ML17334B682

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Responds to NRC 971126 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp on 970804-0907.Corrective Actions:Rwst Level Taps Have Been Moved from Discharge Line to Dedicated Instrument Area That Is Not Subject to Flow Effects
ML17334B682
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 01/30/1998
From: FITZPATRICK E
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
AEP:NRC:1260G2, NUDOCS 9802120299
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CATEGORY1REGULAT5INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9802120299 DOC.DATE:

98/01/30NOTARIZED:

~NODOCKETFACXL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM0500031550-316.DonaldC.CookNuclear'Power Plant,Unit2,IndianaM05000316AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICK,E.

XndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

RespondstoNRC971126ltrreviolations notedininspon970804-0907.Corrective actions:RWST leveltapshavebeenmovedfr'omdischarge linetodedicated instrument areathatisnotsubjecttofloweffects.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice ofViolation ResponseNOTES:ERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-3PDCOPIES'ECIPIENT LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME 11HICKMAN,J COPIESLTTRENCL11INTERNAL:

AEOD/SPD/RAB DEDRONRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRPM/PERB OEDIRRGN3FILE011111111111118FILECENTERCBNUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS21111111111EXTERNAL:

LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDR1111NOACNUDOCSFULLTEXT1111DENOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVED"BY YOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR17ENCL17 IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircleDriveBuchanan, Ml491071395 INDIANAMICHIGANPOWERJanuary30,1998AEP:NRC:1260G2 DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskMailStop0-Pl-17Washington, D.C.20555-0001 Gentlemen:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2INTERIMRESPONSETODESIGNINSPECTION REPORTFromAugust4,1997,throughSeptember 12,1997,theNRCconducted adesigninspection atCookNuclearPlant.Zntheinspection report,datedNovember26,1997,wewererequested toprovideaschedulewithinsixtydays,detailing ourplanstocompletethecorrective actionsfortheopenitemsthatwerelistedinappendixAoftheinspection report.Theinspection reportalsonotedthatwewereexpectedtoevaluatetheapplicability oftheresultsandspecificfindingsofthisinspection toothersystemsandcomponents throughout theplant.~g)Jt~VTheattachment tothisletterprovidesaninterimresponsetotheinspection report.ItprovidesthestatusofthespecificitemslistedinappendixAofthereport.Specifically, itprovidesalistingoftheopenitems,including astatement regarding ouragreement withthecharacterization oftheitem,andascheduleforcompleting remaining workrelatedtothespecificitem.AsaresultoftheAEdesigninspection

findings, theNRCissuedaconfirmatory actionletter(CAL)detailing specificitemsthatmustberesolvedpriortorestartofourunits.TheCALalsorequiredustoperformashorttermassessment todetermine whetherthetypesofproblemsidentified existinothersafetysystems,andiftheyimpactoperability.

TheCALalsonotedthat,inthelongterm,wearetoevaluateourprogramstoensurethesetypesofproblemsdonotrecur.TheresultsofourshorttermprogramwereprovidedtotheNRCinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3, datedDecember2,1997.Subsequently, additional information wasprovidedtotheNRCregarding reviewsofcalculations, theadequacyofour10CFR50.59program,andthedevelopment ofourshorttermassessment program.Thisinformation wasprovidedtotheNRCinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G4, datedDecember24,1997.Znadditiontothereviewsconducted'as partofourshorttermprogram,weconducted additional reviewsof10CFR50'9screenings andevaluations, anddesignchanges.Theresultsoftheseadditional reviewswereprovidedtotheNRCinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G5, datedDecember31,1997.Thesereviewswerediscussed withtheNRCduringameetingonJanuary8,1998,andduringthatmeeting,wealsopresented adescription ofourdesignbasesreconstitution project.Thisprojectwillintegrate andenhanceseveralexistingprogramssuchastheUFSARrevalidation 9802120299 980i$0PDRADQCK050003i56PDRlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll.lllllll

+~p(

U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Page2AEP:NRC:1260G2 program,thedesignbasesdocumentreconstitution program,andthenormaloperations procedure upgradeprogram,andisconsidered tobepartofthelongtermprogramtheNRCdiscussed intheCAL.Theinformation wepresented attheJanuary8,1998,meetingwasdocketedinourletterAEP:NRC:1260G6, datedJanuary8,1998.Thelettersdescribed hereinareconsidered tobepartofourresponsetotheAEdesigninspection report,andareherebyincorporated byreference.

Wearecurrently intheprocessofconducting additional reviewsofprevious10CFR50.59screenings andevaluations, aswellasself-assessment ofprocesses thathadthepotential tomakechangestotheplantoutsideofour10CFR50.59programs.

Wewillsupplement thisletterwithanotherletterproviding ourbasisforconsidering theunitsreadyforrestart.Underseparatecorrespondence, wewillalsodefineourlongtermprograminaccordance withtheCAL,andwillprovideanadditional submittal inconnection withtheNRC's10CFR50.54(f)letterconcerning theadequacyandavailability ofdesignbasesinformation.

WetaketheNRC'soverallfindingsandconclusions fromtheAEdesigninspection seriously, andareaggressively pursuingthespecificissuesaswellastheprogrammatic issuesassociated withthesefindings.

Sincerely, E.E.Fitzpatrick VicePresident

/vlbAttachment J.A.AbramsonA.B.BeachMDEQ-DW&RPDNRCResidentInspector J.R.Sampson ATTACHMENT TOAEP:NRC:1260G2INTERIMRESPONSETODESIGNINSPECTION REPORT Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page1ITEMNO.URI-01IssueApparentfailuretorecognize andevaluateallRWSTlevelmeasurement errorsanduncertainties.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2A).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Thecondition hasbeencorrected.

RWSTleveltapshavebeenmovedfromthedischarge linetoadedicated instrument areathatisnotsubjecttofloweffects.Allothersafetyrelatedlevelloopswerereviewedforpossibleflowinteraction.

Threesafetyrelatedsystemswereidentified ashavinginstallations wherepotential flowinducederrorsmayexist.Thesesystemswere:condensate storagetank(CST)levelinstruments, mid-looplevelinstruments, reactorvessellevelindication system(RVLIS).AnalysisoftheCSTindicated thatasmallflowinducedbiascouldpotentially existfortheCSTinstruments atpeakauxiliary feedwater flow.Noadverseimpactsonsystemoperability wereidentified relatedtothisinstrument configuration.

Theflowinducederrorsforthemid-looplevelinstruments werefoundtobenegligible.

Allflowinduced'errorsidentified intheRVLIShadbeenpreviously accounted forintheoriginaldesign.Instrument uncertainty calculations wererevisedtoaddressflow-induced errorsthatincludepipeentrancelosses,pipepressuredropsandBernoulli effects.Theinstrument andcontrolsectionengineering guide(EG-IC-004) hasbeenrevisedtoensuretheproperevaluation oflevelinstrument loopsinthefuture.Allactionshavebeencompleted.

