ML17306A802

Watts Bar, Units 1 and 2, Periodic Submission for Changes Made to the WBN Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual

ML17306A802
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	11/02/2017
From:	Simmons P Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML17306A802 (185)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000 Spring City, Tennessee 37381November 2, 201710 cFR 50 410 CFR 50.71(e)U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control DeskWashington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-90 and NpF-96NRC Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 - Periodic submission forChanges Made to the WBN Technical Specification Bases andTechnical Requirements ManualReferences'.

1 .TVA letter to NRC, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1Periodic Submission for Changes Made to the WBN Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual,"

datedApril 22, 201 6 (M1161 134077)NRC letter to TVA, "lssuance of Facility Operating License No.NPF-96, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2," dated October 22, ZO1S(ML 1s251As87)

The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) withcopies of changes to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) Bases and to provide copies of changes to the Unit 1 and 2 Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). Copies of the TS Bases, through Revision 13T for Unit 1and Revision 11 for Unit 2, are provided in accordance with WBN Units 1 and 2 TSSection 5.6, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program."

ln addition, copiesof changes to the wBN Units 1 and 2 TRM, through Revision 64 for Unit 1 andRevision 7 for Unit 2, ate provided in accordance with WBN TRM Section 5.1, "Technical Requirements (TR) Control Program."

These changes have been implemented at WBNduring the period since WBN Unit 1's last update (Reference

1) and since the issuanceof the operating license for WBN Unit 2 (Reference 2). These changes meet the criteriadescribed within the above control programs for which prior NRC approval is notrequired.

Both control programs require such changes to be provided to the NRC on afrequency consistent with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.71(e).

The WBN TS Bases and TRM updates for the table of contents and change pages areprovided in the enclosures.

2.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2November 2,2017Enclosures 1 and 2 to this submittal provide the WBN Unit 1 TS changes.

Enclosures 3and 4 to this submittal provide the WBN Unit 1 TRM changes.

Enclosures 5 and 6 tothis submittal provide the WBN Unit 2 TS changes.

Enclosures 7 and 8 to this submittal provide the WBN Unit 2 TRM changes.There are no new regulatory commitments in this letter. Should you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Kim Hulvey, Manager of Watts Bar SiteLicensing, at (423) 365-77 20.Respectfully, Paul SimmonsSite Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Enclosures:

1 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases - Table of Contents2 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Specifications Bases - Changed pages3 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual - Table of Contents4 - WBN Unit 1 Technical Requirements Manual - Changed pages5 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases - Table of Contents6 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases - Changed pages7 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual - Table of Contents8 - WBN Unit 2 Technical Requirements Manual - Changed pagescc (Enclosures):

NRC RegionalAdministrator

- Region llNRC Senior Resident lnspector

- Watts Bar Nuclear plantNRR Project Manager - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant ENCLOSURE 1WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPEGIFICATION BASESTABLE OF CONTENTSE-1 TABLE OF CONTENTSLIST OF FIGURESLtsT oF ACRONYMS

........................

viLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ........,.,..

ViiiB 2.0 SAFEW LIMITS (SLs)............

...8 2.0-1B 2.1.1 Reactor Core SLs ...... B 2.0-1B 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ... B 2.0-8B30B 3.0B 3.1B 3.1 .1B 3.1 .2B 3.1 .3B 3.1 .4B 3.1 .5B 3.1 .6B 3.1 .7B 3.1 .8B 31.9B 3 1 10B 3.2B 3.2.1B 3.2.2B 3.2.3B 3.2.4B 3.3B 3.3.1B 3.3.2B 3.3.3B334B 3.3.5B 3.3.6B 3.3.7B338LrMrrNG CONDTTON FOR OPEMTTON (LCO)APPlrCABrlrrY............................B 3.0-1SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR)APPLrCABlLlry..........

............8 3.0-10REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .....8 3.1-1SHUTDO\A/I{

MARGTN (SDM) T"w > 200"F ......8 3.1-1SHUTDO\ N MARGIN (SDM) T"w < 200'F ......83.1-7 Core Reactivity.................

..............8 3.1-12ModeratorTemperature Coefficient (MTC)..........

..................8 3.1-18Rod Group Alignment Limits...........

....................

B 3.1-24Shutdown Bank lnsertion Limits........

.................8 3.1-35ControlBank lnsertion Limits ........8 3.140Rod Position lndication.....

B 3.148PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions MODE 1 ...................

...............8 3.1-55PHYSlCSTESTSExceptionsMODE2..................

...............B3.1$2 PO\A/ER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS ..........83.2-1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FO(Z)) .. .. . .......83.2-1 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot ChannelFactor (F"aH).........

..................8 3.2-12AxtAt FLUXDTFFERENCE (AFD).. . . . ..........8 3.2-19QUADRANTPO\

/ERTlLTRATlO(OPTR)

......83.2-24 INSTRUMENTATION,......

..B 3.3.1Reactor Trip System (RTS) 1nstrumentation................................................

B 3.3-1Eng ineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation................

....................B 3.3-O4Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation................

...8 3.3-121Remote Shutdown System ............B 3.3-141Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG)Start lnstrumentation

..............B 3.3-147Containment Vent lsolation lnstrumentation............

B 3.3-154Control Room Emergency Ventilation System(CREVS) Actuation lnstrumentation................

................

B 3.3-163Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)Actuation lnstrumentation................

.............8 3.3-171(continued)

Revision 90Watts Bar-Unit 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.4B 3.4.1B 3.4.2B 3.4.3B 3.4.4B 3.4.5B 3.4.6B 3.4.7B3.48B 3.4.9B 3.4.10B 3.4.11B 3.4.12B 3.4.1 3B 3.4.14B 3.4.15B 3.4.16B 3.4.17B 3.5B 3.5.1B 3.5.2B 3.5.3B 3.5.4B35sB 3.6B 3.6.1B 3.6.2B36.3B 3.6.4B36.sB36.6B 3.6.7B36.8B 3.6.9B 3.6.10B 3 6.11B 3.6.12B 3.6.1 3B 3.6.14B 3.6.15REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)..........

..........8 3.4-1RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits B 3.4-1RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticahty

. ........

... .............

B 3.4*RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits...........

.............B 3.4-9RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2.........

................8 3.4-17RCS Loops-MODE 3...................

....................83.4-21 RCS Loops-MODE 4...................

....................B 3.4-27RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Fi11ed............

.....8 3.4-33RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled.....

.....B 3.4-38Pressurizer..

...............8 3.44'lPressurizerSafetyValves

.............B 3.446Pressurizer Power Operated ReliefValves (PORVS)......

................8 3.4-5'lCold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) B 3.4-58RCS Operational 1EAKAGE..................

...........B 3.4-74RCS Pressure lsolation Valve (PlV) Leakage.......

..................8 3.4-81RCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation................

................8 3.4-87RCS Specific Activity B 3.4-93Steam Generator (SG) Tube lntegrity

...............8 3.4-99EMERGENCY CORE COOLTNG SYSTEMS (ECCS) ....................B 3.5-1Accumulators

...........B 3.5-1ECCS-Operating..........

..............8 3.5-10ECCS-Shutdown..........

.............8 3.5-20Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST).......

.....83.5-24 Seallnjection F1ow.............

............8 3.5-31CoNTAlNMENT SYSTEMS..................

.B 3.6-1Containment

...............8 3.6-1Containment Air Locks ...................8 3.6*Containment lsolation Valves .......8 3.6-14Containment Pressure......

.............8 3.6-28Containment Air Temperature...............

.............

B 3.6-31Containment Spray Systems..................

...........B 3.6-35Hydrogen Recombiners

- Deleted .....................B 3.6-43Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS) ..................8 3.6.49Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) ....B 3.6-55Air Return System (ARS). .... . .....B 3.660lce Bed ..8 3.6-65lce Condenser Doors.......

83.6-74Divider Barrier lntegrity........

..........8 3.6-84Containment Recirculation Drains . B 3.6-90Shield Building..................

..............8 3.6-95(continued)

Revision 82,94Watts Bar-Unit 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS (conttnued)

B 3.7B 3.7.1B 3.7.2B 3.7.3B 3.7.4B37.5B 3.7.6B 3.7.7B37.8B 3.7.9B 3.7.10B 3.7.11B 3.7.12B 3.7.1 3B 3.7.14B 3.7-1 5B 3.7-16B 3.7-17B 3.8B 3.8.1B 3.8.2B 3.8.3B 3.8.4B 3.8.5B386B 3.8.7B 3.8.8B38.9B 3.8.10B 3.9B 3.9.1B 3.9.2B3.93B 3.9.4B3.95B396B 3.9.7B39.8B 3.9.9B 3 9.10PLANT SYSTEMS,..

..........B 3,7.1Main Steam SafetyValves (MSSVS)......

...........8 3.7-1Main Steam lsolation Valves (MSlVs) 83.7-7Main Feedwater lsolation Valves (MFlVs)and Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVS)and Associated Bypass Va1ves..........

........

B 3.7-13Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs)......

..............8 3.7-20Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW System.........

..........8 3.7-24Condensate Storage Tank (CST) .83.7-UComponent Cooling System (CCS)..........

.......8 3.7-38Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW System........

.............8 3.743Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)...........

....83.748 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) .......B 3.7-51Control Room Emergency Air Temperature ControlSystem (CREATCS).

B 3.7-58Aufliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)......

........8 3.7$2Fuelstorage PoolWater Level............

...............B 3.768Secondary Speclfic Activity.................

...............8 3.7-71Spent FuelAssembly Storage ......8 3.7-75Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown....

................8 3.7-78Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System Shutdown....

B 3.7-83ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS...

.....8 3.8-1AC Sources-Operating

..............B 3.8-1AC Sources-Shutdown....

..........B 3.8-37DieselFuelOil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air................

B 3.843DC Sources-Operating....

..........8 3.8-54DC Sources-Shutdown....

..........8 3.8-70Battery CellParameters...............

..83.8-74 lnverters-Operating........

............8 3.8-81lnverters-Shutdorarn

...................B 3.8-85Distribution Systems-Operating B 3.8*9Distribution Systems-Shutdown.......

..............B 3.8-99REFUELTNG OPERATlONS..................

....................B 3.9-1Boron Concentration.........

..............8 3.9-1Unborated Water Source lsolation Valves ........

B 3.9-5Nuclear lnstrumentation

................

B 3.9-8Deleted B 3.9-12Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and CoolantCirculation

- High Water Level B 3.9-17Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and CoolantCirculation

- Low Water Leve! ...................

B 3.9-21Refueling Cavity Water Leve1............

..................8 3.9-25Deleted . B 3.9-29Spent FuelPoolBoron Concentration...................

..................B 3.9-33Decay Time............

...B 3.9-35Watts Bar-Unit 1Revision 123 LIST OF TABLESTable No. Title Paqe PaqeB 3.8.1-2 TS Action or Surveillance Requirement (SR)Contingency Actions........

....................

B 3.8-36B 3.8.9-1 AC and DC ElectricalPower Distribution Systems.......

.B 3.8-98Watts Bar-Unit 1

LIST OF FIGURESFiqure No. TitlePageB 2.1.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits vs Boundary ofProtection

...................8 2.0:7B 3.1.7-1 Control Bank lnsertion vs Percent RTP.............

.........

B 3.147B 3.2.1-1 K(z) - Normalized Fq(z) as a Function of CoreHeight ...83.2-11 B 3.2.3-1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Acceptable Operation Limitsas a Function of RATED THERMAL POWER ..83.2-23 Watts Bar-Unit 1

AcronymABGTSACRPASMEAFDAFWAROARFSADVBOCCAOCCCSCFRCOLRCREVSCSSCSTDNBECCSEFPDEGTSEOCERCWESFESFASHEPAHVACLCOMFIVMFRVMSIVMSSVMTCNMSODCMPCPPDMSPIVPORVPTLRQPTRRAOCRCCARCPRCSRHRRTPLIST OF ACRONYMS(Page 1 ot 2)TitleAuxiliary Building Gas Treatment SystemAuxiliary Control Room PanelAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers Axial Flux Difference Auxiliary Feedwater SystemAll Rods OutAir Return Fan SystemAtmospheric Dump ValveBeginning of CycleConstant Axial Offset ControlComponent Cooling SystemCode of Federal Regulations Core Operating Limits ReportControl Room Emergency Ventilation SystemContainment Spray SystemCondensate Storage TankDeparture from Nucleate BoilingEmergency Core Cooling SystemEffective Full-Power DaysEmergency Gas Treatment SystemEnd of CycleEssential Raw Cooling WaterEngineered Safety FeatureEngineered Safety Features Actuation SystemHigh Efficiency Particulate AirHeating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning Limiting Condition For Operation Main Feedwater lsolation ValveMain Feedwater Regulation ValveMain Steam Line lsolation ValveMain Steam Safety ValveModerator Temperature Coefficient Neutron Monitoring SystemOffsite Dose Calculation ManualProcess Control ProgramPower Distribution Monitoring SystemPressure lsolation ValvePower-Operated Relief ValvePressure and Temperature Limits ReportQuadrant Power Tilt RatioRelaxed Axial Offset ControlRod Cluster Control AssemblyReactor Coolant PumpReactor Coolant SystemResidual Heat RemovalRated Thermal PowerWatts Bar-Unit 1Revision 104 LIST OF ACRONYMS(Page 2 of 2)Acronvm TitleRTS Reactor Trip SystemRWST Refueling Water Storage TankSG Steam Generator SI Safety lnjection SL Safety LimitSR Surveillance Requirement UHS Ultimate Heat SinkWatts Bar-Unit 1vil TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPageNumber:iiiiiiivVviviiviiiixxxixiixiiixivXVxvixviixviiixixxxxxixxiixxiiixxivxxvxxvixxviixxviiixxixRevisionNumber:9094123001040137120123135123131136132124193246606B758594102110120129137PageNumber:B 2.0-1B 2.0-2B 2.0-382.04B 2.0-5B 2.0-6B 2.0-7B 2.0-8B 2.0-9B 2.0-1 0B 2.0-1 1B 2.4-12B 3.0-1B 3.0-2B 3.0-3B 3.04B 3.0-5B 3.0-6B 3.0-7B 3.0-8B 3.0-9B 3.0-9aB 3 0-9bB 3 0-10B 3.0-1 1B 3.0-12B 3 0-1 3B 3.0-14B 3.1-1B 3.1-2B 3.1-3B 3.14B 3.1-5B 3.1-6B 3.1-7B 3 1-8B 3.1-9B 3.1-10B 3 .1-11B 3.1-12B 3.1-13B 3.1-14B 3.1-15RevisionNumber:059059108590000108013300686868010313313313301375368680006800006800013200viltWatts Bar-Unit 1Revision 137 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPageNum..hgr:

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B 3.9-1 IB 3 9-20B 3.9-21B 3.9-22B 3.9-23B 3.9-24B 3.9-25B 3 9-26B 3.9-27B 3.9-28B 3.9-29B 3.9-30B 3.9-31B 3.9-32B 3.9-33B 3.9-34B 3.9-35B 3.9-36RevisionNum.he[000686801194511945119119119119860119119xvtWatts Bar-Unit 1Revision 125 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintalned by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECTNPF-20 11-09-95 Low Power Operating LicenseRevision 1 12-08-95 Slave Relay TestingNPF-90 02-07-96 Full Power Operating LicenseRevision 2 (Amendment

1) 12-08-95 Turbine Driven AFW Pump SuctionRequirement Revision 3 03-27-96 Remove Cold Leg Accumulator AlarmSetpoints Revision 4 (Amendment

2) 06-13-96 lce Bed Surveillance Frequency AndWeightRevision 5 07-03-96 Containment Airlock Door lndication Revision 6 (Amendment

3) 09-09-96 lce Condenser Lower lnlet DoorSurveillance Revision 7Revision 8Revision 909-28-96 Clarification of COT Frequency for COMS11-21 -96 Admin Control of Containment tsol. Valves04-29-97 Switch Controls For Manual Cl-Phase ARevision 10 (Amendment

5) 05-27-97 Appendix-J, Option BRevision 11 (Amendment

6) 07-28-97 Spent Fuel Pool RerackRevision 12 09-10-97 Heat Trace for Radiation MonitorsRevision 13 (Amendment

7) 09-11-97 Cycle 2 Core ReloadRevision 14 10-10-97 Hot Leg Recirculation Timeframe Revision 15 02-12-98 EGTS Logic TestingRevision'16 (Amendment

10) 06-09-98 Hydrogen Mitigation System Temporary Specification Revision 17 07-31-98 SR Detectors (Visual/audible indication)

Revision 18 (Amendment

11) 09-09-98 Relocation of F(Q) Penalty to COLRRevision 19 (Amendment

12) 10-19-98 Online Testing of the Diesel Batteries andPerformance of the 24 Hour DieselEndurance RunWatts Bar-Unit 1XViiRevision 19 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUEDSUBJECTRevision 20 (Amendment

13) 10-26-98 Clarification of Surveillance TestingRequirements for TDAFW PumpRevision 21 11-30-98 Clarification to lce Condenser DoorACTIONS and door lifi tests, and lce Bedsampling and flow blockage SRsRevision 22 (Amendment

14) 11-10-98 COMS - Four Hour Allowance to MakeRHR Suction Relief Valve OperableRevision 23 01-05-99 RHR Pump Alignment for Refueling Operations Revision 24 (Amendment

16) 12-17-98 New action for Steam Generator ADVsdue to lnoperable ACAS.Revision 25 02-08-99 Delete Reference to PORV Testing NotPerformed in Lower ModesRevision 26 (Amendment

17) 12-30-98 Slave Relay Surveillance Frequency Extension to 18 MonthsRevision 27 (Amendment

'18) 01-15-99 Deletion of Power Range Neutron FluxHigh Negative Rate Reactor Trip FunctionRevision 28 04-02-99 P2500 replacement with lntegrated Computer System (lCS). DeleteReference to ERFDS as a redundant inputsignal.Revision 29 03-13-00 Added notes to address instrument error invarious parameters shown in the Bases.Also corrected the applicable modes forTS 3.6.5 from 3 and 4 to 2,3 and 4.Revision 30 (Amendment

23) 03-22-00 For SR 3.3.2.10, Table 3.3.2-1, one timerelief from turbine trip response timetesting.

Also added Reference 14 to theBases for LCO 3.3.2.Revision 31 (Amendment

19) 03-07-00 Reset Power Range High Flux ReactorTrip Setpoints for Multiple lnoperable MSSVS.I Revision 32 O4-13-OO Clarification to Reflect Core Reactivity andI nltrc Behavior.

Watts Bar-Unit 1xviltRevision 32 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUEDSUBJECT0s-02-00Revision 33Revision 34 (Amendment 24)Revision 35Revision 36 (Amendments 22 and 25)Revision 37 (Amendment 26)Revision 38Revision 39 (Amendments 21and 28)Revision 40Revision 41 (Amendment 31)Revision 42Revision 43Revision 44 (Amendment 33)Revision 45 (Amendment 35)Revision 4607-07-0008-14-0008-23-0009-08-0009-17-0009-1 3-0009-28-0001-22-0103-07-0105-29-0101-31-0202-12-A2a2-25-42Clarification identifying four distribution boards primarily used for operational convenience.

Elimination of Response Time TestingClarification of ABGTS Surveillance TestingRevision of lce Condenser sampling andflow channel surveillance requirements Administrative Controls for OpenPenetrations During Refueling Operations SR 3.2.1.2 was revised to reflect the areaof the core that will be flux mapped.Amendment 21 - lmplementation of BestEstimate LOCA analysis.

Amendment 28 - Revision of LCO 3.1 .10,"Physics Tests Exceptions

- Mode 2."Clarifies WBN's compliance withANSI/ANS-19.6.1 and deletes the detaileddescriptions of Physics Tests.Power Uprate from 3411 MWt to 3459MWt Using Leading Edge Flow Meter(LEFM)Clarify Operability Requ irements forPressu rizer PORVsChange CVI Response Time from 5 to 6Secondslce weight reduction from 1236 to 1110 lbsper basket and peak containment pressurerevision from 11 .21 to 10.46 psig.Relaxation of CORE ALTERATIONS Restrictions Clarify Equivalent lsolation Requirements in LCO 3.9.4Watts Bar-Unit 1xixRevision 46 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool malntained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Speclfication Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECTRevision 47 (Amendment

38) 03-01-02 RCS operational LEAKAGE and SGAlternate Repair Criteria forAxial OutsideDiameter Stress Corrosion Cracking(oDSCC)Revision 48 (Amendment

36) 03-06-02 lncrease Degraded Voltage Time Delayfrom 6 to 10 seconds.Revision 49 (Amendment

34) 03-08-02 Deletion of the PoslAccident SamplingSystem (PASS) requirements from Section5.7.2.6 of the Technical Specifications.

Revision 50 (Amendment

39) 08-30-02 Extension of the allowed outage time (AOT)for a single diesel generator from 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />sto 14 days.Revision 51 11-14-02 Clarify that Shutdown Banks C and D haveonly One Rod GroupRevision 52 (Amendment 4'l) 12-20-02 RCS Specific Activity Level reduction from<1.0 pCi/gm to <0.265 pCi/gm.Revision 53 (Amendmenl42) 01-24-A3 Revise SR 3.0.3 for Missed Surveillances Revision 54 (Amendment

43) 05-01-03 Exigent TS SR 3.5.2.3 to delete Sl Hot Leglnjection lines from SR untilUlC5 outage.Revision 55 05-22-03 Editorialcorrections (PER 02-015499),

correct peak containment

pressure, andrevise l-131 gap inventory for an FHA.Revision 56 07-10-03 TS Bases for SRs 3.8.4.8 through SR3. 8.4. 1 0 clarifi cation of inter-tier connection resistance test.Revision 57 08-11-03 TS Bases for B 3.5.2 Background information provides clarification when the 9hrs for hot leg recirculation is initiated.

Revision 58 (Amendment

45) 09-26-03 The Bases for LCO 3.8.7 and 3.8.8 wererevised to delete the Unit 2 lnverters.

Revision 59 (Amendment

46) 09-30-03 Address new DNB Correlation inB.2.1.1 andB,3.2.12 for Robust FuelAssembly (RFA)-2.Revision 60 (Amendmenl4T) 10-06-03 RCS Flow Measurement Using Elbow TapFlow Meters (Revise Table 3.3.1-1(10)

&sR 3.4.1.4).

Watts Bar-Unit 1Revision 60 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUEDSUBJECTRevision 62Revision 63Revision 64 (Amendment 50)Revision 65Revision 66Revision 67 (Amendment 45)Revision 68 (Amendment 55)Revision 61 (Amendments 40 and 48)1 0-14-03lncorporated changes required toimplement the Tritium Program(Amendment

40) and Stepped BoronConcentration increases for RWST andCLAs (Amendment

48) depending on thenumber of TPBARS installed into thereactor core.Clarified ECCS venting in Bases Section B3.5.2 (WBN-TS-03-1 9)The contingency actions listed in BasesTable 3.8. 1-2were reworded to beconsistent with the NRC Safety Evaluation that approved Tech Spec Amendment 39.lncorporated Amendment 50 for theseismic qualification of the Main ControlRoom duct work. Amendment 50 revisedthe Bases for LCO 3.7.10, .CREVS,"

andLCO 3.7 .11,'CREATCS."

An editorial correction was made on Page B 3.7-61.Revised the Bases for Action B.3.1 of LCO3.8.1 to clarify that a common causeassessment is not required when a dieselgenerator is made inoperable due to theperformance of a surveillance.

Revised Page B 3.8-64 (Bases for LCO3.8.4) to add a reference to SR 3.8.4.13that was inadvertently deleted by thechanges made for Amendment 12.Revised the Bases for LCOs 3 .8.7, 3.8.8and 3.8.9 to incorporate changes to theVital lnverters (DCN 51370). Refer to thechanges made for Bases Revision 58(Amendment 45)Amendment 55 modified the requirements for mode change limitations in LCO 3.0.4and SR 3.0.4 by incorporating TSTF-359, Revision 9.10-15-0312-08-0303-23-0404-01-0405-21-0403-0s-0503-22-05Watts Bar-Unit 1xxtRevision 68 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REV!SIONS ISSUEDSUBJECTRevision 68 (Amendment 55 and 56)Revision 69 (Amendment 54)Revision 70 (Amendment 58)Revision 7 1 (Amendment 59)Revision 72Revision 73Revision 74Revision 75 (Amendment 45)03-22-0504-04-051 0-17 -0502-01-0608-31-0609-1 1-0609-16-0609-18-06Change MSLB primary to secondary leakage from 1 gpm to 3 gpm (WBN-TS 14).Revised the use of the terms inter-tier andinter-rack in the Bases for SR 3.8.4.10.

Alternate monitoring process for a failedRod Position lndicator (RPl) (TS-03-1 2).Temporary Use of Penetrations in ShieldBuilding Dome During Modes 1-4 (WBN-TS-04 -17)M inor Revision (Corrects Typographical Error) - Changed LCO Bases Section3.4.6 which incorrectly referred toSurveillance Requirement 3 .4.6.2 ratherthan correctly identifying Surveillance Requirement 3.4.6.3.Updated the Bases for LCO 3.9.4 to clarifythat penetration flow paths throughcontainment to the outside atmosphere must be limited to less than the ABSCEbreach allowance.

AIso administratively removed from the Bases for LCO 3 .9.4 astatement on core alterations that shouldhave been removed as part ofAmendment 35.For the LCO section of the Bases for LCO3.9.4, adrninistratively removed the changemade by Revision 73 to the discussion of anLCO note and placed the change in anotherarea of the LCO section.Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8and 3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter forChannel 1-ll of the Vital lnverters (DCN51370).Watts Bar-Unit 1xxiiRevision 75 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUEDSUBJECTRevision 76 (Amendment 45)09-22-06Revis ton 77 (Amendment 45)Revision 78 (Amendment 45)Revision 79 (Amendment 60, 6164)Revision 80Revision 81 (Amendment 62)Revision 82 (Amendment 65)Revision 83Revision 84Revision 85and10-10-0610-13-061 1-03-061 1-08-0611-15-0611-17-0611-20-061 1-30-0603-22-07Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter forChannel 1-lV of the Vital lnverters (DCN51370).Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter forChannel 1-l of the Vital lnverters (DCN51370).Revised the Bases for LCOs 3.8.7, 3.8.8 and3.8.9 to incorporate a spare inverter for eachof the Vital lnverters (DCN 51370).Steam Generator Narrow Range Levellndication lncreased from 6a/o to 32% (WBN-T5-05-06)

Bases Sections 3.4.5, 3.4.6, and3.4.7.Revised the Bases for SR 3.5.2.8 to clarifythat inspection of the containment sumpstrainer constitutes inspection of the trashrack and the screen functions.

Revised the Bases for SR 3.6. 11.2, 3.6.11.3, and 3.6.11.4 to address the lncrease lceWeight in lce Condenser to SupportReplacement Steam Generators (WBN-TS-05-0e) [sGRP]Steam Generator (SG) Tube lntegrity (wBN-rs-05-1

0) [SGRP]Updated Surveillance Requirement (SR)3.6.6.5 to clarify that the number ofunobstructed spray nozzles is defined in thedesign bases.Revised Bases 3.6.9 and 3.6.15 to show theoperation of the EGTS when annuluspressure is not within limits.Revised Bases 3.6.9 and 3.6.15 inaccordance with TACF 1-07-0002-065 toclarify the operation of the EGTS.Watts Bar-Unit 1xxiiiRevision 85 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUEDSUBJECT01-31-08Revision 86Revision 87Revision 88 (Amendment 67)Revision 89 (Amendment 66)Revision 90 (Amendment 68)Revision 91 (Amendment 70)Revision 92 (Amendment 71)Revision 93 (Amendment 74)Revision 94 (Amendment 72)02-12-0803-06-0805-01-0810-02-0811-25-2008 11-26-2008 02-09-2009 02-23-2009 Figure 3.7.15-1 was deleted as part ofAmendment

40. A reference to the figure inthe Bases for LCO 3.9.9 was not deleted atthe time Amendment 40 was incorporated into the Technical Specifications.

BasesRevision 86 corrected this error (refer to PER130e44).lmplemented Bases change package TS-07-13 for DCN 52220-A.

