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| {{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DOCUMENTDISTRIBUTION SYSTEMREGULAT+INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO!YSTEM (RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:9308200131 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REGULAT+INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO!YSTEM (RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:9308200131 DOC.DATE: 93/08/13 NOTARIZED: |
| 93/08/13NOTARIZED: | | NO DOCKET¹FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BREWER,S.J. |
| NODOCKET¹FACIL:50-315 DonaldC.CookNuclearPowerPlant,Unit1,IndianaM05000315AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION BREWER,S.J.
| | Indiana Michigan Power Co.BLINDFA.A. |
| IndianaMichiganPowerCo.BLINDFA.A.
| | Indiana Michigan Power Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION |
| IndianaMichiganPowerCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
| |
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| |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER93-010-01:on 900824,routing ofcableforUnits162notincompliance w/10CFR50,App R.Initiat plantmodifications forcablecompliance.Rev correctserrorinidentified controlroominstrumentation duringfire.W/930813 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1LADEAN,WINTERNAL:
| | LER 93-010-01:on 900824,routing of cable for Units 1 6 2 not in compliance w/10CFR50,App R.Initiat plant modifications for cable compliance.Rev corrects error in identified control room instrumentation during fire.W/930813 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA DEAN,W INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRIL/RPEB R~QS SPLB G FIL 02 RGN3 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE F J~H NRC PDR NSIC POOREFW~2 2 1 1 1 1 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| ACNWAEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRIL/RPEB R~QSSPLBGFIL02RGN3FILE01COPIESLTTRENCL1111221111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD3-1PDAEOD/DOAAEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB COPIESLTTRENCL111122111111221111EXTERNALEGGGBRYCEFJ~HNRCPDRNSICPOOREFW~221111LSTLOBBYWARDNSICMURPHY,G.A NUDOCSFULLTXT111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
| | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACI'HE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.504-2065)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 30 ENCL 30 I'X Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant~One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 lNDIAMA NlCHletAN POWER August 13, 1993 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No.50-315 Document Control Manager: In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ort S stem the following report is being submitted: |
| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACI'HE DOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.504-2065)
| | 90-010-01 Sincerely, A.A.Blind Plant Manager/sb Attachment c: J.B.Martin, Region III E.E.Fitzpatrick P.A.Barrett R.F.Kroeger W.E.Walters-Ft.Wayne NRC Resident Inspector B.A.Wetzel-NRC M.R.Padgett G.Charnoff, Esp.D.Hahn INPO S.J.Brewer B.A.Svensson;-OA i3~f'.9308200i3i 9308i3 PDR ADOCK 050003i5 8 PDR NRC FORM 366 (569)VS.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)APPROVED OMB NO.3)504)104 EXPIRES: 4I30I92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUESTt 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (Pc)30).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555.AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 131500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME lll D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PA E 3)o 5 o o o 31 510(-05'''" 10CFR50 Appendix R Deficiencies Resulting in Potential Loss of Local Shutdown Indication Panel Function EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER IS)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sl MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL r..epi NUMBER N'c>NUMSE R MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES D.C.Cook-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBERISI 0 5 0 0 0 316 0 8 249 09 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 1 3 9 3 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE IS)jth's xc NCi...Cv': |
| TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
| | POWER LEVEL'1 p p y'v'0.402()t) 20A05(el(1 (0)20AOSle HI)(Q)20,405(sl(1) liiil 20.405 (4)(I)(lr)20.405(e l (1)(r)20.405(c)BOM(e)II!50M(e)(2)50.73(el(2) ll)50.73(sl(2) |
| LTTR30ENCL30 I'X IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyCookNuclearPlant~OneCookPlaceBridgman, Ml491066164655901lNDIAMANlCHletAN POWERAugust13,1993UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskRockville, Maryland20852Operating LicensesDPR-58DocketNo.50-315DocumentControlManager:Inaccordance withthecriteriaestablished by10CFR50.73entitledLicenseeEventReortSstemthefollowing reportisbeingsubmitted:
| | Iiil 50.73ls)(2)liiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I 50.73(el l2)lie)50,'73(s)(2)(r)50.73(s)(2)lr)I)50.73(~)(2)(xiii)IA)50.73(e I (2)ls)ill (5)50.73(~I l2)I x)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE RLDUIREMENTB of 10 cFR (i: Icsrcc onr ot mtNr oi tnr fottowinpl Ill 73.71(o)73.71(cl OTHER ISpectiy in Apttrect Orlow end in Text, Hi)C Form 36SAJ NAME S.J.Brewer-Nuclear Safety, Licensing and Assessment, Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 61 422 3-2 02 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT l13)CAUSE SYSTFM COMPONENT MANUF AC.TVRER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TVRER EPORTABL TO NPRDS 5~8%SKI&SVPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES Iif yet, compirte EXPECTED SVS4IISSIOH DATfi NO ABSTRACT ILlmit to 14IX)tprcrt, i.r., rppmximetriy fifteen sinplr g>>cr typrwn'ttrn imrsl IIS)EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE IISI MONTH DAY YEAR The purpose of the revision is to correct an error in the identified control room instrumentation available during a fire in Unit 2 fire area 29.The revision also is in response to a commitment in LER 50-316 f93-005 dated-5/20/93.The commitment in LER 50-316 893-005 was to revise this LER upon re-evaluation of the Appendix R compliance strategy for the sub)ect fire areas.On August 24, 1990, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode Six, it was discovered that the routing of cable associated with the Unit 1 Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels was not in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.On September 6, 1990, i.t was subsequently di.scovered that a simi.lar condition existed for the Unit 2 LSI panels.The immediate corrective action taken was initiation of plant modi.fications to bring the subject plant cabling into compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.All identified areas are provided with adequate fire detection and suppression to substantially mitigate the impact of a fire on normal and LSI instrumentation. |
