ML18106B008

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LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr
ML18106B008
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 12/24/1998
From: Bakken A, Knieriem R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-001, LER-97-1, LR-N980560, NUDOCS 9901060113
Download: ML18106B008 (5)
v • d • e


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  • Publ!c Servic.e Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit DEC 24 1998 LR-N980560 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 272/97-001-01 SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-311 Gentlemen:

_This Licensee Event Report entitled "FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of ' \

Federal Regulations ****10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) ****

Sincerely,

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A. C. Bakken Ill General Manager Salem Operations Attachment

/rbk c Distribution LER File 3.7 The po\\*er is in rnur hands.

95-2168 REV. 6/94

NRC FORM 366

( 6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT e

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (LER)

  • APPROVED BY am NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 0

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FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) 1 OF 4 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 TITLE (4)

FAILURE TO PERFORM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM CHECK VALVES EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I ENTlAL SE:lJMBER I REVISION I NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME Salem Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 02 15 97 97 - 0 01 - 01 12 24 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER I OPERATING MODE (9)

I I N THIS REPORT IS SUBMIITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Oleck one or more) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) X 50.73(a)(2)(i) 11) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

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S0.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71

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.I'.~* 20.2203(a)(2)(iil) 50.36(c}(l) 50.73(a)(2)(v} 5Dedfv In Abstract below or lri NRC Form 366A 111" _fij~fi.Zf~~~..,1~!1~-~}: 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Robert B. Knieriem, Licensing Engineer 609-339-1782

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COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

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'""'!'¥1' SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

x INO SUBMISSION DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

This' supplemental LER reports a TS non-compliance identified during a review of the Salem In-service Test program (IST) . On February 15, 1997 a review of the Salem IST program determined that the IST surveillance of Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210 was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 under the provision that they remain isolated by closure of manual valves CC145 and CC146. Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 that permitted at least one of these two manual isolation valves to remain open during plant operation. Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. Specifically, the requirements of TS 4.0.5 regarding in-service inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components.

The cause of this event was a lack of programmatic interface between the IST program personnel and Operations department personnel responsible for programs used to control system configuration. To prevent recurrence, procedural controls will be implemented to inform IST program personnel of changes to normal valve positions before those changes are implemented so that adjustments to the IST program can be made when warranted to comply with TS 4.0.5.

NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

  • U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOI\

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (31 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 - 001 - 01 2 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Injection {BP/-}

Component Cooling {KB/-}

Main Steam {SB/-}

  • Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as {SS/CC}

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of the occurrence Salem Unit 1 was defueled and Salem Unit 2 was in Mode 5.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On January 18, 1997 a review as a result of a recent NRC inspection determined that the Inservice Test (IST) surveillance on motor operated valves SJ4 {BP/V} and SJ5, Safety Injection Charging Pumps to Boron Injection Tank {BP/TK}, was not properly performed in the past. Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) SGTR-1 requires the operators to close these valves to terminate safety injection during the steam generator tube rupture event.

This method implements UFSAR Section 15.4.4 to terminate safety injection. The closure of these valves is an active safety function of the design basis of the plant. Because it is an active safety function, testing of these valves to close is required by Technical Specification 4.0.5 and must be included in the IST program.

Subsequent review of the SJ4 and SJS issue determined that there were 12 additional Unit 2 valves that were not being tested in the IST program in the direction contained in the EOPs. These 12 valves are 21CC16 {KB/V}, 22CC16, 2SJ12 {BP/V}, 2SJ13, 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54, 21CS36 {BE/V}, 22CS36, 21MS45 {SB/V} and 23MS45. The corresponding Unit 1 valves are likewise affected.

On February 15, 1997 further review determined that the IST surveillance on Component Cooling Water system check valves CC195 and CC210, was not performed as required. CC195 and CC210, which serve as a part of the ASME Class 3 boundary, were exempted from IST program testing in 1991 as a part of the IST Ten-year Update. This change was made under the provision that CC195 and CC210 remain isolated by closure of manual* valves CC145 and CC146.

Contrary to the requirements of the IST program, changes were made to the required positions of CC145 and CC146 to allow one of these valves to remain open to permit filling of the Component Cooling Water surge tank from the control room. Because these changes were made without consideration of IST program requirements, reverse flow testing of CC195 and CC210 to verify the integrity of the ASME Class 3 boundary was not performed.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on the SJ4 and SJ5 valves was inadequate communication between the EOP group and the IST reviewers in determining what valves were manipulated in the EOPs and were therefore required to be included in the IST Program.

The cause of the failure to perform the IST surveillance on CC195 and CC210 was the lack of a programmatic interface between Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves that could affect the IST program.

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

  • U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION

~CILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 97 - 001 01 3 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Fann 366A) (17)

PRIOR SIMII,.AR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem Units 1 and 2 for the past two years did not identify any reportable occurrences that were caused by an inadequate programmatic interface between the Operations department and IST program personnel to communicate changes to the normal positions of valves affecting the IST program.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS There were no safety consequences associated with the occurrences in this LER. Evaluation of other testing performed on the identified valves provides confidence that .the valves would have operated if needed. This is based on the following.

The 21CC16, 22CC16, 2SJ4, 2SJ5, 2SJ12, and 2SJ13 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and are stroke timed quarterly in the open direction.

The 21CS36 and 22CS36 valves are in the GL 89-10 program and open stroked during cold shutdown. After the open stroke test, the valve is returned to the closed position.

The 21SJ54, 22SJ54, 23SJ54, 24SJ54 valves are in the GL 89-10 Program and are operated when transitioning in and out of cold shutdown.

The 21MS45 and 23MS45 valves are manual valves and do not have any scheduled stroke tests.

These valves are closed which provides assurance that they were capable of being closed in the past.

The 2CC195 and 2CC210 valves were radiographed to verify that they were closed. The results were satisfactory and the valves were determined to be operable.

The health and safety of the public was not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The Salem EOPs were reviewed for similar problems and the results are noted above.
2. The Operations Department Emergency/Abnormal Operating Procedure Program procedure, SC.OP-AP. ZZ-0113, will be revised to include IST notification of proposed changes. This will be completed by May 5, 1997. *
3. As a result of the issues in this LER and other recently identified IST issues, a plan has been developed and will be completed to ensure that the Unit 2 IST Program is satisfactory prior to Unit 2 entering Mode 4.
4. The Salem Generating Station IST Manual will be revised to include the addition of the stroke test to the required valve tests for these valves. This will be completed by March 31, 1997.
5. The revised surveillance test for the identified valves will be performed prior to entering the applicable mode when the valve is required to be operable for Units 1 and 2.
6. A review of the normal valve positions in the IST Manual and the normal valve positions listed in the Tagging Request Information System (TRIS) was conducted to identify other discrepancies. Three other valve position discrepancies were identified. Appropriate changes were made to obtain agreement between the IST Manual and TRIS.

NRG FORM 366A (6-1998)

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

  • U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION ru-IBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 97 - 001 - 01 4 OF 4 05000272 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

7. Procedure SC.RA-IS.ZZ-0007(Q), Exercise Closed Verification Check Valve Radiography, was revised to include quarterly radiography of 1CC195, 2CC195, 1CC210, and 2CC210 to verify that those valves are closed.
8. Salem procedure SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) and Hope Creek procedure HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0103(Q) were revised to require that IST Program personnel review and approve valve position changes for valves in the IST program. (PIR 970220076, CRCA 05, CRCA 04).

NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)

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