This DCN ties the ABIand CVI signals together so that either signalinitiates the other signal.Technical Specification Amendment 67increased the number of TPBARs from 240to 400.Update of Bases to be consistent with thechanges made to Section 5.7 .2.11 of theTechnical Specifications to reference theASME Operation and Maintenance Codelssuance of amendment regarding Reactor Trip System and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systemcompletion times, bypass test times, andsu rveillance test intervals The Bases for TS 3.7.10, "Control RoomEmergency Ventilation System (CREVS)"were revised to address control roomenvelope habitabi I ity.The Bases for TS 3.4.1 5, "RCS LeakageDetection lnstrumentation" were revised toremove the requirement for the atmospheric gaseous radiation monitor as one of themeans for detecting a one gpm leak withinone hour.Updates the discussion of the Allowable Values associated with the Containment Purge Radiation Monitors in the LCO sectionof the Bases for LCO 3.3.6.Bases Revision 94 [Technical Specification (TSX Amendment 72 deleted the HydrogenRecombiners (LCO 3.6.7) from the TS andmoved the requirements to the Technical Requirements Manual.Watts Bar-Unit 1xxivRevision 94 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administratave tool maintained by WBN Lacensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUED SUBJECTRevision 95 03-05-2009 Corrected an error in SR 3.3.2.6 whichreferenced Function 6.9 of TS Table 3.3.2-1.This function was deleted from the TS byAmendment 1.Revision 96 (Amendment

75) 06-19-2009 Modified Mode 1 and 2 applicability forFunction 6.e of TS Table 3.3.2-1 ,Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System lnstrumentation."

This is associated with AFW automatic start on trip of all mainfeedwater pumps. ln addition, revised LCO3.3.2, Condition J, to be consistent with WBNUnit 1 design bases.Revision 97 (Amendment

76) 09-23-2009 Amendment 76 updates LCO 3.8.7,"lnverters

- Operating" to reflect theinstallation of the Unit 2 inverters.

Revision 98 (Amendments 77, 79, & 10-05-2009 Amendment 77 revised the number of81) TPBARS that may be loaded in the core from4OO to 704.Amendment 79 revised LCO 3.6.3 to allowverification by administrative means isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured.Amendment 81 revised the allowed outagetime of Action B of LCO 3.5.1 from t hour to24 hours.Revision 99 10-09-2009 Bases Revision 99 incorporated Westinghouse Technical Bulletin (TB) 08-04.Revision 100 11-17-2009 Bases Revision 100 revises the LCOdescription of the Containment Spray Systemto clarify that transfer to the containment sump is accomplished by manualactions.

Revision 101 02-09-2010 Bases Revision 101 implemented DCN52216-A that will place both trains of theEGTS pressure controlvalve's handswitches in A-AUTO and will result in thevalves opening upon initiation of theContainment lsolation phase A (ClA) signal.They will remain open independent of theannulus pressure and reset of the ClA.Revision 102 03-01-2010 Bases Revision 102 implemented EDC52564-A which addresses a new singlefailure scenario relative to operation of theEGTS post LOCA.Watts Bar-Unit 1Revision 102 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUEDSUBJECTRevision 103Revision 104 (Amendment 82)Revision 105Revision 106Revision 107 (Amendment 85)Revision 108Revision 109Revision 1 1004-05-2010 09-20-2010 10-28-2A10 01-20-2011 02-24-2011 03-07-2011 04-06-2011 04-19-2011 Bases Revision 103 implemented NRCguidance "Application of Generic Letter 80-30"which allows a departure from the singlefailure criterion where a non-TS supportsystem has two 100% capacity subsysteffis, each capable of supporting the design heatload of the area containing the TS equipment.

Bases Revision 104 implemented LicenseAmendment No. 82, which approved theBEACON-TSM application of the PowerDistributing System. The PDMSrequirements reside in the TRM.DCN 53437 added spare chargers 8-S and9-S which increased the total of 125 VDCVital Battery Chargers to eight (8)Revised SR 3.8.3.6 to clarify that identified fuel oil leakage does not constitute failure ofthe surveillance.

Amendment 85 revises TS 3.7.11, "ControlRoom Emergency Air Temperature ControlSystem (CREATCS).

Specifically, theproposed change will only be applicable during plant modifications to upgrade theCREATCS chillers.

This "one-time" TSchange will be implemented during Watts BarNuclear Plant, Unit 1 Cycles 10 and 1 1beginning March 1,2A1 1, and ending April30,2012.Bases Revision 108 deletes reference toNSRB to be notified of violation of a safetylimit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in TSB 2.2.4. Also,corrected error in SR 3.3.2.4 in the reference to Table 3.3.1-1 . lt should be Table 3.3.2-1 .Bases Revision 109 clarifies that during plantstartup in Mode 2 the AFW anticipatory auto-start signal need not be OPERABLE if theAFW system is in service.

PER 287712 wasidentified by NRC to provide clarification toTS Bases 3.3.2, Function 6.e, Trip of AllTurbine Driven Main Feedwater Pumps.Clarified the text associated with theinterconnection of the ABI and CVI functions in the bases for LCO 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 3 .7.12 and3 9.8.xxviWatts Bar-Unit 1Revision 1 10 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS Revision 11 1Revision 112Revision 1 13Revision 114Revision 1 15Revision 1 16Revision 117Revision 1 18Revision 1 19ISSUED05-05-2011 05-24-2011 06-24-2011 12-12-2011 12-21-2011 06-27-2012 07 201201-30-2013 08-17 -2013SUBJECTAdded text to several sections of the Basesfor LCO 3.4.16 to clarify that the actualtransient limit for l-131 is 14 pCilgm andrefers to the controls being placed in AOI-28.DCN 55076 replaces the existing four 125-Vdc DG Battery Chargers with four sets ofredundant new battery charger assemblies.

Final stage implementation of DCN 55076which replaced the existing four 125-Ydc DGBattery Chargers with four sets of redundant new battery charger assemblies.

Clarifies the acceptability of periodically using a portion of the 25o/o grace period inSR 3.0.2 to facilitate 13 week maintenance work schedules.

Revises several surveillance requirements notes in TS 3.8.1 to allow performance ofsurveillances on WBN Unit 2 6.9 kVshutdown boards and associated dieselgenerators while WBN Unit 1 is operating inMODES 1, 2,3, or 4Revises TS Bases 3.8.1 , AC Sources -Operating, to make the TS Bases consistent with TS 3.8.1, Condition DRevises TS Bases 3.7 .1 0, Control RoomEmergency Ventilation System (CREVS),

tomake the TS Bases consistent withTS 3 .7.10, Condition ERevises TS Bases 3.4.16, Reactor CoolantSystem (RCS) to change the dose equivalent l-1 31 spike limit and the allowable value forcontrol room air intake radiation monitors.

Revises TS Bases 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 3.7.12,3.7 .1 3, 3 .9.4,3.9.7

, 3.9.8, and adds TSBases 3.9.10 to reflect selective implementation of the Alternate Source Termmethodology for the analysis of FuelHandling Accidents (FHAs) and make TSBases consistent with the revised FHA doseanalysis.

Watts Bar-Unit 1xxviiRevision 1 19 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS Revision 120Revision 121Revision 122 (Amendment 94)Revision 123 (Amendment 104)Revision 124Revision 125 (Amendment 84, 102,1 03)Revision 126Revision 127ISSUED01-23-2014 08-04-2014 01-1 4-201403-16-2016 02-12-2016 03-16-2016 03-18-2016 04-1 8-2016SUBJECTRevised the References to TS Bases 3.1.9,PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions

- Model , todocument NRC approval of WCAP 12472-P-A. Addendum 1-A and 4-4., Addendum 1-Aapproved the use of the Advance NodalCode (ANC-Phoenix_

in the BEACONsystem as the neutronic code for measuring core power distribution.

ls also approved theuse of fixed incore self-powered neutrondetectors (SPD) to calibrate the BEACONsystem in lieu of incore and excore neutrondetectors and core exit thermocouples (CET). For plants that do not have SPDsAddendum 4-A approved Westinghouse methodology that allow the BEACON systemto calculate CET uncertainty as a function ofreactor power on a plant cycle basis duringpower ascension following a refueling outage.Revises references in TS Bases 3.7.1 forconsistency with changes to the TS Bases3.7.1 references approved in Revision 89.Revises TS Bases 3.7 .1 0, Control RoomEmergency Ventilation System (CREVS) tomake the TS Bases consistent with TS3.7 .1 0, Actions E, F, G, and H.Amendment 104, TSB Revision 123 addsTS 83.7.16, "Component Cooling System(CCS) - Shutdown" and adds TS 83.7.17,"Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW)System - Shutdown.

Revises TS Bases Table 83.8.9-1

, "AC andDC Electrical Power Distribution Systems,"

the second Note.Revises TS Bases Section 83.8-1 , "ACSou rces-Operating.

"Revises TS Bases Section 83 .7.7,"Component Cooling System" the 1B and 28surge tank sections.

Revises TS Bases Section B 3.6.4,"Containment Pressure" and 83.6.6,"Containment Spray System to change themaximum peak pressure from a LOCA of9.36 psig.Watts Bar-Unit 1xxvillRevision 127 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS Revision 128Revision 129Revision 130Revision 131 (Amendment 107)Revision 132 (Amendment 1 10)Revision 133 (Amendment 111)Revision 134 (Amendment 112)Revision 135Revision 136 (Amendment 1 13)Revision 137 (Arnendment 114)ISSUED06-27 -1608-1 9-1612-22-1601-1 3-1701-17-1703-1 3-1704-25-1705-1 7 -1705- 17 -1707 17SUBJECTRevises TS Bases Section 83.6.8,"Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS)", todelete sentence regarding HydrogenRecombiners that are abandoned.

Revises TS Bases Section 3.6.15, "ShieldBuilding,"

to clarify the use of the Condition Bnote.Revises TS Bases Sections 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and3.6.3 to reflect the deletion of TS 3.9.4 inWBN Unit 1 TS Amendment 92.Revises TS Bases Section 3.5.4, " Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), Applicable Safety Analyses" Revises TS Bases Section 3.8.1 , 'ACSources -Operating" Adds TS Bases Section 3.0.8 forI noperability of Snubbers.

Revise TS Bases Section 3.7.11Action A.1regarding CREATCS.Revises TS Bases Section 83.3.3, "PAMlnstrumentation" Revises TS Bases Section 83 .7.7 "CCS'Revises TS Bases Section B SR 3 .0.2 to adda one-time extension for the surveillance interval.

Watts Bar-Unit 1xxtxRevision 137 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES . REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

Watts Bar-Unit 1

ENCLOSURE 2WBN UNIT 1 TECHNIGAL SPECIFICATION BASESCHANGED PAGESE-2 LCO Applicability B30B 3.0 LTMTTTNG CONDTTTON FOR OPERATTON (tCO) APPLlCABlLTTY BASESLCOs LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8 establish the general requirements applicable to all ISpecifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e.,when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).

LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, theassociated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each RequiredAction for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that anACTIONS Condition is entered.

The Required Actions establish those remedialmeasures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when therequirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; andb. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is metwithin the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.

There are two basic types of Required Actions.

The first type of Required Actionspecifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is theCompletion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPEMBLEstatus or to restore variables to within specified limits. lf this type of RequiredAction is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown maybe required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification isnot applicable.

(Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of theentered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon enteringACTIONS.)

The second type of Required Action specifies the remedialmeasures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. ln this case, compliance with the Required Actionsprovides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.

(continued)

Revision 133Amendment 111Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.0-1 LCO Applicability B30BASESLCO 3.0.7There are certain specialtests and operations required to be performed atvarious times over the life of the plant. These special tests and operations arenecessary to demonstrate select plant performance characteristics, to performspecial maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions.

Test Exception LCOs 3. 1 .9 and 3.1 . 1 0 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special testsand operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to complywith the requirements of these TS. Unless othenrvise specified, all the other TSrequirements remain unchanged.

This willensure allappropriate requirements ofthe MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required tobe changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.The Applicability of a Test Exception LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS. Compliance with TestException LCOs is optional.

A special operation may be performed either underthe provisions of the appropriate Test Exception LCO or under the otherapplicable TS requirements.

lf it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Test Exception LCO, the requirements of the TestException LCO shall be followed.

LCO 3.0.8LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered to remaincapable of performing their intended safety function when associated snubbersare not capable of providing their associated support function(s).

This LCO statesthat the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one ormore snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s).

This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance,

testing, or repair of one or more snubbers not capable of performing theirassociated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures arespecified in the snubber requirements, which are located outside of the Technical Specifications (TS) under licensee control.

LCO 3.0.8 applies to snubbers thatonly have seismic function.

lt does not apply to snubbers that also have designfunctions to mitigate steam/water hammer or other transient loads. The snubberrequirements do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii),

and, as such, areappropriate for control by the licensee.

When applying LCO 3.0.8.a, at least one train of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)system must be OPEMBLE during MODES when AFW is required to beOPERABLE.

When applying LCO 3.0.8.a during MODES when AFW is notrequired to be OPERABLE, a core cooling method (such as Decay HeatRemoval(DHR) system) must be available.

When applying LCO 3.0.8.b, ameans of core cooling must remain available (AFW, DHR, equipment necessary for feed and bleed operations, etc.). Reliance on availabitity of a core coolingsource during modes where AFW is not required by TSs provides an equivalent safety margin for plant operations were LCO 3.0.8 not applied and meets theintent of Technical Specification Task Force Change Traveler TSTF-372, Revision 4, 'Addition of LCO 3.0.8, lnoperability of Snubbers."

Revision 133Amendment 111Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.0-9 LCO Applicability B30BASESLCO 3.0.8(continued)

When a snubber is to be rendered incapable of performing its related supportfunction (i.e., nonfunctional) for testing or maintenance or is discovered to not befunctional, it must be determined whether any system(s) require the affectedsnubbe(s) for system OPEMBLILITY, and whether the plant is in a MODE orspecified condition in the Applicability that requires the supported system(s) to beOPERABLE.

lf an analysis determines that the supported system(s) do not require thesnubber(s) to be functional in order to support the OPERABILITY of thesystem(s),

LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. lf the LCO(S) associated with any supported system(s) are not currently applicable (i.e., the plant is not in a MODE or otherspecified condition in the Applicability of the LCO), LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. lfthe supported system(s) are inoperable for reasons other than snubbers, LCO3.0.8 cannot be used. LCO 3.0.8 is an allowance, not a requirement.

When asnubber is nonfunctional, any supported system(s) may be declared inoperable instead of using LCO 3.0.8.Every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used, WBN Unit 1 willconfirm that atleast one train (or subsystem) of systems supported by the inoperable snubberswill remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions forpostulated design loads other than seismic loads. A record of the design functionCNL-16-061 Page E-23 of 30 of the inoperable snubber (i.e., seismic vs. non-seismic) and the associated plant configuration willbe available on a recoverable basis for NRC staff inspection.

LCO 3.0.8 does not apply to non-seismic snubbers.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.8are not to be applied to supported TS systems unless the supported systemswould remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions forpostulated design loads other than seismic loads. The risk impact of dynamicloadings other than seismic loads was not assessed as part of the development of LCO 3.0.8. These shocktype loads include thrust loads, blowdown loads,water-hammer loads, steam-hammer loads, LOCA loads and pipe rupture loads.However, there are some important distinctions between non-seismic (shocktype) loads and seismic loads which indicate that, in general, the riskimpact of the out-of-service snubbers is smaller for non-seismic loads than forseismic loads. First, while a seismic load affects the entire plant, the impact of anonseismic load is localized to a certain system or area of the plant. Second,although non-seismic shock loads may be higher in totalforce and the impactcould be as much or more than seismic loads, generally they are of much shorterduration than seismic loads. Third, the impact of non-seismic loads is more plantspecific, and thus harder to analyze generically, than for seismic loads. For thesereasons, every time LCO 3.0.8 is applied, at least one train of each system that issupported by the inoperable snubber(s) should remain capable of performing their required safety or support functions for postulated design loads other thanseismic loads.lf the allowed time expires and the snubber(s) are unable to perform theirassociated support function(s),

the affected supported system's LCO(s) must bedeclared not met and the Conditions and Required Actions entered inaccordance with LCO 3.0.2.Revision 133Amendment 111Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.0-9a LCO Applicability B30BASESLCO 3.0.8(continued)

LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to a single train or subsystem of a multipletrain or subsystem supported system or to a single train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable.

The72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event thatwould require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubbe(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function and due to theavailability of the redundant train of the supported system.LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to more than one train or subsystem of amultiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.b allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> torestore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable.

The 12hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismicevent concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubbe(s) are not capable of performing theirassociated support function.

LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed.

lndustry and NRCguidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(aX4)

(the Maintenance Rule)does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO 3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existingMaintenance Rule process to the extent possible so that maintenance on anyunaffected train or subsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues areproperly addressed.

The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be aqualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated supportfunction.

Revision 133Amendment 111Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.0-9b SR Applicability B 3.0BASES (continued)

SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires theperiodic performance of the Required Action on a "once per . . ." interval.

SR 3.0.2 permits a 25o/o extension of the interval specified in the Frequency.

This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.9.,transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

Ona one-time basis the surveillance interval for those surveillances listed in TSTable 3.0.2-1 are allowed to be extended as identified on Table SR 3.0.2-1.

Theone-time surveillance interval extensions expires on November 30,2017.The 25o/o extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results fromperforming the Surveillance at its specified Frequency.

This is based on therecognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance beingperformed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions toSR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which lhe 25o/o extension of the intervalspecified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in theindividual Specifications.

The requirements of regulations take precedence overthe TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the testinterval cannot be extended by the TS, and the surveillance requirement willinclude a note in the frequency

stating, "SR 3.0.2 does not apply." An exampleof an exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations, is thediscussion in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, that SR 3.0.2does not apply. This exception is provided because the program alreadyincludes extension of test intervals.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25o/o extension also does not apply to the initial portionof a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per . . ."basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initialperformance.

The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is aparticular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a singleaction with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing lhe 25o/oextension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that noloss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diversecomponents or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in analternative manner.The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as anoperational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than thoseconsistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyondthose specified, with the exception of surveillances required to be performed on a31-day frequency.

For surveillances performed on a 31-day frequency, thenormal surveillance interval may be extended in accordance with Specification 3.0.2 cyclically as required to remain synchronized to the 13-week maintenance work schedules.

This practice is acceptable based on the results of anevaluation of 31-day frequency surveillance test histories that demonstrate thatno adverse failure rate changes have occurred nor would be expected to developas a result of cyclical use of surveillance interval extensions and the fact that thetotal number of 31-day frequency surveillances performed in any one-year periodremains unchanged.

(continued)

Revision 10, 114, 137Amendment 5, 114Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.0-1 1 PAM lnstrumentation B 3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)

23. Refuelino Water Storaoe Tank LevelRWST water level is used to verify the water source availability to theECCS and Containment Spray (CS) Systems.

lt alerts the operator tomanually switch the CS suction from the RWST to the containment sump. lt may also provide an indication of time for initiating cold legrecirculation from the sump following a LOCA.24. Steam Generator PressureSteam pressure is used to determine if a high energy secondary linerupture has occurred and the availability of the steam generators as aheat sink. lt is also used to verifu that a faulted steam generator isisolated.

Steam pressure may be used to ensure proper cooldown ratesor to provide a diverse indication for natural circulation cooldown.

25. Auxiliarv Buildino Passive Sumo LevelAuxiliary Building Passive Sump Level, a non-Type A Category 1variable, monitors the sump level in the auxiliary building.

The twofunctions of this indication are to monitor for a major breach of the spentfuel pit and to monitor for an RCS breach in the auxiliary building (i.e., anRHR or CVCS line break). The purpose is to verify that radioactive waterdoes not leak to the auxiliary building.

The Auxiliary Building PassiveSump Level monitor consists of two channels on separate power supply.Both channels provide inputs to lCS. The calibrated range of the two Imonitors are 12.5" to72.5".(continued)

Revision 135Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3 3-134 RWSTB 3.5.4BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES(continued) volume. The deliverable volume limit is set by the LOCA and containment analyses.

For the RWST, the deliverable volume is different from the totalvolume contained since, due to the design of the tank, more water can becontained than can be delivered.

The minimum boron concentration is an explicitassumption in the main steam line break (MSLB) analysis to ensure the requiredshutdown capability.

The maximum boron concentration is an explicit assumption in the inadvertent ECCS actuation

analysis, although it is typically a nonlimiting event and the results are very insensitive to boron concentrations.

The maximumtemperature ensures that the amount of cooling provided from the RWST duringthe heatup phase of a feedline break is consistent with safety analysisassumptions;the minimum is an assumption in both the MSLB and inadvertent ECCS actuation

analyses, although the inadvertent ECCS actuation event istypically nonlimiting.

The MSLB analysis has considered a delay associated with the interlock betweenthe VCT and RWST isolation valves, and the results show that the departure fromnucleate boiling design basis is met. The delay has been established as27 seconds, with offsite power available, or 37 seconds without offsite power.For a large break LOCA Analysis, the minimum water volume limit of 370,000gallons and the minimum boron concentration limit is used to compute the postLOCA sump boron concentration necessary to assure subcriticality.

(continued)

Revision 13, 61 , 88, 98 , 131Amendment 7 , 40, 48, 67 ,77 , 1A7Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3 5-26 RWSTB3.54BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES(continued)

The large break LOCA is the limiting case since the safety analysisassumes least negative reactivity insertion.

The upper limit on boron concentration of 3300 ppm is used to determine themaximum allowable time to switch to hot leg recirculation following a LOCA. Thepurpose of switching from cold leg to hot leg injection is to avoid boronprecipitation in the core following the accident.

ln the ECCS analysis, the containment spray temperature is assumed to be equalto the RWST lower temperature limit of 60"F. lf the lower temperature limit isviolated, the containment spray further reduces containment

pressure, whichdecreases the rate at which steam can be vented out the break and increases peak clad temperature.

The acceptable temperature range of 60'F to 105'F isassumed in the large break LOCA analysis, and the small break analysis valuebounds the upper temperature limit of 105'F. The upper temperature limit of105'F is also used in the containment OPEMBILITY analysis.

Exceeding theupper temperature limit will result in a higher peak clad temperature, becausethere is less heat transfer from the core to the injected water following a LOCAand higher containment pressures due to reduced containment spray coolingcapacity.

For the containment response following an MSLB, the lower limit onboron concentration and the upper limit on RWST water temperature are used tomaximize the total energy release to containment.

The RWST satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCOThe RWST ensures that an adequate supply of borated water is available to cooland depressurize the containment in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA),to cool and cover the core in the event of a LOCA, to maintain the reactorsubcritical following a DBA, and to ensure adequate level in the containment sump to support ECCS and Containment Spray System pump operation in therecirculation mode.To be considered

OPERABLE, the RWST must meet the water volume, boronconcentration, and temperature limits established in the SRs.(continued)

Revision 13, 61 , 131Amendment 7, 40, 48, 107Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.5-27 Containment B 3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLE Satisfactory leakage rate test results are a requirement forSAFETY ANALYSES the establishment of containment OPERABILIry.

(continued)

The containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Containment OPEMBILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to < 1.0 L", exceptprior to the first start up after performing a required Containment Leakage RateTesting Program leakage test. At this time, applicable leakage limits must bemet.Compliance with this LCO will ensure a containment configuration, including equipment

hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to thoseleakage rates assumed in the safety analysis.

lndividual leakage rates specified for the containment air lock (LCO 3.6.2), purgevalves with resilient seals, and Shield Building containment bypass leakage(LCO 3.6.3) are not specifically part of the acceptance criteria of '10 CFR 50,Appendix J, Option B. Therefore, leakage rates exceeding these individual limitsonly result in the containment being inoperable when the leakage results inexceeding the acceptance criteria of Appendix J, Option B.APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive materialinto containment.

ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of theseevents are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of theseMODES. Therefore, containment is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5and 6 to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment.

(continued)

Revision 10, 130Amendment 5Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-3 Containment Air LocksB3.62BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1,2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material tocontainment.

ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of theseevents are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of theseMODES. Therefore, the containment air locks are not required in MODES 5 and 6to prevent leakage of radioactive materialfrom containment.

ACTIONSThe ACTIONS are modified by a Note that allows entry and exit to performrepairs on the affected air lock component.

lf the outer door is inoperable, then itmay be easily accessed for most repairs.

lt is preferred that the air lock beaccessed from inside containment by entering through the other OPEMBLE airlock. However, if this is not practicable, or if repairs on either door must beperformed from the barrel side of the door then it is permissible to enter the airlock through the OPERABLE door which means there is a short time during whichthe containment boundary is not intact (during access through the OPERABLEdoor). The ability to open the OPERABLE door, even if it means the containment boundary is temporarily not intact, is acceptable due to the low probability of anevent that could pressurize the containment during the short time in which theOPERABLE door is expected to be open. After each entry and exit, theOPERABLE door must be immediately closed.A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO,separate Condition entry is allowed for each air lock. This is acceptable, sincethe Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable air lock. Complying with the Required Actions mayallow for continued operation, and a subsequent inoperable air lock is governedby subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.ln the event the air lock leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate, Note 3 directs entry into the applicable Conditions and RequiredActions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment."

(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-8Revision 130 Containment lsolation ValvesB 3.6.3BASESLCO(continued) times in the FSAR (Ref. 2).The normally closed containment isolation valves areconsidered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves arede-activated and secured in their closed position, blind flanges are in place, andclosed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves/devices are thoselisted in Reference 2.Purge valves with resilient seals and shield building bypass valves meetadditional leakage rate requirements.

The other containment isolation valveleakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1, "Containment,"

as Type C testing.This LCO provides assurance that the containment isolation valves will performtheir designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the containment boundary during accidents.

APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1,2,3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material tocontainment.

ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of theseevents are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of theseMODES. Therefore, the containment isolation valves are not required to beOPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.ACTIONSThe ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths, to beunisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator (licensed or unlicensed) at thevalve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. ln thisway, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated.

For valve controls located in the control room, an operator(other than the Shift Operations Supervisor (SOS), ASOS, or the Operator at theControls) may monitor containment isolation signal status rather than bestationed at the valve controls.

Other secondary responsibilities which do notprevent adequate monitoring of containment isolation signal status may beperformed by the operator provided his/her primary responsibility is rapidisolation of the penetration when needed for containment isolation.

Use of theUnit Control Room Operator (CRO) to perform this function should be limited tothose situations where no other operator is available.

A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO,separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This isacceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-17Revision 130 Containment PressureB 3.6.4B 3 6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSB 3.6.4 Containment PressureBASESBACKGROUND The containment pressure is limited during normal operation to preserve theinitial conditions assumed in the accident analyses for a loss of coolant accident(LOCA) or steam line break (SLB). These limits also prevent the containment pressure from exceeding the containment design negative pressure differential

(-2.0 psid) with respect to the Shield Building annulus atmosphere in the event ofinadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System or Air Return Fans.Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored and controlled.

The containment pressure limits are derived from the input conditions used in thecontainment functional analyses and the containment structure external pressureanalysis.

Should operation occur outside these limits coincident with a DesignBasis Accident (DBA), post accident containment pressures could exceedcalculated values.APPLICABLE SAFEry ANALYSESContainment internal pressure is an initialcondition used in the DBAanalyses to establish the maximum peak containment internal pressure.

Thelimiting DBAs considered, relative to containment

pressure, are the LOCA andSLB, which are analyzed using computer pressure transients.

The worst caseLOCA generates larger mass and energy release than the worst case SLB.Thus, the LOCA event bounds the SLB event from the containment peakpressure standpoint (Ref. 1).The initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was 15.0 psia.This resulted in a maximum peak pressure from a LOCA of 9.36 psig. Thecontainment analysis (Ref. 1) shows that the maximum allowable internalcontainment

pressure, P" (15.0 psig), bounds the calculated results from thelimiting LOCA. The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worstcase LOCA, does not exceed the containment design pressure, 13.5 psig.(continued)

Revision 44, 55 ,76, 127Amendment 33Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-28 Containment Spray SystemB3.66BASESBACKGROUND (continued)

The operation of the ice condenser, is adequate to assure pressure suppression during the initial blowdown of steam and water from a DBA. During the postblowdown period, the Air Return System (ARS) is automatically started.

TheARS returns upper compartment air through the divider barrier to the lowercompartment.

This seryes to equalize pressures in containment and to continuecirculating heated air and steam through the ice condenser, where heat isremoved by the remaining ice and by the Containment Spray System after theice has melted.The Containment Spray System limits the temperature and pressure that couldbe expected following a DBA. Protection of containment integrity limits leakageof fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSESThe limiting DBAs considered relative to containment OPERABILITY are theloss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The DBALOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predict theresultant containment pressure and temperature transients.

