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{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY1REGULATOYINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9705290178 DOC.DATE:97/05/21NOTARIZED:NODOCKETFACIL:50-315DonaldC.CookNuclearPoeerPlantiUnitiiIndianaM0500031550'-316DonaldC.CookNucleav.PoeerPlant.Unit2.EndianaM05000316AUTH.NAI'IEAUTHORAFFILIATION FITZPATRICKiE.AmericanElectricPowerCo.~Inc.RECIP.NAME,RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)
{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY 1 REGULATO Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 9705290178 DOC.DATE: 97/05/21 NOTAR I ZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Poeer Planti Unit ii Indiana M 05000315 50'-316 Donald C.Cook Nucleav.Poeer Plant.Unit 2.Endiana M 05000316 AUTH.NAI'IE AUTHOR AFFILIATION FITZPATR ICKi E.Amer i can Electric Power Co.~Inc.RECIP.NAME, RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Forfardsresponseto.970326RAIreplantraceway/f irestopconfiguration inresponsetoconcernsfovGL-92-08.
Forfar ds response to.970326 RAI re plant raceway/f ire stop conf iguration in response to concerns f ov GL-92-08."Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Bav;v iev s." DISTRIBUTION CODE: A029D COP EES RECEI')ED:
"Thermo-Lag 330-1FireBav;vievs."DISTRIBUTION CODE:A029DCOPEESRECEI')ED:
LTR ENCL SIZE: I ITLE: Genev ic Lettev 92-008 Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Bav riev NOTES:+87 E RECIP EENT ID CODE/NAI'IE PD3-3 LA HECKMANi J INTERNAL.FILE CEN~TZ~O~'%FR/DRPW/PD3-1 RGN3 FILF.1 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DSS*/SPL'B COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 0 PD3-3 PD 1 COPIES LTTR EiNCL 1 1 1 1 1,1 G 0 Y EXTERNAL: NOAC QI~R,~(ngS NRC PDR 1 oca, e tw e~t'~i eh D 0 N NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECIPZENTSI PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COP EES REQUIRED: LTTR 10 ENCL 9 ed-8 t a l l Indiana Michigan~Power Company 500 Circle Drive Buchanan, Mi 491071395 INQMNA Sllml6AN PQWM May 21, 1997 AEP:NRC:0692DM Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:
LTRENCLSIZE:IITLE:GenevicLettev92-008Thermo-Lag 330FireBavrievNOTES:+87ERECIPEENTIDCODE/NAI'IE PD3-3LAHECKMANiJINTERNAL.
Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 92-08 (TAC NOS.M85538 AND M85539)THERMO-LAG 330-1 FIRE BARRIERS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION In our letter dated December 27, 1996 (AEP:NRC:692DB), we informed the NRC that corrective actions in response to the concerns identified in NRC generic letter 92-08, and subsequent requests for additional information, have been completed at Cook Nuclear Plant.By letter dated March 26, 1997, your staff requested additional information concerning how our raceway/fire stop configuration, described in AEP:NRC:692DB, meets the NRC fire protection requirements and Cook Nuclear Plant licensing and design bases.Our response to the request for additional information is contained in the attachments.
FILECEN~TZ~O~'%FR/DRPW/PD3-1 RGN3FILF.11111NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DSS*/SPL'B COPIESRECIPIENT LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME 0PD3-3PD1COPIESLTTREiNCL11111,1G0YEXTERNAL:
Attachment 1 describes our use of fire stops for the 20 foot separation boundary.Attachments 2 and 3 contain the technical evaluations for auxiliary building fire zones 6M and 6S, and fire zones 44N and 44S, respectively.
NOACQI~R,~(ngS NRCPDR1oca,etwe~t'~iehD0NNOTETOALL"RZDS"RECIPZENTSI PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPEESREQUIRED:
Attachments 4 and 5 contain design detail drawings 2-1434R-5 and 2-1419R-6, respectively.
LTTR10ENCL9ed-8 tall IndianaMichigan~PowerCompany500CircleDriveBuchanan, Mi491071395 INQMNASllml6ANPQWMMay21,1997AEP:NRC:0692DM DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Gentlemen:
Sincerely, CW p E.E.Fitzpatrick Vice President vlb Attachments CC: A.A.Blind A.B.Beach MDEQ-DW Ec RDP NRC Resident Inspector J.R.Padgett 9705290i78 PDR" ADOCK P 97052i 050003i5 PDR 3%&.g IN (.e~0 Lzs ff!ffff!fff!ffllllfffffffffrfffffffff 1 l E ATTACHMENT 1 TO AEP:NRC:0692DM FIRE STOPS FOR 20 FOOT SEPARATION BOUNDARY  
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2RESPONSETOGENERICLETTER92-08(TACNOS.M85538ANDM85539)THERMO-LAG 330-1FIREBARRIERSREQUESTFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION InourletterdatedDecember27,1996(AEP:NRC:692DB),
weinformedtheNRCthatcorrective actionsinresponsetotheconcernsidentified inNRCgenericletter92-08,andsubsequent requestsforadditional information, havebeencompleted atCookNuclearPlant.ByletterdatedMarch26,1997,yourstaffrequested additional information concerning howourraceway/fire stopconfiguration, described inAEP:NRC:692DB, meetstheNRCfireprotection requirements andCookNuclearPlantlicensing anddesignbases.Ourresponsetotherequestforadditional information iscontained intheattachments.
Attachment 1describes ouruseoffirestopsforthe20footseparation boundary.
Attachments 2and3containthetechnical evaluations forauxiliary buildingfirezones6Mand6S,andfirezones44Nand44S,respectively.
Attachments 4and5containdesigndetaildrawings2-1434R-5 and2-1419R-6, respectively.
Sincerely, CWpE.E.Fitzpatrick VicePresident vlbAttachments CC:A.A.BlindA.B.BeachMDEQ-DWEcRDPNRCResidentInspector J.R.Padgett9705290i78 PDR"ADOCKP97052i050003i5PDR3%&.gIN(.e~0Lzsff!ffff!fff!ffllllfffffffffrfffffffff 1lE ATTACHMENT 1TOAEP:NRC:0692DM FIRESTOPSFOR20FOOTSEPARATION BOUNDARY  


Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0692DM Page1IntheNRCRAIdatedMarch26,1997,thefollowing requestwasmade."Additional information isrequiredtoresolvethestaff'squestions andreviewthenewconfiguration.
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692DM Page 1 In the NRC RAI dated March 26, 1997, the following request was made."Additional information is required to resolve the staff's questions and review the new configuration.
Specifically, pleaseaddress,indetail,howtheraceway/fire stopconfiguration described intheletterofDecember27,1996,meetsNRCfireprotection requirements andtheD.C.Cooklicensing anddesignbases.Inthisdiscussion, identifyanyexemptions fromSectionIII.GorAppendixRto10CFRPart50thathavebeenrequested andgrantedforthefirestopconfigurations described intheletterofDecember27,1996.Inaddition, submitthedesigndetailsofthefirestops,thedrawingsshowingthelocations oft.hefirestopsandfireareaswheretheyarecredited, andtheengineering analysesthatsupportachieving a20footseparation usingcabletrayfire"-tops."NRCFireProtection Reuirements andCookNuclearPlantLicensinandDesinBasesThesafeshutdowncapability assessment (SSCA)wascreatedtoaddresscompliance with10CFR50,appendixR,sectionZIZ.G.AppendixR,sectionZIZ.G.2.(b) providesonemeansofensuringthatoneoftheredundant trainsisfreeoffiredamage.Thissectionstates,"[S]eparation ofcablesandequipment andassociated non-safetycircuitsofredundant trainsbyahorizontal distanceofmorethan20feetwithnointervening combustible orfirehazards.Inaddition, firedetectors andanautomatic firesuppression systemshallbeinstalled inthefirearea;...."
Specifically, please address, in detail, how the raceway/fire stop configuration described in the letter of December 27, 1996, meets NRC fire protection requirements and the D.C.Cook licensing and design bases.In this discussion, identify any exemptions from Section III.G or Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 that have been requested and granted for the fire stop configurations described in the letter of December 27, 1996.In addition, submit the design details of the fire stops, the drawings showing the locations of t.he fire stops and fire areas where they are credited, and the engineering analyses that support achieving a 20 foot separation using cable tray fire"-tops." NRC Fire Protection Re uirements and Cook Nuclear Plant Licensin and Desi n Bases The safe shutdown capability assessment (SSCA)was createdto address compliance with 10 CFR 50, appendix R, section ZIZ.G.Appendix R, section ZIZ.G.2.(b) provides one means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage.This section states,"[S]eparation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards.In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area;...." Rev.0 of the SSCA, dated March 1983, was submitted to the NRC on March 31, 1983, by our letter AEP:NRC:0692E.
Rev.0oftheSSCA,datedMarch1983,wassubmitted totheNRConMarch31,1983,byourletterAEP:NRC:0692E.
This submittal contained sections 8.3.1 and 8.16.1, that described two locations where section ZII.G.2.(b) was utilized.In both ituations, the SSCA stated that certain"open cable trays traversing the zone from the north side to the south side will be appropriately fire stopped to prevent fire propagation from one section of the fire zone to the other" Rev.1 to the SSCA was submitted on March 20, 1987, by AEP:NRC:~92AZ.There was no change to the statements in sections 8.3.1 and 8.16.1 quoted above.Generic letter (GL)86-10 contains guidance regarding the meaning and intent of section III.G.2.(b) wording for intervening combustibles and exemption requests.Based on the information in GL 86-10, the cables in the trays without some form of non-combustible covering are considered intervening combustibles.
Thissubmittal contained sections8.3.1and8.16.1,thatdescribed twolocations wheresectionZII.G.2.(b) wasutilized.
However, because the use of fire stops met our original licensing bases (SSCA)and predated GL 86-10, we did not believe the installation of additional fire stops warranted an exemption request relative to the subject fire stop configuration.
