ML17227A297

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LER 92-001-00:on 920117,fuel Handling Bldg Ventilation Stack Radiation Monitor Not in Svc During Routine Check.Caused by Personnel Oversight.Event Reviewed W/Chemistry Personnel.W/ 920218 Ltr
ML17227A297
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/18/1992
From: Sager D, Snyder M
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-92-37, LER-92-001, LER-92-1, NUDOCS 9202240396
Download: ML17227A297 (6)


Text

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONS RATION SYSTEM REGULA Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9202240396 DOC.DATE: 92/02/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000335 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SNYDERgM.J. Florida Power &.Light Co.

, SAGER,D.A. Florida Power S Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 92-001-00:on 920117,fuel handling bldg ventillation stack radiation monotor was not in svc during routine. check.

Caused by personnel oversight. Event was reviwed. w/chemistry pe r son ne1 . W/9 20218 1 t r .

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL I'SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

5 NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-2 LA 1 1 PD2-2 PD 1 1 NORRISIJ 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS ,2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB 7E 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB8H3 1 1 NRR/DS3'PLB8D1 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 E 02 1 1 RES/DS IR/E I B 1 1 FILE Ol 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG6G BRYCE,J.H 3 3 L ST LOBBY NARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYiG.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 33 ENCL 33

P.O. Box 128, Ft. Pierce, FL 34954.0128 r

PAL February 18, 1992 L-92-37 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 92-01 Date of Event: January 16, 1992 Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor Out of Service Due to Personnel Error The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours, D. A ager Vice P esident St. cie Plant DAS/JJB/kw Attachment cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant II DAS/PSL N621-92

~202240396 920218 PDR ADOCK 05000335 PDR P4QQ ]] an FpL Group companY

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FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE 3 St. Lucie Unit 1 050003351 0 4 (4) Fuel Handling Building ventilation radiation monitor out of service results in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications due to a personnel error.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED(8)

DAY YEAR YEAR S IAL I DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES N/A DOCKET NUMBER(S) 05 00 0' 169 2 9 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 8 9 2 N/A, 05000 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR OPERATING Check one or more of the folio+in (11)

MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 1 0 0 20.405(a)(1)(li) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a) (1 )(iII) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) beIOFI/andin Text 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) NRC Form 366A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEP ONE NUMBER AREA CODE Michael J. Snyder, Shift Technical Advisor 4 0 7 465 -3550 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- TURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- REPORTABLE TURER TO NPRDS I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces.i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typeFFriften lines) (16)

On 17 January, 1992 at 0730, a plant Chemistry supervisor noted that the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building (FHB) ventilation stack radiation monitor was not in service during a routine check of that system's operability. This FHB monitor is required to be in service by plant Technical Specifications, or else to have in place alternate means of sampling and monitoring the FHB ventilation effluent. A review of this event indicated that the radiation monitor was probably placed out of service during routine grab sampling of the FHB effluent at 0830 on 16 January. By procedure, the radiation monitor's sample pump is secured during grab sampling and should be restarted following sampling completion.

The root cause of this event is attributed to an oversight by Chemistry personnel for not restarting the FHB stack radiation monitor sample pump. A contributing factor to this event is that the sample pump's low flow alarm was improperly overridden during the grab sample surveillance. Another contributing factor is that Operations personnel who found the sample pump secured during the midnight shift equipment checks on January 17th did not contact Chemistry personnel and improperly restarted the monitor.

During the 23 hour2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> period that the monitor was out of service, there were no work activities taking, place in the FHB, and subsequently no unplanned effluent releases through the FHB ventilation stack were made.

Corrective actions for this event: Properly restored the FHB stack radiation monitor to service, Chemistry supervision has reviewed this event with all Chemistry personnel to discuss the importance of following procedures and not adjusting alarm setpoints'unless procedurally addressed, Operations supervision has emphasized the need for notifying Chemistry when problems occur with effluent radiation monitors, Training will evaluate this event for use in plant personnel training.