No two DBAs areassumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively.

The postulated DBAs areanalyzed, in regard to containment ESF systems, assuming the loss of one ESFbus, which is the worst case single active failure, resulting in one train of theContainment Spray System, the RHR System, and the ARS being renderedinoperable (Ref. 2).The DBA analyses show that the maximum peak containment pressure of9.36 psig results from the LOCA analysis, and is calculated to be less than thecontainment design pressure.

The maximum peak containment atmosphere temperature results from the SLB analysis.

The calculated transient containment atmosphere temperatures are acceptable for the DBA SLB.(continued)

Revision 44, 55, 76, 127Amendment 33Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-37 HMSB 3.6.8BASESBACKGROUND (continued)

When the HMS is initiated, the ignitor elements are energized and heat up to asurface temperature

> 't700"F.

At this temperature, they ignite the hydrogen gasthat is present in the airspace in the vicinity of the ignitor.

The HMS depends onthe dispersed location of the ignitors so that local pockets of hydrogen atincreased concentrations would burn before reaching a hydrogen concentration significantly higher than the lower flammability limit. Hydrogen ignition in thevicinity of the ignitors is assumed to occur when the local hydrogen concentration reaches a minimum 5.0 volume percent (v/o).APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSESThe HMS causes hydrogen in containment to burn in a controlled manneras it accumulates following a degraded core accident (Ref. 3). Burning occurs atthe lower flammability concentration, where the resulting temperatures andpressures are relatively benign. Without the system, hydrogen could build up tohigher concentrations that could result in a violent reaction if ignited by a randomignition source after such a buildup.The hydrogen ignitors have been shown by probabilistic risk analysis to be asignificant contributor to limiting the severity of accident sequences that arecommonly found to dominate risk for plants with ice condenser containments.

Assuch, the hydrogen ignitors are considered to be risk significant in accordance with the NRC Policy Statement.

LCOTwo HMS trains must be OPERABLE with power from two independent, safetyrelated power supplies.

For this plant, an OPERABLE HMS train consists of 33of 34 ignitors energized on the train.(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-50Revision 128 Shield BuildingB 3.6.1 5B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSB 3.6.15 Shield BuildingBASESBACKGROUND The shield building is a concrete structure that surrounds the steel containment vessel. Between the containment vessel and the shield building inner wall is anannular space that collects containment leakage that may occur following a lossof coolant accident (LOCA) as well as other design basis accidents (DBAs) thatrelease radioactive material.

This space also allows for periodic inspection of theouter surface of the steel containment vessel.During normal operations when containment integrity is required, annulus vacuumis established and maintained by the annulus vacuum control subsystem.

lnemergencies, in which containment isolation is required, this subsystem isisolated and shut down because it performs no safety-related function (Ref.4).The nominal negative pressure for the annulus vacuum control equipment is 5-inches of water gauge. This negative pressure level, chosen for normaloperation, ensures that the annulus pressure will not reach positive values duringthe annulus pressure surge produced by a LOCA in the primary containment.

The annulus vacuum control subsystem also aids in containment pressure reliefby exhausting to the auxiliary building exhaust stack the containment vent air thatgoes through the containment vent air clean up units and is discharged into theannulus.During an emergency, the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shield building andthe steel containment vessel. Filters in the system then controlthe release ofradioactive contaminants to the environment.

The shield building is required tobe OPEMBLE to ensure retention of containment leakage and proper operation of the EGTS.Several normal plant evolutions can cause the annulus pressure to exceed itslimits briefly; containment

venting, both the normal or alternate method, testing ofthe EGTS, annulus entries, and auxiliary building isolations.

These activities cause an inrush of air into the annulus, lowering in the annulus vacuum until theannulus vacuum control fans can return annulus vacuum to within limits.The containment vent system is a non-safety related system, which providescontinuous pressure relief during normal operation, by allowing containment airoutflow through the 8-inch containment penetration through two 100% redundant air cleanup units (ACUs), containing HEPA/charcoalfilters, into the annulus withthe motive force being the pressure differential between the containment and theannulus.

Depending on the inflow into the annulus when containment vent isinitiated, annulus pressure may not be within limits untilthe annulus vacuum(continued)

Revision 129Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-95 Shield BuildingB 3.6.15BASESBACKGROUND (continued) control system can recover the annulus vacuum.An alternate containment pressure relief function (containment vent) is providedby way of a configuration alignment in the reactor building purge ventilating system. This function is accomplished by opening lower compartment purgelines (one supply and one exhaust) or one of the two pairs of lines (one supplyand one exhaust) in the upper compartment.

To prevent inadvertent pressurization of containment due to supply and exhaust side ductwork flowimbalances, the supply ductwork airflow may be temporarily throttled as needed(Ref.5).During resting of the EGTS, alignment of the system to the annulus for the testcauses an inrush of air from the EGTS ducting increasing annulus pressure.

Thisinrush of air can cause annulus pressure to exceed the annulus pressure limituntilthe EGTS fan is started, stopping the inrush allowing the annulus vacuumcontrol fan to restore annulus pressure to within limits.APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSESThe design basis for shield building OPERABILITY is a LOCA.Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY ensures that the release of radioactive materialfrom the containment atmosphere is restricted to those leakage pathsand associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses.

The shield building satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCOShield building OPERABILITY must be maintained to ensure proper operation ofthe EGTS and to limit radioactive leakage from the containment to those pathsand leakage rates assumed in the accident analyses.

APPLICABILITY Maintaining shield building OPEMBILITY prevents leakage of radioactive material from the shield building.

Radioactive material may enter the shieldbuilding from the containment following a DBA. Therefore, shield buildingOPERABILIW is required in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 when DBAs could releaseradioactive material to the containment atmosphere.

ln MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are lowdue to the Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure limitations in theseMODES. Therefore, shield building OPERABILITY is not required in MODE 5or 6.(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-96Revision 129 Shield BuildingB 3.6.15BASESACTIONSNote:The highlighted text onthis page and thefollowing page wasincorporated as part ofAmendment

59. Thisamendment also added aseries of notes toTechnical Specification 3.6.15. As stated inNRC's Safety Evaluation for Amendment 59(NRC's letter datedJanuary 6, 2006), thesecontrols were onlyapplicable until WBNUnit 1 entered Mode 5 atthe start of the Cycle 7refueling outage. Thehighlighted text in thisBases section and thenotes in Technical Specification 3.6.15 will bedeleted via a futureamendment to theTech n ica I Specifications.

4.1ln the event shield building OPERABILITY is not maintained, shield buildingOPEMBILITY must be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Twenty-four hours is areasonable Completion Time considering the limited leakage design ofcontainment and the low probability of a Design Basis Accident occurring duringthis time period.8.1The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is based on engineering judgment.

The normalalignment for both EGTS control loops is the A-Auto position.

With both EGTScontrol loops in A-Auto, both trains will function upon initiation of a Containment lsolation Phase A (ClA) signal. ln the event of a LOCA, the annulus vacuumcontrol system isolates and both trains of the EGTS p.essure control loops will beplaced in service to maintain the required negative pressure.

lf annulus vacuumis lost during normal operations, the A-Auto position is unaffected by the loss ofvacuum. This operational configuration is acceptable because the accident doseanalysis conservatively assumes the annulus is at atmospheric pressure at eventinitiation.

(Ref. 3)A Note has been provided which makes the requirement to maintain the annuluspressure within limits not applicable for a maximum of t hour during: Ventilating operations, Required annulus entries, or Auxiliary Building isolations.

Ventilating operations include containment

venting, the Reactor Building Purge Ventilating System alternate containment pressure relief function, and testing of theEmergency Gas Treatment system. ln addition to Note makes the requirement tomaintaintheannulusDressurewithinlimitsnotapplicabteffif;fi (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-97Revision 15 ,29, 101 , 129 Shield BuildingB 3 6 15BASESACTIONSB.1 (continued)

C.1 and C.2lf the shield building cannot be restored to OPEMBLE status within the requiredCompletion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO doesnot apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Timesare reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plantconditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems.SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS sR 3.6.15.1Verifying that shield building annulus negative pressure is within limit (equal to ormore negative than - 5 inches water gauge, value does not account forinstrument error, Ref. 2) ensures that operation remains within the limit assumedin the containment analysis.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency of this SR was developed considering operating experience related to shield building annulus pressurevariations and pressure instrument drift during the applicable MODES.sR 3.6.15.2Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY requires maintaining each door in theaccess opening closed, except when the access opening is being used for normaltransient entry and exit. The 31 day Frequency of this SR is based onengineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the other indications Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-98Revision 15 , 29, 101 , 129 Shield BuildingB 3.6.1 5BASESof door status that are available to the operator.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.15.3REQUIREMENTS (continued)

This SR would give advance indication of gross deterioration of the concretestructural integrity of the shield building.

The Frequency of this SR is the same asthat of SR 3.6.1.1.

The verification is done during shutdown.

sR 3.6.15.4The EGTS is required to maintain a pressure equal to or more negative than-0.50 inches of water gauge ("wg) in the annulus at an elevation equivalent to thetop of the Auxiliary Building.

At elevations higher than the Auxiliary

Building, theEGTS is required to maintain a pressure equalto or more negative than -0.25"wg. The low pressure sense line for the pressure controller is located in theannulus at elevation 783. By verifying that the annulus pressure is equal to ormore negative than -0.61 "wg at elevation 783, the annulus pressurization requirements stated above are met. The ability of a EGTS train with final flow >3600 and s 4400 cfm to produce the required negative pressure during the testoperation provides assurance that the building is adequately sealed. Thenegative pressure prevents leakage from the building, since outside air will bedrawn in by the low pressure at a maximum rate < 250 cfm. The 18 monthFrequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with Regulatory Guide1.52 (Ref. 1) guidance for functional testing.REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, "Design, Testing and Maintenance C riteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Featu re Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units of Light-Water CooledNuclear Power Plants."2. Watts Bar Drawing 147W605-242, "ElectricalTech Spec Compliance Tables."3. DCN 52216-A, "Elimination of A-AUTO STANDBY Hand Switch Positionfor EGTS Pressure Control Loops."4. WBN UFSAR Section 6.2.3.2.2, "Emergency Gas Treatment System(EGrS).',

5. WBN UFSAR Section 9.4.6, "Reactor Building Purge Ventilating System(RBPVS).',

Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.6-99Revision 15, 29, 101 , 129 CCSB 3.7.7B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS)BASESBACKGROUND The CCS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat fromsafety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.

During normal operation, the CCS also provides this function for variousnonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCSserves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System, andthus to the environment.

The CCS is arranged as two independent, full-capacity cooling trains, Train A andB. Train A in unit 1 is served by CCS Hx A and CCS pump 1A-A. Pump 1B-B,which is actually Train B equipment, is also normally aligned to the Train Aheader in unit 1. However, pump 1B-B can be realigned to Train B on loss ofTrain A.Train B is served by CCS Hx C. Normally, only CCS pump C-S is aligned to theTrain B header since few nonessential, normally-operating loads are assigned toTrain B. However, pump 1B-B can be realigned to the Train B header on a lossof the C-S pump.ln addition, CCS Pump 2B-B may be substituted for CCS Pump C-S supplying the CCS Train B header provided the OPERABILITY requirements for the pumpare met and the pump is in operation.

CCS Pump 2B-B only receives a safetyinjection (Sl) actuation signal from Unit 2. The presence of a Unit 1 Sl signal willhave no effect on CCS Pump 2B-B. lf CCS Pump 2B-B is aligned as a substitute for CCS Pump C-S, then Unit 1 CCS Train B would not be OPERABLE becauseCCS pump 2B-B does not start if a Unit 1 Sl signal is generated.

However, ifCCS Pump 2B-B pump is in operation, and an Sl Signal is generated, it willcontinue to operate.

ln the event of a loss of offsite power, with or without an Slsignal present, CCS pump 2B-B will be automatically sequenced onto itsrespective diesel and continue to perform its required safety function.

Each safety related train is powered from a separate bus. An open surge tank inthe system provides pump trip protective functions to ensure that sufficient netpositive suction head is available.

lt is preferred that the 1B and 28 surge tanksections be aligned o the associated operable CCS pump(s);

however, aligning asingle 1B or 28 surge tank section provides an operable surge tank for theassociated pump(s).The pump in each train is automatically started on receipt ofa Sl signal, and all nonessential components will be manually isolated.

(continued)

Revision 136Amendment 113Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.7-38 CCSB 3.7.7BASESLCO(continued)

CCS Train B is also considered OPEMBLE when:a. Pump 2B-B and associated surge tank are OPEMBLE; andb. Pump 2B-B is in operation; andc. The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, and instrumentation andcontrols required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

The isolation of CCS from other components or systems not required for safetymay render those components or systems inoperable but does not affect theOPERABILITY of the CCS.APPLICABILITY ln MODES 1,2,3, and 4, the CCS is a normally operating system, which must beprepared to perform its post accident safety functions, primarily RCS heatremoval, which is achieved by cooling the RHR heat exchanger.

ln MODE 5 or 6, the OPERABILITY requirements of the CCS are determined bythe systems it supports.

ACTIONSA.1Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," beentered if an inoperable CCS train results in an inoperable RHR loop. This is anexception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for thesecomponents.

lf one CCS train is inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPEMBLE statuswithin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. ln this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CCS train isadequate to perform the heat removalfunction.

The72 hour Completion Time isreasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the OPEMBLEtrain, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.B.1 and B.2lf the CCS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO doesnot apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at least MODE 3within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Timesare reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plantconditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems.(continued)

Revision 136Amendment 113Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.740 CCSB 3.7.7BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS sR 3.7.7.1This SR verifies that the C-S pump is powered from the normal power sourcewhen it is aligned for OPERABLE status. Verification of the correct poweralignment ensures that the two CCS trains remain independent.

The 7-dayFrequency is based on engineering

judgment, is consistent with procedural controls governing breaker operation, and ensures correct breaker position.

sR 3.7.7.2This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the isolation of the CCS flow toindividual components may render those components inoperable but does notaffect the OPERABILITY of the CCS.Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valvesin the CCS flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for CCSoperation.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct positionprior to locking,

sealing, or securing.

This SR also does not apply to valves thatcannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering

judgment, is consistent with theprocedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valvepositions.

sR 3.7.7.3This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CCS valves on an actual orsimulated actuation signal. The CCS is a normally operating system that cannotbe fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation.

ThisSurveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative control.

The 18 monthFrequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if theSurveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from areliability standpoint.

sR 3.7.7.4This SR verifies proper automatic operation of the CCS pumps on an actual orsimulated actuation signal. The CCS is a normally operating system that cannotbe fully actuated as part of routine testing during normal operation.

The 18 monthFrequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if theSurveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed Revision 136Amendment 113Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.741 CCSB 3.7.7BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.7.4 (continued)

REOUIREMENTS at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable fromreliability standpoint.

The SR is modified by a Note that eliminates the requirement to verify CCS pump2B-B starts automatically on an actual or simulated Unit 1 Sl actuation signal.Because CCS pump 2B-B is supporting Unit 1 operation and the pump does notreceive a Unit 1 Sl actuation signal, ensuring CSS pump 2B-B is in operation ensures the pump will continue to operate if a condition requiring a Unit 1 Slactuation signal exists. lf a LOOP occurs, the SR continues to require verification of an automatic start on a simulated or actual loss of offsite power actuation signal.sR 3.7.7.5This SR assures the operability of Unit 1 CCS Train B when CCS Pump 2B-B issubstituted for CCS Pump C-S. Because CCS Pump 2B-B does not receive a Slactuation signal from Unit 1, by verifying the pump is aligned and in operation, assurance is provided that Unit 2 CCS Train B will be operable in the event of aUnit 2 Sl actuation with a loss of CCS Train A.This SR is modified by a Note that states the alignment and operating verification requirement is only required to be met when CCS pump 2B-B is being used tosupport the OPERABILITY of CCS Train B. When CCS pump 2B-B is notsupporting the OPERABILITY of CCS Train B the other SRs provide thenecessary and appropriate verifications of the CCS Train OPERABILITY.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering other indications and alarmsavaihbb to the operator in the control room to monitor CCS performance.

REFERENCES

1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 9.2.2, "Component Cooling System."2. Watts Bar Component Cooling System Description, N3-70-4002.

Revision 136Amendment 1 13Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.742 CREATCSB 3.7.11BASESACT!ONS(continued)

A.1DELETED(continued)

Revision 64, 107, 134Amendment 50, 85, 112Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.7-59a AC Sources - Operating B381BASESBACKGROUND A single offsite circuit is capable of providing the ESF loads. Two of these(continued) circuits are required to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation.

The onsite standby power source for each 6.9 kV shutdown board is a dedicated DG. WBN uses 4 DG sets for Unit 1 operation.

These same DGs will be sharedfor Unit 2 operation.

A DG starts automatically on a safety injection (Sl) signal I(i.e., low pressurizer pressure or high containment pressure signals) or on an 6.9kV shutdown board degraded voltage or loss-of-voltage signal (refer toLCO 3.3.5, "Loss of Power (LOP) DieselGenerator (DG) Start lnstrumentation").

After the DG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective 6.9 kV shutdownboard after offsite power is tripped as a consequence of 6.9 kV shutdown boardloss-of-voltage or degraded

voltage, independent of or coincident with an Slsignal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby mode without tying tothe 6.9 kV shutdown board on an Sl signal alone. Following the trip of offsitepower, a loss-of-voltage signal strips all nonpermanent loads from the 6.9 kVshutdown board. When the DG is tied to the 6.9 kV shutdown board, loads arethen sequentially connected to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown board by theautomatic sequencer.

The sequencing logic controls the permissive and startingsignals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic loadapplication.

ln the event of a loss of preferred power, the 6.9 kV shutdown boards areautomatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactorshutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA)such as a LOCA.Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequencein order to prevent overloading the DG in the process.

Within the requiredinterval (FSAR Table 8.3-3) after the initiating signal is received, all automatic andpermanently connected loads needed to recover the plant or maintain it in a safecondition are returned to service.Ratings for Train 1A, 18, 2A and 28 DGs satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each DG is 21400 kW with10olo overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. The ESF loadsthat are powered from the 6.9 kV shutdown boards are listed in Reference 2.The capability is provided to connect a 6.9 kV FLEXS DG to supply power to anyof the four 6.9 kV shutdown boards. The 6.9 kV FLEX DG is commercial-grade and not designed to meet Class 1E requirements.

The FLEX DG is madeavailable to support extended Completion Times in the event of an inoperable DG. The FLEX DG is made available as a defense-in-depth alternate source ofAC power to mitigate a loss of offsite power event. The FLEX DG would remaindisconnected rom the Class 1E distribution system unless required during a lossof offsite power.(continued)

Revision 125,132Amendment 84, 103, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-2 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in theSAFEry ANALYSES FSAR, Section 6 (Ref. 4) and Section 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems areOPERABLE.

The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient

capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability ofnecessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System(RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded.

These limits arediscussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits;Section 3.4, Reactor Goolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.The OPEMBILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initialassumptions of the Accident analyses and is based upon meeting the designbasis of the plant. This results in maintaining at least two DG's associated withone load group or one offsite circuit OPERABLE during Accident conditions in theevent of:a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; andb. A worst case single failure.The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2xii).

LCO Two qualified circuits between the Watts Bar Hydro 161 kV switchyard and theonsite Class 1E Electrical Power System and separate and independent DGs foreach train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor andmaintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part ofthe licensing basis for the plant.Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining acceptable frequency andvoltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the6.9 kV shutdoup boards.Offsite power from the Watts Bar Hydro 161 kV switchyard to the onsite Class 1Edistribution system is from two independent immediate access circuits.

Each ofthe two required circuits are routed from the switchyard through a 161 kVtransmission line and one of four 161 to 6.9 kV transformers (common stationservice transformers (CSSTs))

to the onsite Class '1E distribution system.Normally the two required circuits are aligned to power the 6.9 kV shutdownboards through CSST C and CSST D. However, one of the two required circuitsmay also be aligned to power two shutdown boards in the same load groupthrough either CSST A or CSST B and its associated Unit Boards, either directlyfrom the CSST through the Unit Board or by automatic transfer from the UnitStation Service Transformer (USST) to the CSST. Use of CSST A or B as an(continued)

Revision 125, 132Amendment 103, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B38-3 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)

A.3According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue inCondition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. With one requiredoffsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and thepotential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for achallenge to the plant safety systems.

ln this Condition,

however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to theonsite Class 1E Distribution System.The72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability ofthe remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on themaximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to beinoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lfCondition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable and that DG issubsequently returned

OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met forup to 10 days. This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initial failure to meetthe LCO, to restore the offsite circuit.

At this time, a DG could again becomeinoperable, the circuit restored

OPEMBLE, and an additional 10 days (for a totalof 23 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13 dayCompletion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition afterdiscovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable forsituations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

The'AND"connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 13 day Completion Times means that bothCompletion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to thenormal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock.'

This will resultin establishing the'timE zero" althe time that the LCO was initially not met,instead of at the time Condition A was entered.(continued)

Revision 125, 132Amendment 103, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-7 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS B.1 and C.1(continued)

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one or more DGsinoperable in Train A OR with one or more DGs inoperable in Train B, it isnecessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a morefrequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform,"

a failure ofSR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met.However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable.

Upon requiredoffsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must thenbe entered.8.2ln order to extend the Required Action B.5 Completion Time for an inoperable DGlrom 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 1 0 days, it is necessary to evaluate the availability of the 6.9 kVFLEX DG within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> upon entry into LCO 3.8.1 and every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

Since Required Action B.2 only specifies "evaluate,"

discovering the 6.9 kV FLEXDG unavailable does not result in the Required Action being not met (i.e., theevaluation is performed).

However, on discovery of an unavailable 6.9 kV FLEXDG, the Completion Time for Required Action B.5 starts lhe72 hour and/or 24hour clock.6.9 kV FLEX DG availability requires that:1) 6.9 kV FLEX DG fuel tank level is verified locally to be ) 8-hour supply; and2) 6.9 kV FLEX DG supporting system parameters for starting and operating are verified to be within required limits for functional availability (e.9., batter stateof charge).The 6.9 kV FLEX DG is not used to extend the Completion Time for more thanone inoperable DG at any one time.8.3 and C.2Required Actions 8.3 and C.2 are intended to provide assurance that a loss ofoffsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in acomplete loss of safety function of critical systems.

These features are designedwith redundant safety related trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such as the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are not included.

Redundant required feature failures consist ofinoperable features associated with a train, redundant to the train that hasinoperable DG(s).The Completion Time for Required Actions B.3 and C.2 are intended to allow theoperator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

ThisCompletion Time also allows for an exception to the normal 'time zero" forbeginning the allowed outage time "clock."

ln this Required Action, theCompletion Time only begins on discovery that both:(continued)

Revision 50, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 103 , 110Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-8 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS8.3 and C.2 (continued)

a. An inoperable DG exists; andb. A required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) is inoperable.

lf at any time during the existence of this Condition (one or more DGs inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Timewould begin to be tracked.Discovering one or more required DGs in Train A or one or more DGs in Train Binoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported

features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DGs, results in startingthe Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery ofthese events existing concurrently is Acceptable because it minimizes risk whileallowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

(continued)

Revision 132Amendment 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-8a AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.3 and C.2 (continued) ln this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits areadequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class '1E Distribution System.Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hourCompletion Time takes into account the OPEMBILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature.

Additionally, the 4 hourCompletion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBAoccurring during this period.8.4.1.8.4.2.

C.3.1 and C.3.2Required Actions B.4.1 and C.3.1 provide an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DG. lf it can be determined that the cause of theinoperable DG(s) does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.2 does nothave to be performed.

For the performance of a Surveillance, Required ActionB.4.1 is considered satisfied since the cause of the DG(s) being inoperable isapparent.

lf the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s)would be declared inoperable upon discovery and Condition F of LCO 3.8.1 wouldbe entered if the other inoperable DGs are not on the same train, otherwise, if theother inoperable DGs are on the same train, the unit is in Condition C. Once thefailure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists, and RequiredActions B.4.1 and 8..2 are satisfied.

lf the cause of the initial inoperable DGcannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance ofSR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPEMBILITY of thatDG(s).ln the event the inoperable DG(s) is restored to OPERABLE status prior tocompleting either 8.4.'1 ,8.4.2, C.3.1 or C.3.2, the corrective action program willcontinue to evaluate the common cause possibility.

This continued evaluation,

however, is no longer under the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> constraint imposed while in Condition Bor C.According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 11), 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reasonable to confirmthat the OPERABLE DG(s) is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG(s).B.5ln Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequateto supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 1O-dayCompletion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources (including the 6.9 kV FLEX DG), a reasonable time for repairs, andthe low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.(continued)

Revision 50, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 103 , 110Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-9 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.5 (continued) lf the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is or becomes unavailable with an inoperable DG, thenaction is required to restore the 6.9 kV FLEX DG to available status or to restorethe DG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from discovery of an unavailable 6.9kV FLEX DG. However, if the 6.9 kV FLEX DG unavailability occurs sometimeafter 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of continuous DG inoperability, then the remaining time to restorethe 6.9 kV FLEX DG to available status or to restore the DG to OPERABLEstatus is limited to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.The72 hour and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Times allow for an exception to the normal"time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock.'

The 72 hourCompletion Time only begins on discovery that both an inoperable DG exists andthe 6.9 kV FLEX DG is unavailable.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time only begins ondiscovery that an inoperable DG exists for 2 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the 6.9 kV FLEX DG isunavailable.

Therefore, when on DG is inoperable due to either preplanned maintenance (Preventive or corrective) or unplanned corrective maintenance work, theCompletion Time can be extended from72 hours to 10 days if the 6.9 kV FLEXDG is verified available for backup operation.

The Fourth Completion Time for Required Action B.5 establishes a limit on themaximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to beinoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lfCondition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and thatcircuit is subsequently restored

OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been notmet for up to 3 days. This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initial failure tomeet the LCO, to restore the DGs. At this Time, an offsite circuit could againbecome inoperable, the DGs restored

OPERABLE, and an additionalT2 hours(for a total of 20 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13-day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable forsituations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently.

THE "AND'connector between the 1O-day and 13-day Completion Times mean that bothCompletion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.(continued)

Revision 50, 65, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 110Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-10 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS B.5 (continued)

Compliance with the contingency actions listed in Bases Table 3.8.1-2 is requiredwhenever Condition B is entered for a planned or unplanned outage that willextend beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. lf Condition B is entered initially for an activity intendedto last less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or for an unplanned outage, the contingency actionsshould be invoked as soon as it is established that the outage period will belonger than72 hours.As in Required Action B.3, the Completion Time allows for an exception to thenormal "Time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

This will resultin establishing the "time zeto" atthe time that the LCO was initially not met,instead of at the time Condition B was entered.(continued)

Revision 132Amendment 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-10a AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued) c.4According to Regulatory Guide 1.93, (Ref. 6), operation may continue inCondition C for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.ln Condition C, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequateto supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The72hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of theremaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of aDBA occurring during this period. Restoration of at least on DG within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />sresults in reverting back under Condition B and continuing to track the "time zero"Completion Time for one DG inoperable.

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.4 establishes a limit on themaximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to beinoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. lfCondition C is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and thatcircuit is subsequently restored

OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been notmet for up to72 hours. This could lead to a total of 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br />, since initial failureto meet the LCO, to restore the DGs. At this time, an offsite circuit could againbecome inoperable, the DGs restored

OPEMBLE, and an additionalT2 hours(for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 6 dayCompletion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition afterdiscovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable forsituations in which Conditions A and C are entered concurrently.

The "AND"connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 6 day Completion Times means that bothCompletion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.As in Required Action C.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to thenormal 'time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock.'

This will resultin establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO was initially not met,instead of at the time Condition C was entered.(continued)

Revision 50, 65, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3 8-11 AC Sources - Operating B3.8 1BASESACTIONS(contin ued)D.1 and D.2 IRequired Action D.1, which applies when two required offsite circuits are Iinoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident singlefailure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.

The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to12 hours from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two required offsitecircuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trainsare OPERABLE.

When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists,this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> isappropriate.