Inbothituations, theSSCAstatedthatcertain"opencabletraystraversing thezonefromthenorthsidetothesouthsidewillbeappropriately firestoppedtopreventfirepropagation fromonesectionofthefirezonetotheother"Rev.1totheSSCAwassubmitted onMarch20,1987,byAEP:NRC:~92AZ.Therewasnochangetothestatements insections8.3.1and8.16.1quotedabove.Genericletter(GL)86-10containsguidanceregarding themeaningandintentofsectionIII.G.2.(b) wordingforintervening combustibles andexemption requests.
Desi n Details Attachments 4 and 5 are drawings that show the two locations where fire stops are provided in accordance with section III.G.2.(b)
Basedontheinformation inGL86-10,thecablesinthetrayswithoutsomeformofnon-combustible coveringareconsidered intervening combustibles.
.These drawings show the cable trays located in the subject 20 foot separation spaces, the location of the fire stops on the trays, details of the fire stops, and fire zone locations.
However,becausetheuseoffirestopsmetouroriginallicensing bases(SSCA)andpredatedGL86-10,wedidnotbelievetheinstallation ofadditional firestopswarranted anexemption requestrelativetothesubjectfirestopconfiguration.
These drawings have details showing extensions added to the sides of certain trays.The following is provided to clarify why and how these extensions were added.For some control cable installations, additional space was needed for proper installation of the silicone Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692DM Page 2 foam and spreading of the cables.The added space is provided by sheet metal extensions.
DesinDetailsAttachments 4and5aredrawingsthatshowthetwolocations wherefirestopsareprovidedinaccordance withsectionIII.G.2.(b)
In attachment 4, these extensions are'hown on drawing 2-1419R-6 in details KB, MB, F9, H9, K9 and M9, and in attachment 5 on drawing 2-1434R-S, they are shown in details J2 and L2.For these installations, the sides of the raceway/fire stop configurations have been extended as shown.This design detail is not applicable to power cable trays.The silicone foam is entirely enclosed between the metal housing and the damming material.The damming material at the ends of the silicone foam reservoir separates the control cables.As the silicone foam expands and fills the enclosed space, it also separates the control cables.En ineerin Anal ses That Su ort Achievin a 20 Foot Se aration Usin Cable Tra Fire Sto s Attachments 2 and 3 are technical evaluations 11.42 and 1.43 respectively.
.Thesedrawingsshowthecabletrayslocatedinthesubject20footseparation spaces,thelocationofthefirestopsonthetrays,detailsofthefirestops,andfirezonelocations.
At the end of each of the technical evaluations there is a conclusion section.That section provides a summary of the defense-in-depth that leads to the conclusion that a fire on either side of the subject 20 foot separation spaces will not spread to the other side.This summary does not take credit for other attributes such as the enclosed (control cable)trays and the small quantity of cables, ranging from 3 to 20, in the open (power cable)trays, both of which further contribute to minimizing the impact of the intervening combustibles within the designated 20 foot spaces.During preparation of this response, it was noticed that the title and purpose of these technical evaluations may need clarification.
Thesedrawingshavedetailsshowingextensions addedtothesidesofcertaintrays.Thefollowing isprovidedtoclarifywhyandhowtheseextensions wereadded.Forsomecontrolcableinstallations, additional spacewasneededforproperinstallation ofthesilicone Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0692DM Page2foamandspreading ofthecables.Theaddedspaceisprovidedbysheetmetalextensions.
Appendix R section III.G.2.(b) was paraphrased and contains the phrase"with no intervening combustibles".
Inattachment 4,theseextensions are'hownondrawing2-1419R-6 indetailsKB,MB,F9,H9,K9andM9,andinattachment 5ondrawing2-1434R-S, theyareshownindetailsJ2andL2.Fortheseinstallations, thesidesoftheraceway/fire stopconfigurations havebeenextendedasshown.Thisdesigndetailisnotapplicable topowercabletrays.Thesiliconefoamisentirelyenclosedbetweenthemetalhousingandthedammingmaterial.
