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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML17146B1741999-08-0303 August 1999 GL 96-06 Risk Assessment for Sses. ML20195B2381999-03-31031 March 1999 Redacted Version for 10CFR2.790 Request for Decommissioning Status Rept for Sses,Units 1 & 2 ML20217Q4891998-04-21021 April 1998 Rev 1 to Draft LDCN 2482, FSAR Chapter 13.4 & FSAR Chapter 17.2 Changes to Support ITS Implementation ML20155F7661996-07-25025 July 1996 Partially Deleted Job Number 739619-96, Investigation of E Diesel Breaker Misalignment ML20155F7491996-07-24024 July 1996 Independent Safety Evaluation Svcs Project Rept 3-96, Investigation of E Diesel Generator In-Operability Event ML17164A6631995-04-11011 April 1995 Impact of Extending T-10 AOT from 3 to 7 Days. ML18026A5351994-10-31031 October 1994 SSES Unit 1 & 2 MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method Seismic Evaluation. W/One Oversize Drawing ML17158A1631993-12-0909 December 1993 Remote Indication of Spent Fuel Pool Level & Temperature. ML18026A4281993-08-16016 August 1993 PP&L Response to NRC Concerns Re Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Following Loca,Sses,Units 1 & 2. ML17157C1421992-10-21021 October 1992 Engineering Assessment of Fuel Pool Cooling Piping EDR-G20020. ML17157C1401992-08-31031 August 1992 Review of Fuel Pool Cooling During Postulated Off-Normal & Accident Events SSES Units 1 & 2. ML17157C1411992-08-31031 August 1992 Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling Event Evaluation. ML20082C4941992-08-14014 August 1992 Evaluation of Unit 1 & Unit 2 Derating of Power Cables in Raceways Wrapped W/Thermo-Lag Matl ML17157C1381992-07-27027 July 1992 Safety Consequences of Boiling Spent Fuel Pool at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. ML17157B0971990-11-0505 November 1990 COTTAP-2,Rev 1 Theory & Input Description Manual. ML20065L6651990-10-31031 October 1990 Environ Qualification Analysis of 250 Volt DC Limitorque Motor Operators for Valves Located Outside Containment of Susquehanna Steam Electric Station ML17157A4211990-08-31031 August 1990 Analysis of Pitting Corrosion Failures in ESW Sys RHR Lube Oil Coolers & RCIC Pump Room Unit Coolers at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. ML17157A2171990-05-0303 May 1990 Rev 1 to SEA-EE-183, Evaluation of Unit 1 Computer Class 1E - Non-Class 1E Interfaces. ML17157A2191990-05-0303 May 1990 Rev 1 to SEA-EE-184, Evaluation of Unit 1 Annunciator Class 1E - Non-Class 1E Interfaces. ML17157A2201990-05-0303 May 1990 Rev 1 to SEA-EE-226, Evaluation of Welded Shut Class 1E Limitorque Limit Switches Used for Unit 2 Computer Inputs. ML17157A2221990-04-17017 April 1990 Rev 0 to SEA-EE-235, Evaluation of Potential High Voltage Sources Into Unit 1 & 2 Computers. ML17157A2211990-04-12012 April 1990 Rev 0 to SEA-EE-231, Evaluation of Welded Contacts of Class 1E Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Switches & Limit Switches Used for Unit 2 & Common Annunciator Inputs. ML20005F9831990-01-0505 January 1990 Rev 0 to Analysis of B & C 1989 Diesels Failure. ML20235Z1801989-01-31031 January 1989 Rev 2 to Pennsylvania Power & Light Co Approach to Risk Mgt & Risk Assessment ML17156A6921988-07-31031 July 1988 CRD Housing Cap Screw Corrosion. ML17146B0951987-11-30030 November 1987 Rev 1 to Susquehanna Unit 2 Cycle 3 Reload Analysis Design & Safety Analyses. ML17146B0941987-11-30030 November 1987 Rev 1 to Susquehanna Unit 2 Cycle 3 Plant Transient Analysis. ML18040A8521987-08-31031 August 1987 Suppl 4 to Evaluation of Selected Fire Door & Door Frame Assemblies, Technical Rept ML17146B0101987-05-31031 May 1987 Suppl 3 to Evaluation of Selected Fire Door Frame Assemblies, Technical Rept ML17146B0091986-06-30030 June 1986 Suppl 2 to Evaluation of Selected Fire Door & Door Frame Assemblies, Technical Rept ML18040B1191985-08-31031 August 1985 