ML17309A559

Forwards Response to NRC 940901 RAI Re Eals,Eals Annotated Classification Criteria Based on Response to NRC Rais,Rev 1 to OSSI-92-402A-4-REG, Re Ginna EALs Technical Bases & Rev 1 to Ossi 92-402A-2-REG, Fission Product Barrier....

ML17309A559
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	11/07/1994
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	JOHNSON A R NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML17263A834	List: ML17263A833 ML17263A835 ML17309A559
References
TAC-M89506, NUDOCS 9411090265
Download: ML17309A559 (53)

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PRIGRITY1ACCELERATED RIDSPROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RXDS)ACCESSION NBR:9411090265 DOC.DATE:

94/11/07NOTARIZED:

NOFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGi.nnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester GAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas6ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFXLIATION JOHNSON,A.R.

ProjectDirectorate I-3DOCKETg05000244PR

SUBJECT:

ForwardsresponsetoNRC940901RAIreEALs,EALs annotated classification criteriabasedonresponsetoNRCRAXs,Rev1toOSSI-92-402A-4-REG, "REGinnaEALsTechnical Bases"&Rev1toOSSI92-402A-2-REG, "FissionProductBarrier...."

DISTRIBUTION CODE:A045DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLtSIZE:5i~~4TITLE:ORSubmittal:

Emergency Preparedness Plas,Implement'g Procedures, CNOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

05000244IXNTERNAL:

RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3PDCENTE01OCCTEXTERNAL:

NOAC~Pz.c>7$g(Q<4&COPIESLTTRENCL11111111RECXPIENT IDCODE/NAME JOHNSON,A NRR/DRSS/PEPB NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111Y'CNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEiViiSTE!CONTACT'I'HE DOCL'ifEN'r CON'rROLDESK,ROO!ifPl-37(EXT.04-DOS3)TOELI!iflNATE YOURNAifLFROifDISTRIIIU I'IONLIS'I'SFORDOCI:b,fEN'I'SYOL'ON"I'L'ED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPXESREQUIRED:

LTTR7ENCL7 V1I1'y

~P4NDROCHESTER GASANDElECTRICCORPORAllON

~89EASTAVENUE; ROCHESTER, N.Y146rI9-000I AREACODE716546-2700ROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresident hlvcieorOperations November7,1994U.S.Nuclear,Regulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:AllenR.JohnsonProjectDirectorate I-3Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

Emergency ActionLevelsResponsetoRequestforAdditional Information R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Ref.(a):LetterfromA.R.Johnson(NRC),toR.C.Mecredy(RG&E),

Subject:

"RequestforAdditional Information onR.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevels(TACNo.M89506),"

datedSept.1,1994(b):LetterfromR.C.Mecredy(RG&E),toA.R.Johnson(NRC),samesubject,datedOctober5,1994

DearMr.Johnson:

Reference (a)requested within30daysthatRG&Eprovideadditional information withregardtotheproposedEmergency ActionLevels(EAL)fortheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.Reference (b)requested anextension ofanadditional 30daysinordertocoordinate ourproposedEALswiththoseofothernuclearutilities inthestateofNewYork.Attachedarethefollowing inresponsetoReference (a):Attachment A-ResponsetotheRequestforAdditional Information:

AresponsetoeachgeneralandspecificNRCcommenthasbeenprovided.

Attachment B-R.E.Ginna"Emergency ActionLevels:Annotated Classification CriteriaBasedonResponsetoNRCRAI.Attachment C-Emergency ActionLevelsTechnical Bases,Revision1.Attachment D-FissionProductBarrierEvaluation, Revision1..Attachment E-R.E.GinnaPlantSpecificEALGuideline (PEG),Revision1.'1Forthepurposeofthissubmittal theEALTables,Attachment B,containannotated cross-references totheNUMARCICgs,suchas[SA2],[SS2],[SG2].Wedonotplan,however,toincludethese0891357g7gK/2>k~resrroeo2ee

'st41107OS000244PDR

references withintheEALimplementing procedures.

TheNUMARCICgsareincludedaspartoftheTechnical Bases(Attachment C).Very'trulyyours,RobertC.MecredyGAHK352xc:Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14D1)ProjectDirectorate I-3Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector TV 50-244GINNARG5EC,RESPONSETORE(VESTFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE,EMERGENCY ACTIONLEVELS.';REC'DM/LTRDTDll/7/94...9411090265

-NOTICE-THEATTACHEDFILESAREOFFICIAL'ECORDSOFTHEINFORMATION

&REPORTSMANAGEMENT BRANCH.THEYHAVEBEENCHARGEDTOYOUFORALIMITEDTIME PERIODANDMUSTBERETURNEDTOTHERE-CORDS&ARCHIVESSERVICESSEC-TIONP1-22WHITEFLINT.PLEASEDONOTSENDDOCUMENTS CHARGEDOUTTHROUGHTHEMAIL.REMOVALOFANYPAGE(S)FROMDOCUMENTFORREPRODUCTION MUST,BERE-FERREDTOFILEPERSONNEL..

Attachment A'>>";;.'R.E.GinnaEmergency.

Ac@po~~yels RESPONSPTORKQUEBe7+FOR ADDITIONAL INFQRP~YXON

.Docket50-244

R.E:GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1"TheR.E.GinnaEALtables(bothCategories andSubcategories) omittedthefulltextoftheNUMARCInitiating Conditions.

Forexample..."

"Inaccordance withNUMARC/NESP-007, ICsare:"oneofapredetermined subsetofnuclearpowerplantconditions whereeitherthepotential existsforaradiological emergency, orsuchanemergency hasoccurred."

EALsare:"apre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold foraplantICthatplacestheplantinagivenemergency class."TheuseofICsisadvantageous fromahumanfactorsperspective.

GroupingEALsunderICswillindicatetothosewhomustuseEALshowanEAL(orseveraldiverseEALs)isrelatedtotheplantcondition ofconcern.Thiswillassisttheemergency directorintheuseofjudgmentinmakingthecorrecteventclassification.

ThelackofICsforlossoffissionproductbarriersisofparticular concerntothestaff.Itisimportant thatpersonnel whoperformeventclassification, andthosewhocommunicate theclassification tooffsiteauthorities, clearlyunderstand thecondition ofeachfissionproductbarrierasreQectedintheEAL.Thisassociation betweenbarriersandEALsisnotreadilyapparentintheGinnamethodology."

"ThelackofICsinthelicensee's classification schemerepresents asignificant departure fromtheNUMARCguidanceandisunacceptable.

ThelicenseeshouldincludeICswiththeirEALstodemonstrate therelationship betweentheEALsandtheirassociated classification" AsstatedintheRAI,ICsareasubsetofpowerplantconditions whichrepresent apotential oractualradiological emergency.

EALsare"apre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold foraplantICthatplacestheplantinagivenemergency class."Whenasite-specific, observable threshold (EAL)isreached,entryintoitsassociated emergency classisrequiredirrespective oftheIC&omwhichtheEALisderived.AsstatedintheRAI,ICsprovidecriteriathatmayberelevanttoemergency classification basedontheusers"judgment,"

Therefore, itfollowsthatuseofjudgmentmayberequiredforthoseconditions inwhichno"pre-determined, site-specific, observable threshold" canbedefined.SinceICslack"site-specific, observable thresholds" foremergency classification, forthosepostulated conditions inwhichnositespecificobservable threshold exists,theusersjudgmentmustbebasedonthegenericdefinition oftheassociated emergency classification.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION EALCategory9.0"Other"definesEALsineachemergency classwhicharebasedupontheuser'sjudgment.

Category9.0isusedwhentheplantcondition doesnotmeetanyoftheEALthresholds ofCategory1.0throughCategory8.0butitisdetermined thattheplantcondition meetseithertheemergency classdefinition criteriaortheMBrIARC/NESP-007 fissionproductbarrierlossorpotential losscriteria.

'nhini'nfnr"AbsentfromtheR.E.GinnaICandthesupporting EALweretheNUMARCcriteriaof"ActualorImminent" and"UsingActualMeteorology."

Thebasisdocumentincludedthecriteriaregarding meteorology, butwouldhavetobereferredtobytheclassifier inadditiontoaclassification implementing procedure.

Thelicenseeshouldassurethatcrossreferencing requirements areminimized byincluding allnecessary attributes ofICsandEALsinonelocation."

Thoughnotspecifically stated,itisinferredthatthisRAIisinreference toEALs5.2.4and5.2.5.Foranyactualorimminentrelease,doseprojections performed in'accordance withEPIP2-18,"ControlRoomDoseAssessment, EPIP2-4"Emergency DoseProjections

-ManualMethod,EPIP2-5"Emergency DoseProjections-PersonalComputerMethod,orEPIP2-6"Emergency DoseProjections-MIDASProgram,useofactualmeteorology isspecified.

Therefore, implicitintheperformance ofanydoseprojection istheuseofactualmeteorology.

'm'nn~~immi R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOgEQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[para.1]"Thelicensee's failuretoincludeafissionproductbarrierevaluation matrixconstitutes asignificant departure fromthemethodology inNUMARC/NESP-007.NESP-007specifically includedbarrierevaluation initsclassification methodology tocomplement thesymptomatic andevent-based ICs,especially forthehigherclassifications.

Thefissionproductbarriermatrixprovidesmultipleindicators tooperators toassessthestatusofeachofthebarriersandclassifytheemergency basedupontheirintegrity.

Thematrixalsoprovidestheabilitytodynamically assesshowfarpresentconditions arefromescalating tothenexthigheremergency class."Forexample,ifFuelCladbarrierandRCSbarrier'Loss'ALs existed,ThiswouldindicatetotheEmergency Directorthat,inadditiontooffsitedoseassessments, continual assessments ofradioactive inventory andcontainment integrity mustbefocusedon.If,ontheotherhand,bothfuelcladbarrierandRCSbarrier'Potential Loss'ALsexisted,theEmergency Directorwouldhavemoreassurance thattherewasnoimmediate needtoescalate..."."

[para.2]"Thelicenseehasindicated thattheirproposedfissionproductbarrierEALsreducetheburdenontheoperators inevaluating thefissionproductbarriers, however,theuseofnineseparatecategories ofEALsbythelicenseewillstillrequiresomeonetorefertoseveraldifferent categories toperformadynamicassessment ofthefissionproductbarriers.

Further,theschemeisinternally conQicting becauseofthemultiplecategories.

Forexample,ifcoolantactivitywas>300p,Ci/ccDEI-131andprimarysystemleakagewas>46gpm,eitheroftheseconditions wouldbeanAlertperthelicensee's EALtables.However,thecollective failureswouldnotnecessarily resultinasiteareaemergency (SAE)declaration, asisrequiredbyNUMARCcriteria.

[para.3]"Intheboundinganalysisthatwasperformed toevaluatethenumerouscombinations ofconditions ofthethreefissionproductbarriers, severalassumptions weremadethatwerenotadequately justified orledtotheelimination ofsomecombinations thatwereboundedbythecondition.

Forexample,undertheremarkssectionoftheGinnaFissionProductBarrierEvaluation:

[Subpara.

