ML17335A414: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:NRCForm366U.S.NUCLEAREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150.0104EXPIRES06)30/2001ESTSIATEDBURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORYWFORMATIONCOILECTIONREOVEST:500HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDWTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOWDUSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDWGBURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCH(T4F55).U.S.NUCLEARREGIRATORYCOMMISSIILWAQ40ATOILDC205554001.ANDTOTHEPAPERWOIWREDVCTIONPROJECT(51504104),OFFICEOFMANAGEMENTANDBVDGET,WASICNGTOILDC20505FACIUTYNAME(1)TITLE(4)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315PAGE(5)1of3PostulatedHighEnergyLineBreakCouldResultinConditionOutsideDesignBasesforAuxiliaryFeedwaterEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(8)MONTHDAYYEARYEARSEQUENTIALNUMBERREVISIONNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARILINAMDCCook-Unit2NUMR05000-3161619981998-0580012161998ILICNVMOPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)00020.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFRg:(Checkoneormore)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)OTHERSpecifyIrrAb51racIbehwornNRCFcnn366AMr.JoelGebbie,SafetyRelatedMechanicalEngineeringSupervisorTELEPHONENUMBER(InrdvdeAreaCode)616/465-5901x1543COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIX$51'CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14XYES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATENOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE15)MONTH02OAY.081999Abstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)DuringaSafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFI)self-assessmentoftheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System,arequestwasmadetoreviewtheHighEnergyLineBreak(HELB)analysisfortheAFWpumpcommonhallway.TheUnit1EastMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump(MDAFP),Unit1TurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump(TDAFP),Unit2-EastMDAFP,andUnit2TDAFParelocatedadjacenttoeachotherandshareacommonhallway.AHELBanalysisforthehallwaycouldnotbelocated.EvaluationofthepotentialeffectsofaHELBontheAFWpumpsresultedintheconclusionthatthisconditioncouldleadtotheconcurrentfailureoftheTDAFPandasingleMDAFP.OnNovember16,1998thisconditionwasdeterminedtobereportable.Therefore,thisLERisbeingsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)asaconditionoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.TherootcauseofthisconditionwasdeterminedtobedeficienciesassociatedwiththeadministrationoftheHELBprogram.Anindependentassessmentoftheprogramhasbeencompleted,whichidentifiedseveralprogrammaticdeficiencies.Thesedeficienciesarebeingaddressedintheaggregate,andcorrectiveactionstoaddresstheprogrammaticdeficiencieswillbeavailableinearlyFebruary1999.EngineeringpersonnelwillperformaHELBanalysisoftheAFWSystemandperformnecessaryactionstorestorethesystemtoitsdesignbases.ThesafetysignificanceofthisconditionwasevaluatedconsideringthelossofboththeTDAFPandasingleMDAFPonaHELBinthearea.BasedonthefactthatasingleMDAFPcanprovidesufficientflowinordertosafelyshutdowntheplantandoneMDAFPwouldbeunaffectedbytheHELB,itwasdeterminedthattheconditiondidnotposeathreattothehealthorsafetyofthepublic.'2)812230138981216PDRADQCK050003158PDR NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEAR1998LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBER058REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2of3TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired,useeddilionelcopiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)ConditionsPriortoEventUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownDescritionofEventOnSeptember21,1998,aSafetySystemFunctionInspection(SSFI)self-assessmentoftheAuxiliaiyFeedwater(AFW)systembegan,usingSSFItechniquesinaccordancewithNRCInspectionProcedure93801,"SafetySystemFunctionalInspection".Theinspectionteamutilizedaverticalslicereviewinthefunctionalareasofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrol,operations,maintenance,surveillanceandtesting,andqualityassuranceandcorrectiveactions.Theself-assessmentconcludedonOctober23,1998.DuringtheSSFI,aninquirywasmadetoreviewtheHighEnergyLineBreak(HELB)analysisfortheAFWpumpcommonhallway.Nosuchanalysiscouldbelocated.OnNovember16,1998itwasdeterminedthatthepotentialeffectsofaHELBintheareawasreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)asaconditionoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.TheUnit1EastMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump,Unit1TurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump,Unit2EastMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump,andUnit2TurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumparelocatedadjacenttoeachotherandshareacommonhallway.ThesteamusedtodrivetheTDAFPturbinesisprovidedby4inchsupplylines,whichtapoffofthe30inchMainSteamheader.Duetothe4inchsteamsupplylines,itispossibleforaHELBtooccurineitheroftheTDAFProoms.Tohelpmitigatetheconsequencesofthepostulatedbreak,thedoorstotheTDAFProomsareproppedopenwhilethedoorstotheMDAFProomsaremaintainedclosed.ThisarrangementallowsthesteamfromtheHELBtoexhaustintothecommonhallwaysharedbythepumps.InvestigationhasrevealedthatnoanalysiscouldbelocatedwhichevaluatedtheeffectsoftheHELBontheequipmentinthecommonhallway.Alinebreakintheareawillresultinatemperatureof330Fandapressureof14.7psia,asindicatedonplantdrawing1(2)-1355.FourcomponentswereidentifiedwhichmayberenderedinoperablefollowingaHELB.Thosefourcomponentsare1.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto1-WMO-753,EssentialServiceWaterSupplyToTheTDAFP-Thequalificationreportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironmentof250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.Sincethequalifiedtemperatureofthecableislessthanthecalculatedtemperatureof330'F,itwasassumedtofail.2.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto1-WMO-754,EssentialServiceWaterSupplyToTheEastMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump-Thequalificationreportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironmentof250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.Sincethequalifiedtemperatureofthecableislessthanthecalculatedtemperatureof330'F,itwasassumedtofail.3.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto2-WMO-753,EssentialServiceWaterSupplyToTheTDAFP-Thequalificationreportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironmentof250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.Sincethequalifiedtemperatureofthecableislessthanthecalculatedtemperatureof330'F,itwasassumedtofail.4.Thecablewhichsuppliespowertothesolenoidfor2-FRV-258,TDAFPEmergencyLeakoffRegulatingValve-Noqualificationrecordscouldbelocatedforthecable;therefore,itwasconservativelyassumedthatthevalvewouldfail.Theelectricalcomponentslistedabovemaynotwithstandtheeffectsoftheharshsteam-airenvironment.PerTable14.4.2-1oftheUFSAR,thefourcomponentsarerequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Therefore,itwasconcludedthisconditioncouldleadtothefailuretheTDAFPandasingleMDAFPuponaHELBinthearea.NRCFORM366A(6-1996)  
{{#Wiki_filter:NRCForm366U.S.NUCLEAREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150.0104 EXPIRES06)30/2001 ESTSIATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORY WFORMATION COILECTION REOVEST:500HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED WTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOWDUSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDWGBURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(T4F55).U.S.NUCLEARREGIRATORY COMMISSIIL WAQ40ATOIL DC205554001.
ANDTOTHEPAPERWOIW REDVCTION PROJECT(51504104),
OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBVDGET,WASICNGTOIL DC20505FACIUTYNAME(1)TITLE(4)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315 PAGE(5)1of3Postulated HighEnergyLineBreakCouldResultinCondition OutsideDesignBasesforAuxiliary Feedwater EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)MONTHDAYYEARYEARSEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARILINAMDCCook-Unit2NUMR05000-316 1619981998-0580012161998ILICNVMOPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10) 00020.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFRg:(Checkoneormore)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)
LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
OTHERSpecifyIrrAb51racIbehwornNRCFcnn366A Mr.JoelGebbie,SafetyRelatedMechanical Engineering Supervisor TELEPHONE NUMBER(InrdvdeAreaCode)616/465-5901 x1543COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIX$51'CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14XYES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATENOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE15)MONTH02OAY.081999Abstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)DuringaSafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFI)self-assessment oftheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)System,arequestwasmadetoreviewtheHighEnergyLineBreak(HELB)analysisfortheAFWpumpcommonhallway.TheUnit1EastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump(MDAFP),Unit1TurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump(TDAFP),Unit2-EastMDAFP,andUnit2TDAFParelocatedadjacenttoeachotherandshareacommonhallway.AHELBanalysisforthehallwaycouldnotbelocated.Evaluation ofthepotential effectsofaHELBontheAFWpumpsresultedintheconclusion thatthiscondition couldleadtotheconcurrent failureoftheTDAFPandasingleMDAFP.OnNovember16,1998thiscondition wasdetermined tobereportable.