| 90-010-01 Sincerely, A.A.BlindPlantManager/sbAttachment c:J.B.Martin,RegionIIIE.E.Fitzpatrick P.A.BarrettR.F.KroegerW.E.Walters-Ft.WayneNRCResidentInspector B.A.Wetzel-NRCM.R.PadgettG.Charnoff, Esp.D.HahnINPOS.J.BrewerB.A.Svensson;-OAi3~f'.9308200i3i 9308i3PDRADOCK050003i58PDR NRCFORM366(569)VS.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)APPROVEDOMBNO.3)504)104 EXPIRES:4I30I92ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWTHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REGUESTt50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHERECORDSANDREPORTSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(Pc)30).U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555.ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT131500104), | | Therefore, this event did not adversly impact the health and safety of the public.NRC Fottn 365 (569) |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC20503.FACILITYNAMElllD.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)PAE3)o5ooo31510(-05'''"10CFR50AppendixRDeficiencies Resulting inPotential LossofLocalShutdownIndication PanelFunctionEVENTDATE(SILERNUMBERIS)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(SlMONTHDAYYEARYEARSEQUENTIAL r..epiNUMBERN'c>NUMSERMONTHOAYYEARFACILITYNAMESD.C.Cook-Unit2DOCKETNUMBERISI 0500031608249090010008139305000OPERATING MODEIS)jth'sxcNCi...Cv':
| | NRC FORM 344A (4$9)U.S.NUCLEAR AEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVED OMB NO.S(500(05 EXPIRES: el30N2 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 500 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. |
| POWERLEVEL'1ppy'v'0.402()t) 20A05(el(1 (0)20AOSleHI)(Q)20,405(sl(1) liiil20.405(4)(I)(lr)20.405(el(1)(r)20.405(c)
| | WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(5041041. |
| BOM(e)II!50M(e)(2)50.73(el(2) ll)50.73(sl(2) | | OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (41 55GVCNTIAL r(2 NVM IIEVISION NVM 5O PAGE (3)TEXT lll more epece lr rer)o(red. |
| Iiil50.73ls)(2)liiilLICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12I50.73(ell2)lie)50,'73(s)
| | Iree eddldorml llRC%%drm 35EABI (12)o 5 o o o 315 9 0 010 01 02 OF 0 5 Co ditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 in Mode 6.Descri tion of Event On August 24, 1990, it was discovered that the routing of cables associated with the Unit 1 Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels was not in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. |
| (2)(r)50.73(s)(2)lr)I)50.73(~)(2)(xiii) | | A postulated fire in any of three Unit 1 fire areas could have resulted in an inability to maintain power to the LSI panels.The.following describes the analysis performed. |
| IA)50.73(eI(2)ls)ill(5)50.73(~Il2)Ix)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANT70THERLDUIREMENTB of10cFR(i:IcsrcconrotmtNroitnrfottowinpl Ill73.71(o)73.71(clOTHERISpectiyinApttrectOrlowendinText,Hi)CForm36SAJNAMES.J.Brewer-NuclearSafety,Licensing andAssessment, ManagerTELEPHONE NUMBERAREACODE614223-202COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORTl13)CAUSESYSTFMCOMPONENT MANUFAC.TVREREPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFAC.TVREREPORTABLTONPRDS5~8%SKI&SVPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YESIifyet,compirteEXPECTEDSVS4IISSIOH DATfiNOABSTRACTILlmitto14IX)tprcrt,i.r.,rppmximetriy fifteensinplrg>>crtyprwn'ttrn imrslIIS)EXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATEIISIMONTHDAYYEARThepurposeoftherevisionistocorrectanerrorintheidentified controlroominstrumentation available duringafireinUnit2firearea29.Therevisionalsoisinresponsetoacommitment inLER50-316f93-005dated-5/20/93.Thecommitment inLER50-316893-005wastorevisethisLERuponre-evaluation oftheAppendixRcompliance strategyforthesub)ectfireareas.OnAugust24,1990,withUnit1operating at100percentpowerandUnit2inModeSix,itwasdiscovered thattheroutingofcableassociated withtheUnit1LocalShutdownIndication (LSI)panelswasnotincompliance with10CFR50AppendixR.OnSeptember 6,1990,i.twassubsequently di.scovered thatasimi.larcondition existedfortheUnit2LSIpanels.Theimmediate corrective actiontakenwasinitiation ofplantmodi.fications tobringthesubjectplantcablingintocompliance with10CFR50AppendixR.Allidentified areasareprovidedwithadequatefiredetection andsuppression tosubstantially mitigatetheimpactofafireonnormalandLSIinstrumentation. | | Unit 1 Fire Areas 40 (Zone 41), 48 (Zone 55), and 49 (Zone 56).The area analyses performed identified that a fire in any one of these fire areas could have eliminated both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 power to the Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels.The discrepant cable in question was cable 1-29685G (EIIS/ED-CBL3) which runs between panels 1-LSI-6 and 1-LSI-6X.A fault of this cable due to a fire would have eliminated the Unit 2 Alternate feed-to the Unit 1 LSI panels.The Unit 1 normal power feed to the LSI panels was already assumed lost for a fire in any of these areas because various cables associated with the availability of MCC 1-ABC-B would have been lost.On September 6, 1990, it was subsequently discovered that a similar condition existed for the Unit 2 LSI panels.A postulated fire in one of the Unit 2 fire areas could have resulted in an inability to maintain power to the LSI panels.The following describes the analysis performed. |
| Therefore, thiseventdidnotadverslyimpactthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.NRCFottn365(569) | | Unit 2 Fire Area 29 (Zones 24, 25)The area analyses performed identified-that a fire in Fire Zone 24 would have faulted both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 power to the LSI panels.The discrepant power source to the Unit 2 LSI panels runs in Fire Zone 24 which also contains the Unit 2 normal source cable 2-12467 (EIIS/ED-CBL3). |
| NRCFORM344A(4$9)U.S.NUCLEARAEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPAOVEDOMBNO.S(500(05 EXPIRES:el30N2ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWTHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI500HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHERECORDSANDREPORTSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIP430).U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION.
| | Although 2-12467 also runs in Zone 25, 1-1936R does not.Fire Zones 24 and 25 are separated by a three-hour fire-rated wall.NRC Form 344A(509) |
| WASHINGTON, DC20555,ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3(5041041. | | NRC FORM 35SA)509)ILS.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO.31504)0>> |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET,WASHINGTON, OC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLERNUMBER(4155GVCNTIAL r(2NVMIIEVISION NVM5OPAGE(3)TEXTlllmoreepecelrrer)o(red.