1]3.Theinitiation signal...

Containment isolation signalscanalsooccurduetolossofcontainment coolingorfaultedsteamgenerator 4

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[Subpara.

2]4.Inordertoreach...Notechnical supporting information wasprovidedtosupporttheassertion thatacorecoolingorheatsinkREDpathmustexist.Thelicenseealsodidnotadequately demonstrate thatthiscondition isindicative ofalossofthefuelcladbarrier.[Subpara.

3]10.ACoreExitThermocouple reading...

EntryintoCoreCooling-RED pathalsorequiresthelossofallRCPsandisnotindicative ofapotential lossofcontainment.

Therefore, declaration ofaGeneralEmergency wouldbeunwarranted.

[Subpara.

4]11....Thus, entryintoCore...TheNUMARCguidanceforpotential lossofthecontainment duetodegradation intheCoreCoolingCSFspecifically requiresthatfunctional recoveryprocedures havebeenineffective for15minutes.Severeaccidentanalyseshaveconcluded thatfunctional restoration procedures canarrestcoredegradation withinthereactorvesselinasignificant fractionofthecoredamagescenarios, andthatthelikelihood ofcontainment failureisverysmallintheseevents.Therefore, itisappropriate toprovideareasonable periodoftimetoallowfunctionrestoration procedures toarrestthecoremeltsequence.

Whetherornottheprocedures willbeeffective shouldbeapparentwithin15minutes.[Subpara.

5]12.CoreCooling-Orange ontheCSFST...The"Loss"EALfortheRCSbarrierinNU1KARC/NESP-007 thataddresses RCSleakageisundertheheading"RCSLeakRate."Thewordingis"RCSleakrateGREATERthanmakeupcapacityasindicated byalossofRCSsubcooling."

InNUMARC'stechnical basisitstatesthe"lossofsubcooling isafundamental indication thattheinventory controlsystemsareinadequate inmaintaining RCSpressureandinventory againstthevolumelossthroughtheleak."Thus,lossofsubcooling isavalidindicator forlossoftheRCSbarrier~xi~MJMARCdoesnotstatethatlossofsubcooling canonlyoccurduetoalossoftheRCSpressureboundaryasisimpliedbythestatement above.Thelicenseemusttechnically justifythatalossofsubcooling canonlyoccurwhenthereisabreachoftheRCSbarrier.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[Subpara.

6]22.Thiscombination ofconditions wouldproduce...

TheNtBrIARCguidancehasbeendeveloped tospecifically provideformultipleredundant indications oflossorpotential lossofthethreefissionproductbarriers, Itisunacceptable tosimplyeliminate acombination ofconditions becauseofitsredundancy tootherEALs.[Subpara.

7]23.EAIPFC6.1isequivalent to...Thiscommentappliestothecombination ofalossoftheRCSbarrierasindicated bycontainment radiation monitorreadingsandalossofthefuelcladasindicated byothersite-specific indications.

Thelicenseehaseliminated itbaseduponitsredundancy toancontainment radiation monitorEALforlossoftheRCSandFuelClad.Asstatedinthepreviouscomment,itisunacceptable tosimplyeliminate acombination ofconditions becauseofitsredundancy tootherEALs.[Subpara.

8]45.Anycombination ofPC4.1andeither...

PC4.1states,"Releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere withprimarytosecondary leakagegreaterthantechspec.allowable."

Thiscondition isnotrefiective ofalossorpotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.Thus,declaration ofaGeneralEmergency wouldnotbewarranted inconjunction withalossofthefuelclad.[Para.4]BoththeMMARCguidanceandAppendixEto10CFRPart50requiretheuseofmultipleindicators forevaluating plantconditions.

Thelicenseeshouldconsideradifferent format(Barrieranalysis) forthefissionproductbarrierEALsthatmaximizes thenumberofparameters orindicators available, minimizes thetimetoclassify, andassuresmultipleconditions arereadilyevaluated andproperlyclassified.

R.E:GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[Para.1]MJMARC/NESP-007 neitherstatesnorinfersthatthegenericfissionproductbarriermatrixisintendedorrequiredtobeimplemented onasite-specific basis.OnSeptember 22-23,1992theEmergency ActionLevelsImplementation Workshopwasconducted byNUSGQ(C.Specifically statedinpresentations andintheworkshoptrainingmaterials (Section3pagePF-39,pageBF-30andthePWRFissionProductBarrierMatrixBreakoutSessionGuideSection7)attached, wasthefactthatthematrixformatisnotrequired.

Itonlyrequiresthatcompliance withallcombinations aredocumented.

NKMARC/NESP-007 doesnotprecludethedevelopment ofEALsbasedonanevaluation offissionproductbarrierloss/potential lossconditions aspartofthedevelopment process.Thefissionproductbarrierlossmatrixaspresented inNU1NARC/NESP-007 was"chosentoclearlyshowthesynergism amongtheEALsandsupportmoreaccuratedynamicassessments."

Further,NUMARC/NESP-007 states"Theguidancepresented hereisnotintendedtobeappliedtoplantsas-is.TheEALguidanceisintendedtogivethelogicfordeveloping site-specific EALsusingsite-specific EALpresentation methods."

TheFissionProductBarrierEvaluation andthesubsequent binningoftheGinnafissionproductbarrierbasedEALsintocategories wasspecifically performed tosupporttheuser'sabilityto"dynamically assesshowfarpresentconditions arefromescalating tothenexthigheremergency class."Bydefininglogicaleventcategories andsubcategories inwhichtoplacetheseEALs,theabilitytoperformadynamicassessment isenhanced.

Theusability andcorrectness oftheGinnamethodofEALpresentation hasbeendemonstrated anddocumented innumerousdynamicsimulator scenarios duringEALvalidation exercises.

TheNUMARC/NESP-007 matrixformatrequirestheusertoevaluatethousands ofcombinations ofconditions thatmayhavenologicalrelationship.

Suchaformatisahindrance, notanaid,inmakingtimely,accurate, andconsistent emergency eventclassifications.

Toourknowledge, neitherNUNCnorplantsthathaveadoptedtheMJMARC/NESP-007 fissionproductbarriermatrixformathaveattempted adynamictestoftheirEALsforthepurposeofdemonstrating andassessing theirusability characteristics.

Tothecontrary, itisrecognized thatsomeBWRandPWRplantshavesuspended implementation ofMB~C/NESP-007 basedEALsorhavecanceledtheirimplementation becausetheirusersfindtheformatconfusing, unworkable, andpronetomisclassification.

TheFissionProductBarrierEvaluation demonstrates thattheGinnafissionproductbarrier-based EALsaretechnically correctandmeettheintentofNUMARC/NESP-007.

hrifrmhFiiPBrrirnhnhfiiIni'nhmnhnr'n1rrrirlnllimri R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION

[Para.2]NUMARC/NESP-007 states"Thepresentation methodshownforFissionProductBarrierswaschosentoclearlyshowthesynergism amongtheEALsandtosupportmoreaccuratedynamicassessments."

Itdoesnotstateorimplythatthismethodofpresentation isnecessary eithertodepictthesynergism ortoprovidetheabilityfordynamicassessments.

Rather,itisprovidedasaguidefortheEALwritertoensurethattheselectedpresentation methodology properlyreflectsthedesiredsynergistic qualityandassessment capability.

WhileNUMARC/NESP-007 doesnotdefinetheterm"dynamicassessment",

itisassumedthatitmeanstheabilitytoevaluatefissionproductbarrierlossandpotential lossindicators under'volvingplantconditions.

UnliketheMJMARC/NESP-007 matrixformat,theGinnaEALpresentation methodplacessimilarEALsintocategories andsubcategories thatfocustheuser'sattention tothespecificEALthreshold thatcorresponds totheplantcondition ofconcern.Thisprovidesalogicalclassification andescalation pathofrelatedindicators andthusallowsforrapidassessment ofemergency conditions associated withfissionproductbarrierloss.Itisimportant tonotethattheGinnaEALcategories andsubcategories arenotsimplyrepresentations orabbreviations oftheMMARC/NESP-007 ICs.Rather,eachGinnacategoryandassociated subcategory isapathwayfrombroadindicators ofpotential emergency eventstoasetofspecificthreshold conditions thatrequireemergency classification.

TheEALsderivedfromtheFissionProductBarrierEvaluation takeintoaccounttheintended'synergism'f thefissionproductbarrierbasisinformation whichcannotbeadequately addressed bytheNUMARC/NESP-007matrixformat.Anexamplewouldbeacondition inwhichRCSleakageintocontainment isinexcessofnormalmakeupcapacity(RCSpotential loss)inconjunction withasecondary sidereleasewithprimarytosecondary leakageinexcessoftechnical specifications (Containment loss).Underamatrixformat,thiscombination ofconditions wouldrequireaSiteAreaEmergency (SAE)declaration becauseNUMARC/NESP-007 requiresanSAEforthepotential lossofthefuelcladorRCSwiththelossofanotherbarrier.Thisisclearlynotintended.

MB~C/NESP-007 containment lossindicator C4basisstatesthattheSiteAreaEmergency associated withthecontainment lossindication isintendedtobeescalatory fromRCSbreachesassociated withSGtuberuptures.

TheFissionProductBarrierEvaluation doesnotrelyonsingleindications asstatedintheRAI.Forthemajorityoftheboundingconditions definedintheFissionProductBarrierEvaluation theindicators subsumedintoothercombinations ofconditions consistofthoseindicators whichareeither:~Completely boundedbyanothercombination forthesameindicator, or~Areasubsetofanotherindicator.

R.E.Ginna'mergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION Inthecasecited(>300pCi/ccDEI-131inconjunction withprimarysystemleakage>46gpm),thecombination wasomittedintheFissionProductBarrierEvaluation becausethiscondition wouldresultinexceedin'g the100R/hrSAEEAL.The1008/hrSAEEALisbasedon>300p,Ci/ccDEI-131inconjunction withprimarysystemleakageintocontainment.

in'ThisEALhasbeenaddedinlightoftheassumptions whicharemadeinthederivation ofthecontainment radiation monitorvalueassociated withthefuelcladlossEALaswellasvariables intheboundingassumptions (i.e.diQerences intimeaftershutdownandcoolantvolumereleased).

[Para.3][Subpara.

1],Lossofcontainment coolingwillnotresultinacontainment pressure(4.0psig)sufBcient toresultinacontainment isolation, Inaddition, procedural requirements requirethecontainment tobeventedunderthiscondition tomaintainpressurewellbelowtheisolation setpoint.

Afaultedsteamgenerator couldresultinacontainment isolation signal.~hni'ninhii1fhninm1ifi'1mni1[Subpara.

2]NUMARC/NESP-007 statesinthebasisforcontainment barrierlossN1:"Conditions leadingtocontainment REDpathresultfromRCSbarrierand/orFuelCladBarrierLoss.Thus,thisEALisprimarily adiscriminator betweenSiteAreaEmergency andGeneralEmergency representing apotential lossofthethirdbarrier."