ITEMNO.URI-02IssueIncorrect RWSTlevelacceptance criterion specified intechnical specification (T/S)surveillance procedure couldhaveallowedtheRWST'leveltobelessthantheT/Srequirement.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion ZIZ(DesignControl)(El.l.1.2A2).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.TheT/Ssurveillance procedure (1/2-OHP4030.STP.030) hasbeenrevisedtoincludethecorrectRWSTlevelacceptance criterion.

Theprocedures forremoving'theresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopfromservice,01-OHP4021.017.003and02-OHP4021.017.003,havealsobeenrevisedtoensurethattheT/Slimitsaremet.Theinstrument uncertainty programisbeingexpandedasdescribed inourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3, datedDecember2,1997,attachment 3.Allitemsarecomplete.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2Page2ITEMNO.URI-03ANDURI-04IssuesApparentfailuretoconsiderpotential forvortexing andairentrainment whenestablishing theRWSTLow-LowLevelsetpoint10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2A3)

.Apparentfailuretotakepromptcorrective actionafterthe1993SBICIfindingregarding thepotential forvortexing andairentrainment intheRWST,andafterdocumented bythelicenseein1995inCR95-1015.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion XVI(Corrective Action)(El.1.1.2A3).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization oftheseissues.Calculation ENSM970606JJR,Revision2,established vortexlimitsandprovidedinputtoECP1-2-I9-03, Calculation 3,whichestablishes theRWSTlow-lowlevelsetpoint.

ENSM970606JJR,Revision2,alsodetermined thatpastoperability wasnotcompromised.

ECP1-2-I9-03 hasbeenrevisedtoincorporate vortexing.

Weagreethatourcorrective actionsonthismatterwerenottimely.Ourcorrective actionsprogramwasre-engineered inMay1996.Oneoftheissuesthatpromptedtherevisionoftheprogramwasaninconsistency incompleting corrective actionsforcondition reports,selfassessments, andauditfindingsinatimelymanner.Wecontinuetomonitortheprogressoftheprogramthroughthecorrective actionprogramcontinuous improvement team(CAPCIT).Allactionsarecomplete.

Asapointofinformation, thesitevicepresident iscurrently providing management oversight ofarootcauseanalysisteamthat.isdetermining thecauseofcontinued poorperformance in'thisareaasdocumented inCR=97-3360:

Inaddition, wewillbepartic'i'pating inanindustryprojectsponsored byEPRIplantsupportengineering subcommittee todevelopguidancetooptimizeengineering activities insupportofcorrective actionprograms.

ZTKMNO.URI-05IssueTheuncertainty calculations forthecontainment andcontainment sumplevelinstrumentation loopsdonotaccountfortheimpactonthepost-accident.

containment waterlevels(ECPs1-2-N3-01, 1-RPC-14,and2-RPC-14),

anddonotconsiderthepotential forvortexing, airentrainment, ornetpositivesuctionheadrequirements.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2B3).

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page3StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.ECP12-00-14hasbeenrevisedtoincludevortexing, airentrainment andNPSHrequirements.

Emergency operating procedures (EOPs)1/2-OHP4023.ES-1.3 havebeenrevisedtoproperlyincorporate concerns.

Westinghouse hasperformed anevaluation ofthepeakcontainment pressurebasedonthecurrentrevisionofES-1.3.Westinghouse iscurrently verifying inputstotheevaluation andwillcompleteitsanalysis.

Thiswillbecompleted priortorestart.ITEMNO.URZ-06IssueApparentfailuretodemonstrate, usingdesignbasesdocumentation, thattherewasadequatecontainment recirculation sumpwatervolumefollowing aloss-of-coolant accident(LOCA).10CFRPart50.46(emergency corecoolingsystem[ECCS]performance criteria)

(E1.1.1.2C)

.StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Newanalysesforcurrentoperations havebeencompleted.

Ithasbeenconfirmed that,forbothpostulated largeandsmallbreakLOCAsanadequatevolumeofwaterwouldberesidentinthecontainment structure, andthatadequatecommunication existsinthecontainment subcompartment boundaries toensuresufficient drainagetothecontainment recirculation sump.Additionally, ithasbeenconfirmed that,forcurrentoperation, forpostulated LOCAstherewouldbenoimpactonthecontainment integrity analysisandsufficient waterexiststomaintainthecoresubcritical.

Theseanalysesincludedextensive reviewsoflossofinventory tovariouscontainment volumesandconcluded theselossescouldbetolerated.

\InourletterAEP:NRC".0900K, datedOctober8,1997,aT/Schangewassubmitted thatincreased minimumicecondenser iceweightsandallowedconsideration ofwaterfromicemeltinconjunction withwaterfromtheRWST,whichincreases sumpwatervolumefollowing aLOCA.T/Samendments 220forunit1,and204forunit2,wereapprovedbytheNRConJanuary2,1998.Allactionshavebeencompleted.

ITEMNO.URZ-07IssueApparentfailuretoprecludeasingleactivefailurewhenperforming changestotheplant,whichiscontrarytotheassumptions intheupdatedfinalsafetyanalysisreport(UFSAR)andthedesignbases.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion IZI(DesignControl)(E1.1.1.2D).

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page4StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.1/2-OHP4023.ES-1.3 wererevisedtotransferboththeeastandwestRHRpumpsfromtheRWSTtotherecirculation sump.Subsequent tothetransferoftheRHRpumpstotherecirculation sump,RHRsupplywillbeestablished tothesafetyinjection (SI)pumpsandthecentrifugal chargingpumps(CCPs).AftertheRHRsupplyisestablished totheSIpumpsandCCPs,theirRWSTsuctionvalveswillbeclosed.Thenewswitchover sequencewillprecludethesituation whereasingleactivefailurewouldcausearedundant trainfrombeingimpacted.

Thisrevisionwasimplemented onJanuary2,1998.Theprocedure, revision2,whichcreatedthesinglefailurevulnerability, occurredin1992.Sincethattime,thereviewprocessforEOPshasbeenimproved.

Currently, therearemulti-discipline reviewsfromtechnically qualified personnel.

Thisprocesshasbeeneffective inidentifying andcorrecting procedural problems.

Thenatureoftheincorporation oftheunacceptable ECCSlineupinRevision2ofOHP4023.ES-1.3, "ATransfertoColdLegRecirculation",

wouldsuggestthatthiswasanisolatedcase.Policy800000-POL-2300-04, "Definition andUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Attachment 3ofthispolicyprovidesspecificdirection onthedefinition anduseofthe"singlefailurecriteria".

