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NRCFOAM366A(6.'I998)4lLlCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION~FACILITYNAME(1)St.Lucie'nit1DOCKETNUMBER205000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009.-00PAGE(3)Page7of8TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366AI(17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)Theresultofthisre-analysisdemonstratesapotentialneedforareductioninfeedwatermassadditiontocontainmentforUnit1.Manyengineeringsolutionscanbeconsidered,includingmodificationoftheMFIVclosuretimes.Afasterresponseinclosuretime,suchasintheUnit2design,clearlybenefitsinincreasedmargintothedesignlimitof44psig.Abestestimate102%powercasewithsafeguardsavailableisprovidedintheABB-CEcalculation.Case2oftheMSLBcontainmentresponsecreditsnormaloperationofthemainfeedwaterregulatingvalvesandutilizesrealisticinputdata.Theresultsofthiscasedemonstrateapeakcontainmentpressureof43.339psig.Thisvalueisbelowthecontainmentdesignvalueof44psig.Althoughthiscaseisnotaboundingcaseforanalysisconsideration,itdemonstratesthatpressuresremainbelowdesignforaMSLBmassandenergyreleaseinsidecontainmentwithrealisticinputassumptions.ThisevaluatedcaseprovidespartofthebasesforoperabilityofUnit1containment.TheMSLBanalysisispostulatedtoreachapeaktemperatureofapproximately375Fat42.2seconds.Ztwasidentifiedthat11ofthe37in-containmentEQDocPacsenvelopthe375Fpostulatedpeaktemperature.Section4.3ofEQDocPac2998-A-451-1000(page1000-4-5)hasadiscussionofthermal.lagfortheUnit2insidecontainmentMSLB,andconcludesthattheactualtemperatureexperiencedbycomponentsareboundedbythecontainmentLOCAtemperatureprofiles.TheseUnit2resultsareapplicablefortheUnit1in-containmentEQDocPacsthatarenotenvelopedbythe375Ftemperaturepeak.Figures4-5and4-6oftheDocPacshowatypicalinstrumentcableandRosemounttransmitterandthetemperaturelagfor.045inchesbelowthesurfaceofthecable(typicalthicknessofacablejacket)andthesurfacetemperatureofthetransmitterwhenexposedtoatypicalMSLBprofile.TheseitemsconservativelyrepresentalloftheEQequipmentthatwouldbeexposedtoanin-containmentMSLB.FromtheplotofthesurfacetemperatureofthecableinFigure4-6oftheDocPac,thepeaktemperatureisapproximately385Fat45secondsenvelopingthepostulatedpeakforUnit1.Theplotsofthetransmittersurfacetemperatureandat.045belowthesurfaceofthecable(atthecableinsulation),showsthatthetemperatureofthetransmitterreachesapproximately245Fandtheinsulationofthecablejustbarelyexceeds260F.SincebothofthesetemperaturesarebelowtheUnit1LOCAtemperatureof270F,thequalificationoftheEQequipmentwillnotbeadverselyaffectedandwouldremainoperable.ThedoseconsequencesforaMSLBinsidecontainmentareboundedbytheMSLBoutsidecontainmentandtheLOCAevent.TechnicalSpecificationoperabilityisbasedontheLOCA,nottheMSLBevent.Furthermore,significantmarginexistsabovetheNRCFORM388AI8.1998) | | NRCFOAM366A(6.'I998)4lLlCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION~FACILITYNAME(1)St.Lucie'nit1DOCKETNUMBER205000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009.-00PAGE(3)Page7of8TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366AI(17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)Theresultofthisre-analysisdemonstratesapotentialneedforareductioninfeedwatermassadditiontocontainmentforUnit1.Manyengineeringsolutionscanbeconsidered,includingmodificationoftheMFIVclosuretimes.Afasterresponseinclosuretime,suchasintheUnit2design,clearlybenefitsinincreasedmargintothedesignlimitof44psig.Abestestimate102%powercasewithsafeguardsavailableisprovidedintheABB-CEcalculation.Case2oftheMSLBcontainmentresponsecreditsnormaloperationofthemainfeedwaterregulatingvalvesandutilizesrealisticinputdata.Theresultsofthiscasedemonstrateapeakcontainmentpressureof43.339psig.Thisvalueisbelowthecontainmentdesignvalueof44psig.Althoughthiscaseisnotaboundingcaseforanalysisconsideration,itdemonstratesthatpressuresremainbelowdesignforaMSLBmassandenergyreleaseinsidecontainmentwithrealisticinputassumptions.ThisevaluatedcaseprovidespartofthebasesforoperabilityofUnit1containment.TheMSLBanalysisispostulatedtoreachapeaktemperatureofapproximately375Fat42.2seconds.Ztwasidentifiedthat11ofthe37in-containmentEQDocPacsenvelopthe375Fpostulatedpeaktemperature.Section4.3ofEQDocPac2998-A-451-1000(page1000-4-5)hasadiscussionofthermal.lagfortheUnit2insidecontainmentMSLB,andconcludesthattheactualtemperatureexperiencedbycomponentsareboundedbythecontainmentLOCAtemperatureprofiles.TheseUnit2resultsareapplicablefortheUnit1in-containmentEQDocPacsthatarenotenvelopedbythe375Ftemperaturepeak.Figures4-5and4-6oftheDocPacshowatypicalinstrumentcableandRosemounttransmitterandthetemperaturelagfor.045inchesbelowthesurfaceofthecable(typicalthicknessofacablejacket)andthesurfacetemperatureofthetransmitterwhenexposedtoatypicalMSLBprofile.TheseitemsconservativelyrepresentalloftheEQequipmentthatwouldbeexposedtoanin-containmentMSLB.FromtheplotofthesurfacetemperatureofthecableinFigure4-6oftheDocPac,thepeaktemperatureisapproximately385Fat45secondsenvelopingthepostulatedpeakforUnit1.Theplotsofthetransmittersurfacetemperatureandat.045belowthesurfaceofthecable(atthecableinsulation),showsthatthetemperatureofthetransmitterreachesapproximately245Fandtheinsulationofthecablejustbarelyexceeds260F.SincebothofthesetemperaturesarebelowtheUnit1LOCAtemperatureof270F,thequalificationoftheEQequipmentwillnotbeadverselyaffectedandwouldremainoperable.ThedoseconsequencesforaMSLBinsidecontainmentareboundedbytheMSLBoutsidecontainmentandtheLOCAevent.TechnicalSpecificationoperabilityisbasedontheLOCA,nottheMSLBevent.Furthermore,significantmarginexistsabovetheNRCFORM388AI8.1998) 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| NRCFORM366A(8.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION~FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit1DOCKETNUMBERI205000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009-00PAGE(3)Page8of8TEXT/ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm3MA)I17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)calculatedMSLBcontainmentanalysispeakpressuretoensurethatthecontainmentwouldnotfailasaresultofaMSLBinsidecontainment.Bestestimateanalysisdemonstratesthatundermoreprobableconditionsthecurrentdesignpressureof44psigwillnotbeexceeded.Basedontheseconsiderations,nooperabilityconcernexistsfortheconditionsstatedinthisLBR,andcontinuedplantoperationposesnoadverserisktothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.CorrectiveActions1.LongtermcorrectiveactionwillconsistofeithermodificationstoreducefeedwaterflowtothefaultedgeneratororachangetothelicensingbasisoftheMSLBpeakcontainmentpressuretoavalueofgreaterthan56psig.2.ThelowtemperatureoverpressureLTOPanalysiswasidentifiedasnothavingbeenre-runsinceoriginallicenseandiscurrentlybeingre-baselined.3.St.Luciewillreviewthegenericimplicationsofsimilarsignificantdifferences(similartothedifferenceinMFZVclosuretime)insafetyrelatedsystems/componentsbetweenthetwounits.OtherInformationNoneNoneNRCFORM388A(81998) | | NRCFORM366A(8.