| | EXPIRES:>>/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST.'00 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAQEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINQTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150410i). |
| Ireeeddldorml llRC%%drm35EABI(12)o5ooo315900100102OF05CoditionsPriortoOccurrence Unit1inMode1at100percentRatedThermalPowerUnit2inMode6.DescritionofEventOnAugust24,1990,itwasdiscovered thattheroutingofcablesassociated withtheUnit1LocalShutdownIndication (LSI)panelswasnotincompliance with10CFR50AppendixRrequirements.
| | OFFICE OF MANAQ E MENT AND BUDGET, WASH INQTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME 11)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 12)o 5 o o o 315 LER NUMBER 15)YEAR<~SEQUENTIAL |
| Apostulated fireinanyofthreeUnit1fireareascouldhaveresultedinaninability tomaintainpowertotheLSIpanels.The.following describes theanalysisperformed.
| | )~AEVI>>ION>0?3 NUM>>II.sW: NUMB>>A 90-010-01~AOE C))03oF 0 5 TEXT///mor>><<ec>>4 r>>r/unrL u>>>>>>~Ar/IC form Sr/SAS/(ill Cause of Event The condition was the result of insufficient scoping for 10CFR50 Appendix R design changes.Insufficient controls were in place to ensure that new cables added to the plant complied with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements. |
| Unit1FireAreas40(Zone41),48(Zone55),and49(Zone56).Theareaanalysesperformed identified thatafireinanyoneofthesefireareascouldhaveeliminated boththeUnit1andUnit2powertotheLocalShutdownIndication (LSI)panels.Thediscrepant cableinquestionwascable1-29685G(EIIS/ED-CBL3) whichrunsbetweenpanels1-LSI-6and1-LSI-6X.
| | nal sis of Event This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(C) in that the condition was outside the design basis and not covered by the plant's.operating and emergency procedures respectively. |
| Afaultofthiscableduetoafirewouldhaveeliminated theUnit2Alternate feed-totheUnit1LSIpanels.TheUnit1normalpowerfeedtotheLSIpanelswasalreadyassumedlostforafireinanyoftheseareasbecausevariouscablesassociated withtheavailability ofMCC1-ABC-Bwouldhavebeenlost.OnSeptember 6,1990,itwassubsequently discovered thatasimilarcondition existedfortheUnit2LSIpanels.Apostulated fireinoneoftheUnit2fireareascouldhaveresultedinaninability tomaintainpowertotheLSIpanels.Thefollowing describes theanalysisperformed.
| | Unit 1 Fire Areas 40, 48 and 49 Analysis Fire Area 402 Our Safe Shutdown System Analysis (SSSA)shows that for a fire in Area 40 control room indications equivalent to those found on the LSI cabinet would be lost.Due to cable misrouting, the LSI panel indications would also have been lost.Further investigation revealed the reason that the control room indication would have been lost is because one of the alternate sources to the CRID panels, the isolimeters, is located in this area.What the SSSA does not show is that the preferred source to the GRID panels would have been available. |
| Unit2FireArea29(Zones24,25)Theareaanalysesperformed identified-thatafireinFireZone24wouldhavefaultedboththeUnit1andUnit2powertotheLSIpanels.Thediscrepant powersourcetotheUnit2LSIpanelsrunsinFireZone24whichalsocontainstheUnit2normalsourcecable2-12467(EIIS/ED-CBL3).
| | The inverters are located in Fire Area 41 (Fire Zone 42C).Therefore, normal control room indication of process monitoring would have been available for fire in Area 40.b.Fire Areas 48 and 492 Under conservative assumptions of loss of function for an area fire, the SSSA shows that for a fire in Areas 48 and 49 both the control room and the LSI panel indications would have been lost.However, Fire Areas 48 and 49 are provided with adequate suppression and detection to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSI instrumentation. |
| Although2-12467alsorunsinZone25,1-1936Rdoesnot.FireZones24and25areseparated byathree-hour fire-rated wall.NRCForm344A(509)
| | NRC Form 356A 15$9) |
| NRCFORM35SA)509)ILS.NUCLEARREQULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVED0MBNO.31504)0>>
| | NRC FORM 388A (889)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO.3)504)08 EXPIRES: O)30NQ ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50J)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REQARDINQ BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8)YEAR I))OISSQUSNTIALg~ASVISIQN PA IIUM SII'A NUM SII~AQE I3)TEXT lit mon JOoco*roOIdmd.uso oddldoool HRC FomI 388AQJ (17)o oooo 315 9 0 010-01 040" 0 5 Anal sis of Event Unit 2 Fire Area 29 (Zones 24 and 25)Analysis: Although power to the LSI panels would be lost for a fire in zone 24, necessary control room indication would still have been available with the exception of RCS temperature (RCS cold leg temperature could have been derived indirectly from the available steam generator pressure instrumentation. |
| EXPIRES:>>/30/92ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWTHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST.'00 HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHERECORDSANDREPORTSMANAQEMENT BRANCH(P430),U.S.NUCLEARREQULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINQTON, DC20555,ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150410i). | | According to our Safe Shutdown Systems Analysis, a fire in Fire Area 29 (Zones 24 and 25)would not have eliminated process monitoring indication in the control room for steam generators 1 and 4.The following indication would have been available in the Unit 2 control room: 2-BLP-112 2-BLP-142 2-MPP-210 2-MPP-240 2-M31 2-NLP-151 or 2-NLP-153 2-NPS-121 SG 1 Water Level (normal range)SG 4 Water Level (normal range)SG1 Pressure SG 4 Pressure Source Range Monitoring Channel 1 Pressurizer Water Level RCS Pressure (wide range)**Subsequent investigation indicates that 2-NPS-121 would not have been available since the cable for 2-NPS-121 was unprotected and is also routed through zone 24.Loss of 2-NPS-121 during a potential fire in zone 24 could have been compensated for through the use of a contingency procedure within the emergency operating procedures. |
| OFFICEOFMANAQEMENTANDBUDGET,WASHINQTON,DC20503.FACILITYNAME11)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER12)o5ooo315LERNUMBER15)YEAR<~SEQUENTIAL
| | This procedure provided for the use of test instruments connected to the RVLIS cabinet in the control room to read RCS pressure.Control room operators were trained on the use of this procedure. |
| )~AEVI>>ION>0?3NUM>>II.sW:NUMB>>A90-010-01~AOEC))03oF05TEXT///mor>><<ec>>4r>>r/unrLu>>>>>>~Ar/ICformSr/SAS/(illCauseofEventThecondition wastheresultofinsufficient scopingfor10CFR50AppendixRdesignchanges.Insufficient controlswereinplacetoensurethatnewcablesaddedtotheplantcompliedwith10CFR50AppendixRrequirements. | | These indications could provide an indirect means of determining RCS temperature. |
| nalsisofEventThiseventisbeingreportedinaccordance with10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B) and10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(C) inthatthecondition wasoutsidethedesignbasisandnotcoveredbytheplant's.operating andemergency procedures respectively.
