedwiththisfindingweretheoperabilitydeterminationmadeon,cell34oftheunit2trainCDbattery,andthelengthoftimethecellwasindividuallycharged.TheoperabilitydeterminationwasbasedonT/Ssurveillance4.8.2.3.2.a,whichdoesnotspecificallyrequirethebatterycelltobeonfloatchargewhenreadingthevoltage.The51dayequalizechargeoncell34wasexcessive.TheseissuesarebeingaddressedbyrevisingT/Ssurveillancesforthe250VDCbatterytotheWestinghousestandardT/Ssurveillanceforbatteries.Inconcertwiththisefforttemporaryprocedure12-IHP5021.EMP.009willberevisedtolimittheamountoftimeanindividualcellcanbeonequalizechargewhenmakingoperabilitydecisions,andwhenperformingcorrectivemaintenanceactivities.TheprocedurerevisionwillbecompletebyMarch2,1998.Asapointofclarification,cell34wascarefullyinspectedandnomineralcrystallizationwasidentified.Insupportofourinitialoperabilitydetermination,cell34wasremovedfromserviceandcapacitytested.Theresultsshowedcapacityof116.9%ofratedcapacity.Thistestwasperformed AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page10severalmonthsafterthecellwasremovedfromserviceandplacedonfloatcharge.ITEMNO.URI-018IssueApparentfailureto'aintainadequatedesignandproceduralcontrolsthatallowedtheplanttooperateinmodes5and6withoutanadequatevolumeofboratedwaterintheotherunit'sRWSTinordertomeetappendixRrequirements.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CritexionIIZ,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2A).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.InstanceswereidentifiedwheretheRWSTlevelfellbelowthe87,000galrequiredforappendixR.TheT/Ssrequirethatafirewatchbepostedinapplicablelocationsiftheminimumwaterlevelisnotrestoredwithin7days.Therewerefiveinstanceswherethe7dayswasexceeded.Ineachofthefiveinstancestherearerecordsthatindicateafirewatchwaspostedintheapplicableplaces.ThefirewatchisallowedasanalternativeforshutdowncapabilityperT/Ss.Therefore,theT/Sswerenotviolated.DuringtheAEinspectiontwocalculationswereidentifiedonthesubjectoftheRWSTminimumrequiredwaterleveltosupportAppendixR(ECP1-2-Z9-03andTH-90-02).AlthoughtheresultsofTH-90-02wereacceptable,subsequenttotheAEinspection,anewcalculationENSM971001CVwasdevelopedthatbetterdocumentsthemethodologyandincorporatesadditionalconservatisms.Thisnewcalculationrequires131,921gallonsintheRWST.CalculationTH90-02hasbeensuperseded.Calculation1-2-Z9-03hasbeenrevisedtoremovethereferencetotheoldcalculationandreferenceENSM971001CV.Thefollowingprocedureshavebeenrevisedtoincorporatethemoreconservativeresults.ofENSM971001CV:\1/2-OHP4030.STP.0301/2-OHP4021.018.0051/2-OHP4021.018.008PMP-4100TheonlyactionsthatremainaretorevisethedescriptionsintheAppendixRdesignbasesdocumentandthefireprotectionprogrammanual.TheserevisionswillbecompletebyFebruary15,1998.ITEMNO.URI-019IssueApparentfailuretoperforminstrumentuncertaintycalculationfortheCCWheatexchangeroutlettemperatureloopuncertainty.10CFRPart50AppendixB,CriterionIZZ,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2BS).
