ML18101A592

LER 95-001-00:on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup activities.W/950310 Ltr

ML18101A592
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/10/1995
From:	Pastva M, Summers J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-95-001, LER-95-1, NUDOCS 9503210284
Download: ML18101A592 (6)

Text

• ' e Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit March 10, 1995 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Document Control Desk SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 95-001-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2') (iv) . Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.

SORC Mtg.95-027 MJPJ:vs C Distribution LER File 9503210284 950310 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDR The power is in yow-hands. Sincerely, J. C. Summers General Manager -Salem Operations a' fP I 95-2168 REV. 6/94

• --NRC FORM 366 . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104).

OFFICE OF (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON.

DC 20503. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) Salem Generating Station -Unit 2 05000 _311 1 OF5 TITLE (4) Manually Initiated Engineered Safety.Feature Actuation To Effect A Main Steam Isolation Signal In Order to Increase Reactor Coolant Svs'tem T-avg Above 541 Degrees (F) EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6 REPORT NUMBER (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NUMBER 02 12 95 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 95 --001 --00 03 10 95 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT-IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS .OF 10 CFR §: lCheck one or more (11) MODE (9) 2 20.402(b) 20.405(c)

IX 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b) POWER 20.405(a)(1

)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2) (v) 73.71 (c) LEVEL (10) 1.6% 20.405(a)

(1) (ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii) OTHER I-20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2) (viii)(A) (Specify in Abstract 20.405(a)

(1) (iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a) (2) (viii) (B) below and in Text, NRG Form 366A) 20.405(a)(1

)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) ' Michael J. Pastva, Jr.' LER Coordinator

-* 609 339-5164 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER . REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES x SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO DATE (15) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) From approximately 0136 -0137 hours on 2/12/95, while reducing reactor power from 4 -2%, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Tavg decreased below the Technical Specifications (TS) minimum value for criticality

[541 degrees Fahrenheit ( F) ] ' with a minimum value of 5*40. 5 degrees F. To respond to the decreasing Tavg, the steam line warmup and drain valves were closed by using the manual closure signal from the Safeguards bezels, which uses the Solid State Protection System circuitry (Engineered Safety Feature actuation) . This increased RCS Tavg above the TS minimum value and terminated the event. This event resulted from less than conservative decision making when reactor power was increased to* 4%, with the Steam Generator's (SGs) Main Steam Isolation Valves closed and 22MS10 (22SG power-operated atmospheric relief valve) unavailable.

A temporary hold was placed on Unit 1 and 2 activities, from 0700 -1900 hours on 2/14/95. Communication packages were presented to the Operations shift personnel to provide specific examples and identified key areas for immediate improvement

+/-n Reactivity Management, Procedure Compliance, and Communications.

Involved members of the operating shift, responsible for the less than acceptable performance, will be counseled using the positive discipline process by 3/15/95. Appropriate classroom and plant simulator training will be conducted to address the necessity of conservative decision making as well as lessons learned from this occurrence.

NRG FORM 366 (5-92)

" ,. e e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit2 Docket Number 50-311 Plant and System Identification:

LERNumber 95-001-00 Page 2of5 Westinghouse

-Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes appear in the text as {xx} Identification of Occurrence:

Manually Initiated Engineered Safety Feature Actuation To Effect A Main Steam Isolation Signal In Order To Increase Reactor Coolant System Tavg Above 541 Degrees Fahrenheit (F) Event Date: February 12, 1995 Report Date: March 10, 1995 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.95-112. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 2 Reactor Power 1.6% Unit Load MWe Startup activities following refueling/maintenance outage 2R8 were ongoing, with the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps in service maintaining steam generator (SG) level. In addition, 22SG feed pump (SGFP) was available for service, if required.

The SGs' main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)21-24MS167 were closed. 22MS10, the 22SG power-operated atmospheric relief valve, was cleared and tagged for maintenance.

The main steam warm-up valve (MS18) and main steam drain valve (MS7) of each SG were open to provide a path to equalize SG pressures and warm up the steamlines.

Description of Occurrence:

At approximately 0119 hours0.00138 days <br />0.0331 hours <br />1.967593e-4 weeks <br />4.52795e-5 months <br /> on February 12, 1995, reactor power was increased to 4%, to support data collection involved with resetting the reactor intermediate and power range trip setpoints.

Following the power increase, 24SG required a higher rate of AFW flow than the other SGs. At approximately 0131 hours0.00152 days <br />0.0364 hours <br />2.166005e-4 weeks <br />4.98455e-5 months <br /> (same day), the action related to the intermediate and power range trip setpoints' data e e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 Docket Number 50-311 Description of Occurrence: (cont'd) LERNumber 95-001-00 Page 3of5 collection was completed.