Therefore, entryintoContainment REDpathbyitselfisintendedtoresultinaGeneralEmergency.

frn'hn11AsstatedintheGinnaPEG,inordertoreachcontainment REDpath,acontainment pressureof60psigmustbereached.ThispressureiswellinexcessofthemaximumpressureattainedfromtheDBALOCAandisgreaterthanthemaximumpressureattainedforallanalyzedsteamlinebreaksinsidecontainment specified intheGinnaFSAR.Therefore, toattainsuchacontainment

pressure, theenergysourcemustbeasaresultofaseverelydegradedcore(metalwaterreaction) inconjunction withRCSbreachorasevereATWScondition inconjunction withRCSbreach.PerNUMARC/NESP-007 ICSS2suchanATWSleadstoimminentorpotential lossoffuelclad.rinAr'n11i'

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION ifinFiinnE1Dh[Subpara.

3]PertheGinnaEALs,'core coolingREDonlyrequiresdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

Justification

¹10intheFissionProductBarrierEvaluation referenced inthisRAIwasinerrorandshouldhaveread"...andwarrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency."

ifii[Subpara.

4]PertheGinnaEALs,corecoolingREDandfunctional restoration procedures noteffective within15minutesisthethreshold foraGeneralEmergency.

[Subpara.

5]Thejustification wasnotintendedtoinferthatalossofRCSsubcooling canonlyoccurfromalossofRCS.Rather,thatanycorecoolingORANGEorREDpathrepresents alossofsubcooling resulting fromalossofRCS.Justification

¹12hasbeenrewordedtoreflectthefollowing basis.ORANGEpathcorecoolingisenteredwheneitherCET>700'ForRVLISwaterlevel<topoffuel(REDpathifbothconditions existorCETs>1200'F).TheRCSpressurecorresponding to700'Fisapproximately 3100psig.Thispressureismorethan600psiggreaterthanthepressurizer safetyvalveliftpressureand365psiggreaterthantheRCSsafetylimit.IftheRCSisintactunderthiscondition, RCSbarrierlossisimminent.

RCSinventory isneverintentionally.

reducedtothetopoffuel(43%RVLIS)underhotconditions orpoweroperations.

Areduction inRCSvolumeofthismagnitude indicates asignificant br'eachoftheRCSbarriersincenointentional valvingconfiguration wouldresultinsuchadecrease.

Anycondition whichresultsinaninventory lossofthismagnitude mustbeattributed toanRCSbreachcausedbyaRCSlinebreakorunisolated primarysystemdischarging inexcessofmakeupcapacity.

Itwouldbeextremely poorjudgmenttoassumethatalossoftheRCSbarrierhasnotoccurredundereitheroftheseconditions.

Itshouldbenotedthatvesselwaterlevelbelowthetopoffuelisconsidered aRCSbarrierlossintheBWRfissionproductEALs.Thereisnodifference inthemechanisms whichcouldcausevesselleveltodropbelowthetopoffuelbetweenBWRsandPWRs.Important tothisbasisis,forthepurposeofemergency declaration, thepotential releaseoffissionproductstotheenvironment.

Inthecasewherethefuelcladisactuallyorpotentially

breached, theassumption thatthefissionproductswouldbecontained, evenintheabsenceofotherRCSlossindicators notimmediately

apparent, withvessellevelbelowthetopoffuelisinappropriate.

Figure4.16ofNUREG1228"SourceTermEstimation DuringResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents" showshoweachofthecriticalsafetyfunctions isrelatedtofissionproductbarriermaintenance asregardspreventing radioactivity R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION releases.

Coreheatremoval(corecooling)alongwithRCSpressurecontrolandRCSheatremoval(heatsink)areshowntobedirectlyrelatedtoRCS.boundarymaintenance.

ItshouldalsobenotedthatNUMARC/NESP-007 considers REDpathheatsinkapotential lossofRCS,yettheconditions requiring entryintothispatharebasedoninsufBcient SGlevelandfeedwater flow.Theseconditions arenotdirectthreatstoRCSbarrierintegrity butmayleadtoRCSpressureconditions whichinturnmayleadtoRCSbarrierbreach.NUMARC/NESP-007providesnotechnical basistosupporthowaREDpathheatsinkrepresents apotential lossofRCSboundary.

ItwouldappearthattheRCSinventory lossconditions requiring entryintocorecoolingORANGEorREDpatharemuchmoredirectlyindicative ofactualorpotential RCSbreachthanisentryintoREDpathheatsink.[Subpara.

6]mininrfrnhmiin1hlk[Subpara.

7]inm'nlinmi[Subpara.

8]ggzrgg~Theconditions referenced bythisjustification represent alossofRCSinconjunction withalossofcontainment andthuswererevisedtoreflectaSiteAreaEmergency.

EALsderivedfromcombinations ofunisolable secondary sidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureincombination withanyfuelcladloss/potential lossindicators resultinaGeneralEmergency.

[Para.4]Itisstillappropriate todefine,wherepossible, distinctEALswhichareindicative ofmultiplebarrierloss/potential loss.Thisminimizes thetimetoclassifywhileassuringmultipleconditions arereadilyevaluated andproperlyclassified.

Basedonexhaustive operatorinterviews, theuseofafission-productbarriermatrixformathasbeendetermined tobeoverlyburdensome andconfusing fortheuserresulting inmissedorincorrect classifications.

Thisconcernhasbeenexpressed byotherlicensees whohaveattempted toimplement NUMARC/NESP-007 fissionproductbarrierEALswithonlyamatrixformat.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION Becauseofthecomplexity oftheNUMiARC/NESP-007 fissionproductbarrierloss/potential lossdefinition oftheSiteAreaEmergency, somelicensees haveattempted todeviatefromIGB~Candsimplifythefissionproductbarrierloss/potential lossdefinition byremovingtheintendedreducedweighting ofthecontainment.

Thereducedweighting ofthecontainment attheSAEclassification isasignificant partofthebasisintheintendedsynergism betweenbarrierlossindicators.

TheGinnaFissionProductBarrierEvaluation maintains thisintendedsynergism ofNUMARCwhileeliminating theinherentcomplexity.

TheGinnaEALformathasbeenvalidated byoperating crewsutilizing scenarios intheplant-specific simulator totesteachEAL.Theresultsofthisvalidation havebeendocumented andfeedbackincorporated intotheEALstofurtherensuretheirusability.

"Inseveralinstances thatarespecifically commented on,thelicenseehasdepartedfromtheNUMARCguidanceofbasingclassifications uponobserving theintegrity ofthethreefissionproductbarriers, andmadeclassifications basedononeindicator, especially inthecaseofCriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTree(CSFST)status.Forexample,iftheCSFforcontainment isonaREDpath,ageneralemergency isdeclared.

Thisapproachisinconsistent withNUMARCguidancethatrequiresevaluation ofeachbarrier.Thelicenseeshouldassurethatallbarriersareevaluated whenarrivingataclassification ratherthansimplyobserving onestatusindicator.

Thiscommentrelatestothecommentabove.NUMARC/NESP-007 Section3.9states:"Plantemergency operating procedures (EOPs)aredesignedtomaintainand/orrestoreasetofCSFswhicharelistedintheorderofpriorityofrestoration effortsduringaccidentconditions."...

Therearediverseandredundant plantsystemstosupporteachCSF.Bymonitoring theCFSsinsteadoftheindividual systemcomponent status,theimpactofmultipleeventsisinherently addressed, e.g.thenumberofoperablecomponents available tomaintainthefunction.

TheEOPscontaindetailedinstructions regarding themonitoring ofthesefunctions andprovidesaschemeforclassifyingthesignificance ofthechallenge tothefunctions.

Inproviding EALsbasedontheseschemes,theemergency classification canflowfromtheEOPassessment ratherthanbeingbasedonaseparate R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION EALassessment.

Thisisdesirable asitreducesambiguity andreducesthetimenecessary toclassifytheevent."AsstatedbyTABAC,eachCSFissupported bydiverseandredundant plantsystems.Theentryconditions forCSFSTsarealsosupported bydiverseandredundant instrumentation.

Containment REDpathisnotasingleindicator butadefined,measurable andoperationally significant condition whichisknowntobeindicative ofmultiplefissionproductbarrierlosses.TheGinnaEALschemedoesnotrelysolelyonthiscondition todetermine whenageneralemergency duetothelossoffissionproductbarriersmustbedeclared.

Nordoesitprecludethedeclaration ofageneralemergency basedonotherfissionproductbarrierlossEALswhichmayormaynotmanifestthemselves underagivencondition.

TheGinnaEALschemedoesrequireclassification ofaGeneralEmergency because,inandofitself,thiscondition represents alossofthefuelclad,RCSbarriersandapotential lossofcontainment barrier.Thetechnical basesforthosesite-specific EALsproposedbythelicenseeconcerning secondary sidereleasesconsiderthecondenser airejectorasapotential releasepathway.The"Questions andAnswersonNUMARC/NESP-007,published inJuneof1993,specifically excludethecondenser airejectorsasaprolonged secondary sidereleasepathway.Thelicenseeshouldprovidejustification forincluding thispathwayasadiscriminator forthoseEALsorrevisetheirtechnical basestoeliminate thereference.

Thinin'fiffmiInseveralEALsproposedbythelicensee, entryintoaCore-Cooling ORANGEorREDpathwasconsidered tobeatleastapotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.However,thecorecoolingcriticalsafetyfunctionwasnotconsidered byNUIKARC/NESP-007 asadiscriminator fortheRCSbarrierintegrity anditsusebythelicenseewasnotadequately justified.

Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional information thatclearlydemonstrates thatacorecoolingORANGEorREDpathisindicative ofafailureoftheRCSbarrierorrevisethoseEALsthatincorporate thisconcepttobeconsistent withtheNUMARCguidance.

RefertoResponsetoGeneralRAI¹3[Para.3l[Subpara.

5]

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNUMARCexampleAUl-1statesinpart;"Avalidreading..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforeBluentmonitors, UnusualEvent,5.1.1statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."

NUMARCspecifies thatasitespecificprocedure beusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee's PEGprovidedprocedures forreleaseassessment, buttheseprocedures werenotincorporated intotheEALsnorincludedinthetechnical bases.TheNUMARCnoteregarding declaration iftheassessment isnotaccomplished within60minuteswasnotincludedintheEAL,butwasdiscussed inthetechnical bases.Itisimportant thatadoseassessment isperformed usingactualmeteorology andabestestimateoftheactualradionuclide mixtodetermine iftheeffluentreleasewillleadtoescalation oftheemergency duetoadverseconditions.

ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMJMARCcriteria, orprovidete'chnical justification forthedeviation.

hr1ThLhllrinifhrfrnrrirTheNUNCexampleAAl-1statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforeffluentmonitors, Alert,5.1.2statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."

NUMARCspecifies thatasitespecificprocedure beusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee's PEGprovidedprocedures forreleaseassessment, buttheseprocedures werenotincorporated intotheEALsnorincludedinthetechnical bases.TheNUMARCnoteregarding declaration iftheassessment isnotaccomplished within15minuteswasnotincludedintheEAL,nordiscussed inthetechnical bases.Itisimportant thatadoseassessment isperformed usingactualmeteorology andabestestimateoftheactual R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION radionuclide mixtodetermine iftheeKuentreleasewillleadtoescalation oftheemergency duetoadverseconditions.

ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMB~Ccriteria, orprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation.

L421rii'im'heNUIKARCcr'iteria forInitiating Condition AA3statesinpart:"Releaseofradioactive..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforAreaRadiation Levels,Alert,5.3.3statesinpart:"Sustained abnormalarearadiation levels>8Rlhr..."Thelicensee's EALdidnotincludetheNUMARCcriteriaforestablishing ormaintaining coldshutdownconditions.

Thereferenced table5.3wasnotincludedintheEAL,butwasinthetechnical bases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtobeconsistent withtheNUNCcriteriaandprovidethereferenced tableintheEALorprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation.

inlhrin"rirminin1h"Thrfrn1hnnlTheNUMARCexampleAS1-1statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforeffluentmonitors, SiteAreaEmergency, 5.1.3statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."

NUMARCspecifies thatasitespecificprocedure beusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee's PEGprovidedprocedures forreleaseassessment, however,thiswasnotincorporated intotheEALs.TheNARCnote R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION regarding declaration iftheassessment isnotaccomplished within15minuteswasnotincludedintheEALandnotdiscussed inthetechnical bases.Theeffluentsetpoints forthesiteareaemergency EALarebaseduponFSARsourcetermsandaverageannualmeteorology and,therefore, maysignificantly differfromtheactualreleaseconditions.

Thus,escalation toasiteareaemergency duetoeffluentreleasesshouldbebaseduponanassessment ofpotential offsitedosesasdetermined byactualsourcetermandmeteorology.

Theprimarypurposeoftheeffluentsetpointistotriggerthisassessment, nottoupgradetheemergency class.Classification throughuseoftheeffluentmonitorreadingaloneisonlyexpectedwhendoseassessments cannotbecompleted withintherequiredtime.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMB~Ccriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovideinformation onthesourceterms(s)utilizedtodetermine thevaluesintable5.1.ThAhlThesourcetermsutilizedtodetermine thevalueinTable5.1arethoseutilizedintheGinnadoseprojection procedure EPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment.

TheEPIP,2-18 doseassessment methodology useseffluentmonitordoseconversion factorswhichwerederivedusingNUREG-1228 Table2.2fissionproductinventories andassumedreleasefractions specified intable3.12ofNUREG1465"Accident SourceTermsforLightWaterNuclearPowerPlant"forin-vessel severecoredamage.TheNU)rIARCcriteriaforInitiating Condition AG1statesinpart:"Boundary DoseResulting fromanActual..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforeffluentmonitors, GeneralEmergency, 5.2.5statesinpart:"Doseprojections orfieldsurveyswhich..."

NUMARCspecifies theuseofactualmeteorology forthedoseprojections.

ThelicenseeEALdidnotreflecttheuseofactualmeteorology fordoseprojections, howeverthelicenseediscussed therequirement foruseofactualmeteorology inthetechnical bases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUNCcriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION Thesitespecificprocedures whichmaybeutilizedtoassessareleaseEPIP2-18,"ControlRoomDoseAssessment, EPIP2-4"Emergency DoseProjections-ManualMethod,EPIP2-5"Emergency DoseProjections

-PersonalComputerMethod,orEPIP2-6"Emergency DoseProjections

-MIDASProgramallspecifytheuseofactualmeteorology.

Therefore specificreference toitsuseisunnecessary.

TheNUMARCexampleAG1-1states:"Avalidreading..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforeffluentmonitors, GeneralEmergency, 5.1.4statesinpart:"Avalidreading..."

NUMARCspecifies thatasitespecificprocedure beusedtoassesstherelease.Thelicensee's PEGprovidedprocedures forreleaseassessment whichwasnotincorporated intotheEALs.TheNUMARCnoteregarding declaration iftheassessment isnotaccomplished within15minuteswasnotincludedintheEALnordiscussed inthetechnical bases.TheefQuentsetpoints forthegeneralemergency EALarebaseduponFSARsourcetermsandaverageannualmeteorology and,therefore, maysignificantly differfromtheactualreleaseconditions.

Thus,escalation toageneralemergency duetoefHuentreleasesshouldbebaseduponanassessment ofpotential offsitedosesasdetermined byactualsourcetermandmeteorology.

Theprimarypurposeoftheeffluentsetpointistotriggerthisassessment, nottoupgradetheemergency class.Classification throughuseoftheefHuentmonitorreadingaloneisonlyexpectedwhendoseassessments cannotbecompleted withintherequiredtime.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMJMARCcriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovideinformation onthesourceterms(s)utilizedtodetermine thevaluesintable5.1.fnrmnfnhrlThEALh1nrin1riririn1ininimiThesourcetermsutilizedtodetermine thevalueinTable5.1arethoseutilizedintheGinnadoseprojection procedure EPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment.

TheEPIP2-18doseassessment methodology usesefHuentmonitordoseconversion factorswhichwerederivedusingNUREG-1228 Table2.2fissionproductinventories andassumedreleasefractions specified R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION inTable3.12ofI%KEG1465"Accident SourceTermsforLightWaterNuclearPowerPlant"forin-vessel severecoredamage.Thelicensee's EAL4.1.3,"Containment Integrity Status,"states:"Either:CIorCVIvalve(s).

~."Therelationship betweenCIandCVIvalveswasnotexplained inthetechnical basestodemonstrate howfailureofeitheronetoclosewillprovideapathwayoutsidecontainment.

Thelicenseeshouldprovideinformation onthesetwosystemsandtheirinterfaces, ifany.Thelicenseeshouldprovideinformation ontheentryconditions foraLOCAtodemonstrate theseentryconditions arecommensurate withapotential lossorlossoftheRCSbarrier.Thesecondargumentdoesnotprovideathreshold fortheamountofprimarysystemleakageoutsidecontainment.

Thelicenseeshouldincludeathreshold thatoperators canutilizetoevaluatethisargumentagainsttheguidanceinNUMARC/NESP-007 forlossorpotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.Containment Isolation (CI)andContainment Ventilation Isolation (CVI)valvesarethosevalvesassociated withtheCIandCVIlogic.CIandCVIareprotective systemsdesignedtoclosecontainment isolation valvesinthosesystemswhicheithercomeintodirectcontactwithprimarypressure(CI)orthecontainment atmosphere (CVI)andpenetrate thecontainment barrier.Thesevalvesaredesignedtocloseunderconditions whichareindicative ofaLOCA(anyautomatic SIsignal).Failureofoneormoreofthesevalvestoclosefollowing aconfirmed LOCAdoesnotbyitselfprovideapathwayoutsidecontainment.

Aslongasonevalveinthelineisclosed,orifbothvalvesfailtoclosebutnodownstream pathwayexists,classification underthisEALwouldnotberequired, Thecriterion "ANDRadiological pathwaytotheenvironment exists"providesthisdiscriminator.

Thereisnointerface betweentheCIandCVIsystemsbuteachiscomprised ofdiversesystemswhichprovidethecontainment isolation functionunderLOCAconditions.

Thedetermination oftheexistence ofaLOCAisconsistent withthediagnostic activities specified inE-0'ReactorTriporSafetyInjection'.

Thecriterion "Inability toisolateanyprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment" addresses anybreachoftheRCSandcontainment whichisnotprotected bytheCIorCVIsystemsorwhichresultsfromaninterfacing systemLOCA(notaddressed byNUMARC).Noleakagethreshold isspecified sinceleaksoutsidecontainment, particularly underdynamicconditions, aredificulttoquantifyandmaymanifestthemselves withdiversesymptoms.

Symptomsofaprimarysystemdischarging outsidecontainment maybeindicated viamassbalance,decreasing RCSinventory withoutcorresponding containment

response, orareatemperatures and R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION radiation levelsoutsidecontainment.

ItisforthisreasonthatShikSupervisor/Emergency Coordinator judgmentisintendedtobeusedinevaluating thiscriteria.

TheNU)~Ccriteriafor"FuelCladBarrierExampleEALs"(Table4,FissionProductBarrierReference Table),"rii1fnistatesinpart:PIALCoreCooling-Red MB~CTable4alsostates:CoreCooling-Orange ORHeatSink-RedALERT:AnyLossorANY...Thelicenseeequivalent EAL,CSFSTstatus,1.2CoreCoolingforSAEstatesinpart:ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGThephrase"ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling,"

wasinconsisterit withthetextofNUNCTable4inthatanOrangeorRedpathforcorecoolingwasnotconsidered intheguidanceasalossorpotential lossoftheRCSbarrier.Thebasisdocumentprovidedthefollowing justification forthisdeparture:

"CSFSTCoreCooling-ORANGE..."

Theassumption thattheRCSbarrierislostwhenaCore-Cooling OrangeorRedpathexistswasnotadequately justified.

Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional justification toshowthattheadditional conservatism affordedbyrelyingonthesingularCSFofthisEALclearlydemonstrates achallenge toboththeRCSandFuelCladbarriers, ormodifytheEALschemetobeconsistent withtheNUMARCcriteria.

RefertoResponsetoGeneralRAI43[Para.3][Subpara.

51forjustification ofuseofORANGEorREDpathcorecoolingasaRCSlossindicator.

UseofthisCSFasaRCSlossindicator isnotaconservatism, butratheroneofmultipleindications ofpotential FuelCladandRCSbarrierlossavailable totheuser.WhilethisCSFindicator byitselfrequiresdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency, itisnotinconsistent withMB~C.Forexample,NUMARC/NESP-007 specifies REDpathHeatSinkasbothapotential lossoffuelcladandRCSbarriers.

EventhoughMB~C/NESP-007 doesnot R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION provideabasisforhowREDpathheatsinkrelatestoRCSbarrierpotential loss,nonetheless,aSiteAreaEmergency isrequiredbasedonthissingularCSF.TheNUMARCcriteriafor"FuelCladBarrierExampleEALs"(Table4.FissionProductBarrierReference Table),"ll"statesinpart:NotApplicable LevelLESSthan(site-specific) valueNUMARCTable4alsostates:ALERT:AnyLossorANY...Thelicenseeequivalent EAL,Category3.0,ReactorCoolantSystem,forSAE3.1.3statesinpart:"RVLIScannotbemaintained..."

~lllMEIhlfthEALthhldb'*dd,thMB~Ccriteriaprovidesfordeclaration ofanAlertonlossofonebarrier,i.e.,whenwaterleveldropstotopofactivefuel.Thelicensee's EALsrequiredadeclaration ofaSAE.Thisinconsistency withtheMB~Ccriteriawasnottechnically justified inthebasesdocument.

Furthermore, thelicenseetreatedreactorvessellevelasanEALreflecting ReactorCoolantSystemintegrity, whereastheNUMARCcriteriautilizeslevelasafuelintegrity EAL.Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional justification toshowthattheaddedconservatism affordedbyrelyingonthesingularEALofreactorvesselwaterlevelfordeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency iswarranted, ormodifytheEALschemetobeconsistent withtheNUMARCcriteria.