| | This area is provided with adequate detection and suppression to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSI instrumentation. |
| Unit1FireAreas40,48and49AnalysisFireArea402OurSafeShutdownSystemAnalysis(SSSA)showsthatforafireinArea40controlroomindications equivalent tothosefoundontheLSIcabinetwouldbelost.Duetocablemisrouting, theLSIpanelindications wouldalsohavebeenlost.Furtherinvestigation revealedthereasonthatthecontrolroomindication wouldhavebeenlostisbecauseoneofthealternate sourcestotheCRIDpanels,theisolimeters, islocatedinthisarea.WhattheSSSAdoesnotshowisthatthepreferred sourcetotheGRIDpanelswouldhavebeenavailable.
| | NR 0 FomI 388A (589) |
| Theinverters arelocatedinFireArea41(FireZone42C).Therefore, normalcontrolroomindication ofprocessmonitoring wouldhavebeenavailable forfireinArea40.b.FireAreas48and492Underconservative assumptions oflossoffunctionforanareafire,theSSSAshowsthatforafireinAreas48and49boththecontrolroomandtheLSIpanelindications wouldhavebeenlost.However,FireAreas48and49areprovidedwithadequatesuppression anddetection tosubstantially mitigatetheimpactonnormalandLSIinstrumentation.
| | NRC FORM355A (549)U.S.NUCLEAR AEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVEO 0MB NO.31504'105 EXPIRES(tl30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 508)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BUADEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOAOS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4301, U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK AEDUCTION PROJECT (31504)04), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET.WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (I)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (5)ttQVtNTIAL NVM tR RtVI510N NVM tR PAGE IS)TEXT llf mctt Sotto lt tNFdctd, oto tddidootl NRC FomlÃ)4'tl (17)0 5 000 315 9 0 010 01 05 oFo 5 Conclusion In conclusion, the condition did not adversely impact the health and safety of the public due to the fact that Areas 40, 48 and 49 of Unit 1 and Area 29 of Unit 2 and provided with suppression and detection to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSZ instrumentation. |
| NRCForm356A15$9)
| | Also, a large portion of the station's normal instrumentation would remain functional since fires propagate at a finite rather than causing an instantaneous loss of function for an entire area.Corrective Actions Unit One A plant Temporary Modification was initiated which installed a 1 ampere fuse in 1-LSI-6 on the load side of the 1>>29685G cable.This way a fire in the fire areas of concern would not eliminate the ability of providing Unit 2 power to the LSI panels.~Ukt Tee A plant Minor Modification was initiated to provide a one-hour fire enclosure (wrapped)around Conduit 2-12467 that exists in Fire Zone 24.Conduit 2-12467 was in 10CFR50 Appendix R compliance on 9/20/90.Subsequent investigation has revealed that when modifications 2900-B.04 (October 5, 1990)and 12-3053 (December 19, 1990)were completed/installed the sub)ect cable no longer needed to be wrapped because zone 24 could now be categorized as meeting Appendix R ZIZ.G.1 criteria due to the installation of additional instrumentation. |
| NRCFORM388A(889)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDOMBNO.3)504)08EXPIRES:O)30NQESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWTHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50J)HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREQARDINQ BURDENESTIMATETOTHERECORDSANDREPORTSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(P430).U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC20555,ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(31504104),
| | Zn addition, there is suppression and detection in the area.~Ge eral Our program for ensuring continued 10CFRSO Appendix R compliance will be revised.It is anticipated that this revision will be in place by March 1, 1991.Failed Com onent Identification None Previous Similar Events 050"315/90-0083 10CFR50 Appendix R deficiencies resulting in potential loss of auto-start of service water pumps due to incorrect implementation of design change.NRC Fonll 35SA (589)}} |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANOBUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)LERNUMBER(8)YEARI))OISSQUSNTIALg~ASVISIQN PAIIUMSII'ANUMSII~AQEI3)TEXTlitmonJOoco*roOIdmd.
| |
| usooddldoool HRCFomI388AQJ(17)ooooo31590010-01040"05AnalsisofEventUnit2FireArea29(Zones24and25)Analysis:
| |
| AlthoughpowertotheLSIpanelswouldbelostforafireinzone24,necessary controlroomindication wouldstillhavebeenavailable withtheexception ofRCStemperature (RCScoldlegtemperature couldhavebeenderivedindirectly fromtheavailable steamgenerator pressureinstrumentation.
| |
| According toourSafeShutdownSystemsAnalysis, afireinFireArea29(Zones24and25)wouldnothaveeliminated processmonitoring indication inthecontrolroomforsteamgenerators 1and4.Thefollowing indication wouldhavebeenavailable intheUnit2controlroom:2-BLP-112 2-BLP-142 2-MPP-210 2-MPP-240 2-M312-NLP-151 or2-NLP-153 2-NPS-121 SG1WaterLevel(normalrange)SG4WaterLevel(normalrange)SG1PressureSG4PressureSourceRangeMonitoring Channel1Pressurizer WaterLevelRCSPressure(widerange)**Subsequent investigation indicates that2-NPS-121 wouldnothavebeenavailable sincethecablefor2-NPS-121 wasunprotected andisalsoroutedthroughzone24.Lossof2-NPS-121 duringapotential fireinzone24couldhavebeencompensated forthroughtheuseofacontingency procedure withintheemergency operating procedures. | |
| Thisprocedure providedfortheuseoftestinstruments connected totheRVLIScabinetinthecontrolroomtoreadRCSpressure.
