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| {{#Wiki_filter:~CATEGORY3REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9809090173 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:~CATEGORY 3 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9809090173 DOC.DATE: 98/09/02 NOTARIZED: |
| 98/09/02NOTARIZED: | | NO FACIL:50-389 St.Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power 6 Light Co.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FREHAFER;K.W.'lorida Power 6 Light Co.STALL,J.A. |
| NOFACIL:50-389 St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower6LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FREHAFER;K.W.'lorida Power6LightCo.STALL,J.A.
| | Florida Power 5 Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389 |
| FloridaPower5LightCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389
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| |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER98-005-00 on980807,discovered thatPORVmarginswere'insufficient toaccommodate addiconservatism.
| | LER 98-005-00 on 980807,discovered that PORV margins were'insufficient to accommodate addi conservatism. |
| Causedbyinadequacies inoriginalvendorMOVmethodology.
| | Caused by inadequacies in original vendor MOV methodology. |
| Willimplement plannedvalveactuatormods.W/980902 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:ERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3PDINTERNAL:
| | Will implement planned valve actuator mods.W/980902 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: E RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HOHB NRR/DRPM/PECB RES/DET/EZB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME GLEAVES,W AEOD/SPD/RAB NTE NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RGN2 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HOHB NRR/DRPM/PECB RES/DET/EZB EXTERNAL:
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTETH TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LZSTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 23 ENCL 23 Florida Power 5 Light Company, 650t South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL34957 FPL September 2, 1998 L-98-223 10 CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Re: St.Lucie Unit 2 Docket No.50-389 Reportable Event: 1998-005-0 Date of Event: August 7, 1998 New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve 0 erabilit Problem The attached Licensee Event Report 1998-005 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, J.A.Stall Vice President St.Lucie'lant Ii, JAS/EJW/KWF Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St.Lucie Plant 980'tr0901.73 |
| LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME GLEAVES,W AEOD/SPD/RAB NTENRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RGN2FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111111111111111DNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
| | 'it80902 PDR ADOCtt'M00389 S PDR an FPL Group company NRC FORM 366 Ia-1999)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB NO.3160-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 Estimatod burden por response lo comply with this mandatory information collection roquest: 50 hm.Reported lessons learned aro incorporated tnto the licensing process and fed back to industry.Forward comments regarding burdon estimato to the Records Management Branch (TA F33)US.Nuclear Reguhtory Commission, Washington, DC 205554001, and to the Papenvork Reduction Proiect (31504104$ |
| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTETHTOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LZSTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
| | , Oflice of Management and Budget, Washington DC 20503.If an information colfecgon does not display a currently va(ld OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, lho information colloction. |
| LTTR23ENCL23 FloridaPower5LightCompany,650tSouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957FPLSeptember 2,1998L-98-22310CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389Reportable Event:1998-005-0 DateofEvent:August7,1998NewMOVMethodology CausedPastPORVBlockValve0erabilitProblemTheattachedLicenseeEventReport1998-005isbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.73toprovidenotification ofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresident St.Lucie'lant Ii,JAS/EJW/KWF Attachment cc:RegionalAdministrator, USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant980'tr0901.73
| | FACILITY NAME (1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000389 PAGE (3)Page 1 of 4 TITLE (4)New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem EVENT DATE (6)LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACIUTIES INVOLVED 8 MONTH 08 DAY 07 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998 1998-005-00 09 DAY P 02 1998 FACIUTY NAME FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER DocKET NUMsot OPERATING MODE (9)PURSUANT TO THE REQ THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED UIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check 60.73(a)(2)(i)20.2201 (b)20.2203(a) |
