ML17335A564

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LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A564
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1999
From: BAKKEN A C, DEPUYDT M B
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-99-024, NUDOCS 9910260103
Download: ML17335A564 (6)


Text

VA.JRSVP.XJ.REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)<<SIACCESSION NBR:9910260103

'OC.DATE:

99/10/18NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaMAUTH.Nlg!E

.'UTHORAFFILIATION DEPUYDT,M.B.

,IndianaMichiganPowerCo.BAKKEN,A.C.

IndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET05000315

SUBJECT:

LER99-024-00:on 990708,literalTSrequirements werenotmetbyaccumlator valvesurveillance.

Causedbymisjudgement madeinconversion frominitialDCCookTStoWStdTS.Submitted licenseamendrequest.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:ATERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME LPD3-1COPIESLTTRENCL11RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME STANG,JCOPIESLTTRENCL110INTERN.ILECENTERRES/DET/ERAB RGN3FILE01EXTERNAL:

LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDR11111111111111NRR/DIPM/IOLBNRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DRAA/OERAB LMITCOMARSHALLNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXT111111111111DNNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083IFULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR15ENCL15

IndianaMichiganPoweiCompanyCockNudearRaclOneCookRaceMgman.Ml491066164696lZINEMANAMICHIGANPOWEROctober18,1999UnitedStatesNudearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555Operating LicenseDPR-58DocketNo.50-315DocumentControlManager:&hlhhl~tgtgDFRSDFD RRM~~.thfllghltlghltg:

LER315/99-024-00, "LiteralTechnical Specifications Requirement NotMetByAccumulator ValveSurveillance."

Therearenocommitments identified inthissubmittal.

Sincerely, A.Christopher Bakken,IIISiteVicePresident IsrdAttachment c:S.E.Dyer,NRCRegionIIIR.P.PowersP.A.BarrettR.F.GodleyR.WhaleD.HahnRecordsCenter,INPONRCResidentInspector 9910260103 991018PDRADOCK05000315SPDRAE/':~Iaiericn's EnetgInrlnl,'r da NRCForm366U.S.NUCLEARREGUlATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYORBNo.31504(04EXPIRES06)30/2001 ESTSAATED IKSIDENPERRESPONSETOCOLDLYIATIHTISSEQPOATORY WFORMAllON CIKIECAON REOUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDIESSONSLEARNEDAREWCORPOMTED WTOTIC~PROCESSAIEIFEDBACKTOSCMSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREOARDINO BISICENESTNATETOTHEPFORllATION ANDRECORDSMANACEMENT lÃIANCHIT%Feej.IAS.NVCIEARRECIAATORY COMMISSOIL WASISNOTOIL OC20MSCC01.

PIC)TOTHEP~REDVCTION reameroleoolor),

OFRCEOFMANAOEMENT AroIROSET,wASISNrnorA DC21500FACIUlYNAME(1)TITLE(0)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315 PAGE(0)1of3LiteralTechnical Specifications Requirement NotMetByAccumulator ValveSurveillance 07DAYYEAR081999EVENTDATE(5)1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER024REVISIONNUMBER00REPORTDATE(7)MONTHDAYYEAR10181999AILINAMCookNuclearPlant2AIUTYHAMCKETNUMB05000-316 NUMOTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)OPERATING MODE(9)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFRIi:(Checkoneormore)(11)POWERLEVEL(10)020.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)

LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71OTHERSpeorrinADCraoIDerorrornNRCForm366AMs.MaryBethDepuydt,Regulatory Compliance TELEPHONE NUMBER(Inc4deAreaCode)(616)465-5901X1589COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXCAUSECOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE loEPIXSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED14)YES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE)XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15MONTHDAYAbstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJuly8,1999,duringareviewofTechnical Specifications (TS)surveillance procedures, itwasdiscovered thatTSSurveillance Requirement (SR)4.5.1.cwasnotbeingmetbytheassociated surveillance procedure.

SR4.5.1.crequiresthatpowertotheRCSaccumulator isolation valvemotoroperatorbedisconnected by,"...removalofthebreakerfromthecircuit."

Thesurveillance procedure doesnotmeettheliteralwordingofTSSR4.5.1.cinthatthebreakerisopenedandmaintained inthatpositionratherthanbeingphysically removed.ThisLERistherefore submitted inacco'rdance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),

asacondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications.

Thiscondition resultedfromamisjudgment madeintheconversion fromtheinitialD.C.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)TStotheWestinghouse StandardTechnical Specifications (STS),asdescribed inNUREG-0452.

ThewordingappearstohavebeenadoptedfromtheSTSwithoutconsidering thetypeofbreakerinstalled fortheaccumulator isolation valves.Alicenseamendment requestwillbesubmitted tochangeTSSR4.5.1.c.Acomprehensive reviewoftheadequacyofTSsurveillance testprocedures isbeingperformed aspartofRestartActionPlan¹0001,"Programmatic Breakdown inSurveillance Testing."

Theidentified condition hasnosafetysignificance becausepowerwasremovedfromtheaccumulator isolation valvecontrolcircuit,therebypreventing inadvertent valveoperation duetoasinglefailureinthevalvecontrolcircuitry.

NRCFORM366(6-1998) 0NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)2of31999-.02400TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useaddiiional copiesofNRCFormP66A)(17)Unit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownOnJuly8,1999,duringareviewofTechnical Specifications (TS)surveillance procedures, itwasdiscovered thatTSSurveillance Requirement (SR)4.5.1.cwasnotbeingmetbytheassociated surveillance procedure.

