ML14080A029
| ML14080A029 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/2014 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Shared Package | |
| ML14080A058 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327/13-302, 50-328/13-302 | |
| Download: ML14080A029 (27) | |
Text
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination:12/2/2013 Exam Level: RO SRO Operating Test No: 2013-302 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Code* Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations R, M Calculate the Boric Acid Controller Setting 2.1.37 (4.3) Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. Conduct of Operations R, M Determine Maintenance of Active License Status. 2.1.4 (3.8) Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical -active license status, 10CFR55, etc. Equipment Control R, N Perform a Defense-In-Depth Assessment. 2.2.18 (2.6) Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations. Radiation Control Not examined Emergency Procedures/Plan R, N Perform RO Actions During Aircraft Probable Threat AOP-T.01 App D. 2.4.39 (3.9) Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom A.1.a Given plant data with Unit 1 in MODE 5, the examinee will calculate the Boric Acid Controller Setting of 71.2 using 0-SO-62-7 Boron Concentration Control Appendix M. A.1.b Given a situation with five different Senior Reactor Operators that are not currently on shift, the Examinee will assess the work schedules for five different operators and using OPDP 10 License Status Maintenance, Reactivation and Proficiency for Non-Licensed Positions determines Operator #2, #3 and #4 have maintained an active license status and that Operator #1 and #5 have not accumulated sufficient time required to maintain an active license status. A.2 Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 5 following a Refueling Outage. S/G Manways are installed. RCS Boron concentration is sufficient for Shutdown Margin requirements. The RCS is in a Partial Drain Condition. The Switchyard is protected. The 1A Charging pump is out of service for maintenance. The 1B 6.9 kv Shutdown Board was de-energized and locked out while performing work. The Examinee will perform a Defense-In-Depth Assessment using 1-PI-OPS-000-020.2, OPERATOR AT THE CONTROLS DUTY STATION CHECKLISTS-MODES 5, 6 AND DE-FUELED and determines a RED condition exists on Decay Heat removal and an ORANGE condition exists on Power Availability and that Decay Heat Removal is the most significant challenged safety function. A.3 Not examined. A.4 During an Aircraft PROBABLE Threat event the examinee will perform AOP-T.01, SECURITY EVENTS, Appendix D Aircraft PROBABLE Threat Notifications. The Examinee will notify the SM to classify an ALERT based on EAL 4.6, determine that inadequate time for rapid evacuation exists, and ensures REP Responders are dispatched using the REP Paging system.
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination:12/2/2013 Exam Level: RO SRO Operating Test No: 2013-302 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Code* Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations R, M Determine Actions Required Following a Reactivity Management Event When at Power. 2.1.37 (4.6) Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. Conduct of Operations R, M Determine Maintenance of Active License Status. 2.1.4 (3.8) Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical -active license status, 10CFR55, etc. Equipment Control R, N Perform a Defense-In-Depth Assessment. 2.2.18 (3.9) Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations. Radiation Control R, M Approve a Waste Gas Decay Tank Release for Maintenance and Radiation Monitor RM-118 INOPERABLE. 2.3.6 (3.8) Ability to approve release permits. Emergency Procedures/Plan R, M Classify The Event Using The EPIP-1 and Complete a State Notification Form. 2.4.41 (4.6) Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom RO retakes)
A.1.a Given a sequence of events while acting as the Unit Supervisor when a CVCS Purification mixed bed ion exchanger was placed in service with insufficient boron loading, the examinee will determine the following: The severity of the event as a Minor Reactivity Management Event using NPG-SPP-10.4 Reactivity Management Program. That site operations management and duty plant manager are the required internal notifications using NPG-SPP-3.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements. This task is based on a Sequoyah internal operating event. A.1.b Given a situation with five different Senior Reactor Operators that are not currently on shift, the Examinee will assess the work schedules for five different operators and using OPDP 10 License Status Maintenance, Reactivation and Proficiency for Non-Licensed Positions determines Operator #2, #3, #4 and #5 have maintained an active license status and that Operator #1 and #5 have not accumulated sufficient time required to maintain an active license status. A.2 Given the following conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 5 following a Refueling Outage. S/G Manways are installed. RCS Boron concentration is sufficient for Shutdown Margin requirements. The RCS is in a Partial Drain Condition. The Switchyard is protected. The 1A Charging pump is out of service for maintenance. The 1B 6.9 kv Shutdown Board was de-energized and locked out while performing work. The Examinee will perform a Defense-In-Depth Assessment using 1-PI-OPS-000-020.2, OPERATOR AT THE CONTROLS DUTY STATION CHECKLISTS-MODES 5, 6 AND DE-FUELED and determines a RED condition exists on Decay Heat removal and an ORANGE condition exists on Power Availability and that Decay Heat Removal is the most significant challenged safety function.