FPL Facsimile of NRC Form 366 (6-89)

FPL Fffcslmle DI I'RC Form 366 (S 89)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATlON U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E010IAT ED NPNRN PE Il ~ IPPROYEOOAO ICl $ 1$ 0010$

0 NATES, $ 000 I

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TO DIANEY Wl TH $ 10$ IN'CIDIAITCNCOIIECOON INOINCll $ 00 $ 00$ fORWAITT CIRNNNT0 INCARDNO IAPDE N ECllNATE TO TIN IECOOS AN) INPCRT ~ IIANACEINNT DRANCN rPEW$ 1$ 0 IIIClEARREOIAATORY WANNATION,DC 00$ 0$ II0$ TO TIN 0PERWWOIYI EOVCllCN PRON CT $ $ 1 $ 00 I01$ Cf ACE CP NAKIINIRAICIIAEICET WA&NICTON, DC $00rfk FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

't. Lucie Unit 1 YEAR I EQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER . NUMBER 0 500 0335 9 2 0 0 1 0 0 0,2 0 4 TEXT (Ifmore spaceis required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 16 January, 1992, St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power. At 0830, a Technical Specification required grab sample was drawn from the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) ventilation stack radiation monitor (EIIS:IL) by a utility Chemistry technician. Per an approved plant procedure, the radiation monitor's sample pump is secured during this surveillance. Before the sample was taken, the technician overrode the radiation monitor's low flow alarm in order to avoid spurious alarms in the control room. Override of the alarm is not an approved practice.

On 17 January, during midshift while making his required equipment checks, a non-licensed operator noted that the FHB stack monitor sample pump was secured. The monitor flow indicated zero flow and the sample pump was off, but power was still available to the monitor skid. He notified the control room of this condition, and with the concurrence of licensed operators he restarted the sample pump. Nominal sample flow through the monitor was noted, no abnormal alarms were noted in the control room, and operators assumed that the monitor was back in service.

At 0730, a routine system check of the FHB monitor by a Chemistry supervisor reviewing the printout history of effluent monitors revealed that the FHB vent radiation monitor had been in the since 0134 hrs on the 17th, and was therefore inoperable. Operators in the control 'urge'ode room were notified, and the system was restored to service at 0805.

The root cause of the FHB vent radiation monitor being found secured is attributed to the Chemistry technician inadvertantiy failing to restart the, sample pump after taking the weekly grab sample on the 16th. Procedurally, the sample pump is to be secured while drawing the grab sample, and then restarted upon completion of the surveillance. The cause of the monitor being put in the purge condition at 0134 on the 17th is most likely due to improperly restarting the monitor by Operations personnel. Functional equipment checks by Operations and Chemistry personnel after this event did not reveal any mechanical or electrical faults which may have caused the system to inadvertantly run in the purge mode of operation.

There were several contributing factors to this event. One contributing factor was that the sample pump's low flow alarm was overridden during the surveillance, and was not restored after the grab sample was drawn due to an oversight. This is not an approved practice. The Iow flow alarm annunciates in the control room, and would have alerted operators of low radiation monitor sample flow. A second contributing factor to this event was that Operations personnel did not notify the on shift Chemistry technician that the FHB vent radiation monitor was found to be out of service. This action may have shortened the time the monitor was out of service. A third contributing factor to this event is that the shiftly data taken on this process monitor showed normal trends, and did not identify any trends or problems with the FHB vent radiation monitor. This condition is expected because the FHB is normally at background radiation levels, and background radiation levels are also recorded when the monitor's sample pump is secured or in the purge mode of operation. There were no unusual work characteristics or adverse environmental conditions which contributed to this event.