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION~FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit1DOCKETNUMBERI205000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009-00PAGE(3)Page8of8TEXT/ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm3MA)I17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)calculatedMSLBcontainmentanalysispeakpressuretoensurethatthecontainmentwouldnotfailasaresultofaMSLBinsidecontainment.Bestestimateanalysisdemonstratesthatundermoreprobableconditionsthecurrentdesignpressureof44psigwillnotbeexceeded.Basedontheseconsiderations,nooperabilityconcernexistsfortheconditionsstatedinthisLBR,andcontinuedplantoperationposesnoadverserisktothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.CorrectiveActions1.LongtermcorrectiveactionwillconsistofeithermodificationstoreducefeedwaterflowtothefaultedgeneratororachangetothelicensingbasisoftheMSLBpeakcontainmentpressuretoavalueofgreaterthan56psig.2.ThelowtemperatureoverpressureLTOPanalysiswasidentifiedasnothavingbeenre-runsinceoriginallicenseandiscurrentlybeingre-baselined.3.St.Luciewillreviewthegenericimplicationsofsimilarsignificantdifferences(similartothedifferenceinMFZVclosuretime)insafetyrelatedsystems/componentsbetweenthetwounits.OtherInformationNoneNoneNRCFORM388A(81998)}} |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
ML17229A7381998-05-21021 May 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980421,missed EDG Fuel Oil Sample Surveillance Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Fuel Oil Sampling Service Purchase Order & Revised Site procedure.W/980521 Ltr
ML17229A7011998-04-27027 April 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980326,discovered Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability.Caused by Inadequate Design by Personnel Error.Removed RPS & ESFAS Containment Pressure Bypass Keys immediately.W/980427 Ltr
ML17229A6761998-04-0202 April 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980305,identified Two Conditions That Were Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Design Oversight During Development of Original App R Safe SD Design.Established 30 Minute Roving Fire Watches & Provided training.W/980402 Ltr
ML17229A6731998-03-26026 March 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980224,radiation Monitor Surveillance Inadequacies Led to Operating of Facility Prohibited by Tss. Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error.Permanent Procedure Changes Were implemented.W/980326 Ltr
ML17229A6551998-03-0505 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980206,high/low Pressure Shutdown Cooling Interface Was Noted Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Personnel Error.Addl Guidance Was Provided to Engineering Dept personnel.W/980305 Ltr
ML17229A6281998-02-19019 February 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980121,emergency Lighting Outside App R Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Congnitive Personnel Error During Translation of App R Section Iii.Procedures Onop 1 & 2 ONP-100.01 Were Issued for Use on 980206.W/980219 Ltr
ML17229A6211998-02-0909 February 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980110,manual Rt Due to DEH Leak at Turbine Test Block Was Noted.Caused by o-ring Extrusion.Shortened Bolts by About 0.125 & Reinstalled at Correct Torque values.W/980209 Ltr
ML17229A6191998-02-0404 February 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980105,CIS Bistable in Bypass Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Tss.Caused by Personnel Error. Radiation Monitor Was Restored to service.W/980204 Ltr
ML17229A6161998-02-0303 February 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980104,inadvertent RPS Actuation Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies & Inadequate self-checking by Licensed Utility Personnel. Placards Have Been Placed in CRs.W/980203 Ltr
ML17229A6051998-01-27027 January 1998
LER 97-010-01:on 971027,inadvertent Core Alteration Prohibited by TSs Were Noted Due to Stuck Cea.Caused by Personnel Error.Cea #24 Was Dislodged & Transferred to Spent Pool for insp.W/980127 Ltr
ML17229A5501997-12-0505 December 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 971107,inadequate CR Ventilation Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Operating Procedure 2-1900050 Was revised.W/971205 Ltr
ML17309A9091997-12-0202 December 1997
LER 97-011-00:on 971102,non-conservative RAS Set Point Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Set Point & Instrument Loop Scaling Process.Revised ESFAS Functional Tp W/Proper Set point.W/971202 Ltr
ML17229A5391997-11-26026 November 1997
LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A5151997-11-0707 November 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971008,inoperable Containment Cooling Fan Resulted in Operation of Facility Outside Design Basis. Caused by non-cognitive Personnel Error.Ccs Operation Was Revised & Issued on 971013.W/971107 Ltr
ML17229A4991997-10-17017 October 1997
LER 97-009-00:on 970917,inoperable PORV Block Valve Resulted in Operation Prohibited by Tech Specs Occurred.Caused by Plant GL 89-10 Program Plan to Review Plant Manager Action Item Sys.Porv Block Valve V-1403 restored.W/971017 Ltr
ML17309A9011997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-008-00:on 970728,mechanical Fire Penetrations Were Inoperable & Outside App R Design Bases.Caused by Seal Mfg Not Providing Formal Documentation for Installed Seals. Modified Inoperable Fire penetrations.W/970827 Ltr
ML17229A4311997-07-29029 July 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970630,discovered Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Subgroup Relays.Caused by Inadequacy in Implementing TS Requirements in Surveillance Procedures.Revised Surveillance procedures.W/970729 Ltr
ML17229A4241997-07-25025 July 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970625,discovered That Hot Shutdown Control Panel Shutdown Cooling Flow indicator,FI-3306 Inoperable. Caused by Weakness in Work Order & Procedure Used to Repair FI-3306.Section Meeting W/I&C Planners held.W/970725 Ltr
ML17229A3971997-07-11011 July 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970611,discovered Incorrect Original Cable Tray Fire Stop Assembly Installation Was Outside App R Design Basis.Caused by Personnel Error.Hourly Fire Watch Patrols Will Be posted.W/970711 Ltr
ML17229A3871997-06-19019 June 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970521,determined Required Post Maint Open Stroke Test for Valve V3245,2B2 SIT Discharge Check Valve, Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure revised.W/970619 Ltr