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page-llStatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.InstrumentuncertaintycalculationshavebeencompletedfortheCCWheatexchangeroutlettemperatureanddocumentedinECPs1-WSI-04and2-WSZ-04.OperatingprocedureshavebeenmodifiedtoprovideamargintoCCWsystemtemperaturelimitsbasedonthecalculatedinstrumentuncertainty.Allactionshavebeencompleted.ITEMNO.URZ-020IssueApparentfailuretoperforminstrumentuncertaintycalculationfortheESWintaketemperatureloopuncertainty.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionZZZ,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2B6).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.ECP-12-WO-01wascompleteanddeterminedtheuncertaintyofthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureinstrumentation.Thisanalysisshowedtheuncertaintiesassociatedwiththisinstrumentationcanaffectoperationatelevatedlaketemperatures.Therefore,interimmeasures(EngineeringTechnicalDirectionMemo97-095),havebeenputinplacetobenchmarkdiverseinstalledinstrumentationwhentheindicatedcirculatingwatertemperaturereachestheuncertaintylimit.ThebenchmarkingentailscrosscalibratingtheplantprocesscomputertemperatureindicationwithtraceableM&TE.Thisallowstheuseofthisinstalledinstrumentationwithagreatlyreducederrormarginforthecirculatingwaterinlettemperaturelimit.12-OHP-4021.019.001hasbeenrevisedtoperformthebenchmarkingpriorto724F,andtorequirethatifthh,"floatingonehour~averagecirculating'watertemperatureisgreaterthan754F,unitshutdownshallbeinitiated.Further,at75.5',theESWsystemistobedeclaredinoperable.ADCP174fearincreasingallowablelaketemperaturehasbeeninitiated.Thecalculationsforindicationuncertaintywillbereviewedandnewdirectionprovided,pendingfinalimplementationofthisdesignchange.ITEMNO.VRI-021IssueApparentfailuretoperforminstrumentuncertaintycalculationforthecontrolroomtemperatureloopuncertainty.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2B7).
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page12StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.ECP-1-B1-07andECP-2-Bl-07havebeenrevisedandincorporatedinto1/2-OHP4030.STP.030.AllactionswerecompletedOctober24,1997.ITEMNO.URZ-022IssueApparentprogrammaticdeficiencywiththeSetpointControlProgramconcerningtheabilitytoperformandaccountforinstrumentuncertainties.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.3).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Theresultsofuncertaintycalculationswerenoteffectivelyincorporatedintoprocedures.TheinstrumentuncertaintyprogramisbeingexpandedasdescribedinAEP:NRC:1260G3,attachment3.AllactionsaretobecompletedbytheendofDecember1998.ITEMNO.URZ-023IssuePerformingchangestosafetyrelatedprocedureswithoutapparentproperreviewand/orapproval,contrarytotheprovisionsofT/S6.5.3.1and10CFRPart50.59requirements.(El.5.2A)StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Therewerethreespecificproceduresdiscussed.~01-0HP.4023-ES1.3.AsafetyevaluationdatedOctober29,1997,wasperformedfor01-OHP4023-ES1.3Revision5toaddressthecontainmentwaterlevelpermissiveandoperatorrelianceoncontainmentsumpwaterlevelinstrumentation.Thesafetyscreeningandsafetyevaluationwereperformedpriortoprocedureapproval.~12-OHP.4021.019.001.A10CFR50.59screeningdatedAugust21,1997,wasperformedontheprocedurerevisiontospecifythatthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureof76~Fisthedesignbasestemperaturelimit.Thesafetyevaluationscreeningwascompletedpriortoprocedureapproval.Procedure12-OHP-4021.019.001hasalsobeenrevisedtorequirethatifthefloatingonehouraveragecirculatingwatertemperatureisgreaterthan754Funitshutdownshallbeinitiatedinbothunits.Thisprocedurealsorequiresthatifthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureisgreaterthan75.54F,asindicatedbyinstrumentation,theESWsystemistobeconsideredinoperable.