A.3 Given a situation while acting as the Unit Supervisor when a Waste Gas Decay Tank B release is planned with 0-RE-90-118 inoperable, the Examinee determines the following requirements are necessary to accommodate the Waste gas release and intrusive maintenance: A Purge required prior to maintenance. ABGTS Train B will be used for the release. Two independent samples and analyses of the Waste Gas Decay are performed. Two independent calculations of the Waste Gas Decay Tank release rate are performed. Two independent of the verifications discharge valve lineup are performed. The requirements listed are necessary to demonstrate the appropriate administrative controls that are in place to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent release radioactive in excess of limits to the public. A.4 Acting as the Site Emergency Director during a MODE 5 LOCA, the Examinee classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on EAL 6.1 and the Examinee completes a TVA Initial Notification for Site Area Emergency form with no errors on items noted with an *.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 12/2/2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No: 2013-302 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function a. Initiate Emergency Boration with Multiple Control Rods Not Fully Inserted. EPE 024 EA 1.06 (3.2/3.1) M, A, S 1 b. Depressurize an Unisolable Cold Leg Accumulator. 006 A4.02 (4.0/3.8) M, A, EN, L, S 2 c. Respond to a Shutdown LOCA with a Failure of Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolation. EPE 011 EA 2.04 (3.8/4.0) N, A, EN, L, S 3 d. Establish Once Through Cooling by Initiating RCS Bleed and Feed. EPE E05 EA 2.2 (3.7/4.3) N, A, EN, L, EN, S 4P e. Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid. 045 A4.02 (2.7/2.6) N, A, S 4S f. Perform Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation. 103 A4.01 (4.5/4.8) M, EN, L, S 5 g. Respond to a Main Control Room High Radiation Alarm with a Failure of Control Room Isolation. APE 061 AA1.01 (3.6/3.6) D, S 7 h. Perform CR Actions for Fire in the Auxiliary Building. APE 067 AA2.17 (3.5/4.3) N, L, S 8 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i. Respond to Decreasing RCS Pressure from the Aux CR. APE 068 AA1.12 (4.4/4.4) D, E 8 j. Align Upper Containment Radiation Monitor to Lower Containment. 002 A3.01 (3.7/3.9) D, R 2 k. Cycle the Unit 2 Main Generator PCB 062A4.04 (2.6/2.7) N, L 6 @ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) (P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 - / - m)
- a. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 following a Reactor Trip with multiple Control Rods that are not fully inserted. The examinee will be directed to initiate emergency boration from the A BAT using EA-68-4 Emergency Boration. The examinee will not be able to establish emergency boration using the CHARGING FLOW CONTROL valve and will implement the alternate path to establish emergency boration through the Charging Pump ECCS Discharge (CCPIT) valves. b. The examinee will assume the shift during an event with E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT in progress. The examinee will isolate the Loop 1, 2 and 3 Cold Leg Accumulators (CLA) but discovers the Loop 4 CLA discharge valve will not close. The Examinee will implement the alternate path and vent the Loop 4 CLA using EA-63-1, VENTING UNISOLATED COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR. c. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 5 and will respond to plant conditions. The Examinee will diagnose a loss of RCS Inventory and manually stop Reactor Coolant and Residual Heat Removal Pumps and align injection from the Charging Pumps. The Examinee will implement the alternate path to manually close Containment Radiation Monitor and Containment Purge isolation valves using AOP-R.02 SHUTDOWN LOCA. d. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with an event in progress. The Examinee will restore a Heat Sink using FR-H.1 LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. The Examinee will implement the alternate path to manually start the Train A Safety Injection Pump and vent the RCS using the Reactor head vents which establishes RCS Bleed and Feed. e. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 and will start and synchronize the Main Generator the grid using 0-GO-4, POWER ASCENSION FROM LESS THAN 5% REACTOR POWER TO 30% REACTOR POWER. The examinee will respond to a failure of the voltage regulator and implement the alternate path to to trip the main turbine. f. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 following an inadvertent Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. The examinee will perform EA-0-1 EQUIPMENT CHECKS FOLLOWING ESF ACTUATION and will start at least one train of Emergency Gas Treatment and Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment fans. g. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 and will respond to plant conditions. The examinee will diagnose a Main Control Room high radiation condition and manually place one train of Emergency Control Room Ventilation in service and isolate the normal Control Room Ventilation using 0-SO-30-2 Control Room Isolation. h. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with an uncontrolled fire in the Unit 1 Aux Building Penetration Room. The examinee will perform AOP-N.08 APPENDIX R FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN to perform time critical actions which will stop Charging pumps, and manually align Charging pump suction and discharge to the ECCS using AOP-N.08, APPENDIX R FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN. i. While responding to lowering RCS pressure during a Control Room abandonment situation, the examinee will take
