|
|
| Line 17: |
Line 17: |
|
| |
|
| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:Thispageintentiona11y b1ankDOCK05000~3>so~77aSOS09PDRAPDRST.LUCIE-UNITI'/43-36 5'ff'14)4n' PLANTSYSTEMSSURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued e.Atleastonceper18monthsby:l.Verifying thatthepressuredropsacrossthecombinedHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberbanksis<4.15inchesWaterGaugewhileoperating theventilation systemataflowrateof2000cfm+10$.'.Verifying thatonacontaireent isolation signal,thesystemautomaticaly isolatesthecontrolroomwithin35secondsandswitchesintoarecirculation modeofoperation withflowthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberbanks.3.Verifying thatthesystemmaintains thecontrolrocmatapositivepressureof>1/8inchW.G.relativetotheoutsideatmosphere duringsystemoperation with<450cfmoutsideairintake.f.Aftereachcompleteorpartialreplacement ofaHEPAfilterbankbyverifying thattheHEPAfilterbanksremove>99$oftheDOPwhentheyaretestedin-placeinaccordance withANSIN510-1975 whileoperating theventilation systemataflowrateof2000cfm+107,.g.Aftereachcompleteorpartialreplacement ofacharcoaladsorberbankbyverifying thatthecharcoaladsorbers remove>99$ofanalogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant testgaswhentheyaretestedin-placeinaccordance withANSIN510-1975 whileoperating theventilation systemataflowrateof2000cfm+105.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/47-23 IHSTRUt)ENTATI ONBASES3/4.3.3.7 FIREDETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY ofthefiredetection instrumentation ensuresthatadequatewarningcapability isavailable forthepromptdetection offires.Thiscapability isrequiredinordertodetectandlocatefiresintheirearlystages.Promptdetection offireswillreducethepoten-tialfordamagetosafetyrelatedequipment andisanintegralelementintheoverallfacilityfireprotection program.Intheeventthataportionofthefiredetection instrumentation isinoperable, theestablishment offrequentfirepatrolsintheaffectedareasisrequiredtoprovidedetection capability untiltheinoperable instrumentation isrestoredtoOPERABILITY. | | {{#Wiki_filter:This page intentiona11y b1ank DOCK 05000~3>so~77 aSOS09 PDR A PDR ST.LUCIE-UNIT I'/4 3-36 5'f f'1 4)4 n' PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued e.At least once per 18 months by: l.Verifying that the pressure drops across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is<4.15 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm+10$.'.Verifying that on a contaireent isolation signal, the system automaticaly isolates the control room within 35 seconds and switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.3.Verifying that the system maintains the control rocm at a positive pressure of>1/8 inch W.G.relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation with<450 cfm outside air intake.f.After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove>99$of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm+107,.g.After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove>99$of a nalogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm+105.ST.LUCIE-UNIT 1 3/4 7-23 IH STRUt)ENTATI ON BASES 3/4.3.3.7 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires.This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages.Prompt detection of fires will reduce the poten-tial for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY. |
| 3/4.3.3.8ACOIDENTMONITORING INSTRUMENTATION TheOPERABILITY oftheaccidentmonitoring instrumentation ensuresthatsufficientinformation isavailable onselectedplantparameters tomonitorandassessthesevariables duringandfollowing anaccident. | | 3/4.3.3.8 ACOI DENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that suffici ent information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident.This capability is consistent with the recommendations of HUREG-0578,"TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations." ST.LUCIE-UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 PLAHT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM Continued for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. |
| Thiscapability isconsistent withtherecommendations ofHUREG-0578, "TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportandShort-Term Recommendations."
| | The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control rocm design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent. |
| ST.LUCIE-UNIT1B3/43-3 PLAHTSYSTEMSBASES3/4.7.7CONTROLROOMEMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMContinued foroperations personnel duringandfollowing allcredibleaccidentconditions. | | This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 10 of Appendix"A", 10 CFR 50.3/4.7.8 ECCS AREA VEHTILATIOH SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the ECCS area ventilation system ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the enviroreent. |
| TheOPERABILITY ofthissysteminconjunction withcontrolrocmdesignprovisions isbasedonlimitingtheradiation exposuretopersonnel occupying thecontrolroomto5remorlesswholebody,oritsequivalent.