Withinthetextofattachment 3,aspecificexampleofan"activefailure"iscitedas"thefailuretocontinuetorun".Trainingforpersonnel impactedbytheissuanceofthispolicywascompleted inNovember1997.Asdescribed inattachment 4toourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3, acontributing factortotheECCSswitchover procedure issuewastheaspectofthedesignthatcrossties theECCSsystemtrainsthroughacommonrecirculation suctionsourcefortheintermediate andhighheadinjection pumps.Weperformed areviewofothersafetysystemswithcrosstiecapabilities, eitherbetweentrainsorbetweenunits,toprovidereasonable assurance thatsinglefailurecriteriahavebeenappropriately considered andthatprocedures allowingtheuseofthecrossties havebeenproperlyevaluated.

Systemsreviewedwereauxiliary feedwater (AFW),essential servicewater(ESW),chemicalandvolumecontrol(CVCS),component coolingwater(CCW),andelectrical distribution.

Nooperability concernswereidentified withtheuseofsafetysystemcrossties.

Allactionsare'complete.

ITEMNO.URI-08IssueApparentfailuretomaintainthe1/4"containment reci'rculation sumpparticulate retention requirement, whichcouldallowtheECCSthrottlevalvesandcontainment spraynozzlestobecomeinoperable.

10CFRPart50.46(ECCSperformance criteria)

(E1.1.1.2E2)

.StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page5Inlate1996(unit2)andearly1997(unit1)ventsinthesumptopcover,whichwerenotpreviously providedwithparticleretention screens,wereincorrectly pluggedtoaddressthethreatofforeignmaterial.

Theseventshavebeenreinstalled withappropriate particleretention screens.Allactionshavebeencompleted.

ITEMNO.URI-09ECCSpumpsuctionvalvesnotleak-rate testedtoconfirmaccidentanalysisassumption.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion XI,(TestControl)(E1.1.1.2G4).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Testingwasperformed onthevalvesthatwerenotpreviously testedforpotential leakagebacktotheRWST.ThetestresultsshowedthatthetotalleakageforthesepathsbacktotheRWSTwaswellbelowthe10gpmvalueintheUFSAR.Theleakagesforeachofthevalvestestedisasfollows:Unit1andUnit2Unit1andUnit2Unit1andUnit2Unit1Unit2IMO-910IMO-911IMO-261RH"130RH-1300gpm0gpm0gpm0gpm0.48gpm.Allcorrective actionsarecompleted.

Thesevalveswillbeincludedinthein-service testingprogramprocedures byJune1,1998.ITEMNO.URI-010IssueApparentfailuretodemonstrate, usingdesignbasesdocumentation, thattheplantcouldperformaT/S3.0.3.shutdown in36hoursto2004F,usingoneCCWtrainanddesign-basesassumptions.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion ZII(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2B).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Theoriginalsingletrain36hourcooldownanalysisallowedthecomponent coolingwatersupplytemperature toreach1204F.Operating procedures acknowledge thatCCWsupplytemperature couldelevateto1204Fduringsomecooldownevolutions.

Contrarytothis,thedesignbasesCCWsupplytemperature asdetailedintheUFSARwas954F.Acooldownanalysishadnotbeencompleted toshowthata36hoursingletraincooldowncouldbeachievedwiththeCCWsupplytemperature limitedto95F.Inaddition, theanalysisofrecordhadincorrectly modeledtheCCWheatexchanger ascounterflow insteadofTEMAtypeE.Duetotheseerrors,wecouldnotdemonstrate theplantcouldperforma36hourshutdownusingdesignbasesassumptions.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2

~Page6Evaluation andanalysiswerecompleted toallowoperation oftheCCWsystemwithamaximumsupplytemperature of120~F.Thisreviewwascompleted underdesignchangepackage(DCP)12-DCP-855.

Subsequent tothereview,achangetotheUFSARwasinitiated toallowtheCCWsupplytemperature toreach120'duringemergency cooldownandpost-accident conditions.

Theheatexchanger modelwascorrected.

Anewcooldownanalysishasbeencompleted thatdemonstrates thecapability toperforma36hourcooldownusingoneCCWtrainanddesignbasesassumptions.

Allactionsarecomplete.

ITEMNO.URI-011IssueApparentfailuretocorrectly translate theas-builtdesignoftheCCWheatexchanger intosafetyrelatedcalculations andanalyses.

10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion III(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2E2)

.StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Priortothedesigninspection, theCCWheatexchanger wasincorrectly modeledbybothusandWestinghouse asacounterflow heatexchanger.

Contrarytothis,theCCWheatexchanger isaTEMAtypeEheatexchanger.

Thiscondition resultedfromanerrorinthemodelingoftheheatexchanger duringoriginalplantdesign,whichwascarriedthroughtomorerecentcalculations.

Theunit130%steamgenerator tubeplugginganalysishasbeencorrected.

InourletterAEP:NRC:1223M, datedSeptember 10,1997,werequested thattheNRCsuspendreviewoftheunit2uprate.WesentateamtotheWestinghouse officestoreviewtheanalysesofrecordforbothunits.Theteamdetermined thatWestinghouse hadmodeledothersafetyrelatedheat'exchangers properly.

It'asalsoconfirme'dthatHoltecInternational','ho performed theanalysisofrecordforthespentfuelpool(SFP)system,correctly modeledtheSFPheatexchanger.

Wethenreviewedintexnalcalculations todetermine ifsafetyrelatedheatexchangers hadbeenmodeledproperly.

Thisreviewconcluded thatthreeheatexchangers wereincorrectly modeledinouranalyses.

Specifically, theCCWheatexchanger, thedieselgenerator jacketwatercooler,anddieselgenerator lubeoilcoolerwerealsomodeledascounterflow heatexchangers, wheninrealitytheyareTEMA-Edesign.Reviewswereperformed toensurethattheseheatexchanger modelingerrorsdidnotchangetheconclusions ofthesecalculations.

Theseinternalcalculations willberevisedtoensurethattheheatexchangers aremodeledproperlybyMarch31,1998.ITEMNO.URI-012IssueApparentlackofdocumentation todemonstrate thatthecontrolroomequipment wasqualified atworstcaseoperating temperatures inthe

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2Page7controlroom.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion ZII(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2E2).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Thisissueaddresses theoperation oftheplantwithlakewatertemperatures above764F.Restrictions havebeenplacedonplantoperation suchthattheplantwillnotbeoperatedwithlaketemperatures above76'.Theserestrictions willremaininplaceuntilallanalyses, 10CFR50.59safetyevaluations, andthenecessary approvals arecompletetochangethetemperature.

Procedure OHI-4013hasbeenrevisedtodirecttheuseofprocedure 12-OHP4021.019.001 ifthecirculating waterinlettemperature approaches 74.5'.Procedure 12-0HP-4021.019.001 hasbeenrevisedtorequirethatifthefloatingonehouraveragecirculating watertemperature isgreaterthan75',unitshutdownshallbeinitiated inbothunits.Thisprocedure acquiresthatifthecirculating waterinlettemperature isgreaterthan75.5',asindicated byinstrumentation, theESWsystemistobeconsidered inoperable.

Allactionsarecomplete.