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page13ProcedureOHZ-4013hasbeenrevisedtodirecttheuseofprocedure12-OHP4021.019.001ifthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureapproaches74.5'.~2-OHP.4021.016.003.A10CFR50.59safetyevaluationdatedOctober17,1997,wasperformedtoestablishtheappropriateCCWoperatingtemperaturelimitforrapidRCScooldown.Thissafetyevaluationwascompletedpriortoprocedureapproval.Topreventtemporarynon-intentchangesfrombeingmadetoprocedureswithoutproperreview,PMSO.179hasbeenissuedandPMI-2010hasbeenrevisedtoprohibittherevisionofprocedureswithoutanapproved10CFR50.59screeningbeingcompleted.ITEMNO.URI-024IssueApparentfailuretomaintainproperdesigncontrolregardingindustrystandardsandcodes.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII,(DesignControl)(E1.5.2C).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Therewerefourinstancesdiscussed.~ConflictinpipingspecificationandclassificationofCCWpipinginsidecontainment.PipingspecificationES-PIPE-1013-QCNClassM-12hasbeenrevisedtoreflectthecorrectdesignpressureof2485psiganddesigntemperatureof5504F.Athermalanalysishasbeenperformedforthepipesupportsassociatedwiththesectionsofpipinginquestion.~DeviationfromB31.1coderequirementforoverpressureprotectionintheCCWsystem.FourCCWvalvesineachunitwereidentifiedasinterveningstopvalves.ThesevalveshavebeenlockedopenandarenowincludedinprocedureOHP4030.STP.035,"ControlledValvePositionLogging".This:willensurethatthepositionofthese.va'ivesis'heckedonamonthlybasis.Thesevalvesarenolongerconsideredinterveningstopvalves.~RHRlowpressureinterlockduringmode4.InourletterAEP:NRC:1278,datedSeptember19,1997,aT/Schangetodeletethisinterlockwasrequested.Amendments219forunit1and203forunit2wereapprovedonDecember10,1997.~OverpressureprotectionfortheCCWheatexchangers.Overpressureprotectionisprovidedforthetubeside.Nooverpressureprotectionisprovidedfortheshellside.AnevaluationwasperformedthatconcludedthattherearenoCCWshellsidepressureincreasesresultingfromincreasedCCWandESWtemperaturesorexternalsourcesthatcouldcausetheCCWinternalpressuretoexceedthedesignpressureof150psi.A10CFR50.59evaluationwasperformedforrevisingtheUFSARtoincludeafootnotetoTable9.5-1,clarifying'hattheCCWheatexchangersweremanufacturedtoASMEB&PVCode,SectionVIIZ,1968edition,butinstalledinaccordancewithUSASB31.1,1967edition.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page14ITEMNO.URZ-025IssueApparentfailuretomaintainadequatedesigncontrolandfollowestablishedproceduresforequipmentabandonedinplace.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIII,(DesignControl)(E1.5.2D).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Areviewofeachplantsystemwillbeledbythesystemengineerforthepurposeof'dentifyingequipmentthatisnolongerusedoruseful.Equipmentthatfallsintothiscategoryandhasnotbeenabandonedinplacethroughthedesignchangeprocessshallbeprocessedthroughtheprojectacceptance/designchangeprocess.Thisreviewwillalsoconfirmthatequipmentpreviouslyabandonedinplacehasbeenappropriatelytaggedasabandonedinplace.ThesereviewswillbecompletedbyMay1,1998.ITEMNO.URZ-026IssueApparentfailuretomaintainadequatedrawingcontrolthathasthepotentialtoimpactplantoperatingprocedures,andmaintenanceactivitiesthatusedrawings.