SR4.5.1.crequiresthatpowertotheRCSaccumulator isolation valvemotoroperatorbedisconnected by,"...removalofthebreakerfromthecircuit."

Thesuiveillance procedure, 01(02)-OHP-4030.STP.031, "Operation WeeklySurveillance Checks,"requirestheoperatortocheckthebreakerswitchintheOFFposition, butthebreakerisnotphysically removedfromthecubicle.Therefore, thesurveillance procedure doesnotmeettheliteralrequirement ofTSSR4.5.1.c.Thiscondition resultedfroma.misjudgment madeintheconversion fromtheinitialD.C.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)TStotheWestinghouse StandardTechnical Specifications (STS),asdescribed inNUREG-0452.

TheNUREG-0452, "Standard Technical Specifications forWestinghouse Pressurized WaterReactors,"

accumulator isolation valvesurveillance requirement appearstohavebeenadoptedwithoutconsidering Cookplantdesign.Duringconversion fromtheoriginaltotheSTS,itwaserroneously decidedthattheTSSRwouldbemetbyopeningthemoldedcasecircuitbreaker(MCCB)thatsuppliespowertotheaccumulator valveoperator, andmaintaining thebreakerintheOFFposition.

Theinvestigation hasshownthatCNPpersonnel donotconsidertheMCCBscapableofbeing"rackedout"duetotheirphysicaldesign.Instead,whendirectedtorackoutthisstyleofbreaker,personnel understand thatrackoutmeanstoplacethebreakerintheOFFposition.

Whilethesurveillance procedure actionsmeettheintentoftheTSbyplacingthebreakersintheOFFposition, theydonotmeettheliteralrequirement ofTSSR4.5.1.c.Thiscondition hasexistedsinceinitialplantstartup.OnSeptember 20,1999,thiscondition wasdetermined tobereportable; therefore, thisLERissubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),

asacondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications.

Thegapintimebetweenthediscovery dateofJuly8,1999,andthereporting dateofSeptember 20,1999,wasduetotheneedforevaluation byD.C.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)staffandmanagement duetotheextendedhistoryoftheissue.TSSR4.5.1.crequiresthatweperiodically verify,"...thatpowertotheisolation valveoperatorisdisconnected byremovalofthebreakerfromthecircuit."

ThebasisforthisTSsurveillance requirement isthat,"...astheseaccumulator isolation valvesfailtomeetsinglefailurecriteria, removalofpowertothevalvesisrequired."

ThisCNPTSsurveillance requirement andbaseswereadopteddirectlyfromNUREG-0452, andnoplant-specific changesweremadetotheCNPrequirement.

Tophysically removeabreakerfromacircuit,thebreakerisrackedout.Theterm"rackout"meanstousetheinstalled rackingmechanism tophysically movetheswitchgear breakerawayfromthebusstabssuchthatthebreakerisnolongerincontactwiththebusbars.Additionally, rackingoutabreakerdisconnects thebreakerfromthecontrolcircuitsuchthatthebreakercannotoperate.Breakersthatarecapableofbeingrackedouthavebuilt-inmechanisms toallowtherackoutoperation, andaregenerally foundonswitchgear buses.Thesafety-related accumulator isolation valvesarepoweredfromtheAux600Vswitchgear busesthroughMotorControlCenters(MCCs).ThebreakersusedontheseMCCsarenotoftheswitchgear type,andhavenomechanism forbeingNRCFORM366A(6-1998)

NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1996)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACIUTYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)3of31999-02400TEXTPfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCFormP66A)(17)rackedout.Rather,thebreakersusedaresmallMCCBs,whicharecommonforasmallloadofthistypeandvoltage.TheMCCBsarehard-wired tothesupplylinesandloadsintheMCC,andaredifficult toremovefromtheircubicles.

Theterm"rackout"doesnotapplytoMCCBs.To"electrically" removetheaccumulator isolation valveMCCBfromthecircuit,theoperatormerelyhastoopenthebreakerandmaintainitintheOFFposition.

PlacingthebreakerinOFFde-energizes controlpowertothevalveoperator.

Deliberate operatoractionbyphysically closingthebreakeratthelocalMCCpanelisrequiredtorestorevalveoperatorcontrolpower.Openingtheaccumulator valvebreakerwhenreactorsystempressureisgreaterthan2000psigpreventsthepotential foranactivefailureorinadvertent operation ofthevalveswitchfromthecontrolroomtocausethevalvestoclose.Noelectrical faultwillcausethebreakertoclose.Therefore, theintentoftheTSismet.Basedontheaboveinformation, theidentified condition hasnosafetysignificance.

Openingtheaccumulator isolation valvebreakerorremovingthebreakerfromthecircuitbothremovepowertothecircuitandpreventinadvertent valveoperation duetoasinglefailureinthevalvecontrolcircuitry.

Noimmediate corrective actionswererequiredbecausetheplantwasinanoperating Modewherethesurveillance requirement wasnotapplicable.

Alicenseamendment requestwillbesubmitted byOctober22,1999,tochangeTechnical Specifications Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1.ctoread,"Atleastonceper31dayswhentheRCSpressureisabove2000psig,byverifying thatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulator isolation valveoperator."

Aspreviously statedincorrespondence AEP:NRC:1260GH,datedMarch19,1999,"Enforcement Actions98-150,98-151,98-152and98-186,ReplytoNoticeofViolation DatedOctober13,1998,"acomprehensive reviewoftheadequacyofTSsurveillance testprocedures isbeingperformed.

ThisactionisbeingtrackedbyRestartActionPlan40001,"Programmatic Breakdown inSurveillance Testing."

NoneNRCFORM366A(6-1996)