ITEMNO.URX-013IssueApparentfailuretoanalyzeallpotential failuremodesofthe.instrument airsystemthatcouldrenderredundant trainsofsafetyrelatedequipment inoperable.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion IZI(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2F).

,StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.DCP854addedsafetyvalvestoprovideoverpressure protection forthecontrolairheadersintheturbinebuilding, auxiliary

building, andcontainment.

Althoughthismodification wascompleted, webecameconcerned thatpressureaccumulation inthepipingtothecontainment airheadersafetyvalvescouldbeexcessive andwouldnotensurethatallcomponents servedbytheheaderwouldbeadequately protected fromoverpressure.

Anadditional modification tocorrectthisconcernisinprogressandwillbecompleted priortoenteringmode4.ITEMNO.URI-014IssueOperation oftheplantwithCCW-supplied flowstosafetyrelatedandimportant tosafetycomponents contrarytothevaluesstatedintheUFSAR.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion ZIZ,(DesignControl)(E1.2.1.2G)

.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page8StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Aflowrangewasestablished foreachcomponent cooledbytheCCWsystem.Specifically, aminimumflowratewasestablished (orverifiedtobecorrect)toensurethateachcomponent receivedsufficientcoolingandamaximumflowratewasestablished toprotecteachcomponent fromdamagingflowrates.Currentflowrateshavebeenconfirmed withinthenewlimitsandtheselimitswillbeincorporated intotheflowbalanceprocedure priortoitsnextuse.WithrespecttothespecificissueoftheCCWflowtotheRCPthermalbarrierheatexchanger, theminimumflowrequirement wasdecreased from35gpmto24gpm.A10CFR50.59evaluation hasbeencompleted andthenewflowrateswillbeincludedinthenextUFSARupdate.ITEMNO.URI-015IssueApparentfailuretoestablish controlstopreventpotential operation oftheCCWsystemwiththeCCWheatexchangers abovethemaximumfoulingfactorvalueestablished bytheGL89-13testingprogram.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III,(DesignControl)(El.2.1.2H).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Maximumallowable CCWheatexchanger foulingwithinthegenericletter(GL)89-13servicewaterprogramhasbeensetatthedesignmaximumfoulingvalue.Thisacceptance limitdoesnotprovidemargintoensurethatheat.exchanger foulingstaysbelowthemaximumlimitduringthenextoperating cycle.Asapointofinformation, sincetheGL89-13programhasbeeninplace,theCCWheat'exchangers havebeenvisuallyinspected duringallexceptonerefueling outage,whereinspection wasnotnecessary foroneheatexchanger basedontestresultsindicating zerofouling.Whenheatexchangers wereopenedforinspection, theywerecleanedtoensurethey.enteredthesuccessive operating cyclewithminimumfouling.Theprocedure usedtocollectdataandmeasureCCWheatexchanger foulingfactorwillberevisedpriortoitsnextuse,unit1refueling outagein1999,toincludeamarginbetweentheacceptance limitandthemaximumfoulinglimit.Thisprovidesassurance thatthemaximumfoulingwillnotbeexceededduringthenextoperating cycle.Instrumentation uncertainties willbeconsidered forinclusion indetermination ofthetestacceptance criteria.

ITEMNO.VRZ-016IssuePerformance testingoftheemergency dieselgenerator (EDG)heatexchangers wasnotabletodetectdegradation, asrequiredbythe Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page9licensee's GL89-13testingprogram.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion XI,(TestControl)(E1.2.1.2H).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Themethodcurrently usedtotrendEDGheatexchanger degradation isineffective becauseheatexchanger outlettemperature iscontrolled byautomatic valvesthatregulatetemperature.

Pastinternalinspection oftheseheatexchangers hasdemonstrated thattheseheatexchangers areingoodcondition, andprovidesassurance ofcurrentoperability.

Specifically, theEDGaftercoolers, whicharethefirstofthreeEDGheatexchangers arrangedinseries,areinspected everyotherrefueling outage,andhavebeenobservedtobeclean,withtheexception ofsomeminorsedimentthatcollectsinthebottomoftheheatexchangers whenisolated.

Inspection oftheothertwoheatexchangers, thoughnotonapredetermined periodicity, hasproducedsimilarresults.ThemethodtotrendEDGheatexchanger degradation isunderreviewtodetermine ifamethodology canbedevisedthatprovidesmoremeaningful results.TheGL89-13programwillberevisedbyJune30,1998,toeitherincorporate amoremeaningful testmethod,orincludeabetterdefinedscheduleforinspecting theinternals oftheseheatexchangers.

ITEMNO.URI-017IssueInadequate justification toreturntheunit2250VDCbatterytrainCDtoanoperablestatus(E1.3.1.2).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Thetwoissuesidentified withthisfindingweretheoperability determination madeon,cell34oftheunit2trainCDbattery,andthelengthoftimethecellwasindividually charged.Theoperability determination wasbasedonT/Ssurveillance 4.8.2.3.2.a, whichdoesnotspecifically requirethebatterycelltobeonfloatchargewhenreadingthevoltage.The51dayequalizechargeoncell34wasexcessive.

Theseissuesarebeingaddressed byrevisingT/Ssurveillances forthe250VDCbatterytotheWestinghouse standardT/Ssurveillance forbatteries.

Inconcertwiththisefforttemporary procedure 12-IHP5021.EMP.009 willberevisedtolimittheamountoftimeanindividual cellcanbeonequalizechargewhenmakingoperability decisions, andwhenperforming corrective maintenance activities.

Theprocedure revisionwillbecompletebyMarch2,1998.Asapointofclarification, cell34wascarefully inspected andnomineralcrystallization wasidentified.

Insupportofourinitialoperability determination, cell34wasremovedfromserviceandcapacitytested.Theresultsshowedcapacityof116.9%ofratedcapacity.

Thistestwasperformed Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page10severalmonthsafterthecellwasremovedfromserviceandplacedonfloatcharge.ITEMNO.URI-018IssueApparentfailureto'aintain adequatedesignandprocedural controlsthatallowedtheplanttooperateinmodes5and6withoutanadequatevolumeofboratedwaterintheotherunit'sRWSTinordertomeetappendixRrequirements.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Critexion IIZ,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2A).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Instances wereidentified wheretheRWSTlevelfellbelowthe87,000galrequiredforappendixR.TheT/Ssrequirethatafirewatchbepostedinapplicable locations iftheminimumwaterlevelisnotrestoredwithin7days.Therewerefiveinstances wherethe7dayswasexceeded.

Ineachofthefiveinstances therearerecordsthatindicateafirewatchwaspostedintheapplicable places.Thefirewatch isallowedasanalternative forshutdowncapability perT/Ss.Therefore, theT/Sswerenotviolated.

DuringtheAEinspection twocalculations wereidentified onthesubjectoftheRWSTminimumrequiredwaterleveltosupportAppendixR(ECP1-2-Z9-03 andTH-90-02).