These features are powered from redundant AC safe$ trains. Thisincludes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train features, such asthe turbine driven auxiliary pump, are not included in the list.The Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to allow the operator Itime to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Timealso allows for an exception to the normal "time zero'for beginning the allowedoutage time "clock."

ln this Required Action the Completion Time only begins ondiscovery that both:a. All required offsite circuits are inoperable; andb. A required feature is inoperable.

lf at any time during the existence of Condition D (two required offsite circuit.

linoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time beginsto be tracked.According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue inCondition D for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This level ofdegradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have thecapability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident;

however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded.

This level ofdegradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level ofdegradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two ACsources inoperable (e.9., combinations that involve an offsite circuit and one DGinoperable, or one or more DGs in each train inoperable).

However, two factorstend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation:

(continued)

Revision 50, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 103, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-12 AC Sources - Operating B3.8 1BASESACTIONSD.1 and D.2 (continued)

a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system thatremains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure;andb. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable required offsitepower source is generally much less than that required to detect andrestore an unavailable onsite AC source.With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sourcesare available to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition in the event of aDBA or transient.

ln fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, anda worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in thesafety analysis.

Thus, lhe24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time toeffect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its designcriteria.

According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources, two less thanrequired by the LCO, operation may continu e for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. lf two offsite sourcesare restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unrestricted operation may continue.

lf only oneoffsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, power operation continues inaccordance with Condition A.E.1 and E.2Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be enteredeven if allAC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization.

Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note to indicatethat when Condition E is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating,"

must beimmediately entered.

This allows Condition E to provide requirements for the lossof one offsite circuit and one or more DGs in a train, without regard to whether atrain is de-energized.

LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for ade-energized train.According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue inCondition E for a period that should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.(continued)

Revision 50, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 103, 110Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3 8-1 3 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued) lln Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electricalpower Isystem and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power systemredundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition D I(loss of both required offsite circuits).

This difference in reliability is offset by thesusceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity andcapability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the lowprobability of a DBA occurring during this period.F.1 and F.2 IWith one or more DGs in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one or more DGs Iin Train B inoperable, there are no remaining standby AC sources.

Thus, with anassumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources areavailable to power the minimum required ESF functions.

Since the offsiteelectrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level ofdegradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short timecould be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (theimmediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total lossof AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total lossof offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severelyrestricted.

The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level ofdegradation.

According to Reference 6, with one or more DGs in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one or more DGs in Train B inoperable, operation maycontinue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.G.1 and G.2,tth" t"*rble AC electric power sources cannot be restored to OPEMBLEstatus within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODEin which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must bebrought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Theallowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, toreach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderlymanner and without challenging plant systems.(continued)

Revision 50, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-14 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)

H.1 and 1.1Condition H and Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which allredundancy in the AC electrical power supplies cannot be guaranteed.

At thisseverely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system willcause a loss of function.

Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation.

The plant is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests aresupplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (undersimulated accident conditions).

The SRs for demonstrating the OPEMBILITY ofthe DGs are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9(Ref. 3) and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9), as addressed in the FSAR.Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, thefollowing is applicable.

6800 volts is the minimum steady state output voltageand the 10 second transient value. 6800 volts is 98.6% of the nominal busvoltage of 6900 V corrected for instrument error and is the upper limit of theminimum voltage required for the DG supply breaker to close on the 6.9 kVshutdown board. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 7260Yis 1 10% of the nameplate rating of the 6600 V motors. The specified 3 secondtransient value of 6555 V is 95% of the nominal bus voltage of 6900 V. Thespecified maximum transient value of 8880 V is the maximum equipment withstand value provided by the DG manufacturer.

The specified minimum andmaximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively.

Thesteady state minimum and maximum frequency values are 59.8 Hz and 60.1 Hz.These values ensure that the safety related plant equipment powered from theDGs is capable of performing its safety functions.

sR 3.8.1.1This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supplyto the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power.The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position toensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred powersource, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained.

The7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change withoutthe operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the controlroom.(continued)

Revision 50, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84 , 102, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-1 5 AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.19 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration plant conditions required toperform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuelcycle length of 18 months.For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated andtemperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

TheDG engines for WBN have an oil circulation and soakback system that operatescontinuously to preclude the need for a prelube and warmup when a DG isstarted from standby.This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that the performance of the Surveillance for DG 1A-A or 1B-B would remove a required offsite circuitfrom service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safetysystems.

Credit may be taken for unplanned events that satisfy this SR.Examples of unplanned events may include:1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment to performthe function specified by this Surveillance, for which adequatedocumentation of the required performance is available;and

2) Post corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of thisSurveillance in order to restore the component to OPEMBLE, providedthe maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction withmaintenance required to maintain OPERABILIry or reliabilig.

sR 3.8.1.20This SR verifies that DG availability is not compromised by the idle start circuitry, when in the idle mode of operation, and that an automatic or emergency startsignalwill disable the idle start circuitry and command the engine to go to fullspeed. The 18 month frequency is consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengthsand is considered sufficient to detect any degradation of the idle start circuitry.

(continued)

Revision 1 15, 132Amendment 89, 1 10Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-32 Bases Table 3.8.1-2TS Action or Surueillance Requirement (SR) Contingency ActionsAC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1Revision 50, 125, 132Amendment 39, 84, 1 10Contingency Actionsto be lmplemented Applicable TSAction or SRApplicable Modes1.Verify that the offsite power system is stable. This actionwill establish that the offsite power system is within single-contingency limits and will remain stable upon the loss ofany single component supporting the system. lf a gridstability problem exists, the planned DG outage will not bescheduled.

sR 3.8.1 .14Action B.51,21,2, 3, 42.Verify that no adverse weather conditions are expectedduring the outage period. The planned DG outage will bepostponed if inclement weather (such as severethunderstorms or heavy snowfall) is projected.

sR 3 .8.1 .14Action B.51,21,2, 3, 43Do not remove from service the ventilation systems forthe 6.9 kV shutdown boardrooms, the elevationTT2 transformer rooms, or the 480-volt shutdown boardrooms, concurrently with the DG, or implement appropriate compensatory measures.

Action B.51,2,3,44.Do not remove the reactor trip beakers from serviceconcurrently with planned DG outage maintenance.

Action B.51,2, 3, 45.D not remove the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DGoutage.Action 8.51,2, 3, 4b.Do not remove the AFW level control valves to the steamgenerators from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DGoutageAction 8.51,2,3,47.Do not remove the opposite train residual heat remove(RHR) pump from service concurrently with a Unit 1 DGoutage.Action 8.51,2, 3, 4Watts Bar-Unit 1B 3.8-36a ENCLOSURE 3WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALTABLE OF CONTENTSE-3 TABLE OF CONTENTSTECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTSLIST OF TABLES ............................

vLIST OF FlGURES....

......................

viLIST OF ACRONYMS

.....................

viiLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES ........

viii1.01.11.21.31.4TR 3.0TR 3.1TR 3.1 .1TR 3.1 .2TR 3.1.3TR 3.1.4TR 3.1.5TR 3.1 6TR 3 1.7TR 3.3TR 3.3.1TR 3 3.2TR 3.3.3TR 3.3.4TR 3.3.5TR 3.3.6TR 3.3.7TR 3.3.8TR 3.3.9TR 3.4TR 3.4.1TR 3.4.2TR 3.4.3TR 3.4.4TR 3.4.5TR 3.6TR 3.6.1TR 3 6.2TR 3.6.3REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ............3.1.1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown

.............3.1-1 Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating

.............

3.'l-3Charging Pump, Shutdown

..............3.1-5 Charging Pumps, Operating.....

........3.1-6 Borated Water Sources, Shutdown....

...................

3.1-8Borated Water Sources, Operating

.. 3.'t-10Position lndication System, Shutdown 3.1-13TNSTRUMENTATTON

.....................

...............

3.3-1ReactorTrip System (RTS) lnstrumentation........

......................3.3-1 Engineered Safety FeaturesActuation System (ESFAS) lnstrumentation................

..............3.3-5 Movable lncore Detectors................

.3.3-12Seismic lnstrumentation...............

.... 3.3-14Turbine Overspeed Protection

.........

3.3-18Loose-Part Detection System........

...3.3-20 Plant Calorimetric Measurement............

3.3-22Hydrogen Monitors

......3.3-24 Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) ....3.3-26 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)..........

..................3.4-1 SafetyValves, Shutdown

..................3.4-1 Pressurizer Temperature Limits ...........

.................

3.4-3RCS Vents ...................

3.4-5Chemistry....

.................3.4-7 Piping System Structurallntegrity

....3.4-10 CoNTAlNMENT SYSTEMS..................

........

3.6-1lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System .............3.6-1 lnlet Door Position Monitoring System ..................3.64 Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System ........

3.66(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements Revision 56 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

TR 3.7TR 3.7.1TR 3.7 2TR 3.7.3TR 3.7.4TR 3.7.5TR 3.8TR 3 8.1TR 3.8.2TR 3.8.3TR 3.8.4TR 3.9TR 3.9.1TR 3 9.2TR393TR3945.05.1PISNT SYSTEMS ....................3.7-1 Steam Generator Pressure/

Temperature Limitations

.....3.7-1 Flood Protection Plan ..3.7-3DELETED, 3.7.10Sealed Source Contamination.................,.

3.7-22Area Temperature Monitoring

..............

3.7-26ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ......,........3.8.1 lsolation Devices........

..3.8-1Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices ..............3.8-5 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal OverloadBypass Devices........

3.8-10Submerged Component Circuit Protection 3.8-17REFUELTNG OPERATlONS...................

....... 3.9-1Deleted........

.................

3.9-1Communications..............

.................

3.9-2Refueling Machine.......

.....................

3.9-3Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building

. 3.9-5ADMlNlSTMTlVE CONTROIS................

...5.0-1TechnicalRequirements (TR) ControlProgram

...5.0-1(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Requirements Revision 62 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

BASESB30B 3.1B 3.1 .1B 3.1 .2B 3.1 .3B 3.1 .4B 3.1 .5B 3.1 .6B 3.1 .7B 3.3B 3.3.1B3.32B3.33B 3.3.4B 3.3.5B 3.3.68.3.3.7B33.8B 3.3.9B 3.4B 3.4.1B 3.4.2B 3.4.3B 3.4.4B 3.4.5B 3.6B 3.6.1B 3.6.2B 3.6.3B 3.7B 3.7.1B 3.7.2B3.73B 3.7.4B 3.7.5B 3.8B3.8 1B 3.8.2B38.3B 3.8.4TECHNICAL REQUTREMENTS (TR) ANDTECHNICAL SURVETLLANCE REQUTREMENTS (TSR)APPLICABlLtry

..............

B 3.0-1REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B 3.1-1Boration Systems Flow Paths, Shutdown....

.. B 3.1-1Boration Systems Flow Paths, Operating....

.. B 3.'t-5Charging Pump, Shutdown.

...... B 3.1-9Charging Pumps, Operating

..... B 3.1-11Borated Water Sources, Shutdown 83.1-14Borated Water Sources, Operating.....

B 3.1-18Position lndication System, Shutdown....

....... B 3.1-23INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3-1ReactorTrip System (RTS) lnstrumentation

. B 3.3-1Engineered Safety FeaturesActuation System (ESFAS)Movable lncore Detectors.

................

Seismic lnstrumentation................

Turbine Overspeed Protection Loose-Part Detection SystemPlant Calorimetric Measurement.............

Hydrogen Monitors......

Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS)........

B334B 3.3-7B 3.3-10B 3 3-14B 3.3-18B 3.3-2183.3-2583.3-30REACTOR COOl-ANT SYSTEM (RCS)...........

B 3.4-1SafetyValves, Shutdown

..........

B 3.4-1Pressurizer Temperature Limits...........

..........

B 3.44RCS Vents...

.........83.4-7 Chemistry B 3.4-10Piping System Structural lntegrity........

..........

B 3.4-14CoNTAlNMENT SYSTEMS..................

........

B 3.6-1lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System.........

B 3.6-1lnlet Door Position Monitoring System........

... B 3.6*Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System . B 3.6-10PI.ANT SYSTEMS 83.7.'ISteam Generator Pressure/Temperature Limitations....

.....8 3.7-1Flood Protection Plan......

..........83.74 DELETED...

..........

B 3.7-12Sealed Source Contamination..................

..... B 3.7-18Area Temperature Monitoring..............

..........

B 3.7-22ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8-1lsolation Devices .. B 3.8-1Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices ....... B 3.8-7Motor-Operated Valves ThermalOverload Bypass Devices B 3.8-15Submerged Component Circuit Protection....

B 3.8-19(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements Revision 62 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.9B 3 9.1B 3.9.2B3.93B 3.9.4REFUELING DeletedCommunications..............

Refueling Machine.......

Crane Travel - Spent Fuel StorageB 3.9-1B 3.9-1B 3.9-3B 3.9-5(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Requirements IVRevision 53 LIST OF TABLESTable No. Title Paqe1.1-1 MODES ...1.163.3.1-1 ReactorTrip System lnstrumentation Response Times........

.....3.3-3 3.3.2-1 Engineered Safety FeaturesActuation System Response Times..........

....................3.3-7 3.3.4-'l Seismic Monitoring lnformation...

......3.3-17 I3.7.3-',t

- 3.7.3-5.......

...........DE1ETED I3.7.5-1 Area Temperature Monitoring......

..........1..........

....3.7-29 3.8.3-1 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices WhichAre Bypassed UnderAccident Conditions.................

...3.8-12 3.8.4-1 Submerged Components With Automatic De-energization UnderAccident Conditions

..3.8-19Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements Revision 62 LrsT oF FTgURESLJ$J_9 F M r sc E.L_LAN EqU_S ts Hppl3rs Al_{ p_ pRpG RAMS.Core Operating Limits ReportWatts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements viRevision 62 A-g"IgIry"m ABGTSACRPASMEAFDAFWAROARFSARVBOCccsCFRCOLRCREVSCSSCSTDNBECCSEFPDEGTSEOCERCWESFESFASHEPAHVACLCCLCOMFIVMFRVMSIVMSSVMTCNMSODCMPCPPDMSPIVPORVPTLRQPTRRAOCRCCARCPRCSRHRRTPRTSRWSTSGSISLSRUHSLrsr oF ACB9NYMSTilleAuxiliary Building Gas Treatment SystemAuxiliary Contro! Room PanelAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers Axial Flux Difference Auxiliary Feedwater SystemAll Rods OutAir Return Fan SystemAtmospheric Relief ValveBeginning of CycleComponent Cooling Water SystemCode of Federal Regulations Core Operating Limits ReportControl Room Emergency Ventilation SystemContainment Spray SystemCondensate Storage TankDeparture from Nucleate BoilingEmergency Core Cooling SystemEffective Full-Power DaysEmergency Gas Treatment SystemEnd of CycleEssential Raw Cooling WaterEngineered Safety FeatureEngineered Safety Features Actuation SystemHigh Efficiency Particulate AirHeating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning Lower Com partment CoolerLimiting Condition For Operation Main Feedwater lsolation ValveMain Feedwater Regulation ValveMain Steam Line lsolation ValveMain Steam Safety ValveModerator Temperature Coefficient Neutron Monitoring SystemOffsite Dose Calculation ManualProcess Control ProgramPower Distribution Monitoring SystemPressure lsolation ValvePower-Operated Relief ValvePressure and Temperature Limits ReportQuadrant Power Tilt RatioRelaxed Axial Offset ControlRod Cluster Control AssemblyReactor Coolant PumpReactor Coolant SystemResidual Heat RemovalRated Thermal PowerReactor Trip SystemRefueling Water Storage TankSteam Generator Safety lnjection Safety LimitSurveillance Requ irementUltimate Heat SinkWatts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements vilRevision 46 TECHN ICAL REQU I REMENTSLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPageI)-,l,um..b.sr iiiiiiivVviviiviiiixxxixiixiiixivXVxvi1 .1-11.1-21.1-31.1-41.1-51.1-61.2-11.2-21.2-31.3-11.3-21.3-31.3-41 3-51 3-61.3-71 3-81.3-91 .3-101.3-111.3-121.3-131.4-11.4-21.4-31.4-43.0-13.0-23.0-33.0-43.1-13.1-23.1-3Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements RevisionNumb.e-r5662625362624664646462223747586402203100000000000000000000003838393838051PageN."u.m.h""e"r 3.1-43.1-53.1-63,1-73 1-83.1-93,1-1 03.1-113.1-123.1-12a3.1-133.3-13.3-23.3-33.3-43.3-53.3-63.3-73.3-83.3-93.3-103.3-113.3-123.3-133.3-143.3-153 3-163.3-173.3-183 3-193.3-203.3-213.3-223.3-233.3-243.3-253.3-263.3-273.3-283.4-13.4-23.4-33.4-43.4-53.4-63.4-73.4-83.4-9RevisionIYumh"cr038510037033042800344400263630494604040019383863023234545464646000000000villRevision 64 TECHNICAL REQUI REMENTSLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPageNumber3.4-103.4-113.4-123 6-13.6-23.6-33.6-43.6-53.6-63.6-73.7-13.7-23.7-33.7-43.7-53.7-63.7-73.7-83.7 -93.7 -103.7 -113.7 -123.7-133.7 -143.7 -153.7-163.7 -173.7-183.7 -193.7-203.7-213.7-223.7-233.7-243,7-253.7-263.7 -273.7-283.7-293.7-303.8-13.8-23 8-33.8-43.8-53.8-6RevisionNumber6405200056560000171717171717176262626262626262626262624300040404A220002500PageNumber3.8-73 8-83.8-93 8-103.8-1 13.8-123.8-1 33.8-143.8-1 53.8-163.8-173.8-183.8-193.9-13.9-23.9-33.9-43 9-55.0-1RevisionNumber00250000556059018185302828024Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements ixRevision 64 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPageNUmbefB 3.0-1B 3.0-2B30-3B 3.A4B 3.0-5B 3.0-6B 3.0-7B 3.0-8B 3.0-9B 3.0-10B 3.0-11B 3.0-12B 3.1-1B 3.1-2B 3.1-3B 3.14B 31-5B 3.1-6B 3.1-7B 3.1-8B 3.1 -9B 3 1-10B 3.1-11B 3.1-12B 3.1-1 3B 3. 1-14B 3.1-15B 3. 1-16B 3. 1-17B 3.1-18B 3.1-19B 3 1-20B 3. 1-21B 3 1-22B 3 1-23B 3. 1-24B 3.1-25B 3.3-1B 3.3-2B 3.3-3B 3.34B 3.3-5B 3.3-6B 3.3-7B 3.3-8B 3.3-9B 3 3-10B 3.3-11B 3.3-12Watts Bar-Unit 1Techn ical Req uirements RevisionNumFer00038380005039393800380510202038415104102037370020273700I00022220464646194040PageNumh.e.rB 3.3-13B 3.3-14B 3 3-15B 3.3-16B 3 3-17B 3.3-18B 3 3-19B 3.3-20B 3 3-21B 3.3-22B 3.3-23B 3.3-24B 3.3-25B 3.3-26B 3.3-27B 3.3-28B 3.3-29B 3 3-30B 3.3-31B 3.3-32B 3.3-33B 3.3-34B 3.4-1B 3.4-2B 3.4-3B 3.4-4B34-5B34-6B 3.4-7B 3.4-8B34-9B 3.4-10B 3.4-11B 3.4-12B 3.4-13B 3.4-14B 3.4-15B 3.4-16B 3.6-1B 3.6-2B 3.6-3B36-4B 3.6-5B 3.6-6B36-7B 3.6-8B 3.6-9B 3.6-10B 3.6-1 1RevisionNumber19038638636363232323234545454545545446465400000000000006438520202000105661000Revision 64 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPageNumbe.!:B 3.6-12B 3.7-1B 3.7-2B 3.7-3B 3.74B 3.7-5B 3.7-6B 3.7-7B37-8B 3.7-9B 3.7-10B 3.7-11B 3.7-12B 3.7-13B 3.7-14B 3.7-15B 3.7-16B 3.7-17B 3.7-18B 3.7-19B 3.7-20B 3.7-21B 3.7-22B 3.7-23B 3.7-24B 3.7-25B 3.8-1B 3.8-2B 3.8-3B 3.84B 3.8-5B 3.8-6B 3.8-7B 3.8-8B 3.8-9B 3.8-10B 3.8-1 1B 3.8-12B 3.8-13B 3.8-14B 3.8-15B 3.8-16B 3.8-17B 3.8-18B 3.8-19B 3 8-20B 3.8-21RevisionNumber036383657171717171717176262626262620430002040400000025250000025250000000PageNumberB 3.8-22B 3.9-1B 3.9-2B39-3B 3.9-4B 3.9-5B 3.9-6B 3.9-7B 3.9-8B 3.9-9RevisionNunbg,,r:

185353002802800Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements xiRevision 62 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTINGRevisions lssued SUBJECTRevision 0 09-30-95 lnitial lssueRevision 1 12-06-95 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 2 01-04-96 Area Temperature Monitoring

- Change in MSSV LimitRevision 3 02-28-96 Turbine Driven AFW Pump Suction Requirement Revision 4 08-18-97 Time-frame for Snubber Visual ExamsRevision 5 08-29-97 Performance of Snubber Functional Tests at PowerRevision 6 09-08-97 Revised Actions for Turbine Overspeed Protection Revision 7 09-12-97 Change OPAT/OTAT Response TimeRevision 8 09-22-97 Clarification of Surveillance Frequency for Position lndication SYstemRevision I 10-10-97 Revised Boron Concentration for Borated Water SourcesRevision 10 '12-17-98 ICS lnlet Door Position Monitoring

- Channel CheckRevision 1't 01-08-99 Computer-Based Analysis for Loose Parts Monitoring Revision 12 01-15-99 Removalof Process ControlProgram from TRMRevision 13 03-30-99 Deletion of Power Range Neutron Flux High Negative RateReactor Trip FunctionRevision 14 04-07-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 15 M-07-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 16 04-13-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 17 05-25-99 Flood Protection PlanRevision 18 08-03-99 Submerged Component Circuit Protection Revision 19 10-12-99 Upgrade Seismic Monitoring lnstruments Revision 20 03/13/00 Added Notes to Address lnstrument Error for VariousParameters Revision 21 C/,l13l00 COLR, Cycle 3, Rev 2Revision 22 07107100 Elimination of Response Time Testing(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements xilRevision 22 Revis"ip.np_

Revision 23Revision 24Revision 25Revision 26Revision 27Revision 28Revision 29Revision 30Revision 31Revision 32Revision 33Revision 34Revision 35Revision 36Revision 37TECHNICAL REQU IREMENTS MANUALLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTINGlssued SUBJECT01122101 PlantCalorimetric(LEFM) 03/19/01 TRM Change Control Program per 50.59 Rule05115101 Change in Preventive Maintenance Frequency for Molded CaseCircuit Breakers05129101 Change CVI Response Time from 5 to 6 Seconds01131102 Change pH value in the borated water sources due to TSchange for ice weight reduction 02105102 Refueling machine upgrade under DCN D-50991-A 02126102 Added an additional action to TR 3.7.3 to perform anengineering evaluation of inoperable snubbe/s impact on theoperability of a supported system.06/05/02 Updated TR 3.3.5.1 to reflect implementation of the TIPTOP05t14144program in a Technical lnstruction (Tl).Correct RTP to 3459 MWt (PER 02-9519-000)

Editorial correction to Bases for TSR 3.1.5.3.Updated TRs 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 and their respective bases toincorporate boron concentration changes in accordance withchange packages WBN-TS-02-14 and WBN-TS-03-017

.Revised ltem 5, "source Range, Neutron Flux" function of Table3.3.1-1 to provide an acceptable response time of less than orequal 0.5 seconds.

(Reference TS Amendment 52.)Revised Table 3.3.2-1, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation systems Response Times," to revise containment sprayresponse time and to add an asterisk note to notation 13 of thetable via Change Package WBN-TS-04-16.

Revised the response time for Containment Spray in Table3.3.2-1 and the RTr.ror values in the Bases for TR 3.7.1 . Bothchanges result from the replacement of the steam generators.

Revised TR 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 and the Bases for these TRs toupdate the boron concentration limits of the RWST and theBAT,10t31t0209/17 t0310t14t0304/06/0509/251061 1/08/06continued Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements Revision 37 Rpv"isiens Revision 38Revision 39Revision 40Revision 41Revision 42Revision 43Revision 44Revision 45Revision 46Revision 47TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESREVISION LISTINGlssued SUBJECT11129106 Updated the TRM to be consistent with Tech SpecAmendment

55. TRM Revision 38 modified the requirements for mode change limitations in TR 3.0.4 and TSR 3.0.4 byincorporating changes similar to those outlined in TSTF-359, Revision

9. (T5-06-24) 04116107 Updated the TRM to be consistent with Tech Spec Amendment 42.TRM Revision 39 modified the requirements of TSR 3.0.3 byincorporating changes similar to those outlined in TSTF-358.

(TS-07-03) 05124107 Updated the TRM and Bases to remove the various requirements for the submittal of reports to the NRC. (TS-07-06) 05125107 Revision 41 updates the Bases of TR 3.1.3, 3.1.4 and 3.4.5 to beconsistent with Technical Specification Amendment

66. Thisamendment replaces the references to Section Xl of the ASMEBoiler and Pressure Vessel Code with the ASME Operation andMaintenance Code for lnservice Testing (lST) activities andremoves reference to "applicable supports" from the IST program.0312012008 Revision 42 updates Figure 3.'1.6 to remove the 240 TPBAR Limit.0711712008 Revision 43 removes a reporting requirement from TR 3.7.4,"Sealed Source Contamination."

The revision also updates theBases for TR 3.7.4.1011012008 Revision 44 updates Table 3.3.1-1 to be consistent with thechanges approved by NRC as Tech Spec Amendment 68.02i232009 Added TR 3.3.8, "Hydrogen Monitors,'and the Bases forTR 3.3.8.This change is based on Technical Specification (TS) Amendment 72 which removed the Hydrogen Monitors (Function 13 of LCO3.3.3) from the TS.09120n010 Revision 46 implements changes from License Amendment 82(Iechnical Specification (TS) Bases Revsion 104) for the approvedBEACON-TSM application of the Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS).1010812010 Revision 47 changes are in response to PER 215552 whichrequested clarification be added to the TRM regarding supported system operability when a snubber is declared inoperable orremoved from service.continued Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements xtvRevision 47 Revisions Revision 48Revision 49Revision 50Revision 51Revision 52Revision 53Revision 54Revision 55Revision 56Revision 57Revision 58TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESREVISION LISTINGlssuedSUBJECT0411212011 CANCELLED 0512412011 Revision 49 updated Note 14 of Table 3.3.2-1to clarify that thereferenced time is only for'partial' transfer of the ECCS pumpsfrom the VCT to the RWST.1211212011 Clarifies the acceptability of periodically using a portion of the 25%grace perid in TSR 3.0.2 to facilitate 13 week maintenance workschedules.

08/09/20'1 3 Adds a note to TR 3.1 .2 and TR 3. 1 .4 to permit securing onecharging pump in order to supporting transition into or from theApplicability of Technicat Specification 3.4.12 (PER 593365).08/30/2013 Clarifies that TR 3.4.5, "Piping System Structural lntegri$,"

appliesto all ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 piping systems, and is notlimited to reactor coolant system piping.1211212013 Technical Specification Amendment 92 added Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.10, "Decay Time," which was redundant toTechnical Requirement (TR) 3.9.1, "Decay Time." Revision 53removes TR 3.9.1 from the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)and the TRM Bases.0112312014 TRM which updates Technical Requirement (TR) 3.3.9, "PowerDistribution Monitoring System,"

to reflect the Addendum to WCAP12472-P-4.

0111412015 Provided in the attachment is TRM Revision 55 which revises TRMTable 3.8.3-1 pages 3 and 5, Motor-Operated Valves ThermalOverload Devices which are bypassed under accident conditions.

This revision results in the valves requiring their Thermal OverloadBypasses to be operable.

0/,13012015 This revision restructures TR 3.6.2 CONDITIONS, REQUIREDACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIME(s) to address two distinctcases of system inoperability.

TRM BASES B 3.6.2 was alsorevised to coincide with the changes described above and toinclude additional detail regarding use of indirect means forperforming channel checks0510712015 This revision changes the elevation of the Mean Sea Level bysubmergence during floods vary from 714.5ftto 739.2 ft in TRMBases B 3.7.2, Flood Protection Plan.0511912015 This revision is an administrative change in TRM Bases 3.4.5background information.