Suppl 1 to Evaluation of Selected Fire Door & Door Frame Assemblies. ML18040B1291985-04-17017 April 1985 Fact-Finding Rept on Air Duct Penetrations Through 1 H Fire Resistive Wall Assembly. ML20102C2131985-03-0101 March 1985 Detailed Control Room Design Review Supplementary Summary Rept ML18040A7861985-01-31031 January 1985 Evaluation of Selected Fire Door & Door Frame Assemblies, Technical Rept ML20092J2391984-06-0606 June 1984 Investigation of Unit 2 Power Transient of 840528. Related Info Encl ML20091B3401984-02-10010 February 1984 Reactor Mode Switch Functional Testing & Wear Characteristics Evaluation, Final Rept ML18040B0231983-09-0909 September 1983 Rev 4 to Equipment Qualification Rept. ML20023D1651983-04-29029 April 1983 Reactor Mode Switch Failure Modes & Mechanisms, Final Rept ML18031A4071982-10-27027 October 1982 Addendum to Final Rept Independent Design Review- Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. ML17139B0421982-08-24024 August 1982 Suppl to Investigation of Unit 1 Small Piping Sys Design Installation & Insp Program Adequacy & Implementation. Viewgraphs Encl ML17139B0401982-08-23023 August 1982 Investigation of Unit 1 Small Piping Sys Design Installation & Insp Program Adequacy & Implementation. ML18031A3861982-07-23023 July 1982 Pool Swell Forcing Functions for Mark II Wetwell-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers. ML20050C2991982-04-30030 April 1982 Design Assessment Rept, Vol 2,Revision 6 ML17139B8881982-03-31031 March 1982 App D to Rev 1 to Control Sys Power Supply & Sensor Malfunction Study, Commonality Diagrams. ML17139B8851982-03-31031 March 1982 Rev 1 to Control Sys Power Supply & Sensor Malfunction Study. ML17139B8901982-03-31031 March 1982 App E to Rev 1 to Control Sys Power Supply & Sensor Malfunction Study, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis. ML17139B8911982-03-31031 March 1982 App F to Rev 1 to Control Sys Power Supply & Sensor Malfunction Study, Malfunction Analysis Tables. ML18040B0271982-03-31031 March 1982 App C to Rev 1 to Control Sys Power Supply & Sensor Malfunction Study, Control Sys Identification Diagrams. W/Five Oversize Diagrams.Aperture Cards Are Available in PDR ML18040A7091982-03-31031 March 1982 App B to Rev 1 to Control Sys Power Supply & Sensor Malfunction Study, Control Sys & Safety Functions. 1999-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML17146B1741999-08-0303 August 1999 GL 96-06 Risk Assessment for Sses. ML20206D3331999-04-27027 April 1999 SER of Individual Plant Examination of External Events Submittal on Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,Units 1 & 2. Staff Notes That Licensee IPEEE Complete with Regard to Info Requested by Suppl 4 to GL 88-20 ML20195B2381999-03-31031 March 1999 Redacted Version for 10CFR2.790 Request for Decommissioning Status Rept for Sses,Units 1 & 2 ML17164A8451998-10-31031 October 1998 SSES Unit 1 Tenth Refueling & Insp Outage ISI Outage Summary Rept. ML20236N6751998-07-0909 July 1998 Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Notification of Potential Safety Hazard from Breakage of Cast Iron Suction Heads in Apkd Type Pumps.Caused by Migration of Suction Head Journal Sleeve Along Lower End of Pump Shaft.Will Inspect Pumps ML20217Q4891998-04-21021 April 1998 Rev 1 to Draft LDCN 2482, FSAR Chapter 13.4 & FSAR Chapter 17.2 Changes to Support ITS Implementation ML18026A4931998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971017,entry Into TS 3.0.3 Occurred to Allow Completion of Surveillance Testing of One Channel of Rbm.Caused by Failure of Components in LPRM Output to Rbm. Submitted TS Change Request to Extend LCO Action Statement ML18026A5401998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station.W/980313 Ltr ML18026A4891997-11-17017 November 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971017,TS 3.0.3 Entry Voluntarily Made. Caused by Inadequate Post