Asdescribed inResponsetoGeneralRAI¹3[Para.3][Subpara.

5],RCSinventory isneverintentionally reducedtothetopoffuel(43%RVLIS)underhotconditions orpoweroperations.

Areduction inRCSvolumeofthismagnitude indicates asignificant breachoftheRCSbarriersincenointentional valvingconfiguration wouldresultinsuchadecrease.

Anycondition whichresultsinaninventory lossofthismagnitude mustbeattributed toaRCSbreachcausedbyaRCSlinebreakorunisolated primarysystemdischarging inexcessofmakeupcapacity.

Itwouldbeextremely poorjudgmenttoassumethatalossoftheRCSbarrierhasnotoccurredunderthiscondition.

Important tothisbasisis,forthepurposeofemergency R,E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION declaration, thepotential releaseoffissionproductstotheenvironment.

Inthecasewherethefuelcladisactuallyorpotentially

breached, theassumption thatthefissionproductswouldbecontained, evenintheabsenceofotherRCSlossindicators, withvessellevelbelowthetopoffuelisinappropriate.

Asstatedabove,itrequiresasignificant RCSinventory losstoattainthislevel.Therefore, considering vessellevelbelowthetopoffuelalossofRCSisnotconservative, butappropriate.

Itshouldalsobenotedthatvesselwaterlevelbelowthetopoffuelisconsidered aRCSbarrierlossintheBWRfissionproductbarrierEALs.ThereisnodifFerence inthemechanisms whichcouldcausevesselleveltodropbelowthetopoffuelbetweenBWRsandPWRs.ThereisalsoaconflictwithinNUIT/NESP-007 regarding vesselwaterlevel.AsstatedintheRAI,NUMARC/NESP-007 wouldonlyrequiredeclaration ofanAlertduetovessellevelbelowthetopoffuelbasedonfissionproductbarrierloss.ThefissionproductbarrierlossEALsonlyapplyunderpoweroperations andhotcondition.

Yetsystemmalfunction ICSS5requiresdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency forvessellevelresulting incoreuncoverywhenincoldshutdownorrefueling modes.ThiswouldmeanthatwithoutotherRCSlossindicators, ifthevesselleveldroppedtobelowthefuelunderhotconditions, theemergency wouldhavetobeupgradedtoaSiteAreaEmergency iftheplantachievedcoldconditions.

Table4inNUIVCARC/NESP-007 requiresthedeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency whenthereis:LossofANYTwoBarriersANDPotential LossofThirdBarrierThelicensee's EAL4.2.2,"SGTubeRupturew/Secondary Release,"

statestheaGeneralEmergency willbedeclaredwhen:"Releaseofsecondary sidetoatmosphere..."

ThisEALprovidesindications oflossofthefuelcladbarrierandlossofthecontainment barrier.Thelicensee's useof0.1gpmprimarytosecondary leakageasanindication ofapotential lossoftheRCSbarrierwasnotadequately justified.

Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional information thatdemonstrates theadequacyofthisthreshold forpotential lossoftheRCSorrevisetheEALtobeconsistent withtheNUMARCguidance.

Thini1rh~rr~~Theconditions referenced bythisjustification represent alossof'CSinconjunction withalossofcontainment andthuswererevisedto R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION reflectaSiteAreaEmergency.

EALsderivedfromcombinations ofunisolable secondary sidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureincombination withanyfuelcladloss/potential lossindicators resultinaGeneralEmergency.

TheNUMARCcriteriafor"Containment BarrierExampleEALs"(Table4,FissionProductBarrierReference Table),"ri~~statesinpart:8Notapplicable NUMARCTable4alsostates:Containment-Red UNUSUALEVE%X:ANYLossorANYPotential LossofContainment" Thelicenseeequivalent EAL,CSFSTstatus,1.5Containment forGEstatesinpart:"REDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENT" Thebasesdocumentstatesinpart:"CSFSTContainment

-REDpathisentered..."

Section3.9oftheNUMARCdiscussion concerning Emergency ActionLevelsstatesinpart:"Itreasonably followsthatifanyCSFentersaRED..."However,thelicenseestatedinthebasisdocument, itisnotpossibletoreachthatcondition withoutotherindicators.

Classifications basedupontheNUMARCguidancearenotmadebaseduponsoleindicators suchas"CSFSTContainment

-RED,"butratheracombination ofindicators.

Therefore, thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional justi6cation toshowthattheaddedconservatism afFordedbyrelyingonthesingularCSFofthisEALfordeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency iswarranted, ormodifytheEALschemetoconsistency withtheNUM%BCcriteria.

ThiscommentalsoappliestoEAL4.3.1,"Combustible GasConcentration."

RefertoResponsetoGeneralRAI03[Para.3][Subpara.

2].Itwouldbeinappropriate nottodeclareaGeneralEmergency basedonavalidindication ofcontainment pressureinexcessof60psigresulting fromalossofreactorcoolant,regardless oftheavailability ofotherfuelcladandRCSbarrierlossEALs.Itisunderstood thatifotherapplicable fuelcladandRCSbarrierloss R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION indicators areavailable, theywouldservetoconfirmtheirrespective barrierlosses.ButMQ~C/NESP-007 doesnotrequireconfirmation bymultiplebarrierlossindicators forasinglebarrier.Thatis,anyonevalidbarrierlossindicator issufBcient toconsiderthatbarrierlost.Thebasissupporting declaration ofaGeneralEmergency uponentryintoREDpathcontainment isthatitisindicative oflossofbothfuelcladandRCSwithpotential lossofcontainment.

Theonlysourceofsignificant hydrogenconcentration incontainment isseverefueldamageresulting

&ommetal-water reactionandsubsequent discharge intothecontainment atmosphere.

Acontainment hydrogenconcentration of4%corresponds toatleast25%metal-water reaction(Figure3EPIP2-16"CoreDamageEstimation"

)andis'ellintothepossibleuncoolable coregeometryregion(FigureB-10NUREG/BR-0150, Vol.1,Rev.2).FailuretodeclareaGeneralEmergency, basedonavalidindication, undertheseconditions isinappropriate.

Thelicensee's PEGbasesforRCSLeakRate,RCS2.2statesinpart:"...twochargingpumpsarerequiredfornormalliquidinventory control."

ThePEGbasesforSGTubeRupture,RCS3.2statesinpart:"...onechargingpumpisrequiredfornormalinventory control."

Thelicenseeshouldcorrecttheinconsistency andassurethatanydeviation fromNUIKARCcriteriaof'exceeding thecapacityofonechargingpumpinthenormalchargingmodearetechnically justified.

Th2nrnin'Ginna,bydesign,normallyhastwochargingpumpsrunning.Thespecified leakrateisthecapacityofonechargingpumpasspecified byNUNARC/NESP-007 sincebothpumpsarerequiredtomaintainnormalCVCSoperation.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION ThelicenseeusedTable4.1,FuelCladLossIndicators, andTable4.2,FuelClad.DamageIndicators, intheEALsasfollows:Table4.1FuelCladLossIndicators 1.Coolantactivity...

Table4.2FuelCladDamageIndicators ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,..~COdtdddtdd SRII'I't,IISAR,IIemergency 4.1.4referredtoTable4.1asfuelclad"loss"indicators; generalemergency, 4.1.5referredtoTable4.2asfuelclad"damage"indicators.

Nodistinction between"loss"and"damage"usedintheEALtabletitleswasmade.Thelicenseeshouldclarifythedifference betweenfuelcladlossandfuelcladdamage.Table4.1identifies fuelcladlossindicators foruseincombination withtheRSSIdttt'~idlt("SKIS'tlsignalduetoLOCAwithlessthanminimumoperablecontainment heatremovalequipment").

Table4.2includesfuelcladlossandpotential lossindicators foruseincombination withRCS~andcontainment

~indicators.

Ehlinh1l'nirlinin'hhfiinrrrirmrixTheterm"fuelcladdamageindicators "wasusedtorepresent bothfuelcladlossandpotential lossindictors, Theterm'fuelcladlossindicators" wasusedtorepresent fuelcladlossindicators only.TheNUMARCcriteriaforFuelCladandRCSBarrierExampleEALsutilizing Containment Radiation Monitoring astheEALthresholds stateinpart""FUELCLADBARRIEREXAMPLEEALs...".

~.Theequivalent R.E.GinnaEALs(Category 2.0,ReactorFuel)stateinpart:"2.3Containment Radiation..."

"2.3.1Alert..."

"2.3.2SiteAreaEmergency..."

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION "2.3.2GeneralEmergency..."

Therewerenoequivalent Category3.0ReactorCoolantSystemEALs.However,thePEGfortheRCSBarrierEALs(RCS4.1)utilizing Containment Radiation Monitoring astheEALthreshold statesinpart:"Containment radiation monitoring..."

ThePEGBasesinformation accompanying theEALstatesinpart;"The~1f~rreadingisa..."TheTechnical Basisinformation forCategory2.0ReactorFuel,EAL2.3.1,statesinpart:"The10R/hrreadingisavalue..."

Noadditional justification information wasincludedineitherofthebases'information astowhyaRCSleakEALwasincludedintheReactorFuelcategory, andomittedfromtheReactorCoolantSystemcategory.

ThelicenseeshouldincludetheNUMARCcriteriafordiscerning reactorcoolantsystemleaksutilizing containment radiation monitoring orprovidejustification foromittingitfromtheRCScategory.

Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovidethesitespecificanalysesforcalculating thesecontainment radiation monitorsetpoints.

Asdiscussed inResponsetoGeneralRAIC3[Para.3][Subpara.

2],theGinnaEALpresentation methodplacessimilarEALsintocategories andsubcategories thatfocustheuser'sattention tothespecificEALthreshold thatcorresponds totheplantcondition ofconcern.Thisprovidesalogicalclassification andescalation pathofrelatedindicators andthusallowsforrapidassessment ofemergency conditions associated withfissionproductbarrierloss.Itisimportant tonotethattheGinnaEALcategories andsubcategories arenotrepresentations orabbreviations oftheNUNARC/NESP-007 ICs.Rather,eachGinnacategoryandassociated subcategory isapathwayfrombroadindicators ofpotential emergency eventstoasetofspecificthreshold conditions thatrequireemergency classification.

rhn1il'lfiinnnnhrrnThevaluesforEALs2.3.1,2.3.2and2.3.3werederivedfromtheR-29/R-30 "DoseRateversusTimeAfterShutdown" curves,Attachment 10toEPIP2-16 R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION "CoreDamageEstimation."

Thesecurvesaretakenfrom"Technology forEnergyReportNo.R-81-012."

EAL2.3.1:Usingthe100%coolantreleaseline,thecorresponding doserateisapproximately 10R/hrat1houraftershutdown.