ML17229A3841997-06-17017 June 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970518,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design Due to Gaps in Screen Encl.Performed SER to Document Containment Sump Design requirements.W/970617 Ltr
ML17229A3751997-06-0202 June 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 970501,operation Was Prohibited by TS Due to Inadequately Tested Degraded Voltage Sys.Revised Unit 1 ESFAS Surveillance Test procedure.W/970602 Ltr
ML17229A3611997-05-29029 May 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 970502,reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys Was Outside App R Design Bases.Identified Leak Sites Were Repaired & Mods to RCP Oil Collection Sys to Capture Any Future Leakage from areas.W/970529 Ltr
ML17229A3491997-05-21021 May 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970423,containment Isolation Actuation Occurred.Caused by Increased Radiation Levels During Removal of Upper Guide Structure.Proper Actuation of Containment Isolation Components Was verified.W/970521 Ltr
ML17229A3441997-05-13013 May 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 970419,reactor Was Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage.Hot Cracking Was Caused by Weld Contamination.Repairs to RCPB Were Completed & 1A SDC Train Was Restored to Svc
ML17229A3141997-04-30030 April 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 970402,refueling Machine Was Operating in Manner Prohibited by TS Due to Original Design of Refueling Machine Bypass Feature Conflicting W/Ts Requirements. Eliminated Overload Cut Off Limit bypass.W/970430 Ltr
ML17229A2951997-03-31031 March 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970304,automatic Rt Resulted from Loss of Electrical Power to 1A2 Rc Pump.Rcp Breaker Was Replaced & Pump Was Returned to svc.W/970331 Ltr
ML17229A2721997-03-21021 March 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970221,operation in Excess of Max Rated Thermal Power Occurred Due to Digital Data Processing Sys (Ddps) Calorimetric Error.Verified Acceptable Performance of Ddps Functions & Reviewed Software mods.W/970321 Ltr
1999-07-06
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17241A4891999-10-0707 October 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990912,noted That MSSV Surveillance Was Outside of TS Requirements.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Subject MSSVs Are Being Refurbished & Retested Prior to Unit Startup from SL1-16 Refueling Outage.With 991007 Ltr
ML17241A4951999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 991014 Ltr
ML17241A4741999-08-31031 August 1999
Rev 1 to PCM 99016, St Lucie Unit 1,Cycle 16 Colr.
ML17241A4591999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990913 Ltr
ML17241A4301999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jul 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990805 Ltr
ML17241A4111999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990610,unplanned Cooldown Transient Occurred Due to Personnel Error.Trained & Briefed Personnel & Revised Procedures.With 990716 Ltr
ML17241A4031999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990605,sub-critical Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Inadvertent MSIV Opening.Caused by Personnel Error. Provided Operation Supervision Instruction to Operating Crews,Stand Down Meetings & Operator Aids.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4041999-07-0606 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990604,CEA Drop Resulted in Manual Reactor Trip.Caused by Procedural Inadequacies.Procedure Changes Are Planned to Correct Lack of Procedural Guidance for CEA Subgroup Power Switch Replacement.With 990706 Ltr
ML17241A4091999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990712 Ltr
ML17241A3941999-06-30030 June 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990415,as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Manufacturing Process Defect. All Three Psvs Were Replaced with pre-tested Valves During Cycle 11 Refueling Outage.With 990630 Ltr
ML17355A3681999-06-30030 June 1999
Revised Update to Topical QA Rept, Dtd June 1999
ML17241A3551999-06-0404 June 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990505,both Trains of Safety Injection Actuation Were Blocked During Surveillance.Caused by Procedure Error.Procedure Revised.With 990604 Ltr
ML17241A3631999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 990610 Ltr
ML17241A3321999-05-17017 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990415,determined That as Found Cycle 10 Psv Setpoints Outside TS Limits.Root Cause Under Investigation.Psvs Replaced with pe-tested Valves During Cycle 11
ML17241A3271999-05-0606 May 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990406,ECCS Suction Header Leak Resulted in Both ECCS Trains Being Inoperable & Entry Into TS 3.0.3. Caused by Chloride Induced OD Stress Corrosion Cracking of Piping.Made Code Repairs & Coated Piping.With 990506 Ltr
ML17241A3331999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990517 Ltr
ML17229B0801999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990311,SG ECT Error Caused Operation with Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Deficiencies in Data Analysis Guideline Instructions.Licensee Will Change Data Analysis Guidelines for Lead Analysts.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0841999-04-0707 April 1999
Rev 2 to PSL-ENG-SEMS-98-102, Engineering Evaluation of ECCS Suction Lines.
ML17229B0791999-04-0707 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990309,discovered Inadequate Design & IST SRs for Iodine Removal Sys (Irs).Caused by Original Design Inadequacies & Personnel Error.Naoh Tank Vent Valve V07233 Was Tagged Open.With 990407 Ltr
ML17229B0961999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990408 Ltr
ML17229B0541999-03-10010 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990211,inadequate TS SRs for SIT & SDC Isolation Valves Were Noted.Caused by Failure to Correctly Implement TS Srs.Submitted LAR to Align Required TS SR with Design Bases Requirements Being Verified.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0461999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990310 Ltr
ML17229B0051999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990211 Ltr
ML17229A9901999-01-20020 January 1999
LER 98-009-00:on 981223,noted That Facility Operated Outside of Design Basis.Caused by non-conservative MSLB Analysis Inputs.Will Review SR Component Differences Between Units & Will re-baseline LTOP Analysis.With 990120 Ltr
ML17229A9961999-01-14014 January 1999
SG Tube Inservice Insp Special Rept.