Therefore, thisLERisbeingsubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) asacondition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Therootcauseofthiscondition wasdetermined tobedeficiencies associated withtheadministration oftheHELBprogram.Anindependent assessment oftheprogramhasbeencompleted, whichidentified severalprogrammatic deficiencies.
Thesedeficiencies arebeingaddressed intheaggregate, andcorrective actionstoaddresstheprogrammatic deficiencies willbeavailable inearlyFebruary1999.Engineering personnel willperformaHELBanalysisoftheAFWSystemandperformnecessary actionstorestorethesystemtoitsdesignbases.Thesafetysignificance ofthiscondition wasevaluated considering thelossofboththeTDAFPandasingleMDAFPonaHELBinthearea.BasedonthefactthatasingleMDAFPcanprovidesufficient flowinordertosafelyshutdowntheplantandoneMDAFPwouldbeunaffected bytheHELB,itwasdetermined thatthecondition didnotposeathreattothehealthorsafetyofthepublic.'2)812230138 981216PDRADQCK050003158PDR NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEAR1998LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER058REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2of3TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired, useeddilionel copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)Conditions PriortoEventUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownDescritionofEventOnSeptember 21,1998,aSafetySystemFunctionInspection (SSFI)self-assessment oftheAuxiliaiy Feedwater (AFW)systembegan,usingSSFItechniques inaccordance withNRCInspection Procedure 93801,"SafetySystemFunctional Inspection".
Theinspection teamutilizedaverticalslicereviewinthefunctional areasofengineering designandconfiguration control,operations, maintenance, surveillance andtesting,andqualityassurance andcorrective actions.Theself-assessment concluded onOctober23,1998.DuringtheSSFI,aninquirywasmadetoreviewtheHighEnergyLineBreak(HELB)analysisfortheAFWpumpcommonhallway.Nosuchanalysiscouldbelocated.OnNovember16,1998itwasdetermined thatthepotential effectsofaHELBintheareawasreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) asacondition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.TheUnit1EastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump,Unit1TurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump,Unit2EastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump,andUnit2TurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparelocatedadjacenttoeachotherandshareacommonhallway.ThesteamusedtodrivetheTDAFPturbinesisprovidedby4inchsupplylines,whichtapoffofthe30inchMainSteamheader.Duetothe4inchsteamsupplylines,itispossibleforaHELBtooccurineitheroftheTDAFProoms.Tohelpmitigatetheconsequences ofthepostulated break,thedoorstotheTDAFProomsareproppedopenwhilethedoorstotheMDAFProomsaremaintained closed.Thisarrangement allowsthesteamfromtheHELBtoexhaustintothecommonhallwaysharedbythepumps.Investigation hasrevealedthatnoanalysiscouldbelocatedwhichevaluated theeffectsoftheHELBontheequipment inthecommonhallway.Alinebreakintheareawillresultinatemperature of330Fandapressureof14.7psia,asindicated onplantdrawing1(2)-1355.
Fourcomponents wereidentified whichmayberenderedinoperable following aHELB.Thosefourcomponents are1.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto1-WMO-753, Essential ServiceWaterSupplyToTheTDAFP-Thequalification reportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironment of250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.
Sincethequalified temperature ofthecableislessthanthecalculated temperature of330'F,itwasassumedtofail.2.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto1-WMO-754, Essential ServiceWaterSupplyToTheEastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump-Thequalification reportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironment of250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.
Sincethequalified temperature ofthecableislessthanthecalculated temperature of330'F,itwasassumedtofail.3.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto2-WMO-753, Essential ServiceWaterSupplyToTheTDAFP-Thequalification reportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironment of250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.
Sincethequalified temperature ofthecableislessthanthecalculated temperature of330'F,itwasassumedtofail.4.Thecablewhichsuppliespowertothesolenoidfor2-FRV-258, TDAFPEmergency LeakoffRegulating Valve-Noqualification recordscouldbelocatedforthecable;therefore, itwasconservatively assumedthatthevalvewouldfail.Theelectrical components listedabovemaynotwithstand theeffectsoftheharshsteam-air environment.
PerTable14.4.2-1oftheUFSAR,thefourcomponents arerequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Therefore, itwasconcluded thiscondition couldleadtothefailuretheTDAFPandasingleMDAFPuponaHELBinthearea.NRCFORM366A(6-1996)  


NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER).TEXTCONTINUATION.FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)3of31998-058-'0TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useaddilionalcopiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)CauseofEventTherootcauseofthisconditionisthattheHELBprogramlacksaclearlydefined,centralizedowner.ItwasdeterminedthatthereisnocentrallocationfortheHELBanalysesthathavebeencompletedfortheplant.Theinformationisfragmentedthroughouttheorganization.Also,thereisnosingleauthorityresponsiblefortheHELBprogramandmuchoftheHELBprogramappearstobe"tribalknowledge"heldbydifferentindividualsthroughouttheorganization.Ineffect,theproceduralcontrolsfortheHELBprogramareinadequate.AnalsisofEventThisLERissubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),asaconditionoutsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.TheAFWsystemprovideswatertothesteamgeneratorswhenmainfeedwaterisunavailablebecauseofalossofmainfeedwater,unittrip,feedwaterorsteamlinebreak,lossofoff-sitepower,orsmallbreakLossofCoolantAccident(SBLOCA).Thiswaterremovescoreresidualheattopreventthereleaseofprimarywaterthroughthepressurizersafetyorpower-operatedreliefvalvesandallowstheplanttocooldowntothepointatwhichResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)can'beplacedinservice.EachunitisequippedwithoneturbinedrivenAFWpumpandtwomotordrivenAFWpumps.Foreachunit,theTDAFPservesallfoursteamgeneratorsandeachMDAFWpumpservestwosteamgenerators.ThesteamtotheAFWpumpturbineissuppliedfromtwoofthesteamgenerators.ThepreferredsourceofwaterfortheAFWsystemisthenon-safetyrelatedCST.Eachunit'sCSTiscross-tiedbyanormallyclosedairoperatedvalvetoprovidecondensatetotheoppositeunit'sAFW.IfbothCSTsareunavailable,waterissuppliedfromLakeMichiganviathes'afetyrelatedESWsystem,whichisconnectedupstreamoftheAFWpumpsuctionstrainers.Aminimumof175,000gallonsisrequiredtomaintaintheunitathotshutdownforninehours.AHELBintheareamayleadtoaconcurrentfailureoftheTDAFPandasingleMDAFP.AsdeterminedbytheAppendixRanalyses,asingleMDAFP,withacapacityof450gpm,canprovideadequatecoolinginordertosafelyshutdowntheunit.TheWestMDAFPwouldnotbeaffected.byaHELBinthearea.Therefore,itwasconcludedthatthisconditiondoesnotjeopardizehealthandsafetyofthepublic.CorrectiveActionsEngineeringpersonnelwillperformaHELBanalysisoftheAFWsystemandperformnecessaryactionstorestoretheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemtoitsdesignbasis.TheHELBanalysisofAFWwillbecompletedbyJanuary22,1999.Ifanyplantmodificationsarerequiredasaresultoftheanalysis,themodificationswillbecompletedpriortorestart.AnindependentassessmentoftheHELBprogramhasbeenperformedbyanoutsideconsultant.Severalprogrammaticdeficiencieswereidentifiedduringtheassessment.Thesedeficienciesarebeingaddressedintheaggregate,andcorrectiveactionstoaddresstheprogrammaticdeficiencieswillbeavailableinearlyFebruary1999.PreviousSimilarEventsNoneNRCFORM366A(6-1998) f}}
NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER).TEXTCONTINUATION.
FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)3of31998-058-'0TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useaddilional copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)CauseofEventTherootcauseofthiscondition isthattheHELBprogramlacksaclearlydefined,centralized owner.Itwasdetermined thatthereisnocentrallocationfortheHELBanalysesthathavebeencompleted fortheplant.Theinformation isfragmented throughout theorganization.
Also,thereisnosingleauthority responsible fortheHELBprogramandmuchoftheHELBprogramappearstobe"tribalknowledge" heldbydifferent individuals throughout theorganization.
Ineffect,theprocedural controlsfortheHELBprogramareinadequate.
AnalsisofEventThisLERissubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),
asacondition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.TheAFWsystemprovideswatertothesteamgenerators whenmainfeedwater isunavailable becauseofalossofmainfeedwater, unittrip,feedwater orsteamlinebreak,lossofoff-sitepower,orsmallbreakLossofCoolantAccident(SBLOCA).
Thiswaterremovescoreresidualheattopreventthereleaseofprimarywaterthroughthepressurizer safetyorpower-operated reliefvalvesandallowstheplanttocooldowntothepointatwhichResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)can'beplacedinservice.EachunitisequippedwithoneturbinedrivenAFWpumpandtwomotordrivenAFWpumps.Foreachunit,theTDAFPservesallfoursteamgenerators andeachMDAFWpumpservestwosteamgenerators.
ThesteamtotheAFWpumpturbineissuppliedfromtwoofthesteamgenerators.
Thepreferred sourceofwaterfortheAFWsystemisthenon-safety relatedCST.Eachunit'sCSTiscross-tied byanormallyclosedairoperatedvalvetoprovidecondensate totheoppositeunit'sAFW.IfbothCSTsareunavailable, waterissuppliedfromLakeMichiganviathes'afetyrelatedESWsystem,whichisconnected upstreamoftheAFWpumpsuctionstrainers.
Aminimumof175,000gallonsisrequiredtomaintaintheunitathotshutdownforninehours.AHELBintheareamayleadtoaconcurrent failureoftheTDAFPandasingleMDAFP.Asdetermined bytheAppendixRanalyses, asingleMDAFP,withacapacityof450gpm,canprovideadequatecoolinginordertosafelyshutdowntheunit.TheWestMDAFPwouldnotbeaffected.
byaHELBinthearea.Therefore, itwasconcluded thatthiscondition doesnotjeopardize healthandsafetyofthepublic.Corrective ActionsEngineering personnel willperformaHELBanalysisoftheAFWsystemandperformnecessary actionstorestoretheAuxiliary Feedwater Systemtoitsdesignbasis.TheHELBanalysisofAFWwillbecompleted byJanuary22,1999.Ifanyplantmodifications arerequiredasaresultoftheanalysis, themodifications willbecompleted priortorestart.Anindependent assessment oftheHELBprogramhasbeenperformed byanoutsideconsultant.
Severalprogrammatic deficiencies wereidentified duringtheassessment.
Thesedeficiencies arebeingaddressed intheaggregate, andcorrective actionstoaddresstheprogrammatic deficiencies willbeavailable inearlyFebruary1999.PreviousSimilarEventsNoneNRCFORM366A(6-1998) f}}

