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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
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. NlllC For111 JN U.I. NUCLEAlll lllEQULATOlllY 19-831 I . -A""ROVEO OMI NO.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI EXPIRES 8/3111& FACILITY NAME 111 'DOCKET NUMIElll 121 . I
"' Salem Generating Station -Unit 2 o 1s101010131 11 l 1 loF 019 TITLE 141 Appendix R Criteria Non-Conformance EVEN')' DATE Ill LEA NUMBER 1.11 RE .. ORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIEI INVOLVED Ill MONTH QAY *YEAR YEAR ::::::::::
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}) REVISK>N MONTH DAY YEAR FACIL.ITV NAMES DOCKET NUMllERISI NUMBE" NUMBER Salem -Unit 1 0 I 5 Io I o I o 12 I 712 ol 9 ilo I -I ol9 -ol4 ii ol6 ' sl 1 8 7 8 7 0 0 0 15 IO Io I o I I I OPEl'lATINQ THll REl'ORT II IUIMITTED PURIUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTI OF 10 CFlll §: ICl><<k OM or ml>'W of tho followin1) 1111 MOOE Ill N I/A 20.402(bl 20.-lcl I0.731811211M 73.71(bl ---l'OWl!ll 20.411111*1111111 80.*1*1111 x I0.731oll21M 731.71(*1 i-----I LEVEL 1101 I I 20.-11Jl111NI llO.alcll21 80.7311o112llwMI OTHER (Sp<</fy in Ab111Wt ---/>>low ontl In To*t. NRC Form *l*lil:l.lllli'l.l:lil*ll"lll:111:11::111.111*111*1*1.11111:111:1111.
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THll LEA 1121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. K. Gray -Licensing Engineer 6 1 0 1 9 31319 I -14 13. I 1,0 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRllED IN THll REl'ORT 1131 :.*.;.;.;.;
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()ATE/ DATE 1151 I NO I I AUTAACT (Limit ro 1.fOO q>>en, i.* .. *PPfOxim*r.ly fiftHn 1ingl**11>>c1 ry,,.wrirt1n hn11J (111 The following system/component conditions were identified by a PSE&G task force reviewing/evaluating Salem Station's compliance with the requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R. LER 87-009-00 addressed a SW System cabling Appendix R separation criteria inadequacy.
The root cause was inadequate design review. The current design meets the original electrical separation criteria, but not the Appendix R criteria.
PSE&G is reviewing design change options. LER 87-009-01 addressed non-seismically qualified Marinite walls located in Salem Units i & 2 460V Switchgear Room. The walls have been reinforced to seismic criteria.
A sample of design changes installed before implementation of current design control procedures is being conducted.
LER 87-009-02 addresses RHR Room Coolers IVFI cabling Appendix R inadequacies and control cabling Appendix R inadequacies for RHR Room Coolers, Charging*
Pump Room Coolers IVFI and Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps IDCI. The root cause of these Appendix R inadequacies is inadequate design review. In both cases, an hourly roving fire watch patrol was established for the respective areas. A design change correcting these deficiencies will be made. LER 87-009-03 addressed a D/G power cabling Appendix R separation criteria deficiency.
The root cause was inadequate design review. Design change options are being reviewed.
This LER Supplement addresses cabling defic;iencies located in both Units C02 Equipment Rooms, identified on 9/10/87e The root cause was inadequate design/ J2/ review. NlllCF--19-631 A design change correcting 8710140071 B710CD6 PDR ADOCK 05000272 s PDR this deficiency will be made.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CLER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
Westinghouse
-Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 2 of 9 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Appendix R Criteria Non-Conformance Discovery Date: 09/10/87 Report Date: 10/06/87 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.87-241, 87-256, 278, 279, 301, & 343 CONDITIONS, PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
The following plant system/component conditions were identified by a Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) task force established to review and evaluate Salem Station's compliance with the requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R. The original LER (paragraphs designated "A") dealt with a design configuration problem associated with Salem Unit 2's Service Water System electrical cabling. The first supplement (paragraphs designated "B") addresses a wall constructed to act as a fire barrier but its design did not fully address seismic criteria concerns.
The second supplement addresses Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Room Coolers {VF} cabling concerns (paragraphs designated "C") and control cabling concerns for RHR Room Coolers, Charging Pump Room Coolers {VF} and Diesel Generator (D/G) Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps {DC} (paragraphs designated "D"). The third supplement addressed inadequate separation of D/G power cabling (paragraphs designated "E"). This addresses inadequate separation of cabling located in the C02 Equipment Room (paragraphs designated "F"). On June 19, 1987 at 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the cabling for the three (3) electrical trains of the Unit 2 Service Water (SW) System {BI} did not meet the separation requirements of the Code of Federal Regula-tions, lOCFR 50 Appendix R. These cables are located in the SW Pipe Tunnel located between the Auxiliary Building and the "A" SW Intake Structure.
