ML20062D516

/03L-0 on 780920:A RHR Room Watertight Door Found Open.Caused by Contractor Personnel Ignorance. Personnel Admonished to Heed Procedures at All Times

ML20062D516
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/19/1978
From:	Kooi M COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20062D508	List: ML20062D503 ML20062D516
References
LER-78-026-03L, LER-78-26-3L, NUDOCS 7811240177
Download: ML20062D516 (2)

Text

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT COr.THOL BLOCK: l I

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PRODABLE CONSEQUENCES h

[oTTll During normal unit operation on September 20, 1978, it was reported to the Shift i 1013l [, Engineer at 3:05 PM that the Unit One "A" RHR room watertight door was found open.' l gl The door was known to be closed previously at 1:20 PM, meaning the door could not l

[o l3j l have remained open for more than one hour and 45 minutes. The LPCI mode of RHR was l

[o lc j l considered Inoperable during this time in accordance with Technical Specification l lo l2l l 3.7.C.2. The doors to both of the Core Spray Room and the HPCI Room were closed. l ITt - I l l 7 8 9 80

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44 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h li101l It is believed that the door was lef t open by contractor personnel . working in the l

[T TT1 I area. who did not heed the warning sien posted at the doorway to keep the door I

[T . ll closed at all times other then when accessed. Upon discovery, the door was immedi- l Fi'TTII ately closed. A letter w!11 be sent to all department heads and the construction i i 4 l' department stressing the importance of keeping watertight doors closed at all times. l 2 8 e so STA  % POWE R OTHER STATUS dis O RY D'SCOVERY CESCRIPTION i

li l5 I W@ l0' l 8 l6 l@l" NA l lBl@l Routine inspection l

! UA!TiviTY cO0 TENT i RELE ASED OF PE LE ASE li j s l l Z l @ l Z l@l 7 8 9 10 11 AMOUNT NA OF ACTIVITY 44 l

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@ lLOCATION OF RELEASE @

l 80 PERSONNEL E x*OSURES NUYSER l i 171 l 0l 0 l OjhlTYFEZl@l DESCRIPTION NA l PE RScNNa',~J ES NueeE R cES:niPTicN@ 7811240 l D l i l ' 8l l9 0 l 01 O_lhl12 7 11 NA l 80 Lots OF OR C AVAGE TO F ACIL TY T vF E D E SC.9 t #T* 0N l i l 9 I (_.Zj@l NA l r 7 8 s 20 ec iss[*cElCm.T,0N@ NRC USE ONLY 12 I oI L2d81 NA I IIIIIIIII'i'Ii 7 8 9 la 68 69 60 %

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N A*.'E C F P R E P A A E R t __

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l. LER NUMBER: LER/R0 78-26/03L-O ll. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Ill. FACILITY NAME: Unit One IV. 06CKET NUMBER: 050-254

• V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

During normal unit operation on September 20, 1978, it was reported to the Shift Enigneer at 3:05 PM that the "A" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) watertight door on Unit One was found open.

The person who discovered the door open, verified that the door had been previously closed at 1:20 PM; thus, determining the maximum time period during which the door could have been lef t open. The Low Pressure Coolant injection (LPCI) mode of RHR was considered inoperable during this time period in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.C.2. The door was immediately closed. The doors to each Core Spray Room and to the HPCI Room were closed.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

Although the watertight door was required to be closed in order for the LPCI system to be considered operable, this system would have been capable of performing its intended function, if needed since all of its active components were operable. Additionally, both core spray systems and the diesel generators were operable during this occurrence; thus, the safety implications of this event were mininal.

Vll. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to personnel error.

Investigation of the event failed to reveal exactly how or when the event occurred. However, it is believed that the door was lef t open by contractor personnel working in the area f who did not heed the warning signs posted at the doorway to keep the door closed.

Vill. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

1 A letter will be sent to the station department heads, and to the station and substation construction departments, stressing the importance of keeping the vJtertight doors closed at all times. Because this is the first occurrence of this type since the warning signs were posted, the corrective action taken is deened adequate.

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