We agree that the cables under discussion are intervening combustibles.
Thedammingmaterialattheendsofthesiliconefoamreservoir separates thecontrolcables.Asthesiliconefoamexpandsandfillstheenclosedspace,italsoseparates thecontrolcables.EnineerinAnalsesThatSuortAchievina20FootSearationUsinCableTraFireStosAttachments 2and3aretechnical evaluations 11.42and1.43respectively.
However, these technical evaluation evaluate the ability of the"twenty foot wide separation space" to prevent the spread of fire between fire zones and to maintain safe shutdown capability for both units.Three differences between the current design/procedures and the description in the technical evaluations were noted.All three differences have either no impact or they enhance the a~~cribed situation.
Attheendofeachofthetechnical evaluations thereisaconclusion section.Thatsectionprovidesasummaryofthedefense-in-depth thatleadstotheconclusion thatafireoneithersideofthesubject20footseparation spaceswillnotspreadtotheotherside.Thissummarydoesnottakecreditforotherattributes suchastheenclosed(controlcable)traysandthesmallquantityofcables,rangingfrom3to20,intheopen(powercable)trays,bothofwhichfurthercontribute tominimizing theimpactoftheintervening combustibles withinthedesignated 20footspaces.Duringpreparation ofthisresponse, itwasnoticedthatthetitleandpurposeofthesetechnical evaluations mayneedclarification.
The three differences are: 1)the boundaries have shifted slightly from those described in the evaluations and shown on the sketches attached to the evaluations (no impact);2)the fire loadings have been reduced because of thermo-lag removal (enhancement);
AppendixRsectionIII.G.2.(b) wasparaphrased andcontainsthephrase"withnointervening combustibles".
and 3)the daily tour is being upgraded to a procedure versus a guideline (enhancement).
Weagreethatthecablesunderdiscussion areintervening combustibles.
These differences have no significant impact on the evaluations.
However,thesetechnical evaluation evaluatetheabilityofthe"twentyfootwideseparation space"topreventthespreadoffirebetweenfirezonesandtomaintainsafeshutdowncapability forbothunits.Threedifferences betweenthecurrentdesign/procedures andthedescription inthetechnical evaluations werenoted.Allthreedifferences haveeithernoimpactortheyenhancethea~~cribed situation.
~Summar The SSCA (rev.0 and 1), submitted to the NRC, stated that a commitment to meet appendix R, section III.G.2.(b) requirements at two locations would be accomplished by providing fire stops in cable trays traversing the separation space.No commitment was made to provide a covering of the intervening combustibles.
Thethreedifferences are:1)theboundaries haveshiftedslightlyfromthosedescribed intheevaluations andshownonthesketchesattachedtotheevaluations (noimpact);2)thefireloadingshavebeenreducedbecauseofthermo-lag removal(enhancement);
The thermo-lag was believed to be a non-combustible wrapping and was added to some cable trays traversing the separation space.When the thermo-lag was removed, the cable between the fire stops became an intervening combustible.
and3)thedailytourisbeingupgradedtoaprocedure versusaguideline (enhancement).
Because our licensing bases use of fire stops predated GL 86-10 guidance, we believed that an exemption was not required.The safe shutdown impact of the use of fire stops is contained in the technical evaluations prepared for
Thesedifferences havenosignificant impactontheevaluations.
~SummarTheSSCA(rev.0and1),submitted totheNRC,statedthatacommitment tomeetappendixR,sectionIII.G.2.(b) requirements attwolocations wouldbeaccomplished byproviding firestopsincabletraystraversing theseparation space.Nocommitment wasmadetoprovideacoveringoftheintervening combustibles.
Thethermo-lag wasbelievedtobeanon-combustible wrappingandwasaddedtosomecabletraystraversing theseparation space.Whenthethermo-lag wasremoved,thecablebetweenthefirestopsbecameanintervening combustible.
Becauseourlicensing basesuseoffirestopspredatedGL86-10guidance, webelievedthatanexemption wasnotrequired.
Thesafeshutdownimpactoftheuseoffirestopsiscontained inthetechnical evaluations preparedfor


Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0692DM Page3theselocat'ons.
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692DM Page 3 these locat'ons.
Thesetechnical ovaluations showthattheintentofappendixR,section'ZXE.G.2.(b) hasbeenmet.
These technical ovaluations show that the intent of appendix R, section'ZXE.G.2.(b) has been met.
J ATTACHMENT 2TOAEP:NRC:0692DM TECHNICAL EVALUATION FORAUXILIARY BUILDINGFIREZONES6MAND6S}}
J ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:0692DM TECHNICAL EVALUATION FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE ZONES 6M AND 6S}}

Revision as of 06:51, 6 July 2018

Forwards Response to 970326 RAI Re Plant Raceway/Fire Stop Configuration in Response to Concerns for GL-92-08, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barriers.
ML17333A901
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 05/21/1997
From: FITZPATRICK E
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17333A902 List:
References
AEP:NRC:0692DM, AEP:NRC:692DM, GL-92-08, GL-92-8, TAC-M85538, TAC-M85539, NUDOCS 9705290178
Download: ML17333A901 (12)


Text

CATEGORY 1 REGULATO Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 9705290178 DOC.DATE: 97/05/21 NOTAR I ZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-315 Donald C.Cook Nuclear Poeer Planti Unit ii Indiana M 05000315 50'-316 Donald C.Cook Nucleav.Poeer Plant.Unit 2.Endiana M 05000316 AUTH.NAI'IE AUTHOR AFFILIATION FITZPATR ICKi E.Amer i can Electric Power Co.~Inc.RECIP.NAME, RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Forfar ds response to.970326 RAI re plant raceway/f ire stop conf iguration in response to concerns f ov GL-92-08."Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Bav;v iev s." DISTRIBUTION CODE: A029D COP EES RECEI')ED:

LTR ENCL SIZE: I ITLE: Genev ic Lettev 92-008 Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Bav riev NOTES:+87 E RECIP EENT ID CODE/NAI'IE PD3-3 LA HECKMANi J INTERNAL.FILE CEN~TZ~O~'%FR/DRPW/PD3-1 RGN3 FILF.1 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DSS*/SPL'B COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 0 PD3-3 PD 1 COPIES LTTR EiNCL 1 1 1 1 1,1 G 0 Y EXTERNAL: NOAC QI~R,~(ngS NRC PDR 1 oca, e tw e~t'~i eh D 0 N NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECIPZENTSI PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COP EES REQUIRED: LTTR 10 ENCL 9 ed-8 t a l l Indiana Michigan~Power Company 500 Circle Drive Buchanan, Mi 491071395 INQMNA Sllml6AN PQWM May 21, 1997 AEP:NRC:0692DM Docket Nos.: 50-315 50-316 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:

Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 92-08 (TAC NOS.M85538 AND M85539)THERMO-LAG 330-1 FIRE BARRIERS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION In our letter dated December 27, 1996 (AEP:NRC:692DB), we informed the NRC that corrective actions in response to the concerns identified in NRC generic letter 92-08, and subsequent requests for additional information, have been completed at Cook Nuclear Plant.By letter dated March 26, 1997, your staff requested additional information concerning how our raceway/fire stop configuration, described in AEP:NRC:692DB, meets the NRC fire protection requirements and Cook Nuclear Plant licensing and design bases.Our response to the request for additional information is contained in the attachments.

Attachment 1 describes our use of fire stops for the 20 foot separation boundary.Attachments 2 and 3 contain the technical evaluations for auxiliary building fire zones 6M and 6S, and fire zones 44N and 44S, respectively.

Attachments 4 and 5 contain design detail drawings 2-1434R-5 and 2-1419R-6, respectively.

Sincerely, CW p E.E.Fitzpatrick Vice President vlb Attachments CC: A.A.Blind A.B.Beach MDEQ-DW Ec RDP NRC Resident Inspector J.R.Padgett 9705290i78 PDR" ADOCK P 97052i 050003i5 PDR 3%&.g IN (.e~0 Lzs ff!ffff!fff!ffllllfffffffffrfffffffff 1 l E ATTACHMENT 1 TO AEP:NRC:0692DM FIRE STOPS FOR 20 FOOT SEPARATION BOUNDARY

Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692DM Page 1 In the NRC RAI dated March 26, 1997, the following request was made."Additional information is required to resolve the staff's questions and review the new configuration.

Specifically, please address, in detail, how the raceway/fire stop configuration described in the letter of December 27, 1996, meets NRC fire protection requirements and the D.C.Cook licensing and design bases.In this discussion, identify any exemptions from Section III.G or Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 that have been requested and granted for the fire stop configurations described in the letter of December 27, 1996.In addition, submit the design details of the fire stops, the drawings showing the locations of t.he fire stops and fire areas where they are credited, and the engineering analyses that support achieving a 20 foot separation using cable tray fire"-tops." NRC Fire Protection Re uirements and Cook Nuclear Plant Licensin and Desi n Bases The safe shutdown capability assessment (SSCA)was createdto address compliance with 10 CFR 50, appendix R, section ZIZ.G.Appendix R, section ZIZ.G.2.(b) provides one means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage.This section states,"[S]eparation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards.In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area;...." Rev.0 of the SSCA, dated March 1983, was submitted to the NRC on March 31, 1983, by our letter AEP:NRC:0692E.