FPL Facsimile of NRC Form 366 (6-89)

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F PL Facalrfila ol U.S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION AFFROITOOIIINIA01S0010l NRC Form SG6 ftrftfan4000 I (I'F8@

TSTSAATTOIAFIOTHFTR IHSFISRCToCOIHAT FATN nfs NFarSAANOHOCIATCNOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INCISE Sn 000 Itta fORWARS COINJEHT 0 IHOARCtHO TIATXN0 SNHATC To TtC IH CCATS HO IHFORT0 NHHIHIHNTSRANCSI TF-SSIAIAS IAHITARIHIHAATCRF TEXT CONTINUATION wARNHRCH.OO ISIHt HAS TonH FlfcRHcffttottcTMNFRrtacTR1HHI10FAcfftcc OF NANAOIIHHTAHl IKOOCT, WAHINCTON, OC IIICL FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR EQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER St. Lucie Unit 1 0 5 0 0 03 35 9 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 TEXT (Ifmore spaceis required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (1/)

This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.i. as "any operation or condition prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.", As per Technical Specification 3.3.3.10, the required action to be taken with the FHB vent radiation monitor inoperable is to immediately suspend the release of effluents monitoredby the instrument or else estimate effluent release rate and take grab samples every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and provide for continuous sampling with auxiliary sample equipment. The function of the effluent radiation monitor is to provide indication of radiation levels during normal and accident conditions. 4 In this event, the FHB vent radiation monitor was out of service for approximately 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br />. During that period, the FHB exhaust fan was in operation, but no work was being performed in the FHB.

Therefore, there was no unplanned release from the FHB during that time period. In the unlikely event that an unplanned release from the FHB vent had occurred during the time period that the effluent radiation monitor was out of service, operators would have been alerted to this condition by an increasing trend in shiftly logs readings of the FHB area radiation monitors. These independent area monitors also have alarms which sound in the control room. Therefore, the health and safety of the public was not affected by this event.

1. Operations and Chemistry personnel restored the FHB vent radiation monitor back to service
2. Functional testing of the FHB vent monitor done by Operations and Chemistry personnel did not reveal any mechanical or electricai faults which may have caused the system to inadvertantly run in the 'purge'ode.
3. Chemistry supervision has reviewed this event with all Chemistry personnel to discuss the generic importance of procedural compliance and the importance of step by step execution of a procedure for an evolution.
4. Chemistry supervision has reviewed this event with all Chemistry personnel to discuss the generic importance of not adjusting alarm setpoints unless procedurally addressed.
5. Chemistry will revise the applicable procedure to caution against defeating alarm setpoints when this practice is not specfically called for.
6. Operations supervision has emphasized the need to notify Chemistry when problems occur with effluent radiation monitors.
7. Training will evaluate this event for use in plant staff training.

FPL Facsimile of NRC Form 366 (6-89)

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FPL Facalmlo ol U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSCN AAYROVIOTHAIHtl0 I0041 Il NRC Form 39S

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CTTHRa lOOI0 (6 89)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ff TSTYIATTO TATHITN a IKSffHOCTO COIHT.YWITH Illa 04OIWATlONM00CYIDrl IRCXHCT!000 ITI0 IORWART CIHHRIR4 IRCARCAIO 800HN TCTTHATC TO RR IHCCfO0 TEXT CONTINUATlON la 4a NO IHACRT0 HAHAIX HT CRAHCH TA IXL IAJClTAN IHCIAATORY WAN THCTOH . OC HTHA AN) TO TIN 0JYYRWORI IROOCTCN PROH CT ITII04IOOCfRCC Of AW TARRY,WA%IHCTON,OCHHCk FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR EQUENTIAL REVISION St. Lucie Unit 1 NUMBER NUMBER 0 500 0335 9 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 TEXT (lfmore space is'required, use addifl'onal NRC Form 366A's) (17)

None A prevous similar event is described in LER 335-89-006, when a Technical Specification effluent monitor was inoperable due to an I8C personnel error during maintenance.

FPL Facsimile of NRC Form 366 (6-89)