(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req uirements Revision 58 Revisions TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESREVISION LISTINGl"s.s-ued S"U"BJE9T 1011312015 This revision adds the Unit 1 and Unit 2 FCV67-0066 and FCV-67-0067 valves to TRM Table 3.8.3-1 .Revision 59Revision 60 0O10112016 This revision is to add 2-FCV-70-153 valve to TRM Table 3.8.3-1Sheet 4 of 5.Revision 61 0212'112017 Revises TRM Bases 3.6.2 "lnlet Door Position Monitoring System"actions.Revision 62 0313112017 This revision deletes TRM and TRM Bases section 3.7.3,Snubbers" via the License Amendment 111.Revision 63 511712017 Revises the obsolete analog system that was limited to monitoring 1 sensorfor each RCS collection point.Revision

&l 8122t17 Clarified ASME Code Class in the section description in Section I3.4.5, Piping System Structural lntegrity.

IWatts Bar-Unit 1Technical Req u irementsxviRevision 64 ENGLOSURE 4WBN UNIT 1 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALCHANGED PAGESE-4 Loose-Part Detection SystemTR 3.3.6TR 3 3 INSTRUMENTATION TR 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection SystemTR 3 3.6APPLICABILITY:

The Loose-Part Detection System shall be OPERABLE.

MODES 1 and 2.NOTETR 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION Both channels of one ormore collection regions ofLoose-Part Detection System inoperable

> 30days.COMPLETION TIMEln accordance withthe Corrective ActionProgram.ACT!ONSREQUIRED ACTION4.1 Document in accordance withthe Corrective Action Program.Watts Bar-Unit 1Tech nical Requ irementsRevision 40, 6305/1 7 t173.3-20 TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCSTR 3.4.5 ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5APPLICABILITY:

CONDITION Structural integrity of any ASMECode Class 1 component(s) notwithin limits.Watts Bar-Unit 1Tech nical Requ irementsPiping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5Prior to increasing Reactor CoolantSystem temperature

> 50oF above theminimum temperature required by NDTconsiderations.

Prior to increasing Reactor CoolantSystem temperature

> 50oF above theminimum temperature required by NDTconsiderations.

The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components in all systemsshall be maintained in accordance with TSR 3.4.5.1and TSR 3.4.5.2.AIIMODES.

COMPLETION TIMEA.ACTIONS(continued)

REQUIRED ACTIONRestore structural integrity ofaffected component(s) to withinlimit.lsolate affected component(s).

3.4-10Revision 38, 52,64 TR37 PLANTSYSTEMS TR 3.7.3 DeletedWatts Bar-Unit 1Techn ica! Requirements SnubbersTR 3.7.3Revision 6203/311173.7-10 through 21 Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass DevicesTR 3.8.3Table 3.8.3-1 (Page 4 of 5)Motor-Operated Valves Thermal OverloadDevi ce' lH [: ,fE"?f,tr;:o u n d e rVALVE NO.1-FCV-67-141 1-FCV-72-21 1-FCV-72-22 1-FCV-72-2 1-FCV-72-39 1-FCV-72-40 1-FCV-72-41 1-FCV-72-44 1-FCV-72-45 1-FCV-26-240 1-FCV-26-243 1-FCV-68-332 1-FCV-68-333 1-FCV-70-153 2-FCV-70-153 1-FCV-70-156 1-FCV-67-9A 2-FCV-67-9A 1-FCV-67-9B 2-FCV-67-98 1-FCV-67-10A 2-FCV-67-10A 1-FCV-67-108 2-FCV-67-1 0BWatts Bar-Unit 1Tech nical Requirements FUNCTIONContainment lsolation UpperContainment Spray Pump SuctionContainment Spray Pump SuctionContainment Spray lsolation Containment Spray lsolation RHR Containment Spray lsolation RHR Containment Spray lsolation Containment Sump to Header A - Containment SprayContainment Sump to Header B - Containment SprayContainment Isolation RCP Containment Spray lsolation RCS PRZR ReliefRCS PRZR ReliefRHR Heat Exchanger B-B OutletRHR Heat Exchanger B-B OutletRHR Heat Exchanger A-A OutletERCW Strainer BackwashERCW Strainer BackwashERCW Strainer FlushERCW Strainer FlushERCW Strainer BackwashERCW Strainer BackwashERCW Strainer FlushERCW Strainer Flush(continued) 3.8-15Revision 60 Loose-Part Detection SystemB 3.3,6B 3 3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6 Loose-Part Detection SystemBASESBACKGROUND The Loose-Part Detection System consists of twelve sensors with associated pre-amplifiers, signalconditioners and digitalsignal processor units, and a CPUwith its supporting equipment.

Two sensors are located at each of the six naturalcollection regions around the Reactor Coolant System. These regions consist ofthe top and bottom plenums of the reactor vessel and the primary coolant inletplenum to each of the four steam generators.

The entire system is described inReference 1.The Loose-Part Detection System provides the capability to detect acousticdisturbances indicative of loose parts within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)pressure boundary.

This system is provided to avoid or mitigate damage to RCScomponents that could occur from these loose parts. The Loose-Part Detection System Technical Requirement is consistent with the recommendations ofReference 2.APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSESThe presence of a loose part in the RCS can be indicative of degraded reactorsafety resulting from failure or weakening of a safety-related component.

A loosepart, whether it be from a failed or weakened component, or from an iteminadvertently left in the primary system during construction, refueling, ormaintenance, can contribute to component damage and materialwear byfrequent impacting with other parts in the system. Also, a loose part increases the potential for control-rod jamming and for accumulation of increased levels ofradioactive crud in the primary system (Ref. 2).The Loose Part Detection System provides the capability to detect loose parts inthe RCS which could cause damage to some component in the RCS. Looseparts are not assumed to initiate any DBA, and the detection of a loose part is notrequired for mitigation of any DBA (Ref. 3).Watts Bar-Unit 1Tech nical Requirements (continued)

Revision 63jst17 t17B 3.3-1 I Loose-Part Detection SystemB 3.3.6BASES (continued)

TRTR 3.3.6 requires the Loose-Part Detection System to be OPERABLE.

This isnecessary to ensure that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallicparts in the RCS and avoid or mitigate damage to the RCS components.

Thisrequirement is provided in Reference 2.APPLICABILITY TR 3.3.6 is required to be met in MODES 1 and2 as stated in Reference 2.These MODES of applicability are provided in Reference 2.The Applicability has been modified by a Note stating that the provisions of TR3.0.3 do not apply.ACTIONS4.1lf both channels of one or more collection regions of the Loose-Part Detection System are inoperable for more than 30 days, document theinoperability of the channels in accordance with Corrective Action Program.TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.3.6.1Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK for the Loose-Part Detection System onceevery 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.

ln addition, the Loose-Part Detection System performs an automatic system self-test each day which provides a printable daily report and displays any faultsdiscovered during he test. The CHANNEL CHECK activity will review the dailyreport, observe the display to determine if any faults were discovered during thesystem self-test, verifl the system is in an operable condition and verify there areno alarms. The CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus it iskey to verifying that the instrumentation continues to operate properly betweeneach CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1Tech nical Requ irementsRevision 6305/1 7117B 3.3-1 I Loose-Part Detection SystemB3.36BASESTECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.3.6.1 (continued)

The Surveillance and the Surveillance Frequency are provided in Reference 2.TSR 3.3.6.2A CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST is to be performed every 31 days on eachrequired channelto ensure the entire channelwill perform the intended function.

This test verifies the capability of the Loose-Part Detection System to detectimpact signals which would indicate a loose part in the RCS. The Surveillance and the Surveillance Frequency are provided in Reference 2.TSR 3.3.6.3CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and thesensor. The Surveillance Frequency of 18 months is based upon operating experience and is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle. TheSurveillance and the Surveillance Frequency are provided in Reference 2.Reference 1 describes the use of the built-in capabilities of the system to verifyproper channel calibration.

This is an acceptable option to using a mechanical impact device for sensors located in plant areas where plant personnel radiation exposure is considered by Plant Management to be excessive.

REFERENCES 1.2.3Watts Bar FSAR, Section7.6.7, "Loose Part Monitoring System (LPMS)System Description."

Regulatory Guide 1 .133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the PrimarySystem of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors."

WCAP-1 1618, "MERITS Program-Phase ll, Task 5, Criteria Application,"

including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989.Watts Bar-Unit 1Tech n ical Requ irements05117117Revision 11,63B 3.3-20 Piping System Structural lntegrity B 3.4.5B 3 4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)B 3.4.5 ASME Class 1,2, and 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity BASESBACKGROUND lnservice inspection and pressure testing of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3components in all systems are performed in accordance with Section Xl of theASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) and applicable

Addenda, asrequired by 10 CFR 50.55a(g)

(Ref. 2). Exception to these requirements applywhere relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) and (a)(3). ln general, the surveillance intervals specified inSection Xl of the ASME Code apply. However, the lnservice lnspection Programincludes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section Xl of the ASME Code. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout theTechnical Specifications.

Each reactor coolant pump flywheel is, in addition, inspected as recommended in Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide1.'14, Revision 1, August 1975 (Ref. 3).APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSESCertain components which are designed and manufactured to the requirements of specific sections of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code are part of theprimary success path and function to mitigate DBAs and transients.

However,the operability of these components is addressed in the relevant specifications that cover individualcomponents.

ln addition, this particular Requirement coversonly structural integrity inspection/testing requirements for these components, which is not a consideration in designing the accident sequences for theoretical hazard evaluation (Ref .4).TRTR 3.4.5 requires that the structural integrity of the ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3components in all systems be maintained in accordance with TSR 3.4.5.1 andTSR 3.4.5.2.

ln those areas where conflict may exist between the Technical Specifications and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, the Technical Specifications take precedence.

(continued)

Revision 58, 64Watts Bar-Unit 1Tech nical Req uirements B 3.4-14 lnlet Door Position Monitoring SystemB 3.6.2BASES (continued)

ACTIONS(continued) c.1lf the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or Bcannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition where OPERABILITY ofthe lnlet Door Position Monitoring System is not required.

This is accomplished by immediately entering Technical Specification LCO 3.6.12, Condition D, whichrequires placing the plant in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODES from fullpower in an orderly mannerand without challenging plant systems.TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Watts Bar-Unit 1Techn ical Req u irementsTSR 3.6.2.1Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK for the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation hasnot occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels.

lt is based on theassumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should readapproximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of thechannels or of something even more serious.

Performance of the CHANNELCHECK helps to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properlybetween each TADOT. The dual switch arrangement on each door allowscomparison of open and shut indicators for each zone as well as a check with theannunciator window.When equipment conditions exist that prevent the preferred direct comparison ofopen and shut indicators for each zone as described above, indirect methodsmay be employed to verify that the inlet doors are shut. The indirect methodsinclude the performance of a continuity check of the circuit used by theannunciator window, by monitoring ice bed temperature, or by monitoring icecondenser and containment parameters.

The annunciator continuity check canconfirm if one or more inlet door zone switch contacts are closed which wouldrepresent an open inlet door. The lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System canbe used to provide confirmation of inlet door closure by confirming there isuniform equilibrium temperature in the ice bed. lce condenser and containment parameters such as temperature and humidity can also be used to determine ifan ice condenser inlet door is open.When indirect methods are used to verify ice condenser inlet doors are shut, atechnical analysis must be completed and documented in accordance with thecorrective action program.

ln those instances when a technical analysis can notbe made within the allowed Completion Time, the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System must be declared lnoperable and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.12,Condition D must be entered immediately.

2t21t17Revision 61B36-8 SnubbersB 3.7.3BASESB 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3.7.3 DeletedWatts Bar-Unit 1Tech nical Requ irementsRevision 6203/31117B 3 .7 -12 thoru gh 17 ENCLOSURE 5WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASESTABLE OF CONTENTSE-5 TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTSLIST OF TABLESLIST OF ACRONYMS

......LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESIViViviixB 2.0-1B 2.0-1B 2.0-7B 3 .1-1B 3.1-1B 3.1-8B 3 .1-12B 3.1-18B 3.1-25B 3.1-35B 3 .1-40B 3.1-48B 3 .1-57B 3.1-64B 3.2-1B 3.2-1B 3.2-14B 3.2-21B 3.2-26B 2.0B 2.1 .1B 2.1 .2B 3.0B 3.0B 3.1B 3.1.1B 3.1.2B 3.1 .3B 3 .1.4B 3.1 .5B 3.1 .6B3.1 .7B 3.1 .8B 3.1 .9B 3.1 .10B 3.2B 3.2.1B 3.2.2B 3.2.3B 3.2.4SAFETY LIMITS (SLs)Reactor Core SLsReactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ...LTMITING CONDTTTON FOR OPERATTON (LCO)APPLICABILITY

... B 3.0-1SURVElLLANCE REQUTREMENT (SR) APPLlCABlLlTY

... B 3.0-11REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ......SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) - T",s ) 200'FSHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) - T",s ( 200'FCore Reactivity

...Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)Rod Group Alignment LimitsShutdown Bank lnsertion LimitsControl Bank lnsertion LimitsRod Position lndication PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 1 ......PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions-MODE 2 ......POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITSHeat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Fo(Z))Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor (pXs)AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD)QUADRANT POWER TlLT RATlO (OPTR)Watts Bar - Unat2(continued)

TABLE OF CONTENTSB 3.3B 3.3.1B 3.3.2B 3.3.3B 3.3.4B 3.3.5B 3.3.6B 3.3.7B 3.3.8B 3.4.2B 3.4.3B 3.4.4B 3.4.5B 3.4.6B 3.4.7B 3.4.8B 3.4.9B 3 .4.10B 3.4.11B 3.4.12B 3 .4.13B 3.4.14B 3.4.15B 3.4.16B 3 .4.17INSTRUMENTATION

.... B 3.3-1Reactor Trip System (RTS) lnstrumentation

... B 3.3-'1Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)lnstrumentation

.. ........

B 3.3-64Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) lnstrumentation...

B 3.3-122Remote Shutdown System B 3.3-138Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Startlnstrumentation

... B 3.3-144ContainmentVent lsolation lnstrumentation

... ..... B 3.3-151Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)Actuation lnstrumentation

... B 3.3-159Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) Actuation lnstrumentation

... ....... B 3.3-165B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ........

B 3.4-1B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure fromNucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits . ... .RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality

. ....RCS Pressure and Temperature (PfD LimitsRCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2RCS Loops - MODE 3RCS Loops - MODE 4RCS Loops - MODE 5,RCS Loops - MODE 5,Pressurizer P ress urizer Safety ValvesPressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)RCS Operational LEAKAGERCS Pressure lsolation Valve (PlV) LeakageRCS Leakage Detection lnstrumentation RCS Specific ActivitySteam Generator (SG) Tube lntegrity Loops t,i'"oLoops Not FilledB 3 .4-1B 3.4-6B 3.4-9B 3.4-16B 3.4-24B 3.4-25B 3.4-31B 3.4-35B 3.4-38B 3.4-42B 3.4-46B 3.4-52B 3.4-65B 3 .4-71B 3.4-76B 3.4-82B 3.4-88Watts Bar - U nal 2(continued)

TABLE OF CONTENTSB 3.5B 3.5.1B 3.5.2B 3.5.3B 3.5.4B 3.5.5B 3.6B 3.6.1B 3.6.2B 3.6.3B 3.6.4B 3.6.5B 3.6.6B 3.6.7B 3.6.8B 3.6.9B 3.6.10B 3.6.1 1B 3 .6.12B 3.6.13B 3.6.14B 3.6.15B 3.7B 3.7.1B 3.7.2B 3 .7.3B 3.7.4B 3.7.5B 3.7.6Accumulators ECCS - Operating B 3.5-1B 3.5-1B 3.5-9B 3.5-20B 3.5-24B 3.5-30B 3.6-1B 3.6-1B 3.6-6B 3.6-13B 3.6-27B 3.6-30B 3.6-34B 3.6-41B 3.6-42B 3.6-48B 3.6-54B 3,6-59B 3.6-69B 3.6-78B 3.6-83B 3.6-87Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)Seal lnjection FIowCONTAINMENT SYSTEMSContainment

... . aContainment Air LocksContainment lsolation ValvesContainment PressureContainment Air Temperature

.. .. r ....Containment Spray System ... ....RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITIONHydrogen Mitigation System (HMS)Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)Air Return System (ARS)lce Bedlce Condenser DoorsDivider Barrier lntegrity Containment Recirculation DrainsShield BuildingPLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7-1Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVS) B 3.7-1Main Steam lsolation Valves (MSlVs) .... B 3.7-8Main Feedwater lsolation Valves (MFlVs) and MainFeedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVS) andAssociated Bypass Valves B 3.7-13Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) ... .... B 3.7-19Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW System B 3.7-23Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ... ... ... B 3.7-32Watts Bar - Unit2(continued)

TABLE OF CONTENTSB 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued) 83.7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS) ....... B 3.7-36B 3.7.8 Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System B 3.7-42B 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ... B 3.7-47B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) ....... B 3.7-50B 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System(CREATCS)

........

B 3.7-59Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) .... B 3.7-63Fuel Storage PoolWater Level ... B 3.7-68Secondary Specific Activity

.. B 3.7-71Spent FuelAssembly Storage B 3.7-74Component Cooling System (CCS) - Shutdown

.. B 3.7-77Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) - Shutdown B 3.7-84ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMSAC Sources - Operating AC Sources - ShutdownDiesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil,DC Sources - Operating DC Sources - ShutdownBattery Parameters lnverters

- Operating Distribution Systems - Operating Distribution Systems - ShutdownREFUELING OPERATIONS Boron Concentration Unborated Water Source lsolation ValvesN uclear I nstrumentation RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITIONResidual Heat Removal (RHR) andCoolant Circulation

- High Water LevelB 3 .7.12B 3 .7.13B 3 .7.14B 3.7 .15B 3 .7.16B 3 .7.17B 3.8B 3.8.1B 3.8.2B 3,8,3B 3.8.4B 3.8.5B 3.8.6B 3.8.7B 3.8.8B 3.8.9B 3.8.10B 3.9B 3.9.1B 3,9.2B 3.9.3B 3.9.4B 3.9.5B 3.8-1B 3.8-1B 3.8-38B 3.8-43B 3.8-53B 3.8-68B 3.8-72B 3.8-78B 3.8-82B 3.8-86B 3.8-95B 3.9-1B 3.9-1B 3.9-5B 3.9-8B 3.9-1 1B 3.9-12Watts Bar - Unit 2(continued)

IV TABLE OF CONTENTSB 3.9B 3.9.6B 3.9.7B 3.9.8B 3.9.9B 9.10REFUELING OPERATIONS (continued)

Residual Heat Removal(RHR) andCoolant Circulation

- LowWater Level ...Refueling CavityWater Level ...RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITIONSpent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration

...Decay Time ......,.B 3.9-16B 3.9-20B 3.9-23B 3.9-24B 3.9-26Watts Bar - Untz TABLE OF CONTENTSLIST OF TABLESTITLEPAGETS Action or Surveillance Requirements Contingency Actions...

... ... . 83.8-37aB 3.8.9-1AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution SystemsB 3.8-94LIST OF FIGURESFIGURENO.TITLEPAGETABLENOB 3 .8.1-2B 2.1 .1-1B 3 .1 .7-1B 3.2.1-1B 3.2.3-1Reactor Core Safety Limits vs. Boundary of Protection Control Bank Insertion vs. Percent RTPK(Z) - Normalized F a(Z) as a Function of Core HeightTYPICAL AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE Acceptable Operation Limits as a Function ofRATED THERMAL POWERB 2.0-6B 3.1-47B 3.2-13B 3.2-25VIWatts Bar - Unit 2Amendment 5

ACRONYMABGTSACRPAFDAFWARFSAROARVASMEBOCCAOCCCSCFRCOLRCREVSCSSCSTDNBECCSEFPDEGTSEOCLrsr oF ACRqNYMSTITLEAuxiliary Building Gas Treatment SystemAuxiliary Control Room PanelAxial Flux Difference Auxiliary Feedwater SystemAir Return Fan SystemAll Rods OutAtmospheric Relief ValveAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers Beginning of CycleConstant Axial Offset ControlComponent Cooling Water SystemCode of Federal Regulations Core Operating Limits ReportControl Room Emergency Ventilation SystemContainment Spray SystemCondensate Storage TankDeparture from Nucleate BoilingEmergency Core Cooling SystemEffective Full-Power DaysEmergency Gas Treatment SystemEnd of CycleWatts Bar - Unit2vll(cont[ueq)-

ACRONYMERCWESFESFASHEPAHVACLCOMFIVMFRVMSIVMSSVMTCNMSODCMPCPPIVPORVPTLRQPTRRAOCRCCARCPRCSLIST OF ACRONYMSTITLEEssential Raw Cooling WaterEngineered Safety FeatureEngineered Safety Features Actuation SystemHigh Efficiency Particulate AirHeating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning Limiting Condition For Operation Main Feedwater lsolation ValveMain Feedwater Regulation ValveMain Steam Line lsolation ValveMain Steam Safety ValveModerator Temperature Coefficient Neutron Monitoring SystemOffsite Dose Calculation ManualProcess Control ProgramPressure lsolation ValvePower-Operated Relief ValvePressure and Temperature Limits ReportQuadrant Power Tilt RatioRelaxed Axial Offset ControlRod Cluster Control AssemblyReactor Coolant PumpReactor Coolant System(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit2viii ACRONYMRHRRTPRTSRWSTSGSISLSRUHSLLSr OF ACSONWSResidual Heat RemovalRated Thermal PowerReactor Trip SystemRefueling Water Storage TankSteam Generator Safety lnjection Safety LimitSurveillance Requirement Ultimate Heat SinkTITLEtxWatts Bar - Unit 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERxxixiixiiixivxivXVxvixviixviiixixxxxxiB 2.0-1B 2.0-2B 2.0-3B 2.A-4B 2.0-5B 2.0-6B 2.0-7B 2.0-8B 2.0-9B 2.0-10B 3.0-1B 3.0-2B 3.0-3B 3.0-4B 3.0-5B 3.0-60000050001100008011I610110000000000700000B 3.0-7B 3.0-8B 3.0-9B 3.0-10B 3.0-10aB 3.0-10bB 3.0-10cB 3.0-1 1B 3.0-12B 3.0-13B 3.0-14B 3.0-15B 3.0-16B 3.0-17B 3.0-18B 3.1-1B 3.1-2B 3.1-3B 3.1-4B 3.1-5B 3.1-6B 3.1-7B 3.1-8B 3.1-9B 3.1-10B 3 .1-11B 3 .1-12B 3.1-13B 3 .1-14B 3.1-15B 3.1-16B 3 .1-17B 3.1-18B 3.1-19B 3.1-20B 3.1-21B 3.1-22B 3.1-23000077701000000000000000000000000000000Watts Bar - Unit 2Revision 11 TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.1-24B 3.1-25B 3.1-26B 3.1-27B 3.1-28B 3.1-29B 3.1-30B 3 .1-31B 3.1-32B 3.1-33B 3.1-34B 3.1-35B 3.1-36B 3.1-37B 3.1-38B 3.1-39B 3.1-40B 3 .1-41B 3.1-42B 3.1-43B 3.1-44B 3.1-45B 3.1-46B 3 .1-47B 3.1-48B 3.1-49B 3.1-50B 3.1-51B 3.1-52B 3.1-53B 3.1-54B 3.1-55B 3.1-56B 3 .1-57B 3.1-58B 3.1-59B 3.1-60B 3.1-61B 3.1-62B 3.1-63B 3.1-64B 3.1-65B 3.1-66B 3.1-67B 3.1-68B 3l_69B 3.1-70B 3.2-1B 3.2-2B 3.2-3B 3.2-4B 3.2-5B 3.2-6B 3.2-7B 3.2-8B 3.2-9B 3.2-10B 3 .2-11B 3.2-12B 3.2-13B 3.2-14B 3.2-15B 3.2-16B 3.2-17B 3.2-18B 3.2-19B 3.2-20B 3.2-21B 3.2-22B 3.2-23B 3.2-24B 3.2-25B 3.2-26B 3.2-27B 3.2-28B 3.2-29xiWatts Bar - Unit2 TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.2-30B 3.2-31B 3.3-1B 3.3-2B 3.3-3B 3.3-4B 3.3-5B 3.3-6B 3.3-7B 3.3-8B 3.3-9B 3.3-10B 3.3-11B 3.3-12B 3.3-13B 3.3-14B 3.3-15B 3.3-16B 3.3-17B 3.3-18B 3.3-19B 3.3-20B 3.3-21B 3.3-22B 3.3-23B 3.3-24B 3.3-25B 3.3-26B 3.3-27B 3.3-28B 3.3-29B 3.3-30B 3.3-31B 3.3-32B 3.3-33B 3.3-34B 3.3-35B 3.3-36B 3.3-37B 3.3-38B 3.3-39B 3.3-40B 3.3-41B 3.3-42B 3.3-43B 3.3-44B 3.3-45B 3.3-46B 3.3-47B 3.3-48B 3.3-49B 3.3-50B 3.3-51B 3.3-52B 3.3-53B 3.3-54B 3.3-55B 3.3-56B 3.3-57B 3.3-58B 3.3-59B 3.3-60B 3.3-61B 3.3-62B 3.3-63B 3.3-64B 3.3-65B 3.3-66B 3.3-67B 3.3-68B 3.3-69B 3.3-70B 3.3-7 1B 3.3-72B 3.3-73xiiWatts Bar - Unil 2 TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.3-74B 3.3-75B 3.3-76B 3.3-77B 3.3-78B 3.3-79B 3.3-80B 3.3-81B 3.3-82B 3.3-83B 3.3-84B 3.3-85B 3.3-86B 3.3-87B 3.3-BBB 3.3-89B 3.3-90B 3.3-91B 3.3-92B 3.3-93B 3.3-94B 3.3-95B 3.3-96B 3.3-97B 3.3-98B 3.3-99B 3.3-100B 3.3-101B 3.3-102B 3.3-103B 3.3-104B 3.3-105B 3.3-106B 3.3-107B 3.3-108B 3.3-109B 3.3-1 10B 3 .3-111B 3.3-112B 3.3-1 13B 3 .3-114B 3.3-1 15B 3.3-1 16B 3 .3-117B 3.3-1 18B 3.3-1 19B 3.3-120B 3.3-121B 3.3-122B 3.3-123B 3.3-124B 3.3-125B 3.3-126B 3.3-127B 3.3-128B 3.3-129B 3.3-130B 3.3-131B 3.3-132B 3.3-133B 3.3-134B 3.3-135B 3.3-136B 3.3-137B 3.3-138B 3.3-139B 3.3-140B 3 .3-141B 3.3-142B 3.3-143B 3.3-144B 3.3-145B 3.3-146B 3.3-147B 3.3-148xiiiWatts Bar - Unit2 TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.3-149B 3.3-150B 3.3-151B 3.3-152B 3.3-153B 3.3-154B 3.3-155B 3.3-156B 3.3-157B 3.3-158B 3.3-159B 3.3-160B 3.3-161B 3.3-162B 3.3-163B 3.3-164B 3.3-165B 3.3-166B 3.3-167B 3.3-168B 3 .4-1B 3.4-2B 3.4-3B 3.4-4B 3.4-5B 3.4-6B 3.4-7B 3.4-BB 3.4-9B 3.4-10B 3 .4-11B 3.4-12B 3.4-13B 3.4-14B 3.4-15B 3.4-16B 3.4-17B 3.4-18B 3.4-19B 3,4-20B 3,4-21B 3.4-22B 3.4-23B 3.4-24B 3.4-25B 3.4-26B 3.4-27B 3.4-28B 3.4-29B 3.4-30B 3.4-31B 3.4-32B 3.4-33B 3.4-34B 3.4-35B 3.4-36B 3.4-37B 3.4-38B 3.4-39B 3.4-40B 3.4-41B 3.4-42B 3.4-43B 3.4-44B 3 .4-45B 3.4-46B 3.4-47B 3.4-48B 3.4-49B 3.4-50B 3.4-51B 3.4-52B 3.4-53B 3.4-54B 3.4-55Watts Bar - Unit 2xivRevision 8