Thisvaluewasalsoselectedbecauseofit'soperational significance, entryintoFR-Z.3"Response toHighContainment Radiation Level"EALs2.3.2and2.3.3:UsingtheRG1.25100%gapreleaselineand4hoursaftershutdown, thecorresponding doserateisapproximately 5000R/hr.TheEAL2.3.3valueof1000Rfhrrepresents 20%ofthe100%value.TheEAL2.3.2valueof100R/hrrepresents 2%ofthe100%value.Fourhoursaftershutdownwasconservatively assumedsinceactualcontainment samplesresultswouldlikelybeavailable toassesscoredamagewithinthistimeframe.Also,therateofdecayofcontainment doserateswithtimebeyondfourhoursisminimal.TheMB~CcriteriaforContainment BarrierExampleEALsutilizing Containment Radiation Monitoring astheEALthresholds state:CONTAINMENT BARRIEREXAMPLEEALsiiniTheequivalent R.E.GinnaEALs(category 2.0,ReactorFuel)stated:"2.3Containment Radiation..."

Therewerenoequivalent Category4.0Containment EALs.However,thePEGfortheContainment BarrierEALs(PC5.1)utilizing Containment Radiation Monitoring astheEALthreshold stated:"Containment radiation monitoring..."

ThePEGandTechnical Basesinformation accompanying thisEALstated:"The~i~Qgreadingisavalue..."Section3.8oftheIGBdARCdiscussion concerning Emergency ClassThresholds addressed thesubjectofsignificant radioactive inventory withincontainment isnotpossibleunlessamajorfuelcladdingfailurehasoccurred.

Thusitispossibletoconsideraccepting anEALthatisinconsistent with'able4(i.e.,aGEvs.UE)forthesamerationale asinComment¹9.Thatis,suchanEALisconservatively anticipatory sincethecontainment withlargeradioactive inventory is"...anextremechallenge toaplantfunctionnecessary R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevels'ESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION fortheprotection ofthepublic..."

However,asthelicenseestatedinthebasisdocument, itisnotpossibletoreachthiscondition withoutotherindicators.

Classifications basedontheNUMARCguidancearenotmadebaseduponsoleindicators suchasContainment radiation monitorR-29/R-30 reading>1000H/hr,butratheracombination ofindicators.

Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional justification toshowthattheaddedconservatism affordedbyrelyingonthesingularradiation monitorreadingofthisEALfordeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency iswarranted, ormodifytheEALschemetobeconsistent withtheNUMARCcriteria.

Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovidethesitespecificanalysesusedtodetermine thecontainment radiation monitorsetpoints.

RefertoResponsetoSpecificRAI¹14.Thevalueof1000H/hr,whichisindicative ofsignificant radioactive inventory incontainment (20%claddamage),boundsthevaluesofboththeRCSloss(10H/hr)andthefuelcladloss(100H/hr)EALs.Exceeding thisvaluerequiresdeclaration ofaGeneralEmergency.

MB~C/NESP-007 doesnotspecifythatmultiplefissionproductbarrierlossindicators mustbepresenttoconsiderthatbarrierlost.Thelogictermusedbetweeneachfissionproductbarrierloss/potential lossindicator inTable4is"OR".Thismeansthatanyoneindicator issuf6cient toconsiderthebarrierlostorpotentially lost.Furthermore, NUMARC/NESP-007 doesnotstatethatthesameindicator shouldnotbeusedtoindicatethelossofmorethanonefissionproductbarrier.NUINARC/NESP-007 alsostatesinpart:"5.SignifzcantRadioactive Inventory inContainment" "The(site-speci jic)readingisavaluewhichindicates signif'scantfueldamagewellinexcessoftheEAIsassociated withbothlossofFuelCladandlossofRCSbarriers.

Asst'atedinSection3.8,amqjorreleaseofradioactivity requiring offsiteprotective actionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamqjorfailureoffuelcladdingallowsradioactive

'aterialtobereleasedfromthecoreintothereactorcoolant.Regardless ofwhethercontainment ischallenged, thisamountofactivityincontainment, ifreleased, couldhavesuchsevereconsequences thatitisprudenttotreatthisasapotential lossofcontainment, suchthataGeneralEmergency declaration iswarranted..

~."Itisalsoimportant tonotethatitisnotexpectedthatemergency classification'would bebasedoncontainment radiation alone.Providedthatotherindicators areavailable, classification wouldbeconfirmed bythoseredundant indicators.

But,intheeventofasevereaccident, manyoftheotherindicators ofmultiplefissionproductbarrierlossmaynotbeavailable.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION Therefore, itwouldbeappropriate torelyonthissingleindicator sinceitisindicative ofmultiplefissionproductbarrierloss/potential loss.TheNUMARCexampleforSU4-1states:(site-specific) radiation monitor..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALsunder2.1.1,"CoolantActivity,"

and2.2.1,"FailedFuelDetectors" state:"Coolantsampleactivity..."

Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional information tojustifythe~logicinthesecondargumentofEAL2.1.1.Thelicenseeshouldalsodemonstrate howEAL2.2.1isequivalent toEAL2.1.1.GinnaTechnical Specification 3.1.4.1forcoolantactivityspecifies twolimits.Thefirstlimitisspecified as84/E-barpCi/cctotalspecificactivity.

Thesecondlimitisdefinedas>0.2p,Ci/ccI-131equivalent andtheconditions ofsection3.1.4.3bareexceeded.

Section3.1.4.3.b allowscontinued operation underthiscondition forupto168hoursprovidedtheI-131equivalent activityisbelowthelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1.TheFigure3.1.4-1activitylimitisafunctionofratedthermalpower.EAL2.2.1specifies aLetdownmonitorR-9readingof>2R/hr.EPIP2-16"CoreDamageAssessment" Section6.2.1specifies thatthisvaluecorresponds to1%fuelrodcladdingdefects.TheGinnaTechnical Specifications Section3.1.4coolantactivitybasisstatesinpart:"Thetotalactivitylimitfortheprimarysystemcorresponds tooperation withtheplantdesignbasisof1%fueldefects."

(FSARTable9.2-5).NUMARCICSS5,"LossofWaterLevelintheReactorVesselThatHasorWillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel,"providesthefollowing exampleEALfordeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency:

LossofReactorVessel..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALunder2.4.3,"Refueling accidents orOtherRadiation Monitors,"

states,foranAlert:"Reportofvisual..."

Thelicensee's technical basisforthisEALspecifically includesdeclarations forfueluncoveryinthereactorvessel.Thisdeviation fromNUMARCwas R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevels"RESPONSETO.REQUESTS FORADDITIONAL INFORMATION notjustified.

Thelicenseealsodidnotincludetheanticipatory wordingofMBrIARCwhichrequiresdeclaration whenindicators showthatthefuelwillbeuncovered.

Thelicenseeshouldprovidejustification forthesedeviations orrevisetheEALtobeconsistent withtheNUMARCguidance.

EAL2.4.3isnottheequivalent ofNUMARCICSS5.Thetechnical basisINIttttNEALId'dNEINAECIEAA22.

ENN111inrrviTheEALderivedfromMJMARCICSS5is3.1.3"RVLIScannotbemaintained

>43%withnoRCPsrunningORWiththereactorvesselheadremoved,itisreportedthatwaterlevelinthereactorv'esselisdroppinginanuncontrolled mannerandcoreuncoveryislikely."ThisEALprovidestheanticipatory wordingofNUMARCICSS5.Theterm"cannotbemaintained" isdefinedinthedefinition sectionofthetechnical bases:"Thevalueoftheidentified parameter(s) isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecified limits.Thisdetermination includesmakinganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturesystemperformance inrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s)..."

Themodeapplicability wasexpandedtoALLinconsideration fortheinclusion ofwaterlevelbelowtopoffuelasanRCSpotential lossindicator (refertoResponsetoSpecificRAI49).TheNUMARCexamplesAA2-3andAA2-4werenotaddressed inthelicensee's classification scheme.TheseexampleEALsstate:"Waterlevellessthan..."Thelicenseeshouldincludesite-specific EALfortheseexamplesorprovidetechnical justification fortheiromission.

AsstatedinthebasisforICAA2intheGinnaPEG:"Thereisnoindication thatwaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolorrefueling cavityhasdroppedtothelevelofthefuelotherthanbyvisualobservation.

SinceAA2.2addresses visualobservation offueluncovery, EALAA2.3isunnecessary.

Sincethereisnolevelindicating systeminthefueltransfercanal,visualobservation oflossofwaterlevelwouldalsoberequired, EALAA2.4isunnecessary."

Therefore, EAL2.4.3addresses theconcernsoftheseexampleEALs.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNUMARCexampleforSU1-1states:"Thefollowing conditions exist,"Thelicensee's equivalent EALforLossofACPowerSources,UnusualEvent.6.1.1stated:"Lossofabilitytosupply..."

TheNUMARCcriteriaspecifically requiresasitespecificminimumemergency generator supplytotheemergency busses.Thelicenseedidnotprovideasitespecificminimumemergency generator electrical supplytotheemergency busesintheEAL.ThePEGspecified thatbothemergency dieselgenerators arecapableofsupplying powertothesafeguard buses.TheNUMARCcriteriarequiresthatemergency generators areactuallysupplying power.Thelicenseeshouldprovideadditional justification forthedeviation fromtheNUINARCcriteriaorrevisethatEALtoachieveconsistency.

Thestatement "Atleast(site-specific) emergency generator aresupplying powertoemergency buses"servesnopurpose.ThisEALisconcerned onlywiththelossofoff-siteACpowercapability.

Ifoneoftheemergency dieselsisnotsupplying itsemergency busunderhotconditions thenanAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL6.1.3(SA5).NUMARCprovidesnocriteriaforthecondition inwhichoffsiteACpowercapability islostandoneemergency dieselgenerator isnotsupplying it'semergency busundercoldconditions.

Ifneitheremergency dieselsaresupplying theiremergency busses,eitheranAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL6.1.2oraSAEbasedonEAL6.1.4,depending onplantoperating mode.TheNUMARCexampleSU7-1states:"1.Eitherofthefollowing conditions..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforlossofDCpower,UnusualEvent,6.2.1stated:"<105vdcbusvoltage..."

TheMBrIARCcriteriaspecifies thatthelossofDCvoltageisunplanned.

ThisEALappliestocoldshutdownandrefueling, andplannedworkthatde-energizes theDCbusesshouldnottriggeradeclaration.

4ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNU)rIARCcriteriaorprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION BothDCbuseswouldneverbede-energized foranyplannedactivityunlessthereactorwasdefueled.

TheNU1NARCexampleSA1-1states:"1.Thefollowing conditions exist:..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforLossofACPowerSources,Alert,6.1.2stated."Lossofallsafeguards bus..."TheNUIKARCcriteriaspecifies asitespecificlistoftransformers andgenerators.

ThelicenseedidnotprovideasitespecificlistinthisEAL,butdidspecifythesitespecificpowerrequirements inthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMB~Ccriteriaorprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation.

TheconcernofNUMARCICSA1andthisEAListhelossofabilitytoprovideACpowertothesafeguards bussesandtheirvitalloads.Acondition canexistwherethesupplytransformers and/oremergency dieselgenerators areavailable butafaultonthebusprecludes poweringvitalloads.Therefore itismoreappropriate andinclusive todefinetheEALbytheinability topowerthesafeguards busesratherthanthelossofthepowersources.TheMB~CexampleSA2-1states:(Site-specific) indication(s) existthatindicate..."