- j. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 when the Lower Containment radiation monitor becomes unavailable due to a fault. The examinee will start a sample pump and align Upper Containment radiation monitor 2-RM-90-112 to sample lower containment using 2-SO-90-2 Gaseous Process Radiation Monitoring System. k. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 5 with maintenance complete on the Unit 2 main Generator PCB. The examinee cycle the Unit 2 Main Generator circuit breaker with generator using 2-SO-57-1, GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER. This component is a recent plant modification.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 12/2/2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No: 2013-302 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function a. Initiate Emergency Boration with Multiple Control Rods Not Fully Inserted. EPE 024 EA 1.06 (3.2/3.1) M, A, S 1 b. Depressurize an Unisolable Cold Leg Accumulator. 006 A4.02 (4.0/3.8) M, A, EN, L, S 2 c. Respond to a Shutdown LOCA with a Failure of Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolation. EPE 011 EA 2.04 (3.8/4.0) N, A, EN, L, S 3 d. Establish Once Through Cooling by Initiating RCS Bleed and Feed. EPE E05 EA 2.2 (3.7/4.3) N, A, EN, L, EN, S 4P e. Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid. 045 A4.02 (2.7/2.6) N, A, S 4S f. Perform Equipment Checks Following ESF Actuation with a Failure of ESF Slave Relays. 103 A4.01 (4.5/4.8) M, EN, L, S 5 g. Not examined N/A N/A h. Perform CR Actions for Fire in the Auxiliary Building with a Failure of CCPIT Valves to Close. APE 067 AA2.17 (3.5/4.3) N, L, S 8 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i. Respond to Decreasing RCS Pressure from the Aux CR. APE 068 AA1.12 (4.4/4.4) D, E 8 j. Align Upper Containment Radiation Monitor to Lower Containment. 002 A3.01 (3.7/3.9) D, R 2 k. Cycle the Unit 2 Main Generator PCB 062A4.04 (2.6/2.7) N, L 6 @ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) (P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 - / -
- a. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 following a Reactor Trip with multiple Control Rods that are not fully inserted. The examinee will be directed to initiate emergency boration from the A BAT using EA-68-4 Emergency Boration. The examinee will not be able to establish emergency boration using the CHARGING FLOW CONTROL valve and will implement the alternate path to establish emergency boration through the Charging Pump ECCS Discharge (CCPIT) valves. b. The examinee will assume the shift during an event with E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT in progress. The examinee will isolate the Loop 1, 2 and 3 Cold Leg Accumulators (CLA) but discovers the Loop 4 CLA discharge valve will not close. The Examinee will implement the alternate path and vent the Loop 4 CLA using EA-63-1, VENTING UNISOLATED COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR. c. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 5 and will respond to plant conditions. The Examinee will diagnose a loss of RCS Inventory and manually stop Reactor Coolant and Residual Heat Removal Pumps and align injection from the Charging Pumps. The Examinee will implement the alternate path to manually close Containment Radiation Monitor and Containment Purge isolation valves using AOP-R.02 SHUTDOWN LOCA. d. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with an event in progress. The Examinee will restore a Heat Sink using FR-H.1 LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK. The Examinee will implement the alternate path to manually start the Train A Safety Injection Pump and vent the RCS using the Reactor head vents which establishes RCS Bleed and Feed. e. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 and will start and synchronize the Main Generator the grid using 0-GO-4, POWER ASCENSION FROM LESS THAN 5% REACTOR POWER TO 30% REACTOR POWER. The examinee will respond to a failure of the voltage regulator and implement the alternate path to to trip the main turbine. f. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 following an inadvertent Reactor Trip and Safety Injection. The examinee will perform EA-0-1 EQUIPMENT CHECKS FOLLOWING ESF ACTUATION and will implement the alternate path to start at least one train of Emergency Gas Treatment and Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment fans. g. Not Examined h. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 with an uncontrolled fire in the Unit 1 Aux Building Penetration Room. The examinee will perform AOP-N.08 APPENDIX R FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN to perform time critical actions which will stop Charging pumps, and manually align Charging pump suction and discharge to the ECCS. i. While responding to lowering RCS pressure during a Control Room abandonment situation, the examinee will take local control of j. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 when the Lower Containment radiation monitor becomes unavailable due to a fault. The examinee will start a sample pump and align Upper Containment radiation monitor 2-RM-90-112 to sample lower containment using 2-SO-90-2 Gaseous Process Radiation Monitoring System.