Maint Testing Following Earlier Work Associated W/Components.Failed Components Repaired, Replaced & Testing Completed ML18017A2921997-10-28028 October 1997 1997 Nrc/Fema Observed Exercise. ML17158C1861997-06-0505 June 1997 Proceedings of Intl Topical Meeting on Advanced Reactors Safety Vol II, on 970601-05 ML20140A9661997-05-29029 May 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Ksv Emergency Diesel Generator Power Piston Failure.Caused by Jacket Water in Combustion Chamber. Recommends That Users Verify That Crown Thickness at Valve Cutout Be 100 Minimum ML18026A4781997-03-28028 March 1997 Rev 1 to Application of Anfb to ATRIUM-10 for Susquehanna Reloads. ML20137G6261997-03-25025 March 1997 Svcs Part 21 Rept Re Emergency Generators Installed at Zion Station Which Developed Significant Drop in Crankcase Lube Oil Level.Caused by Crack in Liner Wall,Allowing Jacket Water to Enter Chamber ML20155F7661996-07-25025 July 1996 Partially Deleted Job Number 739619-96, Investigation of E Diesel Breaker Misalignment ML20155F7491996-07-24024 July 1996 Independent Safety Evaluation Svcs Project Rept 3-96, Investigation of E Diesel Generator In-Operability Event ML20117G4641996-05-14014 May 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Cooper Bessemer Reciprocating Products,Div of Cooper Cameron Corp,Issued Ltr to Define Utils/Plants Containing Similar Equipment as Supplied on Cooper Bessemer Ksv & Enterprise Dsr EDGs ML18026A5961996-01-0202 January 1996 LER 95-013-00:on 951119,thermally Induced Pressure Locking of HPCI Valve Occurred Under Bonnet Pressure of 3,000-7,000 Psig.Damaged HPCI Injection Valve repaired.W/960102 Ltr ML18017A0511995-11-30030 November 1995 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1995 for SSES Units 1 & 2. W/951215 Ltr ML20092H7641995-08-31031 August 1995 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1995 for Susquehanna Ses ML17158A8771995-08-15015 August 1995 Exercise Manual. ML17158A8061995-07-14014 July 1995 Books 1 & 2 of ISI Outage Summary Rept SSES Unit 1 8th Refuel Outage. ML18017A0461995-07-0707 July 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950609,shift Average Licensed Core Thermal Power Was Exceeded.Caused by Failed Instrumentation Drift. Repaired & Recalibrated Subject Instrumentation ML17164A6631995-04-11011 April 1995 Impact of Extending T-10 AOT from 3 to 7 Days. ML17164A5871995-01-31031 January 1995 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1995 for Susquehanna Ses ML18026A5351994-10-31031 October 1994 SSES Unit 1 & 2 MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method Seismic Evaluation. W/One Oversize Drawing ML17158A4821994-08-23023 August 1994 ISI Outage Summary Rept Unit 2 6th Refueling Outage, Books 1 & 2 of 2 ML17158A2391994-04-0505 April 1994 Books 1 & 2 of SSES Unit 1 Seventh Refueling & Insp Outage ISI Outage Summary Rept. ML18017A2701993-12-31031 December 1993 PP&L Annual Rept 1993. ML17158A2651993-12-31031 December 1993 Allegheny Electric Cooperative,Inc Annual Rept 1993. ML17158A1631993-12-0909 December 1993 Remote Indication of Spent Fuel Pool Level & Temperature. ML18026A4281993-08-16016 August 1993 PP&L Response to NRC Concerns Re Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Following Loca,Sses,Units 1 & 2. ML18026A4261993-06-0909 June 1993 LER 90-007-01:on 900705,primary Power Supply to RPS a Power Distribution Panel Lost When One Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) Breaker Tripped.Epa Logic Cards Reviewed & RPS Power Supply Will Be redesigned.W/930609 Ltr ML17157C2441993-02-28028 February 1993 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1993 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,Units 1 & 2 ML18017A2031993-02-0101 February 1993 Books 1 & 2 of Unit 2 Fifth Refueling & Insp Outage,Isi Outage Summary Rept. ML20044C2741993-01-31031 January 1993 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1993 