Revision as of 07:07, 29 June 2018

LER 98-058-00:on 981216,postulated High Line Break Could Result in Condition Outside Design Bases for Af Occurred. Caused by Deficiencies Associated with Administration of HELB Program.Analysis of Af Will Be Completed by 990122
ML17335A414
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 12/16/1998
From: GEBBIE J
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17335A413 List:
References
LER-98-058, LER-98-58, NUDOCS 9812230138
Download: ML17335A414 (5)


Text

NRCForm366U.S.NUCLEAREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150.0104 EXPIRES06)30/2001 ESTSIATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORY WFORMATION COILECTION REOVEST:500HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED WTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOWDUSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDWGBURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(T4F55).U.S.NUCLEARREGIRATORY COMMISSIIL WAQ40ATOIL DC205554001.

ANDTOTHEPAPERWOIW REDVCTION PROJECT(51504104),

OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBVDGET,WASICNGTOIL DC20505FACIUTYNAME(1)TITLE(4)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315 PAGE(5)1of3Postulated HighEnergyLineBreakCouldResultinCondition OutsideDesignBasesforAuxiliary Feedwater EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)MONTHDAYYEARYEARSEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARILINAMDCCook-Unit2NUMR05000-316 1619981998-0580012161998ILICNVMOPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10) 00020.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFRg:(Checkoneormore)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)

LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

OTHERSpecifyIrrAb51racIbehwornNRCFcnn366A Mr.JoelGebbie,SafetyRelatedMechanical Engineering Supervisor TELEPHONE NUMBER(InrdvdeAreaCode)616/465-5901 x1543COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIX$51'CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14XYES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATENOEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE15)MONTH02OAY.081999Abstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)DuringaSafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFI)self-assessment oftheAuxiliary Feedwater (AFW)System,arequestwasmadetoreviewtheHighEnergyLineBreak(HELB)analysisfortheAFWpumpcommonhallway.TheUnit1EastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump(MDAFP),Unit1TurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump(TDAFP),Unit2-EastMDAFP,andUnit2TDAFParelocatedadjacenttoeachotherandshareacommonhallway.AHELBanalysisforthehallwaycouldnotbelocated.Evaluation ofthepotential effectsofaHELBontheAFWpumpsresultedintheconclusion thatthiscondition couldleadtotheconcurrent failureoftheTDAFPandasingleMDAFP.OnNovember16,1998thiscondition wasdetermined tobereportable.

Therefore, thisLERisbeingsubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) asacondition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.Therootcauseofthiscondition wasdetermined tobedeficiencies associated withtheadministration oftheHELBprogram.Anindependent assessment oftheprogramhasbeencompleted, whichidentified severalprogrammatic deficiencies.

Thesedeficiencies arebeingaddressed intheaggregate, andcorrective actionstoaddresstheprogrammatic deficiencies willbeavailable inearlyFebruary1999.Engineering personnel willperformaHELBanalysisoftheAFWSystemandperformnecessary actionstorestorethesystemtoitsdesignbases.Thesafetysignificance ofthiscondition wasevaluated considering thelossofboththeTDAFPandasingleMDAFPonaHELBinthearea.BasedonthefactthatasingleMDAFPcanprovidesufficient flowinordertosafelyshutdowntheplantandoneMDAFPwouldbeunaffected bytheHELB,itwasdetermined thatthecondition didnotposeathreattothehealthorsafetyofthepublic.'2)812230138 981216PDRADQCK050003158PDR NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEAR1998LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER058REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2of3TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired, useeddilionel copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)Conditions PriortoEventUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownDescritionofEventOnSeptember 21,1998,aSafetySystemFunctionInspection (SSFI)self-assessment oftheAuxiliaiy Feedwater (AFW)systembegan,usingSSFItechniques inaccordance withNRCInspection Procedure 93801,"SafetySystemFunctional Inspection".

Theinspection teamutilizedaverticalslicereviewinthefunctional areasofengineering designandconfiguration control,operations, maintenance, surveillance andtesting,andqualityassurance andcorrective actions.Theself-assessment concluded onOctober23,1998.DuringtheSSFI,aninquirywasmadetoreviewtheHighEnergyLineBreak(HELB)analysisfortheAFWpumpcommonhallway.Nosuchanalysiscouldbelocated.OnNovember16,1998itwasdetermined thatthepotential effectsofaHELBintheareawasreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) asacondition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.TheUnit1EastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump,Unit1TurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump,Unit2EastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump,andUnit2TurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparelocatedadjacenttoeachotherandshareacommonhallway.ThesteamusedtodrivetheTDAFPturbinesisprovidedby4inchsupplylines,whichtapoffofthe30inchMainSteamheader.Duetothe4inchsteamsupplylines,itispossibleforaHELBtooccurineitheroftheTDAFProoms.Tohelpmitigatetheconsequences ofthepostulated break,thedoorstotheTDAFProomsareproppedopenwhilethedoorstotheMDAFProomsaremaintained closed.Thisarrangement allowsthesteamfromtheHELBtoexhaustintothecommonhallwaysharedbythepumps.Investigation hasrevealedthatnoanalysiscouldbelocatedwhichevaluated theeffectsoftheHELBontheequipment inthecommonhallway.Alinebreakintheareawillresultinatemperature of330Fandapressureof14.7psia,asindicated onplantdrawing1(2)-1355.

Fourcomponents wereidentified whichmayberenderedinoperable following aHELB.Thosefourcomponents are1.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto1-WMO-753, Essential ServiceWaterSupplyToTheTDAFP-Thequalification reportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironment of250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.

Sincethequalified temperature ofthecableislessthanthecalculated temperature of330'F,itwasassumedtofail.2.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto1-WMO-754, Essential ServiceWaterSupplyToTheEastMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump-Thequalification reportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironment of250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.