This submittal contained sections 8.3.1 and 8.16.1, that described two locations where section ZII.G.2.(b) was utilized.In both ituations, the SSCA stated that certain"open cable trays traversing the zone from the north side to the south side will be appropriately fire stopped to prevent fire propagation from one section of the fire zone to the other" Rev.1 to the SSCA was submitted on March 20, 1987, by AEP:NRC:~92AZ.There was no change to the statements in sections 8.3.1 and 8.16.1 quoted above.Generic letter (GL)86-10 contains guidance regarding the meaning and intent of section III.G.2.(b) wording for intervening combustibles and exemption requests.Based on the information in GL 86-10, the cables in the trays without some form of non-combustible covering are considered intervening combustibles.

However, because the use of fire stops met our original licensing bases (SSCA)and predated GL 86-10, we did not believe the installation of additional fire stops warranted an exemption request relative to the subject fire stop configuration.

Desi n Details Attachments 4 and 5 are drawings that show the two locations where fire stops are provided in accordance with section III.G.2.(b)

.These drawings show the cable trays located in the subject 20 foot separation spaces, the location of the fire stops on the trays, details of the fire stops, and fire zone locations.

These drawings have details showing extensions added to the sides of certain trays.The following is provided to clarify why and how these extensions were added.For some control cable installations, additional space was needed for proper installation of the silicone Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692DM Page 2 foam and spreading of the cables.The added space is provided by sheet metal extensions.

In attachment 4, these extensions are'hown on drawing 2-1419R-6 in details KB, MB, F9, H9, K9 and M9, and in attachment 5 on drawing 2-1434R-S, they are shown in details J2 and L2.For these installations, the sides of the raceway/fire stop configurations have been extended as shown.This design detail is not applicable to power cable trays.The silicone foam is entirely enclosed between the metal housing and the damming material.The damming material at the ends of the silicone foam reservoir separates the control cables.As the silicone foam expands and fills the enclosed space, it also separates the control cables.En ineerin Anal ses That Su ort Achievin a 20 Foot Se aration Usin Cable Tra Fire Sto s Attachments 2 and 3 are technical evaluations 11.42 and 1.43 respectively.

At the end of each of the technical evaluations there is a conclusion section.That section provides a summary of the defense-in-depth that leads to the conclusion that a fire on either side of the subject 20 foot separation spaces will not spread to the other side.This summary does not take credit for other attributes such as the enclosed (control cable)trays and the small quantity of cables, ranging from 3 to 20, in the open (power cable)trays, both of which further contribute to minimizing the impact of the intervening combustibles within the designated 20 foot spaces.During preparation of this response, it was noticed that the title and purpose of these technical evaluations may need clarification.

Appendix R section III.G.2.(b) was paraphrased and contains the phrase"with no intervening combustibles".

We agree that the cables under discussion are intervening combustibles.

However, these technical evaluation evaluate the ability of the"twenty foot wide separation space" to prevent the spread of fire between fire zones and to maintain safe shutdown capability for both units.Three differences between the current design/procedures and the description in the technical evaluations were noted.All three differences have either no impact or they enhance the a~~cribed situation.

The three differences are: 1)the boundaries have shifted slightly from those described in the evaluations and shown on the sketches attached to the evaluations (no impact);2)the fire loadings have been reduced because of thermo-lag removal (enhancement);

and 3)the daily tour is being upgraded to a procedure versus a guideline (enhancement).

These differences have no significant impact on the evaluations.

~Summar The SSCA (rev.0 and 1), submitted to the NRC, stated that a commitment to meet appendix R, section III.G.2.(b) requirements at two locations would be accomplished by providing fire stops in cable trays traversing the separation space.No commitment was made to provide a covering of the intervening combustibles.

The thermo-lag was believed to be a non-combustible wrapping and was added to some cable trays traversing the separation space.When the thermo-lag was removed, the cable between the fire stops became an intervening combustible.

Because our licensing bases use of fire stops predated GL 86-10 guidance, we believed that an exemption was not required.The safe shutdown impact of the use of fire stops is contained in the technical evaluations prepared for

Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0692DM Page 3 these locat'ons.

These technical ovaluations show that the intent of appendix R, section'ZXE.G.2.(b) has been met.

J ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:0692DM TECHNICAL EVALUATION FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE ZONES 6M AND 6S