| |
| Controlroomoperators weretrainedontheuseofthisprocedure.
| |
| Theseindications couldprovideanindirectmeansofdetermining RCStemperature.
| |
| Thisareaisprovidedwithadequatedetection andsuppression tosubstantially mitigatetheimpactonnormalandLSIinstrumentation.
| |
| NR0FomI388A(589)
| |
| NRCFORM355A(549)U.S.NUCLEARAEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPAOVEO0MBNO.31504'105 EXPIRES(tl30/92 ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWTHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:508)HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BUADENESTIMATETOTHERECOAOSANDREPORTSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(P4301,U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC20555,ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK AEDUCTION PROJECT(31504)04),
| |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANOBUDGET.WASHINGTON, DC20503.FACILITYNAME(I)D.C.CookNuclearPlant-Unit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)YEARLERNUMBER(5)ttQVtNTIAL NVMtRRtVI510NNVMtRPAGEIS)TEXTllfmcttSottolttNFdctd,ototddidootl NRCFomlÃ)4'tl(17)05000315900100105oFo5Conclusion Inconclusion, thecondition didnotadversely impactthehealthandsafetyofthepublicduetothefactthatAreas40,48and49ofUnit1andArea29ofUnit2andprovidedwithsuppression anddetection tosubstantially mitigatetheimpactonnormalandLSZinstrumentation.
| |
| Also,alargeportionofthestation's normalinstrumentation wouldremainfunctional sincefirespropagate atafiniteratherthancausinganinstantaneous lossoffunctionforanentirearea.Corrective ActionsUnitOneAplantTemporary Modification wasinitiated whichinstalled a1amperefusein1-LSI-6ontheloadsideofthe1>>29685Gcable.Thiswayafireinthefireareasofconcernwouldnoteliminate theabilityofproviding Unit2powertotheLSIpanels.~UktTeeAplantMinorModification wasinitiated toprovideaone-hourfireenclosure (wrapped) aroundConduit2-12467thatexistsinFireZone24.Conduit2-12467wasin10CFR50AppendixRcompliance on9/20/90.Subsequent investigation hasrevealedthatwhenmodifications 2900-B.04 (October5,1990)and12-3053(December 19,1990)werecompleted/installed thesub)ectcablenolongerneededtobewrappedbecausezone24couldnowbecategorized asmeetingAppendixRZIZ.G.1criteriaduetotheinstallation ofadditional instrumentation. | |
| Znaddition, thereissuppression anddetection inthearea.~GeeralOurprogramforensuringcontinued 10CFRSOAppendixRcompliance willberevised.Itisanticipated thatthisrevisionwillbeinplacebyMarch1,1991.FailedComonentIdentification NonePreviousSimilarEvents050"315/90-0083 10CFR50AppendixRdeficiencies resulting inpotential lossofauto-start ofservicewaterpumpsduetoincorrect implementation ofdesignchange.NRCFonll35SA(589)}}
| |
Similar Documents at Cook |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999
LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented
ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999
LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary
ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed
ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs
ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999
LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4
ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999
LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830
ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999
LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves
ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999
LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr
ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis
ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999
LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr
ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written
ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999
LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified
ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed
ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999
LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions
ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999
LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed
ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised
ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared
ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design
ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold
ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation
ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate
ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures
ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing
ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling
ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed
ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors
ML17335A5171999-02-11011 February 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990112,determined That RCS Pressurizer PORVs Had Not Been Tested,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Scheduling Controls Allowing Personnel Error.Surveillance Procedure Was Completed & Updated LER Will Be Submitted
ML17335A5141999-02-10010 February 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405
ML17335A5011999-02-0101 February 1999
LER 98-060-00:on 981231,identified That Rt Sys Response Time Testing Did Not Comply with TS Definition.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Corrective Actions Will Be Developed & Update to LER Will Be Submitted by 990415.With 990201 Ltr
ML17335A4951999-01-29029 January 1999
LER 98-059-00:on 981230,interim LER -single Failure in Containment Spray Sys Could Result in Containment Spray Ph Outside Design Occurred.Investigation Into Condition Continuing.Update Will Be Submitted by 990514 Ltr
ML17335A4961999-01-27027 January 1999
LER 98-057-00:on 981228,discovered That AFW Valves Were Not Tested IAW Inservice Testing Program.Caused by Failure to Recognize Design Bases Features Re Afws by Personnel. Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr
ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999
LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components
ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing
ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr
ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999
LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing
ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr
ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998
LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr
ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998
LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process
ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event
ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr
ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122
ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria
ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998
LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing
ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998
LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr
ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr
ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998
LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned
ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998
LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3
1999-09-17
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999
LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented
ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999
LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary
ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed
ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs
ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999
LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4
ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999
LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830
ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999
LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves
ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999
LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr
ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis
ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999
LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr
ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written
ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999
LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified
ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed
ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999
LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions
ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999
LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed
ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised
ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared
ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design
ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold
ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation
ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate
ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures
ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing
ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling
ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed
ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors
ML17335A5171999-02-11011 February 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990112,determined That RCS Pressurizer PORVs Had Not Been Tested,Per Ts.Caused by Inadequate Scheduling Controls Allowing Personnel Error.Surveillance Procedure Was Completed & Updated LER Will Be Submitted