Licenseeequivalent Initiating Condition inthePEGstated:"SA2FailureofReactorProtection..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EAL,CSFSTstatus,1.1.1Alertstated:"ORANGEorREDpathF-O.l..."

ThelicenseeInitiating Condition andEALdeviatedfromtheNUMARCcriteria.

NUINARCbasestheAlertonthefailureoftheautomatic protection systemtorespondtotheestablished setpoint.

Thelicenseeaddedtheadditional, inappropriate condition thatamanualscramwasalsoineffective, whichshouldescalatetheeventtoaSAE.Thelicensee's technical basis R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION states,ThisEALaddresses anymanualtriporautomatic tripsignalfollowedbymanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentrequiring emergency boration.

Thelicenseeidentified thisdifFerence asadeviation inthePEGbutdidnotprovidejustification forthedeviation inthetechnical bases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethatEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUMiARCcriteriaorprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation.

Foradditional guidanceonthisICthelicenseeshouldreference the"Questions andAnswers"onNUMARC/NESP-007, published inJune1993.AsstatedinthePEG:"ThisICandresulting EALhavebeenspecifically modifiedtomoreaccurately definethecondition described bythegenericbasesasappliedtopressurized waterreactors.

Thefailureofautomatic initiation ofareactortripfollowedbysuccessful manualinitiation actionswhichcanberapidlytakenatthereactorcontrolconsoledoesnotposeapotential lossofeitherfuelcladorRCSboundaries.

Itisthecontinued criticality underconditions requiring areactorscramwhichposesthepotential threattoRSCorfuelcladintegrity.

IfanORANGEpathexistsonF-0.1,CRITICALITY afterimmediate attemptstotripthereactorhavebeentaken,therehasbeenafailuretoshutdownthereactor,butwithoutsubstantial heatgeneration.

IfaREDpathexistsonF-0.1,CRITICALITY aRerimmediate attemptstotripthereactorhavebeentaken,therehasbeenafailuretoshutdownthereactor,withsubstantial heatgeneration.

Eitheroftheseconditions mayrepresent apotential lossofthefuelcladboundary, andthuswarrantadeclaration ofALERT.Amanualtripisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperator(s) atthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical (e.g.,reactortripbutton).Itisimportant tonotethatthefailureofthereactorprotection systemtoinitiateanautomatic tripdoesnotinferactualorpotential failuresofothersystemsnorisit,inandofitself,aprecursor tofissionproductbarrierdegradation.

TheRPSservesnoothersafetyfunctionbuttoinitiatereactortrips.Therefore, oncethereactorhasbeensuccessfully tripped,failuresintheRPSsystemcanhavenoplantsafetyimpact.Ifimmediate manualactionstotripthereactoraresuccessful following recognition ofanautomatic tripfailure,thereisnothreattoeitherplantsafetyorfissionproductbarrierintegrity relatedtotheautomatic tripfailure.Thisdeviation isconsistent withthephilosophy ofmakingaccuratevs.conservative classifications."

Itisalsoimportant tonotetheresponsetoNUMARC/NESP-007 "Questions

&Answers"Generalquestion09:Q:If,aRerthefact,itisdiscovered thataneventhasoccurredthatcausedanEALtobereachedwithoutadverseconsequences, shouldaclassification declaration bemade?A:Ifanemergency condition nolongerexists,thereisnoreasontodeclareanemergency.

TheNRCshallbenotifiedakerdiscovery within1hour,meeting10CFR50.72 reporting criteria...."

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNlB/IARCEALSA2,aswritten,wouldnothavetobedeclared, basedonthiscriteria, absentexceeding anotherfuelcladorRCSbarrierbreachEAL.GiventhattheNUMARC/NESP-007 EALSA2represents neitherfissionproductbarrierlossorpotential lossnorinvolveactualorpotential substantial degradation ofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,itisinappropriate

=todeclareanAlertclassification.

TheNURLARCexampleSA3-1states:"1.Thefollowing conditions exist..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforsystemfailures, Alert,7.2.4stated:"Reactorcoolanttemperature.

~."ThelicenseeEALdidnotincludetherequiredtechnical specification functions tomaintaincoldshutdownanddidnotincludetheanticipatory philosophy relatedtoanuncontrolled temperature rise.Thelicenseejustified theomissionoftheseattributes intheTechnical Basisdocumentwiththestatement:

"Areactorcoolant..."

Withouttheanticipatory declaration thatwouldoccurwiththelossofshutdownfunctions oruncontrolled riseintemperature, theEALisinadequate.

Therefore, thelicenseeshouldmodifytheEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUMARCcriteria, orprovideadditional justification forthedeviation.

TheGinnaTechnical Specifications donotspecifyrequiredfunctions tomaintaincoldshutdown.

EAL7.2.4isderivedfromICSA3whichstates:"Inability toMaintainPlantinColdShutdown."

Theanticipatory criteriaisprovidedintheuseoftheterm"cannotbemaintained."

Thedefinition sectionoftheTechnical BasesDocumentdefinesthetermasfollows:"Thevalueoftheidentified parameter(s) isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecified limits.Thisdetermination includesmakinganevaluation thatconsiders bothcurrentandfuturesystemperformance inrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).

Neitherimpliesthattheparameter mustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached."

NUMARC/NESP-007 "Questions andAnswers"published inJune1993definestheterm'function's:

"Theactionwhichasystem,subsystem orcomponent isdesignedtoperform."

Theevaluation ofbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformance (function) isinherentinthisdefinition of"cannotbemaintained."

,

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheMBrfARCexampleSS1-1states:"1LossofalloffsiteandonsiteAC..."Thelicenseeequivalent EALforLossofACPowerSources,SAE,6.1.4stated:"Lossofallsafeguards..."

TheNUMARCcriteriaspecifies asitespecificlistoftransformers andgenerators.

Thelicenseeomittedasitespecificlistoftransformers andgenerators.

ThelicenseeomittedasitespecificlistintheEAL,butdidspecifythesitespecificpowerrequirements inthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNIJMARCcriteriaorprovidejustification forthedeviation.

RefertoResponsetoSpecificRAI021TheNUMARCexampleSS2-1states:"1.(Site-specific) indication existthat..."Thelicenseeequivalent EAL,CSFSTstatus,1.1.2stated:"REDpathF-0.1..."TheSubcriticality RedPathisenteredbaseduponfailureofpowerrangeindication todecreasebelow5%following areactortrip.Thiscondition byitselfwouldbeanadequateEALexceptthelicenseehasaddedotherconditions thatwereinconsistent withtheNUMARCcriteria.

Therefore, thelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMB~Ccriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

AsstatedinthePEG:"CSFSTSubcriticality

-REDpathisenteredbasedonfailureofpowerrangeindication todecreasebelow5%following areactortrip.ThisportionoftheEALaddresses anymanualtriporautomatic tripsignalfollowedbyamanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentthatthereactorisproducing moreheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.

Thiscondition indicates failureofboththeautomatic andmanualprotection systemstotripthereactorinconjunction withafailureofalternate borationsystemstoreducereactorpowerbelowdecayheatlevels.Thecombination offailureofbothfrontlineandbackupprotection systemstofunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient, alongwiththecontinued production ofheatposesadirectthreattofuelcladandRCS

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION integrity andthuswarrantsdeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency.

15minutesisspecified toallowtimeforemergency borationtobeeffective andprovidesadiscriminator betweenSA2.1andSS2.1.Theclassification shouldbemadeassoonasitisapparentthatemergency borationisnotorwillnotbeeffective inreducingreactorpowerbelow5%."Itisthefailureofbothprimaryandbackupmeansofreactorshutdownsystemswhichrepresents aneventwhichinvolvesactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctions neededfortheprotection ofthepublic.TheNUMARCexampleforSS4-1states:"1.Completelossofany..."Thelicenseeequivalent EAL,RCSLeakage1.3.1,forSAEstated:"REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINK"TheNUMARCcriteriaspecifies completelossoffunctions requiredforhotshutdown, including theultimateheatsinkandreactivity control.ThelicenseeEALdidnotaddressthelossoffunctions requiredforhotshutdown.

EntryintoCSFSTRedPathdidnotprovidetheanticipatory declaration thatlossoffunctions would.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheIAJMARCcriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

Thelicenseeshouldalsoprovideinformation ontheirdisposition ofthefunctionofcorecoolinginrelationtothisIC.GinnaTechnical Specifications Section1.2defineshotshutdownas:Reactivity LQdk%5-1andTavg2540'F.Sincethehotshutdownmodehasnoupperdefininglimitforcoolanttemperature, theabilitytoachieveandmaintainhotshutdownisonlyafunctionofreactivity control.EAL1.1.2addresses lossofreactivity control.TheNUMARC/NESP-007 basisforSS4,whilenotsupporting theICorexampleEAL,doesstatethattheEALisintendedaddresses lossoffunctions, including ultimateheatsink.Noreference tocorecoolingismade.'However, EAL1.2.1andEAL3.1.3provideforthedeclaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency underconditions whichlossoffunctions threatencorecooling.Itisalsoimportant todiQerentiate betweenfunctionandoperability ofcomponents orequipment whichsupportafunction.

IAB~C/NESP-007 "Questions andAnswers"published inJune1993defines'function's:

"Theactionwhichasystem,subsystem orcomponent is,designedtoperform.Safetyfunctions, asappliedtoPWRsarereactivity control,RCSinventory controlandsecondary heatremoval."

MBrIARC/NESP-007 Section3.9states"Therearediverseandredundant plantsystemstosupporteachCSF.Bymonitoring theCSFsinsteadoftheindividual systemcomponent status,theimpactofmultipleeventsis R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION inherently addressed, e.g.,thenumberofoperablecomponents available tomaintainthefunction."

Sinceitwouldbeimpossible todefineallpossiblelossesofsystemcomponent operability underwhichlossoffunctionmayoccur,consistent withSection3.9ofNUNARC/NESP-007, thelossoffunctionisdefinedbyCSFstatus.Forsecondary heatremoval,thatCSFisREDpathheatsink.ThThnilnr'221nlTheNUMARCexampleSS5-1states:"OPERABILITY MODEAPPLICABILITY:

ColdShutdown..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EAL,RCSLeakage3.1.3forSAEstated:"RVLIScannotbemaintained..."

TheNUMARCcriteriaspecifies evaluation ofdecayheatremovalforthiseventsincethecriteriaappliesfortheshutdowncondition.

ThelicenseedidnotincludethiscriteriaintheEALsincetheEALwasintendedtoapplytoalloperating modes.However,theEALwasself-contradictory inthemodeapplicability cannotbeALL...Withthereactorvesselheadremoved.Therefore, thelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUNCcriteriaandclarityofmeaning,orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

TheMB~CICfromwhichEAL3.1.3isderivedisNUMARCICSS5:"LossofWaterLevelintheReactorVesselThatHasorWillUncoverFuelintheReactorVessel."Therearenumerousconditions whichcanleadtoalossofRCSinventory totheextentresulting incoreuncoverywhileincoldshutdownorrefuelmodes.Theoneaddressed inthegenericbasesforPWRsis"sequences suchasprolonged boilingfollowing lossofdecayheatremoval."