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,CriterionIIZ,(DesignControl)(E1.5.2E).'tatus~Item4(a):CCWflowratesareshowninconsistentlyondrawing1OP-1-5135,revision33.Thisdrawingwascorrectedbyremovingflowrateinformationforallitemsotherthanpumps.Thiswasdonebecausetheflowratesaredefinedinotherdocuments.Wedonothavea,requirementtoshowb'ranchlineflowrateson,ourflowdiagrams.,Designguidelineno.0202-1(n),'hasbeenupdatedtoensurethatflowrateswillbeconsistentlyeliminatedfromflowdiagramsassectionsoftheflowdiagramsarerevised.~Item4(b):Ahorizontalperforatedplate(grating)wasshownontwosectionviewsonmasonrydrawing1-2-3178-14.Thegratingwasremovedviathe1979RFCDC-12-2361.Atthattime,theprimarysteeldrawing12-3902,revision4,wasmarkeduptoshowthatthegratingshouldberemovedandtheremovalwasnotedintherevisionbox.Becausemasonrydrawing1-2-3178-14referencedbacktotheprimarysteeldrawing12-3902concerningthisgratingremoval,thegratingwouldnothavebeenreinstalledbasedonthemasonrydrawing.Theprimarysteeldrawing1-2-3178wascorrectedwithinformationprovidedthroughCR97-2344.~Item4(c):AnoteconcerningthetemporarywiringofapressureswitchassociatedwiththespareCCWpumphadsomeincorrectwirenumbers.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page15In1983and1984thesubjectdrawingswereenhancedtoclarifysomeconfusionwithwireidentification.Theenhancementcausedthesubjectnotetobemisleading.Drawings1-93011,1-93048,2-93011and2-93048werecorrectedwithinformationprovidedthroughCR97-2304.Allitemsarecomplete.ITEMNO.URZ-027IssueApparentfailuretoadequatelytranslatedesignbasesassumptionsintoPlantProcedureOHP4021.001.004,PlantCooldownfromHotStandbytoColdShutdown.10CFRPa'rt50,AppendixB,CriterionIII,(DesignControl)(1.5.2F).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.1/2-OHP4021.001.004and1/2-OHP4021.017.002havebeenrevisedtoprovidetheoperatorwiththeguidancenecessaryforsafeoperationoftheCCWsystem.1/2-OHP4021.001.004nowhaveaprecautiontoverifythattheCCWheatexchangerflowisintherangeof8,000-9,000gpm.1/2-OHP4021.017.002nowhaveaprecautiontomaintainCCWflowthroughtheRHRheatexchangerbetween5,000and5,500gpm.Allitemsarecomplete.ITEMNO.URZ-028IssueTheteamdeterminedthatthelicenseehadoperatedtheplantabovethemaximumUHStemperaturelimitwithoutperforminga10CFR50.59evaluation,whichalsopotentiallycreatedaunreviewedsafety'question(USQ)xegardingareductionofsafetymarginasdefinedintheT/S'asesforthe"controlroomemergencyventilationtemperaturelimitof954F(E.1.2.2E[1]).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.ProcedureOHI-4013hasbeenrevisedtodirecttheuseofprocedure12-OHP4021.019.001ifthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureapproaches74.5F.Procedure12-OHP-4021.019.001hasbeenrevisedtorequirethatifthefloatingonehouraveragecirculatingwatertemperatureisgreaterthan754Funitshutdownshallbeinitiatedinbothunits.Thisprocedurerequiresthatifthecirculatingwaterinlettemperatureisgreaterthan75.54F,asindicatedbyinstrumentation,theESWsystemistobeconsideredinoperable.Theserestrictionswillremaininplaceuntilallanalysesand,10CFR50.59safetyevaluationsandnecessaryapprovalsarecompletetochangethetemperature.