ML17335A5141999-02-10010 February 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405
ML17335A5011999-02-0101 February 1999
LER 98-060-00:on 981231,identified That Rt Sys Response Time Testing Did Not Comply with TS Definition.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Corrective Actions Will Be Developed & Update to LER Will Be Submitted by 990415.With 990201 Ltr
ML17335A4951999-01-29029 January 1999
LER 98-059-00:on 981230,interim LER -single Failure in Containment Spray Sys Could Result in Containment Spray Ph Outside Design Occurred.Investigation Into Condition Continuing.Update Will Be Submitted by 990514 Ltr
ML17335A4961999-01-27027 January 1999
LER 98-057-00:on 981228,discovered That AFW Valves Were Not Tested IAW Inservice Testing Program.Caused by Failure to Recognize Design Bases Features Re Afws by Personnel. Updated LER Will Be Submittted by 990415.With 990127 Ltr
ML17335A4921999-01-19019 January 1999
LER 98-052-01:on 981128,no Analysis for NSR Sc Manual Loader for Tdafwp Could Be Found in Original Design.Cause Due to All Failure Modes Not Considered When Compressed Air Sys Originally Designed.Performed Review of Components
ML17335A4721999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-055-00:on 981207,potential for Condition Outside of Design Bases for Rod Control Sys Was Noted.Caused by Calibration Error Coupled with Single Rod Failure.Condition Rept Investigation Is Ongoing
ML17335A4691999-01-0606 January 1999
LER 98-056-00:on 981211,hot Leg Nozzle Gaps Resulted in Plant Being in Unanalyzed Condition.Analyses Are Being Performed by W to Resolve Problem.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990211.With 990106 Ltr
ML17335A4661999-01-0505 January 1999
LER 98-049-00:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing
ML17335A4631999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-054-00:on 981202,discovered That at Least One MSSV Had Not Been Reset as Required by Ts.Engineering Is Continuing Review of Extent of Condition for Event.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990129.With 990104 Ltr
ML17335A4481998-12-30030 December 1998
LER 98-053-00:on 981130,discovered Use of Inoperable Substitute Subcooling Margin Monitor.Caused by Condition Existing Since Installation of Plant Process Computer in 1992.Updated LER Will Be Submitted.With 981230 Ltr
ML17335A4581998-12-28028 December 1998
LER 98-052-00:on 981128,turbine Driven AFW Pump Speed Controller Failure Mode Occurred.Caused Because Not All Failure Modes Were Considered When Compressed Air Sys Was Originally Designed.Verified Current Design Change Process
ML17335A4281998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 98-051-00:on 981122,reactor Trip Signal from Manual Safety Injection Not Verified as Required by TS Surveillance,Was Discovered.Maintenance Currently Evaluating Significance & Cause of Event
ML17335A4111998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-047-00:on 981117,potential for Increase Leakage from Reactor Coolant Pump Seals Was Identified.Util Is Working with W to Resolve Issue.Current Expectations Are to Submit Update to LER by 990215.With 981217 Ltr
ML17335A4141998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for AF Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of AF Will Be Completed by 990122
ML17335A4181998-12-16016 December 1998
LER 98-050-00:on 980814,ancillary Equipment Installed in Ice Condenser Was Not Designed to Withstand Design Basis Accident/Earthquake Loads.Caused by Lack of Established Design Criteria.Developed Design Criteria
ML17335A3871998-12-11011 December 1998
LER 98-031-01:on 980610,potential Common Mode Failure of RHR Pumps Were Noted.Caused by Inaccurate Values.Accurate Miniflow Numbers Have Been Determined by Flow Testing
ML17335A3821998-12-0808 December 1998
LER 98-039-01 Re EOP Step Conflicts with Small Break LOCA Analysis.Ler 98-039-00 Has Been Canceled.With 981208 Ltr
ML17335A3781998-12-0707 December 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 981106,high Energy Line Break Effects in Auxiliary FW Sys Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation & Will Be Completed by 990220.Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990310.With 981207 Ltr
ML17335A3771998-12-0303 December 1998
LER 98-046-00:on 981103,determined That Afs Was Unable to Meet Design Flow Requirements During Special Test.Caused by Failure to Consider All Aspects of Sys Operation in Design of Suction Basket Strainers.Sys Will Be Redesigned
ML17335A3741998-12-0202 December 1998
LER 97-011-02:on 970822,operation Was Noted Outside Design Bases for ECCS & CSP for Switchover to Recirculation Sump Suction.Caused by Ineffective Change Mgt.Revised Procedure for Switchover 01(02) Ohp 4023.ES-1.3
1999-09-17
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999
LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr
ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented
ML17335A5631999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 991012 Ltr
ML17335A5621999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 991012 Ltr
ML17335A5481999-09-30030 September 1999
Non-proprietary DC Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Mods to Containment Sys W SE (Secl 99-076,Rev 3).
ML17335A5451999-09-28028 September 1999
Rev 1 to Containment Sump Level Design Condition & Failure Effects Analysis for Potential Draindown Scenarios.
ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999
LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary
ML17326A1481999-09-17017 September 1999
Independent Review of Control Rod Insertion Following Cold Leg Lbloca,Dc Cook,Units 1 & 2.
ML17326A1211999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.With 990915 Ltr
ML17326A1201999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.With 990915 Ltr
ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed
ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999
LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs
ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999
LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4
ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999
LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830
ML17335A5461999-08-0202 August 1999
Rev 0 to Evaluation of Cook Recirculation Sump Level for Reduced Pump Flow Rates.
ML17326A0871999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990812 Ltr
ML17326A0861999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Units 2.With 990812 Ltr
ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999
LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves
ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999
LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr
ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis
ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999
LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr
ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written
ML17326A0511999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990709 Ltr
ML17326A0501999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990709 Ltr
ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999
LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified
ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed
ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999
LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions
ML17326A0061999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Dcp.With 990609 Ltr
ML17326A0071999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990609 Ltr
ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999
LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions
ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made
ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999
LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed
ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised
ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared
ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design
ML17335A5301999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990508 Ltr
ML17335A5291999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990508 Ltr
ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold
ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation
ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate
ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures
ML17325B5491999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2.With 990408 Ltr
ML17325B5441999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990408 Ltr
ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing
ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling
ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed
ML17325B5671999-03-0202 March 1999
Summary of Unit 1 Steam Generator Layup Chemistry from 980101 to 990218.
ML17325B4631999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With 990308 Ltr
ML17325B4621999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990308 Ltr
ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
ACCELERATED DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM REGULAT+INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO!YSTEM (RIDE)ACCESSION NBR:9308200131 DOC.DATE: 93/08/13 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET¹FACIL:50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Indiana M 05000315 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BREWER,S.J.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.BLINDFA.A.
