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| {{#Wiki_filter:('A.'l'EQO8.2REGULATIOINFQRMATIQNDIBTRIBUTIor~sTEM(RIDE)!ACCESSIONNBR:9707150008DOC.DATE:97/07/11NOTARIZED:NOFACIL'.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFREHA:ER,K.W.FloridaPower&LightCo.STALL,J.A.FloridaPower6LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET¹05000389 | | {{#Wiki_filter:('A.'l'EQO8.2REGULATIO INFQRMATIQN DIBTRIBUTIor~sTEM (RIDE)!ACCESSION NBR:9707150008 DOC.DATE: |
| | 97/07/11NOTARIZED: |
| | NOFACIL'.50-389 St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FREHA:ER,K.W. |
| | FloridaPower&LightCo.STALL,J.A. |
| | FloridaPower6LightCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389 |
|
| |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER97-004-00:on970611,discoveredincorrectoriginalcabletrayfirestopassemblyinstallationoutsideAppRdesignbasis.Causedpersonnelerror.Postedhourlyfirewatchpatrols.W/970711ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR'NCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PDINTERNAL:ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGBNRR/DE/EMEBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DET/EIBEXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOOREFW.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEWIENSFL~AEOD/SPD/RABET~KRONENRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRCH/HOLBNRR/DRPM/PECBNRR/DSSA/SRXBRGN2FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENERFDSNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTR'ENCL112211111111111111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD"5(EXT.415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDONTNEEDrFULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQJIRED:LTTR25ENCL25 FloridaPower&LightCompany,6501SouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957July11,1997L-97-17910CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389ReportableEvent:97-004DateofEvent:June11,1997IncorrectOriginalCableTrayFireStopP~TheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmittedpursuanttotherequirement'sof10CFR50.73toprovidenotificationofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LuciePlantJAS/KWFAttachmentl/(W)cc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant'Ir7071500089707iXPDRADOCK0500038'PSPDRanFPLGroupcompanyiliillllllllllllllllllllllllIllslllllll NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLZCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDSYOMSNo.3160%I04Exp)RES04)3ore6ESTIMATEDBURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATOINFORMATIONCOLLECTIONREGUEST:60.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDINTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEBACKTOINDUSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDINGBURDENESTIMATToTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCHIT%F33)U.S.NUCLEARREGIAATORYCOMMISSION.WASHINGTON,OC206664KO)ANDTOTHEPAPERWORKREDUCTIONPROJECTI3160<104),OFFICE0MANAGEMENTANDBUDGET,WASHINGTON,DC20603.FACIUTYNAME(1)STLUCIEUNIT2DOCKETNUMBER12)05000389PAGE13I1OF4TITLEI4)IncorrectOriginalCableTrayFireStopAssemblyInstallationOutsideAppendixRDesignBasesMONTHDAYYEAR1197SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-004-0MONTHDAYYEAR97FACIUTYNAMEFACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000DOCKETNUMBER05000OPERATINGMQDE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(n)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(1)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm3BSANAMEK.W.Frehafer,LicensingEngineerTELEPHONENUMBERSecludeAreeCode)(5611468-4284CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETONPRDS,x:,t,;4(..NkÃ"'9):AcAusEsYsTEMcoMpoNENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToNPRDSYEs(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnJune11,1997,St,LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.Inspectionresultsindicatedthat,generically,twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblieslackedtheinstallationofceramicfiberbetweencableswithinthefirebarrier.FPLdeterminedthattheas-builtconfigurationoftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliesdidnotmeetthetestedconfigurationforathreehourfireratedassembly.AlltheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliesweredeclaredinoperable.Theapparentcauseofthiseventwasduetopersonnelerrorduringtheimplementationofdesigndrawingsorinsufficientdesignguidanceduringinitialinstallation.Correctiveactionsincludethepostingofhourlyfirewatchpatrolsthatwereestablishedtocompensatefortheinoperablefirestopassemblies.Repairsorplantmodificationswillbeimplementedtorestoretheaffectedfirestopassembliestotheirrequiredthreehourfirerating.NACFOAM366(4.95) | | LER97-004-00:on 970611,discovered incorrect originalcabletrayfirestopassemblyinstallation outsideAppRdesignbasis.Causedpersonnel error.Postedhourlyfirewatchpatrols.W/970711 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR |
| NRCFORM366AI4-9SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TfXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION97-004-02OF4TEXTIlfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofiVRCForm366Ai(17lOnJune11,1997,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.FPLwasinvestigatingdiscrepanciesoftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliesidentifiedduringpreviousfieldsurveillances.Intrusiveinspectionsoftheremainingpopulationoffirestopassembliesofthisdesignwereinprogresstodeterminetheextentoftheissue.Preliminaryinspectionresultsindicatedthat,generically,theas-builtconfigurationoftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblieslackedtheinstallationofceramicfiberbetweencableswithinthefirebarrier.TheconfigurationdidnotconformtothedesigndrawingsandFPLascertainedthattheidentifiedfieldconditionswerenotpreviouslyevaluatedduringinitialconstruction.Therefore,thetwosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliesdidnotmeetthetestedconfigurationforathreehourfireratedassembly,asrequiredbytheplant10CFR50AppendixRcommitments.Asaconservativemeasure,alltheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliesweredeclaredinoperablebasedonthepreliminaryinspectionresults.Hourlyfirewatchpatrolswereestablishedascompensatorymeasuresasrequiredbyplantadministrativeprocedures.St.LucieUnit1doesnotutilizecabletrayfirestopsofthisdesign,sothisconditionisonlyapplicabletoUnit2.Areviewoftheoriginalinstallationandinspectiondocumentationfortheconstructionofthetwosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliessuggeststhattheapparentcauseofthiseventwasduetopersonnelerrorduringtheimplementationofdesigndrawingsorinsufficientdesignguidanceduringinitialinstallation.Acontributingcausewasthattheinstallationdrawingswerenotclearinspecifyingthatceramicfiberneededtobeinstalledaroundeachcableinthefirestopassembly.Thisconditionwasdiscoveredduringarecentfirestopsurveillance.ConsistentwiththeIndustry,normalfirebarrierinspectioncriterionisavisualinspectionofexposedsurfacescheckingforvoids,gaps,andholes.Nointrusiveinspectionsordisassemblingoffirebarriersareperformed.Oneofthefirestopswaslocatedsuchthatavisualinspectionwasdifficulttoperform,sotheinspectorranhishandaroundthefirestoptocheckforvoids,gaps,'andholes.Theinspectornotedairflowbetweencablesthroughtheassembly.Althoughairflowwasnotedduringthatinspection,routinedetectionofairflowthroughadiscrepantfirestopisproblematicinnatureandhighlydependentontheexistenceofadifferentialpressureacrossthefirebarrier.Evenifpreviousinspectionswereperformedinahandsonmanner,adifferentialpressurecouldnotbeassuredbecauseofReactorAuxiliaryBuildingventilationlineupordoorconfigurationsineffectduringtheinspection.Thisconditionisreportableunder10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)becausetheasfoundconditionoftheUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliesdonotmeetthreehourfirebarrierrequirements.ThefirebarriersarediscussedintheUnit2.UFSARinchapter9.5A.Theprincipaldesignobjectiveofthefirebarrierandassociatedpenetrationsealsistoprotectpersonnelandredundantequipmentfromtheeffectsofpostulatedfiresinthereactorauxiliarybuilding,toassurethecapabilitytoachievesafeshutdowninaccordancewith10CFR50AppendixRandBTP9.5-1AppendixA.Thebarriersandassociatedpenetrationsealsarepassivedevicesandarepartoftheplantfireprotectionsystem.NRGF0AM366AI4-95I C,4NRCFORM366AI4-9SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION97-004-03OF4TEXT/Ifmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366AJl17)TheceramicfiberbetweenthecablesisanextensionoftheMariniteboard(ceramicfiberboard)firestopface.Thisceramicfiberservestoresistheat,flame,andsmokepropagationthroughthefirestop.Inconjunctionwiththeflameretardantthisisaneffectivethreehourfireratedassembly.(SeeFigure1fortypicaldesigndetails).However,withouttheceramicfiberbetweenthecablesapathforheatandsmokepropagationisprovided.Thisisasmallandtortuouspathinthatthespacebetweenthecablesistypicallysmall.Theheatwouldstillneedtotravelatleastonefootdownthetraywheretheflameretardantisapplied,thenwouldenteralargeopenspaceinthewall,andwouldthenneedtoexitthroughanotherfootofconfinedspacebetweencablesonthenon-firesideoftheassembly.Localizedhotspotswouldexist.TheIEEE-383cableswillresisttheeffectsoftheincreasedtemperaturesandhelptopreventtheignitionofcableinthenon-firesideoftheassembly.Thetwosidedcabletrayfirestopdeficiencieswereevaluatedanddeterminedtobenotsafetysignificant.Although'theas-foundconditionofthesecabletrayfirestopswasnotinaccordancewiththetestedanddesignconditions,andwouldprobablynotmeetathreehourfireratingwithouttheceramicfiberbetweenthecables,theinstallationdoesprovideresistancetofirepropagation.Inaddition,fireprotectiondefenseindepthprovidesanintegratedmeansformitigatingtheconsequencesofafire,suchastheexistingsmokedetectionsystems,automaticwaterfiresuppressionsystems,hosestations,administrativeprogramsthatcontrolcombustibleloading,andoperatoractions.Basedontheabove,itisconcludedthatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwerenotadverselyaffectedbytheconditionoftheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies.Thehourlyfirewatchpatrolswereestablishedtocompensatefortheinoperabletwosidedcabletrayfirestopassembliesasrequiredbyplantadministrativeprocedures.FPLwilleitherreworktheassociatedfirestopassembliestotheiroriginaldesignordevelopandimplementanewdesigntorestorethedegradedbarrierstoathreehourfirebarrierrating.None. | | 'NCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3PDINTERNAL: |