| | The operation of this systen and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses.M 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitations on sealed source removable-contmination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiation does not exceed allowable limits i'the event of ingestion or inhalation of the probable leakage frcm tne source material.The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c)limits for plutonium. |
| Thislimitation isconsistent withtherequirements ofGeneralDesignCriteria10ofAppendix"A",10CFR50.3/4.7.8ECCSAREAVEHTILATIOH SYSTEMTheOPERABILITY oftheECCSareaventilation systemensuresthatradioactive materials leakingfromtheECCSequipment following aLOCAarefilteredpriortoreachingtheenviroreent.
| | guanti ti es of interest to this speci f i cation whi ch are exempt from the leakage testing are consistent with the criteria of 10 CFR Parts 30.11-20 and 70.19.Leakage from sources excluded from the requirements of this specificat'ion is not likely to represent more than one maximum permissible body burden for total body irradiation if the source material is inhaled or ingested.3/4.7.10 SNUBBER S All snubbers are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating, dynamic loads., Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related |
| Theoperation ofthissystenandtheresultant effectonoffsitedosagecalculations wasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.
| | -system.The visual inspection frequency is based on maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems.Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection. |
| M3/4.7.9SEALEDSOURCECONTAMINATION Thelimitations onsealedsourceremovable-contmination ensurethatthetotalbodyorindividual organirradiation doesnotexceedallowable limitsi'theeventofingestion orinhalation oftheprobableleakagefrcmtnesourcematerial.
| | Inspections performed ST.LUCIE-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-5 |
| Thelimitations onremovable contamination forsourcesrequiring leaktesting,including alphaemitters, isbasedon10CFR70.39(c)limitsforplutonium.
| |
| guantitiesofinteresttothisspecificationwhichareexemptfromtheleakagetestingareconsistent withthecriteriaof10CFRParts30.11-20and70.19.Leakagefromsourcesexcludedfromtherequirements ofthisspecificat'ion isnotlikelytorepresent morethanonemaximumpermissible bodyburdenfortotalbodyirradiation ifthesourcematerialisinhaledoringested.
| |
| 3/4.7.10SNUBBERSAllsnubbersarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatthestructural integrity ofthereactorcoolantsystemandallothersafetyrelatedsystemsismaintained duringandfollowing aseismicorothereventinitiating, dynamicloads.,Snubbersexcludedfromthisinspection programarethoseinstalled onnonsafety-related systemsandthenonlyiftheirfailureorfailureofthesystemonwhichtheyareinstalled wouldhavenoadverseeffectonanysafety-related | |
| -system.Thevisualinspection frequency isbasedonmaintaining aconstantlevelofsnubberprotection tosystems.Therefore, therequiredinspection intervalvariesinversely withtheobservedsnubberfailuresandisdetermined bythenumberofinoperable snubbersfoundduringaninspection. | |
| Inspections performed ST.LUCIE-UNIT1B3/47-5 | |
|
| |
|
| ATTACHMENT RE:ST.LUCIEUNIT1DOCKETNO.50-335PROPOSEDLICENSEAMENDMENT CHLORIDEDETECTION SYSTEMSAFETYEYALUATION EVALUATION OFCONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTAL FAILUREOFA150-LB.CHLORINECYLINDERONTHEHABITABILITY OFTHEST.LUCIEUNIT1CONTROLROOMPriortotheinstallation ofthesodiumhypochlorite generator, thesourceofchlorineusedin"thetreatment oftheplantcirculating waterwasone-toncylinders ofliquified chlorine. | | ATTACHMENT RE: ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-335 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT CHLORIDE DETECTION SYSTEM SAFETY EYALUATION EVALUATION OF CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENTAL FAILURE OF A 150-LB.CHLORINE CYLINDER ON THE HABITABILITY OF THE ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Prior to the installation of the sodium hypochlorite generator, the source of chlorine used in" the treatment of the plant circulating water was one-ton cylinders of liquified chlorine.These cylinders were stored at the chlorina-tion facility located within the plant perimeter. |
| Thesecylinders werestoredatthechlorina-tionfacilitylocatedwithintheplantperimeter.