ML17229A9821999-01-0404 January 1999
LER 98-010-00:on 981207,RCS Boron Sample Frequency Required by Ts,Was Exceeded by Twelve Minutes.Caused by Personnel Error.Equipment Clearance Order Was Lifted to Draw Required Sample & Operations Procedure Was Changed.With 990104 Ltr
ML17229A9831998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 990111 Ltr
ML17229A9611998-12-22022 December 1998
LER 97-002-01:on 981204,containment Sump Debris Screen Was Not IAW Design.Caused by Inadequate C/As for Sump Screen Anamolies.All Identified Sump Screen Deficiencies Were Dispositioned &/Or Repaired.With 981222 Ltr
ML17229A9561998-12-15015 December 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981118,missed TS SG U Tube Insp.Caused by Encoding Errors While Using Remote Positioning Fixtures.All SG Tube Surveyed.With 981215 Ltr
ML17241A3581998-12-0909 December 1998
Changes,Tests & Experiments Made as Allowed by 10CFR50.59 for Period of 970526-981209.
ML17229A9421998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981215 Ltr
ML17229A9301998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-005-01:on 980807,discovered That New MOV Methodology Caused Past PORV Block Valve Operability Problem.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Planned Valve Mods Will Be Implemented During Cycle 11 1998 Outage
ML17229A9021998-11-0404 November 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 981008,inadequate Reactor Protection Sys Trip Bypass TS Was Noted.Caused by Poorly Worded Ts. Submitted LAR to Clarify Power Requirements for High Rate of Power Trips.With 981104 Ltr
ML17241A4931998-11-0101 November 1998
Statement of Account for Period of 981101-990930 for Suntrust Bank,As Trustee for Florida Municipal Power Agency Nuclear Decommissioning Trust (St Lucie Project).
ML17229A9051998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 981110 Ltr
ML17229A8871998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1 Which Was Machined with Improper Length.C/A Includes Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8781998-10-19019 October 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Swagelok Stainless Steel Front Ferrule,Part Number SS-503-1,which Was Machined with Improper Length.Insp Equipment That Will 100% Identify Short Length
ML17229A8771998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980918,inadvertent Afas Actuation Was Noted.Caused by Degradation of Multiple Afas Power Supplies. Replaced Afas Power Supplies & Revised Procedures.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8761998-10-14014 October 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980918,identified Discrepancies Between Fire Protection Design Requirements & Field Conditions. Caused by Inadequate Translation & Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements.Procedures Revised.With 981014 Ltr
ML17229A8721998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for St Lucie Units 1 & 2.With 981009 Ltr
ML17229A8511998-09-0202 September 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980807,discovered That PORV Margins Were Insufficient to Accommodate Addl Conservatism.Caused by Inadequacies in Original Vendor MOV Methodology.Will Implement Planned Valve Actuator mods.W/980902 Ltr
ML17229A8611998-08-31031 August 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.With 980911 Ltr
ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency
ML17229A8481998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 1 to PSL-ENG-SEFJ-98-013, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 10 Colr.
ML17229A9461998-08-0707 August 1998
Rev 0 to PCM 98016, St Lucie Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr.
ML17229A8301998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980814 Ltr
ML17229A8201998-07-29029 July 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980630,inadequate Procedure May Have Resulted in SBO Recovery Complications.Caused by Inadequate Procedures.Attached Caution Tags to Appropriate Control switches.W/980729 Ltr
ML17229A7981998-06-30030 June 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980713 Ltr
ML17229A7701998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for St Lucie,Units 1 & 2.W/980612 Ltr
ML17229A7411998-05-28028 May 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980430,discovered Waste Gas Decay Tank Operation W/O Available Oxygen Analyzers,Which Is Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Inadequate Licensee Review of License Amend. Oxygen Analyzer recalibrated.W/980528 Ltr
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
CATEGORYleREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9901270103DOC.DATE:99/01/20NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONFREHAFER,K.W.FloridaPower&LightCo.STALL,J.A.FloridaPower&.LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET¹05000335
SUBJECT:
LER98-009-00:op981223,notedthatfacilityoperatedoutsideofdesignbasis.Causedbynon-conservativeMSLBanalysisinputs.WillreviewSRcomponentdifferencesbetweenunits&willre-baselineLTOPanalysis.With990120ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRIENCLiSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3PD'NTERNAL:ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGBNRR/DE/EMEBNRR/DRCH/HOHBNRR/DRPM/PECBRES/DET/EIBEXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111,1RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEGLEAVES,WAEODCENTRDEBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRGN2FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DSNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111111'1111111111CNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATIONREMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSOP.REDUC-THENUMBER.OFCOPIESRECEIVEDBY-OUORYOURORGANZATION,CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTRO'ESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR23ENCL23