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PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.4-56B 3.4-57B 3.4-58B 3.4-59B 3.4-60B 3.4-61B 3.4-62B 3.4-63B 3.4-64B 3.4-65B 3.4-66B 3.4-67B 3.4-68B 3.4-69B 3,4-70B 3 .4-71B 3.4-72B 3.4-72B 3.4-73B 3.4-74B 3.4-75B 3.4-76B 3.4-77B 3.4-78B 3.4-79B 3.4-80B 3.4-81B 3.4-82B 3.4-83B 3.4-84B 3.4-85B 3.4-86B 3.4-87B 3.4-88B 3.4-89B 3.4-90B 3.4-91B 3.4-92B 3.4-93B 3.4-94B 3.5-1B 3.5-2B 3.5-3B 3.5-4B 3.5-5B 3.5-6B 3.5-7B 3.5-8B 3.5-9B 3.5-10B 3.5-11B 3,5-12B 3.5-13B 3.5-14B 3.5-15B 3.5-16B 3 .5-17B 3.5-18B 3.5-19B 3.5-20B 3.5-21B 3.5-22B 3.5-23B 3.5-24B 3.5-25B 3.5-26B 3.5-27B 3.5-28B 3.5-29B 3.5-30B 3.5-31B 3.5-32B 3.5-33B 3.6-1B 3.6-2Watts Bar - Unit2 TECHNICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.6-3B 3.6-4B 3.6-5B 3.6-6B 3.6-7B 3.6-8B 3.6-9B 3.6-10B 3.6-1 1B 3.6-12B 3.6-13B 3.6-14B 3.6-15B 3.6-16B 3.6-17B 3.6-18B 3.6-19B 3.6-20B 3.6-21B 3.6-22B 3.6-23B 3.6-24B 3.6-25B 3.6-26B 3.6-27B 3.6-28B 3.6-29B 3.6-30B 3.6-31B 3.6-32B 3.6-33B 3.6-34B 3.6-35B 3.6-36B 3.6-37B 3.6-38B 3.6-39B 3.6-40B 3 .6-41B 3.6-42B 3.6-43B 3.6-44B 3.6-45B 3.6-46B 3.6-47B 3.6-48B 3.6-49B 3.6-50B 3.6-51B 3.5-52B 3.6-53B 3.6-54B 3.6-55B 3.6-56B 3.6-57B 3.6-58B 3.6-59B 3.6-60B 3.6-61B 3.6-62B 3.6-63B 3.6-64B 3.6-65B 3.6-66B 3.6-67B 3.6-68B 3.6-69B 3.6-74B 3 .6-71B 3.6-72B 3.6-73B 3.6-74B 3.6-75B 3.6-76B 3.6-770000000000000000000110000110000000000000Watts Bar - Unit2XVIRevision 11 TECHN ICAL SPECI FICATIONS BASESLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (continued)

PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.6-78B 3.6-79B 3.6-80B 3.6-81B 3.6-82B 3.6-83B 3.6-84B 3.6-85B 3.6-86B 3.6-87B 3.6-88B 3.6-89B 3.6-9083.6-91B 3 .7-1B 3.7-2B 3.7-3B 3.7-4B 3.7-5B 3.7-6B 3.7-7B 3.7-8B 3.7-9B 3 .7-10B 3 .7-11B 3.7-12B 3 .7-13B 3.7-14B 3 .7-15B 3 .7-16B 3.7-17B 3.7-18B 3.7-19B 3.7-20B 3.7-21B 3.7-22B 3.7-23B 3.7-24B 3.7-25B 3.7-26B 3.7-27B 3.7-28B 3.7-29B 3.7-30B 3.7-31B 3.7-32B 3.7-33B 3.7-34B 3.7-35B 3.7-36B 3 .7-37B 3.7-38B 3.7-39B 3.7-4AB 3.7-41B 3.7-42B 3.7-43B 3.7-44B 3.7-45B 3.7-46B 3.7-47B 3.7-48B 3.7-49B 3.7-50B 3 .7-51B 3.7-52B 3.7-53B 3.7-54B 3.7-55B 3.7-56B 3.7-57B 3.7-58B 3.7-59B 3.7-60B 3.7-61Watts Bar - Unit2xviiRevision I

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PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.7-62B 3.7-63B 3.7-64B 3.7-65B 3.7-66B 3 .7-67B 3.7-68B 3.7-69B 3 .7-7083.7-7 1B 3.7-72B 3.7-73B 3,7-74B 3.7-75B 3.7-76B 3.7-77B 3.7-78B 3.7-79B 3.7-80B 3.7-81B 3.7-82B 3.7-83B 3.7-84B 3.7-85B 3.7-86B 3.7-87B 3.7-88B 3.8-1B 3,8-2B 3.8-3B 3.8-4B 3.8-5B 3.8-6B 3.8-7B 3.8.8B 3.8-9B 3.8-10B 3.8-10aB 3.8-1 1B 3.8-12B 3.8-12aB 3.8-12bB 3.8-13B 3,8-14B 3.8-15B 3.8-16B 3.8-17B 3.8-18B 3.8-19B 3.8-20B 3.8-21B 3.8-22B 3.8-23B 3.8-24B 3.8-25B 3.8-26B 3.8-27B 3.8-28B 3.8-28aB 3,8-29B 3.8-30B 3.8-31B 3.8-32B 3.8-33B 3.8-34B 3.8-35B 3.8-36B 3.8-37B 3.8-37aB 3.8-38B 3.8-39B 3.8-40B 3.8-41B 3.8-42B 3.8-43Watts Bar - Unit2xviiiRevision 6

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PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3 .8-44B 3.8-45B 3.8-46B 3.8-47B 3.8-48B 3.8-49B 3.8-50B 3.8-51B 3.8-52B 3.8-53B 3.8-54B 3.8-5sB 3.8-56B 3.8-57B 3.8-58B 3.8-59B 3.8-60B 3.8-61B 3.8-62B 3.8-63B 3.8-64B 3.8-65B 3.8-66B 3.8-67B 3.8-68B 3.8-69B 3.8-70B 3 .8-71B 3.8-72B 3.8-73B 3.8-74B 3.8-7sB 3.8-76B 3.8-77B 3.8-78B 3.8-79B 3.8-80B 3.8-81B 3.8-82B 3.8-83B 3.8-84B 3.8-85B 3.8-86B 3.8-87B 3.8-88B 3.8-89B 3.8-90B 3.8-91B 3.8-92B 3.8-93B 3.8-94B 3.8-95B 3.8-96B 3.8-97B 3.8.98B 3.9-1B 3.9-2B 3.9-3B 3.9-4B 3.9-5B 3.9-6B 3,9-7B 3.9-8B 3.9-10B 3.9-11B 3.9-12B 3.9-13B 3.9-14B 3.9-15B 3.9-16B 3 .9-17B 3.9-18B 3.9-19B 3.9-20B 3.9-21Watts Bar - Unit2xtxRevision 1

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PAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERPAGENUMBERAMENDMENT NUMBERB 3.9-22B 3.9-23B 3.9-24B 3.9-25B 3.9-26B 3.9-27B 3.9-280000000Watts Bar - Unit2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES - REVISION LISTING(This listing is an administrative tool maintained by WBN Licensing and may be updatedwithout formally revising the Technical Specification Bases Table-of-Contents)

REVISIONS ISSUEDSUBJECTNPF-20Revision 1Revision 2Revision 3Revision 4Revision 5Revision 6Revision 7Revision 8Revision 9Revision 10Revision 11, Amendment 1410-22-152-12-163-18-167 168-1 9-161-17 -172-24-173-13-174-7 -174-25-177 179-29-17Low Power Operating LicenseTS Bases Table B 3.8.9-1 , "AC and DCElectrical Power Distribution Systems"Revise TS Bases 83,3.7, "Component Cooling System (CCS)," regarding the 1Band 28 surge tank sections.

Revise TS Bases 83.6.4, "Containment Pressure,"

and 83.6.6, "Containment SpraySystem" regarding the maximum peakcontainment pressure from a LOCA of11 .73 psig.Revise TS Bases 83.6.15, "ShieldBuilding,"

to clarify the use of the Condition B note.Revises TS Bases B 3.8.1 "AC-Sources" Revises TS Bases B 3.7 .7 , "Component Cooling System (CCS)," and B 3.7.16,"Component Cooling System (CCS) -Shutdown".

Adds TS Bases B 3.0.8 for lnoperability ofSnubbers.

Revises TS Bases B 3.4.6.3 to correct thesteam generator minimum narrow rangelevel.Revises TS Bases 83.7-10 CREVS.Revises TS Bases SR 83.0.2 for a one-time extension of the Alternating CurrentSources.Revises TS Bases 83.6.11 to change theice mass weight.Watts Bar - Unit 2xxtRevision 11 ENCLOSURE 6WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASESCHANGED PAGESE-6 LCO Applicability B 3.0B 3.0 LtMtTtNG CONDITlON FOR OPERATTON (LCO) APPLtCABtLtTy BASESLCOsLCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8applicable to all Specifications stated.establish the general requirements and apply at all times, unless othenruise LCO 3.0.1LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met(i.e., when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of theApplicability statement of each Specification).

LCO 3.0.2LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO,the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of eachRequired Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point intime that an ACTIONS Condition is entered.

The Required Actionsestablish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. ThisSpecification establishes that:a. Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; andb. Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO ismet within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.

There are two basic types of Required Actions.

The first type of RequiredAction specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limitis the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component toOPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. lf thistype of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE orcondition in which the Specification is not applicable, (Whether stated asa Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an actionthat may always be considered upon entering ACTIONS.)

The secondtype of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permitcontinued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by theCompletion Time. ln this case, compliance with the Required Actionsprovides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.0-1Revision 7Amendment 6

LCO Applicability B 3.0BASES (continued)

LCO 3.0.8LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered toremain capable of performing their intended safety function whenassociated snubbers are not capable of providing their associated supportfunction(s).

This LCO states that the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one or more snubbers not capable ofperforming their associated support function(s).

This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance,

testing, orrepair of one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures arespecified in the snubber requirements, which are located outside of theTechnicalSpecifications (TS) under licensee control.

LCO 3.0.8 applies tosnubbers that only have seismic function.

lt does not apply to snubbersthat also have design functions to mitigate steamlwater hammer or othertransient loads. The snubber requirements do not meet the criteria in 10CFR 50.36(cX2Xii),

and, as such, are appropriate for control by thelicensee.

When applying LCO 3.0.8.a, at least one train of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system must be OPERABLE during MODES when AFW isrequired to be OPERABLE.

When applying LCO 3.0.8.a during MODESwhen AFW is not required to be OPERABLE, a core cooling method(such as Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system) must be available.

Whenapplying LCO 3.0.8.b, a means of core cooling must remain available (AFW, DHR, equipment necessary for feed and bleed operations, etc.).Reliance on availability of a core cooling source during modes whereAFW is not required by TSs provides an equivalent safety margin for plantoperations were LCO 3.0.8 not applied and meets the intent of Technical Specification Task Force Change Traveler TSTF-372, Revision 4,"Addition of LCO 3.0.8, lnoperability of Snubbers."

When a snubber is to be rendered incapable of performing its relatedsupport function (i.e., nonfunctional) for testing or maintenance or isdiscovered to not be functional, it must be determined whether anysystem(s) require the affected snubber(s) for system OPERABLILITY, and whether the plant is in a MODE or specified condition in theApplicability that requires the supported system(s) to be OPERABLE.

lf an analysis determines that the supported system(s) do not require thesnubbe(s) to be functional in order to support the OPERABILITY of thesystem(s),

LCO 3.0.8 is not needed. lf the LCO(S) associated with anysupported system(s) are not currently applicable (i.e., the plant is not in aMODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO), LCO3.0.8 is not needed. lf the supported system(s) are inoperable for reasonsother than snubbers, LCO 3.0.8 cannot be used. LCO 3.0.8 is anallowance, not a requirement.

When a snubber is nonfunctional, anysupported system(s) may be declared inoperable instead of using LCO3.0.8.(continued)

Revision 7Amendment 6Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.0-10a LCO Applicability B30BASESLCO 3.0.8(continued)

Every time the provisions of LCO 3.0.8 are used, WBN Unit 2 will confirmthat at least one train (or subsystem) of systems supported by theinoperable snubbers will remain capable of performing their requiredsafety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismicloads. A record of the design function of the inoperable snubber (i.e.,seismic vs. non-seismic) and the associated plant configuration will beavailable on a recoverable basis for NRC staff inspection.

LCO 3.0.8 does not apply to non-seismic snubbers.

The provisions ofLCO 3.0.8 are not to be applied to supported TS systems unless thesupported systems would remain capable of performing their requiredsafety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismicloads. The risk impact of dynamic loadings other than seismic loads wasnot assessed as part of the development of LCO 3.0.8. These shocktype loads include thrust loads, blowdown loads, water-hammer loads, steam-hammer loads, LOCA loads and pipe rupture loads. However, there aresome important distinctions between non-seismic (shocktype) loads andseismic loads which indicate that, in general, the risk impact of the out-of-service snubbers is smaller for non-seismic loads than for seismic loads.First, while a seismic load affects the entire plant, the impact of anonseismic load is localized to a certain system or area of the plant.Second, although non-seismic shock loads may be higher in totalforce and the impact could be as much or more than seismic loads, generally they are of much shorter duration than seismic loads. Third, the impact ofnon-seismic loads is more plant specific, and thus harder to analyzegenerically, than for seismic loads. For these reasons, every time LCO3.0.8 is applied, at least one train of each system that is supported by theinoperable snubbe(s) should remain capable of performing their requiredsafety or support functions for postulated design loads other than seismicloads.lf the allowed time expires and the snubbe(s) are unable to perform theirassociated support function(s),

the affected supported system's LCO(s)must be declared not met and the Conditions and Required Actionsentered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable ofproviding their associated support function(s) to a single train orsubsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or to asingle train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />sto restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported systeminoperable.

The72 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on the lowprobability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would requireoperation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are notcapable of performing their associated support function and due to theavailability of the redundant train of the supported system.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit2B 3.0-10bRevision 7Amendment 6

LCO Applicability B 3.0BASESLCO 3.0.8(continued)

LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable ofproviding their associated support function(s) to more than one train orsubsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO3.0.8.b allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring thesupported system inoperable.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time isreasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported systemoccurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing theirassociated support function.

LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed.

lndustry andNRC guidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)

(theMaintenance Rule) does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existing Maintenance Rule process tothe extent possible so that maintenance on any unaffected train orsubsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues are properlyaddressed.

The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be aqualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated support function.

Revision 7Amendment 6Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.0-10c SR Applicability B 3.0BASESSR 3 0,1(continued)

Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing isrequired to declare equipment OPERABLE.

This includes ensuringapplicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordancewith SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not bepossible in the current tt43DE or other specified conditions in theApplicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having beenestablished.

ln these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to theextent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to beincapable of performing its function.

This will allow operation to proceedto a tvDDE or other specified condition where other necessary postmaintenance tests can be completed.

sR 3.0.2SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic performance of the Required Action on a"once per. . ." interval.

SR 3.0.2 permits a25o/o extension of the interval specified in theFrequency.

This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling andconsiders plant operating conditions that may not be suitable forconducting the Surveillance (e.9., transient conditions or other ongoingSurveillance or maintenance activities).

On a one-time basis thesurveillance interval for the surveillances listed in TS Table 3.0.2-1 areallowed to be extended as identified on Table SR 3.0.2-1.

The one-timesurveillance interval extension expires on November 30, 2017.The25o/o extension does not significantly degrade the reliability thatresults from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency.

Thisis based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformancewith theSRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply.These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications.

Therequirements of regulations take precedence over the TS. Therefore, when a test interval is specified in the regulations, the test interval cannotbe extended by the TS, and the surveillance requirement will include anote in the frequency

stating, "SR 3.0.2 does not apply." An example ofan exception when the test interval is not specified in the regulations, isthe discussion in the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, thatSR 3.0.2 does not apply. This exception is provided becausethe program already includes extension of test intervals.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initialportion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a"once per . . ." basis. The25o/o extension applies to each performance after the initial performance.

The initial performance of the Required(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.0-12ffisndm ent 12, Revision 10 RCS Loops - MODE 4B 3.4.6BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) sR 3.4.6.2This SR requires verification every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> that one required RCS orRHR loop is in operation when the rod control system is not capable ofrod withdrawal.

Verification includes flow rate, temperature, or pumpstatus monitoring, which help ensure that forced flow is providing heatremoval.

The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is sufficient considering otherindications and alarms available to the operator in the control room tomonitor RCS and RHR loop performance.

sR 3.4.6.3SR 3.4.6.3 requires verification of SG OPERABILITY.

SG OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring that the secondary side narrow range water level isgreater than or equalto 6% (value does not account for instrument error,Ref. 1). lf the SG secondary side narrow range water level is lessthan 6%, the tubes may become uncovered and the associated loop maynot be capable of providing the heat sink necessary for removal of decayheat. The 12-hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of otherindications available in the control room to alert the operator to the loss ofSG level.sR 3.4.6.4Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures that anadditional RCS or RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, tomaintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation.

Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available tothe required pump. The Frequency of 7 days is considered reasonable inview of other administrative controls available and has been shown to beacceptable by operating experience.

REFERENCES NoneAmendment 8Revision 8Watts Bar - Unit2B 3.4-30 Containment PressureB 3.6.4B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSB 3.6.4 Containment PressureBASESBACKGROUND The containment pressure is limited during normal operation to preservethe initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses for a loss ofcoolant accident (LOCA) or steam line break (SLB). These limits alsoprevent the containment pressure from exceeding the containment designnegative pressure differential G2.0 psid) with respect to the shield buildingannulus atmosphere in the event of inadvertent actuation of theContainment Spray System or Air Return Fans.Containment pressure is a process variable that is monitored andcontrolled.

The containment pressure limits are derived from the inputconditions used in the containment functional analyses and thecontainment structure external pressure analysis.

Should operation occuroutside these limits coincident with a Design Basis Accident (DBA), postaccident containment pressures could exceed calculated values.APPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSESContainment internal pressure is an initial condition used in the DBAanalyses to establish the maximum peak containment internal pressure.

The limiting DBAs considered, relative to containment

pressure, are theLOCA and SLB, which are analyzed using computer pressure transients.

The worst case LOCA generates larger mass and energy release thanthe worst case SLB. Thus, the LOCA event bounds the SLB event fromthe containment peak pressure standpoint (Ref. 1).The initial pressure condition used in the containment analysis was15.0 psia. This resulted in a maximum peak containment pressure from aLOCA of 11.73 psig. The containment analysis (Ref. 1) shows that themaximum allowable internal containment

pressure, Pa (15.0 psig), boundsthe calculated results from the limiting LOCA. The maximum containment pressure resulting from the worst case LOCA does not exceed themaximum allowable calculated containment pressure of 15.0 psig.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unat2B 3.6-27Revision 3

Containment Spray SystemB 3.6.6BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The limiting DBAs considered relative to containment are the loss ofSAFETY coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break (SLB). The DBAANALYSES LOCA and SLB are analyzed using computer codes designed to predictthe resultant containment pressure and temperature transients.

No twoDBAs are assumed to occur simultaneously or consecutively.

Thepostulated DBAs are analyzed, in regard to containment ESF systems,assuming the loss of one ESF bus, which is the worst case single activefailure, resulting in one train of the Containment Spray System, the RHRSystem, and the ARS being rendered inoperable (Ref. 2).The DBA analyses show that the maximum peak containment pressure of11.73 psig results from the LOCA analysis, and is calculated to be less Ithan the containment maximum allowable pressure of 15 psig. Themaximum peak containment atmosphere temperature results from theSLB analysis.

The calculated transient containment atmosphere temperatures are acceptable for the DBA SLB.The modeled Containment Spray System actuation from the containment analysis is based on a response time associated with exceeding thecontainment High-High pressure signal setpoint to achieving fullflowthrough the containment spray nozzles.

A delayed response timeinitiation provides conservative analyses of peak calculated containment temperature and pressure responses.

The Containment Spray Systemtotal response time of 234 seconds is composed of signal delay, dieselgenerator

startup, and system startup time.For certain aspects of transient accident

analyses, maximizing thecalculated containment pressure is not conservative.

ln particular, theECCS cooling effectiveness during the core reflood phase of a LOCAanalysis increases with increasing containment backpressure.

For thesecalculations, the containment backpressure is calculated in a mannerdesigned to conservatively

minimize, rather than maximize, the calculated transient containment pressures in accordance with 10 CFR 50,Appendix K (Ref. 3).Inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System is evaluated inthe analysis, and the resultant reduction in containment pressure iscalculated.

The maximum calculated steady state pressure differential relative to the Shield Building annulus is 1.4 psid, which is below thecontainment design external pressure load of 2.0 psid.The Containment Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR50.36(cX2Xii).

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.6-36(continued)

Revision 3

lce BedB 3.6.11B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSB 3.6.1 1 lce BedBASESBACKGROUND The ice bed consists of over 2,404,500lbs of ice stored in 1944 basketswithin the ice condenser.

lts primary purpose is to provide a large heatsink in the event of a release of energy from a Design Basis Accident(DBA) in containment.

The ice would absorb energy and limitcontainment peak pressure and temperature during the accidenttransient.

Limiting the pressure and temperature reduces the release offission product radioactivity from containment to the environment in theevent of a DBA.The ice condenser is an annular compartment enclosing approximately 300o of the perimeter of the upper containment compartment, butpenetrating the operating deck so that a portion extends into the lowercontainment compartment.

The lower portion has a series of hingeddoors exposed to the atmosphere of the lower containment compartment, which, for normal plant operation, are designed to remain closed. At thetop of the ice condenser is another set of doors exposed to theatmosphere of the upper compartment, which also remain closed duringnormal plant operation.

lntermediate deck doors, located below the topdeck doors, form the floor of a plenum at the upper part of the icecondenser.

These doors also remain closed during normal plantoperation.

The upper plenum area is used to facilitate surveillance andmaintenance of the ice bed.The ice baskets contain the ice within the ice condenser.

The ice bed isconsidered to consist of the total volume from the bottom elevation of theice baskets to the top elevation of the ice baskets.

The ice basketsposition the ice within the ice bed in an arrangement to promote heattransfer from steam to ice. This arrangement enhances the icecondenser's primary function of condensing steam and absorbing heatenergy released to the containment during a DBA.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.6-59Revision 11Amendment 14 lce BedB 3.6.1 1BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) sR 3.6.11.2The weighing program is designed to obtain a representative sample ofthe ice baskets.

The representative sample shall include 6 baskets fromeach of lhe 24 ice condenser bays and shall consist of one basket fromradial rows 1,2,4,6, 8, and 9. lf no basket from a designated row can beobtained for weighing, a basket from the same row of an adjacent bayshall be weighed.The rows chosen include the rows nearest the inside and outside walls ofthe ice condenser (rows 1 and 2, and I and 9, respectively),

where heattransfer into the ice condenser is most likely to influence melting orsublimation.

Verifying the totalweight of ice ensures that there isadequate ice to absorb the required amount of energy to mitigate theDBAs.lf a basket is found to contain less than 1237 lb of ice, a representative sample of 20 additional baskets from the same bay shall be weighed.The average weight of ice in these 21 baskets (the discrepant basket andthe 20 additional baskets) shall be greater than or equal to 1237 lb al a95% confidence level. [Value does not account for instrument error.]Weighing 20 additional baskets from the same bay in the event aSurveillance reveals that a single basket contains less than 1237 lbensures that no local zone exists that is grossly deficient in ice. Such azone could experience early melt out during a DBA transient, creating apath for steam to pass through the ice bed without being condensed.

TheFrequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and theallowance built into the required ice mass over and above the massassumed in the safety analyses.

Operating experience has verified that,with the 18 month Frequency, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.

sR 3.6.11.3This SR ensures that the azimuthal distribution of ice is reasonably

uniform, by verifying that the average ice weight in each of threeazimuthal groups of ice condenser bays is within the limit. TheFrequency of 18 months was based on ice storage tests and theallowance built into the required ice mass over and above the massassumed in the safety analyses.

Operating experience has verified that,with the 18-month Frequency, the weight requirements are maintained with no significant degradation between surveillances.

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.6-64Revision 11Amendment 14 Shield BuildingB 3.6.15BASES (continued)

B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSB 3.6.15 Shield BuildingBASESBACKGROUND The shield building is a concrete structure that surrounds the steelcontainment vessel. Between the containment vessel and the shieldbuilding inner wall is an annular space that collects containment leakagethat may occur following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) as well asother design basis accidents (DBAs) that release radioactive material.

This space also allows for periodic inspection of the outer surface of thesteel containment vessel.During normal operations when containment integrity is required, annulusvacuum is established and maintained by the annulus vacuum controlsubsystem.

ln emergencies, in which containment isolation is required, this subsystem is isolated and shut down because it performs no safety-related function (Ref. 2). The nominal negative pressure for the annulusvacuum control equipment is 5-inches of water gauge. This negativepressure level, chosen for normal operation, ensures that the annuluspressure will not reach positive values during the annulus pressure surgeproduced by a LOCA in the primary containment.

The annulus vacuum control subsystem also aids in containment pressure relief by exhausting to the auxiliary building exhaust stack thecontainment vent air that goes through the containment vent air clean upunits and is discharged into the annulus.During an emergency, the Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)establishes a negative pressure in the annulus between the shieldbuilding and the steel containment vessel. Filters in the system thencontrolthe release of radioactive contaminants to the environment.

Theshield building is required to be OPERABLE to ensure retention ofcontainment leakage and proper operation of the EGTS.Several normal plant evolutions can cause the annulus pressure toexceed its limits briefly; containment

venting, both the normal or alternate method, testing of the EGTS, annulus entries, and auxiliary buildingisolations.

These activities cause an inrush of air into the annulus,lowering the annulus vacuum until the annulus vacuum controlfans canreturn annulus vacuum to within limits.The containment vent system is a non-safety related system, whichprovides continuous pressure relief curing normal operation, by allowingcontainment air outflow through the 8-inch containment penetration (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.6-87Revision 4

Shield BuildingB 3.6.15BASES (continued)

BACKGROUND (continued) through two 100% redundant air cleanup units (ACU)s, containing HEPA/charcoalfilters, into the annulus with the motive force being thepressure differential between the containment and the annulus.Depending on the inflow into the annulus when containment vent isinitiated, annulus pressure may not be within limits unit the annulusvacuum control system can recover the annulus vacuum.An alternate containment pressure relief function (containment vent) isprovided by way of a configuration alignment in the reactor building purgeventilating system, This function is accomplished by opening lowercompartment purge lines (one supply and one exhaust) or one of the twopairs of lines (one supply and one exhaust ) in the upper compartment.

To prevent inadvertent pressurization of containment due to supply andexhaust side ductwork flow imbalances, the supply ductwork airflow maybe temporarily throttled as needed (Ref. 3).During testing of the EGTS, alignment of the system to the annulus forthe test causes an inrush of air from the EGTS ducting increasing annuluspressure.

This inrush of air can cause annulus pressure to exceed theannulus pressure limit until the EGTS fan is started, stopping the inrushallowing the annulus vacuum controlfan to restore annulus pressure towithin limits.APPL!CABLE SAFETYANALYSESThe design basis for shield building OPERABILITY is a LOCA.Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY ensures that the release ofradioactive materialfrom the containment atmosphere is restricted tothose leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in theaccident analyses.

The shield building satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(cX2Xii).

LCOAPPLICABILITY Shield building OPERABILITY must be maintained to ensure properoperation of the EGTS and to limit radioactive leakage from thecontainment to those paths and leakage rates assumed in the accidentanalyses.

Maintaining shield building OPERABILITY prevents leakage of radioactive materialfrom the shield building.

Radioactive material may enter theshield building from the containment following a DBA. Therefore, shieldbuilding OPERABILITY is required in MODES 1,2,3, and 4 when DBAscould release radioactive materialto the containment atmosphere.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events arelow due to the Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressurecontinued Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.6-88Revision 4

Shield BuildingB 3.6.15BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY limitations in these MODES. Therefore, shield building OPERABILITY is(continued) not required in MODE 5 or 6.ACTIONS A.1ln the event shield building OPERABILITY is not maintained, shieldbuilding OPERABILITY must be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is areasonable Completion Time considering the limited leakage design ofcontainment and the low probability of a Design Basis Accident occurring during this time period.8.1The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> is based on engineering judgment.

Thenormal alignment for both EGTS control loops is the A-Auto position.

With both EGTS controlloops in A-Auto, both trains willfunction uponinitiation of a Containment lsolation Phase A (ClA) signal. ln the event ofa LOCA, the annulus vacuum controlsystem isolates and both trains ofthe EGTS pressure control loops will be placed in service to maintain therequired negative pressure.

lf annulus vacuum is lost during normaloperations, the A-Auto position is unaffected by the loss of vacuum. Thisoperational configuration is acceptable because the accident doseanalysis conservatively assumes the annulus is at atmospheric pressureat event initiation.