Indiana Michigan Power Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
SUBJECT:
LER 93-010-01:on 900824,routing of cable for Units 1 6 2 not in compliance w/10CFR50,App R.Initiat plant modifications for cable compliance.Rev corrects error in identified control room instrumentation during fire.W/930813 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 LA DEAN,W INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DORS/OEAB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRIL/RPEB R~QS SPLB G FIL 02 RGN3 FILE 01 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-1 PD AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE F J~H NRC PDR NSIC POOREFW~2 2 1 1 1 1 L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MURPHY,G.A NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 1 1 1 1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACI'HE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.504-2065)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 30 ENCL 30 I'X Indiana Michigan Power Company Cook Nuclear Plant~One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106 616 465 5901 lNDIAMA NlCHletAN POWER August 13, 1993 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Rockville, Maryland 20852 Operating Licenses DPR-58 Docket No.50-315 Document Control Manager: In accordance with the criteria established by 10 CFR 50.73 entitled Licensee Event Re ort S stem the following report is being submitted:
90-010-01 Sincerely, A.A.Blind Plant Manager/sb Attachment c: J.B.Martin, Region III E.E.Fitzpatrick P.A.Barrett R.F.Kroeger W.E.Walters-Ft.Wayne NRC Resident Inspector B.A.Wetzel-NRC M.R.Padgett G.Charnoff, Esp.D.Hahn INPO S.J.Brewer B.A.Svensson;-OA i3~f'.9308200i3i 9308i3 PDR ADOCK 050003i5 8 PDR NRC FORM 366 (569)VS.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)APPROVED OMB NO.3)504)104 EXPIRES: 4I30I92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REGUESTt 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (Pc)30).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555.AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 131500104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME lll D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PA E 3)o 5 o o o 31 510(-05" 10CFR50 Appendix R Deficiencies Resulting in Potential Loss of Local Shutdown Indication Panel Function EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER IS)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Sl MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL r..epi NUMBER N'c>NUMSE R MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES D.C.Cook-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBERISI 0 5 0 0 0 316 0 8 249 09 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 1 3 9 3 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE IS)jth's xc NCi...Cv':
POWER LEVEL'1 p p y'v'0.402()t) 20A05(el(1 (0)20AOSle HI)(Q)20,405(sl(1) liiil 20.405 (4)(I)(lr)20.405(e l (1)(r)20.405(c)BOM(e)II!50M(e)(2)50.73(el(2) ll)50.73(sl(2)
Iiil 50.73ls)(2)liiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I 50.73(el l2)lie)50,'73(s)(2)(r)50.73(s)(2)lr)I)50.73(~)(2)(xiii)IA)50.73(e I (2)ls)ill (5)50.73(~I l2)I x)THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE RLDUIREMENTB of 10 cFR (i: Icsrcc onr ot mtNr oi tnr fottowinpl Ill 73.71(o)73.71(cl OTHER ISpectiy in Apttrect Orlow end in Text, Hi)C Form 36SAJ NAME S.J.Brewer-Nuclear Safety, Licensing and Assessment, Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 61 422 3-2 02 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT l13)CAUSE SYSTFM COMPONENT MANUF AC.TVRER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TVRER EPORTABL TO NPRDS 5~8%SKI&SVPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES Iif yet, compirte EXPECTED SVS4IISSIOH DATfi NO ABSTRACT ILlmit to 14IX)tprcrt, i.r., rppmximetriy fifteen sinplr g>>cr typrwn'ttrn imrsl IIS)EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE IISI MONTH DAY YEAR The purpose of the revision is to correct an error in the identified control room instrumentation available during a fire in Unit 2 fire area 29.The revision also is in response to a commitment in LER 50-316 f93-005 dated-5/20/93.The commitment in LER 50-316 893-005 was to revise this LER upon re-evaluation of the Appendix R compliance strategy for the sub)ect fire areas.On August 24, 1990, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode Six, it was discovered that the routing of cable associated with the Unit 1 Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels was not in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.On September 6, 1990, i.t was subsequently di.scovered that a simi.lar condition existed for the Unit 2 LSI panels.The immediate corrective action taken was initiation of plant modi.fications to bring the subject plant cabling into compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.All identified areas are provided with adequate fire detection and suppression to substantially mitigate the impact of a fire on normal and LSI instrumentation.
Therefore, this event did not adversly impact the health and safety of the public.NRC Fottn 365 (569)
NRC FORM 344A (4$9)U.S.NUCLEAR AEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVED OMB NO.S(500(05 EXPIRES: el30N2 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 500 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP430).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(5041041.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (41 55GVCNTIAL r(2 NVM IIEVISION NVM 5O PAGE (3)TEXT lll more epece lr rer)o(red.
Iree eddldorml llRC%%drm 35EABI (12)o 5 o o o 315 9 0 010 01 02 OF 0 5 Co ditions Prior to Occurrence Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent Rated Thermal Power Unit 2 in Mode 6.Descri tion of Event On August 24, 1990, it was discovered that the routing of cables associated with the Unit 1 Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels was not in compliance with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements.
A postulated fire in any of three Unit 1 fire areas could have resulted in an inability to maintain power to the LSI panels.The.following describes the analysis performed.
Unit 1 Fire Areas 40 (Zone 41), 48 (Zone 55), and 49 (Zone 56).The area analyses performed identified that a fire in any one of these fire areas could have eliminated both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 power to the Local Shutdown Indication (LSI)panels.The discrepant cable in question was cable 1-29685G (EIIS/ED-CBL3) which runs between panels 1-LSI-6 and 1-LSI-6X.A fault of this cable due to a fire would have eliminated the Unit 2 Alternate feed-to the Unit 1 LSI panels.The Unit 1 normal power feed to the LSI panels was already assumed lost for a fire in any of these areas because various cables associated with the availability of MCC 1-ABC-B would have been lost.On September 6, 1990, it was subsequently discovered that a similar condition existed for the Unit 2 LSI panels.A postulated fire in one of the Unit 2 fire areas could have resulted in an inability to maintain power to the LSI panels.The following describes the analysis performed.
Unit 2 Fire Area 29 (Zones 24, 25)The area analyses performed identified-that a fire in Fire Zone 24 would have faulted both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 power to the LSI panels.The discrepant power source to the Unit 2 LSI panels runs in Fire Zone 24 which also contains the Unit 2 normal source cable 2-12467 (EIIS/ED-CBL3).