AlthoughtheresultsofTH-90-02wereacceptable, subsequent totheAEinspection, anewcalculation ENSM971001CVwasdeveloped thatbetterdocuments themethodology andincorporates additional conservatisms.

Thisnewcalculation requires131,921gallonsintheRWST.Calculation TH90-02hasbeensuperseded.

Calculation 1-2-Z9-03 hasbeenrevisedtoremovethereference totheoldcalculation andreference ENSM971001CV.Thefollowing procedures havebeenrevisedtoincorporate themoreconservative results.ofENSM971001CV:\1/2-OHP4030.STP.030 1/2-OHP4021.018.0051/2-OHP4021.018.008 PMP-4100Theonlyactionsthatremainaretorevisethedescriptions intheAppendixRdesignbasesdocumentandthefireprotection programmanual.Theserevisions willbecompletebyFebruary15,1998.ITEMNO.URI-019IssueApparentfailuretoperforminstrument uncertainty calculation fortheCCWheatexchanger outlettemperature loopuncertainty.

10CFRPart50AppendixB,Criterion IZZ,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2BS).

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page-llStatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Instrument uncertainty calculations havebeencompleted fortheCCWheatexchanger outlettemperature anddocumented inECPs1-WSI-04and2-WSZ-04.

Operating procedures havebeenmodifiedtoprovideamargintoCCWsystemtemperature limitsbasedonthecalculated instrument uncertainty.

Allactionshavebeencompleted.

ITEMNO.URZ-020IssueApparentfailuretoperforminstrument uncertainty calculation fortheESWintaketemperature loopuncertainty.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion ZZZ,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2B6).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.ECP-12-WO-01 wascompleteanddetermined theuncertainty ofthecirculating waterinlettemperature instrumentation.

Thisanalysisshowedtheuncertainties associated withthisinstrumentation canaffectoperation atelevatedlaketemperatures.

Therefore, interimmeasures(Engineering Technical Direction Memo97-095),havebeenputinplacetobenchmark diverseinstalled instrumentation whentheindicated circulating watertemperature reachestheuncertainty limit.Thebenchmarking entailscrosscalibrating theplantprocesscomputertemperature indication withtraceable M&TE.Thisallowstheuseofthisinstalled instrumentation withagreatlyreducederrormarginforthecirculating waterinlettemperature limit.12-OHP-4021.019.001 hasbeenrevisedtoperformthebenchmarking priorto724F,andtorequirethatifthh,"floatingonehour~averagecirculating'water temperature isgreaterthan754F,unitshutdownshallbeinitiated.

Further,at75.5',theESWsystemistobedeclaredinoperable.

ADCP174fearincreasing allowable laketemperature hasbeeninitiated.

Thecalculations forindication uncertainty willbereviewedandnewdirection

provided, pendingfinalimplementation ofthisdesignchange.ITEMNO.VRI-021IssueApparentfailuretoperforminstrument uncertainty calculation forthecontrolroomtemperature loopuncertainty.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.2B7)

.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page12StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.ECP-1-B1-07 andECP-2-Bl-07 havebeenrevisedandincorporated into1/2-OHP4030.STP.030.

Allactionswerecompleted October24,1997.ITEMNO.URZ-022IssueApparentprogrammatic deficiency withtheSetpointControlProgramconcerning theabilitytoperformandaccountforinstrument uncertainties.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III,(DesignControl)(E1.3.2.3).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Theresultsofuncertainty calculations werenoteffectively incorporated intoprocedures.

Theinstrument uncertainty programisbeingexpandedasdescribed inAEP:NRC:1260G3, attachment 3.Allactionsaretobecompleted bytheendofDecember1998.ITEMNO.URZ-023IssuePerforming changestosafetyrelatedprocedures withoutapparentproperreviewand/orapproval, contrarytotheprovisions ofT/S6.5.3.1and10CFRPart50.59requirements.

(El.5.2A)

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Therewerethreespecificprocedures discussed.

~01-0HP.4023-ES1.3.

Asafetyevaluation datedOctober29,1997,wasperformed for01-OHP4023-ES1.

3Revision5toaddressthecontainment waterlevelpermissive andoperatorrelianceoncontainment sumpwaterlevelinstrumentation.

Thesafetyscreening andsafetyevaluation wereperformed priortoprocedure approval.~12-OHP.4021.019.001.A10CFR50.59screening datedAugust21,1997,wasperformed ontheprocedure revisiontospecifythatthecirculating waterinlettemperature of76~Fisthedesignbasestemperature limit.Thesafetyevaluation screening wascompleted priortoprocedure approval.

Procedure 12-OHP-4021.019.001 hasalsobeenrevisedtorequirethatifthefloatingonehouraveragecirculating watertemperature isgreaterthan754Funitshutdownshallbeinitiated inbothunits.Thisprocedure alsorequiresthatifthecirculating waterinlettemperature isgreaterthan75.54F,asindicated byinstrumentation, theESWsystemistobeconsidered inoperable.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page13Procedure OHZ-4013hasbeenrevisedtodirecttheuseofprocedure 12-OHP4021.019.001 ifthecirculating waterinlettemperature approaches 74.5'.~2-OHP.4021.

016.003.A10CFR50.59safetyevaluation datedOctober17,1997,wasperformed toestablish theappropriate CCWoperating temperature limitforrapidRCScooldown.

Thissafetyevaluation wascompleted priortoprocedure approval.

Topreventtemporary non-intent changesfrombeingmadetoprocedures withoutproperreview,PMSO.179hasbeenissuedandPMI-2010hasbeenrevisedtoprohibittherevisionofprocedures withoutanapproved10CFR50.59screening beingcompleted.

ITEMNO.URI-024IssueApparentfailuretomaintainproperdesigncontrolregarding industrystandards andcodes.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III,(DesignControl)(E1.5.2C).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Therewerefourinstances discussed.

~Conflictinpipingspecification andclassification ofCCWpipinginsidecontainment.

Pipingspecification ES-PIPE-1013-QCN ClassM-12hasbeenrevisedtoreflectthecorrectdesignpressureof2485psiganddesigntemperature of5504F.Athermalanalysishasbeenperformed forthepipesupportsassociated withthesectionsofpipinginquestion.

~Deviation fromB31.1coderequirement foroverpressure protection intheCCWsystem.FourCCWvalvesineachunitwereidentified asintervening stopvalves.Thesevalveshavebeenlockedopenandarenowincludedinprocedure OHP4030.STP.035, "Controlled ValvePositionLogging".

This:willensurethatthepositionofthese.va'ivesis'hecked onamonthlybasis.Thesevalvesarenolongerconsidered intervening stopvalves.~RHRlowpressureinterlock duringmode4.InourletterAEP:NRC:1278, datedSeptember 19,1997,aT/Schangetodeletethisinterlock wasrequested.