A Note has been provided which makes the requirement to maintain theannulus pressure within limits not applicable for a maximum of 't hourduring; Ventilating operations, Required annulus entries, or Auxiliary Building isolations.

Ventilating operations include containment venting,the Reactor Building Purge Ventilating System alternate containment pressure relief function, and testing of the Emergency Gas Treatment system.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.6-89Revision 4

Shield BuildingB 3.6.15BASESSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) sR 3.6.15.4The EGTS is required to maintain a pressure equalto or more negativethan -0.50 inches water gauge (" wg) in the annulus at an elevation equivalent to the top of the Auxiliary Building.

At elevations higher thanthe Auxiliary

Building, the EGTS is required to maintain a pressure equalto or more negative than -0.25" wg. The low pressure sense line for thepressure controller is located in the annulus at elevation 783. By verifying that the annulus pressure is equalto or more negative than -0.61" w9 atelevation 783, the annulus pressurization requirements stated above aremet. The ability of a EGTS train with final flow >3600 cfm and <4400 cfmto produce the required negative pressure during the test operation provides assurance that the building is adequately sealed. The negativepressure prevents leakage from the building, since outside air will bedrawn in by the low pressure at a maximum rate <250 cfm. The 18 monthFrequency on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 1) guidance for functionaltesting.

REFERENCES 1.Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, "Design, Testing andMaintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmospheric Cleanup System Air Filtration and Adsorption Units ofLight-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."WBN UFSAR Section 6.2.3.2.2, "Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS)."WBN UFSAR Section 9.4.6, "Reactor Building Purge Ventilating System (RBPVS)."

2.3.Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.6-91Revision 4

CCSB 3 .7.7B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3 .7.7 Component Cooling System (CCS)BASESBACKGROUND The CCS provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident(DBA) or transient.

During normal operation, the CCS also provides thisfunction for various non-essential components, as well as the spent fuelstorage pool. The CCS serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW System, and thus to the environment.

The CCS is arranged as two independent, full-capacity cooling trains,Train A and Train B. Train A in Unit 2 is served by CCS Hx B andCCS pump 2A-A. Pump 2B-B, which is actually Train B equipment, isalso normally aligned to the Train A header in Unit 2. However,pump 2B-B can be realigned to Train B on loss of Train A.Train B is served by CCS Hx C. Normally, only CCS pump C-S is alignedto the Train B header since few non-essential, normally-operating loadsare assigned to Train B. However, pump 2B-B can be realigned to theTrain B header on a loss of the C-S pump. During Unit 1 outages CCSHeat Exchanger A may be substituted for CCS Heat Exchanger C tomaintain CCS Train 28 operable under certain conditions.

Refer to FSARSection 9.2.2for required system alignments.

Each safety related train is powered from a separate bus. An open surgetank in the system provides pump trip protective functions to ensure thatsufficient net positive suction head is available.

lt is preferred that the 1Band 28 surge tank sections be aligned to the associated operable CCSpump(s);

however, aligning a single 1B or 28 surge tank section providesan operable surge tank for the associated pump(s).The pump in eachtrain is automatically started on receipt of a safety injection signal, and allnon-essential components will be manually isolated.

CCS Pump 'lB-B may be substituted for CCS Pump C-S supplying theCCS Train B header for Unit 2 provided the OPERABILITY requirements are met.Additional information on the design and operation of the system, alongwith a list of the components served, is presented in the FSAR,Section 9.2.2 (Ref. 1). The principalsafety related function of the CCS isthe removal of decay heat from the reactor via the Residual HeatRemoval (RHR) System. This may be during a normal or post accidentcooldown and shutdown.

(continued)

Revision 6Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.7-36 CREVSB 3.7.10BASESACTIONSD.1 and D.2 (continued)

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require isolation ofthe CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accidentrisk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

E.1lf both CREVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1 ,2,3, or 4, due to actionstaken as a result of a tornado, the CREVS may not be capable ofperforming the intended function because of loss of pressurizing air to thecontrol room. At least one train must be restored to OPERABLE statuswithin 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes accident risk. To achieve this status, the plant must be placed in at leastMODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The 8 hourrestoration time is considered reasonable considering the low probability of occurrence of a design basis accident concurrent with a tornadowarning.The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full powerconditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.F.1 and F.2lf one CREVS train cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within theassociated Completion Time of Condition E, the plant must be placed in aMODE that minimizes accident risk. TO achieve this status, the plantmust be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 within36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based onoperating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from fullpower conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plantsystems.G.1ln MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies withtwo CREVS trains inoperable or with one or more CREVS trainsinoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be takenimmediately to suspend activities that could result in a release ofradioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unitin a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude themovement of fuel to a safe position.

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.7-55Revision 9Amendment I

CREVSB 3 .7.10BASESACTIONS(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS H.1lf both CREVS trains are inoperable in MODE 1,2,3, ot 4, for reasonsother than Condition B or Condition E the CREVS may not be capable ofperforming the intended function and the plant is in a condition outsidethe accident analyses.

Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be enteredimmediately.

sR 3.7.10.1Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that theyfunction properly.

As the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not too severe, testing each train once every monthprovides an adequate check of this system. The systems need only beoperated for > 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system. The31-day Frequency is based on the reliability of the equipment and thetwo train redundancy.

sR 3.7.10.2This SR verifies that the required CREVS testing is performed inaccordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). TheCREVS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 6).The VFTP includes testing the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoaladsorber efficiency, minimum flow rate, and the physical properties of theactivated charcoal.

Specific test Frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.sR 3.7.10.3This SR verifies that each CREVS train starts and operates on an actualor simulated actuation signal. The Frequency of 18 months is based onindustry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle.(continued)

Revision 9Amendment 9Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.7-56 CCS - ShutdownB 3 .7.16B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3 .7.16 Component Cooling System (CCS) - ShutdownBASESBACKGROUND The general description of the Component Cooling System (CCS) isprovided in TS Bases 3.7.7, "Component Cooling System."

The CCS hasa Unit 2 Train A header supplied by CCS Pump 2A-A cooled throughCCS Heat Exchanger (HX) B. Unit t has a separate Train A headercontaining HX A supplied by CCS Pump 1A-A. The Train B header isshared by Unit 1 and Unit 2 and contains HX C. Flow through the Train Bheader is normally supplied by CCS Pump C-S. CCS Pump 1B-B can bealigned to supply the Train B header, but it is normally aligned to theUnit 1 Train A header. Similarly, CSS Pump 2B-B can supply coolingwater to the Train B header, but is normally aligned to the Unit 2 Train Aheader. During Unit 1 outages CCS Heat Exchanger A may besubstituted for CCS Heat Exchanger C to maintain CCS Train 28operable under certain conditions.

Refer to FSAR Section 9.2.2forrequired system alignments.

The following describes the functions andrequirements within the first 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after shut down, when the ResidualHeat Removal (RHR) System is being used for residual and decay heatremoval.During a normal shutdown, decay heat removal is via the reactor coolantsystem (RCS) loops until sometime after the unit has been cooled downto RHR entry conditions (T"o6 < 350oF). Therefore, as LCO 3.7.16becomes Applicable (entry into Mode 4) the RCS loops are stillOPERABLE.

Entry into MODES 4 and 5 can place high heat loads ontothe RHR System, CCS and the Essential Raw Cooling Water System(ERCW when shutdown cooling is established.

Residualand decay heatfrom the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is transferred to CCS via theRHR HX. Heat from the CCS is transferred to the ERCW System via theCCS HXs. The CCS and ERCW systems are common between the twooperating units.During the first 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown, the heat loads are atsufficiently high levels that the normal pump requirement of LCO 3.7.7 forone CCS pump on the Train B header may not be sufficient to supportshut down cooling of Unit 2, concurrent with either a nearly simultaneous shutdown of Unit 1 or a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) onUnit 1, with loss of offsite power and a single failure of Train A power to6.9 kV Shutdown Boards 1A-A and 2A-4.ln either scenario, CCS Pump C-S would normally be the only pumpsupplying the Train B header and the Train B header would be supplying both the Unit'l RHR Train B HX and the Unit 2 RHR Train B HX. Duringthe Unit'1 LOCA scenario, the Unit I RHR Train B HX would be cooling(continued)

Watts Bar-U nat 2B 3 .7-77Revision 6

CCS - ShutdownB 3 .7.16BASESBACKGROUND (continued) the recirculating Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) water from thecontainment sump.To assure that there would be adequate CCS flow to both units' RHRTrain B HXs, prior to placing RHR in service for Unit 2, either CCSPump 1B-B or 2B-B would be aligned to the CCS Train B header.With two CCS pumps on the Train B header, CCS willsupply at least5000 gpm to the Unit 'l RHR Train B HX and 5000 gpm to the Unit 2 RHRTrain B HX.The alignment of either CCS Pump 1B-B or 2B-B to the CCS Train Bheader before entry into MODE 4 places both units in an alignment thatsupports LOCA heat removal requirements and allows the other unit toproceed to cold shutdown.

Having the CCS pumps realigned while a unitbeing shut down with steam generators available for heat removal,precludes the need for manual action outside of the main control room toalign CCS should a LOCA occur. lf a LOCA occurs with the concurrent loss of the Train A 6.9 kV shutdown boards, CCS Pump 1B-B or 2B-B willbe started from the main control room, if the pump is not already inoperation.

Both CCS pumps must be running before the RHR pumpsuction is transferred from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to thecontainment sump to ensure adequate cooling is maintained.

lf a LOCAoccurs, the C-S pump automatically starts on a safety injection (Sl)actuation from either unit. The CCS pump control circuits are designedsuch that, if a pump is running and a loss of power occurs, the pump willbe automatically reloaded on the DG. With this alignment, two CCSpumps will be available if a LOCA occurs on one unit when the other unitis being shut down.Alternatively, the unit being shut down can remain on steam generator cooling for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> before RHR is placed in service.

lf a LOCA occurredon the other unit, CCS would only be removing heat from one RHR HX.A single CCS pump and CCS HX provides the required heat removalcapability.

After the unit has been shut down for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, a single CCSpump on Train B provides adequate flow to both the Unit 1 and the Unit 2RHR Train B HXs.lf the single failure were the loss of Train B power, the normal CCSalignment is acceptable, because CCS Pump 1A-A supplies the Unit 1RHR Train A HX and CCS Pump 2A-A supplies the Unit 2 RHR Train AHX. CCS Pump 2A-A does not provide heat removal for Unit 1.Additional information on the design and operation of the system, alongwith a list of the components served, is presented in the FSAR,Section 9.2.2 (Ref. 1). The principalsafety related function of the CCS is(continued)

Watts Bar-Unit2 B 3.7-78Revision 6

CCS - ShutdownB 3 .7.16BASESBACKGROUND (continued) the removal of heat from the reactor via theduring a normal or post accident cool downCCS Train A header is not used to supportRHR System. This may beand shut down. The Unit 1Unit 2 operation.

APPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSESThe CCS functions to cool the unit from RHR entry conditions in MODE 4(T*ra < 350oF), to MODE 5 (T-ro < 200oF), during normal operations.

Thetime required to cool from 350oF to 200'F is a function of the number ofCGS and RHR trains operating.

One CCS train is sufficient to removeheat during subsequent operations with T"oro < 200oF. This assumes amaximum ERCW inlet temperature of 85'F occurring simultaneously withthe maximum heat loads on the system.The design basis of the CCS is for one CCS train to remove the postLOCA heat load from the containment sump during the recirculation phase, with a maximum CCS HX outlet temperature of 110'F (Ref. 2).The ECCS LOCA analysis and containment LOCA analysis each modelthe maximum and minimum performance of the CCS, respectively.

Thenormal maximum HX outlet temperature of the CCS is 95oF, and, duringunit cooldown to MODE 5 (T*ro < 200"F), a maximum HX outlettemperature of 110'F is assumed.

The CCS design based on thesevalues, bounds the post accident conditions such that the sump fluid willnot increase in temperature after alignment of the RHR HXs during therecirculation phase following a LOCA, and provides a gradual reduction inthe temperature of this fluid as it is supplied to the RCS by the ECCSpumps.The CCS is designed to perform its function with a single failure of anyactive component, assuming a loss of offsite power.CCS - Shutdown satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(cX2)(ii).

Watts Bar-Unit 2B 3.7-79(continued)

Revision 6

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND (continued)

The onsite standby power source for each 6.9 kV shutdown board is adedicated DG. WBN uses 4 DG sets for Unit 2 operation.

These sameDGs are shared for Unit 1 operation.

A DG starts automatically on asafety injection (Sl) signal (i.e., low pressurizer pressure or highcontainment pressure signals) or on a 6.9 kV shutdown board degradedvoltage or loss-of-voltage signal (Refer to LCO 3.3.5, "Loss of Power(LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start lnstrumentation.").

After the DG hasstarted, it will automatically tie to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown boardafter offsite power is tripped as a consequence of 6.9 kV shutdown boardloss-of-voltage or degraded

voltage, independent of or coincident with anSl signal. The DGs will also start and operate in the standby modewithout tying to the 6.9 kV shutdown board on an Sl signal alone.Following the trip of offsite power, a loss-of-voltage signal strips allnonpermanent loads from the 6.9 kV shutdown board. When the DG istied to the 6.9 kV shutdown board, loads are then sequentially connected to its respective 6.9 kV shutdown board by the automatic sequencer.

Thesequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motorbreakers to prevent overloading the DG by automatic load application.

ln the event of a loss of preferred power, the 6.9 kV shutdown boards areautomatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safereactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design BasisAccident (DBA) such as a LOCA.Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading the DG in the process.

Withinthe required interval (FSAR Table 8.3-3) after the initiating signal isreceived, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed torecover the plant or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.Ratings for Train 1A, 1B, 2A and 28 DGs satisfy the requirements ofRegulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The continuous service rating of each DGis 4400 kW with 10% overload permissible for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in any24 hour period. The ESF loads that are powered from the 6.9 kVshutdown boards are listed in Reference 2.The capability is provided to connect a 6.9 kV FLEXS DG to supplypower to any of the four 6.9 kV shutdown boards. The 6.9 kV FLEXDG is commercial-grade and not designed to meet Class 1Erequirements.

The FLEX DG is made available to supportextended Completion Times in the event of an inoperable DG. TheFLEX DG is made available as a defense-in-depth alternate sourceof AC power to mitigate a loss of offsite power event. The FLEXDG would remain disconnected rom the Class 1E distribution system unless required during a loss of offsite power.Watts Bar - Unit2B 3.8-2(continued)

Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3,8.1BASESACTIONSA.2 (continued)

Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported

features, or both, that are associated withthe other train that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty four hours is acceptable becauseit minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting theplant to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supplyelectrical power to Train A and Train B of the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable requiredfeature.Additionally,lhe 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacityand capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs,and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.A.3According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue inCondition A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. With onerequired offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system isdegraded, and the potentialfor a loss of offsite power is increased, withattendant potentialfor a challenge to the plant safety systems.

ln thisCondition,

however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs areadequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.The72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity andcapability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, andthe low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limiton the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC powersources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence offailing to meet the LCO. lf Condition A is entered while, for instance, aDG is inoperable and that DG is subsequently returned

OPERABLE, theLCO may already have been not met for up to 10 days. This could leadto a total of 13 days, since initialfailure to meet the LCO, to restore theoffsite circuit.

At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, thecircuit restored

OPERABLE, and an additional 10 days (for a total of23 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 13 dayCompletion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-9Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONSA.3 (continued) considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B areentered concurrently.

The "A\]Q' connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and 13day Completion Times means that both Completion Times applysimultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO wasinitially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered.B.1 and C.1To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one or more DGsinoperable in Train A OR with one or more DGs inoperable in Train B, it isnecessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on amore frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform,"

a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a RequiredAction being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1 .1, it isinoperable.

Upon required offsite circuit inoperabilityr additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.8,2ln order to extend the Required Action B.5 Completion Time for aninoperable DG from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 10 days, it is necessary to evaluate theavailability of the 6.9 kV FLEX DG within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> upon entry into LCO3.8.1 and every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

Since Required Action 8.2 onlyspecifies "evaluate,"

discovering the 6.9 kV FLEX DG unavailable doesnot result in the Required Action being not met (i.e., the evaluation isperformed).

However, on discovery of an unavailable 6.9 kV FLEX DG,the Completion Time for Required Action B.5 starts the72 hour and/or 24hour clock.6.9 kV FLEX DG availability requires that:1) 6.9 kV FLEX DG fueltank level is verified locally to be 2 8-hoursupply; and2) 6.9 kV FLEX DG supporting system parameters for starting andoperating are verified to be within required limits for functional availability (e.9., batter state of charge).The 6.9 kV FLEX DG is not used to extend the Completion Time for morethan one inoperable DG at any one time.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-10Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued) 8.3 and C.2Required Actions 8.3 and C.2 are intended to provide assurance that aloss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does notresult in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems.

Thesefeatures are designed with redundant safety related trains. This includesmotor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. Single train systems, such asthe turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, are not included.

Redundant required feature failures consist of inoperable features associated with atrain, redundant to the train that has inoperable DG(s).The Completion Time for Required Actions B.3 and C.2 are intended toallow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

This Completion Time also allows for an exception to thenormal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

ln thisRequired Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:An inoperable DG exists; andA required feature on the other train (Train A or Train B) isinoperable.

(continued) a.b.Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3 8-10aRevision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.3 and C.2 (continued) lf at any time during the existence of this Condition (one or more DGsinoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, thisCompletion Time would begin to be tracked.Discovering one or more DGs in Train A or one or more DGs in Train Binoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support orsupported

features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLEDGs, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action.Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently isAcceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the plant to transients associated with shutdown.

ln this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits areadequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for therequired feature's function may have been lost; however, function has notbeen lost. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account theOPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable requiredfeature.

Additionally, the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account thecapacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable timefor repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.8.4.1 and 8.4.2 and C.3.1 and C.3.2Required Actions B.4.1 and C.3.1 provide an allowance to avoidunnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. lf it can be determined that thecause of the inoperable DG(s) do not exist on the OPERABLE DGs,SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed.

For the performance of aSurveillance, Required Action 8.4.1 is considered satisfied since thecause of the DG(s) being inoperable is apparent.

lf the cause ofinoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declaredinoperable upon discovery and Condition F of LCO 3.8.1 would beentered if the other inoperable DGs are not on the same train, otherwise ifthe other inoperable DGs are on the same train, the unit is in Condition C.Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists,and Required Actions B.4.1 and 8.4.2 are satisfied.

lf the cause of theinitial inoperable DG(s) cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DGs, performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance ofcontinued OPERABILITY of that DG(s).(continued)

Wats Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-11Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS8.4.18.4.21 and C..2 (continued) ln the event the inoperable DG(s) is restored to OPERABLE status priorto completing either 8.4.1,8.4.2, C.3.1 or C.3.2 the corrective actionprogram will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility.

Thiscontinued evaluation,

however, is no longer under lhe 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> constraint imposed while in Condition B or C.According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7), 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is reasonable toconfirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) are not affected by the same problemas the inoperable DG(s).B.5ln Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits areadequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 1O-day Completion Time takes into account the capacityand capability of the remaining AC sources (including the 6.9 kV FLEXDG), a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBAoccurring during this period.lf the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is or becomes unavailable with an inoperable DG,then action is required to restore the 6.9 kV FLEX DG to available statusor to restore the DG to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from discovery of an unavailable 6.9 kV FLEX DG. However, if the 6.9 kV FLEX DGunavailability occurs sometime after 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of continuous DGinoperability, then the remaining time to restore the 6.9 kV FLEX DG toavailable status or to restore the DG to OPERABLE status is limited to 24hours.The72 hour and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Completion Times allow for an exception to thenormal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

The 72hour Completion Time only begins on discovery that both an inoperable DG exists and the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is unavailable.

The 24 hourCompletion Time only begins on discovery that an inoperable DG existsfor > 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is unavailable.

Therefore, when on DG is inoperable due to either preplanned maintenance (Preventive or corrective) or unplanned corrective maintenance work, the Completion Time can be extended trom72 hoursto 10 days if the 6.9 kV FLEX DG is verified available for backupoperation.

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-12Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.5 (continued)

The Fourth Completion Time for Required Action 8.5 establishes a limiton the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC powersources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence offailing to meet the LCO. lf Condition B is entered while, for instance, anoffsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restoredOPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 3 days.This could lead to a total of 13 days, since initialfailure to meet the LCO,to restore the DGs. At this Time, an offsite circuit could again becomeinoperable, the DGs restored

OPERABLE, and an additionalT2 hours (fora total of 20 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The13-day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit isconsidered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B areentered concurrently.

THE'AND" connector between the 1O-day and 13-day Completion Times mean that both Completion Times applysimultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.Compliance with the contingency actions listed in Bases Table 3.8.1-2 isrequired whenever Condition B is entered for a planned or unplanned outage that will extend beyond 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. lf Condition B is entered initially for an activity intended to last less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or for an unplanned outage, the contingency actions should be invoked as soon as it isestablished that the outage period will be longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.As in Required Action 8.3, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "Time zero" for,beginning the allowed outage time "clock."This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO wasinitially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-12aRevision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued) q,.4According to Regulatory ConditionCforaperiod Guide 1.93, (Ref. 6), operation may continue inthat should not exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.ln Condition C, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits areadequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class '1E Distribution System. fhe 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacityand capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs,and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. Restoration of at least on DG within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> results in reverting back under Condition B and continuing to track the "time zero" Completion Time for one DGinoperable.

The second Completion Time for Required Action C.4 establishes a limiton the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC powersources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence offailing to meet the LCO. lf Condition C is entered while, for instance, anoffsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restoredOPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for upto72 hours.This could lead to a total of 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br />, since initial failure to meet theLCO, to restore the DGs. At this time, an offsite circuit could againbecome inoperable, the DGs restored

OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of theLCO. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on time allowed in aspecified condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit isconsidered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and C areentered concurrently.

The UAND' connector between the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times applysimultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.As in Required Action C.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."This will result in establishing the "time zero" at the time that the LCO wasinitially not met, instead of at the time Condition C was entered.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-12bRevision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)

D.1 and D.2Required Action D.1, which applies when two required offsite circuits areinoperable, is intended to provide assurance that an event with acoincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions.

The Completion Time for this failure ofredundant required features is reduced to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from that allowed forone train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale forthe reduction to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is that Regulatory Guide 1 .93 (Ref. 6) allows aCompletion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety trains areOPERABLE.

When a concurrent redundant required feature failureexists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of12 hours is appropriate.

These features are powered from redundant ACsafety trains. This includes motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.Single train features, such as the turbine driven auxiliary pump, are notincluded in the list.The Completion Time for Required Action D.1 is intended to allow theoperator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities.

ThisCompletion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero"for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

ln this Required Action theCompletion Time only begins on discovery that both:AII required offsite circuits are inoperable; andA required feature is inoperable.

lf at any time during the existence of Condition D (two required offsitecircuits inoperable) a required feature becomes inoperable, thisCompletion Time begins to be tracked.According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue inCondition D for a period that should not exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This level ofdegradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not havethe capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of anaccident;

however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded.

Thislevel of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of thei m med iately accessible offsite power sources.(continued) a.b.Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-13Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONSD.1 and D.2 (continued)

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this levelof degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations oftwo AC sources inoperable (e.9., combinations that involve an offsitecircuit and one DG inoperable, or one or more DGs in each traininoperable).

However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of thislevel of degradation:

The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system thatremains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; andThe time required to detect and restore an unavailable requiredoffsite power source is generally much less than that required todetect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite ACsources are available to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition inthe event of a DBA or transient.

ln fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite ACsources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as apart of the design basis in the safety analysis.

Thus, the 24 hourCompletion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one ofthe offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining anAC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

According to Reference 6, with the available offsite AC sources, two lessthan required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. lf twooffsite sources are restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, unrestricted operation maycontinue.

lf only one offsite source is restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, poweroperation continues in accordance with Condition A.E.1 and E.2Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not beentered even if allAC sources to it were inoperable, resulting inde-energization.

Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition E aremodified by a Note to indicate that when Condition E is entered with noAC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions forLCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating,"

must be immediately entered.

This allows Condition E to provide requirements for the loss ofone offsite circuit and one or more DGs in a train, without regard towhether a train is de-energized.

LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue inCondition E for a period that should not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.(continued) a.b.Wafrs Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-14Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources

• Operating B 3,8.1BASESACTIONSE.1 and E.2 (continued) ln Condition E, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since powersystem redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power,however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appearhigher than that in Condition D (loss of both required offsite circuits).

Thisdifference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power systemconfiguration to a single bus or switching failure.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining ACsources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBAoccurring during this period.F.1 and F.2With one or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one ormore DG(s) in Train B inoperable, there are no remaining standby ACsources.

Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power,insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimumrequired ESF functions.

Since the offsite electrical power system is theonly source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than thatassociated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss ofAC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in atotal loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted.

The intent here is to avoid the riskassociated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize therisk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Reference 6, with one or more DG(s) in Train A inoperable simultaneous with one or more DG(s) in Train B inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.G.1 and G.2lf the inoperable AC electric power sources cannot be restored toOPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant mustbe brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve thisstatus, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> andto MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times arereasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plantconditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and withoutchallenging plant systems.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-15Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)

H.1 and 1.1Condition H and Condition I correspond to a level of degradation in whichall redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies cannot be guaranteed.

At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function.

Therefore, no additional timeis justified for continued operation.

The plant is required by LCO 3.0.3 tocommence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of allimportant areas and features, especially those that have a standbyfunction, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8).Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functionaltests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions).

The SRsfor demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are in accordance withthe recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9), as addressed in the FSAR.Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following is applicable.

6800 volts is the minimum steadystate output voltage and the 10 seconds transient value. 6800 volts is98.6% of the nominal bus voltage of 6900 V corrected for instrument errorand is the upper limit of the minimum voltage required for the DG supplybreaker to close on the 6.9 kV shutdown board. The specified maximumsteady state output voltage of 7260 V is 1 10% of the nameplate rating ofthe 6600 V motors. The specified 3 second transient value of 6555 V is95% of the nominal bus voltage of 6900 V. The specified maximumtransient value of 8880 V is the maximum equipment withstand valueprovided by the DG manufacturer.

The specified minimum and maximumtransient frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61 .2 Hz, respectively.

The steady state minimum and maximum frequency values are 59.8 Hzand 60.1 Hz. These values ensure that the safety related plantequipment powered from the DGs is capable of performing its safetyfunctions.

sR 3.8.1.1This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsiteAC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker isin its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads areconnected to their preferred power source, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained.

The 7 day Frequency isadequate since breaker position is not likely to change without theoperator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in thecontrol room.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-16Revision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.1.14(continued)

REQUIREMENTS Note 3 establishes that credit may be taken for unplanned events thatsatisfy this SR. Examples of unplanned events may include:1) Unexpected operational events which cause the equipment toperform the function specified by this Surveillance, for whichadequate documentation of the required performance is available; and2) Post-corrective maintenance testing that requires performance of thisSurveillance in order to restore the component to OPERABLE, provided the maintenance was required, or performed in conjunction with maintenance required to maintain OPERABILITY or reliability.

Prior to performance of this SR in MODES 1 or 2, actions are taken toestablish that adequate conditions exist for performance of the SR. Therequired actions are defined in Bases Table 3.8.1-2.(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-28aRevision 5Amendment 5

AC Sources - Operating B 3.8.1BASESBases Table 3.8.1-2TS Action or Surveillance Requirement (SR) Contingency ActionsRevision 5Amendment 5Contingency Actionsto be Implemented Applicable TSAction or SRApplicable Modes1.Verify that the offsite power system is stable. Thisaction will establish that the offsite power system iswithin single-contingency limits and will remainstable upon the loss of any single component supporting the system. lf a grid stability problemexists, the planned DG outage will not bescheduled.

sR 3.8 .1 .14Action 8.51,21,2,3,42.Verify that no adverse weather conditions areexpected during the outage period. The planned DGoutage will be postponed if inclement weather (suchas severe thunderstorms or heavy snoMall) isprojected.

sR 3.8 .1 .14Action 8.51,21,2,3,43.Do not remove from service the ventilation systemsfor the 6.9 kV shutdown boardrooms, the elevation 772 transformer rooms, or the 480-volt shutdownboard rooms, concurrently with the DG, orimplement appropriate compensatory measures.