Upon discovery, a continuous fire watch was established at the entrance to the SW Pipe Tunnel. The fire watch periodically walks down the length of the tunnel. This discovery was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by telephone on June 19, 1987 at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> in accordance with the requirements of lOCFR 50. 72 (b) (2) (iii) (D).
.* LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 3 of 9 On June 25, 1987 it was discovered that a Marinite wall located in the Salem Unit 1 460V Switchgear Room (84' Elevation) was not seismically qualified.
If a seismic event occurred a possibility "B" existed that the wall could, have failed causing damage to the 460V Vital Bus Switchgear.
This wall configuration also existed for Salem Unit 2. On July 17, 1987 at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, it was identified that the cabling for redundant trains of. Unit 2 RHR Room Coolers do not meet the requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R, Subsection III(G). These cables are located in a common panel in the Reactor Plant Auxiliary
- Equipment Area, Elevation 64 (Fire Area 2FA-AB-64B).
A postulated "C" fire in this area could these cables resulting in the loss of both RHR Room In addition, damage to these cables could prevent the RHR Room-Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Dampers {VF} from opening. This discovery was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 17, 1987 at 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br /> pursuant to lOCFR 50. 72 (b) (2) (iii) (B). On July 17, 1987 at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, it was identified that the cabling located in the Unit 2 Upper Electrical Penetration Area, Elevation 100', (Fire Area 2FA-EP-100G) does not meet the separation requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R. These cables run from the Safeguards Equipment Cabinets (SECs) to the Vital Ventilation.Control "D" Centers. If a postulated fire occurred in the Upper Electrical Penetration Area, the exists to damage control cabling for both RHR Room Coolers, both Charging Pump Room Coolers, and one (1) D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pump. This equipment is necessary to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown of the plant. This discovery was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 17, 1987 at 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br /> pursuant to lOCFR 50.72(b) (2) (iii) (A). On August 6, 1987 at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />, it was identified that the power_ cabling for the "B" and "C" D/G's of both Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 do not meet the separation criteria of 10 CFR50 Appendix R Subsection "E" III(G). These cables are located in the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Room at elevation 84' (Fire Area 1(2) FA-AB-84D).
A postulated fire in this area damaging these cables could result in the loss of both "B" and "C" D/G's. On September 10, 1987 at 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br />, the cabling located in both Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 COz Equipment Rooms (Fire Areas 1(2)FA-DG-84F) was identified to not meet 10 CFR50 Appendix R Subsection III(G). This cabling includes the neutral ground strap and power cables for the "A" D/G, "B" and "C" SW Pump power feeds, power cabling for the "A" and "B" D/G Fuel Oil Transfer "F" Pumps, and the cabling for various "A" and "C" Train SW components.
If a postulated fire occurred in a COz Equipment Room, the potential exists to damage these cables, resulting in the loss of the applicable Unit's "A" D/G, "B"-and "C" SW Pumps, D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps, various Service Water valves, and portions of the SW
\ LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER} TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Station Unit 2 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 {cont'd} LER NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 4 of 9 HVAC system. This equ_ipment is necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown of the plant. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The root cause of the SW cabling configuration deficiency is inadequate design review. The current design meets the original electrical separation requirements for Salem Station Unit 2, however, it does not meet the lOCFR 50 Appendix R requirements as published in "A" the Federal Register on September 8, 1981. The Appendix R criteria was not applied to the SW Piping Tunnel because of its restricted access and confined space. Due to this oversight, the SW Pump cabling configuration was not modified.
lOCFR 50 Appendix R, Section G(2) requires cables and equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown be protected by one of three (3) options to ensure that one redundant train is free from fire damage. The three (3) options are: (1) separation of cables and equipment of redundant trains by a three (3) hour fire barrier; (2) separation of cables*and equipment of "A" redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than twenty (20) feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards along with fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system in the area; or (3) enclosure of cables and equipment of one redundant train in a one hour rated fire barrier along with fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system in the area. The current design does not meet any of these options. The root cause of the Marinite wall seismic qualification concern is inadequate design review and doclimentation.
The Marinite walls were installed in January 1981 to provide a fire barrier between redundant safety related components.
Although the recent walkdo'Wn of the walls, by structural engineers, revealed the walls to have "B" substantial structural support, it was not clear whether seismic requirements were fully considered in the original design and construction of the walls since documentation of the construction appeared inadequate.