| NRCFORM366AI495ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOSTLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIALREVISION97-004-04OF4TEXT(ifmorespoceisrequired,usoadditionalcopiesofNRCArm3MAlI17)TWO-SIDEDCABLETRAYSEALINFLOOR/WALLOPENINGFIRESTOP2"CERAMICFIBERPLUGSFLAMERETARDANTMARINITE-IBOARDFLAMERETARDANT(MJOWO!eeRotFigure1TypicalTwoSidedCableTrayFireStopAssembly}} | | ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: |
| | LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOOREFW.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME WIENSFL~AEOD/SPD/RAB ET~KRONENRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENERFDS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTR'ENCL112211111111111111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS: |
| | PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD"5(EXT. |
| | 415-2083) |
| | TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDONTNEEDrFULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQJIRED: |
| | LTTR25ENCL25 FloridaPower&LightCompany,6501SouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957July11,1997L-97-17910CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389Reportable Event:97-004DateofEvent:June11,1997Incorrect OriginalCableTrayFireStopP~TheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirement's of10CFR50.73toprovidenotification ofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresident St.LuciePlantJAS/KWFAttachment l/(W)cc:RegionalAdministrator, USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant'Ir707150008 9707iXPDRADOCK0500038'P SPDRanFPLGroupcompanyiliillllllllllllllllllllllllIlls lllllll NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LZCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDSYOMSNo.3160%I04Exp)RES04)3ore6ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATOINFORMATION COLLECTION REGUEST:60.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED INTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEBACKTOINDUSTRY. |
| | FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATToTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIT%F33)U.S.NUCLEARREGIAATORY COMMISSION. |
| | WASHINGTON, OC206664KO) |
| | ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECTI3160<104), |
| | OFFICE0MANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC20603.FACIUTYNAME(1)STLUCIEUNIT2DOCKETNUMBER12)05000389PAGE13I1OF4TITLEI4)Incorrect OriginalCableTrayFireStopAssemblyInstallation OutsideAppendixRDesignBasesMONTHDAYYEAR1197SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-004-0MONTHDAYYEAR97FACIUTYNAMEFACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000DOCKETNUMBER 05000OPERATING MQDE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) |
| | (i)20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a) |
| | (3)(n)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2) |
| | (iii)50.73(a)(2) |
| | (v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm3BSANAMEK.W.Frehafer, Licensing EngineerTELEPHONE NUMBERSecludeAreeCode)(5611468-4284CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS,x:,t,;4(..NkÃ"'9):A cAusEsYsTEMcoMpoNENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE ToNPRDSYEs(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJune11,1997,St,LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.Inspection resultsindicated that,generically, twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies lackedtheinstallation ofceramicfiberbetweencableswithinthefirebarrier.FPLdetermined thattheas-builtconfiguration oftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies didnotmeetthetestedconfiguration forathreehourfireratedassembly. |
| | AlltheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies weredeclaredinoperable. |
| | Theapparentcauseofthiseventwasduetopersonnel errorduringtheimplementation ofdesigndrawingsorinsufficient designguidanceduringinitialinstallation. |
| | Corrective actionsincludethepostingofhourlyfirewatchpatrolsthatwereestablished tocompensate fortheinoperable firestopassemblies. |
| | Repairsorplantmodifications willbeimplemented torestoretheaffectedfirestopassemblies totheirrequiredthreehourfirerating.NACFOAM366(4.95) |
| | NRCFORM366AI4-9SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TfXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-004-02OF4TEXTIlfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofiVRCForm366Ai(17lOnJune11,1997,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.FPLwasinvestigating discrepancies oftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies identified duringpreviousfieldsurveillances. |