Amendments 219forunit1and203forunit2wereapprovedonDecember10,1997.~Overpressure protection fortheCCWheatexchangers.

Overpressure protection isprovidedforthetubeside.Nooverpressure protection isprovidedfortheshellside.Anevaluation wasperformed thatconcluded thattherearenoCCWshellsidepressureincreases resulting fromincreased CCWandESWtemperatures orexternalsourcesthatcouldcausetheCCWinternalpressuretoexceedthedesignpressureof150psi.A10CFR50.59evaluation wasperformed forrevisingtheUFSARtoincludeafootnotetoTable9.5-1,clarifying'hat theCCWheatexchangers weremanufactured toASMEB&PVCode,SectionVIIZ,1968edition,butinstalled inaccordance withUSASB31.1,1967edition.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2Page14ITEMNO.URZ-025IssueApparentfailuretomaintainadequatedesigncontrolandfollowestablished procedures forequipment abandoned inplace.10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion III,(DesignControl)(E1.5.2D).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Areviewofeachplantsystemwillbeledbythesystemengineerforthepurposeof'dentifying equipment thatisnolongerusedoruseful.Equipment thatfallsintothiscategoryandhasnotbeenabandoned inplacethroughthedesignchangeprocessshallbeprocessed throughtheprojectacceptance/design changeprocess.Thisreviewwillalsoconfirmthatequipment previously abandoned inplacehasbeenappropriately taggedasabandoned inplace.Thesereviewswillbecompleted byMay1,1998.ITEMNO.URZ-026IssueApparentfailuretomaintainadequatedrawingcontrolthathasthepotential toimpactplantoperating procedures, andmaintenance activities thatusedrawings.

10CFRPart50,AppendixB,Criterion IIZ,(DesignControl)(E1.5.2E).

'tatus~Item4(a):CCWflowratesareshowninconsistently ondrawing1OP-1-5135, revision33.Thisdrawingwascorrected byremovingflowrateinformation forallitemsotherthanpumps.Thiswasdonebecausetheflowratesaredefinedinotherdocuments.

Wedonothavea,requirement toshowb'ranchlineflowrateson,ourflowdiagrams.,

Designguideline no.0202-1(n),'has beenupdatedtoensurethatflowrateswillbeconsistently eliminated fromflowdiagramsassectionsoftheflowdiagramsarerevised.~Item4(b):Ahorizontal perforated plate(grating) wasshownontwosectionviewsonmasonrydrawing1-2-3178-14.

Thegratingwasremovedviathe1979RFCDC-12-2361.

Atthattime,theprimarysteeldrawing12-3902,revision4,wasmarkeduptoshowthatthegratingshouldberemovedandtheremovalwasnotedintherevisionbox.Becausemasonrydrawing1-2-3178-14 referenced backtotheprimarysteeldrawing12-3902concerning thisgratingremoval,thegratingwouldnothavebeenreinstalled basedonthemasonrydrawing.Theprimarysteeldrawing1-2-3178wascorrected withinformation providedthroughCR97-2344.~Item4(c):Anoteconcerning thetemporary wiringofapressureswitchassociated withthespareCCWpumphadsomeincorrect wirenumbers.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page15In1983and1984thesubjectdrawingswereenhancedtoclarifysomeconfusion withwireidentification.

Theenhancement causedthesubjectnotetobemisleading.

Drawings1-93011,1-93048,2-93011and2-93048werecorrected withinformation providedthroughCR97-2304.Allitemsarecomplete.

ITEMNO.URZ-027IssueApparentfailuretoadequately translate designbasesassumptions intoPlantProcedure OHP4021.001.004, PlantCooldownfromHotStandbytoColdShutdown.

10CFRPa'rt50,AppendixB,Criterion III,(DesignControl)(1.5.2F).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.1/2-OHP4021.001.004 and1/2-OHP4021.017.002 havebeenrevisedtoprovidetheoperatorwiththeguidancenecessary forsafeoperation oftheCCWsystem.1/2-OHP4021.001.004 nowhaveaprecaution toverifythattheCCWheatexchanger flowisintherangeof8,000-9,000gpm.1/2-OHP4021.017.002 nowhaveaprecaution tomaintainCCWflowthroughtheRHRheatexchanger between5,000and5,500gpm.Allitemsarecomplete.

ITEMNO.URZ-028IssueTheteamdetermined thatthelicenseehadoperatedtheplantabovethemaximumUHStemperature limitwithoutperforming a10CFR50.59evaluation, whichalsopotentially createdaunreviewed safety'question (USQ)xegarding areduction ofsafetymarginasdefinedintheT/S'asesforthe"controlroomemergency ventilation temperature limitof954F(E.1.2.2E[1]).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Procedure OHI-4013hasbeenrevisedtodirecttheuseofprocedure 12-OHP4021.019.001 ifthecirculating waterinlettemperature approaches 74.5F.Procedure 12-OHP-4021.019.001 hasbeenrevisedtorequirethatifthefloatingonehouraveragecirculating watertemperature isgreaterthan754Funitshutdownshallbeinitiated inbothunits.Thisprocedure requiresthatifthecirculating waterinlettemperature isgreaterthan75.54F,asindicated byinstrumentation, theESWsystemistobeconsidered inoperable.

Theserestrictions willremaininplaceuntilallanalysesand,10CFR50.59safetyevaluations andnecessary approvals arecompletetochangethetemperature.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page16Allactionsarecomplete.

ITEMNO.URZ-029IssueThelicensee's 10CFR50.59evaluation, datedMarch11,1996,andMarch20,1996,respectively, thatwasperformed toevaluatetheconsequences ofthe1996unit2full-core offload,failedtorecognize thesignificance thattheCCWheatexchanger couldnotperformitsfunctionunderthedesignbasesassumptions thatwerestatedintheUFSARandotherlicensing documentation.

Inaddition, thelicenseealsofailedtoaddressUFSARSection9.4,regarding thecriteriaforspentfuelpool(SFP)coolingtime-to-boileventsandsubsequently failedtoidentifythattheconclusions reachedintheevaluation wouldhavepotentially reducedthetime-to-boiling intheSFP,giventheassumptions statedintheSFPloadingcalculation andintheUFSAR.Reduction inthetimetoboilingcriteriapotentially impactstheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportandisanapparentUSQ(E1.2.1.2C 1).Additionally, thissafetyevaluation failedtoidentifythatadualCCW/ESWtrainoutagewithoneunitinrefueling andtheotherunitatpower,wascontrarytotheUFSARassumptions andplacedtheplantinanunanalyzed condition andoutsideofthedesignbases.Thiscondition alsopotentially increased theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreport,creatingthepotential foraUSQ(E.l.2.1.2D).