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page16Allactionsarecomplete.ITEMNO.URZ-029IssueThelicensee's10CFR50.59evaluation,datedMarch11,1996,andMarch20,1996,respectively,thatwasperformedtoevaluatetheconsequencesofthe1996unit2full-coreoffload,failedtorecognizethesignificancethattheCCWheatexchangercouldnotperformitsfunctionunderthedesignbasesassumptionsthatwerestatedintheUFSARandotherlicensingdocumentation.Inaddition,thelicenseealsofailedtoaddressUFSARSection9.4,regardingthecriteriaforspentfuelpool(SFP)coolingtime-to-boileventsandsubsequentlyfailedtoidentifythattheconclusionsreachedintheevaluationwouldhavepotentiallyreducedthetime-to-boilingintheSFP,giventheassumptionsstatedintheSFPloadingcalculationandintheUFSAR.ReductioninthetimetoboilingcriteriapotentiallyimpactstheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportandisanapparentUSQ(E1.2.1.2C1).Additionally,thissafetyevaluationfailedtoidentifythatadualCCW/ESWtrainoutagewithoneunitinrefuelingandtheotherunitatpower,wascontrarytotheUFSARassumptionsandplacedtheplantinanunanalyzedconditionandoutsideofthedesignbases.Thisconditionalsopotentiallyincreasedtheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreport,creatingthepotentialforaUSQ(E.l.2.1.2D).StatusWepartiallyagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.TheMarch1996cyclespecificanalysisdeterminedthepeakSFPbulktransienttemperaturetobeincompliancewiththedesignbaseslimitdiscussedinsection9.4oftheUFSAR,whichfulfilledourcommitmentmadetotheNRC.inourletterAEP:NRC:1202A,datedFebruary1;1996.Theanalysiswasconservativebecauseitassumedfuelmovementbegan100hoursaftershutdown,eventhoughfuelmovementwasprohibitedforthefirst168hoursbyT/Ss.Thisoverc;onservatismcausedtheanalysistoincorrectlydemonstrateaneedforanadministrativeCCWtemperaturelimitbelowtheallowabledesignbasesCCWtemperature.However,the1997cyclespecificanalysesdemonstrate,byboundingpreviousoffloads,thatthepeakSFPbulktransienttemperaturedesignbaseswouldnothavebeenviolatedduringthe1996refuelingoutage,evenwithouttheadministrativeCCWtemperaturelimitsconservativelyimposed.Therefore,theCCWheatexchangerwascapableofperformingitsdesignfunction.TheSFPanalysesofrecord(approvedbySERdatedJanuary14,1993)indicatedthatthetimetoboilbasiswouldbeviolatedforabounding(fullSFP)singleSFPcoolingtrainfullcoredischargeproceedingattheminimumT/Ssubcriticalityholdtime.Therefore,thisparametershouldhavebeenevaluatedatthepartialSFPloadingpriortotheunit2fullcoredischargein1996.FailuretoevaluatethetimetoboilcouldhavepotentiallyallowedtheSFPtobeplacedinaconditionoutsideofitsdesignbases.However,
'~AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page17the1997cyclespecificanalysesdemonstrate,byboundingpreviousoffloads,thatthetimetoboilbaseswasnotviolatedduringthe1996unit2refuelingoutage.ConsideringthedeficienciesdescribedbelowinthereviewofthedualtrainCCWoutageforunit2in1996,thiswasaconditionoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.ThecontingencyactionsforrecoveringSFPcoolingduringtheunit21996refuelingoutageweresuchthattheplantwascapableofrestoringunit2CCWwithin1.5hours,assumingnoerrorsorenvironmentaleffects.GreaterthanthreehourswouldhavebeenavailablebeforereachingthepeakSFPbulktransienttemperaturefollowinganunexpectedlossofCCWfromunit1.TherequiredtimetoimplementthecontingencyactionswasnotadequatelyreviewedtofullycreditmanualrestorationofCCWflowfromunit2followinganunexpectedlossofCCWflowfromunit1.DualtrainCCWoutageswillnotbescheduledduringrefuelingoutagesuntilanalysesareperformedtoensuretheSFPdesignbaseswillnotbeviolatedandadequatereviewsareperformedtoensurethatanUSQdoesnotexist.Asapointofinformation,HoltecInternationaliscurrentlyperformingaSFPstoragecapacityboundinganalysistocalculatethepeakSFPbulktransienttemperatureandtimetoboilforafullcoredischargetotheSFP,assumingoperationofasingletrainofSFPcoolingatUFSARdesignbasesminimumflowsandmaximumCCWtemperatures.Thisanalysis,whencomplete,isexpectedtoeliminatetheneedforcyclespecificpeakSFPtemperature(ascommittedinourletterAEP:NRC:1202A,datedFebruary1,1996)andtimetoboilevaluations.ITEMNO.URZ-030IssueThe10CFR50.59safetyevaluationthatwasperformedbythelicenseeforrevision2,datedJune1992,toEOPOHP4023.ES-1.3wasnot.effectiveinidentifyingthattherevisionwascreatingasinglefailurevulnerabilitythatcouldrenderoneRHRpump,andbothsafetyrelatedtrainsofSIandCCpumpsinoperable.Subsequentproceduralrevisions(revisions3and4,datedJanuary1996,andJanuary1997,respectively)failedtoidentifythesinglefailurevulnerability(E1.1.1.2D).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.1/2-OHP4023.ES-1.3wererevisedtotransferboththeeastandwestRHRpumpsfromtheRWSTtotherecirculationsump.SubsequenttothetransferoftheRHRpumpstotherecirculationsump,RHRsupplywillbeestablishedtotheSIpumpsandtheCCPs.AftertheRHRsupplyisestablishedtotheSIpumpsandCCPs,theirRWSTsuctionvalveswillbeclosed.Thenewswitchoversequencewillprecludethesituationwhereasingleactivefailurewouldcausearedundanttrainfrombeingimpacted.ThisrevisionwasimplementedonJanuary2,1998.Theprocedurerevision(revision2),whichcreatedthesinglefailurevulnerability,occurredin1992.Sincethattime,the AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page18reviewprocessforEOPshasbeenimproved.Currently,therearemulti-disciplinereviewsfromtechnicallyqualifiedpersonnel.Thisprocesshasbeeneffectiveinidentifyingandcorrectingproceduralproblems.ThenatureoftheincorporationoftheunacceptableECCSlineupinrevision2ofOHP4023.ES-1.3wouldsuggestthatthiswasanisolatedcase.AsthiseventappearstobeanisolatedeventandtherehavebeenimprovementsimplementedintheEOPreviewprocess,noadditionalpreventativeactionswerewarranted.Asdescribedinattachment4toourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3,acontributingfactortotheECCSswitchoverprocedureissuewastheaspectofthedesignthatcrosstiestheECCSsystemtrainsthroughacommonrecirculationsuctionsourcefortheintermediateandhighheadinjectionpumps.Weperformedareviewofothersafetysystemswithcrosstiecapabilities,eitherbetweentrainsorbetweenunits,toprovidereasonableassurancethatsinglefailurecriteriahavebeenappropriatelyconsideredandthatproceduresallowingtheuseofthecrosstieshavebeenproperlyevaluated.SystemsreviewedwereAFW,ESW,CVCS,CCWandelectricaldistribution.Nooperabilityconcernswereidentifiedwiththeuseofsafetysystemcrossties.Policy800000-POL-2300-04,"DefinitionandUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Attachment3ofthispolicyprovidesspecificdirectionregardingthedefinitionanduseofthe"singlefailurecriteria",whichisdefinedinthebodyofthepolicy.Withinthetextofattachment3ofthispolicy,aspecificexampleofan"activefailure"iscitedas"thefailuretocontinuetorun".TrainingregardingthispolicywasinitiatedonNovember4,1997.TheinitialtrainingforpersonnelimpactedbytheissuanceofthispolicywascompletedinNovember1997.Allactionsarecomplete.ITEMNO.URZ-031Issue~In1996(unit2)and.1997(unit1),thelicenSeefilledin-thecontainmentrecirculationsump'oof'entholeswithoutperforminga10CFR50.59evaluation.Thelicenseestatedthattheholesweresealedbecausetheywerenotindicatedonanyplantdesigndrawingsandbecausetheycouldnotlocateanydesignrequirement,forconsiderationoftheventholes(E.1.1.1.2E1).