for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,Unit 2,consisting of Info on Unit Shutdowns & Power Reductions ML17157C3691992-12-31031 December 1992 PP&L Annual Rept 1992. ML20056C3941992-12-31031 December 1992 Allegheny Electric Cooperative,Inc Annual Rept 1992 ML18017A0421992-12-14014 December 1992 Suppl to 921127 Part 21 Rept Re High Air Concentration in Reactor Bldg Making Area Uninhabitable for Retrieving Air Filters,Per NUREG-0737,Item II.F.1.Util Current Position Re Fuel Pool Cooling Issues Contrary to Reg Guide 1.3 ML18026A2481992-11-27027 November 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard in Design of Facility for Loss of Normal Spent Fuel Pool Cooling ML18026A4231992-11-17017 November 1992 LER 92-016-00:on 920416,discovered That Existing Analysis for Two Spent Fuel Storage Pools Did Not Reflect Current Fuel Design & Plant Operation.Caused by Failure to Modify FSAR Analysis.Fsar Will Be revised.W/921117 Ltr ML17157C1421992-10-21021 October 1992 Engineering Assessment of Fuel Pool Cooling Piping EDR-G20020. ML17157C1411992-08-31031 August 1992 Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling Event Evaluation. ML17157C1401992-08-31031 August 1992 Review of Fuel Pool Cooling During Postulated Off-Normal & Accident Events SSES Units 1 & 2. ML20082C4941992-08-14014 August 1992 Evaluation of Unit 1 & Unit 2 Derating of Power Cables in Raceways Wrapped W/Thermo-Lag Matl ML17157C1381992-07-27027 July 1992 Safety Consequences of Boiling Spent Fuel Pool at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. ML17157B9331992-07-24024 July 1992 Sixth Refueling & Insp Outage Inservice Insp Outage Summary Rept, Books 1 & 2 ML20097D4681991-12-31031 December 1991 Pennsylvania Power & Light Company,1991 Annual Rept ML18017A0391991-07-26026 July 1991 LER 91-010-00:on 910628,RWCU Isolated on Two Occassions Due to Actuations of Steam Leak Detection Instrumentation. Caused by Design Deficiency & Elevated Ambient Penetration Room Temps.Temp Modules replaced.W/910726 Ltr 1999-09-30
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Q wjw I I~~ENGINEERING STUDIES, ANALYSES, AND EVALUATIONS COVERSHEET OIAI.I TY I.EYEI.AFETY ASIDE RTIIED IIOII NAI.I TY ED/CTII ND,.SEA IIO Dcr IID.FADE I OF 4y EVALUATION OF WELDED SHUT CLASS 1E LIMITORQUE LIMIT SWITCHES USED FOR UNIT 2 COMPUTER INP 9006290165 900619 PDR ADOCK 05000337 P PDC O I 3o go,peak~Ill+/y~REVISION NO.DATE PREPARED BY I'I o REVI EIED BY PPROVED B I E I~'I LA")
SEA-EE-226 Page 2 of 6 EVALUATION OF WELDED SHUT CLASS 1E LIMITORQUE LIHIT SWITCHES USED FOR UNIT 2 COMPUTER INPUTS 1.0 SCOPE The purpose of this SEA is to evaluate the impact of a welded shut limit switch from Class lE Limitorque motor operators on the operation of the Class 1E valve.SEA-EE-183 determined that closed Limitorque computer input limit switches could weld shut for impressed voltage faults.
2.0 CONCLUSION
S AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 CONCLUSION
S Analysis of the Unit 2 Class lE motor-operated valves shows that these valves, except for Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valves HV-821-2F016 and HV-821-2F019 and the Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Valves HV-G33-2F001 and HV-G33-2F004, will meet their minimum performance requirements even if the computer input limit switches should weld shut.This conclusion is based upon an evaluation that shows:--The valves change position and meet their minimum performance requirements before the computer input limit switches are exposed to potential contact welding, i.e.the valve limit switches are normally open and they close when the valve changes position to its isolation position.OR-The valves are in affiliated (associated) circuits and contacts from these devices are not used in Class 1E circuits, i.e.operation of the valve is not required for design basis event conditions.