StatusWepartially agreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.TheMarch1996cyclespecificanalysisdetermined thepeakSFPbulktransient temperature tobeincompliance withthedesignbaseslimitdiscussed insection9.4oftheUFSAR,whichfulfilled ourcommitment madetotheNRC.inourletterAEP:NRC:1202A, datedFebruary1;1996.Theanalysiswasconservative becauseitassumedfuelmovementbegan100hoursaftershutdown, eventhoughfuelmovementwasprohibited forthefirst168hoursbyT/Ss.Thisoverc;onservatism causedtheanalysistoincorrectly demonstrate aneedforanadministrative CCWtemperature limitbelowtheallowable designbasesCCWtemperature.

However,the1997cyclespecificanalysesdemonstrate, byboundingpreviousoffloads, thatthepeakSFPbulktransient temperature designbaseswouldnothavebeenviolatedduringthe1996refueling outage,evenwithouttheadministrative CCWtemperature limitsconservatively imposed.Therefore, theCCWheatexchanger wascapableofperforming itsdesignfunction.

TheSFPanalysesofrecord(approved bySERdatedJanuary14,1993)indicated thatthetimetoboilbasiswouldbeviolatedforabounding(fullSFP)singleSFPcoolingtrainfullcoredischarge proceeding attheminimumT/Ssubcriticality holdtime.Therefore, thisparameter shouldhavebeenevaluated atthepartialSFPloadingpriortotheunit2fullcoredischarge in1996.Failuretoevaluatethetimetoboilcouldhavepotentially allowedtheSFPtobeplacedinacondition outsideofitsdesignbases.However,

'~Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page17the1997cyclespecificanalysesdemonstrate, byboundingpreviousoffloads, thatthetimetoboilbaseswasnotviolatedduringthe1996unit2refueling outage.Considering thedeficiencies described belowinthereviewofthedualtrainCCWoutageforunit2in1996,thiswasacondition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Thecontingency actionsforrecovering SFPcoolingduringtheunit21996refueling outageweresuchthattheplantwascapableofrestoring unit2CCWwithin1.5hours,assumingnoerrorsorenvironmental effects.Greaterthanthreehourswouldhavebeenavailable beforereachingthepeakSFPbulktransient temperature following anunexpected lossofCCWfromunit1.Therequiredtimetoimplement thecontingency actionswasnotadequately reviewedtofullycreditmanualrestoration ofCCWflowfromunit2following anunexpected lossofCCWflowfromunit1.DualtrainCCWoutageswillnotbescheduled duringrefueling outagesuntilanalysesareperformed toensuretheSFPdesignbaseswillnotbeviolatedandadequatereviewsareperformed toensurethatanUSQdoesnotexist.Asapointofinformation, HoltecInternational iscurrently performing aSFPstoragecapacityboundinganalysistocalculate thepeakSFPbulktransient temperature andtimetoboilforafullcoredischarge totheSFP,assumingoperation ofasingletrainofSFPcoolingatUFSARdesignbasesminimumflowsandmaximumCCWtemperatures.

Thisanalysis, whencomplete, isexpectedtoeliminate theneedforcyclespecificpeakSFPtemperature (ascommitted inourletterAEP:NRC:1202A, datedFebruary1,1996)andtimetoboilevaluations.

ITEMNO.URZ-030IssueThe10CFR50.59safetyevaluation thatwasperformed bythelicenseeforrevision2,datedJune1992,toEOPOHP4023.ES-1.3 wasnot.effective inidentifying thattherevisionwascreatingasinglefailurevulnerability thatcouldrenderoneRHRpump,andbothsafetyrelatedtrainsofSIandCCpumpsinoperable.

Subsequent procedural revisions (revisions 3and4,datedJanuary1996,andJanuary1997,respectively) failedtoidentifythesinglefailurevulnerability (E1.1.1.2D).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.1/2-OHP4023.ES-1.3 wererevisedtotransferboththeeastandwestRHRpumpsfromtheRWSTtotherecirculation sump.Subsequent tothetransferoftheRHRpumpstotherecirculation sump,RHRsupplywillbeestablished totheSIpumpsandtheCCPs.AftertheRHRsupplyisestablished totheSIpumpsandCCPs,theirRWSTsuctionvalveswillbeclosed.Thenewswitchover sequencewillprecludethesituation whereasingleactivefailurewouldcausearedundant trainfrombeingimpacted.

Thisrevisionwasimplemented onJanuary2,1998.Theprocedure revision(revision 2),whichcreatedthesinglefailurevulnerability, occurredin1992.Sincethattime,the Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page18reviewprocessforEOPshasbeenimproved.

Currently, therearemulti-discipline reviewsfromtechnically qualified personnel.

Thisprocesshasbeeneffective inidentifying andcorrecting procedural problems.

Thenatureoftheincorporation oftheunacceptable ECCSlineupinrevision2ofOHP4023.ES-1.3 wouldsuggestthatthiswasanisolatedcase.Asthiseventappearstobeanisolatedeventandtherehavebeenimprovements implemented intheEOPreviewprocess,noadditional preventative actionswerewarranted.

Asdescribed inattachment 4toourletterAEP:NRC:1260G3,acontributing factortotheECCSswitchover procedure issuewastheaspectofthedesignthatcrossties theECCSsystemtrainsthroughacommonrecirculation suctionsourcefortheintermediate andhighheadinjection pumps.Weperformed areviewofothersafetysystemswithcrosstiecapabilities, eitherbetweentrainsorbetweenunits,toprovidereasonable assurance thatsinglefailurecriteriahavebeenappropriately considered andthatprocedures allowingtheuseofthecrossties havebeenproperlyevaluated.

SystemsreviewedwereAFW,ESW,CVCS,CCWandelectrical distribution.

Nooperability concernswereidentified withtheuseofsafetysystemcrossties.

Policy800000-POL-2300-04, "Definition andUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Attachment 3ofthispolicyprovidesspecificdirection regarding thedefinition anduseofthe"singlefailurecriteria",

whichisdefinedinthebodyofthepolicy.Withinthetextofattachment 3ofthispolicy,aspecificexampleofan"activefailure"iscitedas"thefailuretocontinuetorun".Trainingregarding thispolicywasinitiated onNovember4,1997.Theinitialtrainingforpersonnel impactedbytheissuanceofthispolicywascompleted inNovember1997.Allactionsarecomplete.

ITEMNO.URZ-031Issue~In1996(unit2)and.1997(unit1),thelicenSeefilledin-thecontainment recirculation sump'oof'ent holeswithoutperforming a10CFR50.59evaluation.

Thelicenseestatedthattheholesweresealedbecausetheywerenotindicated onanyplantdesigndrawingsandbecausetheycouldnotlocateanydesignrequirement, forconsideration oftheventholes(E.1.1.1.2E 1).StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.TheholeswerereopenedandFMEprotection provided.