Lossofinventory canalsooccurasaresultofdraindownevents.TheconcernofthisICandEALisuncoveryofthefuel,regardless ofthecause.Therefore thecriteriaregarding lossofdecayheatremovalservesnofunction.

TheEALwordingprovidesfortheanticipatory criteria.

Themodeapplicability wasexpandedtoincludetheinability tomaintainRVLISabovetopoffuelconsistent withuseofRVLISlevelasaRCSbarrierlossindicator.

RefertoResponsetoSpecificRAI49.TheEALdoesnotimplythatthereactorvesselheadcanberemovedwhileinhotcondition.

Sincethisconfiguration wouldneveroccurunderhotconditions, thatportionoftheEALbasedonvisualobservation wouldnotapplyorbeevaluated.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNI.JMARCexampleSS6-1states:"1.Thefollowing conditions exist:..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforEquipment

Failures, SAE,7.3.4stated:"Lossofannunciators orindications..."

TheNUMARCcriteriaspeci6esthatCompensatory non-alarming indications areunavailable.

AlthoughthePEGreflected a"modified" EALof~PA'IAl,tl'pecificity waslostinthetranslation totheTechnical BasesandtheEALCategories.

(Baseduponlimitedinformation available, thereviewerhadtoassumethePPCSandSASwerenotlocatedonthepanelsofTable7.3).Nojustification wasprovidedinthetechnical basesfortheomission.

Therefore, thelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUMARCcriteriaandclarityofmeaning,orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

Items(b.)and(c.)ofthisEALintheGinnaPEGwerecombinedintoasinglestatement "Complete lossofabilitytomonitorallcriticalsafetyfunctionstatus."AsstatedintheRAI,PPCSandSASarecompensatory non-alarmingindications.

Ifeitherofthesesourcesarefunctional, criticalsafetyfunctionmonitoring isavailable.

TheNUMARCexampleSG1-1states:"Prolonged lossofalloffsiteandonsite..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforLossofACPowerSources,GE,6.1.5stated:"Lossofallsafeguard busAC..."NUMARCemploysthewordingthatRestoration......is NOTlikely.Thelicenseeusedthewording"Powercannotberestored...".

TheNUMAHC"notlikely"impliesthatassoonasitisknownthatpowerwillnotberestoredthethreshold hasbeenexceeded, whereasthelicensee"cannot":

impliesthatpowerrestoration mustbea"known"quantitybeforealicenseedeclaration.

TheNUlrfARCintentisthatthecondition ismetassoonasitisknownthatpowerrestoration isnotlikelywithinthespeci6ctimelimit.Further,the'icenseedidnotemploytheconceptofIMMINENTreferredtoinNUII~CTable4anddiscussed intheNUINARCbasedinformation forthisInitiating Condition.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNU1KARCcriteriaspecifies asitespecificlistoftransformers andgenerators.

ThelicenseedidnotprovideasitespecificlistinthisEALalthoughsitespecificpowerrequirements werespecified inthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUMARCcriteriaandclarityofmeaning,orprovideadequatejustification

.-forthedeviation.

~Q]ffrwr~44TheconcernofNUITICSG1andthisEAListhelossofabilitytoprovideACpowertothesafeguards busesandtheirvitalloads.Acondition canexistwherethesupplytransformers and/oremergency dieselgenerators areavailable butafaultonthebusprecludes poweringvitalloads.Therefore itismoreappropriate andinclusive todefinetheEALbytheinability topowerthesafeguards busesratherthanthelossofthepowersourcesTheNUMARCexamplesSG2-1and-2state:"1.(Site-specific) indications existthatautomatic..."

Theequivalent licenseeEALwasfoundinCategory1.0,CSFSTStatus,1.3.2GeneralEmergency, whichstated:"REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINK.."TheNUINARClogicofcorecoolingORheatremovalwasomittedfromthelicensees EALs(andtheTechnical BasesDocument) notwithstanding thatthelogicwasincludedinthePEG.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMJMARCcriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

2h R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNUMARCexampleHU1-3states:"Assessment bythecontrolroom.~."Thelicenseeequivalent EALforHazards,UnusualEvent,8.4.3stated:"Assessment byControlRoompersonnel.

~."TheNUMARCcriteriaisunrestricted withthemodifying verbiage"precluding accesstoaplantvitalarea,Table8.3."Thelicenseerestricts thedeclaration tonaturaleventsthatprecludeaccesstovitalareaswithoutjustification inthetechnical bases.ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheIAJMARCcriteria, orprovideadequatejustification in'thetechnical bases.EAL4TheNtB~CexampleHU4-1and-2states:"1.Bombdevicediscovered withinplant..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforhazards,UnusualEvent,8.1.1stated:"Bombdeviceorother..."

TheNUINAHCcriteriasuggeststhatothersecurityeventswhichmaypotentially impactplantsafetyshouldbethesubjectofadeclaration, howevertheadditional EALwasomittedfromthelicensee's EALcategory.

TheTechnical BasesDocumentstated,"ThisEALisbasedontheREGNPSSecurityContingency Plan.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresent atleastapotential degradation inthelevelofsafetyoftheplantarereportedunder10CFR73.71 orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72" Aswritten,theEALdidnotpermitanemergency declaration forothersecurityeventsthatmugrepresent apotential degradation ofsafetywhichisinconsistent withtheMJMARCcriteria.

Thisdiscussion isalsoapplicable totheAlertandSAEEALsbutwillnotberepeated.

ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUNCcriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION 11inEALh1li1fiTheIKJNIARCexampleHA1-3states:"3.Reportofanyvisiblestructural..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforHazards,Alert,8.4.7stated:"Assessment byControlRoompersonnel that..."TheNUMARCcriteriadoesnotlimitthethreshold ofdeclaration to"resulted indamagetoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation."

TheintentoftheNARCEAListhatifvisiblestructural damagehasoccurredtothebuilding, theeventwassignificant andhasahighpotential fordamagetoequipment neededforsafeplantoperation.

Thelicensee's Technical Basesdocumentrecognized thispotential withthefollowing.

"ThisEALaddresses eventsthat..."However,thisrecognition didnotcarrythroughtotheplantEAL.Anticipating theggfg<igldamage,thedeclaration shouldbemadebaseduponvisiblestructural damage,not"Assessment....

damagetoequipment needed...safeplantoperation."

ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheMJMARCcriteria, orprovideadequatejustification forthedeviation.

4n'hin1nrTheNUIMAHCexampleHA2-1states:Thefollowing condition exists:~.."Thelicenseeequivalent EALforHazards,Alert,8.2.2stated:"Fireorexplosion inanyplantarea,..."

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNUlVfARCcriteriaincludesthecondition that"Affected systemparameter indications showdegradedperformance."

ThelicenseeEALdidnotclearlyconveythisNU)~Ccriteria.

ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUMARCcriteriaortechnically justifythedeviation.

22TheNUMARCexamplesHA3-1and2state:"1.Reportordetection oftoxicgases.~."Thelicenseeequivalent EALforHazards,Alert,8.3.5stated:"Reportordetection oftoxic..."

Thelicenseedidnotprovideorreference measurable criteriatotheemergency directorforestablishing concentrations thataffectsafeoperation oftheplant.Withoutsuchinformation readilyavailable, classification wouldbedifBcult.

Thelicenseeshouldprovidemeasurable criteriatotheclassifier todetermine whenlifethreatening andflammable concentration thresholds havebeenexceeded.

Toxicorflammable gasesdonotinthemselves poseanythreattothesafeoperation oftheplantbutmayprecludeaccesstoareasnecessary forsafeoperation oftheplant.Therefore theconcernofthisEALareconcentrations whichareeitherlifethreatening orprecludeaccesstoareasneededforsafeplantoperation.

Nospecificthresholds havebeendefinedsincespecificthresholds aredependent uponthetypeoftoxicorflammable gasinvolvedaswellastheamountandtypeofpersonalprotective equipment available tothoseindividuals requiring access.Therefore, thedetermination astowhetherconcentrations aresuQicient tobelifethreatening orprecludeaccesstoareasrequiredforsafeoperation isleRtothejudgmentoftheuser.Wherespecificcriteriaareavailable totheuseritisexpectedthatcriteriawouldbeconsidered inthisevaluation.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION TheNUMARCexampleHA5-1states:"Entryinto(site-specific) procedure..."

Thelicenseeequivalent EALforEquipment

Failures, Alert,7.2.3stated:"ControlRoomevacuation" TheMB~Ccriteriaspecifically initiates thedeclaration atthetimeofentryintothecontrolroomevacuation procedure.

Thelicensee's EALwasnotspecificaboutthetimeofdeclaration anddidnotidentifytheprocedure uponwhichdeclaration wouldbebased.ThelicenseeshouldrevisetheEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUMARCcriteriaorprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation.

TheNUNCexampleHS2-1states:"1.Thefollowing conditions exist:..."

TheNUlNARCBasisinformation goesontostate:"(Site-specific) timefortransferbased.~."Theequivalent licenseeEAL,7.2.5,SAEstated:"ControlRoomevacuation..."

ThelicenseeTechnical BasesDocumentstated:"Thetimeintervalfortransferisbased..."

Ifthereviewerunderstands thelicensee's basisinformation correctly, thebasisinformation statesthatunderworstcaseconditions itcouldtakeupto20minutestoregaincontrolofsafetysystemsfromremoteshutdownfacilities.

Thissaysnothingaboutwhethercoreuncovering and/orcoredamagecouldoccurduringthetransferperiod.TheintentoftheMVrfARCguidanceisthatadeclaration ofSAEshouldbemadeafterthetimeelapseswheresafetysystemsmaybe"unattended",

andnotincuruncovering and/ordamage.Thelicenseebasisinformation didnotindicatethisunattended time,andthedeviation of20minutesfromtheinaximumcriteriaof15minuteswasnotadequately justified.

R.E.GinnaEmergency ActionLevelsRESPONSETOREQUESTSFORADDITIONAL INFORMATION ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNU1NARCcriteriaorprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation.

minrlhrfn"nn'm"Thi'fTheAppendixRanalysissaysthat20minutesisthemaximumtimeforwhichcontrolofplantsafetysystemsshouldoccurunderworstcaseconditions.

Therefore, 20minutesiswithinthedesigncriteriaoftheremoteshutdownequipment.

TheNU1NARCexamplesHG1-1and-2states:"1.Lossofphysicalcontrolofthecontrolroom..."Thelicenseeequivalent EALforHazards,GE8.1.4stated:Securityeventwhichresultin:..."TheNUMARCcriteriautilizedORlogicfortheEALswhereasthelicenseeutilizedANDlogic.Theinconsistency withtheNU1NARCcriteriawasnotjustified intheTechnical BasesDocument.

ThelicenseeshouldrevisethisEALtoachieveconsistency withtheNUMARCcriteriaorprovidetechnical justification forthedeviation