| | Intrusive inspections oftheremaining population offirestopassemblies ofthisdesignwereinprogresstodetermine theextentoftheissue.Preliminary inspection resultsindicated that,generically, theas-builtconfiguration oftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies lackedtheinstallation ofceramicfiberbetweencableswithinthefirebarrier.Theconfiguration didnotconformtothedesigndrawingsandFPLascertained thattheidentified fieldconditions werenotpreviously evaluated duringinitialconstruction. |
| | Therefore, thetwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies didnotmeetthetestedconfiguration forathreehourfireratedassembly, asrequiredbytheplant10CFR50AppendixRcommitments. |
| | Asaconservative measure,alltheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies weredeclaredinoperable basedonthepreliminary inspection results.Hourlyfirewatchpatrolswereestablished ascompensatory measuresasrequiredbyplantadministrative procedures. |
| | St.LucieUnit1doesnotutilizecabletrayfirestopsofthisdesign,sothiscondition isonlyapplicable toUnit2.Areviewoftheoriginalinstallation andinspection documentation fortheconstruction ofthetwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies suggeststhattheapparentcauseofthiseventwasduetopersonnel errorduringtheimplementation ofdesigndrawingsorinsufficient designguidanceduringinitialinstallation. |
| | Acontributing causewasthattheinstallation drawingswerenotclearinspecifying thatceramicfiberneededtobeinstalled aroundeachcableinthefirestopassembly. |
| | Thiscondition wasdiscovered duringarecentfirestopsurveillance. |
| | Consistent withtheIndustry, normalfirebarrierinspection criterion isavisualinspection ofexposedsurfacescheckingforvoids,gaps,andholes.Nointrusive inspections ordisassembling offirebarriersareperformed. |
| | Oneofthefirestopswaslocatedsuchthatavisualinspection wasdifficult toperform,sotheinspector ranhishandaroundthefirestoptocheckforvoids,gaps,'andholes.Theinspector notedairflowbetweencablesthroughtheassembly. |
| | Althoughairflowwasnotedduringthatinspection, routinedetection ofairflowthroughadiscrepant firestopisproblematic innatureandhighlydependent ontheexistence ofadifferential pressureacrossthefirebarrier.Evenifpreviousinspections wereperformed inahandsonmanner,adifferential pressurecouldnotbeassuredbecauseofReactorAuxiliary Buildingventilation lineupordoorconfigurations ineffectduringtheinspection. |
| | Thiscondition isreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) becausetheasfoundcondition oftheUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies donotmeetthreehourfirebarrierrequirements. |
| | Thefirebarriersarediscussed intheUnit2.UFSARinchapter9.5A.Theprincipal designobjective ofthefirebarrierandassociated penetration sealsistoprotectpersonnel andredundant equipment fromtheeffectsofpostulated firesinthereactorauxiliary |
| | : building, toassurethecapability toachievesafeshutdowninaccordance with10CFR50AppendixRandBTP9.5-1AppendixA.Thebarriersandassociated penetration sealsarepassivedevicesandarepartoftheplantfireprotection system.NRGF0AM366AI4-95I C,4NRCFORM366AI4-9SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-004-03OF4TEXT/Ifmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366AJl17)Theceramicfiberbetweenthecablesisanextension oftheMariniteboard(ceramicfiberboard)firestopface.Thisceramicfiberservestoresistheat,flame,andsmokepropagation throughthefirestop.Inconjunction withtheflameretardant thisisaneffective threehourfireratedassembly. |
| | (SeeFigure1fortypicaldesigndetails). |
| | However,withouttheceramicfiberbetweenthecablesapathforheatandsmokepropagation isprovided. |
| | Thisisasmallandtortuouspathinthatthespacebetweenthecablesistypically small.Theheatwouldstillneedtotravelatleastonefootdownthetraywheretheflameretardant isapplied,thenwouldenteralargeopenspaceinthewall,andwouldthenneedtoexitthroughanotherfootofconfinedspacebetweencablesonthenon-firesideoftheassembly. |
| | Localized hotspotswouldexist.TheIEEE-383cableswillresisttheeffectsoftheincreased temperatures andhelptopreventtheignitionofcableinthenon-firesideoftheassembly. |
| | Thetwosidedcabletrayfirestopdeficiencies wereevaluated anddetermined tobenotsafetysignificant. |
| | Although'the as-foundcondition ofthesecabletrayfirestopswasnotinaccordance withthetestedanddesignconditions, andwouldprobablynotmeetathreehourfireratingwithouttheceramicfiberbetweenthecables,theinstallation doesprovideresistance tofirepropagation. |
| | Inaddition, fireprotection defenseindepthprovidesanintegrated meansformitigating theconsequences ofafire,suchastheexistingsmokedetection systems,automatic waterfiresuppression systems,hosestations, administrative programsthatcontrolcombustible loading,andoperatoractions.Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwerenotadversely affectedbythecondition oftheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies. |
| | Thehourlyfirewatchpatrolswereestablished tocompensate fortheinoperable twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies asrequiredbyplantadministrative procedures. |
| | FPLwilleitherreworktheassociated firestopassemblies totheiroriginaldesignordevelopandimplement anewdesigntorestorethedegradedbarrierstoathreehourfirebarrierrating.None. |
| | NRCFORM366AI495ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-004-04OF4TEXT(ifmorespoceisrequired, usoadditional copiesofNRCArm3MAlI17)TWO-SIDED CABLETRAYSEALINFLOOR/WALL OPENINGFIRESTOP2"CERAMICFIBERPLUGSFLAMERETARDANT MARINITE-IBOARDFLAMERETARDANT (MJOWO!ee RotFigure1TypicalTwoSidedCableTrayFireStopAssembly}} |
|
|---|
Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4951999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML17241A4741999-08-31031 August 1999
Rev 1 to PCM 99016, St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 Colr.
ML17241A4591999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML17241A4301999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990805 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4091999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990712 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999
Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3631999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990610 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17241A3331999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990517 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0841999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines.
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0961999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990408 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0461999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0051999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990211 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9961999-01-14014 January 1999
SG Tube Inservice Insp Special Rept.
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9831998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990111 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17241A3581998-12-0909 December 1998
Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 970526-981209.
ML17229A9421998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17241A4931998-11-0101 November 1998
Statement of Account for Period of 981101-990930 for Suntrust Bank,As Trustee for Florida Municipal Power Agency Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (St Lucie Project).
ML17229A9051998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981110 Ltr
ML17229A8871998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1 Which Was Machined with Improper Length.C/A Includes Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8781998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1,which Was Machined with Improper Length.Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8721998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 981009 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8611998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 980911 Ltr
ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency
ML17229A8481998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 1 to PSL-ENG-SEFJ-98-013, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr.
ML17229A9461998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 0 to PCM 98016, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr.
ML17229A8301998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980814 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7981998-06-30030 June 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980713 Ltr
ML17229A7701998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980612 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
('A.'l'EQO8.2REGULATIO INFQRMATIQN DIBTRIBUTIor~sTEM (RIDE)!ACCESSION NBR:9707150008 DOC.DATE:
97/07/11NOTARIZED:
NOFACIL'.50-389 St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION FREHA:ER,K.W.
FloridaPower&LightCo.STALL,J.A.
FloridaPower6LightCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000389
SUBJECT:
LER97-004-00:on 970611,discovered incorrect originalcabletrayfirestopassemblyinstallation outsideAppRdesignbasis.Causedpersonnel error.Postedhourlyfirewatchpatrols.W/970711 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR
'NCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3PDINTERNAL:
ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL:
LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOOREFW.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME WIENSFL~AEOD/SPD/RAB ET~KRONENRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENERFDS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTR'ENCL112211111111111111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTEICONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD"5(EXT.