Subsequent engineering evaluation of the wall(s) revealed that two of the walls (one per Unit) did not meet seismic requirements since their failure could degrade safety-related equipment.
The root cause of the RHR Room Cooler cabling deficiency was inadequate design review. The current cabling configuration meets the original plant design criteria in effect prior to the issuance of "C" 10 CFR50 Appendix R. The cabling configuration was not included in the fire protection upgrade made pursuant to the issuance of 10 CFR50 Appendix R in September 1981. 10 CFR50 Appendix R, Subsection III(G} requires fire protection "C" features be provided for systems important to safe shutdown.
These features should be able to limit fire damage so systems necessary to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 5 of 9 achieve and maintain cold shutdown can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The subject cables are located in Auxiliary Building HVAC Electrical Panel 119 in Fire Area 2FA-AB-64B.
A fire in this area could cause both RHR Room Coolers to become inoperable and concurrently keep the "C" RHR Room HVAC dampers in the closed position.
This would degrade the performance of the RHR Pumps, which are necessary to achieve cold shutdown.
To meet these Appendix R requirements, it would be necessary to either: (1) separate the cables with appropriate fire barriers, (2) have Alternate Shutdown Instructions and dedicated materials to ensure that repairs are made within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the fire, or (3) obtain NRC approval for an Appendix R exemption in this area. None of these requiremen.ts are currently met. The root cause of the control cabling deficiency for Fire Area 2FA-EP-100G is inadequate design review. The current cabling configuration meets the origina_l plant design criteria in effect prior to the issuance of 10 CFR50 Appendix R. The cabling configuration was not included in the fire protection upgrade made "D" pursuant to the issuance of 10 CFR50 Appendix R. lOCFR 50 Appendix R, Subsection III(G) identifies acceptable cable separation and fire barrier options that ensure one train of systems, necessary to
- achieve and maintain hot shutdown, remain free from fire damage during a postulated fire. The current cable design does not incorporate any of these options. The root cause of the D/G cabling deficiency is inadequate design review. The cabling configuration was not included in the fire protection upgrade made pursuant to the issuance of lOCFR 50 Appendix R. Subsection III(G) of Appendix R identifies acceptable cable "E" separation and fire barrier options that ensure one redundant train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown remains free from fire damage during a postulated fire. The current cablef configuration does not completely incorporate any of these options. The root cause of the C02 Equipment Room cabling deficiencies is inadequate design review. The cabling configuration was not included in the fire protection upgrade made to the issuance of lOCFR 50 Appendix R. Subsection III(G) of Appendix R identifies acceptable cable separation and fire barrier options that ensure one redundant "F" train of systems* necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown remains free from fire damage during a postulated fire. The current cable configuration does riot completely incorporate any of these options because (1) the cables are not protected by rated fire barriers, and ( 2) the area is not equipped with detection or' automatic suppression fire equipment.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The SW System supplies cooling water to both safety related and "A" non-safety related heat loads. The system utilizes six (6) pumps. The 4.16 KV Vital Busses (trains A, B, and C) provide power to two I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit.2 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 (cont'd) LER-NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 6 of 9 (2) SW Pumps per bus. The cabling for these trains runs through the SW Pipe Tunnel to the SW Intake Structure.
These cables do not meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission lOCFR 50 Appendix R separation criteria "A" (for Fire Protection).
If a fire were to occur in this area a possibility exists of damaging all SW Pump electrical trains, thereby fosing all SW flow. The Unit could be maintained in Hot Standby (Mode 3), which is a subcritical mode. While SW Pump Cabling does not meet lOCFR 50 Appendix R separation criteria for fire protection, it does meet the_ separation criteria to which Unit 2 was originally licensed.
The cabling is separated by a horizontal distance of approximately five (5) feet. Also, there is an unrated partial wall between two of the three SW Pump cables. The "A" combustible loading in the area is only approximately six (6) minutes of burn time. Also, access to the SW Pipe Tunnel is restricted, thereby limiting the possibility of adding uncontrolled combustible material to the area. Therefore, it is unlikely a fire would occur that could impair all s*w Pump cabling. The inadequate separation of the SW cabling discovery was reported in accordance with lOCFR 50.72(b) (2) (iii) (D) within four (4) hours of "A" discovery (at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />). Also, this discovery was reported in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (v) (D) via Licensee Event Report 311/87-009-00.
The Marinite walls are located in the Units 1 & 2 460V Switchgear Rooms on 84' Elevation.