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.TheholeswerereopenedandFMEprotectionprovided.Toaddresstheconcernforchangesbeingmadetodesignbasesinformationwithouta10CFR50.59evaluation,Policy800000-POL-2300-04,"DefinitionandUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Thispolicydefinesdesignbasesasinformationthatidentifiesthespecificfunctionstobeperformedbyastructure,system,orcomponentofafacility,andthespecificvaluesorrangesofvalueschosenforcontrollingparametersasreferenceboundsfordesign.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page19TrainingregardingthispolicywascompletedinNovember1997.WeacknowledgethattheNRChasexpressedconcernsintheCALfollowupinspectionregardingtheprocessfollowedinreinstallingtheventholes.ITEMNO.URI-032IssueProcedure01/02-OHP4021.016.003,"OperationoftheComponentCoolingWaterSystemDuringReactorStartupandNormalOperation<<,wasrevisedtoremovethestatement,"...allowingthreehoursatCCWtemperaturesof1204F.<<Thelicenseeimplementedtherevisionundertheauspicesofanon-intentproceduralchange,asallowedbyT/S6.5.3.1.However,theteamdeterminedthatthisrevisionconstitutedachangetotheintentoftheprocedure,contrarytotheconclusionreachedbythelicensee(E1.2.1.2C).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.A10CFR50.59safetyevaluationdatedOctober17,1997,wasperformedtoestablishtheappropriateCCWtemperaturelimit.PMS0.179wasissuedandPMI-2010hasbeenrevisedtoprohibittherevisionofprocedureswithoutanapproved10CFR50.59screeningbeingcompleted.ITEMNO.URI-033IssueThelicenseeconsistentlyoperatedtheplantwithlessthantheUFSAR-specifiedCCWflowsthroughtheRCPthermalbarriersandwithoutperforminga10CFR50.59evaluation.ThisissueisaconcernbecausetheCCWsystemhasoperatedabovethemaximumdesignbasesCCWtemperaturelimitof95',,andwasallowedtooperateattemperaturesupto,1204F,withoutevaluatingtheimpact"ontheRCPthermalbarrierswiththereducedCCWflows(E1.2.1.2G).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.AflowrangewasestablishedforeachcomponentcooledbytheCCWsystem.Specifically,aminimumflowratewasestablished(orverifiedtobecorrect)toensurethateachcomponentreceivedsufficientcoolingandamaximumflowratewasestablishedtoprotecteachcomponentfromdamagingflowrates.A10CFR50.59evaluationwascompletedandtheminimumflowrequirementforthethermalbarrierswasdecreasedfrom35gpmto24gpm.'TheUFSARwillberevisedinthenextscheduledupdate.Policy800000-POL-2300-04"DefinitionandUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.TrainingregardingthispolicywascompletedinNovember1977.
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page20ZTEMNO.URZ-034IssueThelicensee"identifiedthattheyhaveoperatedtheplantwithoutoverpressureprotectiontotheRHRsystem,contrarytotheassumptionsstatedinUFSARChapter9.3.ThischangetothedesignbasesfeaturethatprovidesoverpressureprotectiontotheRHRsystemwastodefeattheinterlocksassociatedwithICM-129andIMO-128,RHRhotleginletisolationvalves,whenoperatinginmode4.However,thechangewasperformedwithoutperforminga10CFR50.59evaluation(El.5.2C3).StatusWepartiallyagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.TheRHRsystemsuctionvalvesfromtheRCSareinterlockedthroughseparatechannelsofRCSpressuresignalstoprovideautomaticclosureintheeventRCSpressureexceedsRHRsystemdesignpressure.Duringshutdownconditions,theseinterlocksareeffectivelydefeatedbyremovingpowertothevalvestopreventalossofRHRcoolingduetoinadvertent,valveclosure.Theinterlocksareunnecessaryinthisconfigurationasoverpressureprotectionsystem(LTOP).WhilethisconfigurationimprovedthereliabilityoftheRHRsystemduringshutdownconditions,andthesurveillancesoftheinterlockswereperformedinaccordancewithT/Ss,theremovalofpowertothevalveswasnotincompliancewithT/Srequirements.InourletterAEP:NRC:1278,datedSeptember19,1997,wesubmittedaT/SchangerequesttodeletetheRHRinterlockrequirement.Amendment219forunit1,and203forunit2,wasapprovedonDecember10,1997.Policy800000-POL-2300-04,"DefinitionandUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.TrainingregardingthispolicywascompletedinNovember1997.\'IAllactionsarecomplete.ITEMIFZ-001IssueUFSARandT/SinconsistencieswithRWSTvolume(E1.4.2B).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.Thenecessaryanalysestoredefinetherequire'dRWSTwatervolumeaswellasaddressinstrumentationissuesoftheinstrumentsusedhavebeendonetosupporttherevisionoftheemergencyoperatingprocedure,whichcontrolsthetransitionfromtheinjectionphasetotherecirculationphase.Therevisedanalyseswereanintegralpartofthesafetyreviewdonefortheprocedurerevision.TheUFSARwillbechangedtoreflectthisredefinitionduringthenextregularupdate.
cAttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1260G2Page21ITEMZFI-002IssueTheRWSTandthecontainmentwaterlevelinstrumentationallowableoutagetimes(AOTs)shouldappropriatelybegovernedbyconsistentAOTrequirements(E1.4.2D).Status.Wepartiallyagreewiththecharacterizationofthisissue.TheRWSTlevelinstrumentation(ILS)andcontainmentwaterlevelinstrumentation(NLI)instrumentsprovidenoautostartfunction,whichwasrecognizedintheinspectionreport.TheILSinstrumentationprovidesindicationonly,whichisusedtoinitiatetheoperator'sactionsthatmanuallyswitchtheunitfrominjectiontorecirculation.TheNLIinstrumentsprovideindicationonly,whichwouldbeusedintheemergencytoinitiateactionsinresponsetoeventsbeyondthedesignbases.Thecontainmentwaterlevelinstrumentationisusedtoindicateanunmonitoreddiversionofwaterfromcontainmentduringinjectionthatisoutsidethedesignbases.Therefore,theinjectioncontainmentwaterlevelinstrumentationisnotusedtosatisfyanengineeredsafetyfunctionasstatedintheinspectionreport.Theseinstrumentsarecurrentlycoveredbythepost-accidentinstrumentationT/Ss.Thisisconsideredappropriateandnochangeisanticipated.TheRWSTinstrumentationusedinconjunctionwiththeanalysisprovidesthenecessaryindicationtocontrolchangeoverfrominjectiontorecirculation.Therearetwochannelsofinstrumentsprovidingtheindicationtheoperatorwouldusetoinitiatetherequiredactions.Ifonlyonechannelwasavailable,theoperatorwouldstillinitiatetherequiredactions.Becausetheseinstrumentshavenoautostartfunctionandtheoperatorwouldinitiateactionsfromasinglechannel,ifonewasoutofservice,thecoverageoftheseinstruments"bythepost-accidentinstrument'ationT/Sisconsideredappropriate,ThelossofbothchannelsofRWSTlevelinstruments,resultinginthelossofallapprovedindications,wouldbecoveredbyT/S3.0.3requiringpromptactionstoshutdowntheunit.Arewordedpost-accidentinstrumentationT/S3.3.3.8willbesubmittedtoclarifythatthelossofbothRWSTlevelinstrumentsplacestheunitinT/S3.0.3.TheT/SchangesubmitalwillbeprovidedbyApril30,1998.
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