415-2083)
TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDONTNEEDrFULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQJIRED:
LTTR25ENCL25 FloridaPower&LightCompany,6501SouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957July11,1997L-97-17910CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit2DocketNo.50-389Reportable Event:97-004DateofEvent:June11,1997Incorrect OriginalCableTrayFireStopP~TheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirement's of10CFR50.73toprovidenotification ofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresident St.LuciePlantJAS/KWFAttachment l/(W)cc:RegionalAdministrator, USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant'Ir707150008 9707iXPDRADOCK0500038'P SPDRanFPLGroupcompanyiliillllllllllllllllllllllllIlls lllllll NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LZCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDSYOMSNo.3160%I04Exp)RES04)3ore6ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATOINFORMATION COLLECTION REGUEST:60.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED INTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEBACKTOINDUSTRY.
FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATToTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIT%F33)U.S.NUCLEARREGIAATORY COMMISSION.
WASHINGTON, OC206664KO)
ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECTI3160<104),
OFFICE0MANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET,WASHINGTON, DC20603.FACIUTYNAME(1)STLUCIEUNIT2DOCKETNUMBER12)05000389PAGE13I1OF4TITLEI4)Incorrect OriginalCableTrayFireStopAssemblyInstallation OutsideAppendixRDesignBasesMONTHDAYYEAR1197SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-004-0MONTHDAYYEAR97FACIUTYNAMEFACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000DOCKETNUMBER 05000OPERATING MQDE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)
(i)20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)
(3)(n)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(1) 50.73(a)(2)
(iii)50.73(a)(2)
(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm3BSANAMEK.W.Frehafer, Licensing EngineerTELEPHONE NUMBERSecludeAreeCode)(5611468-4284CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS,x:,t,;4(..NkÃ"'9):A cAusEsYsTEMcoMpoNENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE ToNPRDSYEs(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJune11,1997,St,LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.Inspection resultsindicated that,generically, twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies lackedtheinstallation ofceramicfiberbetweencableswithinthefirebarrier.FPLdetermined thattheas-builtconfiguration oftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies didnotmeetthetestedconfiguration forathreehourfireratedassembly.
AlltheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies weredeclaredinoperable.
Theapparentcauseofthiseventwasduetopersonnel errorduringtheimplementation ofdesigndrawingsorinsufficient designguidanceduringinitialinstallation.
Corrective actionsincludethepostingofhourlyfirewatchpatrolsthatwereestablished tocompensate fortheinoperable firestopassemblies.
Repairsorplantmodifications willbeimplemented torestoretheaffectedfirestopassemblies totheirrequiredthreehourfirerating.NACFOAM366(4.95)
NRCFORM366AI4-9SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TfXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-004-02OF4TEXTIlfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofiVRCForm366Ai(17lOnJune11,1997,St.LucieUnit2wasinMode1at100percentpower.FPLwasinvestigating discrepancies oftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies identified duringpreviousfieldsurveillances.
Intrusive inspections oftheremaining population offirestopassemblies ofthisdesignwereinprogresstodetermine theextentoftheissue.Preliminary inspection resultsindicated that,generically, theas-builtconfiguration oftwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies lackedtheinstallation ofceramicfiberbetweencableswithinthefirebarrier.Theconfiguration didnotconformtothedesigndrawingsandFPLascertained thattheidentified fieldconditions werenotpreviously evaluated duringinitialconstruction.
Therefore, thetwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies didnotmeetthetestedconfiguration forathreehourfireratedassembly, asrequiredbytheplant10CFR50AppendixRcommitments.
Asaconservative measure,alltheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies weredeclaredinoperable basedonthepreliminary inspection results.Hourlyfirewatchpatrolswereestablished ascompensatory measuresasrequiredbyplantadministrative procedures.
St.LucieUnit1doesnotutilizecabletrayfirestopsofthisdesign,sothiscondition isonlyapplicable toUnit2.Areviewoftheoriginalinstallation andinspection documentation fortheconstruction ofthetwosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies suggeststhattheapparentcauseofthiseventwasduetopersonnel errorduringtheimplementation ofdesigndrawingsorinsufficient designguidanceduringinitialinstallation.
Acontributing causewasthattheinstallation drawingswerenotclearinspecifying thatceramicfiberneededtobeinstalled aroundeachcableinthefirestopassembly.