- k. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 5 with maintenance complete on the Unit 2 main Generator PCB. The examinee cycle the Unit 2 Main Generator circuit breaker with generator using 2-SO-57-1, GENERATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER. This component is a recent plant modification.
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Station 1 & 2 Date of Examination: 12/2/2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No: 2013-302 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF) System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function a. Initiate Emergency Boration with Multiple Control Rods Not Fully Inserted. EPE 024 EA 1.06 (3.2/3.1) M, A, S 1 b. Not Examined N/A N/A c. Respond to a Shutdown LOCA with a Failure of Containment Isolation and Containment Ventilation Isolation. EPE 011 EA 2.04 (3.8/4.0) N, A, EN, L, S 3 d. Not Examined N/A N/A e. Synchronize the Main Generator to the Grid. 045 A4.02 (2.7/2.6) N, A, S 4S f. Not Examined N/A N/A g. Not Examined N/A N/A h. Not Examined N/A N/A In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i. Respond to Decreasing RCS Pressure from the Aux CR. APE 068 AA1.12 (4.4/4.4) D, E 8 j. Align Upper Containment Radiation Monitor to Lower Containment. 002 A3.01 (3.7/3.9) D, R 2 k. Not Examined N/A N/A @ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) (P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 - / -
- a. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 3 following a Reactor Trip with multiple Control Rods that are not fully inserted. The examinee will be directed to initiate emergency boration from the A BAT using EA-68-4 Emergency Boration. The examinee will not be able to establish emergency boration using the CHARGING FLOW CONTROL valve and will implement the alternate path to establish emergency boration through the Charging Pump ECCS Discharge (CCPIT) valves. b. Not Examined c. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 5 and will respond to plant conditions. The Examinee will diagnose a loss of RCS Inventory and manually stop Reactor Coolant and Residual Heat Removal Pumps and align injection from the Charging Pumps. The Examinee will implement the alternate path to manually close Containment Radiation Monitor and Containment Purge isolation valves using AOP-R.02 SHUTDOWN LOCA. d. Not Examined e. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 and will start and synchronize the Main Generator the grid using 0-GO-4, POWER ASCENSION FROM LESS THAN 5% REACTOR POWER TO 30% REACTOR POWER. The examinee will respond to a failure of the voltage regulator and implement the alternate path to to trip the main turbine. f. Not Examined g. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 and will respond to plant conditions. The examinee will diagnose a Main Control Room high radiation condition and manually place one train of Emergency Control Room Ventilation in service and isolate the normal Control Room Ventilation using 0-SO-30-2 Control Room Isolation. h. Not Examined i. While responding to lowering RCS pressure during a Control Room abandonment situation, the PO j. The examinee will assume the shift in MODE 1 when the Lower Containment radiation monitor becomes unavailable due to a fault. The examinee will start a sample pump and align Upper Containment radiation monitor 2-RM-90-112 to sample lower containment using 2-SO-90-2 Gaseous Process Radiation Monitoring System. k. Not Examined.