Action 8.51,2,3,44.Do not remove the reactor trip beakers from serviceconcurrently with planned DG outage maintenance.

Action 8.51,2,3,45.D not remove the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump from service concurrently with a Unit 1DG outage.Action 8.51,2,3,46.Do not remove the AFW level control valves to thesteam generators from service concurrently with aUnit 1 DG outageAction 8.51,2,3,47.Do not remove the opposite train residual heatremove (RHR) pump from service concurrently witha Unit 1 DG outage.Action B.51,2,3,4Watts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-37a Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.9Table B 3.8.9-1 (page 1 of 1)AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems" Each train of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem.

• • For WBN Unit 2, the 480V Reactor MOV Boards 1A1-A and 1B1-B and 480V Reactor VentBoards 1A-A and 1B-B are available for economic and operational convenience.

Theboards contain no Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) Required loads. The boards areconsidered part of the Unit 1 / Unit 2 Electrical Power Distribution System and meet Unit 2TS Requirements and testing only while connected.

WBN Unit 2 is designed to beoperated,

shutdown, and maintained in a safe shutdown status without any of these boardsor their loads. As such, the boards may be disconnected from service without entering anUnit 2 LCO provided their loads are not substituting for an Unit 2 TS required load.TYPEVOLTAGETRAIN A*TRAIN B"AC safetybuses6900 vShutdown Board 1A-A, 2A-AShutdown Board 1B-B, 2B-B480 VShutdown Board 1A1-A, 142-A2A1-4,242-A Rx MOV Board 1A1-A**,

142-A2A1-A,242-A C & A Vent Board 1A1-A, 142-A2A1-A,2A2-A Diesel Aux Board 1A1-A, 142-A2A1-A, 242-ARx Vent Board 1A-A**, 2A-AShutdown Board 181-8, 1B.2-F2B1.8,282.8 Rx MOV Board 1B1-8**,

1B.2-B-2B1-8,282-8 C & A Vent Board 181-8, 182-B281-8,2B,2-B Diesel Aux Board 181-B, 1B.2-B^28_1-8,282-8 Rx Vent Board 1B-B**. 2B-BAC vitalbuses120 VVital channel 1-lVital channel 2-lVital channel 1 -lllVital channel 2-lllVital channel 1-llVita! channel 2-llVital channel 1-lVVital channel z-lVDC buses125 VBoardBoardIiltBoardBoardltIVWatts Bar - Unit 2B 3.8-94Revision 1

ENCLOSURE 7WBN UNIT 2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALTABLE OF CONTENTSE-7 TABLE OF CONTENTSTECHN ICAL REQUI REMENTSTABLE OF CONTENTSLIST OF TABLESLIST OF FIGURESLIST OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND PROGRAMSLIST OF ACRONYMS

......LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESIVTR 1.0TR 1.1TR 1.2TR 1.3TR 1.4TR 3.0TR 3.1TR 3.1 .1TR 3.1 .2TR 3.1 .3TR 3.1 .4TR 3.1 .5TR 3.1 .6TR 3.1 .7TR 3.3TR 3.3.1TR 3.3.2TR 3.3,3TR 3.3.4TR 3.3.5TR 3.3.6TR 3.3.7TR 3.3.8TR 3.3.9USE AND APPLICATION Definitions Logical Connectors Completion TimesFrequency APPLICABILITY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ......Boration Systems Flow Paths, ShutdownBoration Systems Flow Paths, Operating Charging Pump, ShutdownCharging Pumps, Operating Borated Water Sources, ShutdownBorated Water Sources, Operating Position lndication System, ShutdownINSTRUMENTATION VIviviiix1.1-11 .1-11.2-11.3-11.4-13.0-13.1-13.1-13.1-33.1-53.1-63.1-83.1-103.1-143.3-1Reactor Trip System (RTS) lnstrumentation

... 3.3-1Engineered Safety Features Actuation System . 3.3-4RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION

... 3.3.11Seismic lnstrumentation

... 3.3-12RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION

... 3.3-16Loose-Part Detection System ...... 3.3-17RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION

... ....... 3.3-18Hydrogen Monitor .. 3.3-19Power Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS) . 3.3-21Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements (continued)

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ........

3.4-1Safety Valves, Shutdown

.. 3.4-1Pressurizer Temperature Limits .. 3.4-3Reactor Vessel Head Vent System 3.4-5Chemistry 3.4-7Piping System Structural lntegrity 3.4-10CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS

... ...........

3.6-1lce Bed Temperature Monitoring System .......,.

3.6-1lnlet Door Position Monitoring System ... 3.6-4Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System .... 3.6-6PLANT SYSTEMSSteam Generator Pressure

/ Temperature Limitations...

Flood Protection PlanSealed Source Contamination Area Temperature Monitoring ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMSlsolation DevicesContainment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices 3.8-4Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices ............

3.8-8Submerged Component Circuit Protection 3.8-15REFUELING OPERATIONS

... 3.9-1RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION

... 3,9-1Communications

... .........

3.9-2Refueling Machine .........

3.9-3Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building

...... 3.9-5ADMlNlSTRATlVE CONTROLS

...... .............

5.0-1Technical Requirements Control Program ....... 5.0-1TR 3.4TR 3.4.1TR 3.4.2TR 3.4.3TR 3.4.4TR 3.4.5TR 3.6TR 3.6.1TR 3.6.2TR 3.6.3TR 3.7TR 3.7.1TR 3.7.2TR 3.7.3TR 3.7.4TR 3.7.5TR 3.8TR 3.8.1TR 3.8.2TR 3.8.3TR 3.8.4TR 3.9TR 3.9.1TR 3.9.2TR 3.9.3TR 3.9.4TR 5.0TR 5.13.7 -13.7-13.7-33.7-53.7-163.7-193.8-13.8-1Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements Revision 5

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASESTECHNICAL REQUIREMENT (TR) AND TECHNICAL SURVEI LLANCE REQUI REMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ......Boration Systems Flow Paths, ShutdownBoration Systems Flow Paths, Operating Charging Pump, ShutdownCharging Pumps, Operating Borated Water Sources, ShutdownBorated Water Sources, Operating Position lndication System, ShutdownINSTRUMENTATION Reactor Trip System (RTS) lnstrumentation

...Engineered Safety Features Actuation System(ESFAS) lnstrumentation

...RESERVED FOR FUTRE ADDITION

......Seismic lnstrumentation

...RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION

...Loose-Part Detection SystemRESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION

...Hydrogen MonitorPower Distribution Monitoring System (PDMS)REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)Safety Valves, ShutdownPressurizer Temperature LimitsReactor Vessel Head Vent System...

Chemistry Piping System Structural lntegrity CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ...lce Bed Temperature Monitoring Systemlnlet Door Position Monitoring SystemLower Compartment Cooling (LCC) SystemB 3.0B 3.1B 3.1.1B 3.1 .2B 3.1 .3B 3 .1.4B 3.1 .5B 3.1 .683.1 .7B 3.3B 3.3.1B 3.3.2B 3.3.3B 3.3.4B 3.3.5B 3.3.6B 3.3.7B 3.3.8B 3.3.9B 3.4B 3.4.1B 3.4.2B 3.4.3B 3.4.4B 3.4.5B 3.6B 3.6.1B 3.6.2B 3.6.3B 3.0-1B 3 .1-1B 3 .1-1B 3.1-5B 3.1-9B 3.1-12B 3.1-15B 3.1-19B 3.1-24B 3.3-1B 3.3-1B 3.3-4B 3.3-7B 3.3-8B 3.3-13B 3.3-14B 3.3-17B 3.3-18B 3.3-22B 3.4-1B 3.4-1B 3.4-4B 3.4-7B 3.4-10B 3.4-13B 3.6-1B 3.6-1B 3.6-6B 3.6-10Watts Bar - Unt2Technical Requirements iii TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS BASESPLANT SYSTEMSSteam Generator Pressure

/ Temperature Limitations......

Flood Protection PlanSealed Source Contamination Area Temperature Monitoring ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMSlsolation DevicesContainment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices B 3.8-7Motor Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass Devices B 3.8-13Submerged Component Circuit Protection B 3.8-16REFUELING OPERATIONS

... B 3.9-1RESERVED FOR FUTURE ADDITION

... . B 3.9-1Communications...

83.9-2Refueling Machine B 3.9-4Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building

...... B 3.9-7B 3.7B 3 .7.1B 3.7.2B 3 .7.3B 3.7.4B 3 .7.5B 3.8B 3.8.1B 3.8.2B 3.8.3B 3.8.4B 3.9B 3.9.1B 3.9.2B 3.9.3B 3.9.4B 3.7-1B 3 .7-1B 3.7-4B 3.7-8B 3,7-15B 3.7-19B 3.8-1B 3.8-1Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements ivRevision 5

TABLENO.Lrsr ot....IA.P"f=E$.

TITLEMODESTechnical Surveillance Requirement......

Reactor Trip System lnstrumentation Response TimesEngineered Safety Features Actuation System Response TimesSeismic Monitoring I nstrumentation Power Distribution Monitoring (PDMS) lnstrumentation

...DeletedDeletedDeletedDeletedDeletedArea Temperature Monitoring Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload DevicesWhich Are Bypassed Under Accident Conditions Submerged Components

\Mth Automatic PAGE1 .1-13.0.2-13.3 .1-13.3.2-13.3 .4-13.3.9- 13.7.3-13.7.3-23.7.2-33.7.3-43.7.3-53.7.5-13.8.3-13.8.4-11 .1-63.0-53.3-23.3-53.3-153.3-233.7-83.7-93.7 -113.7-123.7-143.7-223.8-9Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements LIST OF FIGURESFIGURENO. TITLE PAGE3.1.6 Boric Acid Tank Limits Based on RWST Boron Concentration Level 1 RwsTConcentration

... 3.1-'13IELETED 3,7-153.7.3-1 vLIST OF MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND PROGRAMSCore Operating Limits ReportWatts Bar - Unit2Tech nical Requirements VI LIST OF ACRONYMS(Page 1 ot 2)ACRONYMTITLEABGTSACRPAFDAFWARFSAROARVASMEBOCCCSCFRCOLRCREVSCSSCSTDNBECCSEFPDEGTSEOCERCWESFESFASHEPAHVACLCCLCOMFIVMFRVMSIVMSSVAuxiliary Building Gas Treatment SystemAuxiliary Control Room PanelAxial Flux Difference Auxiliary Feedwater SystemAir Return Fan SystemAll Rods OutAtmospheric Relief ValveAmerican Society of Mechanical Engineers Beginning of CycleComponent Cooling Water SystemCode of Federal Regulations Core Operating Limits ReportControl Room Emergency Ventilation SystemContainment Spray SystemCondensate Storage TankDeparture from Nucleate BoilingEmergency Core Cooling SystemEffective Full-Power DaysEmergency Gas Treatment SystemEnd of CycleEssential Raw Cooling WaterEngineered Safety FeatureEngineered Safety Features Actuation SystemHigh Efficiency Particulate AirHeating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning Lower Compartment CoolerLimiting Condition For Operation Main Feedwater lsolation ValveMain Feedwater Regulation ValveMain Steam Line lsolation ValveMain Steam Safety Valve(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements vii LIST OF ACRONYMS(Page 2 ot 2)ACRONYMTITLEMTCN/ANMSODCMPCPPDMSPIVPORVPTLRQPTRRAOCRCCARCPRCSRHRRTPRTSRWSTSGSISLSRTSRUHSM oderator Tem peratu re Coefficient Not Applicable Neutron Monitoring SystemOffsite Dose Calculation ManualProcess Control ProgramPower Distribution Monitoring SystemPressure lsolation ValvePower-Operated Relief ValvePressure and Temperature Limits ReportQuadrant Power Tilt RatioRelaxed Axial Offset ControlRod Cluster Control AssemblyReactor Coolant PumpReactor Coolant SystemResidual Heat RemovalRated Therma! PowerReactor Trip SystemRefueling Water Storage TankSteam Generator Safety lnjection Safety LimitSurveillance Requirement Technical Surveillance Requirement Ultimate Heat SinkWatts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements vill TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPAGENUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGENUMBERREVISIONNUMBERVViviiviiiixxxixiixiiixiv1 .1-11.1-21 .1-31.1-41 .1-51 .1-61.2-11.2-21.2-31.3-11.3-21.3-31.3-41.3-51.3-61.3-71.3-81.3-91 .3-101.4-105050000770707000000000000000000001.4-21.4-31.4-43.0-13.4-23.0-33.0-43.0-53.0-63.1-13.1-23.1-33.1-43.1-53.1-63.1-73.1-B3.1-93.1-103.1-113.1-123.1-133.1-143.3-13.3-23.3-33.3-43.3-53.3-63.3-73.3-83.3-93.3-10Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements tx PAGENUMBERTECHN ICAL REQU I REMENTSREVISIONNUMBERLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPAGENUMBER3.7-43.7 -53.7-63.7-73.7-83.7-93.7-103.7 -113.7-123.7-133.7-143.7 -153.7-163.7 -173.7 -183.7 -193.7-203.7-213.7-223.7-233.8-13.8-23.8-33.8-43.8-53.8-63.8-73.8-83.8-93.8-103.8-1 13.8-123.8-133.8-14REVISIONNUMBER3.3-1 13.3-123.3-133.3-143.3-153.3-163.3-173.3-183.3-193.3-203.3-213.3-223.3-233.4-13.4-23.4-33.4-43.4-53.4-63.4-73.4-83.4-93.4-103.4-113.4-123.6-13.6-23.6-33.6-43.6-53.6-63.7 -13.7-23.7-3Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requ irements PAGENUMBERTECHNICAL REQU I REMENTSREVISION,,,,,,,,,,.1)1tJMHqm,,,,,,,,,,,,

000000000000LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPAGENUMBERB 3.1-7B 3.1-8B 3.1-9B 3.1-10B 3 .1-11B 3 .1-12B 3.1-13B 3.1-14B 3.1-15B 3.1-16B 3 .1-17B 3.1-18B 3.1-19B 3.1-20B 3 .1-21B 3.1-22B 3.1-23B 3.1-24B 3.1-25B 3.1-26B 3.3-1B 3.3-2B 3.3-3B 3.3-4B 3.3-5B 3.3-6B 3.3-7B 3.3-8B 3.3-9B 3.3-10B 3.3-1 1B 3.3-12B 3.3-13B 3.3-14REVISIONNUMBER3.8-153.8-163.8-173.8-183.8-193.8-243.9-13.9-23.9-33.9-43.9-55.0-1B 3.0-1B 3.0-2B 3.0-3B 3.0-4B 3.0-5B 3.0-6B 3.0-7B 3.0-8B 3.0-9B 3.0-10B 3.0-11B 3.0-12B 3.0-13B 3 .0-14B 3.0-1sB 3 .1-1B 3.1-2B 3.1-3B 3.1-4B 3.1-5B 3.1-6000000000000000000000Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements xt PAGENUMBERTECHNICAL REQU !REMENTSREVISIONNUMBERLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPAGENUMBERB 3.6-8B 3.6-9B 3.6-10B 3.6-11B 3.6-12B 3 .7-1B 3.7-2B 3.7-3B 3.7-4B 3.7-5B 3.7-6B 3.7-7B 3.7-8B 3.7-9B 3.7-10B 3.7-11B 3.7-12B 3.7-13B 3 .7-14B 3.7-15B 3.7-16B 3.7-17B 3 .7-18B 3.7-19B 3.7-20B 3.7-21B 3.7-22B 3.8-1B 3.8-2B 3.8-3B 3.8-4B 3.8-5B 3.8-6B 3.8-7REVISIONNUMBERB 3.3-15B 3.3-16B 3.3-17B 3.3-18B 3.3-19B 3.3-20B 3.3-21B 3.3-22B 3.3-23B 3.3-24B 3.3-25B 3.3-26B 3 .4-1B 3.4-2B 3.4-3B 3.4-4B 3.4-5B 3.4-6B 3.4-7B 3.4-8B 3.4-9B 3.4-10B 3 .4-11B 3.4-12B 3.4-13B 3.4-14B 3.4-15B 3.6-1B 3.6-2B 3.6-3B 3.6-4B 3.6-5B 3.6-6B 3.6-7Watts Bar - Unit 2Technica!

Requirements xii PAGENUMBERTECHN ICAL REQU I REMENTSREVISIONNUI\,l,pHS

.,, ,,,,,00000000000000000000LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPAGENUMBERREVISIONNUMBERB 3.8-8B 3.8-9B 3.8-10B 3.8-11B 3.8-12B 3.8-13B 3.8-14B 3.8-15B 3.8-16B 3.8-17B 3.8-18B 3.8-19B 3.9-1B 3.9-2B 3.9-3B 3.9-4B 3.9-5B 3.9-6B 3.9-7B 3.9-8Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements xiii TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALLIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES - REVISION LISTINGRevisions IssuedSUBJECTRevision 01 11125115 Revises TRM and TRM Bases section 3.7.3,"Snubbers".

Revision 02 05122116 TR Table 3.3.1-1, "Reactor Trip System lnstrumentation Response Times" , to change the overtemperature andover power times.Revision 03 06127116 TR Table 3.8.3-1, "Motor-Operated Valves ThermalOverload Devices which are Bypassed under AccidentConditions",

add valve 2-FCV-70-133 and delete 4obsolete valves.Revision 04 02121117 Revises TRM Bases 3.6.2, "lnlet Door PositionMonitoring System,"

Actions.Revision 05 AgB1l17 Revises TRM and TRM Bases to delete section 3.7.3"Snubbers."

Revision 06 07lOAl17 Revises TRM section 3.0, "TechnicalSurveillance Requirements (TSR) Applicability" and adds Table3.0.2-1.Revision 07 08122117 Revises the TR 3.4.5 Title to add ASME Class 1,2, and3 in the TRM and Bases. Also revised TSR Table3.0.2-1 to add two addition TSRs.Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements xiv ENCLOSURE 8WBN UN'T 2 TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS MANUALCHANGED PAGESE-8 TSR Applicability TR 3.03.0 TECHNTCAL SURVETLLANCE REQUTREMENT (TSR) APPLTCABTLTTY TSR 3.0.1TSRs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in theApplicability for individualTRs, unless otherwise stated in the TSR.Failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced duringthe performance of the Surveillance or between performances of theSurveillance, shall be failure to meet the TR. Failure to perform aSurveillance within the specified Frequency shall be failure to meet theTR except as provided in TSR 3.0.3. Surveillances do not have to beperformed on lnoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits.TSR 3.0.2The specified Frequency for each TSR is met if the Surveillance isperformed within 1.25 times the interval specified in the Frequency, asmeasured from the previous performance or as measured from the time aspecified condition of the Frequency is met. ln addition, for each of theTSRs listed in TSR Table 3.0.2-1 the specified Frequency is met if theSurveillance is performed on or before the date listed on Table TSR3.0.2-1.

This extension of the test intervals for these TSRs is permitted on a one-time basis and expires October 31,2017.For Frequencies specified as "once," the above interval extension doesnot apply.lf a Completion Time requires periodic performance on a "once per . . ."basis, the above Frequency extension applies to each performance afterthe initial performance, Exceptions to this Requirement are stated in the individual Requirements.

TSR 3.0.3lf it is discovered that a Surveillance was not performed within itsspecified Frequency, then compliance with the requirement to declare theTR not met may be delayed, from the time of discovery, up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> orup to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater.

Thisdelay period is permitted to allow performance of the Surveillance.

A riskevaluation shall be performed for any Surveillance delayed greater than24 hours and the risk impact shall be managed.lf the Surveillance is notimmediately be declaredentered.performed within the delay period, the TR mustnot met, and the applicable Condition(s) must beWhen the Surveillance is performed within the delay period and theSurveillance is not met, the TR must immediately be declared not met,and the applicable Condition(s) must be entered.Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements (continued)

Revision 63.0-3 TSR Applicability TR 3.03.0 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY (continued)

TSR Table 3.0.2-1Tech nical Surveillance Requirement (TSR)Description of TSR Requirement Frequency Extension Limit3 1.2.3Boration Flow Paths - Demonstrate that each automatic valve in the flowpath actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.10131 t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem2.a.3Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection

- Containment lsolation Phase A - Verify ESFAS Response Time.1 0t31t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem2.a.5Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection

- Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps - Verify ESFAS Response Time.10t31t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem2.a.6Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection

- Essential Raw CoolingWater - Verify ESFAS Response Time1 0/3 1t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem2.a.8Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection

- Component CoolingSystem - Verify ESFAS Response Time101311173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem2.a.9Containment Pressure High - Safety lnjection

- Start Diesel Generators

- Verify ESFAS Response Time1 0/3 1 t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem3.a.3Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Containment lsolation Phase A - Verify ESFAS Response Time.1AB1t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem3.a.5Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps - Verify ESFAS Response Time.1 0/311173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem3.a.6Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Essential Raw CoolingWater - Verify ESFAS Response Time1 0/3 1t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem3.a.8Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Component CoolingSystem - Verify ESFAS Response Time10t31t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem3.a.9Pressurizer Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Staft Diesel Generators Verify ESFAS Response Time1 0/3 1 t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem5.a.3Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Containment lsolation Phase A - Verify ESFAS Response Time.10t31t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem5.a.5Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps - Verify ESFAS Response Time.1 0/3 1 t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem5.a.6Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Essential Raw CoolingWater - Verify ESFAS Response Time14t31t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem5.a.8Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Component CoolingSystem - Verify ESFAS Response Time10t31t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem5.a.9Steam Line Pressure Low - Safety lnjection

- Staft Diesel Generators Verify ESFAS Response Time1 0/3 1 t173.3.2.1 f able 3.3.2-1, ltem6.aContainment Pressure High High - Containment Spray - Verify ESFASResponse Time10/311173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem6bContainment Pressure High High - Containment lsolation

- Phase BVerify ESFAS Response Time1 0/3 1 t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem10RWST Level-Low Coincident with Containment Sump Level - High andSafety lnjection

- Verify ESFAS Response Time10t31t17Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements 3.0-5Revision 6

TSR Applicability TR 3.03.0 TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (TSR) APPLICABILITY (continued)

TSR Table 3.0.2-1Technical Surveil lanceRequirement (TSR)Description of TSR Requirement Frequency Extension Limit3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem11Loss-of-Offsite Power - Verify ESFAS Response Time1 0/31t173.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2-1, ltem14Loss of Voltage/Degraded Voltage - Verify ESFAS Response Time1At31t173.4.3.1Reactor Vessel Head Vent System - Verify that the upstream manualRVHVS isolation valve is locked in the open position.

10/31t173.4.3.3Reactor Vessel Head Vent System - Verify flow through the RVHVSpaths during venting.10t311173.8.4.2Submerged Component Circuit Protection

- Verify that the components as shown in Table 3.8.4-1 are automatically de-energized on a simulated accident signal and that the components remain de-energized when theaccident signal is reset.10t31t173.8.1 .1Perform function test on representative sample of > 10% of each type ofmolded-case circuit breaker.1 0/31t173.8.2.3Select and functionally test representative sample of > 10% of eachtype of molded case circuit breaker.1 0/31t17Watts Bar - U nat 2Technical Req uirements 3.0-6Revision 7

RTS lnstrumentation TR 3.3.1Table 3.3 .1-1 (Page 1 of 2)Reactor Trip System lnstrumentation Response TimesFUNCTIONAL UNITRESPONSE TIME3. Power Range, Neutron Fluxa. High Positive Rate N/Ab. High Negative Rate Deleted4. lntermediate Range, Neutron Flux N/A5. Source Range, Neutron Flux s 0.S seconds (1)6. Overtemperature AT s g seconds (1)7. Overpower AT s g seconds (1)1. Manual Reactor Trip2. Power Range, Neutron Fluxa, Highb. LowB. Pressurizer Pressurea. Lowb. High9. Pressurizer Water Level--High N/As 0.5 second (1)< 0.5 second (1)s 2 secondss 2 secondsN/A(continued)

(1) Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing.

Response time of the neutronflux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from the detector output or input of firstelectronic component in channel.Watts Bar - U nit 2Technical Requirements 3.3-2Revisian 2

Piping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5TR 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)TR 3.4.5 ASME Class 1,2, and 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity TR 3.4.5The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components in allsystems shall be maintained in accordance with TSR 3.4.5.1 andTSR 3.4.5.2.APPLICABILITY:

AII MODES.CONDITION COMPLETION TIMEA.Structural integrity of anyASME Code Class 1component(s) not withinlimits.Prior to increasing Reactor CoolantSystem temperature

> 50oF above theminimumtemperature requiredby NDTconsiderations Prior to increasing Reactor CoolantSystem temperature

> 50oF above theminimumtemperature requiredby NDTconsiderations.

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements ACTIONSREQUIRED ACTIONRestore structural integrity of affectedcomponent(s) towithin limit.lsolate affectedcomponent(s).

3.4-10Revision 7

TR 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSTR 3.7,3 DELETEDWatts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements SnubbersTR 3.7.33.7- 5 through 15Revision 5

Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Bypass DevicesTR 3.8.3VALVE NO.2-FCV-70-1 33Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements Table 3.8.3-1 (Page 6 of 6)Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload DevicesWhich Are Bypassed Under Accident Conditions FUNCTIONlsolation for RCP Oal Coolers & Therm Barriers3.8-14Revision 3

7Piping System Structural lntegrity B 3.4.5B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)B 3 .4.5 ASME Class 1,2, or 3 Piping System Structural lntegrity BASESBACKGROUND lnservice inspection and pressure testing of ASME Code Class 1,2, and3 components in all systems are performed in accordance with Section Xlof the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) and applicable

Addenda, as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g)

(Ref. 2). Exception to theserequirements apply where relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i) and (aX3). ln general, thesurveillance intervals specified in Section Xl of the ASME Code apply.However, the lnservice lnspection Program includes a clarification of thefrequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section Xl of the ASME Code. This clarification is provided toensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout the Technical Specifications.

Each reactor coolant pump flywheel is, in addition, inspected as recommended in Regulatory Position C.4.b ofRegulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975 (Ref. 3).APPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSESCertain components which are designed and manufactured to therequirements of specific sections of the ASME Boiler and PressureVessel Code are part of the primary success path and function to mitigateDBAs and transients.

However, the operability of these components isaddressed in the relevant specifications that cover individual components.

ln addition, this particular Requirement covers only structural integrity inspection/testing requirements for these components, which is not aconsideration in designing the accident sequences for theoretical hazardevaluation (Refs. 4 & 5).Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements (continued)

Revision 7B 3.4-13 lnlet Door Position Monitoring SystemB 3.6.2BASESACTIONS(continued) 91"lf the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition Bcannot be met, the plant must be placed in a condition whereOPERABILITY of the lnlet Door Position Monitoring System is notrequired.

This is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within6 hours and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times arereasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the requiredMODES from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.6.2.1Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK for the lnlet Door PositionMonitoring System once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure ofinstrumentation has not occurred.

A CHANNEL CHECK is a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on otherchannels.

lt is based on the assumption that instrument channelsmonitoring the same parameter should read approximately the samevalue. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels couldbe an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or ofsomething even more serious.

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECKhelps to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properlybetween each TADOT. The dual switch arrangement on each doorallows comparison of open and shut indicators for each zone as well as acheck with the annunciator window. When equipment conditions existthat prevent the preferred direct comparison of open and shut indicators for each zone as described above, indirect methods may be employed toverify that the inlet doors are shut. The indirect methods include theperformance of a continuity check of the circuit used by the annunciator window, by monitoring ice bed temperature, or by monitoring icecondenser and containment parameters.

The annunciator continuity check can confirm if one or more inlet door zone switch contacts areclosed which would represent an open inlet door. The lce BedTemperature Monitoring System can be used to provide confirmation ofinlet door closure by confirming there is uniform equilibrium temperature in the ice bed. lce condenser and containment parameters such astemperature and humidity can also be used to determine if an icecondenser inlet door is open.When indirect methods are used to verify ice condenser inlet doors areshut, a technical analysis must be completed and documented inaccordance with the corrective action program.

ln those instances whena technical analysis cannot be made within the allowed Completion Time,(con!!nuedl Watts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements B 3.6-8Revision 4

7BASESSnubbersB 3 .7.3B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMSB 3.7.3 DELETEDWatts Bar - Unit 2Technical Requirements B 3 .7-8 through 14Revision 5