Toaddresstheconcernforchangesbeingmadetodesignbasesinformation withouta10CFR50.59evaluation, Policy800000-POL-2300-04,"Definition andUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Thispolicydefinesdesignbasesasinformation thatidentifies thespecificfunctions tobeperformed byastructure, system,orcomponent ofafacility, andthespecificvaluesorrangesofvalueschosenforcontrolling parameters asreference boundsfordesign.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page19Trainingregarding thispolicywascompleted inNovember1997.Weacknowledge thattheNRChasexpressed concernsintheCALfollowupinspection regarding theprocessfollowedinreinstalling theventholes.ITEMNO.URI-032IssueProcedure 01/02-OHP 4021.016.003, "Operation oftheComponent CoolingWaterSystemDuringReactorStartupandNormalOperation<<,

wasrevisedtoremovethestatement,

"...allowing threehoursatCCWtemperatures of1204F.<<Thelicenseeimplemented therevisionundertheauspicesofanon-intent procedural change,asallowedbyT/S6.5.3.1.However,theteamdetermined thatthisrevisionconstituted achangetotheintentoftheprocedure, contrarytotheconclusion reachedbythelicensee(E1.2.1.2C).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.A10CFR50.59safetyevaluation datedOctober17,1997,wasperformed toestablish theappropriate CCWtemperature limit.PMS0.179wasissuedandPMI-2010hasbeenrevisedtoprohibittherevisionofprocedures withoutanapproved10CFR50.59screening beingcompleted.

ITEMNO.URI-033IssueThelicenseeconsistently operatedtheplantwithlessthantheUFSAR-specifiedCCWflowsthroughtheRCPthermalbarriersandwithoutperforming a10CFR50.59evaluation.

ThisissueisaconcernbecausetheCCWsystemhasoperatedabovethemaximumdesignbasesCCWtemperature limitof95',,andwasallowedtooperateattemperatures upto,1204F,withoutevaluating theimpact"ontheRCPthermalbarrierswiththereducedCCWflows(E1.2.1.2G).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Aflowrangewasestablished foreachcomponent cooledbytheCCWsystem.Specifically,aminimumflowratewasestablished (orverifiedtobecorrect)toensurethateachcomponent receivedsufficientcoolingandamaximumflowratewasestablished toprotecteachcomponent fromdamagingflowrates.A10CFR50.59evaluation wascompleted andtheminimumflowrequirement forthethermalbarrierswasdecreased from35gpmto24gpm.'TheUFSARwillberevisedinthenextscheduled update.Policy800000-POL-2300-04 "Definition andUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Trainingregarding thispolicywascompleted inNovember1977.

Attachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page20ZTEMNO.URZ-034IssueThelicensee"identified thattheyhaveoperatedtheplantwithoutoverpressure protection totheRHRsystem,contrarytotheassumptions statedinUFSARChapter9.3.Thischangetothedesignbasesfeaturethatprovidesoverpressureprotection totheRHRsystemwastodefeattheinterlocks associated withICM-129andIMO-128,RHRhotleginletisolation valves,whenoperating inmode4.However,thechangewasperformed withoutperforming a10CFR50.59evaluation (El.5.2C3).StatusWepartially agreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.TheRHRsystemsuctionvalvesfromtheRCSareinterlocked throughseparatechannelsofRCSpressuresignalstoprovideautomatic closureintheeventRCSpressureexceedsRHRsystemdesignpressure.

Duringshutdownconditions, theseinterlocks areeffectively defeatedbyremovingpowertothevalvestopreventalossofRHRcoolingduetoinadvertent, valveclosure.Theinterlocks areunnecessary inthisconfiguration asoverpressure protection system(LTOP).Whilethisconfiguration improvedthereliability oftheRHRsystemduringshutdownconditions, andthesurveillances oftheinterlocks wereperformed inaccordance withT/Ss,theremovalofpowertothevalveswasnotincompliance withT/Srequirements.

InourletterAEP:NRC:1278, datedSeptember 19,1997,wesubmitted aT/SchangerequesttodeletetheRHRinterlock requirement.

Amendment 219forunit1,and203forunit2,wasapprovedonDecember10,1997.Policy800000-POL-2300-04, "Definition andUseofDesignBases",wasissuedonDecember8,1997.Trainingregarding thispolicywascompleted inNovember1997.\'IAllactionsarecomplete.

ITEMIFZ-001IssueUFSARandT/Sinconsistencies withRWSTvolume(E1.4.2B).

StatusWeagreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.Thenecessary analysestoredefinetherequire'd RWSTwatervolumeaswellasaddressinstrumentation issuesoftheinstruments usedhavebeendonetosupporttherevisionoftheemergency operating procedure, whichcontrolsthetransition fromtheinjection phasetotherecirculation phase.Therevisedanalyseswereanintegralpartofthesafetyreviewdonefortheprocedure revision.

TheUFSARwillbechangedtoreflectthisredefinition duringthenextregularupdate.

cAttachment toAEP:NRC:1260G2 Page21ITEMZFI-002IssueTheRWSTandthecontainment waterlevelinstrumentation allowable outagetimes(AOTs)shouldappropriately begovernedbyconsistent AOTrequirements (E1.4.2D).Status.Wepartially agreewiththecharacterization ofthisissue.TheRWSTlevelinstrumentation (ILS)andcontainment waterlevelinstrumentation (NLI)instruments providenoautostartfunction, whichwasrecognized intheinspection report.TheILSinstrumentation providesindication only,whichisusedtoinitiatetheoperator's actionsthatmanuallyswitchtheunitfrominjection torecirculation.

TheNLIinstruments provideindication only,whichwouldbeusedintheemergency toinitiateactionsinresponsetoeventsbeyondthedesignbases.Thecontainment waterlevelinstrumentation isusedtoindicateanunmonitored diversion ofwaterfromcontainment duringinjection thatisoutsidethedesignbases.Therefore, theinjection containment waterlevelinstrumentation isnotusedtosatisfyanengineered safetyfunctionasstatedintheinspection report.Theseinstruments arecurrently coveredbythepost-accident instrumentation T/Ss.Thisisconsidered appropriate andnochangeisanticipated.

TheRWSTinstrumentation usedinconjunction withtheanalysisprovidesthenecessary indication tocontrolchangeover frominjection torecirculation.

Therearetwochannelsofinstruments providing theindication theoperatorwouldusetoinitiatetherequiredactions.Ifonlyonechannelwasavailable, theoperatorwouldstillinitiatetherequiredactions.Becausetheseinstruments havenoautostartfunctionandtheoperatorwouldinitiateactionsfromasinglechannel,ifonewasoutofservice,thecoverageoftheseinstruments" bythepost-accident instrument'ation T/Sisconsidered appropriate, ThelossofbothchannelsofRWSTlevelinstruments, resulting inthelossofallapprovedindications, wouldbecoveredbyT/S3.0.3requiring promptactionstoshutdowntheunit.Arewordedpost-accidentinstrumentation T/S3.3.3.8willbesubmitted toclarifythatthelossofbothRWSTlevelinstruments placestheunitinT/S3.0.3.TheT/SchangesubmitalwillbeprovidedbyApril30,1998.

0,Jh

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