Insertion of control rods was then begun to reduce and stabilize power at approximately 1.6%. This was intended to eliminate concern of 22SG pressure increasing beyond the then present value of 1020 psig to the 1070 psig lift setpoint of the SG 22MS15 safety valve. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Tavg decreased due to the combination of inserting control rods and the AFW flow rate. Rods were withdrawn 2-3 steps and the resulting temperature, power, and startup rate were closely observed, following each rod pull. RCS Tavg decreased to 543 degrees F and Attachment 1 of Integrated Operating Procedure (IOP)-3 for low reactor temperature, was entered and rod withdrawal continued.

However, at approximately 0136 hours0.00157 days <br />0.0378 hours <br />2.248677e-4 weeks <br />5.1748e-5 months <br /> (same day) with reactor power at approximately 2%, RCS Tavg decreased below the Technical Specification (TS) minimum allowed value for criticality of 54i degrees F, with a minimum value of 540.5 degrees F. A manual main steam isolation was then initiated from the Control Board CCl bezels, to increase RCS Tavg above 541 degrees F. At approximately 0137 hours0.00159 days <br />0.0381 hours <br />2.265212e-4 weeks <br />5.21285e-5 months <br /> (same day), RCS Tavg increased above 541 degrees F, the TS required action was exited, and the event terminated.

At approximately 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br /> on February 13, 1995, this occurrence was recognized by the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) of a different on-duty shift as a manual Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation.

Subsequently, at 0220 hours0.00255 days <br />0.0611 hours <br />3.637566e-4 weeks <br />8.371e-5 months <br /> (same day), NRC notification was made, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)

(2) (ii). Analysis of Occurrence:

While reducing reactor power from low initial power, with one SG power-operated atmospheric relief unavailable and the secondary loop supplied from the AFW motor-driven pumps, RCS Tavg decreased below the TS minimum value for criticality, for approximately one minute. In response to the decreasing Tavg, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) directed the balance of plant (BOP) Nuclear Control Operator (NCO) to manually close the steam line warmup and drain valves by using the manual closure signal from the Safeguards bezels. This was intended to allow the NCO to monitor the SG levels and flows more closely and eliminate the potential of a

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• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit2 Docket Number 50-311 Analysis of Occurrence (cont'd):

LERNumber 95-001-00 Page 4of5 steam line differential pressure condition.

Manual closure from the Safeguards CCl bezels, uses the Solid State Protection System circuitry.

This action increased RCS Tavg above the TS minimum value and terminated the event. Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The occurrence is attributed to "Management/Quality Assurance Deficiency", as classified in NUREG-1022, Appendix B. This resulted from less than conservative decision making when reactor power was increased to 4%, with the SGs' MSIVs closed and 22MS10 unavailable for pressure relief. As such, a condition conducive to less than desirable RCS cooldown occurred during the subsequent reactor power reduction.

The failure to identify this occurrence in a timely manner as an ESF actuation requiring NRC notification is attributed to inadequate communication by the involved Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS), who did not adequately inform the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor of the occurrence.

A* contributor to this miscommunication was a misperception by the NSS that using the Safeguard bezels to initiate the SG isolation was not an ESF actuation, as it was done for convenience and timeliness.

In addition, another contributor occurred when the BOP NCO did not record in the narrative log the use of the Safeguards CCl bezels to close the steam line MS7 and MS18 valves. Prior Similar Occurrence:

Review of documentation did not show a prior similar occurrence.

Safety Significance:

This occurrence is reportable as an manual ESF actuation, in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)

(2) (iv), due to initiating the MSIV isolation signal from the Safeguards bezel. This* occurrence had minimal safety significance, as the event duration was within the 15 minute required action timeframe

• of TS 3 .1.1. 4.

e

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit2 Corrective Action: Docket Number 50-311 LERNumber 95-001-00 Page 5of5 As a result of this occurrence, a temporary hold was placed on startup activities related to Unit 2, as well as those for Unit 1, from 0700 until 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on February 14, 1995. Communication packages were presented to the Operations shift personnel by the SNSSs. These packages provided specific examples and identified key areas for immediate improvement in Reactivity Management, Procedure Compliance, and Communications.

Involved members of the operating shift, responsible for the less than acceptable performance, will be counseled using the positive discipline process by March 15, 1995. In addition, as a result of this occurrence, appropriate Operator classroom and plant simulator training will be conducied to address the necessity of conservative decision making as well as lessons learned from this occurrence.

MJPJ:vs SORC Mtg.95-027 J. C. Summers General Manager -Salem Operations