Sincethequalified temperature ofthecableislessthanthecalculated temperature of330'F,itwasassumedtofail.3.Thecablewhichsuppliespowerto2-WMO-753, Essential ServiceWaterSupplyToTheTDAFP-Thequalification reportforthecablestatesthatitcanoperateinanenvironment of250'F,26.7psia,and100%relativehumidity.

Sincethequalified temperature ofthecableislessthanthecalculated temperature of330'F,itwasassumedtofail.4.Thecablewhichsuppliespowertothesolenoidfor2-FRV-258, TDAFPEmergency LeakoffRegulating Valve-Noqualification recordscouldbelocatedforthecable;therefore, itwasconservatively assumedthatthevalvewouldfail.Theelectrical components listedabovemaynotwithstand theeffectsoftheharshsteam-air environment.

PerTable14.4.2-1oftheUFSAR,thefourcomponents arerequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Therefore, itwasconcluded thiscondition couldleadtothefailuretheTDAFPandasingleMDAFPuponaHELBinthearea.NRCFORM366A(6-1996)

NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION (6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER).TEXTCONTINUATION.

FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2) 05000-315 YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERPAGE(3)3of31998-058-'0TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useaddilional copiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)CauseofEventTherootcauseofthiscondition isthattheHELBprogramlacksaclearlydefined,centralized owner.Itwasdetermined thatthereisnocentrallocationfortheHELBanalysesthathavebeencompleted fortheplant.Theinformation isfragmented throughout theorganization.

Also,thereisnosingleauthority responsible fortheHELBprogramandmuchoftheHELBprogramappearstobe"tribalknowledge" heldbydifferent individuals throughout theorganization.

Ineffect,theprocedural controlsfortheHELBprogramareinadequate.

AnalsisofEventThisLERissubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),

asacondition outsidethedesignbasesoftheplant.TheAFWsystemprovideswatertothesteamgenerators whenmainfeedwater isunavailable becauseofalossofmainfeedwater, unittrip,feedwater orsteamlinebreak,lossofoff-sitepower,orsmallbreakLossofCoolantAccident(SBLOCA).

Thiswaterremovescoreresidualheattopreventthereleaseofprimarywaterthroughthepressurizer safetyorpower-operated reliefvalvesandallowstheplanttocooldowntothepointatwhichResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)can'beplacedinservice.EachunitisequippedwithoneturbinedrivenAFWpumpandtwomotordrivenAFWpumps.Foreachunit,theTDAFPservesallfoursteamgenerators andeachMDAFWpumpservestwosteamgenerators.

ThesteamtotheAFWpumpturbineissuppliedfromtwoofthesteamgenerators.

Thepreferred sourceofwaterfortheAFWsystemisthenon-safety relatedCST.Eachunit'sCSTiscross-tied byanormallyclosedairoperatedvalvetoprovidecondensate totheoppositeunit'sAFW.IfbothCSTsareunavailable, waterissuppliedfromLakeMichiganviathes'afetyrelatedESWsystem,whichisconnected upstreamoftheAFWpumpsuctionstrainers.

Aminimumof175,000gallonsisrequiredtomaintaintheunitathotshutdownforninehours.AHELBintheareamayleadtoaconcurrent failureoftheTDAFPandasingleMDAFP.Asdetermined bytheAppendixRanalyses, asingleMDAFP,withacapacityof450gpm,canprovideadequatecoolinginordertosafelyshutdowntheunit.TheWestMDAFPwouldnotbeaffected.

byaHELBinthearea.Therefore, itwasconcluded thatthiscondition doesnotjeopardize healthandsafetyofthepublic.Corrective ActionsEngineering personnel willperformaHELBanalysisoftheAFWsystemandperformnecessary actionstorestoretheAuxiliary Feedwater Systemtoitsdesignbasis.TheHELBanalysisofAFWwillbecompleted byJanuary22,1999.Ifanyplantmodifications arerequiredasaresultoftheanalysis, themodifications willbecompleted priortorestart.Anindependent assessment oftheHELBprogramhasbeenperformed byanoutsideconsultant.

Severalprogrammatic deficiencies wereidentified duringtheassessment.

Thesedeficiencies arebeingaddressed intheaggregate, andcorrective actionstoaddresstheprogrammatic deficiencies willbeavailable inearlyFebruary1999.PreviousSimilarEventsNoneNRCFORM366A(6-1998) f