In the event computer input limit switches for HV-G33-2F001, HV-G33-2F004, HV-821-2F016 and HV-821-2F019 weld shut, the limit switch main drive shafts could perhaps break loose internal to the valves causing the valves to jam, thus potentially preventing full.closure of the valves.More than likely the welded shut limit switches would cause damage to the limit switch gearing, but would not prevent the subject valves from closing.2.2 RECOMMENDATION To assure that the HV-G33-2F001, HV-G33-2F004, HV-821-2F016 and HV-821-1F019 valves meet their minimum performance requirements with impressed voltage faults on their computer input cables, the computer input limit switches should be rewired such that these valves change position and meet their minimum performance requirements before the computer input switches are exposed to potential welding.The C.~I~0 pi.IA 1" SEA-EE-226 Page 3 of 6 rewired valve limit switches should be normally open and closed only when the valves are 100%closed (i.e.switch closed when the valves closed in the primary containment isolation position).
This action is being tracked by NCR 87-0021.In order to preclude the need for future engineering analysis and maintain compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, gualified Electrical Isolators, capable of withstanding 120V AC and 250V DC, should be installed for newly engineered digital computer inputs developed from Class 1E Limitorque limit switches.This recommendation is in-line with NPE-Electrical Group strategy of eliminating potential pitfalls for maintaining compliance to the plant licensing commitments.
3.0 INPUTS
AND ASSUMPTIONS
3.1 INPUTS
At Susquehanna SES, computer input circuits are non-class 1E even though these inputs are developed from Class 1E motor-operated valves.Regulatory Guide 1.75 which endorses IEEE 384-1974 allows the connection of these low-energy non-class 1E circuits to Class 1E devices provided an analysis has been performed to demonstrate that the Class 1E circuits are not degraded below an acceptable level for faults on the non-class 1E circuits.Computer cables are routed in non-class lE raceways which also contain 120V AC, 125V DC and 250V DC cables.Potential damage to cables in non-class 1E raceways may cause accidental imposition of 120 volts AC or 250 volts DC on computer input wire(s), and through these wires to the Class 1E device(s).
As discussed in SEA-EE-183, open contacts of Limitorque limit switches can withstand impressed voltages of 120 VAC and 250 VDC across the contacts.However, if 120 VAC or 250 VDC were impressed on closed contacts of the limit switches, the contacts could weld shut if sufficient current flowed for a sufficient duration.3.2 This study is limited to Unit 2 digital computer inputs developed from Class 1E Limitorque motor-operators.
ASSUMPTIONS The study was based on as-built drawings and the documents issued as of the date of task initiation.
Affiliated circuits in this study were treated the same as Class IE circuits.A change in state of a computer input contact while there is an impressed voltage was not considered.
Only the contact in the open or closed position was analyzed.
L\'I~Il~c)~h Y K~j~~1 SEA-EE-226 Page 4 of 6 4.0 METHODS The Susquehanna SES Unit 2 I/O Specification Listing-Digital Real was reviewed to identify the computer inputs developed from Limitorque motor-operators equipped with Limitorque limit switches.The Susquehanna SES Motor-Operator Valve (MOV)Index dated October 17, 1989 and system drawings were reviewed to determine which MOVs are safety-related Class 1E valves.Evaluation of the impact of welded-shut Limitorque limit switches used for computer inputs was performed to assure that these devices can perform their safety-related functions with welded computer input limit switches.5.0 RESULTS Review of the Susquehanna SES Unit 2 I/O Specification Listing revealed that the number of computer points derived from Class 1E Limitorque limit switches is 40.Evaluation of welded contacts for each of these limit switches is provided.The Class 1E Limitorque limit switches are part of motor-operated valves which are in one of the following groups: l.Affiliated.
2.Require no automatic operation.
3.Require automatic closure.The affiliated motor-operated valves, listed in Table I, are powered from Class 1E sources.However, these valves and their limit switches are not used in Class 1E circuits.Operation of these valves is not required for design basis event conditions.