| | In order to provide control room occupants protection against an accidental chlorine release, seismic Category 1 chlorine detectors were installed at the control rocm outside air intakes.Although the main source of chlorine for which adequate'protection was pro-vided no longer exists, there remains a smaller quantity of chlorine stored offsite near the sewage treatment facility and the city water storage tanks.This chlorine, stored in 150-lb.cylinders, is the source used in the evalu-ation of the consequences of a postulated accidental release frcm a 150-lb.cylinder on the St.Lucie Unit 1 control room habitability. |
| Inordertoprovidecontrolroomoccupants protection againstanaccidental chlorinerelease,seismicCategory1chlorinedetectors wereinstalled atthecontrolrocmoutsideairintakes.Althoughthemainsourceofchlorineforwhichadequate'protection waspro-vidednolongerexists,thereremainsasmallerquantityofchlorinestoredoffsitenearthesewagetreatment facilityandthecitywaterstoragetanks.Thischlorine, storedin150-lb.cylinders, isthesourceusedintheevalu-ationoftheconsequences ofapostulated accidental releasefrcma150-lb.cylinderontheSt.LucieUnit1controlroomhabitability.
| | In this evaluation it is assumed that 25 percent (38 lb.)of the closest 150-lb.cylinder contents is released instantaneously. |
| Inthisevaluation itisassumedthat25percent(38lb.)oftheclosest150-lb.cylindercontentsisreleasedinstantaneously.
| | The size and diffusion of the cloud are modeled based on the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.78.No credit is taken for the presence of the chlorine detectors and consequently, the normal air exchange between the outside environs and the, control rocm continues. |
| Thesizeanddiffusion ofthecloudaremodeledbasedontheguidancegiveninRegulatory Guide1.78.Nocreditistakenforthepresenceofthechlorinedetectors andconsequently, thenormalairexchangebetweentheoutsideenvironsandthe,controlrocmcontinues.
| | The results of the evaluation.show that the maximum chlorine co'ncentration in the control room is 4.9 ppm whereas the R.G.1.78 toxicity limit is 15 ppm.Given the conservative nature of the evaluation and the relatively small peak.control room concentration, the 150-lb.chlorine cylinders do not constitute a source which would require having qualified detectors at the control rocm air intakes. |
| Theresultsoftheevaluation
| | ~)2 K a STATE OF FLORIDA)))ss.Robert E.Uhri being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is Vice Presiden of Florida Power 6 Light Company, the L)censee herein;That he has executed the foregoing document;that.the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Robert E.Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me'this clay of 19 85'>>t.'aOTAHY PUp~f'XC, n and for the County of Dade, Sf ate o+>>lori a>>ll>>@>>i" cl notary Public, State of Ronda at Large lt~.M Commission Expires October 30, f983 i'""ommission expires: |
| .showthatthemaximumchlorineco'ncentration inthecontrolroomis4.9ppmwhereastheR.G.1.78toxicitylimitis15ppm.Giventheconservative natureoftheevaluation andtherelatively smallpeak.controlroomconcentration, the150-lb.chlorinecylinders donotconstitute asourcewhichwouldrequirehavingqualified detectors atthecontrolrocmairintakes. | |
| ~)2KaSTATEOFFLORIDA)))ss.RobertE.Uhribeingfirstdulysworn,deposesandsays:ThatheisVicePresidenofFloridaPower6LightCompany,theL)censeeherein;Thathehasexecutedtheforegoing document; that.thestate-mentsmadeinthissaiddocumentaretrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge, information, andbelief,andthatheisauthorized toexecutethedocumentonbehalfofsaidRobertE.UhrigSubscribed andsworntobeforeme'thisclayof1985'>>t.'aOTAHY PUp~f'XC, nandfortheCountyofDade,Sfateo+>>loria>>ll>>@>>i"clnotaryPublic,StateofRondaatLargelt~.MCommission ExpiresOctober30,f983i'""ommission expires: | |
| F~C}} | | F~C}} |
|
|---|
Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status
ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks
ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit
ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution
ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position
ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases
ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1
ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position
ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses
ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal
ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b
ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998
Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank
ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews
ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions
ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures
ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998
Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls
ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity
ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values
ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion
ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8
ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE
ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases
ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings
ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept
ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls
ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel
ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria
ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel
ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996
Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition
ML17228B5041996-06-0101 June 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Re Thermal Margin & RCS Flow Limits
ML17228B3761996-01-0404 January 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Rectifying Discrepancy for Each St Lucie Unit & Providing Assurance That Admin Controls for Hpsip Remain Effective in Lower Operational Modes
ML17228B3361995-11-22022 November 1995
Proposed TS 3/4.4.6.1 for RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation,Adapting STS for C-E Plants (NUREG-1432) Spec 3.4.15
ML17228B2451995-08-16016 August 1995
Proposed TS 3.6.6.1, Sbvs.