The 1B(2B) 460V Vital Bus Panel parallels the Marinite wall(s) with an intervening distance of approximately four (4) feet. The eight (8) foot high walls consist of two 4' panels. During a seismic event, it is possible for the upper panel to fail, damaging the 1B(2B) 460V Vital Bus Switchgear.
The Switchgear supplies power to a variety of safety related equipment including Nos. 12 ( 22) & _14 (24) Containment Fan Coil Uni ts (CFCU' s) , No. 12 Hydrogen Recombiner, and the No. 12.Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Fans. This equipment would become inoperable if 1B(2B) Vital Bus was rendered inoperable during a seismic event. Nos. 13(23) and 15(25) CFCU's receive power via No. "B" 1C(2C) electrical train. Additionally, 1C(2C) electrical train supplies power to one Containment Spray (CS) Pump. The limiting case involves the postulated seismic event resulting in the loss of 1B(2B) 460V Vital Bus Switchgear concurrent with a single "active failure" of the 1C(2C) electrical train. This would result in only one (1) operable CFCU and one (1) operable CS Pump. During a design base LOCA, the minimum combination of three (3) CFCU's and one (1)' CS Pump is necessary to maintain post-accident Containment pressure below design values. This requirement would not be met *if the above scenario is assumed. However, this analysis is based upon the conservative assumption that the Marinite wall failure during a seismic event would result in the complete loss of the 1B(2B} 460V Vital Bus Switchgear.
The steel cabinet housing this bus provides a significant degree of protection for the Bus. Futhermore, it is possible the damage to this Bus would not necessarily result in the loss of power to all components powered from this Bus.
I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 . ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 7 of 9 Due to the low probability of the combination of events occurring consistent with the conservative assumption made above, the Marinite "B" wall seismic concern *did not adversely impact the health and safety of the general.public.
However, it is being reported in accordance with lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (vi) as a design inadequacy.
The Auxiliary Building HVAC Electrical Panel 119 contains solenoid valves SV-784 and SV-785 and associated cabling controlling the operation of Nos. 21 and 22 RHR Room Coolers. These solenoid valves are de-energized when either RHR Pump is required to run. RHR Pump Room HVAC dampers 2ABV27 and 2ABV28 fail open when the solenoid valves are de-energized, thereby ensuring circulation of building ventilation air in the room when either RHR Pump is operating.
If a fire occurred in this area, it is possible to hot short the cabling "C" to both RHR Room Coolers and blow the control fuses in the RHR Room Cooler control circuit. This would result in the loss of both RHR Room Coolers. The potential further exists for the solenoid valves to remain energized while the RHR Pumps are running, causing dampers 2ABV27 and 2ABV28 to remain closed thereby preventing circulation of ventilation air to the room. Procedurally, operators are instructed to declare the equipment in the RHR Rooms inoperable if the ambient temperature exceeds 125°F. These limits could be exceeded in a short time given the above scenario.
Furthermore, without "Alternate Shutdown Instructions" and dedicated material on hand, it cannot be assumed that the coolers could be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the postulated fire. -During accident conditions coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power or 4KV Bus undervoltage signal, the SECs start and connect the Diesel Generators
{D/Gs) to the vital buses and sequentially start required safeguards equipment.
During the automatic SEC loading sequence, safeguards equipment not required in the short term is blocked from automatically operating to avoid overloading the D/Gs. Upon completion of the automatic loading sequence, the plant operator resets the SECs allowing control of additional equipment needed to assist in the safe shutdown of the in the long term. This equipment includes the RHR Room Coolers, the Charging Pump Room Coolers, and the D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps. This equipment "D" receives signals from the SECs via _cables 2RP65-AT, 2RP129-BT, and 2RP148-CT which run from 2A, 2B, and 2C SECs to 2A, 2B, and 2C Ventilation Control Centers in Fire Area 2FA-EP-100G.
A fire occurring in the Upper Electrical Penetration Area could damage these cables thereby creating the possibility of not powering up this equipment when called upon. The RHR and Charging Pump Room Coolers ensure the ambient room temperature does not exceed RHR Pump or Charging Pump design limits, however, Auxiliary Building ventilation air would still be available to limit ambient temperature.
The D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps transfer oil from the D/G Storage Tanks to the D/G Day Tanks. Due to the repent modification to the electrical contro.ls for the D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps described in Unit 1 LER 272/87-010-00, only one D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pump would be locked out during the SEC manual loading sequence.