| 'it80902PDRADOCtt'M00389 SPDRanFPLGroupcompany NRCFORM366Ia-1999)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3160-0104 EXPIRES06/30/2001 Estimatod burdenporresponselocomplywiththismandatory information collection roquest:50hm.Reportedlessonslearnedaroincorporated tntothelicensing processandfedbacktoindustry. | | (2)(v)ono or moro)(11)'60.73(a)(2)(viii) |
| Forwardcommentsregarding burdonestimatototheRecordsManagement Branch(TAF33)US.NuclearReguhtory Commission, Washington, DC205554001, andtothePapenvork Reduction Proiect(31504104$
| | POWER LEVEL (10)100 20.2203(a) |
| ,OfliceofManagement andBudget,Washington DC20503.Ifaninformation colfecgon doesnotdisplayacurrently va(ldOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andapersonisnotrequiredtorespondto,lhoinformation colloction. | | (1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a) |
| FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000389PAGE(3)Page1of4TITLE(4)NewMOVMethodology CausedPastPORVBlockValveOperability ProblemEVENTDATE(6)LERNUMBER6REPORTDATE7OTHERFACIUTIES INVOLVED8MONTH08DAY07SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER19981998-005-0009DAYP021998FACIUTYNAMEFACIUTYNAMEDOCKETNUMBERDocKETNUMsotOPERATING MODE(9)PURSUANTTOTHEREQTHISREPORTISSUBMITTED UIREMENTS OF10CFR5:(Check60.73(a)(2)
| |
| (i)20.2201(b)20.2203(a) | |
| (2)(v)onoormoro)(11)'60.73(a)(2)(viii) | |
| POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2203(a)
| |
| (1)20.2203(a)(2) | |
| (i)20.2203(a) | |
| (2)(ii)20.2203(a) | | (2)(ii)20.2203(a) |
| (2)(iii)20.2203(o)(2)(iv)20.2203(a) | | (2)(iii)20.2203 (o)(2)(iv)20.2203(a) |
| (3)(t)20,2203(a) | | (3)(t)20,2203(a) |
| (3)(ii)20.2203(a) | | (3)(ii)20.2203(a) |
| (4)60.36(c)(1)S0.36(c)(2) 60.73(a)(2)(ii) 60.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 60.73(o)(2)(v) | | (4)60.36(c)(1)S0.36(c)(2) 60.73(a)(2)(ii) 60.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 60.73(o)(2)(v) |
| S0.73(a)(2)(vii)60.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyInAbstractbeloworInNRCForm30BALICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER12TELEPHONE NUMSERgnorudaAraaCoda)KennethW,Frehafer, Licensing Engineer(561)467-7748COMPLETEONEUNEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT13CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACIURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXBL200NOSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,compiotoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(16)MONTHDAYABSTRACTiLimitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 16single-spaced typewritten linesl(16)OnAugust7,1998,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.DuringareviewofNRCInformation Notice96-48,Supplement 1,Engineering discovered thattheUnit2poweroperatedreliefvalveblockvalve(V-1476andV-1477)marginswereinsufficient toaccommodate theadditional conservatism specified inNRCInformation Notice96-48,Supplement 1,andassurevalveclosure.Operations enteredtheone-hourACTIONstatement forTechnical Specification 3.4.4.aat19159hoursonAugust7,1998.TheACTIONstatement wasexitedat20:07hoursthesamedaywhenbothUnit2poweroperatedreliefvalveblockvalveswereclosedwithpowerremovedinaccordance withTechnical Specification requirements. | | S0.73(a)(2)(vii)60.73(a)(2)(x)73.71 OTHER Specify In Abstract below or In NRC Form 30BA LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMSER gnoruda Araa Coda)Kenneth W, Frehafer, Licensing Engineer (561)467-7748 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACIURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX B L200 NO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, compioto EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X No EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (16)MONTH DAY ABSTRACT iLimit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 16 single-spaced typewritten linesl (16)On August 7, 1998, St.Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.During a review of NRC Information Notice 96-48, Supplement 1, Engineering discovered that the Unit 2 power operated relief valve block valve (V-1476 and V-1477)margins were insufficient to accommodate the additional conservatism specified in NRC Information Notice 96-48, Supplement 1, and assure valve closure.Operations entered the one-hour ACTION statement for Technical Specification 3.4.4.a at 19159 hours on August 7, 1998.The ACTION statement was exited at 20:07 hours the same day when both Unit 2 power operated relief valve block valves were closed with power removed in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. |
| Thecauseofthiseventwasinadequacies intheoriginalvendormotoroperatedvalvemethodology asdocumented inLimitorque Technical Update98-01andNRCInformation Notice96-48Supplement 1.Thenewmethodology requiredanadditional conservatisms when'evaluating aLimitorque ACpoweredmotoroperator's performance.
| | The cause of this event was inadequacies in the original vendor motor operated valve methodology as documented in Limitorque Technical Update 98-01 and NRC Information Notice 96-48 Supplement 1.The new methodology required an additional conservatisms when'evaluating a Limitorque AC powered motor operator's performance. |
| Corrective actionsincludetheimmediate actionstakenonAugust7,.1998,andtheimplementation oftheplannedvalveactuatormodifications duringtheupcomingfallUnit2Cycle111998refueling outage.NRCFOAM399IB1999) | | Corrective actions include the immediate actions taken on August 7,.1998, and the implementation of the planned valve actuator modifications during the upcoming fall Unit 2 Cycle 11 1998 refueling outage.NRC FOAM 399 IB 1999) |
| NRCFORM366A(8-1998]LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACIUTYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DocKETNUMBER205000389LERNUMBERI6)SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-005-00PAGE(3)Page2of4TEXT/Ifmorespeceisrequired, useaddidonel copiesofNRCForm366A/I17)Description ofEventOnAugust7,1998,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.DuringreviewofNRCInformation Notice(IN)96-48,Supplement 1,Engineering discovered thattheUnit2poweroperatedreliefvalve(PORV)blockvalve(V-1476andV-1477)marginswereinsufficient toassurevalveclosure.Inlightofrecenttestsandstudiesofmotoractuatoroutput,Limitorque retracted itsrelaxation ofthesizingcriteriaforACpoweredmotoractuators throughissuanceofLimitorque Technical Update(TU)98-01.TheLimitorque TUrevisedrequirements such'that anadditional factorofconservatism needstobeaddedtoevaluatethemotoroperator's performance.
| | NRC FORM 366A (8-1998]LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACIUTY NAME (1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DocKET NUMBER 2 05000389 LER NUMBER I6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-005-00 PAGE (3)Page 2 of 4 TEXT/If more speceis required, use addidonel copies of NRC Form 366A/I17)Description of Event On August 7, 1998, St.Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.During review of NRC Information Notice (IN)96-48, Supplement 1, Engineering discovered that the Unit 2 power operated relief valve (PORV)block valve (V-1476 and V-1477)margins were insufficient to assure valve closure.In light of recent tests and studies of motor actuator output, Limitorque retracted its relaxation of the sizing criteria for AC powered motor actuators through issuance of Limitorque Technical Update (TU)98-01.The Limitorque TU revised requirements such'that an additional factor of conservatism needs to be added to evaluate the motor operator's performance. |
| NRCIN96-48,Supplement 1,titled"MotorOperatedValvePerfonnance Issues,"disseminated thisinformation totheindustry.
| | NRC IN 96-48, Supplement 1, titled"Motor Operated Valve Perfonnance Issues," disseminated this information to the industry.Operations entered the one-hour ACTION statement for Technical Specification 3.4.4.a at 19:59 hours on August 7, 1998.The ACTION statement was exited at 20:07 hours the same day when both Unit 2 PORV block valves were closed with power removed in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. |
| Operations enteredtheone-hourACTIONstatement forTechnical Specification 3.4.4.aat19:59hoursonAugust7,1998.TheACTIONstatement wasexitedat20:07hoursthesamedaywhenbothUnit2PORVblockvalveswereclosedwithpowerremovedinaccordance withTechnical Specification requirements. | | Cause of the Event The cause of this event was'inadequacies in the original vendor motor operated valve (MOV)methodology as documented in Limitorque TU 98-01 and NRC IN 96-48, Supplement 1.Analysis of the Event Technical Specification 3.4.4.requires that each'PORV block valve be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3, with no more than one block valve open.ACTION a.states that: "With one or more block valve(s)inoperable, within?hour either restore the block valve(s)to OPEKLBLE status or close the block valve(s)and remove power from the block valve(s);otherwise, be in at least HOT SMDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours." The past inoperability of the PORV block valves constitutes a condition for which firm evidence exists that the condition existed in the past.It is concluded that the past inoperability time exceeded the allowed outage time (i.e., greater than 1 hour)of Technical Specification 3.4.4.a and therefore constitutes operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. |
| CauseoftheEventThecauseofthiseventwas'inadequacies intheoriginalvendormotoroperatedvalve(MOV)methodology asdocumented inLimitorque TU98-01andNRCIN96-48,Supplement 1.AnalysisoftheEventTechnical Specification 3.4.4.requiresthateach'PORVblockvalvebeoperableinModes1,2,and3,withnomorethanoneblockvalveopen.ACTIONa.statesthat:"Withoneormoreblockvalve(s)inoperable, within?houreitherrestoretheblockvalve(s)toOPEKLBLEstatusorclosetheblockvalve(s)andremovepowerfromtheblockvalve(s);
| | Accordingly this condition'is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), that states"Licensees shall report: 'any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.'" The purpose of the Limitorque Technical Update (TU)was to provide new guidance to determine the output torque capability of a Limitorque valve actuator with an AC motor.The motor operated valve (MOV)output torque capability is determined by using the following factors: 1.Motor Rated Torque 2.Pullout Efficiency NRC FORM 3BBA IB-19981 0 P I*'v"0 l RC FORM 366A I8-1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FAGILITY NAME I1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER I2)05000389 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-005-00 PAGE I3)Page 3 of 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3MAI I17)3.Overall Actuator Gear Ratio 4.Motor Texminal Voltage 5.Motor Rated Voltage 6.Application Factor (AF)selected in accordance with Limitorque SEL-4 Engineering reviewed the current NRC Generic Letter (GL)89-10 MOVprogram calculations and determined that the Motor Rated Torque, Overall Actuator Gear Ratio, and the Motor Terminal and Rated Voltage factors were consistent with the TU requirements. |
| otherwise, beinatleastHOTSMDBYwithinthenext6hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 30hours."Thepastinoperability ofthePORVblockvalvesconstitutes acondition forwhichfirmevidenceexiststhatthecondition existedinthepast.Itisconcluded thatthepastinoperability timeexceededtheallowedoutagetime(i.e.,greaterthan1hour)ofTechnical Specification 3.4.4.aandtherefore constitutes operation prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications. | | However, for some MOVs, calculations utilized motor running efficiency (versus pullout efficiency) and the relaxed AF criteria previously provided by Limitorque in TU 93-03.TU 93-03 allowed the assumption of an AP of 1.0 (rather than 0.9)when the motor voltage was less than 90 percent of the motor's rated voltage.Engineering reviewed applicable MOVs, and determined that several valves did not have sufficient margin to account for the additional conservatism introduced by Limitorque TU 98-01.However, only the Unit 2 PORV block valves, V-1476 and V-1477, were determined to be a Technical Specification OPERAEILITY concern.Using the new methodology for the Unit 2 PORV block valves, the calculated closing thrust was 10,464 lbs., and the required closing thrust is 17,440 lbs.Therefore, there is a possibility that the PORV block valves would not close if required.Analysis of the Effect on Safety The past inoperability of the PORV block valves did not constitute operation outside the design basis of the plant and would not have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.The Technical Specifications require that one block valve be.closed during power operation. |
| Accordingly thiscondition | | In the event of an inadvertent PORV opening, the safety analysis does not credit closing of the associated block valve to prevent exceeding safety-limits.The PORVs are discussed in Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-15 for initiation of once through cooling.However, this is a beyond design basis scenario that requires multiple safety related system failures.The past inoperability of the PORV block valves would not have adversely affected the operation of the PORVs for low temperature over pressure protection (LTOP).In the LTOP mode the PORV block valves only need to be open and are not required to be operated.The PORV system is a high/low pressure interface with the primaxy system.To preclude a fire-induced LOCA, the safe shutdown analysis protects the PORVs from possible spurious operation. |
| 'isreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2) | | The PORVs'ontrol and power cables are protected or manual action is taken to isolate the PORVs'ower by use of isolate switches in the electrical penetration room in case of a fire in the control room or cable spread-room.No credit is taken for operation of the Unit 2 PORV block valves as far as the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R safe shutdown analysis is concerned. |
| (i)(B),thatstates"Licensees shallreport:'anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications.'" | | NRC FOAM SBBA IB.19981 s RC FORM 366A (0-1880)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT.CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000389 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-005-00 PAGE (3)Page 4 of 4 TEXT ilf moro speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)Analysis of the Effect on Safety (cont'd)Based on the preceding discussion, past PORV block valve inoperability had no adverse affect on the health and safety of the public.However, in order to provide operational flexibility to the operators during postulated beyond design bases events, St.Lucie implemented temporary system alterations (TSAs)on the Unit 2 PORV block valves to restore these valves to operable status.The TSA for V-1476 was implemented on August 14, 1998, and the TSA for, V-1477 was implemented on August 19, 1998.The TSAs will be removed after the permanent plant modifications are implemented next outage.Corrective Action 1.Immediate action was taken on August 8, 1998 to close the PORV block valves and remove power in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.4.4.a.2.St.Lucie implemented temporary system alterations (TSAs)on the Unit 2 PORV block valves to restore these valves to operable status on August 14, 1998, for V-1476, and August 19, 1998, for V-1477.3.Both PORV block valves will be modified during the upcoming fall 1998 Unit 2 Cycle 11 refueling outage under PC/M 98013.4.The St.Lucie GL 89-10 program requires review of industry operating experience and the incorporation of new information into the program documentation. |
| ThepurposeoftheLimitorque Technical Update(TU)wastoprovidenewguidancetodetermine theoutputtorquecapability ofaLimitorque valveactuatorwithanACmotor.Themotoroperatedvalve(MOV)outputtorquecapability isdetermined byusingthefollowing factors:1.MotorRatedTorque2.PulloutEfficiency NRCFORM3BBAIB-19981 0PI*'v"0l RCFORM366AI8-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FAGILITYNAMEI1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBERI2)05000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-005-00PAGEI3)Page3of4TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm3MAII17)3.OverallActuatorGearRatio4.MotorTexminalVoltage5.MotorRatedVoltage6.Application Factor(AF)selectedinaccordance withLimitorque SEL-4Engineering reviewedthecurrentNRCGenericLetter(GL)89-10MOVprogramcalculations anddetermined thattheMotorRatedTorque,OverallActuatorGearRatio,andtheMotorTerminalandRatedVoltagefactorswereconsistent withtheTUrequirements.
| | The information and issues identified in NRC ZN 98-48 Supplement 1 will be incorporated into the GL 89-'10 program documentation by January 31, 1999.Similar Events LER 50-335/97-009, dated September 17, 1997, reported MOV calculation deficiencies associated with the St.Lucie Unit 1 PORV block valve V-1403.Failed Components Identified Component: |
| However,forsomeMOVs,calculations utilizedmotorrunningefficiency (versuspulloutefficiency) andtherelaxedAFcriteriapreviously providedbyLimitorque inTU93-03.TU93-03allowedtheassumption ofanAPof1.0(ratherthan0.9)whenthemotorvoltagewaslessthan90percentofthemotor'sratedvoltage.Engineering reviewedapplicable MOVs,anddetermined thatseveralvalvesdidnothavesufficient margintoaccountfortheadditional conservatism introduced byLimitorque TU98-01.However,onlytheUnit2PORVblockvalves,V-1476andV-1477,weredetermined tobeaTechnical Specification OPERAEILITY concern.Usingthenewmethodology fortheUnit2PORVblockvalves,thecalculated closingthrustwas10,464lbs.,andtherequiredclosingthrustis17,440lbs.Therefore, thereisapossibility thatthePORVblockvalveswouldnotcloseifrequired. | | V-1476 and V-1477, PORV block Valve Motor/Actuator Manufacturer: |
| AnalysisoftheEffectonSafetyThepastinoperability ofthePORVblockvalvesdidnotconstitute operation outsidethedesignbasisoftheplantandwouldnothaveprevented thefulfillment ofasafetyfunction.
| | Limitorque Model Number: SB-00 (3G0861A)NRC FORM 300A (0.18881 |
| TheTechnical Specifications requirethatoneblockvalvebe.closedduringpoweroperation.
| |
| Intheeventofaninadvertent PORVopening,thesafetyanalysisdoesnotcreditclosingoftheassociated blockvalvetopreventexceeding safety-limits.ThePORVsarediscussed inEmergency Operating Procedure EOP-15forinitiation ofoncethroughcooling.However,thisisabeyonddesignbasisscenariothatrequiresmultiplesafetyrelatedsystemfailures.
| |
| Thepastinoperability ofthePORVblockvalveswouldnothaveadversely affectedtheoperation ofthePORVsforlowtemperature overpressureprotection (LTOP).IntheLTOPmodethePORVblockvalvesonlyneedtobeopenandarenotrequiredtobeoperated.
| |
| ThePORVsystemisahigh/lowpressureinterface withtheprimaxysystem.Toprecludeafire-induced LOCA,thesafeshutdownanalysisprotectsthePORVsfrompossiblespuriousoperation.
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| ThePORVs'ontrol andpowercablesareprotected ormanualactionistakentoisolatethePORVs'ower byuseofisolateswitchesintheelectrical penetration roomincaseofafireinthecontrolroomorcablespread-room.Nocreditistakenforoperation oftheUnit2PORVblockvalvesasfarasthe10CFR50,AppendixRsafeshutdownanalysisisconcerned.
| |
| NRCFOAMSBBAIB.19981 sRCFORM366A(0-1880)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXT.CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit2DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000389LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-005-00PAGE(3)Page4of4TEXTilfmorospeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)Analysis oftheEffectonSafety(cont'd)Basedonthepreceding discussion, pastPORVblockvalveinoperability hadnoadverseaffectonthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.However,inordertoprovideoperational flexibility totheoperators duringpostulated beyonddesignbasesevents,St.Lucieimplemented temporary systemalterations (TSAs)ontheUnit2PORVblockvalvestorestorethesevalvestooperablestatus.TheTSAforV-1476wasimplemented onAugust14,1998,andtheTSAfor,V-1477wasimplemented onAugust19,1998.TheTSAswillberemovedafterthepermanent plantmodifications areimplemented nextoutage.Corrective Action1.Immediate actionwastakenonAugust8,1998toclosethePORVblockvalvesandremovepowerinaccordance withtherequirements ofTechnical Specification 3.4.4.a.2.St.Lucieimplemented temporary systemalterations (TSAs)ontheUnit2PORVblockvalvestorestorethesevalvestooperablestatusonAugust14,1998,forV-1476,andAugust19,1998,forV-1477.3.BothPORVblockvalveswillbemodifiedduringtheupcomingfall1998Unit2Cycle11refueling outageunderPC/M98013.4.TheSt.LucieGL89-10programrequiresreviewofindustryoperating experience andtheincorporation ofnewinformation intotheprogramdocumentation.
| |
| Theinformation andissuesidentified inNRCZN98-48Supplement 1willbeincorporated intotheGL89-'10programdocumentation byJanuary31,1999.SimilarEventsLER50-335/97-009, datedSeptember 17,1997,reportedMOVcalculation deficiencies associated withtheSt.LucieUnit1PORVblockvalveV-1403.FailedComponents Identified Component:
| |
| V-1476andV-1477,PORVblockValveMotor/Actuator Manufacturer: | |
| Limitorque ModelNumber:SB-00(3G0861A) | |
| NRCFORM300A(0.18881
| |
| )4}} | | )4}} |
|
|---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4951999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML17241A4741999-08-31031 August 1999
Rev 1 to PCM 99016, St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 Colr.
ML17241A4591999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML17241A4301999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990805 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4091999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990712 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999
Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3631999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990610 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17241A3331999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990517 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0841999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines.
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0961999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990408 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0461999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0051999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990211 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9961999-01-14014 January 1999
SG Tube Inservice Insp Special Rept.
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9831998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990111 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17241A3581998-12-0909 December 1998
Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 970526-981209.
ML17229A9421998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17241A4931998-11-0101 November 1998
Statement of Account for Period of 981101-990930 for Suntrust Bank,As Trustee for Florida Municipal Power Agency Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (St Lucie Project).
ML17229A9051998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981110 Ltr
ML17229A8871998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1 Which Was Machined with Improper Length.C/A Includes Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8781998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1,which Was Machined with Improper Length.Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8721998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 981009 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8611998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 980911 Ltr
ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency
ML17229A8481998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 1 to PSL-ENG-SEFJ-98-013, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr.
ML17229A9461998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 0 to PCM 98016, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr.
ML17229A8301998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980814 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7981998-06-30030 June 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980713 Ltr
ML17229A7701998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980612 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
~CATEGORY 3 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9809090173 DOC.DATE: 98/09/02 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL:50-389 St.Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power 6 Light Co.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION FREHAFER;K.W.'lorida Power 6 Light Co.STALL,J.A.
Florida Power 5 Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389
SUBJECT:
LER 98-005-00 on 980807,discovered that PORV margins were'insufficient to accommodate addi conservatism.
Caused by inadequacies in original vendor MOV methodology.
Will implement planned valve actuator mods.W/980902 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: E RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-3 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HOHB NRR/DRPM/PECB RES/DET/EZB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME GLEAVES,W AEOD/SPD/RAB NTE NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RGN2 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTETH TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LZSTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 23 ENCL 23 Florida Power 5 Light Company, 650t South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL34957 FPL September 2, 1998 L-98-223 10 CFR 50.73 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Re: St.Lucie Unit 2 Docket No.50-389 Reportable Event: 1998-005-0 Date of Event: August 7, 1998 New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve 0 erabilit Problem The attached Licensee Event Report 1998-005 is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, J.A.Stall Vice President St.Lucie'lant Ii, JAS/EJW/KWF Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St.Lucie Plant 980'tr0901.73
'it80902 PDR ADOCtt'M00389 S PDR an FPL Group company NRC FORM 366 Ia-1999)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)APPROVED BY OMB NO.3160-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 Estimatod burden por response lo comply with this mandatory information collection roquest: 50 hm.Reported lessons learned aro incorporated tnto the licensing process and fed back to industry.Forward comments regarding burdon estimato to the Records Management Branch (TA F33)US.Nuclear Reguhtory Commission, Washington, DC 205554001, and to the Papenvork Reduction Proiect (31504104$
, Oflice of Management and Budget, Washington DC 20503.If an information colfecgon does not display a currently va(ld OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, lho information colloction.
FACILITY NAME (1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000389 PAGE (3)Page 1 of 4 TITLE (4)New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem EVENT DATE (6)LER NUMBER 6 REPORT DATE 7 OTHER FACIUTIES INVOLVED 8 MONTH 08 DAY 07 SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998 1998-005-00 09 DAY P 02 1998 FACIUTY NAME FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER DocKET NUMsot OPERATING MODE (9)PURSUANT TO THE REQ THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED UIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check 60.73(a)(2)(i)20.2201 (b)20.2203(a)
(2)(v)ono or moro)(11)'60.73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER LEVEL (10)100 20.2203(a)
(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)
(2)(ii)20.2203(a)
(2)(iii)20.2203 (o)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)
(3)(t)20,2203(a)
(3)(ii)20.2203(a)
(4)60.36(c)(1)S0.36(c)(2) 60.73(a)(2)(ii) 60.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 60.73(o)(2)(v)
S0.73(a)(2)(vii)60.73(a)(2)(x)73.71 OTHER Specify In Abstract below or In NRC Form 30BA LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 TELEPHONE NUMSER gnoruda Araa Coda)Kenneth W, Frehafer, Licensing Engineer (561)467-7748 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACIURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX B L200 NO SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, compioto EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X No EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (16)MONTH DAY ABSTRACT iLimit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 16 single-spaced typewritten linesl (16)On August 7, 1998, St.Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.During a review of NRC Information Notice 96-48, Supplement 1, Engineering discovered that the Unit 2 power operated relief valve block valve (V-1476 and V-1477)margins were insufficient to accommodate the additional conservatism specified in NRC Information Notice 96-48, Supplement 1, and assure valve closure.Operations entered the one-hour ACTION statement for Technical Specification 3.4.4.a at 19159 hours on August 7, 1998.The ACTION statement was exited at 20:07 hours the same day when both Unit 2 power operated relief valve block valves were closed with power removed in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
The cause of this event was inadequacies in the original vendor motor operated valve methodology as documented in Limitorque Technical Update 98-01 and NRC Information Notice 96-48 Supplement 1.The new methodology required an additional conservatisms when'evaluating a Limitorque AC powered motor operator's performance.
Corrective actions include the immediate actions taken on August 7,.1998, and the implementation of the planned valve actuator modifications during the upcoming fall Unit 2 Cycle 11 1998 refueling outage.NRC FOAM 399 IB 1999)
NRC FORM 366A (8-1998]LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACIUTY NAME (1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DocKET NUMBER 2 05000389 LER NUMBER I6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-005-00 PAGE (3)Page 2 of 4 TEXT/If more speceis required, use addidonel copies of NRC Form 366A/I17)Description of Event On August 7, 1998, St.Lucie Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power.During review of NRC Information Notice (IN)96-48, Supplement 1, Engineering discovered that the Unit 2 power operated relief valve (PORV)block valve (V-1476 and V-1477)margins were insufficient to assure valve closure.In light of recent tests and studies of motor actuator output, Limitorque retracted its relaxation of the sizing criteria for AC powered motor actuators through issuance of Limitorque Technical Update (TU)98-01.The Limitorque TU revised requirements such'that an additional factor of conservatism needs to be added to evaluate the motor operator's performance.
NRC IN 96-48, Supplement 1, titled"Motor Operated Valve Perfonnance Issues," disseminated this information to the industry.Operations entered the one-hour ACTION statement for Technical Specification 3.4.4.a at 19:59 hours on August 7, 1998.The ACTION statement was exited at 20:07 hours the same day when both Unit 2 PORV block valves were closed with power removed in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
Cause of the Event The cause of this event was'inadequacies in the original vendor motor operated valve (MOV)methodology as documented in Limitorque TU 98-01 and NRC IN 96-48, Supplement 1.Analysis of the Event Technical Specification 3.4.4.requires that each'PORV block valve be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3, with no more than one block valve open.ACTION a.states that: "With one or more block valve(s)inoperable, within?hour either restore the block valve(s)to OPEKLBLE status or close the block valve(s)and remove power from the block valve(s);otherwise, be in at least HOT SMDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />." The past inoperability of the PORV block valves constitutes a condition for which firm evidence exists that the condition existed in the past.It is concluded that the past inoperability time exceeded the allowed outage time (i.e., greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />)of Technical Specification 3.4.4.a and therefore constitutes operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
Accordingly this condition'is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), that states"Licensees shall report: 'any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.'" The purpose of the Limitorque Technical Update (TU)was to provide new guidance to determine the output torque capability of a Limitorque valve actuator with an AC motor.The motor operated valve (MOV)output torque capability is determined by using the following factors: 1.Motor Rated Torque 2.Pullout Efficiency NRC FORM 3BBA IB-19981 0 P I*'v"0 l RC FORM 366A I8-1998)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FAGILITY NAME I1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER I2)05000389 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-005-00 PAGE I3)Page 3 of 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3MAI I17)3.Overall Actuator Gear Ratio 4.Motor Texminal Voltage 5.Motor Rated Voltage 6.Application Factor (AF)selected in accordance with Limitorque SEL-4 Engineering reviewed the current NRC Generic Letter (GL)89-10 MOVprogram calculations and determined that the Motor Rated Torque, Overall Actuator Gear Ratio, and the Motor Terminal and Rated Voltage factors were consistent with the TU requirements.
However, for some MOVs, calculations utilized motor running efficiency (versus pullout efficiency) and the relaxed AF criteria previously provided by Limitorque in TU 93-03.TU 93-03 allowed the assumption of an AP of 1.0 (rather than 0.9)when the motor voltage was less than 90 percent of the motor's rated voltage.Engineering reviewed applicable MOVs, and determined that several valves did not have sufficient margin to account for the additional conservatism introduced by Limitorque TU 98-01.However, only the Unit 2 PORV block valves, V-1476 and V-1477, were determined to be a Technical Specification OPERAEILITY concern.Using the new methodology for the Unit 2 PORV block valves, the calculated closing thrust was 10,464 lbs., and the required closing thrust is 17,440 lbs.Therefore, there is a possibility that the PORV block valves would not close if required.Analysis of the Effect on Safety The past inoperability of the PORV block valves did not constitute operation outside the design basis of the plant and would not have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.The Technical Specifications require that one block valve be.closed during power operation.
In the event of an inadvertent PORV opening, the safety analysis does not credit closing of the associated block valve to prevent exceeding safety-limits.The PORVs are discussed in Emergency Operating Procedure EOP-15 for initiation of once through cooling.However, this is a beyond design basis scenario that requires multiple safety related system failures.The past inoperability of the PORV block valves would not have adversely affected the operation of the PORVs for low temperature over pressure protection (LTOP).In the LTOP mode the PORV block valves only need to be open and are not required to be operated.The PORV system is a high/low pressure interface with the primaxy system.To preclude a fire-induced LOCA, the safe shutdown analysis protects the PORVs from possible spurious operation.
The PORVs'ontrol and power cables are protected or manual action is taken to isolate the PORVs'ower by use of isolate switches in the electrical penetration room in case of a fire in the control room or cable spread-room.No credit is taken for operation of the Unit 2 PORV block valves as far as the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R safe shutdown analysis is concerned.
NRC FOAM SBBA IB.19981 s RC FORM 366A (0-1880)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT.CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1)St.Lucie Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000389 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998-005-00 PAGE (3)Page 4 of 4 TEXT ilf moro speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)Analysis of the Effect on Safety (cont'd)Based on the preceding discussion, past PORV block valve inoperability had no adverse affect on the health and safety of the public.However, in order to provide operational flexibility to the operators during postulated beyond design bases events, St.Lucie implemented temporary system alterations (TSAs)on the Unit 2 PORV block valves to restore these valves to operable status.The TSA for V-1476 was implemented on August 14, 1998, and the TSA for, V-1477 was implemented on August 19, 1998.The TSAs will be removed after the permanent plant modifications are implemented next outage.Corrective Action 1.Immediate action was taken on August 8, 1998 to close the PORV block valves and remove power in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.4.4.a.2.St.Lucie implemented temporary system alterations (TSAs)on the Unit 2 PORV block valves to restore these valves to operable status on August 14, 1998, for V-1476, and August 19, 1998, for V-1477.3.Both PORV block valves will be modified during the upcoming fall 1998 Unit 2 Cycle 11 refueling outage under PC/M 98013.4.The St.Lucie GL 89-10 program requires review of industry operating experience and the incorporation of new information into the program documentation.
The information and issues identified in NRC ZN 98-48 Supplement 1 will be incorporated into the GL 89-'10 program documentation by January 31, 1999.Similar Events LER 50-335/97-009, dated September 17, 1997, reported MOV calculation deficiencies associated with the St.Lucie Unit 1 PORV block valve V-1403.Failed Components Identified Component:
V-1476 and V-1477, PORV block Valve Motor/Actuator Manufacturer:
Limitorque Model Number: SB-00 (3G0861A)NRC FORM 300A (0.18881
)4