ML17228B2421995-08-16016 August 1995
Proposed Ts,Reflecting Relocation of Selected TS Requirements Re Instrumentation & Emergency & Security Plan Review Process,Per GL 93-07
ML17228B1891995-06-21021 June 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Injection Tank Surveillances
ML17228B1811995-06-21021 June 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Time Allowed to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status
ML17228B1791995-06-21021 June 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Extended Allowed Outage Time for EDGs
ML17228B1471995-05-17017 May 1995
Proposed Tech Specs,Extending Applicability of Current RCS Pressure/Temp Limits & Maximum Allowed RCS Heatup & Cooldown Rates to 23.6 Effective Full Power Yrs of Operation
ML17228B1441995-05-17017 May 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Administrative & Conforming Update
ML17228B0901995-04-0303 April 1995
Proposed Tech Specs Re Incorporation of line-item TS Improvements to TSs 3/4.8.1 & 4.8.1.2.2 for Licenses DPR-67 & NPF-16
ML17228B0591995-02-27027 February 1995
Proposed TS Re Sdcs Min Flow Rate Requirements
ML17228B0521995-02-27027 February 1995
Proposed Tech Spec Tables 3.3-3 & 3.3-4 to Accommodate Improved Coincidence Logic & Relay Replacement for 4.16 Kv Loss of Voltage Relays
ML17228B0331995-02-22022 February 1995
Proposed TS 4.6.1.3,reflecting Deletion of Refs to Automatic Tester for Containment Personnel Air Lock
ML17228A9921995-01-20020 January 1995
Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Operability Requirements for Incore Detectors to (TS 3/4.3.3.2) to Updated FSAR & Revising Lhr Surveillance 4.2.1.4 & Special Test Exceptions Surveillance 4.10.2.2,4.10.4.2 & 4.10.5.2
ML17228A9031994-11-0202 November 1994
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.6.2.1 & 3/4.6.2.3,adapting Combined Spec for Containment Spray & Cooling Sys Contained in Std TS for C-E Plants
ML17228A8911994-10-27027 October 1994
Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating Administrative Changes
ML17228A6521994-07-28028 July 1994
Proposed Tech Specs Re LTOP Requirements for Power Operated Relief Valves,Per GL 90-06
ML17228A6591994-07-25025 July 1994
Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Enhancements Recommended by GL 93-05, Line-Item TS Improvements to Reduce SR for Testing During Power Operation.
ML17228A6561994-07-25025 July 1994
Proposed Tech Specs for Main Feedwater Line Isolation Valves to Be Consistent w/NUREG-1432,standard TS for C-E Plants
ML17228A5771994-05-23023 May 1994
Proposed Tech Specs Removing Option That Allows HPCI Pump 1C to Be Used as Alternative to Preferred Pump for Subsystem Operability
1999-06-01
[Table view]
Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML17309A9961999-06-30030 June 1999
Rev 35 to HP-90, Emergency Equipment.
ML17309A9941999-06-17017 June 1999
Rev 1 to COP-06.06, Guidelines for Collecting Post Accident Samples.
ML17241A3541999-06-0101 June 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.2,allowing Up to 7 Days to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status
ML17309A9951999-05-27027 May 1999
Rev 0 to COP-06.11, Establishing Remote Lab for Analyses of Accident Samples.
ML17241A3451999-05-24024 May 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.5.1 Re Safety Injection Tanks
ML17229B0711999-03-19019 March 1999
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Requested by NRC for Use in Issuance of Proposed License Amend Re SFP Storage Capacity, Per Soluble Boron Credit
ML17229B0441999-03-0202 March 1999
Cycle 11 Reactor Startup Physics Testing Rept. with 990304 Ltr
ML17229B0201999-02-23023 February 1999
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.1.2.9 Re Reactivity Control sys- Boron Dilution
ML17229B0361998-12-22022 December 1998
Rev 20 to Procedure C-200, Odcm.
ML17229A9551998-12-16016 December 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Administrative Controls & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi- Discipline Supervisor Position
ML17229A9161998-11-25025 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Replacing Insert-A,attachment to 971231 Submittal & Revises LCO 3.4.9.11 & Associated Bases
ML17229A9251998-11-22022 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Thermal Margin SL Lines of TS Figure 2.1-1 to Reflect Increase in Value of Design Min RCS Flow from 345,000 Gpm to 365,000 Gpm & Change Flow Rates Stated in Tables 2.2-1 & 3.2-1
ML17229A9131998-11-19019 November 1998
Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Administrative Contols TS 6.3, Unit Staff Qualifications & Incorporating Specific Staff Qualifications for Multi-Discipline Supervisor (MDS) Position
ML20155C3061998-10-29029 October 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Revising Terminology Used in Notation of TS Tables 2.2-1 & 3.3-1 Re Implementation & Automatic Removal of Certain Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypasses
ML20153G0781998-08-26026 August 1998
Rev 19 to Plstqp, Guard Training & Qualification Plan
ML17229A8441998-08-24024 August 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Removing Obsolete License Conditions & Incorporating Revs Which Clarify Component Operations That Must Be Verified in Response to Containment Sump Recirculation Actuation Signal
ML17229A7731998-06-15015 June 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Pages 6-20,6-20a & 6-20c,correcting Info Supplied by Fuel Vendor Relative to Titles of Approved TRs That Are Referenced in Proposed TS 6.9.1.11.b
ML17229A7601998-06-0303 June 1998
Proposed Marked Up TS Pages Modifying Explosive Gas Mixture Surveillance Requirement 4.11.2.5.1 to Provide for Use of Lab Gas Partitioner to Periodically Analyze Concentration of Oxygen in Svc Waste Gas Decay Tank
ML17229A7441998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Providing for More Efficient Use of on- Site Mgt Personnel in Review & Approval Process for Plant Procedures
ML17229A7481998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.5.1,removing Requirement for SITs to Be Operable in Mode 4,which Will Minimize Potential for Inadvertent SIT Discharge During RCS Cooldown/ Depressurization Evolutions
ML17229A7511998-05-27027 May 1998
Proposed Tech Specs Section 6.2.2.f,revised to Allow for Use of Longer Operating Shifts of Up to Twelve Hours Duration by Plant'S Operating Crews
ML17229A6751998-03-27027 March 1998
Cycle 15 Reactor Startup Physics & Replacement SG Testing Rept. W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6501998-03-0303 March 1998
Proposed Tech Specs 3.4.7 Re RCS Chemistry/Design Features/ Administrative Controls
ML17229A6381998-02-12012 February 1998
Rev 19 to C-200, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
ML17229A6151998-01-12012 January 1998
Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, St Lucie Nuclear Plant Unit 1 ISI Plan.
ML17229A6141998-01-12012 January 1998
Rev 0 to ISI-PSL-1, Third Interval ISI Program for St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant,Unit 1.