Therefore, welding a computer input limit switch does not effect Class 1E circuits.The Class 1E motor-operated valves which require no automatic operation are listed in Table 2.These valves have open limit switches for computer inputs during normal plant lineup.These limit switches are not exposed to potential welding.In the event the normal plant lineup is changed, the valves change to their new positions before the computer input limit switches are exposed to potential welding.Therefore, welding of the computer input limit switches does not prevent the motor-operated valves from meeting their minimum performance requirements.
r In addition to the valves in Table 2, the Feedwater Inlet Stop Check Valves HV-821-2F032A and HV-821-2F0328 motor operators, which are in the open position during normal plant operation, are not required to automatically operate for design base accidents.
However, these motor operators have closed limit switches for computer inputs during normal plant operation.
The Feedwater Inlet Stop Check Valves are motor assisted in order to provide these valves with closing capability.
for primary containment isolation leakage rate testing.In the event the limit switches weld shut, the Feedwater Inlet Stop Check Valves will not be
~~W Eq rt 4 lipa~
SEA-EE-226 Page 5 of 6 prevented from closing for design base accidents since these valves are check valves.Therefore, the welding of the computer input limit switches does not prevent HV-B21-2F032A and HV-B21-2F032B from meeting their minimum performance requirements.
The Class 1E valves which are required to operate for design base accidents are evaluated below: The ESW Diesel"E" Cooler Supply Valves Nos.HV-01110E and HV-01120E are required to automatically close for certain DBA's when the Diesel Generator"E" is not aligned and is being tested.For this condition, the computer input limit switches are open and are not exposed to potential welding.If these valves receive an automatic close signal, the valve changes position before the computer input limit switches are exposed to potential welding.Therefore, the welding of these computer input limit switches does not prevent HV-01110E and HV-01120E from meeting their minimum performance requirements.
The Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation Valves HV-G33-2F001 and HV-G33-2F004 and the Main Steam Line Drain Isolation Valves HV-B21-2F016 and HV-B21-2F019 are required to automatically close for certain DBA's.However, the computer input limit switches from these valves are closed when these vaives are open.In the event the computer input limit switches weld shut, the limit switch main drive shafts could perhaps break loose internal to the valves causing the valves to jam, thus potentially preventing full closure of the valves.Per Dan Warsing of Limitorque Corp., this is very unlikely.More than likely, the welded shut limit switch will cause damage to the limit switch gearing, but will not prevent the valves from closing.To assure that the HV-G33-2F001, HV-G33-2F004, HV-B21-2F016 and HV-B21-2F019 valves meet their minimum performance requirements with impressed voltage faults on their computer input cables, the computer input limit switches should be rewired such that these valves change positions and meet their minimum performance requirements before the computer input switches are exposed to potential welding.The rewired valve limit switches should be normally open and closed only when'the valves are 100%closed (i.e.switch closed when the valves closed in the primary containment isolation position).
This action is being tracked by NCR 87-0021.REFERENCES 6.1 IEEE 279-1971.6.2 IEEE 384-1974.6.3 Regulatory Guide 1.75, Rev.0.6.4 Susquehanna SES Unit 2 I/O Specification Listing dated'ec.8, 1989.6.5 Susquehanna SES Motor-Operator Valve Index dated Oct.17, 1989.6.6 SEA-EE-183, Rev.0.6.7 Susquehanna SES Design Description Manual Chapter 5, 15 and 31.jpa/rpa042i(18)
~~I v SEA-EE-226 Page 6 of 6 TABLE 1 AFFILIATED MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES HY-821-2F001 HV-821-2F002 HV-821-2F005 HV-831-2F023A HV-831-2F0238 HV-831-2F031A HV-831-2F0318 HV-831-2F032A HV-831-2F0328 TABLE 2 MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES NO AUTOMATIC OPERATION HV-01112A HV-011128 HV-01112C HV-01112D HV-01110A HV-011108 HV-01110C HV-011100 HV-01122A HV-011228 HV-01122C HV-01122 D HV-01120A HV-011208 HV-01120C HV-011200 HV-01112E HV-01122 E HV-821-2F020 HV-G33-2F042 HV-G33-2F104 HV-24182A HV-241828 j pa/rpa042i (18) r~~~~~<<f>>4