Thiscondition wasdiscovered duringarecentfirestopsurveillance.
Consistent withtheIndustry, normalfirebarrierinspection criterion isavisualinspection ofexposedsurfacescheckingforvoids,gaps,andholes.Nointrusive inspections ordisassembling offirebarriersareperformed.
Oneofthefirestopswaslocatedsuchthatavisualinspection wasdifficult toperform,sotheinspector ranhishandaroundthefirestoptocheckforvoids,gaps,'andholes.Theinspector notedairflowbetweencablesthroughtheassembly.
Althoughairflowwasnotedduringthatinspection, routinedetection ofairflowthroughadiscrepant firestopisproblematic innatureandhighlydependent ontheexistence ofadifferential pressureacrossthefirebarrier.Evenifpreviousinspections wereperformed inahandsonmanner,adifferential pressurecouldnotbeassuredbecauseofReactorAuxiliary Buildingventilation lineupordoorconfigurations ineffectduringtheinspection.
Thiscondition isreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) becausetheasfoundcondition oftheUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies donotmeetthreehourfirebarrierrequirements.
Thefirebarriersarediscussed intheUnit2.UFSARinchapter9.5A.Theprincipal designobjective ofthefirebarrierandassociated penetration sealsistoprotectpersonnel andredundant equipment fromtheeffectsofpostulated firesinthereactorauxiliary
- building, toassurethecapability toachievesafeshutdowninaccordance with10CFR50AppendixRandBTP9.5-1AppendixA.Thebarriersandassociated penetration sealsarepassivedevicesandarepartoftheplantfireprotection system.NRGF0AM366AI4-95I C,4NRCFORM366AI4-9SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-004-03OF4TEXT/Ifmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366AJl17)Theceramicfiberbetweenthecablesisanextension oftheMariniteboard(ceramicfiberboard)firestopface.Thisceramicfiberservestoresistheat,flame,andsmokepropagation throughthefirestop.Inconjunction withtheflameretardant thisisaneffective threehourfireratedassembly.
(SeeFigure1fortypicaldesigndetails).
However,withouttheceramicfiberbetweenthecablesapathforheatandsmokepropagation isprovided.
Thisisasmallandtortuouspathinthatthespacebetweenthecablesistypically small.Theheatwouldstillneedtotravelatleastonefootdownthetraywheretheflameretardant isapplied,thenwouldenteralargeopenspaceinthewall,andwouldthenneedtoexitthroughanotherfootofconfinedspacebetweencablesonthenon-firesideoftheassembly.
Localized hotspotswouldexist.TheIEEE-383cableswillresisttheeffectsoftheincreased temperatures andhelptopreventtheignitionofcableinthenon-firesideoftheassembly.
Thetwosidedcabletrayfirestopdeficiencies wereevaluated anddetermined tobenotsafetysignificant.
Although'the as-foundcondition ofthesecabletrayfirestopswasnotinaccordance withthetestedanddesignconditions, andwouldprobablynotmeetathreehourfireratingwithouttheceramicfiberbetweenthecables,theinstallation doesprovideresistance tofirepropagation.
Inaddition, fireprotection defenseindepthprovidesanintegrated meansformitigating theconsequences ofafire,suchastheexistingsmokedetection systems,automatic waterfiresuppression systems,hosestations, administrative programsthatcontrolcombustible loading,andoperatoractions.Basedontheabove,itisconcluded thatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwerenotadversely affectedbythecondition oftheSt.LucieUnit2twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies.
Thehourlyfirewatchpatrolswereestablished tocompensate fortheinoperable twosidedcabletrayfirestopassemblies asrequiredbyplantadministrative procedures.
FPLwilleitherreworktheassociated firestopassemblies totheiroriginaldesignordevelopandimplement anewdesigntorestorethedegradedbarrierstoathreehourfirebarrierrating.None.
NRCFORM366AI495ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT205000389YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-004-04OF4TEXT(ifmorespoceisrequired, usoadditional copiesofNRCArm3MAlI17)TWO-SIDED CABLETRAYSEALINFLOOR/WALL OPENINGFIRESTOP2"CERAMICFIBERPLUGSFLAMERETARDANT MARINITE-IBOARDFLAMERETARDANT (MJOWO!ee RotFigure1TypicalTwoSidedCableTrayFireStopAssembly