I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 8 of 9 The 4KV power cabling for the DIG's is located in the DIG Fuel Oil Storage Room. Each DIG has two (2) power cables enclosed in conduit. The DIG "B" and "C" cables BDD-B and CDD-C run from the exciter cubicle to the 4KV Vital Bus switchgear and cables BDDA-B and CDDA-C run from the DiG to the exciter cubicle. Only the "B" DIG cable BDD-B is protected with a one hour fire wrap. Approximately 23 feet separate the B and C sets of DIG power cables. Thermal type fire detectors provide fire detection capability.
The C02 flooding "E" system and water deluge system provide diverse and redundant automatic suppression capabilities.
This configuration does not meet any of the three (3) lOCFR 50 Appendix R G(2) options (listed in paragraph "A" of this section).
Option 1 is not met because of the cabling for DIG's "B" and "C" is not separated by a three (3) hour fire barrier. Option 2 is not met because while the DIG "B" and "C" cabling is separated by more than 20 feet, the DIG Fuel Oil Storage Tank is an intervening combustible.
Option 3 is not met because cable BDDA-B is not protected with a one hour rated fire barrier. A postulated fire occurring in the DIG Fuel Oil Storage Room could render DIG's "B" and "C" inoperable.
Two out of the three DIG's are required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown during a postulated "E" fire in this area coincident with a loss of off-site power. During these conditions, only DIG "A" would remain operable.
Therefore, this condition is being reported as a design inadequacy pursuant to lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (vi). If a fire occurred in the C02 Equipment Room resulting in damage to the subject cabling, the potential exists to degrade or prevent the operation of the "A" D/G, "A" and "B" DIG Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps, "B" Train and "C" Train SW Pumps, various SW valves, and portions of the SW HVAC system. To achieve safe shutdown, two (2) out of three "F" (3) SW trains are required, as is one DIG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump. These requirements may not be met if the above postulated fire scenario occurred.
The impact of the loss of various SW valves and portions of the SW HVAC system would be to potentially degrade the function of the SW system thus preventing timely completion of a safe 0 shutdown.
A postulated fire in the C02 Equipment Room in conjunction with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOP) would require the operation of the DIG's. The "A" DIG provides power to the "A" SW Pumps. Since "B" "F" and "C" SW power feed cables are also located in the C02 Equipment Room, the operation of all three SW trains could be affected by the postulated fire. CORRECTIVE ACTION: Upon discovery of the SW Electrical Trains configuration in the SW Pipe Tunnel, a continuous fire watch was established at the entrance "A" to the SW Pipe Tunnel. The fire watch periodically walks down the length of the tunnel. PSE&G is reviewing design modification options to correct this deficiency.
I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 . CORRECTIVE ACTION (cont'd) DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 87-009-04 PAGE 9 of 9 The Marinite walls were reinforced prior to confirmation of their inadequate seismic design. The walls are now qualified to withstand a design base seismic event without degrading adjacent safety related equipment. Systems Analysis Group currently performs a safety/non-safety system and component interaction review of design changes. This review precludes design inadequacies of this nature. "B" A'.lso, :the existing design control procedures incorporate multi-discipline cross checks and system interaction considerationso A sample of design changes installed prior to the implementation of these design control procedures will be conducted to confirm this discrepancy is an isolated occurrence.
Upon discovery of the RHR cabling deficiency, a roving hourly fire watch was established (both Units) for the Reactor Plant Auxiliary "C" Equipment Area. A design change, meeting the requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R, will be implemented based on the recommendations of the Fire Protection Task Force. Upon discovery of the SEC deficiency, a roving hourly fire watch was established (both Units) in the Upper Electrical Penetration Area. A "D" design change, meeting the requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R, will be implemented based on the recommendations of the Fire Protection Task Force. A fire watch is not required in this area since detection and redundant and diverse suppression capabilities exist in the area. A "E" *design change, meeting the requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R, will be implemented based on the recommendations of the Fire Protection Task Force. Upon discovery of the cabling deficiencies in the Salem Units 1 and 2 C02 Equipment Rooms, a fire. watch was established.
A design "F" change, meeting the requirements of lOCFR 50 Appendix R, will be implemented based on the recommendations of the Fire Protection Task Force. The Fire Protection Task Force is continuing its review. If the Task Force identifies other reportable lOCFR 50 Appendix R deficiencies, in the course of its review, they will be incorporated into this Licensee Event Report as a "supplemental" report.
Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.
Public Service Electric and Gas Companv P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 October 06, 1987 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT SUPPLEMENT 87-009-04 This supplemental Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of lOCFR 50.73{a) (2) (v). This report addresses an additional lOCFR 50 Appendix R inadequacy.
This report has been issued within thirty (30) days of the discovery of this add{tional inadequacy.
MJP:pc Distribution Sincerely
- yours, General Salem Operations 89 Iii f'v':* 12-0..: