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{{#Wiki_filter:ttACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEMREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8809080369 DOC.DATE:
{{#Wiki_filter:t t ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8809080369 DOC.DATE: 88/09/02 NOTARIZED-NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana&05000315.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HODGE,W.M.
88/09/02NOTARIZED-NODOCKETFACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,Indiana&05000315.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION HODGE,W.M.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.(formerly Indiana&Michigan Ele SMITH,W.G.
IndianaMichiganPowerCo.(formerly Indiana&MichiganEleSMITH,W.G.
Midwest Electric Cooperative RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
MidwestElectricCooperative RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER88-006-00:on 880803,isolation ofC02fireprotection sys,w/ocompensatory actionduetopersonnel error.W/8ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODEIE22DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR IENCLLSIZE:TITLE:50.73LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RDRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LASTANG,JINTERNAL:
LER 88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of C02 fire protection sys,w/o compensatory action due to personnel error.W/8 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL L SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: R D RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA STANG,J INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DS P/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMS E S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 1 1 PD3-1 PD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/BAB 10 NRR/J3RISJSIB 9A G FIL~02 DS'IR DEPY RGN3 FILE 01 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D S/A TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45 NRC Farm'AS (440)LICENSEE EYENT REPORT (LER)U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3160410I EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit I DOCKET NVI44ER (2)os 0 0o31 PA 1 OF 0 4 so at>on o>re rotectlon ys em, s ou ompensatory et>on Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER (4)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (4)MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR gP SEOUENTIAL
ACRSMICHELSON ACRSWYLIEAEOD/DSP/NASAEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRONRR/DEST/CEB 8HNRR/DEST/ICSB 7NRR/DEST/MTB 9HNRR/DEST/RSB 8ENRR/DLPQ/HFB 10NRR/DOEA/EAB 11NRR/DREP/RPB 10NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RESTELFORD,J RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNALEG&GWILLIAMSESHSTLOBBYWARDNRCPDRNSICMAYS,GCOPIESRECIPIENT LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME 11PD3-1PD11111111111111111111111122111111ACRSMOELLERAEOD/DOAAEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7ENRR/DEST/ESB 8DNRR/DEST/MEB 9HNRR/DEST/PSB 8DNRR/DEST/SGB 8DNRR/DLPQ/QAB 10NRR/DREP/BAB 10NRR/J3RISJSIB 9AGFIL~02DS'IRDEPYRGN3FILE0144FORDBLDGHOY,A11LPDR11NSICHARRIS,J11COPIESLTTRENCL11221122111011111111111111111111111111DDS/ATOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
.%IS REVSION NUMBER rS NUMEER MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(s)0 5 0 0 0 08 03 8 8 0 0 6 00 0 9 288 0 5 0 0 0 OP ERAT(NO MODE (4)POWER LEYEL 0 9 0 20A02(4)20.405(e)(1((I)20 ASS(~I (1)(4)20AOS(el(1)(SII 20AOS (e I (I)(Irl 20AOS(e I (1)(el 20AOS(cl 50.34(cl(1) 50.34lc)(2) 50.73(el(2)
LTTR46ENCL45 NRCFarm'AS(440)LICENSEEEYENTREPORT(LER)U.S.NUCLEARREOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMSNO.3160410IEXPIRES:4/31/44FACILITYNAME(1)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-UnitIDOCKETNVI44ER(2)os00o31PA1OF04soat>ono>rerotectlon ysem,souompensatory et>onDuetoPersonnel ErrorEVENTDATE(SILERNUMBER(4)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(4)MONTHDAYYEARYEARgPSEOUENTIAL
II)50.73(~)(2)(4)50.73 le)(2)(IS)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12)50.73(el(2)(Irl 50.73(e l(2)(r)50.73(e)(2)(rEI 50.73(el(2)(rEII(A'I 50.73(el(2)(r(4)(5) 50.73(e)(2)(e)0 THE REDUIREMKNTs oF 10 cFR g;(checfr one or more of the forrowinol (11)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANT T 73.71 (4)73.71(cl OTHER (Specify In Ahrtrect helow enrf In Tert, HIIC Form 3BSAI NAME W.M.Hodge Security Manager TELKPHONK NUMSKR AREA CODE 616 465-59 01 COMPLETE ONE LINK FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYS1'EM COMPONENT MANUFAG TVRER TO NPRDS (%a.5'AUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURKR EPORTASL TO NPRDS L~%a%AWi 5@Ievafrr'(s((LE SUPPLEMENTAL RKPORT EXPECTED (Iel YES Iff yer, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA FB)NO ASSTRACT ILImlt to Ic00 rpecee, EA, epproefmetery fifteen tlngreapece typewrftten float)(14)EXPECTED SUBMISSION OATS (15)MONTH OAY YEAR On August 3, 1988 during isolation/normalization of the Cardox C02 Fire Protection System for the 4kv Switchgear Cable Vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fir e protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory action as required by Technical Specifi-cation 3.7.9.3, action a.It has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and been able'to control and extinguish the fire without significant propogation or equipment damage.To prevent recurrence appropriate administrative actions were taken con-cerning the individuals involved.8805'080369'30902 PDR ADGCK 050003i5 S PDC NRC Form 345 (SS3)
.%ISREVSIONNUMBERrSNUMEERMONTHOAYYEARFACILITYNAMESDOCKETNUMBER(s) 05000080388006000928805000OPERAT(NOMODE(4)POWERLEYEL09020A02(4)20.405(e)
NRC Form 366A (6831 LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION n U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.31SO&104 EXPIR ES: 8/31/BS FACILITY NAME (11 D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (61 YEAR g8'SOVENTIAL
(1((I)20ASS(~I(1)(4)20AOS(el(1)(SII 20AOS(eI(I)(Irl20AOS(eI(1)(el20AOS(cl50.34(cl(1) 50.34lc)(2) 50.73(el(2)
~....I NVMBBR REVISION NUMBER PACE (31 TECT//F'/4//ro
II)50.73(~)(2)(4)50.73le)(2)(IS)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLERl12)50.73(el(2)
<<>>ce/4 iso//Br/I>>B d/Eor>>/HRC
(Irl50.73(el(2)(r)50.73(e)(2)(rEI50.73(el(2)(rEII(A'I 50.73(el(2)(r(4)(5) 50.73(e)(2)(e)0THEREDUIREMKNTs oF10cFRg;(checfroneormoreoftheforrowinol (11)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSVANTT73.71(4)73.71(clOTHER(SpecifyInAhrtrecthelowenrfInTert,HIICForm3BSAINAMEW.M.HodgeSecurityManagerTELKPHONK NUMSKRAREACODE616465-5901COMPLETEONELINKFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYS1'EMCOMPONENT MANUFAGTVRERTONPRDS(%a.5'AUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFAC.TURKREPORTASLTONPRDSL~%a%AWi5@Ievafrr'(s((LE SUPPLEMENTAL RKPORTEXPECTED(IelYESIffyer,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DAFB)NOASSTRACTILImlttoIc00rpecee,EA,epproefmetery fifteentlngreapece typewrftten float)(14)EXPECTEDSUBMISSION OATS(15)MONTHOAYYEAROnAugust3,1988duringisolation/normalization oftheCardoxC02FireProtection Systemforthe4kvSwitchgear CableVault,personnel errorresultedintheisolation ofthefireprotection system,foraperiodof50minutes,withoutcompensatory actionasrequiredbyTechnical Specifi-cation3.7.9.3,actiona.Ithasbeenconcluded thatintheunlikelyeventofafire,personnel wouldhavebeenpromptlyawareofitspresenceandbeenable'tocontrolandextinguish thefirewithoutsignificant propogation orequipment damage.Topreventrecurrence appropriate administrative actionsweretakencon-cerningtheindividuals involved.
%%dnrr 3(ISA3/(IT(0 5 0 0 0 3]88-0 0 6 0 0 0 2 QF 0 onditions Prior To ccurrence Unit 1 operating at 90 percent reactor thermal power.Descri tion of Event On August 3, 1988, during isolation/normalization of the cardox C02 fire protection system (EIIS/KQ)for the 4kv switchgear cable vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fire protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory measures as required by Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a.The sequence of events were as follows.At approximately 0745 hours a plant security officer was dispatched to isolate the Cardox C02 system for the 4kv switchgear room area to facilitate routine maintenance activities.
8805'080369'30902 PDRADGCK050003i5SPDCNRCForm345(SS3)
[NOTE-This isolation is normally accomplished by: 1)isolating the master"normal/isolation" switch (EIIS/KQ-HS) for the entire 4kv area;2)initiating fire watch patrols at a frequency of once every 30 minutes;and 3)logging the isolation of'involved switches on the"Cardox Activity Log"].At 0747 hours, the security officer attempted to isolate the master switch but noted it was inoperable.
NRCForm366A(6831LICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION nU.S.NUCLEARREOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEDOMSNO.31SO&104EXPIRES:8/31/BSFACILITYNAME(11D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER(21LERNUMBER(61YEARg8'SOVENTIAL
This required the security officer to isolate 4 individual switches (EIIS/KQ-,HS), three switches located adjacent to the master switch outside the 4kv entrance, and one switch inside the 4kv area, at the entrance to the cable vault.Following the isolation, the security officer logged"Unit 1 4kv-4 switches", on the Cardox Switch Activity Log.While the proper switches were isolated, and compensatory fire watch coverage initiated, the security officer violated Security Post Order SP0.016 (Cardox Switch Control)in that four entries should have been logged on the tracking sheet to correspond to the four switches that were'repositioned for the isolation of the area.At-0828 hours, following completion of Maintenance activities in the area, security was requested to normalize the Cardox Systems.Since Security post rotations had taken place a different security officer responded to the request.Upon arrival at the 4kv switchgear room the second officer referred to the Cardox switch tracking sheet to determine which switches had been isolated.The officer noted one entry (" Unit 1 4kv-4 switches"), and normalized three switches located outside the 4kv area, adjacent to the master switch.The officer failed to enter the 4kv area to normalize the switchgear cable vault cardox switch, and failed to recognize he had only normalized three switches.Fire watch coverage was discontinued at this time (0828 Hrs).NRC FORM 3BBA (8831*U.S.GPO:I SSS 0.624 538/455 NRC Form 366A (64)3)LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3)60M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT/6'/IKBB NMBB)1 tor)U(od, IIBB aES/orN/NRC Furr 3664'4)(17)OOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR 3 1 5 8 8 LER NUMBER (6)~SEGUENTIAL NUMBER 0 0 6>re'EVISION NUMBER-0 0 PAGE (3)0 3o" 0 4 At 0918 hours, the same second security officer responded to an unrelated request to reisolate the 4kv area.When the officer reported the isolation to the control room, he was reminded to isolate the switch inside the 4kv area by control room personnel.
~....INVMBBRREVISIONNUMBERPACE(31TECT//F'/4//ro
At this time the security officer discovered the deficiency and firewatch coverage was immediately reestablished.
<<>>ce/4iso//Br/I>>Bd/Eor>>/HRC
The switchgear cable vault area Cardox System had been isolated from 0828 hours to 0918 hours (50 minutes), without compensatory fire watch coverage.Cause Of The Event This event was the result of 2 personnel errors involving the failure to properly comply with the approved procedure:
%%dnrr3(ISA3/(IT(050003]88-0060002QF0onditions PriorToccurrence Unit1operating at90percentreactorthermalpower.DescritionofEventOnAugust3,1988,duringisolation/normalization ofthecardoxC02fireprotection system(EIIS/KQ) forthe4kvswitchgear cablevault,personnel errorresultedintheisolation ofthefireprotection system,foraperiodof50minutes,withoutcompensatory measuresasrequiredbyTechnical Specification 3.7.9.3actiona.Thesequenceofeventswereasfollows.Atapproximately 0745hoursaplantsecurityofficerwasdispatched toisolatetheCardoxC02systemforthe4kvswitchgear roomareatofacilitate routinemaintenance activities.
1)The security officer initially isolating the Cardox System for entry into the 4kv area failed to properly log the isolation of each individual area switch turned (Security Post Order SP0.016 requires each switch turned to be logged separately on the switch activity log,'the security officer made one entry and noted that four switches had been turned);and, 2)the security officer normalizing the Cardox Systems referenced the switch activity log and properly read the entry as four switches, however only repositioned (normalizing) three switches.The security officer normalizing the Cardox Systems erroneously counted the switches he had repositioned.
[NOTE-Thisisolation isnormallyaccomplished by:1)isolating themaster"normal/isolation" switch(EIIS/KQ-HS) fortheentire4kvarea;2)initiating firewatchpatrolsatafrequency ofonceevery30minutes;and3)loggingtheisolation of'involved switchesonthe"CardoxActivityLog"].At0747hours,thesecurityofficerattempted toisolatethemasterswitchbutnoteditwasinoperable.
Anal sis Of The Event The isolation of the switchgear cable vault Cardox System without compensatory fire watch coverage, was in violation of Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).It has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and been able to control and extinguish the fire without significant propagation or equipment damage.This conclusion is based on the following:
Thisrequiredthesecurityofficertoisolate4individual switches(EIIS/KQ-,HS),
1)the relatively low fixed combustible load within the area involved (33,552 BTU's per square foot..for a fire duration of less than 30 minutes);2)the physical and administrative limits on the introduction of transient combustibles (only a negligible amount of combustibles were present in the involved area for the duration of the event);3)operable early warning fire detection systems (consisting of both ionization and infrared detectors), and 4)the existence of a trained on-shift fire brigade.Based on the above, this event is not considered to have created any significant safety concern and did not constitute an unreviewed
threeswitcheslocatedadjacenttothemasterswitchoutsidethe4kventrance, andoneswitchinsidethe4kvarea,attheentrancetothecablevault.Following theisolation, thesecurityofficerlogged"Unit14kv-4switches",
'safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, nor did it create a significant hazard to the health and safety of the general public.NRC FORM 3BBA (64)3)*U.S.GPO:1986.0 624 538/465 NRC Form 366A (943)LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINU ION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/3(/88 FACILITY NAME (I)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 OOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)VEAR'.v<:@'EQUENTIAL 4$NUMBER NO REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)TEXT CF/Roro EPBoo/r FBBUSBI/Iroo a//I/ooo/NRC
ontheCardoxSwitchActivityLog.Whiletheproperswitcheswereisolated, andcompensatory firewatchcoverageinitiated, thesecurityofficerviolatedSecurityPostOrderSP0.016(CardoxSwitchControl)inthatfourentriesshouldhavebeenloggedonthetrackingsheettocorrespond tothefourswitchesthatwere'repositioned fortheisolation ofthearea.At-0828hours,following completion ofMaintenance activities inthearea,securitywasrequested tonormalize theCardoxSystems.SinceSecuritypostrotations hadtakenplaceadifferent securityofficerresponded totherequest.Uponarrivalatthe4kvswitchgear roomthesecondofficerreferredtotheCardoxswitchtrackingsheettodetermine whichswitcheshadbeenisolated.
%%drrn 3/)//A'/(17)0 5 0 0 0 3]8 8 0 0 6 0 0 0 4 QF 0 4 Corrective Action To prevent recurrence, appropriate administrative actions were taken concerning the individuals involved.Although the first security officer failed to follow procedural guidance in logging of the repositioned switches, the officer did provide sufficient information that the second security officer should have recognized the condition of the affected switches.The second officer simply failed to count the number of switches he repositioned/normalized.
Theofficernotedoneentry("Unit14kv-4switches"),
It has been concluded that adequate procedural instruction currently exists.In consideration of former LER 315/88-005-00 there has been individual identification numbers and isolation zone descriptions placed on each cardox control switch.These numbers may be used as an operational aid to assure the proper switch or switches are manipulated.
andnormalized threeswitcheslocatedoutsidethe4kvarea,adjacenttothemasterswitch.Theofficerfailedtoenterthe4kvareatonormalize theswitchgear cablevaultcardoxswitch,andfailedtorecognize hehadonlynormalized threeswitches.
Installation of the numbers and isolation zone information was completed on September 1, 1988.Failed Com onent Identification Not applicable
Firewatchcoveragewasdiscontinued atthistime(0828Hrs).NRCFORM3BBA(8831*U.S.GPO:I SSS0.624538/455 NRCForm366A(64)3)LICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMBNO.3)60M)04EXPIRES:8/31/88FACILITYNAME(1)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1TEXT/6'/IKBBNMBB)1tor)U(od, IIBBaES/orN/NRC Furr3664'4)(17)OOCKETNUMBER(2)YEAR31588LERNUMBER(6)~SEGUENTIAL NUMBER006>re'EVISION NUMBER-00PAGE(3)03o"04At0918hours,thesamesecondsecurityofficerresponded toanunrelated requesttoreisolate the4kvarea.Whentheofficerreportedtheisolation tothecontrolroom,hewasremindedtoisolatetheswitchinsidethe4kvareabycontrolroompersonnel.
-No components failed during the course of this event.Previous Similar Events 50-315/88.-005 50-315/85-008,-020 50 316/84 009F 022F 027 50-316/83-048,-060 50-315/83-022,-028,-034,-094,-114 50-316/82-054,-058,-062,-076,-084 50 315/82 037F 044F 045F 049F 068F 081'F 082F 108 NRC FO/IM SBBA (983)*U.S.GPO:1986 0.824 538/488 Indiana Michiga Power Cotnpany Cook Nuclear Plani P.O.Box 458 Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICHIGAN POWER September 2, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No.50-315 Document Control Manager: In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:
Atthistimethesecurityofficerdiscovered thedeficiency andfirewatch coveragewasimmediately reestablished.
88-006-00 Sincerely, u,~g Plant Manager WGS:clw Attachment cc: D.H.Williams, Jr.A.B.Davis, Region III M.P.Alexich P.A.Barrett J.E.Borggren R.F.Kroeger NRC Resident Inspector J.F.Stang, NRC R.C.Callen G.Charnoff, Esq.Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D.Hahn INPO PNSRC A.A.Blind S.J.Brewer/B.P.Lauzau}}
Theswitchgear cablevaultareaCardoxSystemhadbeenisolatedfrom0828hoursto0918hours(50minutes),
withoutcompensatory firewatchcoverage.
CauseOfTheEventThiseventwastheresultof2personnel errorsinvolving thefailuretoproperlycomplywiththeapprovedprocedure:
1)Thesecurityofficerinitially isolating theCardoxSystemforentryintothe4kvareafailedtoproperlylogtheisolation ofeachindividual areaswitchturned(Security PostOrderSP0.016requireseachswitchturnedtobeloggedseparately ontheswitchactivitylog,'thesecurityofficermadeoneentryandnotedthatfourswitcheshadbeenturned);and,2)thesecurityofficernormalizing theCardoxSystemsreferenced theswitchactivitylogandproperlyreadtheentryasfourswitches, howeveronlyrepositioned (normalizing) threeswitches.
Thesecurityofficernormalizing theCardoxSystemserroneously countedtheswitcheshehadrepositioned.
AnalsisOfTheEventTheisolation oftheswitchgear cablevaultCardoxSystemwithoutcompensatory firewatchcoverage, wasinviolation ofTechnical Specification 3.7.9.3actiona,andisreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Ithasbeenconcluded thatintheunlikelyeventofafire,personnel wouldhavebeenpromptlyawareofitspresenceandbeenabletocontrolandextinguish thefirewithoutsignificant propagation orequipment damage.Thisconclusion isbasedonthefollowing:
1)therelatively lowfixedcombustible loadwithintheareainvolved(33,552BTU'spersquarefoot..for afiredurationoflessthan30minutes);
2)thephysicalandadministrative limitsontheintroduction oftransient combustibles (onlyanegligible amountofcombustibles werepresentintheinvolvedareaforthedurationoftheevent);3)operableearlywarningfiredetection systems(consisting ofbothionization andinfrareddetectors),
and4)theexistence ofatrainedon-shiftfirebrigade.Basedontheabove,thiseventisnotconsidered tohavecreatedanysignificant safetyconcernanddidnotconstitute anunreviewed
'safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59,nordiditcreateasignificant hazardtothehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.NRCFORM3BBA(64)3)*U.S.GPO:1986.0 624538/465 NRCForm366A(943)LICENSEEENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOOMSNO.3150W104EXPIRES:8/3(/88FACILITYNAME(I)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1OOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(6)VEAR'.v<:@'EQUENTIAL 4$NUMBERNOREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)TEXTCF/RoroEPBoo/rFBBUSBI/Irooa//I/ooo/NRC
%%drrn3/)//A'/(17)050003]880060004QF04Corrective ActionTopreventrecurrence, appropriate administrative actionsweretakenconcerning theindividuals involved.
Althoughthefirstsecurityofficerfailedtofollowprocedural guidanceinloggingoftherepositioned
: switches, theofficerdidprovidesufficient information thatthesecondsecurityofficershouldhaverecognized thecondition oftheaffectedswitches.
Thesecondofficersimplyfailedtocountthenumberofswitchesherepositioned/normalized.
Ithasbeenconcluded thatadequateprocedural instruction currently exists.Inconsideration offormerLER315/88-005-00 therehasbeenindividual identification numbersandisolation zonedescriptions placedoneachcardoxcontrolswitch.Thesenumbersmaybeusedasanoperational aidtoassuretheproperswitchorswitchesaremanipulated.
Installation ofthenumbersandisolation zoneinformation wascompleted onSeptember 1,1988.FailedComonentIdentification Notapplicable
-Nocomponents failedduringthecourseofthisevent.PreviousSimilarEvents50-315/88.-005 50-315/85-008,-020 50316/84009F022F02750-316/83-048,-060 50-315/83-022,-028,-034,-094,-114 50-316/82-054,-058,-062,-076,-084 50315/82037F044F045F049F068F081'F082F108NRCFO/IMSBBA(983)*U.S.GPO:1986 0.824538/488 IndianaMichigaPowerCotnpanyCookNuclearPlaniP.O.Box458Bridgman, Ml491066164655901INDIANANICHIGANPOWERSeptember 2,1988UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Operating LicenseDPR-58DocketNo.50-315DocumentControlManager:Inaccordance withthecriteriaestablished by10CFR50.73entitledLicenseeEventReortinSstem,thefollowing reportisbeingsubmitted:
88-006-00 Sincerely, u,~gPlantManagerWGS:clwAttachment cc:D.H.Williams, Jr.A.B.Davis,RegionIIIM.P.AlexichP.A.BarrettJ.E.BorggrenR.F.KroegerNRCResidentInspector J.F.Stang,NRCR.C.CallenG.Charnoff, Esq.DottieSherman,ANILibraryD.HahnINPOPNSRCA.A.BlindS.J.Brewer/B.
P.Lauzau}}

Revision as of 09:02, 6 July 2018

LER 88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of CO2 Fire Protection Sys,W/O Compensatory Action Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Appropriate Administrative Action Taken W/Individuals involved.W/880902 Ltr
ML17326B439
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 09/02/1988
From: HODGE W M, SMITH W G
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG, MIDWEST ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-006-01, LER-88-6-1, NUDOCS 8809080369
Download: ML17326B439 (6)


Text

t t ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8809080369 DOC.DATE: 88/09/02 NOTARIZED-NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana&05000315.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HODGE,W.M.

Indiana Michigan Power Co.(formerly Indiana&Michigan Ele SMITH,W.G.

Midwest Electric Cooperative RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-006-00:on 880803,isolation of C02 fire protection sys,w/o compensatory action due to personnel error.W/8 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL L SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: R D RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA STANG,J INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DS P/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMS E S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 1 1 PD3-1 PD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/BAB 10 NRR/J3RISJSIB 9A G FIL~02 DS'IR DEPY RGN3 FILE 01 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D S/A TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45 NRC Farm'AS (440)LICENSEE EYENT REPORT (LER)U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3160410I EXPIRES: 4/31/44 FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit I DOCKET NVI44ER (2)os 0 0o31 PA 1 OF 0 4 so at>on o>re rotectlon ys em, s ou ompensatory et>on Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER (4)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (4)MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR gP SEOUENTIAL

.%IS REVSION NUMBER rS NUMEER MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(s)0 5 0 0 0 08 03 8 8 0 0 6 00 0 9 288 0 5 0 0 0 OP ERAT(NO MODE (4)POWER LEYEL 0 9 0 20A02(4)20.405(e)(1((I)20 ASS(~I (1)(4)20AOS(el(1)(SII 20AOS (e I (I)(Irl 20AOS(e I (1)(el 20AOS(cl 50.34(cl(1) 50.34lc)(2) 50.73(el(2)

II)50.73(~)(2)(4)50.73 le)(2)(IS)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER l12)50.73(el(2)(Irl 50.73(e l(2)(r)50.73(e)(2)(rEI 50.73(el(2)(rEII(A'I 50.73(el(2)(r(4)(5) 50.73(e)(2)(e)0 THE REDUIREMKNTs oF 10 cFR g;(checfr one or more of the forrowinol (11)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSVANT T 73.71 (4)73.71(cl OTHER (Specify In Ahrtrect helow enrf In Tert, HIIC Form 3BSAI NAME W.M.Hodge Security Manager TELKPHONK NUMSKR AREA CODE 616 465-59 01 COMPLETE ONE LINK FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYS1'EM COMPONENT MANUFAG TVRER TO NPRDS (%a.5'AUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURKR EPORTASL TO NPRDS L~%a%AWi 5@Ievafrr'(s((LE SUPPLEMENTAL RKPORT EXPECTED (Iel YES Iff yer, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA FB)NO ASSTRACT ILImlt to Ic00 rpecee, EA, epproefmetery fifteen tlngreapece typewrftten float)(14)EXPECTED SUBMISSION OATS (15)MONTH OAY YEAR On August 3, 1988 during isolation/normalization of the Cardox C02 Fire Protection System for the 4kv Switchgear Cable Vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fir e protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory action as required by Technical Specifi-cation 3.7.9.3, action a.It has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and been able'to control and extinguish the fire without significant propogation or equipment damage.To prevent recurrence appropriate administrative actions were taken con-cerning the individuals involved.8805'080369'30902 PDR ADGCK 050003i5 S PDC NRC Form 345 (SS3)

NRC Form 366A (6831 LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION n U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.31SO&104 EXPIR ES: 8/31/BS FACILITY NAME (11 D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (61 YEAR g8'SOVENTIAL

~....I NVMBBR REVISION NUMBER PACE (31 TECT//F'/4//ro

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%%dnrr 3(ISA3/(IT(0 5 0 0 0 3]88-0 0 6 0 0 0 2 QF 0 onditions Prior To ccurrence Unit 1 operating at 90 percent reactor thermal power.Descri tion of Event On August 3, 1988, during isolation/normalization of the cardox C02 fire protection system (EIIS/KQ)for the 4kv switchgear cable vault, personnel error resulted in the isolation of the fire protection system, for a period of 50 minutes, without compensatory measures as required by Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a.The sequence of events were as follows.At approximately 0745 hours0.00862 days <br />0.207 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.834725e-4 months <br /> a plant security officer was dispatched to isolate the Cardox C02 system for the 4kv switchgear room area to facilitate routine maintenance activities.

[NOTE-This isolation is normally accomplished by: 1)isolating the master"normal/isolation" switch (EIIS/KQ-HS) for the entire 4kv area;2)initiating fire watch patrols at a frequency of once every 30 minutes;and 3)logging the isolation of'involved switches on the"Cardox Activity Log"].At 0747 hours0.00865 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.842335e-4 months <br />, the security officer attempted to isolate the master switch but noted it was inoperable.

This required the security officer to isolate 4 individual switches (EIIS/KQ-,HS), three switches located adjacent to the master switch outside the 4kv entrance, and one switch inside the 4kv area, at the entrance to the cable vault.Following the isolation, the security officer logged"Unit 1 4kv-4 switches", on the Cardox Switch Activity Log.While the proper switches were isolated, and compensatory fire watch coverage initiated, the security officer violated Security Post Order SP0.016 (Cardox Switch Control)in that four entries should have been logged on the tracking sheet to correspond to the four switches that were'repositioned for the isolation of the area.At-0828 hours, following completion of Maintenance activities in the area, security was requested to normalize the Cardox Systems.Since Security post rotations had taken place a different security officer responded to the request.Upon arrival at the 4kv switchgear room the second officer referred to the Cardox switch tracking sheet to determine which switches had been isolated.The officer noted one entry (" Unit 1 4kv-4 switches"), and normalized three switches located outside the 4kv area, adjacent to the master switch.The officer failed to enter the 4kv area to normalize the switchgear cable vault cardox switch, and failed to recognize he had only normalized three switches.Fire watch coverage was discontinued at this time (0828 Hrs).NRC FORM 3BBA (8831*U.S.GPO:I SSS 0.624 538/455 NRC Form 366A (64)3)LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3)60M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 TEXT/6'/IKBB NMBB)1 tor)U(od, IIBB aES/orN/NRC Furr 3664'4)(17)OOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR 3 1 5 8 8 LER NUMBER (6)~SEGUENTIAL NUMBER 0 0 6>re'EVISION NUMBER-0 0 PAGE (3)0 3o" 0 4 At 0918 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.49299e-4 months <br />, the same second security officer responded to an unrelated request to reisolate the 4kv area.When the officer reported the isolation to the control room, he was reminded to isolate the switch inside the 4kv area by control room personnel.

At this time the security officer discovered the deficiency and firewatch coverage was immediately reestablished.

The switchgear cable vault area Cardox System had been isolated from 0828 hours0.00958 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15054e-4 months <br /> to 0918 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.49299e-4 months <br /> (50 minutes), without compensatory fire watch coverage.Cause Of The Event This event was the result of 2 personnel errors involving the failure to properly comply with the approved procedure:

1)The security officer initially isolating the Cardox System for entry into the 4kv area failed to properly log the isolation of each individual area switch turned (Security Post Order SP0.016 requires each switch turned to be logged separately on the switch activity log,'the security officer made one entry and noted that four switches had been turned);and, 2)the security officer normalizing the Cardox Systems referenced the switch activity log and properly read the entry as four switches, however only repositioned (normalizing) three switches.The security officer normalizing the Cardox Systems erroneously counted the switches he had repositioned.

Anal sis Of The Event The isolation of the switchgear cable vault Cardox System without compensatory fire watch coverage, was in violation of Technical Specification 3.7.9.3 action a, and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).It has been concluded that in the unlikely event of a fire, personnel would have been promptly aware of its presence and been able to control and extinguish the fire without significant propagation or equipment damage.This conclusion is based on the following:

1)the relatively low fixed combustible load within the area involved (33,552 BTU's per square foot..for a fire duration of less than 30 minutes);2)the physical and administrative limits on the introduction of transient combustibles (only a negligible amount of combustibles were present in the involved area for the duration of the event);3)operable early warning fire detection systems (consisting of both ionization and infrared detectors), and 4)the existence of a trained on-shift fire brigade.Based on the above, this event is not considered to have created any significant safety concern and did not constitute an unreviewed

'safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, nor did it create a significant hazard to the health and safety of the general public.NRC FORM 3BBA (64)3)*U.S.GPO:1986.0 624 538/465 NRC Form 366A (943)LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINU ION U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/3(/88 FACILITY NAME (I)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 OOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (6)VEAR'.v<:@'EQUENTIAL 4$NUMBER NO REVISION NUMBER PAGE (3)TEXT CF/Roro EPBoo/r FBBUSBI/Iroo a//I/ooo/NRC

%%drrn 3/)//A'/(17)0 5 0 0 0 3]8 8 0 0 6 0 0 0 4 QF 0 4 Corrective Action To prevent recurrence, appropriate administrative actions were taken concerning the individuals involved.Although the first security officer failed to follow procedural guidance in logging of the repositioned switches, the officer did provide sufficient information that the second security officer should have recognized the condition of the affected switches.The second officer simply failed to count the number of switches he repositioned/normalized.

It has been concluded that adequate procedural instruction currently exists.In consideration of former LER 315/88-005-00 there has been individual identification numbers and isolation zone descriptions placed on each cardox control switch.These numbers may be used as an operational aid to assure the proper switch or switches are manipulated.

Installation of the numbers and isolation zone information was completed on September 1, 1988.Failed Com onent Identification Not applicable

-No components failed during the course of this event.Previous Similar Events 50-315/88.-005 50-315/85-008,-020 50 316/84 009F 022F 027 50-316/83-048,-060 50-315/83-022,-028,-034,-094,-114 50-316/82-054,-058,-062,-076,-084 50 315/82 037F 044F 045F 049F 068F 081'F 082F 108 NRC FO/IM SBBA (983)*U.S.GPO:1986 0.824 538/488 Indiana Michiga Power Cotnpany Cook Nuclear Plani P.O.Box 458 Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 INDIANA NICHIGAN POWER September 2, 1988 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Operating License DPR-58 Docket No.50-315 Document Control Manager: In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ortin S stem, the following report is being submitted:

88-006-00 Sincerely, u,~g Plant Manager WGS:clw Attachment cc: D.H.Williams, Jr.A.B.Davis, Region III M.P.Alexich P.A.Barrett J.E.Borggren R.F.Kroeger NRC Resident Inspector J.F.Stang, NRC R.C.Callen G.Charnoff, Esq.Dottie Sherman, ANI Library D.Hahn INPO PNSRC A.A.Blind S.J.Brewer/B.P.Lauzau