Although 2-12467 also runs in Zone 25, 1-1936R does not.Fire Zones 24 and 25 are separated by a three-hour fire-rated wall.NRC Form 344A(509)
NRC FORM 35SA)509)ILS.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO.31504)0>>
EXPIRES:>>/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST.'00 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAQEMENT BRANCH (P430), U.S.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINQTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150410i).
OFFICE OF MANAQ E MENT AND BUDGET, WASH INQTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME 11)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 12)o 5 o o o 315 LER NUMBER 15)YEAR<~SEQUENTIAL
)~AEVI>>ION>0?3 NUM>>II.sW: NUMB>>A 90-010-01~AOE C))03oF 0 5 TEXT///mor>><<ec>>4 r>>r/unrL u>>>>>>~Ar/IC form Sr/SAS/(ill Cause of Event The condition was the result of insufficient scoping for 10CFR50 Appendix R design changes.Insufficient controls were in place to ensure that new cables added to the plant complied with 10CFR50 Appendix R requirements.
nal sis of Event This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(C) in that the condition was outside the design basis and not covered by the plant's.operating and emergency procedures respectively.
Unit 1 Fire Areas 40, 48 and 49 Analysis Fire Area 402 Our Safe Shutdown System Analysis (SSSA)shows that for a fire in Area 40 control room indications equivalent to those found on the LSI cabinet would be lost.Due to cable misrouting, the LSI panel indications would also have been lost.Further investigation revealed the reason that the control room indication would have been lost is because one of the alternate sources to the CRID panels, the isolimeters, is located in this area.What the SSSA does not show is that the preferred source to the GRID panels would have been available.
The inverters are located in Fire Area 41 (Fire Zone 42C).Therefore, normal control room indication of process monitoring would have been available for fire in Area 40.b.Fire Areas 48 and 492 Under conservative assumptions of loss of function for an area fire, the SSSA shows that for a fire in Areas 48 and 49 both the control room and the LSI panel indications would have been lost.However, Fire Areas 48 and 49 are provided with adequate suppression and detection to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSI instrumentation.
NRC Form 356A 15$9)
NRC FORM 388A (889)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO.3)504)08 EXPIRES: O)30NQ ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50J)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REQARDINQ BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430).U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)LER NUMBER (8)YEAR I))OISSQUSNTIALg~ASVISIQN PA IIUM SII'A NUM SII~AQE I3)TEXT lit mon JOoco*roOIdmd.uso oddldoool HRC FomI 388AQJ (17)o oooo 315 9 0 010-01 040" 0 5 Anal sis of Event Unit 2 Fire Area 29 (Zones 24 and 25)Analysis: Although power to the LSI panels would be lost for a fire in zone 24, necessary control room indication would still have been available with the exception of RCS temperature (RCS cold leg temperature could have been derived indirectly from the available steam generator pressure instrumentation.
According to our Safe Shutdown Systems Analysis, a fire in Fire Area 29 (Zones 24 and 25)would not have eliminated process monitoring indication in the control room for steam generators 1 and 4.The following indication would have been available in the Unit 2 control room: 2-BLP-112 2-BLP-142 2-MPP-210 2-MPP-240 2-M31 2-NLP-151 or 2-NLP-153 2-NPS-121 SG 1 Water Level (normal range)SG 4 Water Level (normal range)SG1 Pressure SG 4 Pressure Source Range Monitoring Channel 1 Pressurizer Water Level RCS Pressure (wide range)**Subsequent investigation indicates that 2-NPS-121 would not have been available since the cable for 2-NPS-121 was unprotected and is also routed through zone 24.Loss of 2-NPS-121 during a potential fire in zone 24 could have been compensated for through the use of a contingency procedure within the emergency operating procedures.
This procedure provided for the use of test instruments connected to the RVLIS cabinet in the control room to read RCS pressure.Control room operators were trained on the use of this procedure.
These indications could provide an indirect means of determining RCS temperature.
This area is provided with adequate detection and suppression to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSI instrumentation.
NR 0 FomI 388A (589)
NRC FORM355A (549)U.S.NUCLEAR AEGULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPAOVEO 0MB NO.31504'105 EXPIRES(tl30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 508)HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BUADEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECOAOS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P4301, U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK AEDUCTION PROJECT (31504)04), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET.WASHINGTON, DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (I)D.C.Cook Nuclear Plant-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMBER (5)ttQVtNTIAL NVM tR RtVI510N NVM tR PAGE IS)TEXT llf mctt Sotto lt tNFdctd, oto tddidootl NRC FomlÃ)4'tl (17)0 5 000 315 9 0 010 01 05 oFo 5 Conclusion In conclusion, the condition did not adversely impact the health and safety of the public due to the fact that Areas 40, 48 and 49 of Unit 1 and Area 29 of Unit 2 and provided with suppression and detection to substantially mitigate the impact on normal and LSZ instrumentation.
Also, a large portion of the station's normal instrumentation would remain functional since fires propagate at a finite rather than causing an instantaneous loss of function for an entire area.Corrective Actions Unit One A plant Temporary Modification was initiated which installed a 1 ampere fuse in 1-LSI-6 on the load side of the 1>>29685G cable.This way a fire in the fire areas of concern would not eliminate the ability of providing Unit 2 power to the LSI panels.~Ukt Tee A plant Minor Modification was initiated to provide a one-hour fire enclosure (wrapped)around Conduit 2-12467 that exists in Fire Zone 24.Conduit 2-12467 was in 10CFR50 Appendix R compliance on 9/20/90.Subsequent investigation has revealed that when modifications 2900-B.04 (October 5, 1990)and 12-3053 (December 19, 1990)were completed/installed the sub)ect cable no longer needed to be wrapped because zone 24 could now be categorized as meeting Appendix R ZIZ.G.1 criteria due to the installation of additional instrumentation.
Zn addition, there is suppression and detection in the area.~Ge eral Our program for ensuring continued 10CFRSO Appendix R compliance will be revised.It is anticipated that this revision will be in place by March 1, 1991.Failed Com onent Identification None Previous Similar Events 050"315/90-0083 10CFR50 Appendix R deficiencies resulting in potential loss of auto-start of service water pumps due to incorrect implementation of design change.NRC Fonll 35SA (589)
