ML18106A949

LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr

ML18106A949
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/22/1998
From:	Bakken A, Bernard Thomas Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-98-015, LER-98-15, LR-N980499, NUDOCS 9811050141
Download: ML18106A949 (4)

Text

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. . Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Public Service Nuclear Business Unit OCT 2 2 1998 LR-N980499 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/98-015-00 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACIUTY OPERA TING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 Gent:emen

• This LiGensee Event Report entitled "Improper Installation of Test Equipment to the Reactor Prot-~::-ction System is being submitted pwsuant to the requirement'> of the~

God"?. Df Feder~I Reguiations 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and "'.QCFR50.7'.3(a)(2)(i1)<B).

neral Manager -

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Salem Operations Attachment BJT C Distribution LER File 3.7

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~g5~~ 6~685~~2 PDR The pO\\tr is in your hands.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001

. 1.,, Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information (6-1998) collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and (See reverse fC?r requir~d number of Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display digits/characters for each block) a currently valid OMB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Salem Unit 1 05000272 1 OF 3 TITLE (4)

Improper Installation of Test Equipment to the Reactor Protection System FVFllT nATF 1i;1 l=R 1111 IMDCD Im *- nl,TI= 171 . nT1,..1cn l=.11.f'll ITll=C: I UVnl Vi:n IRI MONTH DAV YEAR VEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAV YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER Salem Unit 2 05000311 09 24 98 98 015 00 10 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 22 OPERATING THI!'; Rl=PnRT I!'; !';I IClnn TTFn DI IDC>l IJ\NT Tn THF nr-n* *nr-* IFNT!'; ni: 1n f'FR 6* trh<>ri< n~o nr mnrol 1111 Mode 1 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a}(2)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(1 l 20.2203(a)(3)(il x 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(iil 50. 73(a)(2)(iiil 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)( 1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

. 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

I ll"'l=l\IC:CC rnNT 11. l"'T i:nR TUIC: I cr I 1 ?I NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER llnclude Area Code)

Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 rnono1 FT~ nNF 110.1c cno c~ru Fii.ii llDC .n IRFn IN rule> 11 <ll

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CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX TO EPIX C:llDDI -----*-~1 Rl=PnAT '"*~~ ~* 11.t!.I

~ EXPECTED Mf""INTl-I n}\y VCl\D x IYES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA TE). INO I

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16).

A review of the procedure for the connection of test equipment for collection of State Point data identified that test leads from the four channels of Reactor Control and Protection system were connected to switch boxes that had not been qualified to the same requirements as the Reactor Control and Protection system. SpecificallYi, these switchboxes had not been evaluated to determine their capabili~ to resist multiple channel fai ures, the most credible being a seismic event. The connections to the eactor C~ntrol a~d Prote:ction system. were: from the non-isolated fiortion of the syst~m and were not ~rovided with isolation devices as described in the Salem Updated mal Safety Analysis Report (UFSA ).

Specifically the UFSAR states that, "the design criterion used to assure electrical isolation is that no analog signal which is required for initiation of reactor protection or enpineered safety feature actuation is allowed to leave a set of protection channels. Where protection si~na intelligence is required for other than protection functions an isolation amplifier is used to transmit t e intelligence." Based on this, the channels connected to the switchboxes should have been declared inoperable with the test equipment installed since a proper evaluation was not performed prior to installing the test equipment.

The cause of occurrence is still under investigation and the results of this invest?cation will be reported in a sup~lement to this LER. The procedures for the installation of test equipment or the collection of State Point Data for Salem Units 1 and 2 were placed on administrative hold tof2revent use of the procedure until resolution of the problem. This event is reportable under 10CFR50. 3~~(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)( , any condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

NRC FORM 366 (6* 1998)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET 12) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

NUMBER (2)

I I

SEQUENTIAL REVISION SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 3 98 - 015 -- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Reactor Control and Protection System {JC/-}*

• Energy Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CCC}. .

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of discovery, Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE A review of the procedure for the connection of test equipment for collection of State Point data identified that test leads from the four channels of Reactor Control and Protection system were connected to switch boxes that had not been qualified to the same requirements as the Reactor Control and Protection system_ Specifically, these switchboxes had not been evaluated to determine their capability to resist multiple channel failures, the most credible being a seismic event The connections to the Reactor Control and Protection system were from the non-isolated portion of the system and were not provided with isolation devices as described in the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)_ Specifically the UFSAR states that, "the design criterion used to assure electrical isolation is that no analog signal which is required for initiation of reactor protection or engineered safety feature actuation is allowed to leave a set of protection channels_ Where protection signal intelligence is required for other than protection functions an isolation amplifier is used to transmit the intelligence_" Based on this, the channels connected to the switchboxes should have been declared inoperable with the test equipment installed since a proper evaluation was not performed prior to installing the test equipment.

Based on the above, this event is reportable under 10CFR50_73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B); any condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• FACILITY NAME 11) DOCKET 121 LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

NUMBER 121 SEQUENTIAL IREVISION SALEM UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF .3 98 - 015 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) (171 CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of occurrence is still under investigation and the results of this investigation will be reported in a supplement to this LER. Preliminary results of the investigation identify that the apparent cause is attributed to inadequate 10CFR50.59 applicability reviews during past revisions and the original issuance of the procedure.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A r~view of LERs for prior similar occurrences will be performed upon completion of the event investigation.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS The occurrence of a seismic event may have had the ability to affect multiple channels of the Reactor Control and Protection system with the test equipment installed. However, no design basis seismic event has occurred at Salem Station. The impact of connecting the test equipment without the installation of isolation amplifiers as stated in the Salem UFSAR is currently under evaluation. The results of this evaluation will be included in the supplement to this LER.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The procedures for the installation of test equipment for the collection of State Point Data for Salem Units_ 1 af!d 2 were placed on administrative hold to prevent use of the procedure until resolution of the connection of the test equipment to the Reactor Control and Protection system is resolved.

The resolution for the connection of test equipment for State Point Data collection involves the evaluation of possible failure modes to determine the effect of connecting the test equipment to the Reactor Control and Protection system.

2. The cause of the occurrence of the event identified in this LER is still under investigation and the LER will be supplemented by December 18, 1998.

3. As committed in LER 272/98-011-00, review of maintenance procedures has been performed to determine if other procedures allow temporary equipment to be installed on operable systems.

This review has identified several procedures that are currently being assessed to determine if the connection of the temporary equipment to the operable systems has been properly evaluated.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)