FloridaPower5LightCompany.6351S.OceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957January20,1999L-99-01210CFR550.73U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335ReportableEvent:1998-009-00DateofEvent:December23,1998Non-ConservativeMSLBAnalysisInputsResultin0erationofFacilitOutsideDesinBasesTheattachedLicenseeEventReport1998-009isbeingsubmittedpursuanttotherequirementsof10CFRg50.73toprovidenotificationofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresidentSt.LucieNuclearPlantJAS/EJW/KWFAttachmentcc:RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LucieNuclearPlant'ir'ir0i270i03'rr'ir0i20PDRADQCK05000335SPDRanFPLGroupcompany NRCFORM366{6-1996)LtCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)EslimatedburdenperresponsetocomplywiththismandatoryInforrnagonco!lectionroquest:50hrs.Roportodlossonslearnedaroincorporatedintotholicensingprocessandfodbacktoindustry.ForwardcommentsregardingburdenestimatetotheRecordsManagementBranch{TAF33)U.S.Roc)earRegulatoryCommission,Washington,DC2t$5$4001,andlothePaperwrxkReductionProioct(31500104),OfficeofManagementandBudgol,Washington.Dc20503.IfaninformationcollectiondoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor,andapersonhrnolrequiredlorespondto,thoInformationcoltecgon.U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONAPPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104EXPIRES0613012001FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit1DOCKETNUMBER{2)05000335PAGE(3)Page1of8TITLE(4)Non-ConservativeMSLBAnalysisInputsResultinOperationofFacilityOutsideDesignBasesMONTHDAYEVENTDATE(5LERNUMBER6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERMONTHDAYREPORTDATE7IFACIUTYNAMEOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED6OOCKETNUMBER1'219981998-009-00011999FACIUTTNAMEOOCKETNUMBOlOPERATINGMODE(9)20.2201(b)20.2203(a){2){v)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73{a){2)(viii)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFREt(Checkonoormore){11)POWERLEVEL(10)10020.2203(0)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20,2203(o)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)50.36{c){1)50.36(c)(2)X50.73{a)(2){ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2){v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(aw2)(x)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworInNRCForm36SAHAMELICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLERl12)TELEPHONENUMBERSnorudeAresCode)KennethWFrehafer,LicensingEngineer(561)467-7748COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT13CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXBNHN/AN/ANOSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14)YES{IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE{15)MONTHDAYABSTRACT/Limitto1400spaces,i.o.,opproximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlinesi(16)OnDecember23,1998,St.LucieengineeringpersonneldeterminedthatthedraftresultsofaUnit1mainsteamlinebreakcontainmentre-analysisindicateanunexpectedhigherpeakcontainmentpressureof55.946psig.TheUnit1containmentdesignpressureis44psig.Thedifferenceinthere-analysisvalueandtheoriginalcontainmentpeakpressurevalue"isattributedtosomenon-conservativeassumptionsintheoriginalanalysis.Themostsignificantassumptionswerefeedwaterflow,feedwaterisolation,andinitialcontainmentpressure.Thenon-conservatismidentifiedisintheinputdataoriginallyusedtoperformtheanalysis.St.LuciedeterminedthatcontainmentremainsoperablewithanoperabilityassessmentperformedpursuanttoGenericLetter91-18.LongtermcorrectiveactionsincludereviewofsafetyrelatedcomponentdifferencesbetweenUnits1and2,re-baseliningthelowtemperatureoverpressureanalysis,andeitherperformmodificationsor.changethelicensinganddesignbasisoftheMSLBpeakcontainmentpressureanalysis.NRCFOAM306IS.1999)
NRCFORM366A(6-1888)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION,FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit1OOCKETNUMBER(2)05000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009-00PAGE(3)Page2of8TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)DescriptionofEventOnDecember23,1998,St.LucieUnit1wasinMode1at100percentreactorpower.AfterreviewingadraftUnit1MainSteamLineBreak{MSLB),Containmentre-analysis,St.LucieEngineeringconcludedthatthedraftanalysisresultsindicatedanunexpectedhigherpeakcontainmentpressureof55.946psig.TheUnit1containmentdesignpressureis44psig.Thedraftcalculation,CENP007-ST98-C-012,"St.LucieUnit1ContainmentMSLBMassandEnergyandPressure/TemperatureResponseAnalysis,"wasperformedbyABBandwastransmittedbyABB-CEletterST-98-763forFPLtoreviewandcomment.Thedifferenceinthere-analysisvalueandtheoriginalcontainmentpeakpressurevalueisattributedtosomenon-conservativeassumptionsintheoriginalanalysis.Themostsignificantassumptionswerefeedwaterflow,feedwaterisolation,andinitialcontainmentpressure.Thenon-conservatismidentifiedisintheinputdataoriginallyusedtoperformtheanalysis.ThisconditionwasreportedtotheNRCviatheemergencynotificationsystem(ENS)asanon-emergencyreportpursuantto10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)onDecember23,1998.Engineeringperformedanoperabilityassessmentinaccordance.withGenericLetter91-18anddeterminedthatcontainmentremainsoperable.LongtermcorrectiveactionsarebeingformulatedtoeitherimplementchangestorestoretheMSLBcontainmentanalysisresultsorchangetheMSLBcontainmentanalysislicensingbasis.CauseofEventThecauseforthehigherpeakpressureinthere-analyzedMSLBeventisthatnon-conservativeassumptionswereusedintheoriginalanalysisofrecord.TheoriginalMSLBanalysisofrecordwasdevelopedjointlybetweenCombustionEngineering(massenergyinput)andEBASCO(containmentperformance).Thisanalysisconsideredaspectrumofbreaksizes,initialpowerlevels,andsinglefailures.Themostsignificantnon-conservativeinputassumptionsdealtwithfeedwaterflow,feedwaterisolation,andinitialcontainmentpressure.Thisconditionwasnotpreviouslyidentifiedbecause,asdiscussedbelow,aformalre-analysisoftheMSLB'containmentresponsewasneverperformed.SubsequentsensitivitystudiesagainsttheoriginalMSLBcontainmentresponseanalysisofrecordwereperformedduringtheSt.LucieUnit1stretchpoweranalyses.Additionally,themorerecentSteamGeneratorReplacementproject(SGRp)didnotincludeare-baselineoftheoriginalMSLBcontainmentresponseanalysisofrecord.Replacementsteamgenerators(RSGs)wereinstalledduringtheFall1997Unit1refuelingoutage.TheSGRPdidnotincludeare-baselineoftheaffectedUFSARaccidentanalyses.Theimpactstoexistinganalyses,includingMSLB,wereevaluatedpursuantto10CFR50.59.Theevaluationsaddressedpotentialimpactsofcriticalparameterchangesontheanalysesofrecord.Inallcases,theRSGimpactsoncriticalparameterswereevaluatedasbeingboundedbytheanalysisofrecord,butdidnotidentifythelatentnon-conservatismsintheoriginalMSLBinsidecontainmentanalysis.BecausetheRSGs'hangesrepresentedcompetingeffectsontheMSLBanalysis,acalculationwasperformedbyFramatoneTechnologiesInc.(FTI)toquantifythenetNRCFORM388A(8.1888)
,1 NRCFORM366A(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION.FACILITYNAMEI1)St.LucieUnit1DOCKETNUMBER2)05000335LERNUMBERIS)SEQUENTIAlREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009-00PAGEI3)Page3of8TEXT/Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCFarm3MA/I17)CauseofEvent(cont'd)impactontheanalysisofrecord.Themost,significantcompensatingeffectwasfromanintegralsteamlinefloworifice.Theorificewasdesignedtoreducetheeffectivebreaksize.ThisorificewasmorethansufficienttooffsettheotherSGRPchanges(i.e.,higheroperatingpressure/temperature)thatadverselyimpacttheMSLBanalysis).Therefore,theoriginalMSLBanalysisremainedboundingfortheRSGs.Engineeringconductedself-assessmentreviewsofmotoroperatedvalves(MOVs)inpreparationforanNRCauditoftheGL89-10PrograminOctober1997.DuringreviewoftheMFIVsconcernswereidentifiedwithrespect,tofeedwaterassumptionsusedintheoriginalMSLBanalysis.Specifically,thefeedwaterflowisolationwasassumedasa60-secondlinearramp.ActualvalvecharacteristicsfortheMPIVsweremoreconsistentwithastepchangeinflowat60seconds.Additionally,theanalysisdidnotappeartoconsiderblowdownofwaterremaininginthefeedwaterpipingafterMFIVactuation.Also,theoriginalassumptionsfortheflowsplitbetweenthefaultedandunfaultedgeneratorwereindetermanentandpotentiallynon-conservative.Theeffectoftheseassumptionscouldmeanthattheactualflowishigherthanthatassumedintheanalysis.BecausetheMSLBanalysisofrecordhadbeenaugmentedbythePTIcalculationsperformedfortheSGRP,theseeffectsneededtobeevaluatedinadditiontotheRSGeffects.TheSGRPwasrequestedtoperformadditionalsensitivitiestoensurethattheimpactofthenewlydiscoveredfeedwaterassumptionconcernsremainedboundedbytheoriginalMSLBanalysis.Are-analysisoftheFTIcalculationwasperformed,anditwasconcludedthatsufficientmarginfromthesteamlineorificesremainedtoaccommodatethenewfeedwaterflowassumptions.Basedonthisevaluation,allevaluatedeffectsremainedboundedbytheoriginalMSLBanalysisofrecord,andnooperabilityordesignconcernsexisted.Althoughnotrequired,adecisionwasmadeatthistimetore-baselinetheMSLBanalysistofacilitatefutureoperabilityandmodificationevaluations.ThenewanalysiswascompetitivelybidandacontractawardedtoABB-CE.ItwasrecognizedthatinputstotheanalysiswouldneedtoberefinedandsuppliedbyFPLinorderforthereanalysistoremainboundedbytheoriginalUPSARanalysis.Specifically,thefeedwaterflowwouldneedtobemodeledtoevaluatetheactualfeedwaterflowsexpectedandremovethesimplifyingassumptions.FPLandABB-CEhavebeenworkingcloselytorefinetheinputs.However,duringtheprojectseveraladditionalnon-conservativeassumptionsintheoriginalanalysiswereidentifiedwhichcouldnotbejustifiedforthereanalysis.Themostsignificantoftheseare:(1)initialcontainmentpressurewasassumedas0psiginsteadof2.4psigasallowedbytechnicalspecifications;and(2)actualflowtothefaultedsteamgeneratorcouldbehigherthanthetwicenormalfeedwaterflowassumedintheoriginalanalysisduetothepumpsbeingfurtheroutonthepumpcurve.Thesenon-conservativeinputsresultedinthehigherpeakpressuresreportedbythisLER.NRCFORM3BBAIB.1888)
NRCFOAM366A(6.1998)~FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit1LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONDOCKETNUMBER(2)05000335U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBERPage4of8TEXT(Ifmorospaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Ai(17)1998-009-00CauseofEvent(cont'd)AnalysesRe-BaseLiningTheimpactofthelatentnon-conservatismsintheoriginalMSLBinsidecontainmentanalysiswasnotrealizeduntilacompletere-analysiswasperformed.Onepotentialgenericimplicationwouldbeforanyotheranalysesthathavenotbeenre-baselined,butratherevaluatedonanindividualchangebasis.St.Luciereviewedapplicableanalyseswiththefollowingresults.Thefuelanalysesarere-analyzedforeachfuelcycle.TheLOCAcontainmentanalysiswasre-analyzedin1993.OnlytheLowTemperatureOverpressure(LTOp)analysiswasidentifiedasnothavingbeenre-runsinceoriginallicense.TheLTOPanalysisiscurrentlybeingre-baselined.Therefore,allexistinganalysesofrecordhaveeitherbeenorarebeingbase-lined.Theuseofnon-conservativeinputsduringthedevelopmentofanynewfutureanalysesisprecludedbyexistingengineeringprocedures.ProceduralrequirementsensurethatinputstransmittedtoA/EareindependentlyverifiedpriortousebytheA/E.ThedesignoftheUnit1andUnit2mainfeedwaterisolationvalves(MFIVs)aresignificantlydifferent.TheclosuretimesforUnit2areapproximatelyonetenththatforUnit1.However,thecontainmentdesignandotherparameterssignificanttotheMSLBeventareessentiallyidentical.Basedonthisobservation,anothergenericcorrectiveactionwillbetoidentifyanysimilarsignificantdifferencesinsafetyrelatedsystemsandcomponentsbetweenthetwounitsanddetermineiftheyhavebeenadequate'lyreflectedintheanalyses.TheSt.LucieUnit2MSLBcontainmentanalysisdoesnotcontainthesesamenon-conservativeinputdataassumptionsinitsanalysis.Therefore,thisconditionisnotapplicablet'oUnit2.AnalysisofEventThedraftresultsoftheUnit1containmentMSLBmassandenergyandpressureandtemperatureresponseanalysisdonotmeetthemaximumcontainmentpressuredesigncriteriaof44psig.Basedonthedraftdocument,aconditionwasdiscoveredduringplantoperationthatresultsinthenuclearpowerplant,St.LucieUnit1,beinginaconditionthatisoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.Asaresult,thisconditionwasreportedasanon-emergencyreportunder10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B),"Anyeventorconditionduringoperationthatresultsinthenuclearpowerplantbeing:'Znaconditionthatisoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.'"Basedonthistypeofreport,theLicenseeisrequiredtosubmitanLERwithin30days.TheLERcomplieswith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)forreportingaconditionthatisoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.AnalysisofSafetySignificanceIThedraftMSLBcontainmentanalysiswassubsequentlyfinalizedandissuedtoSt.Lucie.Allconclusionsinthissectionarebasedonthefinalanalysisresults.TheresultsoftheMSLBcontainmentanalysisdonotaffecttheTechnicalSpecificationNRCFORM388A(8.1998)
NRCFORM366A(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION~FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit1OOCKETNUMBER2)05000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009-00PAGE(3)Page5of8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesoffVRCForm3MA)(17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)operabilityofthecontainmentorrelatedsystems.Specifically,TechnicalSpecificationoperabilityforTS3/4.6.1.2,CONTAINMENTLEAKAGE,andTS3/4.6.1.6,CONTAINMENTVESSELSTRUCTURALINTEGRITY,arebasedonapeakcontainmentpressureof39.6psigforthelimitingdesignbasisLOCA,nottheMSLB.DuringaMSLBeventthereisarelativelyminorreleaseofradioactivityintothecontainment.Also-notethatinthemorelimitingcaseforoff-sitedose,theMSLBisassumedtooccuroutsidethecontainmentwherethereisadirectpathtotheenvironment.Therefore,thelicensingbasisforthecontainmentoperabilityistheLOCA,nottheMSLB.Asstatedinthepreviousparagraph,thedefinitionofcontainmentoperabilityisnotbasedontheMSLBanalysis.However,thefunctionofthissafetyrelatedstructurecanstillbeshownnottobecompromisedforthere-analyzedMSLBevent.Althoughthecalculatedhigherevaluatedpeakpressureisclosertotheultimatefailureofthecontainment,significantmarginabove56psigremains.TheSt.LucieIndividualPlantExamination(IPE)submittalestimatesacontainmentfailurepressureof95pslg.AbestestimatecasewasalsoperformedbyABB-CE.Thisbestestimatecaseconsideredmorerealisticplantassumptionsinlieuofthemoreconservativedesignbasisassumptions.Specifically,themainfeedregulatingvalves(MFRVs)areassumedtoremainintheirpre-accidentpositionandbothtrainsofemergencycorecoolingsystems(ECCS)areassumedtobeoperable.Thedesignbasiscaseconservativelyandnon-mechanisticallyassumesthatbothMFRVsgofullyopenatthebeginningoftheaccident.Thisresultsinamuchlargerinflowoffeedwatertothefaultedgeneratorthanwouldactuallyoccur.ThebestestimateassumptionoftheMFRVsremainingintheirpre-accidentconditionisstillconservativeinthatthemostlikelyresponsetothebreakwouldbefortheMFRVstoclosedowninresponsetogeneratorswell.ThebestestimateassumptionthatbothtrainsofECCSwouldbeavailabledoesnotmeetdesignbasisrequirementsforsinglefailure,butisreasonablefortheevaluatedscenario.ThemostprobablemeansofacompletelossofoneECCStrain(containmentsprayandcoolers)wouldrequireaLOOPandsubsequentemergencydieselgeneratorfailure.BecauseaLOOPwouldgreatlyreducethepeakpressureasaresultofthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andmainfeedwaterpumpstripping,aLOOPscenarioisnotlimitingforthisaccident.Therefore,theonlyapplicablepostulatedfailureofECCStrainswouldinvolveasingleECCScomponent.Thesearesafetyrelatedcomponentsofhighreliabilitythatareextensivelytestedandmaintained.Thebestestimatecaseresultsinapeakcontainmentpressureof43.339psig,whichisbelowthecurrentUFSARdesignpressureof44psig.AlthoughthebestestimatecaseassumesnormalMFRVoperationandthatbothtrainsofECCSareavailable,operat'ingconstraintsassociatedwiththeseparametersarenotimposedbytheassessment.TechnicalSpecificationoperabilityisbasedontheLOCAeventandnottheMSLBevent.SignificantmarginexistsbetweenthepeakcalculatedMSLBpressureandanticipatedfailureofthecontainment.Thebestestimatecasedemonstratesthatunderconditionsthatwouldnormallybeexpected,thepeakpressurefromapostulatedMSLBremainsbelowdesign.NRCFORM368AI9.1998)
NRCFORM366AIB-)998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION'FACIUTYNAMEI1)St.LucieUnit1DocKETNUMBERI2)05000335LERNUMBERI6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009-00PAGEI3)Page6of8TEXT/Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJI17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)St.LucieUnit1UFSARSection6.2.1.1de'scribesthedesignbasesforcontainment.ThecontainmentvesselisdesignedinaccordancewiththeASMECodeSectionIII,ClassMC.Themaximuminternalpressure,asdefinedinArticleNE-3112ofthecode,is44psig.ThisvalueisdocumentedinSection6.2.1.2oftheUnit1UFSAR.ThisvalueisalsodccumentedintheUnit1TechnicalSpecificationdesignfeatures,section5.2.2.DuetothelargeinventorydesignsteamgeneratorsofCEdesignedplants,theMSLBeventtypicallyproducesthepeakcontainmentpressureandtemperature.However,UFSARSection6.2.1.1.bnotesthattheequipmentsurfacetemperatureislaggedandwillgenerallynotexperiencetheelevatedtemperaturesresultingfromapuresteamblowdownresponse(MSLB).Assuch,forthetemperatureresponse,theLOCAeventisboundingandestablishestheenvironmentalqualificationcriteriaandtemperaturelimitations,asdescribedbelow.TheMSLBcontainmentre-analysispeakcontainmentpressurevalueof55.946psigistheparameterevaluatedinthisLER.ContainmentvesselfailureischaracterizedintheSt.LucieUnits1and2IPEsubmittaldatedDecember1993.Specifically,AppendixG,ContainmentFailurePressureCharacterization,providesanassessmentofcontainmentperformancebasedonthemethodologyofNUREG/CR-2442.Thisassessmentestimatesafailurepressureof95psigfortheSt.LucieUnit1and2containmentvessels.Thus,aMSLBcontainmentresponseanalysispeakpressureof55.946psigisboundedbytheestimatedfailurepressureof95psig.ItisnotedthattheLOCAcontainmentanalysiswasupdatedfromtheoriginalcontainmentanalysisforbothSt.LucieUnits1and2in1993andisdocumentedintherespectiveUFSARs.TheMSLBcontainmentre-analysispeakcontainmentpressurevaluefora102percentpowerwithafailureofacontainmentspraypumpanda60secondMFIVclosuretimeresultsinamaximumpeakcontainmentpressureof55.946psig.Thedesignpressureforcontainmentis44psig.Thedifferencesintheresultsarebasedonnon-conservativeassumptionsintheoriginalanalysis.Theparametersthatmostsignificantlyaffectedtheoutcomewerefeedwaterflowrateandinitialcontainmentpressureandhumidity.Intheoriginalanalysis,thefeedwaterflowratetothefaultedsteamgeneratorwasassumedtoramplinearlyfor60secondMFIVclosure.TheMFIVsaregatevalves;therefore,thisassumptionwouldbenon-conservative.Aconservativeapproachwouldconsiderthisassumptionasastepchangeintheflowrateat60seconds.Theinitialcontainmentpressurewasassumedtobe14.7psia.TechnicalSpecification3.6.1.4allowsforaninternalrangeofpressuresandpermitsacontainmentpressureofhigherthan14.7psia.ThehighervalueisassumedfortherevisedMSLBaccidentanalysis.Containmentinitialhumidity,althoughnotaTechnicalSpecification,cannon-conservativelyimpactpeakcontainmentpressureifnotaccountedfor.Theoriginalassumptions,therefore,weredeterminedtocontainsomenon-conservatismsthatresultedinhigherthanexpectedpeakcontainmentpressurewhenre-analyzed.NRCFORM3BBAIB.1888)
NRCFOAM366A(6.'I998)4lLlCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION~FACILITYNAME(1)St.Lucie'nit1DOCKETNUMBER205000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009.-00PAGE(3)Page7of8TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366AI(17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)Theresultofthisre-analysisdemonstratesapotentialneedforareductioninfeedwatermassadditiontocontainmentforUnit1.Manyengineeringsolutionscanbeconsidered,includingmodificationoftheMFIVclosuretimes.Afasterresponseinclosuretime,suchasintheUnit2design,clearlybenefitsinincreasedmargintothedesignlimitof44psig.Abestestimate102%powercasewithsafeguardsavailableisprovidedintheABB-CEcalculation.Case2oftheMSLBcontainmentresponsecreditsnormaloperationofthemainfeedwaterregulatingvalvesandutilizesrealisticinputdata.Theresultsofthiscasedemonstrateapeakcontainmentpressureof43.339psig.Thisvalueisbelowthecontainmentdesignvalueof44psig.Althoughthiscaseisnotaboundingcaseforanalysisconsideration,itdemonstratesthatpressuresremainbelowdesignforaMSLBmassandenergyreleaseinsidecontainmentwithrealisticinputassumptions.ThisevaluatedcaseprovidespartofthebasesforoperabilityofUnit1containment.TheMSLBanalysisispostulatedtoreachapeaktemperatureofapproximately375Fat42.2seconds.Ztwasidentifiedthat11ofthe37in-containmentEQDocPacsenvelopthe375Fpostulatedpeaktemperature.Section4.3ofEQDocPac2998-A-451-1000(page1000-4-5)hasadiscussionofthermal.lagfortheUnit2insidecontainmentMSLB,andconcludesthattheactualtemperatureexperiencedbycomponentsareboundedbythecontainmentLOCAtemperatureprofiles.TheseUnit2resultsareapplicablefortheUnit1in-containmentEQDocPacsthatarenotenvelopedbythe375Ftemperaturepeak.Figures4-5and4-6oftheDocPacshowatypicalinstrumentcableandRosemounttransmitterandthetemperaturelagfor.045inchesbelowthesurfaceofthecable(typicalthicknessofacablejacket)andthesurfacetemperatureofthetransmitterwhenexposedtoatypicalMSLBprofile.TheseitemsconservativelyrepresentalloftheEQequipmentthatwouldbeexposedtoanin-containmentMSLB.FromtheplotofthesurfacetemperatureofthecableinFigure4-6oftheDocPac,thepeaktemperatureisapproximately385Fat45secondsenvelopingthepostulatedpeakforUnit1.Theplotsofthetransmittersurfacetemperatureandat.045belowthesurfaceofthecable(atthecableinsulation),showsthatthetemperatureofthetransmitterreachesapproximately245Fandtheinsulationofthecablejustbarelyexceeds260F.SincebothofthesetemperaturesarebelowtheUnit1LOCAtemperatureof270F,thequalificationoftheEQequipmentwillnotbeadverselyaffectedandwouldremainoperable.ThedoseconsequencesforaMSLBinsidecontainmentareboundedbytheMSLBoutsidecontainmentandtheLOCAevent.TechnicalSpecificationoperabilityisbasedontheLOCA,nottheMSLBevent.Furthermore,significantmarginexistsabovetheNRCFORM388AI8.1998)
NRCFORM366A(8.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION~FACILITYNAME(1)St.LucieUnit1DOCKETNUMBERI205000335LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1998-009-00PAGE(3)Page8of8TEXT/ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm3MA)I17)AnalysisofSafetySignificance(cont'd)calculatedMSLBcontainmentanalysispeakpressuretoensurethatthecontainmentwouldnotfailasaresultofaMSLBinsidecontainment.Bestestimateanalysisdemonstratesthatundermoreprobableconditionsthecurrentdesignpressureof44psigwillnotbeexceeded.Basedontheseconsiderations,nooperabilityconcernexistsfortheconditionsstatedinthisLBR,andcontinuedplantoperationposesnoadverserisktothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.CorrectiveActions1.LongtermcorrectiveactionwillconsistofeithermodificationstoreducefeedwaterflowtothefaultedgeneratororachangetothelicensingbasisoftheMSLBpeakcontainmentpressuretoavalueofgreaterthan56psig.2.ThelowtemperatureoverpressureLTOPanalysiswasidentifiedasnothavingbeenre-runsinceoriginallicenseandiscurrentlybeingre-baselined.3.St.Luciewillreviewthegenericimplicationsofsimilarsignificantdifferences(similartothedifferenceinMFZVclosuretime)insafetyrelatedsystems/componentsbetweenthetwounits.OtherInformationNoneNoneNRCFORM388A(81998)