ML17229A5691997-12-31031 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages Modifying TS 5.6.1 & Associated Figure 5.6-1 & TS 5.6.3 to Accomodate Increase in Allowed SFP Storage Capacity
ML17309A9131997-12-29029 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Specifications for Selected cycle-specific Reactor Physics Parameters to Provide Reference to St Lucie Unit 2 COLR for Limiting Values
ML17229A5851997-12-12012 December 1997
Rev 0 to ADM-29.01, IST Program for Pumps & Valves.
ML17229A5491997-12-0101 December 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Revising Units 1 & 2 EPP Section 4, Environ Conditions & Section 5, Administrative Procedures to Incorporate Proposed Terms & Conditions of Incidental Take Statement Included in Biological Opinion
ML17309A9171997-11-26026 November 1997
Rev 0 to PSL-ENG-SENS-97-068, Spent Fuel Pool Dilution Analysis.
ML17229A5931997-09-26026 September 1997
Rev 4 to Procedure QI-5-PSL-1, Preparation,Rev,Review/ Approval of Procedures.
ML17229A5921997-09-18018 September 1997
Rev 0 to Procedure ADM-17.11, 10CFR500.59 Screening.
ML20211Q5841997-09-10010 September 1997
Rev 18 to Training & Qualification Plan
ML17229A4621997-08-22022 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising Specification 4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for ISI & Testing of ASME Code Class 1,2 & 3 Components,To Relocate IST Program Requirements to Administrative Control Section 6.8
ML17229A4341997-08-0101 August 1997
Proposed Tech Specs,Extending semi-annual Surveillance Interval Specified in Table 4.3-2 for Testing ESFAS Subgroup Relays to Interval Consistent W/Ceog Rept CEN-403,Rev 1-A for March 1996 & Associated SE
ML17309A8951997-06-11011 June 1997
Rev 0 to PL-CNSI-97-004, Transportation & Emergency Response Plan for St Lucie Unit 1 SG Project.
ML17229A3601997-05-29029 May 1997
Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Administrative Changes That Improve Consistency Throughout TSs & Related Bases
ML17229A2981997-03-0606 March 1997
Final Analysis of Radiological Consequences of Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment for St Lucie Unit 1 NPP Using NUREG-0800 Std Review Plan 15.1.5 App A.
ML17229A1831996-12-20020 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Re Safety Limits & Limiting Safety Sys Settings
ML17229A1611996-12-0909 December 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.9a Re Core Operating Limits Rept
ML17229A1191996-10-31031 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 6.0 Re Administrative Controls
ML17229A1111996-10-30030 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.9.9 Re Containment Isolation Sys & 3/4.9.10 Re Water level-reactor Vessel
ML17229A1061996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs 1.6 Re Channel Functional test,1.7 Re Containment Vessel integrity,1.8 Re Controlled leakage,1.9 Re Core alteration,3/4.6 Re Containment Systems & 3/4.6.1 Re Containment Vessel
ML17229A1091996-10-28028 October 1996
Proposed Tech Specs Rev to Allow Type A,B & C Containment Leakage Tests to Be Conducted at Extended Intervals Determined by performance-based Criteria
ML17229A0951996-10-24024 October 1996
Rev 0 to 00000-OSW-16, In-Situ Pressure Test Results for St Lucie Unit 1 Spring 1996 Outage.
ML17229A0861996-10-18018 October 1996
Startup Physics Testing Rept. W/961018 Ltr
ML17229A2441996-09-23023 September 1996
Rev 18 to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (Odcm).
ML17228B5641996-07-15015 July 1996
Revised Tech Specs Re Core Alteration Definition
ML17229A0961996-06-12012 June 1996
Rev 0 to TR-9419-CSE96-1101, Test Rept - SG Tube In-Situ Hydrostatic Pressure Test Tool Hydro Chamber Pressure Determination.
1999-06-30
[Table view] |
Text
This page intentiona11y b1ank DOCK 05000~3>so~77 aSOS09 PDR A PDR ST.LUCIE-UNIT I'/4 3-36 5'f f'1 4)4 n' PLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued e.At least once per 18 months by: l.Verifying that the pressure drops across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is<4.15 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm+10$.'.Verifying that on a contaireent isolation signal, the system automaticaly isolates the control room within 35 seconds and switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks.3.Verifying that the system maintains the control rocm at a positive pressure of>1/8 inch W.G.relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation with<450 cfm outside air intake.f.After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank by verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove>99$of the DOP when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm+107,.g.After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank by verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove>99$of a nalogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm+105.ST.LUCIE-UNIT 1 3/4 7-23 IH STRUt)ENTATI ON BASES 3/4.3.3.7 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for the prompt detection of fires.This capability is required in order to detect and locate fires in their early stages.Prompt detection of fires will reduce the poten-tial for damage to safety related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.
3/4.3.3.8 ACOI DENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that suffici ent information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables during and following an accident.This capability is consistent with the recommendations of HUREG-0578,"TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Term Recommendations." ST.LUCIE-UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-3 PLAHT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM Continued for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions.
The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control rocm design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent.
This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 10 of Appendix"A", 10 CFR 50.3/4.7.8 ECCS AREA VEHTILATIOH SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the ECCS area ventilation system ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the enviroreent.
The operation of this systen and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident analyses.M 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION The limitations on sealed source removable-contmination ensure that the total body or individual organ irradiation does not exceed allowable limits i'the event of ingestion or inhalation of the probable leakage frcm tne source material.The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 70.39(c)limits for plutonium.
guanti ti es of interest to this speci f i cation whi ch are exempt from the leakage testing are consistent with the criteria of 10 CFR Parts 30.11-20 and 70.19.Leakage from sources excluded from the requirements of this specificat'ion is not likely to represent more than one maximum permissible body burden for total body irradiation if the source material is inhaled or ingested.3/4.7.10 SNUBBER S All snubbers are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating, dynamic loads., Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related
-system.The visual inspection frequency is based on maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to systems.Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection.
Inspections performed ST.LUCIE-UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-5
ATTACHMENT RE: ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-335 PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT CHLORIDE DETECTION SYSTEM SAFETY EYALUATION EVALUATION OF CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENTAL FAILURE OF A 150-LB.CHLORINE CYLINDER ON THE HABITABILITY OF THE ST.LUCIE UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM Prior to the installation of the sodium hypochlorite generator, the source of chlorine used in" the treatment of the plant circulating water was one-ton cylinders of liquified chlorine.These cylinders were stored at the chlorina-tion facility located within the plant perimeter.
In order to provide control room occupants protection against an accidental chlorine release, seismic Category 1 chlorine detectors were installed at the control rocm outside air intakes.Although the main source of chlorine for which adequate'protection was pro-vided no longer exists, there remains a smaller quantity of chlorine stored offsite near the sewage treatment facility and the city water storage tanks.This chlorine, stored in 150-lb.cylinders, is the source used in the evalu-ation of the consequences of a postulated accidental release frcm a 150-lb.cylinder on the St.Lucie Unit 1 control room habitability.
In this evaluation it is assumed that 25 percent (38 lb.)of the closest 150-lb.cylinder contents is released instantaneously.
The size and diffusion of the cloud are modeled based on the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.78.No credit is taken for the presence of the chlorine detectors and consequently, the normal air exchange between the outside environs and the, control rocm continues.
The results of the evaluation.show that the maximum chlorine co'ncentration in the control room is 4.9 ppm whereas the R.G.1.78 toxicity limit is 15 ppm.Given the conservative nature of the evaluation and the relatively small peak.control room concentration, the 150-lb.chlorine cylinders do not constitute a source which would require having qualified detectors at the control rocm air intakes.
~)2 K a STATE OF FLORIDA)))ss.Robert E.Uhri being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is Vice Presiden of Florida Power 6 Light Company, the L)censee herein;That he has executed the foregoing document;that.the state-ments made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Robert E.Uhrig Subscribed and sworn to before me'this clay of 19 85'>>t.'aOTAHY PUp~f'XC, n and for the County of Dade, Sf ate o+>>lori a>>ll>>@>>i" cl notary Public, State of Ronda at Large lt~.M Commission Expires October 30, f983 i'""ommission expires:
F~C
